Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh: Militant Islamist Terror

Mr. Adam E. Stahl

April 30, 2007
First published by http://www.ict.org.il

Radical and militant Islamist organizations have existed as an opposing force to

Bangladesh’s secular and democratic system since Bangladeshi independence in
1971.1 Once a surreptitious force in Bangladesh, these organizations are now
operating overtly, as is witnessed by a steady increase in Islamist terror attacks across
the country; (Bangladesh saw over 500 explosions in 2005, all carried out by militant
Islamists). Membership of Bangladeshi radical and militant Islamist organizations is
rapidly increasing because of two key factors: deep economic turmoil and severe
political instability. These factors are a consequence of the ongoing political rivalry
between the country's two main political parties, the Bangladeshi National Party
(BNP) and the Awami League (AL). An increase in membership to radical Islamist
organizations is proving that Bangladesh is becoming a nexus of militant Islam in
South Asia, as many Bangladeshi militant Islamist organizations have been linked to
al-Qa’ida.2 Furthermore, the secular and democratically elected BNP has built a
coalition with politically oriented Islamist groups such as the Jamaat e-Islami (JI),
Bangladesh’s largest radical political Islamist party and the Islami Oiyka Jote (IOJ).
This was done to ensure the BNP’s hold on power. The by-product of this is that these
groups have elected representatives as well as a legitimate voice to distribute their
ideology. It is noteworthy that the JI and IOJ, though radical, are not involved in
executing terrorist attacks. They are, however believed to be connected to
underground militant Islamist terror organizations, which have carried out well-
organized and fatal attacks against governmental and non-governmental targets, such

1
For the purpose of this paper the term “militant Islamists” refer to those individuals and organizations
that use terrorist attacks to promote their agenda. “Radical Islamists” refer to Islamist parties wishing to
impose Shari’a, without the employment of terrorist attacks to attain their goals.
2
(The al-Qa’ida-funded Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami’s leader signed Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa and joined
the global jihadists’ declaration of war on the United States “Terrorism Report-Bangladesh.” 1 March
2007. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT).
http://www.tkb.org/MoreTerrorismReport.jsp?countryCd=BG
as suicide attacks on the cultural wing of Bangladesh’s Communist Party as well as a
recent stabbing of a university professor, Abdul Alim.3 Though a multitude of
Bangladeshi Islamist terror organizations exist, one group is worthy of attention:
Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (The Party of Holy Warriors). The organization is
Bangladesh’s largest Islamist terror organization.4 It receives funds from foreign
patrons, such as Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti Islamic charities, proving that
international support for their cause exists beyond Bangladesh’s borders. The purpose
of this paper is to briefly observe the structure, and tactics as well as the financing and
stated goals of the Jama’atul Mujahideen-Bangladesh.

Jama’atul Mujahideen-Bangladesh (JMB) is the country’s largest and most

portentous militant Islamist terror organization. The JMB or Party of the Mujahideen
is believed to have established itself in 1998 in Jamalpur, a district of Bangladesh’s
capital city, Dhaka;5 Jamalpur is one of Bangladesh’s most impoverished areas, “in
terms of both income and human development.”6 The organization’s aim is to replace
Bangladesh’s democratic and secular system with an Islamic theocracy. Following
one JMB-perpetrated attack, a flyer at the scene read “…the ruler of our country is an
opponent of Allah because the… government is made by a completely non-Islamic
system…’”.7 This is one reason why the JMB has consistently targeted Bangladesh’s
judiciary, as it sought to stall the implementation of the country’s secular laws, which
the judiciary has protected.8 The government, due to rising internal and external
concern, decided to ban the organization on 23 February 2005. Subsequently,
Bangladeshi security forces arrested the JMB’s top leaders on terrorist, terrorism
related or sedition charges. However, there is no evidence that the loss of leadership
has caused the organization to vanish from the militant Islamist scene.

3
“Rajshahi University teacher stabbed.” 3 February 2007. The Daily Newspaper.
http://www.newagebd.com/2007/feb/03/met.html
4
Concerning this briefing note, an Islamist terror organization is an organized group of individuals
from the Muslim community that carryout attacks to further radical political and religious objectives.
5
“Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).” South Asia Terrorism Portal. (2007)
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm
6
“World Bank Support Community-Driven Development in Bangladesh.” 18 March 2003. World
Bank. http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/bwi/2003/0317bangladesh.htm
7
“Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh-Founding Philosophy.” The Memorial Institute for the Prevention
of Terrorism (MIPT). http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4497
8
Singh, Supriya. “Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh: A Profile. IPCS Special Report 11. February
2006. Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf
 Name Position Date of Arrest Charge
Sheik Maulana Abdur Spiritual leader 2 March, 2006 Links to
Rahman terrorism,
murder
Siddiqul Islam (Bangla JMB Operational 6 March, 2006 Links to
Bhai) Chief terrorism
Dr. Muhammad JMB leader February 2005 Sedition
Asadullah al-Ghalib
Ataur Rahman Sunny Shura member; 14 December
Links to
Dhaka region 2005 terrorism
Abdul Awal Sarker Shura member; 18 November
Links to
Rajshahi region 2005 terrorism
Salauddin Shura member; 25 April 2006
Links to
Sylhet region terrorism
Farouk Hussein Khan Shura member; 26 April 2006 Murder;
Rangpur-Dinajpur Links to
region terrorism
Rafik Hassan Shura member; 28 February Murder;
Khulna region 2006 links to
terrorism
NOTE: “Links to terrorism” refers to the nationwide JMB-perpetrated bombings that
occurred on 17 August 2005.

JMB Leadership

Until the recent flurry of arrests the JMB had three key leaders.9, Sheik Maulana
Abdur Rahman,was considered the spiritual leader of the JMB. Rahman was born in
Charshi Khalifapara village in Jamalpur Sadar Upazila, the same district where the
JMB was founded.10 Rahman’s father was Abdullah Ibn Fazal, famous for his
collaboration with the Pakistani Army during Bangladesh’s 1971 War for
Independence.11 There is little doubt that Fazal’s experiences in fighting alongside the
Pakistanis against a secular Bangladesh influenced his son’s radical Islamist views.
Rahman is also a former member of the JI’s student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir
(ICS).12 The JI sent Rahman to study at Medina University in Saudi Arabia.
Following the completion of his studies at the Ahle Hadith madrassa, (“Followers of
9
Kumar, Dr Anand. “Bangladesh: Attempt to Restrain Islamists before Elections Lacks Sincerity.”
11/10/2006. South Asia Analysis Group. http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1988.html
10
“Rahman Spread Vicious Tentacles in Only Seven Years.” Vol. 5 No. 625. 2 March 2006. The Daily
Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/03/02/d6030201033.htm
11
“Profile of a militant.” 2 March 2006. New Age: The Daily Newspaper.
http://www.newagebd.com/2006/mar/02/front.html
12
Ahsan, Zayadul. “Inside the Militant Groups-Profile of Shaikh Abur Rahman. 28 August 2005. The
Daily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/28/d5082801022.htm
the Hadith”)13 he served as a translator and interpreter, which brought him to
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India for work.14 His work as a translator brought him in
“close contact with diplomatic representatives from Middle Eastern countries”.15
Rahman would later travel to Afghanistan for jihadist training and fighting with the
Mujahideen against the Soviets in the 1980s; Rahman would later be recruited by al-
Qa’ida.16 He also trained in Muzaffarabad, a known haven for Islamist militants in
Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. His connections in Muzaffarabad led to future ties
between the JMB and the Pakistani Islamist organization, Lashkar e-Taiyeba.17
According to one report, Rahman’s most recent visit to Pakistan was in 2003.18
Rahman subsequently returned to Bangladesh where he formed the JMB. It is also
reported that Adbur Rahman was the “emir” of the smaller and more radical Jagrata
Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), a Taliban-like militia, which has claimed
responsibility for at least two attacks, killing one individual.19 Many analysts claim
that the JMJB is either an alias or splinter of the JMB. Both groups were formed in
the same year, are led by the same leaders, and aspire to the same goals.20 In
November 2005, a Bangladeshi court found Rahman guilty and sentenced him, in
absentia, to life in prison for his role in the murder of two judges in a suicide attack.21
Rahman surrendered to the Rapid Action Battalion at a hideout in East Shaplabagh in
Sylhet City on 2 March 2006 following a two-day standoff.22 Bangladeshi authorities
executed Rahman on 30 March 2007 for his role in terrorism.23

13
“Ahle Hadith.” Probe News Magazine. Vol. 5, No 37. March 9-15 2005.
http://www.probenewsmagazine.com/index.php?index=2&contentId=596
14
Ahsan, Zayadul. “Inside the Militant Groups-Profile of Shaikh Abur Rahman. 28 August 2005. The
Daily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/28/d5082801022.htm
15
Ahsan, Zayadul. “Inside the Militant Groups-Profile of Shaikh Abur Rahman. 28 August 2005. The
Daily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/28/d5082801022.htm
16
“Rahman, Maulana Abdur.” 14 February 2007. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of
Terrorism (MIPT). http://www.tkb.org/KeyLeader.jsp?memID=6310
17
Kumar, Anand. “Bangladesh: An Attempt to Restrain Islamists Before Elections Lacks Sincerity.”
Paper No 1988. 11/10/2006. South Asia Analysis Group.
http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1988.html
18
“Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh.” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm
19
“Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh.” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm
20
“Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangaldesh.” 1 March 2007. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of
Terrorism (MIPT). http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4587
21
“Bangladesh JMB chief surrenders.” 2 March 2006. ISN Security Watch.
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=14958
22
Manik, Julfikar Ali and Shamim, Ashraf. “JMB Chief Abdur Rahman Pinned Down.” Vol. 5, No.
625. 2 March 2006. The Daily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/03/02/d6030201011.htm
23
“Six JMB Kingpins Executed.” Associated Foreign Press.
http://www.thebangladeshtoday.com/archive/March'07/31-03-2007.htm
Siddiqul Islam was believed to be the operational chief of the JMB. He was from the
village of Kamipara in the northern industrial Bogra District. Until his arrest in 2006
Islam resided in Bagmara, Rajshahi District, which borders the Indian state of West
Bengal.24 This area has seen an increase in Indo-Bangladeshi tension due to alleged
infiltration of up to 6,000 Bangladeshi Islamic Jihadists into West Bengal on a daily
basis.25 Islam was popularly referred to by his nom de guerre, Bangla Bhai (Brother
of Bengal), though he had a slew of aliases: Azizur Rahman, Siddiqur Rahman,
Azizur Islam, and Omar Ali Litu.26 Islam fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan
in the 1980s. Similar to Rahman, upon Islam’s return to Bangladesh he joined the JI’s
student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS). He became a priority target for
Bangladeshi security forces following the successful 17 August 2005 bombings.
Government forces apprehended him in March 2006. Siddiqul Islam, like Abdur
Rahman, is also a commander in the JMJB.27 Analysts have conjectured that Siddiqul
Islam’s leadership role in both organizations may prove that two groups are actually
one organization working under various aliases.28 Other reports claim that the JMB is
the “…youth front of al-Mujahideen the parent organization that began working in the
mid 1990s…”29 Despite varying reports it is unknown whether the JMB and JMJB are
formally linked. On 6 March 2006, Bangladeshi security forces surrounded Islam’s
hideout in Muktagacha, a town north of Dhaka. In the ensuing gun-battle, an
explosion left Islam with shrapnel and burn injuries.30 He was taken to a hospital in
Mymensingh and underwent surgery. Islam was imprisoned in a “sub-jail”, not a

24
Singh, Supriya. “Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh: A Profile. IPCS Special Report 11. February
2006. Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf
25
Rane, Anil. “Bangladesh trying to push thousands of Islamic Jihadists infiltrators into West Bengal
of India-Indian security forces clashes with Bangladesh rifles.” 20 August 2005. India Daily Online.
http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/4271.asp
26
Singh, Supriya. “Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh: A Profile. IPCS Special Report 11. February
2006. Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf
27
“Siddiqul, Islam.” 14 February 2007. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.
(MIPT). http://www.tkb.org/KeyLeader.jsp?memID=6312
28
“Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh.” The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT).
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4497
29
Singh, Supriya. “Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh: A Profile. IPCS Special Report 11. February
2006. Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf
30
‘Top Bangladeshi Militant Held.’ 6 March 2006. BBC News Online.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4777526.stm
secured facility, in the town of Mirpur.31 Like Rahman, Islam was executed on 30
March 2007 for his role in terrorist activites.

Dr. Muhammad Asadullah al-Ghalib, a professor of Arabic Studies at Rajshahi

University, is also a top leader in the JMB as well as the chief of another radical
Islamist organization, Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB).32 As chief of
AHAB, which is “a mass platform for JMB activities, al-Ghalib was running a
magazine, Al-Tahreek.33 Al-Ghalib was arrested in February 2005. He was charged
with sedition at a northwestern Natore District court, along with 14 others.34

JMB Structure

The JMB is well organized with multiple wings (departments), which form the
structure of the group. It has a full-time force of 10,000 members, reportedly costing
$1250 per individual per month, totaling $150 million each year.35 The part-time
members are estimated to number 100,000 and it is reported that the organization has
a 2000-man standby suicide brigade.36

At the top of the JMB lies the Majlis e-Shura, the highest policymaking decision body
of the organization. As of late 2006, Bangladesh’s Security Force’s Rapid Action
Battalion (RAB) successfully arrested all seven members of the Shura Council;
Bangladeshi authorities have executed four of the members.37 Each Shura member is
allocated a specific region seemingly to ensure that different terror cells operate
independent of one another, thereby restricting information should one cell become
apprehended. Abdur Rahman was in overall command as the spiritual leader. Siqqul

31
Kumar, Anand. “Bangladesh: Attempt to Restrain Islamists before Elections Lacks Sincerity.” 10
October 2006. South Asia Analysis Group. http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1988.html
32
“Bangladesh.” South Asia Intelligence Review. Vol. 3, No. 33. 28 February 2005. South Asia
Terrorism Portal. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_33.htm
33
Rajamohan, PG. “Recent Developments in Bangladesh: Implications for Security.” No. 1921. 11
January 2006. http://www.ipcs.org/US_related_seminars2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1934
34
“Bangladesh 15 on Sedition Charges.” 28 February 2005. BBC News Online.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4303985.stm
35
“Bangladesh Today.” International Crisis Group. Asia Report No. 121. 23 October 2006, p. 16.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/121_bangladesh_today.pdf
36
Holt, Andrew. “Islamists Pose a Growing Threat to Stability in Bangladesh.” Terrorism Focus, Vol.
3, Issue 2. 18 January 2006. http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369870
37
“Bangladesh Assessment 2006.” Para 4. South Asia Terrorism Portal.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/index.htm
Islam, (a.k.a. Bangla Bhai) was the Operational Commander and Head of the
Chittagong region (Coastal, southeast); Ataur Rahman Sunny, also executed on 30
March 2007, was responsible for the Dhaka region (Capital, center); Abdul Awal
Sarker headed the Rajshahi region (Northwest); Salauddin, (a.k.a.Salehin), oversaw
the Sylhet region (Northeast); Farouk Hussein Khan, (a.k.a. Khaled Saifullah), (a.k.a.
Shaikh Tariq) was in charge of the Rangpur-Dinajpur region (North), and Rafik
Hassan (a.k.a. Hafez Mahmoud) oversaw the Khulna region (Southwest). Khan and
Hassan have been sentenced to death for their connection to a September 2004 murder
in Jamalpur.38 A third member, Hafez Mahmoud told authorities of Abdur Rahman’s
location, which led to Rahman’s subsequent arrest.39 In total, four members of the
Majlis e-Shura, including Rahman, have been executed.

Below the Shura Council lie the finance department, public relations wing, a
recruitment branch, and intelligence cells, which are thought to have penetrated
governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations.40 Not much is known
about this part of the group due to the nature of the work undertaken by these
members, which demand that they remain quiet.

Arms

The JMB utilize conventional explosives. The organization carried out its first attack
in 2003 in Dinajpur in which three individuals were injured.41 That attack was
organized by detonating seven bombs simultaneously. Subsequent attacks were
organized in much the same manner, leaving a very familiar al-Qa’ida signature. By
2005, JMB-led attacks were more confident, though the death toll from the attacks
remained relatively low. On August 2005, the JMB perpetrated a nationwide series of
bombings in which 450 near-simultaneous explosions occurred in 64 of the country’s

38
“Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).” Incidents-2006. South Asia Terrorism Portal. (2007)
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm
39
Raman, B. “Funds for BD Blast came from UK.” March 9, 2006 International Terrorism Monitor:
Paper No. 33. South Asia Analysis Group. http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers18%5Cpaper1727.html
40
A “Lakh” is a unit in the Indian number system, which is the equivalent to 100,000. The SATP
assessment claims 10 Lakh or 1 million trainees. “Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).” South
Asia Terrorism Portal. (2007)
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm
41
“Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).” South Asia Terrorism Portal. (2007)
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm
65 districts.42 Despite the massive amount of explosions used in this operation, only
one individual was killed and 100 left injured. Within months the JMB began to
tactically shift their attacks to suicide terrorism; Bangladesh’s first suicide terror
attack occurred on 29 November 2005 in Gazipur and Chittagong, with two bombs
detonated within 40 minutes of one another. The attacks claimed 9 lives, including
two lawyers and one police officer, leaving nearly 80 left injured.43 Both suicide
attacks targeted the judiciary, a common target for the JMB whose goal is to establish
an Islamic state in Bangladesh. The first attack occurred at the Gazipur Bar
Association building. The second attack, carried out by Abul Bashar, attacked a police
checkpoint near the courts in Bangladesh's second largest city, Chittagong; Bashar
was not killed in the explosion.44 Numerous raids on known JMB hideouts revealed
the extent of the organization’s arsenal. The “outfit has access to time bombs,
detonators, petrol bombs, and RDX explosives.” Further, the analysis of the arsenal
revealed that the JMB has been able to secure its weaponry from regional militant
groups in Pakistan, Myanmar, Thailand, and China.45 Much of the arms are believed
to arrive to Bangladesh via water transport, which places further emphasis on the
coastal areas of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar, known havens for radical Islamists.
The possible use of non-conventional weaponry by the JMB cannot be ruled out. On
30 May 2003 in Paiya, Bangladeshi security forces apprehended four suspected JMB
members with a “225 gram ball” of uranium oxide, believed to have been
manufactured in Kazakhstan; a 23-page explosives manual was also found; the
believed plot was to create a radioactive “dirty bomb”.46

42
Kurlantzick, Josh and Suri, Anirudh. “Bangladesh: State in Decline.” 15 January 2007. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18968&prog=zgp&proj=zsa
43
Buerk, Roland. “Bangladesh’s Escalating Extremism.” 29 November 2005. BBC News Online.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4482320.stm
44
“Twin JMB suicide strikes spell carnage in courts.” 30 November 2005. The Daily Star.
http://www.thedailystar.net/law/2005/12/01/week.htm
45
Singh, Supriya. “”Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB): A Profile. IPCS Special Report No. 11.
February 2006. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-
11.pdf
46
Perry, Alex. “A Very Dirty Plot.” 9 June 2003. Time Asia.
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,501030616-457395,00.html
Funding

The JMB funds come from national and international sources, which emphasizes the
true magnitude of the organization, as obtaining funds from overseas is not an easy
task. According to MIPT, “Private citizens from countries throughout the Middle East
allegedly contribute to the JMB, while international NGOs based in the Persian Gulf
also provide also provide a significant source of funding.”47 The Kuwaiti Revival
Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), a financier of the JMB, is an international
organization that has succeeded in spreading Whabbism within numerous Muslim
countries.48 Funds from the RIHS have aided in the construction of “…1,000
mosques, 10 madrassas, four orphanage-cum- madrassas, and a kidney dialysis centre
across the country. The mosques and madrassas were later proved to be centers of
militant activities of the JMB.”49 In 2005, more evidence of foreign links to
Bangladeshi militant Islam came to light with the arrest of Maolana Abu Noman
Muhammad Amanullah, who admitted to having direct links to the 17 August 2005
nationwide bombings; Amanullah was an Imam of the RIHS-funded Ahle Hadith
mosque at Andariapara.50 In 2002, US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil placed both a
criminal and international jihadist tag on the RIHS. The Treasury Department held
that the RIHS ”had been stealing from widows and orphans to fund al-Qaeda
terrorism”.51 This led the US Department of State to blacklist the RIHS on 9
September 2002 for providing financial assistance to Islamist terrorists.52

The Saudi Arabian based charity, al-Haramaine Islamic Institute, has also been
accused of funding JMB activities.53 The Saudi-based institute was banned in by the

47
Jamatul Mujahideen Bangaldesh. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT).
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4497
48
“Bosnian Investigation Confirms Balkananalysis.com Terror Report.” Balkan Analysis.com Security
and Intelligence Brief 3. 06/30/2006. Balkananalysis.com. http://www.balkanalysis.com/security-
intelligence-briefs/06302006-bosnian-investigation-confirms-balkanalysiscom-terror-report/
49
Singh, Supriya. “Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB): A Profile." IPCS Special Report No 11.
February 2006. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-11.pdf
50
“JMB threatens to kills 3 more judges.” The Daily Star. 29 November 2005.
http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/11/29/d51129011614.htm
51
Novak, Jane. "Bangladesh: Fertile Ground for Democracy or Extremism?." 29 April 2005. World
Press.org. http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/2071.cfm
52
Ramachandran, Sudha. “Mixing Aid with Terror.” 22 September 2005. Asia Times Online.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GI22Df01.html
53
Holt, Andrew. “Islamists Pose a Growing Threat to Stability in Bangladesh.” Terrorism Focus, Vol.
3, Issue 2. 18 January 2006. http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369870
U.S. in September 2004; further, on 6 July 2004, the United Nations Security Council
added the al-Haramaine branches in Albania, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and
the Netherlands to the Qa'ida section of its "consolidated list".54 Other organizations
and “charities” from the Gulf States, such as Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE, have also
been implicated in providing funds for the JMB.55 Pakistani organizations are also
alleged to have funded the JMB. There are also reports that non-Middle Eastern
donors assist in funding the JMB. According to one South Asia Analysis Group report
the 17 August 2005 bombings were organized with funding received from the UK.
Atur Rahman, a captured member of the Majlis e-Shura, admitted during a confession
“the August 17 bombings were carried out with the help of a sum of Pound Sterling
10,000 received from two supporters of the JMB in the UK”.56 In addition, the JMB is
tied to local businesses to fund its activities, such as the lucrative shrimp industry in
Bangladesh’s southwest region, specifically Khulna.57 The JMB is also linked to
criminal activity such as money laundering in order to support its activities and
training camps in nearly 60 districts across Bangladesh.

Conclusion

Though the JMB has not claimed responsibility for an attack in nearly 16 months does
not mean that it has ceased to exist. It remains Bangladesh’s largest, most-well
organized and well-financed Islamist terror organization; currently, JMB mosques and
training camps can be found in at least 56 of Bangladesh 65 districts.58 Despite the
high-profile arrests of all members of the Majlis e-Shura and the subsequent
execution of four Shura members, it is highly improbable that the JMB will cease its
operations. Recent reports suggest that JMB members have begun to regroup in
Barisal, under the auspices of at least two veteran Afghan War fighters, Hannan

54
"Security Council Committee Adds Two Individuals, Five Entities to al-Qaida Section of
Consolidated List." Press Release SC/8143 8/7/2004.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8143.doc.htm
55
Zayadul, Ahsan. “Foreign funding, local business keep them going.” Vol. 5, No. 441. 22 August
2005. The Daily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/22/d5082201044.htm
56
Raman, B. “Funds for BD Blast came from UK.” 9 March 2006. International Terrorism Monitor:
Paper No. 33. South Asia Analysis Group. http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers18%5Cpaper1727.html
57
“Bangladesh Assessment 2006.” Para 4. South Asia Terrorism Portal.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/index.htm
58
“Bangladesh Today.” International Crisis Group. Asia Report No. 121. (23 October 2006), p. 16.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/121_bangladesh_today.pdf
Uddin and Mawlana Mohiuddin Faruki59; the latter is believed to be the trainer of the
JMB’s 2000-man suicide brigade.60 Various militant jihadi terror organizations, such
as al-Qa’ida of Iraq, have lost their leaders only to be replaced forthwith by another
motivated individual. The key to countering a resurgence of JMB activity does not lay
in the arrests of the organization’s leaders alone. The government of Bangladesh
needs to focus on two key areas.

First, there must be greater effort put forth in the comprehensive fight against
Bangladeshi militant Islam. The March 2006 terrorism crackdown emphasized the
willingness of the Bangladeshi government and the capability of its security forces to
tackle militant Islam in the country. However, the sporadic “clean ups” efforts are
insufficient and must occur on a regular basis. Further, the government cannot defeat
terrorism on its own and therefore Bangladesh must better cooperate with the
international community in the realm of counterterrorism.

Second, the two main political parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the
Awami League (AL) must mend their differences, or at the very least cooperate on
issues directly affecting national security. The turmoil that these parties have already
caused has created a political vacuum that radical Islamist groups have begun to seize
upon, as witnessed by the presence of JI and the IOJ representatives in Parliament.
Further, the socio-economic services that the government has failed to provide to
Bangladeshis are direct results of this political rivalry. Radical Islamists, such as the
JMB, have begun to fill this void successfully. To counter the JMB, the AL and BNP
must mend their differences. Should this mending fail to materialize, the JMB, along
with other radical Islamists groups, will grow in popularity and threaten the existence
of the secular and democratic system.

59
“Eight Hisbut Tawhid Militants Arrested in Meherpur.” Detail of Terrorism Update-Bangladesh.
Para 2. 14 April 2007. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/detailed_news.asp?date1=4/14/2007#6
60
“JMB Cadres Regrouping in Barisal in Different Names.” The Daily Star. Vol. 5, Number 1020. 14
April 2007. http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/04/14/d70414070174.htm