1968, Revolution in the World-System: Theses and Queries

Author(s): Immanuel Wallerstein and Sharon Zukin

Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Jul., 1989), pp. 431-449
Published by: Springer
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1968, Revolution in the world-system
Theses and queries

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
State University of New York, Binghamton

Thesis 1: 1968wasa revolutionin and of the world-system

The revolutionof 1968 was a revolution;it was a single revolution.It

was markedby demonstrations,disorder,and violence in manypartsof
the world over a period of at least three years. Its origins, conse-
quences, and lessons cannot be analyzedcorrectlyby appealingto the
particularcircumstancesof the local manifestationsof this global phe-
nomenon, however much the local factors conditioned the details of
the politicaland social strugglesin each locality.

As an event, 1968 has long since ended. However,it was one of the
great,formativeevents in the history of our moder world-system,the
kind we call watershedevents.This means that the cultural-ideological
realities of that world-system have been definitivelychanged by the
event, itself the crystallizationof certainlong-existingstructuraltrends
withinthe operationof the system.

Origins

Thesis 2: Theprimaryprotestof 1968 wasagainstU.S.hegemonyin the

world-system(andSovietacquiescencein thathegemony)

In 1968, the world was still in the midst of what has come to be called
in France the "thirtyglorious"years - the period of incredibleexpan-
sion of the capitalistworld-economyfollowingthe end of the Second
WorldWar.Or rather,1968 immediatelyfollowed the first significant
evidence of the beginningof a long world-economicstagnation,that is,
the serious difficultiesof the U.S. dollar in 1967 (difficultiesthat have
neversince ceased).

Theory and Society 18: 431-449, 1989.

? 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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432

The period 1945-1967 had been one of unquestionedhegemony of

the United States in the world-system,whose bedrock was the in-
credible superiorityin productiveefficiencyof the United States in all
fields in the aftermathof the Second World War.The United States
translatedthis economic advantageinto a worldwidepolitical and cul-
tural domination by undertakingfour main policy initiatives in the
post-1945 period.It constructedarounditself an "alliancesystem"with
western Europe (and Japan) characterizedas the leadership of the
"Free World,"and invested in the economic reconstructionof these
areas (the MarshallPlan, etc.). The United States sought therebyboth
to ensure the role of western Europe and Japan as major economic
customersand to guaranteetheirinternalpoliticalstabilityand interna-
tionalpoliticalclientship.

Secondly,the United States enteredinto a stylized Cold War relation-

ship with the U.S.S.R.based on reservingto the U.S.S.R.a small but
important zone of political domination (eastern Europe). This so-
called Yaltaarrangementenabled both countries to present their rela-
tionship as an unlimitedideological confrontation,with the important
proviso that no changes in the East-Westline were to occur and no
actualmilitaryconfrontationswere to ensue, especiallyin Europe.

Thirdly,the United Statessoughtto achievea gradual,relativelyblood-

less decolonization of Asia and Africa, on the assumption that this
could be arrangedvia so-calledmoderateleadership.This was made all
the more urgent by the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in
China, a victory(be it noted) that was achieveddespite the counsels of
the U.S.S.R.Moderationwas definedas the absence of significantideo-
logical linksof this leadershipwith the U.S.S.R.and world Communism
and, even more, the willingnessof the decolonized states to participate
in the existing set of international economic arrangements.This
process of decolonizationunder the control of moderateswas abetted
by the occasionalandjudicioususe of limitedU.S. militaryforce.

Fourthly,the U.S. leadershipsoughtto create a unitedfront at home by

minimizinginternalclassconflict,througheconomic concessions to the
skilled,unionized,workingclass on the one hand, and throughenlisting
U.S. labor in the worldwide anti-Communistcrusade on the other
hand. It also sought to dampen potential race conflict by eliminating
blatant discriminationin the political arena (end of segregationin the
armed forces, constitutionalinvalidationof segregationin all arenas,

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 433

VotingRightsAct). The United States encouragedits principalallies to

work in parallelwaystowardmaximizinginternalunity.

The result of all these policy initiativesby the United States was a sys-
tem of hegemoniccontrol that operated quite smoothlyin the 1950s. It
made possible the continuingexpansion of the world-economy,with
significantincome benefitsfor "middle"stratathroughoutthe world. It
made possible the constructionof the United Nations networkof inter-
national agencies, which at that time reflected the political will of the
United States and ensureda comparativelystableworld politicalarena.
It contributed to the "decolonization"of large parts of what came
to be called the Third Worldwith surprisingrapidity.And it ensured
that, in the West,generally,the 1950s was a period of relativepolitical
quietude.

Nonetheless, by the 1960s, this patternof successful"hegemony"had

begun to fray,in part because of its very success. The economic recon-
structionof the U.S.'sstrongallies became so great that they began to
reassertsome economic (and even some political)autonomy.This was
one, albeit not the only, meaningof Gaullism,for example.The death
of Stalinmarkedthe end of a "monolithic"Sovietbloc. It was followed,
as we know,by a (stillongoing)process of destalinizationand desatelli-
zation, the two major turning-pointsof which were the Report of
Kruschchevto the XXth Party Congress in 1956 and the Sino-Soviet
split in 1960. The smoothnessof the decolonizationof the ThirdWorld
was disturbedby two long and draininganti-colonialwars in Algeria
and Vietnam (to which should be associated the long Cubanstruggle).
Finally,the political"concessions"of the 1950s to "minoritygroups"in
the United States (and elsewhere in the Westernworld) accentuated
expectations that were not in fact being met, either in the political or
the economic arenas, and hence in actual practice stimulatedrather
than constrainedfurtherpoliticalmobilization.

The 1960s beganwith the tandemof Kennedyand Kruschchev,who in

effect promised to do things better.Between them, they succeeded in
liftingthe heavy ideologicallids that had so successfullyheld down the
world in the 1950s, withouthowever bringingabout any fundamental
reforms of the existingsystem.When they were removedfrom power,
and replacedby the tandemJohnson-Brezhnev,the hopes of the early
1960s disappeared.However, the renewed ideological pressuresthat
the powers attemptedto reapplywere now being placed on whatwas a

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434

more disabusedworld public opinion. This was the pre-revolutionary

tinderbox in which opposition to U.S. hegemony, in all its multiple
expressions, would explode in 1968 - in the U.S., in France, in
Czechoslovakia,in Mexico, and elsewhere.

Thesis 3: Thesecondary,but ultimatelymorepassionate,protestof 1968

wasagainstthe "oldleft"antisystemicmovements

The nineteenth century saw the birth of two major varieties of anti-
systemic movements - the social and the national movements. The
former emphasized the oppression of the proletariatby the bour-
geoisie. The second emphasized the oppression of underdog peoples
(and "minorites")by dominant groups. Both kinds of movements
soughtto achieve,in some broad sense, "equality." In fact, both kinds of
movementsused the three terms of the Frenchrevolutionaryslogan of
"liberty,equality,and fraternity"virtuallyinterchangeably.

Both kinds of movements took concrete organizationalform in one

countryafteranother,eventuallyalmosteverywhere,in the second half
of the nineteenthand the first half of twentiethcentury.Both kinds of
movements came to emphasize the importance of obtaining state
power as the indispensableintermediateachievementon the road to
theirultimateobjectives.The social movement,however,had an impor-
tant worldwidesplit in the early twentiethcenturyconcerningthe road
to statepower(parliamentaryversusinsurrectionarystrategies).

By 1945, thereexistedthree clear and separatenetworksof such move-

ments on the world scene: the ThirdInternationalCommunistparties;
the Second Internationalsocial-democraticparties; the various na-
tionalist (or national liberation)movements.The period 1945-1968
was a period of remarkablepolitical achievementfor these three net-
works of movements.Third Internationalparties came to power, by
one means or another,in a series of countriesmore or less contiguous
to the U.S.S.R.(easternEurope, China,North Korea).Second Interna-
tional parties (I use the term loosely, including in this category the
Democratic Party in the United States as Roosevelt reshaped it)
came to power (or at least achieved droit de cite, that is, the right of
alternance)in the western world (western Europe, North America,
Australasia).Nationalist or national liberation movements came to
powerin most formerlycolonized areasin Asia, the Middle East, Afri-

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ca, the Caribbean,and in somewhat differentforms in long-indepen-

dent LatinAmerica.

The importantpoint for the analysisof the revolutionof 1968 was that
the new movements that emerged then were led largely by young
people who had grownup in a world where the traditionalantisystemic
movementsin their countries were not in an early phase of mobiliza-
tion but had alreadyachieved their intermediategoal of state power.
Hence these "old"movementscould be judged not only on theirprom-
ises but on theirpracticesonce in power.They were so judged,and to a
considerabledegreethey were found wanting.

They were found wantingon two main grounds.First,they were found

wantingin their efficacity in combattingthe existing capitalistworld-
system and its current institutional incarnation, U.S. hegemony.
Secondly,they were found wantingin the qualityof life they had creat-
ed in the "intermediate"state structuresthey presumablycontrolled.
Thus it was that,in the words of one famous 1968 aphorism,they were
no longer to be considered "partof the solution."Rather, they had
become "partof the problem."

The anger of the U.S. SDS against "liberals,"of the soixante-huitards

againstthe PCF (not to speak of the socialists),of the German SDS
againstthe SPD was all the more passionate because of their sense of
fundamentalbetrayal.This was the real implicationof that other 1968
aphorism:"Nevertrust anyone over the age of 30."It was less genera-
tional at the level of individualsthan generationalat the level of anti-
systemicorganizations.I take it as no accidentthat the majoroutbreak
in the Sovietbloc was in Czechoslovakia,a countrywith a particularly
long and strongThirdInternationaltradition.The leadersof the Prague
Springfought their strugglein the name of "humanistCommunism,"
that is, againstthe betrayalthat Stalinismrepresented.I take it also as
no accidentthatthe majoroutbreakin the ThirdWorldwas in Mexico,
the country that had the oldest national liberation movement con-
tinuouslyin power, or that particularlyimportantoutbreaksoccurred
in Dakar and in Calcutta,two cities with very long nationalisttradi-
tions.

Not only was the revolutionof 1968 directed,even if only secondarily,

againstthe "old lefts" throughoutthe world, but these "old lefts" re-
sponded,as we know,in coin. The "oldlefts"werefirstof all astonished

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436

at findingthemselvesunderattackfrom the left (who us, who have such

impeccablecredentials?),and then deeply enraged at the adventurism
that the "new lefts" representedin their eyes. As the "old lefts" re-
sponded with increasing impatience and hostility to the spreading
"anarchism"of the "new lefts,"the latter began to place greater and
greateremphasison the ideologicalcentralityof their strugglewith the
"oldlefts."This took the form of the multivariate"maoisms"thatdevel-
oped in the early 1970s in all partsof the world, includingof course in
Chinaitself.

Thesis 4: Counter-culturewas part of revolutionaryeuphoria,but was

notpoliticallycentralto 1968

What we came to call in the late 1960s "counter-culture" was a very

visible component of the various movements that participatedin the
revolutionof 1968. We generallymean by counter-culturebehaviorin
daily life (sexuality,drugs,dress) and in the arts that is unconventional,
non-"bourgeois," and Dionysiac.There was an enormous escalationin
the quantityof such behavior directly associated with activismin the
"movement." The Woodstockfestivalin the United Statesrepresenteda
kind of symbolichighpointof such movement-relatedcounter-culture.

But of course, a counter-culturewas not a particularlynew phenome-

non. There had been for two centuries a "Bohemia"associated with
youth and the arts.The relaxationof puritanicalsexualmores had been
a steady linear developmentthroughoutthe twentiethcentury world-
wide. Furthermore,"revolutions"had often previouslybeen the occa-
sion of counter-culturalaffirmation.Here, however, two models of
previous revolutionsshould be noted. In those revolutions that had
been planned, organized,and involved long militarystruggle,revolu-
tionarypuritanismusuallybecame an importantelement of discipline
(as in the historyof the Chinese CommunistParty).Where, however,
revolutionarycircumstancesincluded a large measureof spontaneous
activity (as was the case in the Russian Revolution of 1917 or the
triumphof Castroin Cuba),the spontaneityinvolved a breakdownin
social constraints and hence was associated, at least initially, with
counter-culture(for example, "free love" in post-1917 Russia). The
revolutionof 1968 had of course a particularlystrong component of
unplanned spontaneity and therefore, as the thesis says, counter-
culturebecamepartof the revolutionaryeuphoria.

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Nonetheless, as we all learnedin the 1970s, it is very easy to dissociate

counter-culturefrom political (revolutionary)activity.Indeed, it is easy
to turn counter-cultural trends into very profitable consumption-
oriented life-styles (the transition from yippies to yuppies). While,
therefore, the counter-cultureof the new left was salient to most of
these forces themselves,as it was to their enemies, in the final analysis
it was a minor element in the picture. It may be one of the conse-
quences of 1968 that Dionysiac life styles spreadfurther.It is not one
of its legacies.It is to the politicallegacies thatwe mustnow turn.

Legacies

Legacies of watershed-eventsare alwayscomplexphenomena.For one

thing, they are always ambiguous. For another, they are always the
object of a struggle by various heirs to claim the legacy, that is, the
legitimacyof a tradition.Please note thattherealreadyexists a tradition
of 1968. Traditions are rapidly created, and the "tradition"of the
Revolutionof 1968 was alreadyfunctioningby the early 1970s. And in
1988 there are many celebrations,manybooks, and many attemptsat
recuperationas well. This should neither surpriseus nor dismay us.
World-historicevents havelives of theirown and they resistany kind of
simple capture. 1968 is no different.Havingthus warned you against
myself,I shallnonetheless put before you whatI thinkare the two prin-
cipal legacies of 1968.

Thesis 5: Revolutionary movements representing "minority"or under-

dog strata need no longer, and no longer do, take second place to revolu-
tionary movements representingpresumed "majority"groups

1968 was the ideological tomb of the concept of the "leadingrole" of

the industrialproletariat.This leading role had long been challenged,
but never before so massivelyand so efficaciously.For in 1968 it was
being challengedon the groundsthat the industrialproletariatwas and
would alwaysstructurallyremainjust one component among others of
the world'sworkingclass.

The historic attitude of both varieties of "old left" movements (the

socialist and the nationalist)was that they representedthe interestsof
the "primary"oppressed - either the "workingclass"of a givencountry
or the "nation"whose nationalexpressionwas unfulfilled.These move-
ments took the view that the complaints of "other"groups who saw

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438

themselvesas being treatedunequally- the unfulfillednationalitiesfor

socialist movements, the working class for nationalist movements,
women for both kinds of movements,and any other group that could
lay claim to social or politicaloppression- were at best secondaryand
at worst diversionary.The "old left"groups tended to arguethat their
own achievementof state power had to be the prime objectiveand the
prior achievement,after which (they argued) the secondary oppres-
sions would disappearof themselvesor at least they could be resolved
by appropriatepoliticalactionin the "post-revolutionary" era.

Needless to say, not everyone agreed with such reasoning.And the

socialistand nationalistmovementsof the world often quarreledfierce-
ly with each other over precisely this issue of priorityof struggle.But
none of the "oldleft"movementsever ceded theoreticalgroundon this
issue of strategicprioritiesin the strugglefor equality,althoughmany
individual movements made tactical and temporary concessions on
such issues in the interestsof creatingor reinforcingparticularpolitical
alliances.

As long as the "old left" movements were in their pre-revolutionary,

mobilizingphases, the argumentabout what would or would not hap-
pen after their achievementof state power remainedhypothetical.But
once they were in state power, the practical consequences could be
assessed on the basis of some evidence. By 1968, many such assess-
ments had been made, and the opponents of the multiple"other"in-
equalitiescould argue,with some plausibility,that the achievementof
powerby "oldleft"groupshad not in fact ended these "other"inequali-
ties, or at least had not sufficientlychanged the multiple group hier-
archiesthathad previouslyexisted.

At the same time, a centuryof strugglehad begun to make clear two

sociologicalrealitiesthathad greatbearingon this debate.The firstwas
that, contraryto prior theorizing,the trend of capitalistdevelopment
was not to transformalmost all the world'slaboringstratainto urban,
male, adult,salariedfactoryworkers,the ideal-typeof the "proletarian"
as traditionallyconceived.The realityof capitalismwas far more occu-
pationallycomplex than that. This ideal-type "proletarian" had repre-
sented a minorityof the world'slaboringstratain 1850, of course.But
it had then been thoughtthis was merely transitional.However,such
ideal-type"proletarians" remaineda minorityin 1950. And it was now
clear that this particularoccupationalprofile would probablyremaina
minorityin 2050. Hence, to organize a movement aroundthis group

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was to give priority - permanent and illegitimate priority - to the

claimsof one varietyover othervarietiesof the world'slaboringstrata.

Analogously, it had become clear that "nationalities"were not just

there in some form that could be objectivelydelineated.Nationalities
were rather the product of a complex process of ongoing social crea-
tion, combining the achievementof consciousness (by themselvesand
by others) and socio-juridicallabeling.It followed that for every nation
there could and would be sub-nations in what threatened to be an
unending cascade. It followed that each transformation of some
"minority"into a "majority"created new "minorities."There could be
no cut-off of this process, and hence no "automatic"resolutionof the
issue by the achievementof statepower.

If the "proletariat"and the "oppressednations"were not destined to

transformthemselves into uncontested majorities,but would forever
remain one kind of "minority"alongside other kinds of "minorities,"
their claim to strategicpriorityin the antisystemicstrugglewould there-
by be grievouslyundermined.1968 accomplishedpreciselythis under-
mining.Or rather,the revolutionof 1968 crystallizedthe recognitionof
these realities in the worldwidepolitical action of antisystemicmove-
ments.

After 1968, none of the "other"groups in struggle- neither women

nor racial"minorities"nor sexual"minorities"nor the handicappednor
the "ecologists"(those who refusedthe acceptance,unquestioningly,of
the imperatives of increased global production) - would ever again
accept the legitimacy of "waiting"upon some other revolution.And
since 1968, the "old left" movements have themselves become in-
creasinglyembarrassedabout making, have indeed hesitated to con-
tinue to make, such demands for the "postponement"of claims until
some presumed post-revolutionaryepoch. It is easy enough to verify
this changein atmosphere.A simple quantitativecontent analysisof the
world's left press, comparing say 1985 and 1955, would indicate a
dramaticincrease of the space accorded to these "other"concernsthat
had once been considered"secondary."

Of course, there is more. The very language of our analyses has

changed,has consciously and explicitlybeen changed.We worryabout
racism and sexism even in arenas once thought "harmless"(appella-
tions, humor,etc.). And the structureof our organizationallife has also
changed. Whereas prior to 1968 it was generally considered a

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440

desideratum to unify all existing antisystemicmovements into one

movement, at least into one movementin each country,this form of
unity is no longer an unquestioneddesideratum.A multiplicityof or-
ganizations,each representinga differentgroup or a differenttonality,
loosely linkedin some kind of alliance,is now seen, at least by many,as
a good in itself. Whatwas a pis aller is now proclaimedas a "rainbow
coalition"(a U.S. coinagethathas spread).

The triumphof the Revolutionof 1968 has been a triple triumphin

terms of racism,sexism,and analogousevils. One resultis that the legal
situations (state policies) have changed. A second result is that the
situations within the antisystemicmovementshave changed. A third
result is that mentalitieshave changed.There is no need to be Polyan-
nish about this. The groups who were oppressed may still complain,
with great legitimacy,that the changes that have occurred are inade-
quate, that the realities of sexism and racism and other forms of
oppressiveinequalityare still very muchwith us. Furthermore,it is no
doubt true that there has been "backlash"in all arenas, on all these
issues. But it is pointless also not to recognizethat the Revolution of
1968 marked,for all these inequalities,a historicturning-point.

Even if the states (or some of them) regressradically,the antisystemic

movementswill neverbe able to do so (or, if they do, they will thereby
lose their legitimacy).This does not mean that there is no longer a
debate about prioritiesamong antisystemicmovements.It means that
the debate has become a debate about fundamentalstrategy,and that
the "oldleft"movements(or tendencies)are no longer refusingto enter
into such a debate.

Thesis 6: The debateon thefundamentalstrategyof social transforma-

tion has been reopenedamongthe antisystemicmovements,and will be
the keypoliticaldebateof the comingtwentyyears

There exist today,in a broad sense, six varietiesof antisystemicmove-

ments. (a) In the Western countries, there are "old left" movements in
the form of the trade-unionsand segmentsof the traditionalleft parties
- labor and social-democraticparties,to whichone mightperhapsadd
the Communistparties,althoughexcept for Italy these are weak and
growing weaker. (b) In the same Westerncountries, there is a wide
varietyof new social movements- of women,"minorities," Greens,etc.
(c) In the socialist bloc, there are the Communist
traditional partiesin
power,among whom a strainof persistentantisystemicvirus has never

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 441

been extinguished,which gives rise to renewed(and "feverish")activity

from time to time. The Gorbachevphenomenon,insofar as it appeals
to "Leninism"against"Stalinism," can be taken as evidence of this. (d)
In this same socialistbloc, a networkis emergingof extra-partyorgani-
zations, quite disparatein nature,which seem increasinglyto be taking
on some of the flavor of Westernnew social movements.They have,
however,the distinctivefeatureof an emphasison the themes of human
rightsand anti-bureaucracy.(e) In the ThirdWorld,there are segments
of those traditionalnationalliberationmovementsstill in power (as, for
example, in Algeria, Nicaragua, and Mozambique)or heirs to such
movementsno longerin power (although"heritages"such as Nasserism
in the Arab world tend to fritter).Of course, in countries with unfull-
filled revolutions (such as South Africa or El Salvador), the move-
ments, still necessarily in their mobilizingphase of struggle,have the
strengthand the characteristicsof their predecessors in other states,
when they were in that phase. (f) And finally,in these same Third
Worldcountries,there are new movementsthatrejectsome of the "uni-
versalist"themes of previous movements(seen as "Western"themes)
and put forward"indigenist"forms of protest,often in religious cloth-
ing.

It seems clear that all six varietiesof movementsare far from uniformly
antisystemic.But all six varieties have some significantantisystemic
heritage, some continuing antisystemicresonance, and some further
antisystemic potential. Furthermore,of course, the six varieties of
movementsare not entirelylimitedgeographicallyto the variouszones
as I have indicated. One can find some trans-zone diffusion, but the
geographicalsegregationof varietiesholds true, broadly speaking,for
the moment.

There are, I believe, three principalobservationsto make about the

relationof these six varietiesof (potentially,partially,historically)anti-
systemicmovementsto each other.First,at the time of the Revolution
of 1968, the six varietiestended to be quite hostile to each other.This
was particularlytrue of the relationof the "old"to the "new"varietyin
each zone, as we have alreadynoted. But it was generally true more
widely.That is, any one of the six varietiestended to be criticalof, even
hostile toward, all five other varieties.This initial, multifaced mutual
hostilityhas tended to diminishgreatlyin the subsequenttwo decades.
Today,one might speak of the six varietiesof movements showing a
hesitant (and still suspicious)tolerancetowardeach other, which is of
coursefar shortof being politicallyalliedwith each other.

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442

Secondly, the six varieties of movements have begun tentatively to

debatewith each other aboutthe strategyof social transformation.One
principalissue is, of course, the desirabilityof seekingstate power,the
issue that has fundamentallydivided the three "old"from the three
"new"varieties of movements.Another, and derived, issue concerns
the structureof organizationallife. These are,to be sure,issues thathad
been widely debated in the 1850-1880 period, and at that time more
or less resolved. They have now been reopened, and are being dis-
cussed again,now howeverin the lightof the "real-existing" experience
of state power.

Thirdly,when and if this debate on global strategywill be resolved,

even if the resolution takes the form of merging the six varieties of
movementsinto one grand worldwidefamily,it does not follow that
there will be a unified antisystemicstrategy.It has long been the case,
and will continueever more to be so, that these movementshave been
strongly penetrated by persons, groups, and strata whose essential
hope is not the achievementof an egalitarian,democraticworldbut the
maintenanceof an inegalitarian,undemocraticone, even if one neces-
sarilydifferentin structurefrom our existingcapitalistworld-economy
(currentlyin its long structuralcrisis).That is to say, at the end of the
debate among the movements,we shall most probablysee a struggle
withinthe possiblysinglefamilyof movementsbetweenthe proponents
of an egalitarian,democraticworldand theiropponents.

Lessons

Whatlessons are we to drawfrom the Revolutionof 1968 and its after-

math?Whatlessons indeed are we to drawfrommore thana centuryof
worldwide,organizedantisystemicactivity?Here I thinkthe formatof
theses is not reasonable.I prefer to lay out the issues in the form of
queries.These are queries,I hasten to add, that cannot find their an-
swers in colloquia alone, or in the privacy of intellectualdiscussion.
These are queriesthat can be answeredfully only in the praxis of the
multiplemovements.But this praxisof course includes,as one part of
it, the analysesand debates in public and in private,especially those
conductedin a contextof politicalcommitment.

Query 1: Is it possible to achieve significantpolitical change without

taking state power?

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I suppose the answer to this depends first of all on how one defines
"significant."But the question is a real one nonetheless.If the Marxists
won the political debate with the Anarchistsin the nineteenthcentury,
and the politicalnationalistswon their paralleldebate with the cultural
nationalists,the explanationwas the compellingforce of one assertion
thatthey made:Those with existingprivilegewill nevercede it willingly,
and will use theircontrol of state violence to preventsignificantchange.
It followed that ousting the privileged from state power was the pre-
requisiteto significantchange.

It seems quite clear that even today,in some countries(say,SouthAfri-

ca), there are governmentsrepresentingprivilegedminoritiesthat are
resolutelyunwillingto cede their privilege.In these countriesit seems
very implausibleto suggest that any significantpolitical change could
occur in the absence of vigorous, and almost inevitablyviolent, politi-
cal activity.SouthAfrica is no doubt a quintessentialinstanceof a state
in which the majorityof its citizens have never had droit de cite and
have thereforenever felt that the governmentwas "theirs"in any sense
whatsoever.

But today there is a large number of states in whichthe majorityof the

populationbelieve that,in some sense, the governmentis "theirs."Most
"post-revolutionary" regimesby and largeenjoy this fundamentalsense
of popularsupport.This is no doubt true of the U.S.S.R.and of China,
and of Algeria.But if of Algeria, is it not also true of India?And is this
not true of Sweden, where fifty years of Social-Democraticregimes
have "integrated"the workingclass into political life? And what about
France, or Germany? One could go on. Each national case has its
specificity.But it is surely clear that there is a very large number of
states in which popular support for the state is widespread,and where
thereforea strugglefor the primaryaccession to state power has little
resonance.It is probablynot very useful to suggestthereforethat some
of these state structures are "post-revolutionary," implying that the
others are "pre-revolutionary." Most of them are in the same boat in
terms of degree of popular support (and popularcynicism).To repeat,
this is not true in states such as South Africa, where accession to state
power by the majoritystill remainsthe primarypoliticalissue. But such
statestodayare a minority.

Indeed, is not the prime issue in many states, and perhapsmost espe-
cially in those that are self-consciously "post-revolutionary,"
the ques-
tion of achievingthe control by the "civilsociety"over the state?Is this

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444

not the heart of the internalpolitical debate not only in the "socialist
countries"but also in LatinAmerica,and southernEurope, and South-
east Asia, and BlackAfrica?"Moredemocracyis more socialism,"says
Mr. Gorbachev.But if so, what is the functionof an antisystemicmove-
ment in the U.S.S.R.?

Query 2: Are thereforms of social power worthconqueringother than

power?
"political"

Obviously,there are other forms of social power - economic power,

cultural power (Gramsci's"hegemony"),power over self (individual
and "group"autonomy).And obviously,individuals,groups, and or-
ganizations constantlyseek such kinds of power. But how does the
effort to attainsuch power articulatewith the political activityof anti-
systemic movements?In what sense will the achievementof more eco-
nomic power,or more culturalpower,or more power over self in fact
contributeto a fundamentaltransformationof the world-system?

We are here before a question that has beset antisystemicmovements

since their outset. Is fundamentaltransformationthe consequence of
an accretion of improvementsthat, bit by bit and over time, create ir-
reversiblechange?Or are such incrementalachievementsvery largelya
self-deceptionthat in fact demobilize and hence preservethe realities
of existing inequities?This is, of course, the "reformism-revolution"
debate once again,whichis largerthan the constrictedversion of this
debate symbolizedby EduardBernsteinversusLenin.

That is to say, is there a meaningful strategythat can be constructed that

involves the variegatedpursuitof multipleforms of power? For this is
what is suggested,at least implicitly,by a lot of the argumentsof the
new social movementsthatemergedin the wake of 1968.

Query 3: Should antisystemicmovementstake the form of organiza-

tions?

The creationof bureaucraticorganizationsas the instrumentof social

transformationwas the great sociological invention of nineteenth-
century political life. There was much debate about whether such
organizationsshould be mass-based or cadre-based,legal or under-
ground,one-issue or multi-issue,whetherthey should demand limited

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or total commitmentof their members.But for over a century,therehas

been littledoubtthat organizationsof some kind wereindispensable.

The fact that Michels demonstrated a very long time ago that these
organizationstook on a life of their own that interferedquite directly
with their ostensible raisonsd'tre did not seem to dampenvery much
the enthusiasm to create still more organizations.Even the spon-
taneous movements of 1968 became transformed into many such
organizations.This no doubt had consequences that made manyof the
post-1968 generation very uncomfortable, as may be seen in the
acerbic debates between Fundis and Realos in the German Green
movement.

The tension between the political efficacity that organizations

representand the ideological and political dangers they incarnateis
perhaps unresolvable.It is perhaps something with which we simply
must live.It seems to me, however,that this is a questionthat has to be
dealt with directlyand debated thoroughly,lest we simplydriftinto two
pointlessfactionsof the "sectarians"and the "dropouts." The numbers
of individualsthroughoutthe world who are "ex-activists" and who are
now "unaffiliated" but who wish in some way to be politicallyactive
has, I believe,grownvery sharplyin the wake of the post-1968 letdown.
I do not thinkwe should think of this as the "depoliticization"of the
disillusioned,thoughsome of it is that. It is ratherthe fear that organi-
zational activity is only seemingly efficacious. But if so, what can
replaceit, if anything?

Query4: Is thereanypolitical basis on whichantisystemicmovements,

Westand East, North (both West& East) and South, can in realityjoin
hands?

The fact thatthereare six varietiesof antisystemicmovements,an "old"

and a "new"varietyin each of the three differentzones, seems to me no
passingaccident.It reflectsa deep differenceof politicalrealitiesin the
three zones. Do there exist any unifying political concerns that could
give rise to a common worldwide strategy?Is there any evidence that,
even if this wasn't true in the period following 1945 it is beginning to be
true in the 1980s, and might be even more true in the twenty-first
century?

Here we need more than pieties and wishful thinking. There has never

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existed heretofore international(that is, interzonal) solidarity of any

significance.And this fact has given rise to much bitterness. Three
things seem to me important.One, the immediateday-to-dayconcerns
of the populationsof the threezones are today in manyways strikingly
different.The movementsthat exist in these three zones reflect their
differences.Secondly,many of the short-runobjectives of movements
in the three zones would, if achieved,have the effect of improvingthe
situationfor some personsin that zone at the expense of other persons
in other zones. Thirdly,no desirable transformationof the capitalist
world-economyis possible in the absence of trans-zonalpolitical co-
operationby antisystemicmovements.

This trans-zonalcooperationwould have to be both strategicand tac-

tical. It might be easier (albeit still not easy) to establish the bases of
tactical cooperation.But strategic?It is probable that strategiccolla-
boration can only be on the basis of a profound radicalizationof the
objectives.For the greatimpedimentto trans-zonalstrategiccollabora-
tion is the incrediblesocioeconomicpolarizationof the existingworld-
system. But is there an objective(and not merely a voluntaristic)basis
for such a radicalization?

Query 5: What does the slogan, "liberty,equality,fraternity"really

mean?

The slogan of the French Revolution is familiarenough to us all. It

seems to referto three differentphenomena,each located in the three
realms into which we are accustomed to divide our social analyses:
libertyin the politicalarena,equalityin the economic arena,and frater-
nity in the socio-culturalarena.And we have become accustomed as
well to debatingtheir relativeimportance,particularlybetween liberty
and equality.

The antinomyof libertyand equalityseems to me absurd.I don't really

understandmyself how one can be "free"if there is inequality,since
those who have more always have options that are not available to
those who have less, and thereforethe latterare less free. And similarly
I don't really understandhow there can be equality without liberty
since, in the absence of liberty,some have more political power than
others, and hence it follows that thereis inequality.I am not suggesting
a verbalgame here but a rejectionof the distinction.Liberty-equalityis
a singleconcept.

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Can then fraternitybe "foldedinto"this singleconcept of liberty-equal-

ity? I do not think so. I note first that fraternity,given our recent con-
sciousnessabout sexist language,should now be bannedas a term.Per-
haps we can talk of comradeship.This bringsus howeverto the heartof
the issues raised by sexism and racism.What is their opposite? For a
long time the lefts of the world preachedone form or anotherof uni-
versalism,that is, of total "integration."The consciousnessof the Revo-
lution of 1968 has led to the assertionby those who most directlysuf-
fered from racismand sexism of the political,cultural,and psychologi-
cal merits of building their own, that is separate,organizationaland
culturalstructures.At a world level, this is sometimescalled the "civili-
zationalproject."

It is correct to assert that the tensions between universalismand par-

ticularismare the product of the capitalistworld-economy and are
impossible to resolve within its framework.But that gives us insuffi-
cient guide for future goals or present tactics.It seems to me that the
movementsafter 1968 have handled this issue the easy way,by swing-
ing back and forth on a pendulum in their emphases.This leaves the
issue intact as a permanentconfusion and a permanentirritant.If we
are to think of a trans-zonalstrategyof transformation,it will have to
include a fairly clear perspective on how to reconcile the thrust for
homogeneity(impliedin the very concept of a trans-zonalstrategy)and
the thrustfor heterogeneity(impliedin the concept of liberty-equality).

Query 6: Is there a meaningful way in which we can have plenty (or

even enough) without productivism ?

The search for the conquest of nature and the Saint-Simonianmoral

emphasis on productive labor have long been ideological pillars not
only of the capitalistworld-economybut also of its antisystemicmove-
ments. To be sure, many have worried about excessive growth, and
waste, and resource depletion. But, as with other such rejections of
dominantvalues, how far can we, should we, drawthe implicationsof
the critiques?

Once again, it is easy to say that jobs versus ecology is a dilemma

producedby the currentsystem and inherentin it. But once again,this
tells us little about long-termobjectivesor short-termtactics.And once
again, this is an issue that has profoundly divided the antisystemic
movementswithinzones, and even more acrossthe zones.

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448

Concluding note

One of the principalimplicitcomplaintsof the Revolutionof 1968 was

that the enormous social effort of antisystemicmovements over the
prior one hundredyears had yielded so little global benefit. In effect,
the revolutionariesweresaying,we are not reallyfartheralong thanour
grandparentswere,in termsof transformingthe world.

The criticismwas a harsh one, no doubt a salutaryone, but also an

unfair one. The conditions of the world-systemicrevolution of 1968
were entirelydifferentfrom those of the world-systemicrevolutionof
1848. From 1848 to 1968, it is hard to see, retrospectively,how the
antisystemicmovementscould have acted other than they did. Their
strategywas probablythe only one realisticallyavailableto them, and
their failures may have been inscribed in the structuralconstraints
withinwhich they necessarilyworked.Their efforts and their devotion
were prodigious.And the dangers they averted,the reforms they im-
posed probablyoffset the misdeeds they committedand the degree to
which their mode of strugglereinforcedthe very system againstwhich
they were struggling.

What is important,however,is not to be a Monday morning quarter-

back of the world'santisystemicmovements.The real importance of
the Revolutionof 1968 is less its critiqueof the past than the questions
it raised about the future.Even if the past strategyof the "old left"
movementshad been the best possible strategyfor the time, the ques-
tion still remainedwhetherit was a useful strategyas of 1968. Here the
case of the new movementswas a far strongerone.

The new movementshoweverhave not offered a fully coherent alter-

native strategy.A coherent alternative strategy is still today to be
workedout. It will possiblytake ten to twentymore yearsto do so. This
is not a cause for discouragement;it is ratherthe occasion for hardcol-
lectiveintellectualand politicalwork.

Editorial note

ImmanuelWallerstein'spaper was the keynote address at "1968 in

Global Retrospective:A Conference on the 20th Anniversary of
1968,"organizedby The HumanitiesInstituteof Brooklyn College of
the City Universityof New York and held at the college on October

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 449

20-21, 1988. Wallerstein's paper was criticized by an international

group of invited speakers who represented both intellectual commit-
ment to the activism of 1968 and a diversity of views. They included
Roslyn Baxandall, K. D. Wolff, David Caute, James Turner, Marianne
Debouzy, Roxane Witke, Sebastiano Maffetone, Michele Wallace,
Irena Lasota, Milan Nikolic, Mitu Hirshman, Todd Gitlin, Jim Miller,
and J. Hoberman. A notable, last-minute cancellation - for urgent rea-
sons - was Daniel Cohn-Bendit. Divided into sessions on "World
Hegemony, State, Culture, and Old Left Movements," "The Key Role
of 'Minority' Revolutions," "Representations of 1968," and "Towards
the Future Global Perspective," the conference was cosponsored by
The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Goethe House, the
Cultural Services of the French Embassy, the Italian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and the New York Council for the Humanities.

Sharon Zukin
Brooklyn College

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