n

SOCIAL ENGINEERING
IN THE PHILIPPINES
The Aims, Execution, and
Impact of American Colonial Policy,
1900-1913

Glenn Anthony May

NEW DAY PUBLISHERS

Quezon City
1984
I
Contents

Illustrations
XI
Tables
Series Foreword
xiii
Preface
xxi
Acknowledgments
Introduction
xxiii

PART ONE
PERSONALITIES, VALUES, GOALS
I-t
American Policy-Makers and Policies 3
Filipino "Collaborators" and Critics 24
2
PART TWO
POLITICAL EDUCATION
The Commission and Filipino Municipal Governments 41
3 57
4 The Philippine Assembly's Attack

PART THREE
SCHOOLING
1900-02: Fred Atkinson 77
5 97
1903-09: David Barrows
6 113
1910-13: The Triumph of Industrial Education
7

PART FOUR
ECONOMIC QUESTIONS
The Commission's View of Philippine Economic
8 129
Development
 Contents

p Congressional Frustration of Philippine Economic

Development
149
CONCLUSION
10 The Balance Sheet Illustrations
179
APPENDIXES
^ppendix A Backgrounds of Members of the Philippine
IAssembly, First and Third Philippine
Legislatures, 1907-09, 1912-16
(Appendix B Assembly Bills Tabled by the Philippine 187
ICommission, First Philippine Legislature,
1907-09
(^ppeadix C Assembly Bills Tabled by the Philippine 189 William Howard Taft (frontispiece) ii
Commission, Second Philippine Legislature, Map of the Philippine Islands xxix
i1910-12 The Philippine Commission, 1900 13
Appendix D Arithmetic in Philippine Primary Schools 191 James F. Smith 18
Appendix E Principal Crops Cultivated in the Philippines, 193 W. Cameron Forbes 18
1902, by Province and Comandancia Benito Legarda 25
197 Sergio Osmeha 33
Notes Manuel Quezon and friend, 1913 33
Bibliographical Essay 201 Reunion of "Thomasites," Baguio, May 1912 86
Index 247 Central Primary School, Rosario, Cavite, 190290
255 Barrio Primary School, Rosario, Cavite, 190391
Pupils and Teacher, Malolos (Bulacan) Central Primary
School, ca. 1912114
Industrial Education: Hat making at the Sampaloc School,
Manila, 1909114
Industrial Education: Class in Lace making, Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, 1912115
Industrial Education: Preparing a School Garden,
Malate School, Manila, September 1912115
Naic-Indang Road, Cavite, Before Improvement136
Naic-Indang Road, After Improvement137
 American Policy-Makers
and Policies

MANY AMERICANS TOOK PART in the making of colonial

policy in the Philippines. Most studies of U.S.-Philippine relations focus
primarily, and coiTectly, on the contributions of the Philippine Commis
sion, an agency of the executive branch of the U.S. government. But other
agents of the executive also played an important role: various secretaries
of war, officials in the War Department, even lower-level bureaucrats in the
Philippines. In addition, Congress made crucial decisions about Philippine
questions.
Because there were so many policy-makers and because those policy
makers often disagreed about goals, it would be accurate to say that dur
ing the years 190013, the United States pursued simultaneously several,,
sometimes contradictory Philippine policies. The War Department and
the Commission were committed to social engineering; they wanted to
effect major changes in Filipino values and institutions. They were also
determined that their efforts in the field of colonial policy would be more
enlightened and more benevolent than those of any other imperial power.
Yet, while they espoused and ostensibly practiced a policy of benevolence,
those same men viewed the Hlipinos with a mixture of scorn and con
descension; and such attitudes tainted their policies in many ways. Where
as the Commission and the War Department formulated a program of
social engineering, Congress, the other chief maker of colonial policy, for
mulated nothing of the sort. Poorly informed about the islands and not
especially interested in them, most Congressmen had no clear idea of how
to proceed in the Philippines. Congressional legislation on the Philippines
was, almost inevitably, inconsistent. Indeed, the most significant effect of
Congress's actions was to obstruct the Commission's attempts at social
engineering.
 Personalities, Values, Goals
THE U.S. COLONIAL SYSTEM
Why did the executive and legislative branches of the US. govern
ment share responsibility for policy-making in the Philippines? To under-
Istand why, one need only consider the curious evolution of the U.S.
(colonial system.
j The United States did not have a colonial system in 1900. At the time
:of the formation of the United States, the writers of the Constitution had
(not envisaged that the new republic would acquire an overseas empire and
jhad made no provision for the rule of colonies. In subsequent years, while
the United States had acquired noncontiguous territories (Alaska in 1867,
Hawaii in 1898), Congress had established no fixed system for ruling them.1
It was not even clear in 1900 which branch of the U.S. government had
the authority to make colonial policy for the Philippines. In peacetime,
Congress would certainly have had the right to make policy, since ac
cording to the Constitution, Congress alone had legislative powers. But,
in 1900, the United States was still at war in the Philippines. Since the
Constitution conferred on the executive supreme command of the land
and sea forces of the nation, President McKinley had a constitutional
basis for determining policy in the Philippines at that time. What is more,
there were precedents for such an extension of the president's powers in
wartime. Many times in the past, U.S. presidents had, in the course of
military occupations, established military governments charged with
promoting the operations of the occupying army and preserving the
safety of the inhabitants. Generally, such governments had interpreted
their charge in the broadest possible terms and engaged in many activities-
establishing local governments, for example-that were properly the func
tion of civil governments.2 Indeed, the army in the Philippines had al
ready begun to establish municipal governments and to open schools in
"pacified" areas.3
Still, there were limits to the president's powers. Since McKinley's
authority in the Philippines derived from his wartime powers as commander-
in-chief, it lasted only as long as the war. Ultimately, Congress, with abso
lute legislative powers, had the right to determine the United States' future
course in the Philippines, and all actions by the president would require con
gressional authorization.4
It did not work out that way. President McKinley wanted the executive
branch to retain control over colonial affairs. He was unwilling to turn Phil
ippine questions over to Congress which, he believed, was not prepared to
American Policy-Makers and Policies5
deal with them. In 1899, at his instruction, the War Department had begun
to consider the establishment of civil government in the new colonies.
Then, in January 1900, the president made two crucial decisions. He de
cided, first of all, that it was necessary to begin the transfer of power from
military to civil authorities in the Philippines. Second, he decided to ap
point a Philippine Commission to draft a complete plan of government
for the Philippines and then to secure Congress's approval of that plan.3
McKinley's determination to retain control had a profound effect upon
future U.S. policy in the Philippines because it resulted in a division of
responsibility and a lack of coordination in the colonial system. Through
out the period 1900-13, the president's Commission and the War Depart
ment, the executive department to which the Commission reported, de
cided many important questions (relating to municipal government, the
courts, public works); on such matters, Congress merely endorsed what
had'been done. Still, Congress made contributions of its own, especially
on key economic and political questions. To complicate the situation
further, the Commission sometimes delegated responsibility for decisions
within its sphere of authority to bureau chiefs—to the director of the
Bureau of Education, for example.
THE ROLE OF ELIHU ROOT
Elihu Root, secretary of war from 1899 to 1904, was one of the chief
makers of U.S. policy in the Philippines. The son of a mathematics pro
fessor, Root graduated from Hamilton College and New York University
Law School and then began a successful career as a lawyer in New York
City- His specialty was corporate law, and his work consisted in large part
of organizing and representing trusts and holding companies. His clients
Included the Havemeyer family of Sugar Trust fame. At a time when re
formers in the United States were demanding the regulation and atomiza-
tion of business consolidations, Root came, literally, to their defense. He
wrote in December 1899:
There is altogether too general an impression that it is immoral
to acquire wealth, and far too little appreciation of the fact that
the great preponderance of the grand fortunes which now exist
in this country have been amassed, not by injuring any living
being, but as an incident to the conferring of great benefits on .
the community.
 |6Personalities, Values, Goals
Like most advocates of the Gospel of Wealth, Elihu Root wasnot moved
by the problems of the working poor. He found nothing wrong with the
unequal distribution of income in the United States.6
Elihu Root was, in short, a conservative. In fact, the chief American
^social engineers in the Philippines-Root, William Howard Taft, W. Cam
eron Forbes—were men who, by the standards of the day, would have
been considered conservatives in the United States. Such men did not
savor rapid change in their own country. They admired American institu
tions and subscribed to traditional American values. They accepted the
American economic system and applauded big business. They did not
kpprove of extensive government intervention into the economy.7 It is
paradoxical, indeed, that several of the men who directed the U.S. ef
fort to change the Philippines during the years 1900-13 were opposed
to the reform of their own society.
I President McKinley had appointed Elihu Root to. his cabinet in the
summer of 1899 because he wanted a lawyer to direct the establish
ment of governments in the United States' new colonies.8 At the time
of his appointment, Root knew almost nothing about coloniai policy.
He attempted at once to inform himself by reading books about the
British colonial system. They provided a wealth of details but, according
to Root, little guidance. In the end, he decided that U.S. colonial policy
had to reflect U.S. principles of government (for example, the guarantees
of individual freedom contained in the Bill of Rights). Yet, he did not
intend to transfer the entire U.S. system of government to the colonies.
The United States would respect "the customs and social life of the
islanders" and would modify them "only when it appears to be neces
sary to conform to our fundamental ideas of justice."9
In the first months of 1900, Root sat down to compose his instruc
tions to the Philippine Commission.10 To some extent, he borrowed
ideas from others—in particular, from the Schurman Commission. In
1899, on McKinley's orders, a commission headed by Jacob Gould
Schurman (president of Cornell) had investigated conditions in the Philip
pines, and in January 1900, that body submitted a lengthy report with
recommendations about the course that the United States should follow
in the archipelago. Parts of Root's instructions bore a close resemblance
to the Schurman Commission's recommendations." But, most of all,
Root's letter of instructions, dated April 7,1900, reflected his own
values and his own independently formulated theories about colonial
government.
American Policy-Makers and Policiesi
Root instructed the Philippine Commission that "the government
which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for
the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands."12 Its actions were
to conform, if possible, to Filipino customs. At the same time, however,
the Commission was to insist upon the observance of certain basic prin
ciples of U.S. government, even if those principles conflicted with Fili
pino customs. Root included a list of rules—actually, a modified Bill of
Rights, lacking only the guarantees of trial by jury and the right to bear
arms—which was to be imposed on every branch of government in the
Philippines.
Those instructions also prescribed the Commission's activities in
general terms. Beginning on September 1,1900, it was to exercise the
legislative functions of government in the Philippines.-The commis
sioners were to concentrate, initially, on establishing municipal govern
ments. Root wanted the Commission to afford Filipinos the opportunity
to manage their own affairs "to the fullest extent of which they are
capable." The officials of the municipalities were to be selected by the
people. The Commission was next to devote its attention to the or
ganization of provincial governments and, if possible, to appoint Fili
pinos to provincial offices. The Commission's legislative authority was
to include revenue-raising (by means of taxes and customs duties), ap
propriation of public funds, organization of the courts, and the estab
lishment of an educational system and a civil service system; it was also
to have the power to appoint officials to civil posts.
It must be emphasized that the instructions did not confer plenary
powers on the Philippine Commission; executive power in the Philip
pines was to remain in the hands of the military authorities until the
establishment of civil government (which occurred in July 1901); the
Commission was to be accountable to the War Department and the
president; and, of course, Congress ultimately had the authority to un
do the work of the Commission. All the same, Root had given the Com
mission considerable responsibility: on most legislative questions, it
would have to reconcile Filipino "customs" and American "principles."
Root's letter of instructions was a revealing document. On the
one hand, it was evidence of the benevolence that underlay much of
U.S. colonial policy. Even though the United States was still at war
with Filipino armies, Root was committing his government to the im
mediate establishment of municipal governments, schools, courts, and a

Personalities, Values, Goals
c vil service. Here were clear indications that the United States-was not
g )ing to impose a Carthaginian peace and an exploitative colonial sys-
ti m on its Filipino wards. On the other hand, what was most striking
a xmt Root's letter of instructions was what it did not say. Root did not
tike into account, or suggest remedies for, the major social problems of
t^e archipelago: the inordinate social and economic power of the indig
e^ous elite, or the poverty of large numbers of peasants, tenants, and
d^y laborers.13 Perhaps Root was simply unaware of the magnitude of
the problems. But it is more likely that he was aware, and that he chose
n©t to do anything about them. Above all, Root was a conservative. He
was opposed to social reforms at home, and he probably did not under
stand the need for social reforms in the United States' colonies. Thus,
from the outset, there were to be certain limits to the scope of U.S.
social engineering.
!TAFT AND HIS COLLEAGUES
The man whom McKinley chose to be head of the Riilippine Com
mission and the most important maker of U.S. colonial policy in the
Philippines during the period 1900-13 was William Howard Taft. Taft
served in the Philippines from June 1900 to December 1903, first as
president of the Philippine Commission and later as governor. Even
after he left the islands, William Howard Taft remained intimately in
volved with Philippine policy: as secretary of war (1904.-08), he over
saw the actions of the Commission; and as president of the United States
(1909-13), he was at the apex of the U.S. colonial hierarchy. For good
reason, scholars often refer to the period 1900-13 in Philippine history
as the Taft Era.
A native of Cincinnati and a graduate of Yale, William Howard Taft
was intelligent and, despite his bulk, industrious. Blessed with an in
fectious laugh and considerable charm, he found it easy to make friends.
Yet, as he revealed in his correspondence, Taft was not genuinely friendly.
Hypercritical, he was an extremely harsh judge of contemporaries; ego
istic, he was invariably certain that he was right.14
Trained as a lawyer, Taft loved the law. From 1892 until t^ic day he
joined the Philippine Commission, Taft had been Judge of the Sixth
U.S. Court of Appeals. He had gained a reputation as a conservative
magistrate; his best-known decisions had benefited big business at the
expense of organized labor. In most respects, Taft shared the world view
American Policy-Makers and Policies^
and biases of his chief, Elihu Root. Taft's only ambition was to become
a justice of the Supreme Court. He had no experience and probably lit
tle interest in anything other than law.15 When McKinley offered him
the appointment on the Philippine Commission, Taft, reluctant to
abandon his judicial career, demurred. He accepted the position only
after family and friends counselled him to do so.16
As he explained to McKinley, Taft had originally opposed the ac
quisition of the Philippines. All the same, he believed that, once in
possession of the islands, the United States had a "sacred duty" to
provide the Filipinos with effective government. "We must exert our
selves to construct a government which should be adapted to the needs
of the people so that they might be developed into a self-governing
people."17
It is significant that Taft articulated these thoughts before he had
even set foot in the Philippines. They were, in a literal sense, pre
judices. With limited knowledge of Philippine conditions, Taft had aP
ready prejudged his Filipino wards. In Taft's estimation, the Filipinos
were at that time incapable of governing themselves. Either he was un
aware of or he discounted the importance of the fact that under Agui-
naldo's government Filipinos had governed themselves for more than
a year. But, of course, Taft was not alone in holding that view of Fili
pino capacity for self-government. In explaining why he had decided
to retain the Philippines, McKinley had cited as one of his reasons that
"they were unfit for self-government."18Moreover, the U.S. Army, the
Schurman Commission, and even prominent Filipinos had made similar
assessments of Filipino capacity for self-government.19
Actual contact with Hlipinos only served to reinforce Taft's opinions.
He and the other members of the Philippine Commission arrived in
Manila on June 3, 1900, and within a few months, Taft declaimed with
authority about the deficiencies of the Filipinos:
The incapacity of these people for self-government is one of the
patent facts that strikes every observer whether casual or close.
The truth is that there are not in these Islands more than six or
seven thousand men who have any education that deserves the
name, and most of these are nothing but the most intriguing
politicians, without the slightest moral stamina, and nothing but
personal interests to gratify. The great mass of the people are •
ignorant and superstitious.20
 ft)Personalities, Values, Goals
Oi other occasions, he characterized the masses as "in many respects
m (thing but grown up children" and "cruel to animals and ^ruel to
ti eir fellows." He viewed the ilustrados, the educated members of the
Filipino elite, as glib and superficial: able to "mouth sentences supposed
tc embody constitutional law" but unable to deal with practical ques-
tii ins. Holding such a low opinion of Filipinos, Taft maintained that
th zy needed "the training of fifty or a hundred years before they shall
ev^r realize what Anglo Saxon liberty is."21
McKinley appointed four others to the Philippine Commission in
lSfOO. Luke E. Wright, a lawyer from Memphis, was the only Democrat
oii the Commission. Handsome and witty, he came to be popular in
American social circles in Manila. Taft appraised him as intelligent and
diligent. When Taft left the Philippines in late 1903 to take charge of
thte War Department, Wright succeeded him as governor (his title changed
in|1905 to governor-general), and he remained in the Philippines until
the end of 1905.22 Henry Clay Ide, a Vermont-born lawyer, had been
active in his state's politics in the 1870s and 1880s. In the next decade,
Ide acquired some expertise in colonial affairs: from 1891 to 1893, he
had served as land commissioner in Samoa and, from 1893 to 1897, as
chief justice of those islands. By temperament he was a cautious man-
perhaps overly cautious. According to one colleague, Ide had "that kind
of mentality that naturally sees the objection to any course of action, and
not the training or mentality that overrides obstructions as they arise." Ide
served on the Commission until September 1906, and in .1906 briefly
held the position of governor-general.23 Dean C. Worcester was the only
commissioner with a detailed knowledge of the Philippines. He was, by
training, a zoologist, and in the past he had spent several years in the
Philippines on field trips. He had also been a member of the Schurman
party, which had investigated conditions in the archipelago in 1899. In
his new job, Worcester would prove to be dedicated and hard-working
but also uncompromising when he believed he was right and occasionally
surly in dealings with subordinates. Worcester remained on the Com
mission until 1913,andinhiscapacity as.secretary of the interior, he
concentrated primarily on administering the so-called non-Christian
tribes.24 Bernard Moses, professor of history and political science at
the University of California, was an expert on Spanish America and
had some knowledge of Philippine history. Lacking energy, he turned
out to be the least effective member of the Commission. Moses served
for slightly more than two years.25
American Policy-Makers and Policies-11
Taft's fellow commissioners shared his assessment of Rlipino abilities.
Worcester, invariably undiplomatic, made no secret of his feelings, and
his words-like Taft's-bore traces of racism. "Honesty among Filipinos
is a theme for a humorist," Worcester opined in a newspaper interview.
He was convinced as well of "the natural unfitness" of the Filipinos
for self-government. Moses, less brash, was equally critical of the Fili
pinos. A few months after his arrival in the Philippines, Moses wrote in
his diary, "The removal of the dominating hand of the United States,
without establishing that of any other nation, would be the beginning
of a rapid return to barbarism." Luke Wright was the most overtly pre
judiced of the commissioners. "Of course Wright comes from the South,"
Taft observed, "and people trained in the South have a more decided
view with respect to the superiority of the white race and find it difficult
to overcome that view in dealing with a brown race."26
The commissioners' attitudes toward Filipinos might be explained, in
part, by their ethnocentric and myopic perception of Filipino conditions.
Using an American yardstick, the members of the Commission measured
the Philippines and the Filipinos against the United States and Americans.
Instead of accepting and attempting to understand Filipino values, they
simply viewed every deviation from the American norm as a sign of back
wardness. They dismissed the Filipino brand of syncretistic Catholicism
as superstition but failed to recognize the superstitious and syncretistic
characteristics of Westernized varieties of Christianity. They viewed Fili
pino politics as hopelessly corrupt but did not comment on the flagrant
corruption of U.S. municipal governments at the same time. In addition,
the commissioners never gave sufficient credit to the intelligence of the
Filipino elite. The Spanish educational system in the islands had been
deficient in many respects, but it still had given tens of thousands of
Rlipinos the opportunity to receive secondary and university education.
In almost every province of the archipelago, there were hundreds of in
telligent, well-read, able Filipinos, men who were certainly the intellectual
equals of their American governors.27
Furthermore, the commissioners were, to some extent, racists (if, by
racist, we mean someone who believes in the superiority of certain races).28
like many Americans of their day, the members of the Philippine Com
mission believed in the superiority of Caucasians, especially Anglo-Saxons,
over other peoples. Bernard Moses, who articulated racial theories more
than any other member of the Commission, considered Filipinos to be
"one of the less advanced races." According to Moses, moreover, Fill-
 Personalities, Values, Goals

ios possessed certain "racial ideas and instincts" which complicated

th: problem of establishing a government in the archipelago. Despite the
di ficulties, Moses believed that by governing and, in particular, by educat
in^ the Filipinos, the United States was performing a valuable service for
minkind. In his view (and in the view of many Americans), "barbarism"
w4s then threatening to overwhelm and destroy Western civilization. In
orqer to stop the barbarian advance, the "Anglo-Saxon nations" must
tu^or the barbarian so that "the barbarian is led to lay aside his barbarism
anji becomes an ally of civilized society."29 No other member of the Com-
mipsion formulated such elaborate racial theories as Moses, but others used
ra^ial terminology and viewed the Filipinos as racially inferior. Taft, for
ex^mple, referred to the Filipinos as "Oriental in their duplicity" and often

co^mented on the superiority of Anglo-Saxon peoples.30

|Yet, while members of the Commission shared many of the racial views
of (turn-of-the-century white Americans, they differed in one important
respect. Even though they judged Filipinos to be inferior, the commis
sioners believed that their wards were capable of improvement. "While
there is today a palpable unfitness for self-government among them,"
Taft stated, "there is in them a capacity for future development."31
Also, despite their feelings about Filipinos, the members of the Com
mission were able to maintain good social relations with them. Taft
regularly entertained members of the elite at Malacahan Palace, the
governor's official residence, and at such functions he made a point of
dancing with Filipinas. The maintenance of close social relations was
part of a conscious strategy on the part of the Commission. In the past,
U.S. military authorities in the islands had rarely associated with Fili
pinos and had conveyed the impression that they did not consider Fili
pinos their equals. The army's discourtesy had offended the sensibilities
of the elite. Taft, interested in gaining indigenous support for his policies,
wanted to convince the RUpinos that the Commission would treat them
as equals.32 It was good public relations but not an accurate reflection of
the Commission's attitudes toward the indigenous population.

THE COMMISSION'S PROGRAM

The values and the prejudices of Taft and his colleagues had a pro
found effect upon the course of U.S. colonial policy in the Philippines.
In whatever they did, in whatever reforms they introduced, in whatever

1
 American Policy-Makers and Policies15
Personalities, Values, Goals

for self-government? Often posed with that question, Taft provided many
r< commendations they made, the commissioners' pessimistic view of Fili-
estimates ranging from "at least a generation" to three generations.35
p no capacities dictated their approach.
Taft's estimates were additional evidence of his poor opinion of Fili
Theoretically, the Commission's job was to flesh out Root's skeletal
ir stmctions-to draft legislation along the lines Root had suggested. They pinos.
The Philippine Commission's program to prepare Filipinos for self-
d d that, but they did more as well. Root's instructions had given no in-
d cation of the United States' long-range political objectives in the Philip- government had three principal components..First of all, the Commis
sion believed that it was necessary to provide Filipinos with tutelage
pi nes. The Commission stated that objective: preparation of Filipinos for
"] topular self-government."33More importantly, during its first eighteen in the art of government (or "political education," as Taft sometimes
called the policy). Taft and his colleagues were at onGe aware that Fili
m cnths in the archipelago, the Commission devised (and announced) a
pinos demanded control over their own affairs and skeptical that they
pi ogram designed to prepare Filipinos for self-government. That program,
were capable of exercising such control. They decided, in line with
w lich went considerably beyond Root's instructions, was to guide the
Root's instructions, to concede them a measure of autonomy in local
activities of the Philippine Commission until 1913.
government, but, at the same time, they limited the electorate and sub
! It should be noted that the goal of the Commission's program-popular
self-government-was not the same thing as independence. Personally, jected the local governments to supervision by the American-run in

Tift did not consider it likely that the Filipinos would ever gain (or even sular administration. Taft wrote in September 1900:
want) absolute independence. He reasoned that if the United States pro
I fear we may go too far in giving them political power, but with
vided good government, Hlipinos would eventually recognize that the
a qualified suffrage and with a judicial insertion of the American
advantages of continued U.S. sovereignty (protection against external
civil service where it is needed in the collection of taxes and the
threats by the U.S. armed forces, stable internal conditions, a preferential custody of funds, 1 think we can give them a political education
tariff) outweighed those of independence. When Taft first came to the which will show them the possibility of the honest administra
islands, he conjectured that the Philippines might become a state in the tion of government.36
union, but, as time passed, he recognized that Congress would never con
sider such a course. More frequently, Taft talked about "qoasi-indepen-
Second, the Commission placed great emphasis on the establishment
dence," such as the relationship between Britain and Australia. While he
of a public school system and, in particular, on primary schools. A few
did not completely rule out the possibility that the United States might months after he arrived in the Philippines, Taft wrote to Henry Cabot
in the distant future end its sovereignty over the Philippines, he was ada
Lodge, "The character of the people contains many discouraging de
mantly opposed to making any promise of independence. He claimed
fects which can only be cured by careful tutelage and widespread edu
that such a promise would lead only to constant agitation for indepen
cation." Taft and the other commissioners seemed to view education as
dence and would consequently undermine the Commission's efforts to
a nostrum; it would cure the Filipino of his laziness, his love of cock-
introduce reforms in the archipelago. "My own judgment," Taft told a
fighting: It would, as well, prepare him for "a large participation in the
Senate committee in 1902, "is that the best policy, if a policy is to be
declared at all, is to declare the future intention of the United States affairs of government."37
Third, the commissioners wanted to bring about the economic de
to hold the islands indefinitely, until the people shall show themselves
velopment of the archipelago. They called for the construction of new
fit for self-government, under a gradually increasing popular govern
railroads, port facilities, and highways, for free entiy of Philippine cash
ment, when their relation to the United States.. .can be declared after
crops into the U.S. market, and, most of all, for the injection of large
mutual conference."34
doses of American capital into the Philippine economy. like Root, how
Thus, Taft favored indefinite retention and, in the meantime, pre
ever, the commissioners did not address themselves directly to the task
paration for self-government. But when would the Filipinos be ready
 Personalities, Values, Goals
alleviating the problems of tenancy and rural poverty. They wanted
'prosperity," but they never seemed to understand that the aggregate
jjrowth of the economic sector might not necessarily improve the living
qonditions of the masses. What is more, the Commission had less authority
cjver economic matters than over the other two components of its pro
gram.
f The Taft program had many weaknesses. As we shall see in subsequent
chapters, it was in many ways poorly adapted to Filipino conditions. More
^ver, Taft, his colleagues and subordinates failed on occasion to execute
their policies effectively. Yet the program's most glaring weakness lay in
t^ie simple fact, apparent to Filipinos and Americans alike, that it was not
p^rmanent. The Philippine Commission had outlined a plan designed to
pfrepare Filipinos for self-government over a period of several generations.
There was no guarantee, however, that the government of the United
States would continue that program or even choose to remain in pos
session of the Philippines for such a length of time. To a large extent,
q^estions relating to the Philippines were partisan issues in the United
States. Most Republicans in Congress had supported the decision of Mc-
Kinley, a Republican president, to acquire the Philippines, and most
Democrats had opposed that decision. Although the Democrats had lost
that battle, their party's platform continued to call for granting indepen
dence to the Philippines. So long as the Republicans remained in control
of the White House and Congress (as they did throughout the first decade
of the twentieth century), the Taft program would remain in effect. But
what would happen if the Democrats captured the White House or Con
gress or both? All observers realized that the Democrats might decide to
grant independence to the Philippines. And even if the Democrats did
not concede the Filipinos immediate independence, they would certainly
scuttle the Taft program. Hence, because of the nature of U.S. politics,
the projected program of the Philippine Commission had virtually no
chance of success.
Yet, all that said, it still should be noted that in the history of modern
imperialism the program of the Philippine Commission was unique. To
generalize about European imperialism is, of course, a peril^us proposi
tion; there were major differences among the policies of the various
colonial powers, and indeed, within each empire, there was considerable
variation from one colony to the next. Still, one might justifiably argue
American Policy-Makers and Policies17
that, by comparison, the Americans placed far greater emphasis on the
preparation of their subjects for self-government than did European policy
makers. Furthermore, while the Americans and the Europeans alike con
sidered education to be a high priority in their colonies, the Americans
alone focused on primary education.
Why did the Americans have such priorities? The policy-makers them
selves never attempted to answer that question, and no doubt they would
have considered it unnecessary to do so. For it must have been obvious to
them and to most Americans that U.S. policy in the Philippines was de
signed primarily to remake the colony in the image of the United States.
Taft and the others, like many Americans of their generation, had an
overwhelming, perhaps naive, faith in themselves, in their country, and in
the superiority of their way of life, and they doubtless felt an obligation
to share their system with the rest of the world. This is not to say that
they believed the Filipinos capable of attaining the intellectual level of
Americans or of running their own government, but they still were de
termined to transfer American values and institutions in some form to
the new colony. Hence, they were not interested in copying the policies
of European colonial powers. Rather, they chose the means which, ac
cording to their understanding of the American past, had contributed
most to the maturation of the United States: experience in self-govern
ment, mass education, and economic development. To provide Filipinos
with experience in self-government surely made sense to men who had
learned from grade school that the roots of U.S. democracy could be
found in New England town government. To educate the Filipino masses
made sense to citizens of a nation which, since its inception, had placed
inordinate faith in the powers of education. To develop the Philippine
economy by means of American investment made sense to men who, in
their own lifetime, had witnessed the dynamic growth of their own
country's economy. One can understand U.S. social engineering in the
Philippines only if one realizes that it was, to a large extent, an experi
ment in self-duplication.
Perhaps a more interesting question concerns the motives of European
colonial powers. For if the Americans were so interested in transferring
their institutions and values to the Philippines, why did the Europeans
not undertake a similar brand of social engineering in their colonies? (Of
course, European colonial powers did attempt to transfer some elements
of their own culture to the colonies, but none did so to the same extent as

lames F. Smith (Courtesy of U.S. National Archives.)
^"wwwwij^i^P|^iiijg^
<^^ J.
W. Cameron Forbes (Courtesy of U.S. National Archives.)
American Policy-Makers and Policies 19
the United States.) There were several reasons. First of all, the comparative
sizes of the colonial enterprises must be taken into account. The Americans
acquired a relatively small empire: the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam.
The total population of those colonies was only one-tenth of the popula
tion of the mother country. On the other hand, the Europeans (with the
exception of the Germans) ruled empires with comparatively large numbers
of subjects. To foster self-government in such populous empires was to run
the risk of encouraging nationalistic uprisings, which the mother countries
would have had difficulty in suppressing. Conditions within most of the
European colonies also worked against the possibility of undertaking a
policy of American-style political education. The Americans inherited a
colony that already had a Westernized indigenous political elite; the Euro
peans found no such elite in most of their colonies. International rivalries—
in part, the reason why European powers had gobbled up large chunks of
Africa and Asia in the late nineteenth century—also made it unlikely that
the Europeans would undertake an ambitious program of social ^ngineer
ing in their colonies. The mother country feared instability in its empire
since it reckoned that rival powers would exploit such conditions to their
advantage and, as a result, would not have been inclined to promote self-
government. Finally, one should remember that, in most cases, the pri
mary objective of European colonial policy-makers was not to bring about
the development of the colonies but rather to promote the interests of
the mother country. The Dutch sought to exploit; the British, to achieve
strategic advantage and to protect economic interests.
JAMES F. SMITH AND W. CAMERON FORBES
Throughout the Taft Era, even though the membership of the Com
mission changed, its basic program did not. It remained relatively constant
because the new members of the Commission essentially endorsed Taft's
prescription to remedy Filipino ills. Two later additions to the Commis
sion, both of whom rose to the position of governor-general, are especially
worthy of mention: James F. Smith and W. Cameron Forbes.
James Smith, a lawyer by profession, joined the Philippine Commis
sion in January 1903 as the replacement for Bernard Moses. Although
Smith was not particularly intelligent (Forbes, for one, called him "slow-
minded"), he was hard-working, collegial, and efficient. He became gov
ernor-general in September 1906, and remained at that post until Novem
ber 1909.38 While Smith agreed with the Commission's original program>
 T 21
Personalities, Values, Goals
ie was distinctive in one respect. James Smith was extremely sensitive to
tharges that the United States had acquired the islands in order to ex-
rloit them, and during his years on the Commission he was less willing
han the other members to make concessions to potential investors in
wder to attract U.S. capital to the Philippines.39
Like Taft, Smith favored indefinite retention of the Philippines. If
^ilipinos gained their independence, he told a Filipino politician in 1907,
Ihey would gain only "an effervescent and evanescent independence."
He maintained that the Filipinos lacked the military might to defend
|hemselves against potential aggressors and lacked the political experi
^nce to govern themselves weU. Smith also opposed independence because
lie believed that the "temperament" of the Filipinos was wrong. (It should
lie noted that he did not question their intelligence.) As late as 1926, he
doubted whether the Philippines would ever become an autonomous de
mocracy because the Filipinos were unwilling to accept the results of
elections: "A democracy requires something more than fine minds and
education in order to prevent its becoming a democracy on paper and
an absolutism in fact."40
W. Cameron Forbes came from a prominent American business fam
ily. His grandfather, John Murray Forbes, had made a fortune in com
merce and in railroad-building. His father, William Forbes, was one of
the founders of the Bell Telephone Company. Not surprisingly, W. Cam
eron Forbes began a career in business. In 1897, he joined the Boston
firm of Stone and Webster, which specialized in organizing and manag
ing electric light and street railway companies. While he advanced in the
firm at a steady pace, Forbes found the work "onerous," and he quit in
1902.41 After a brief respite, during which he reevaluated his goals in
life, Forbes decided to seek a position on the Isthmian Canal Commis
sion, which President Roosevelt was in the process of appointing. Roo
sevelt, with many political debts to repay, found it impossible to offer
Forbes that position. Instead, the president asked Forbgs if he would
like to fill a vacancy on the Philippine Commission, and Forbes accepted.
He took up his duties in August 1904.42
W. Cameron Forbes had strong points. He had read widely, if not par
ticularly critically. He was an adept athlete: a football player during his
college days at Harvard (and later, for one year, Harvard's football coach),
a good polo player, an avid golfer, and a baseball player. He was energetic,
earnest, conscientious. However, Forbes was also formal, humorless, and
American Policy-Makers and Policies
very boring. His appearance-his baby face and prematurely bald pate-
made him the butt of jokes. (Behind his back, Filipinos called him el
cateo-the bald one.) He was, in short, not very likable and consequently
not very popular.43
Soon after his arrival in the Philippines, Forbes revealed that he shared
Taft's attitudes toward the populace. "The Filipino is very easily led and
is very superstitious. .. .Their idea of independence is sometimes very
humorous. There is not one in a hundred that knows what it means."44
If the United States turned the Philippines loose, Forbes asserted, the
Filipinos would immediately begin to fight among themselves and "the
Islands would be one sea of blood from end to end."45 Forbes's major
contributions were in the area of economic policy. Drawing on his ex
perience with Stone and Webster, he supervised railroad-building in the
Philippines. He was also largely responsible for the significant improve
ment in Philippine roads and bridges during the Taft Era. Furthermore,
Forbes constantly tried to convince American businessmen to invest in
the Philippines.
CONGRESSIONAL POLICY ON THE PHILIPPINES
During the years 1900-13, the U.S. Congress also made important
decisions about the Philippines, especiaUy on economic and political
questions. Yet, while the Commission formulated a coherent Philip
pine policy, Congress pursued no fixed course on Philippine questions.
Only a handful of congressmen had ever traveled to the Philippines, and
fewer still had given serious thought to Philippine affairs. On the whole,
members of Congress knew little and cared little about the Filipinos.
When they voted on Philippine questions, other considerations were more
important to them.
One consideration was party loyalty. On most issues (including Philip
pine issues), members of Congress simply voted with their party. During
the period 1900-13, several bills appeared before Congress that had been
drafted either by the War Department or the Philippine Commission
and endorsed by the president. Hence, they became partisan measures,
associated with the Republican presidents of that period (McKinley, Roo
sevelt, and Taft). Most Republicans in Congress supported those bills,
and most Democrats did not.44 However, partisan politics alone does
not explain congressional behavior on Philippine questions. If party lines
 Personalities, Values, Goals American Policy-Makers and Policies 23

i l Congress had held firm, the measures sponsored by the administration missioners that required them to legislate on a wide range of subjects. The

'ould have passed easily, since the Republican Party dominated both
1 ouses of Congress. Members of Congress also took into account the ef-
i :ct of Philippine legislation on their constituents. For example, Con-
i ressmen from sugar-producing states did not want to provide incentives
br the development of Philippine sugar production because Philippine
I roducers competed in the world market with their own constituents,
i nd they certainly did not want to allow Philippine sugar to enter free
of duty into the U.S. market. Furthermore, an ideological split within
the ranks of the Republican Party weakened support for the admini
stration's Philippine legislation. Progressive Republicans, generally critical
Of the inordinate power of big business in the United States, were at the
opposite pole from conservative Republicans, who defended the trusts.47
^uch progressives, fearful that American big business would gain special
Commission had done even more. Taft and the others had drawn up a pro
gram to prepare Filipinos for self-government. They emphasized education,
economic development, and tutelage in the art of government. Believing
the Filipinos inferior and racially deficient, they argued that the program
would have to last for several generations. However, the Commission did
not have a completely free hand. The Taft program would last only as long
as the Republicans remained in control of the U.S. government. Further
more, even during the years when the Republicans were in control, the
Commission had to share responsibility for governing the Philippines with
Congress. Whereas the Commission had formulated a coherent (although
in many ways, deficient) Philippine program, Congress, a crazy quilt of
• partisan loyalties and local interests, was inadequately informed to deal
with Philippine questions and, indeed, often dealt thoughtlessly with the

privileges in the Philippines, opposed administration measures that ap islands.

peared to be too favorable to potential investors. Congress was not the only obstacle that the Commission encountered

A few members of Congress, all Republicans, played key roles in the pas in its attempt to carry out social, engineering in the Philippines. From the

sage of Philippine legislation. Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, chair outset, Filipino leaders scrutinized closely the words and actions of U.S.

man of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, attempted to guide policy-makers. Some endorsed the Commission's program and, as we shall

several administration measures through Congress. Although intelligent see, some criticized and sought to modify it.
and relatively well versed in foreign affairs, Lodge proved to be inept in
handling Philippine legislation. Taft, often disgusted with Lodge's actions,
called him "one of the most cowardly men I know."48 John Colt Spooner,
senator from Wisconsin, was perhaps best known as a defender of the in
terests of railroads, but he also played a significant role in the making of
Philippine legislation. An able legislator and debater, Spooner often con
sulted with the president and the War Department and acted as the ad
ministration's spokesman in Senate debates on Philippine matters.49 Nelson
Aldrich of Rhode Island, probably the most influential man in the Senate,
had no particular interest in the Philippines. However, as the Senate's prin
cipal expert on the tariff and as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee,
Aldrich was a crucial figure in the struggle to reduce the tariff on Philip
pine goods.s0 In the House of Representatives, Henry A. Cooper of Wiscon
sin, chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, frequently introduced
bills prepared by the War Department and defended them effectively.51

Such then was the U.S. colonial system: an ad hoc arrangement that
featured divided responsibility and, unavoidably, Inconsistent policy-mak
ing. Secretary of War Root had issued instructions to the Philippine corn-