Journal ol Personality and Social Psychology

1975, Vol. 32, No. 1, 83-91

Affective-Cognitive Consistency, Attitudes, Conformity,

and Behavior
Ross Norman
University of Western Ontario, London, Canada
Three studies were done to investigate the relationship between affective-
cognitive consistency and the strength of the attitude-behavior relation. In
each study the affective and cognitive components of students' attitudes toward
volunteering as a subject for psychological research were assessed, and an op-
portunity was later presented for these students to actually volunteer as sub-
jects. It was found as hypothesized that students showing high affective-
cognitive consistency were more likely to act in accord with stated attitude
than those showing- low intraattitudinal consistency. It was also hypothesized
that students showing high affective-cognitive consistency would have less
tendency than low-consistency subjects to conform to the actions of others in
attitude-relevant behavior. The data did not provide strong support for this
prediction. Overall, the results indicate the importance of assessing both the
affective and the cognitive components of attitude in identifying those whose
verbal attitude reports have consequences for their behavior.

Attitude formation and change have long
been prominent research topics in social psy-
chology. Implicit in most of this research ap-
pears to be the assumption that an individ-
ual's attitudes are significant determinants
of his subsequent behavior. However, despite
early warnings against assuming a strong rela-
tion between verbal attitude measures and
other forms of behavior (e.g., Corey, 1937;
LaPiere, 1934), only in recent years has there
been a concerted effort to study the nature
of the attitude-behavior relation.
Recent approaches to the study of attitudes
and behavior (e.g., Fishbein, 1967; Wicker,
1971) have emphasized that behavior is a
function of many factors (norms, situational
pressures, etc.) in addition to attitude. When
these "other variables" are taken into con-
sideration in addition to attitude, behavioral
predictions are significantly improved (e.g.,
This paper is based, in part, on a dissertation
submitted by the author in partial fulfillment of the
doctoral requirements at the University of Michigan.
The author would particularly like to express his
thanks to his supervisor, Melvin Manis, and Eugene
Burnstein, James Jackson and Howard Schuman for
their advice in the execution of this research; and to
Richard Sorrentino for his comments on an earlier
draft of this article.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Ross
Norman, Department of Psychology, University of
Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada. Copies
of the scales used in this article may also be obtained
from the author.
83
Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; Wicker, 1971). That
other factors beside attitude influence behav-
ior is hardly surprising. Although the develop-
ment of refined methodology for the assess-
ment of these additional influences is a wel-
come result of recent research, the fact that
various normative and situational pressures
can influence an individual's tendency to
behave in accord with his attitudes is, of
course, to be expected.
The present research has been directed
toward identifying structural characteristics
of attitudes which may help predict the
strength of their relation to behavior. In par-
ticular, this work focuses on Rosenberg's hy-
pothesis (1960, 1968) that the greater the
consistency between the affective and cogni-
tive components of an attitude, the truer is
the disposition implied by that attitude. To
quote Rosenberg (1968):
. . . for any particular social issue or object as con*
fronted by a sample drawn from some fairly uniform
sector of the population (e.g., college students re-
cruited for attitude change experiments, or survey
respondents recruited from some particular sector of
the total national population) one can reasonably
expect that those who show less intra-attitudinal
consistency are, on the average, less invested in the
issue and less likely to have a presently stable
orientation toward it. (p. 88)
Rosenberg (1968) suggested two reasons
why attitudes characterized by low affective-
84 Ross NORMAN
cognitive (structural) consistency are likely
to be unstable.
1. The procedure used for assessing the af-
fective and cognitive attitude components
force the respondent to examine inconsist-
encies between his thoughts and feelings of
which he was previously unaware. Once the
inconsistency is salient, the affective and/or
cognitive components may be changed to
bring about greater consistency, and such
changes result in instability of both compo-
nents in those attitudes which show initially
low structural consistency.
2. Rosenberg also noted that individuals
who are not particularly interested in an issue
rarely have well-articulated, well-thought-out
attitudes. Often such individuals will not re-
veal their apathy by giving a neutral response
but rather will take a position that is a
reaction to situational pressures or that repre-
sents the consensus of some salient individual
or important reference group (see also Con-
verse, 1970). Such a responder may be
regarded as presenting a "vacuous" or "in-
authentic" attitude toward the issue. For the
vacuous responder, neither statements con-
cerning his beliefs nor his feelings are reflec-
tive of a true and stable disposition, and his
attitude responses are apt to show con-
siderable and apparently random fluctuation
over time.
Previous research by Rosenberg (1968)
has supported the notion that affective-cogni-
tive consistency is associated with attitudinal
stability and resistance to persuasion at-
tempts. Given that attitudes characterized by
affective-cognitive consistency have greater
stability than less consistent attitudes, it
seems reasonable to anticipate that they will
have greater validity as predictors of subse-
quent behavior. While there is evidence that
affective-cognitive consistency results in rela-
tively stable verbal attitudes, there is at
present no empirical support for the idea that
structural consistency is related to predictive
validity. Such a relation, if it does exist,
would be important in identifying individuals
who will act in accord with their attitudes
from those whose stated attitudes are rela-
tively superficial and have few behavioral
ramifications. The above considerations lead
to the following two hypotheses: (a) Hy-
pothesis 1—An affective or evaluative index
of an individual's attitude will be more pre-
dictive of behavior when it is consistent with
the cognitive component of the attitude struc-
ture than when there is inconsistency between
the two. (b) Hypothesis 2—A cognitive index
of an individual's attitude will be a better
predictor of behavior when it is consistent
with the affective component of the attitude
than when there is inconsistency between
the two.
A series of three experiments were under-
taken to test the importance of affective-
cognitive consistency. The first experiment
tested the relation between structural con-
sistency and the predictive validity of verbal
attitudes. The second was an attempt to repli-
cate the first and also tested the relation of
structural consistency to attitude stability.
The final experiment examined whether affec-
tive-cognitive consistency also moderates sub-
jects' tendency to conform to others in atti-
tude-relevant behavior. Such an effect might
be found if, as Rosenberg suggests, structural
consistency is related to an individual's
involvement and certainty concerning an issue.
Volunteering to act as a subject for psycho-
logical research was chosen as the attitude
object. This was an issue from which it
seemed possible to obtain measures of attitude
and behavior under circumstances which
would not appear too unusual to the subjects.
METHOD
Development of the Attitude Instrument
Attitude theorists have traditionally made a dis-
tinction between the affective and cognitive compo-
nents of attitude (e.g., Bern, 1970; Katz & Stotland,
1959; Newcomb, 1959; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960;
Triandis, 1971), and several recent studies using
factor analytic techniques support this long-standing
conceptual distinction (Kernan & Trebbi, 1973;
Kothandapani, 1971; Ostrom, 1969). The affective
component in these theories refers to the individual's
general level of positive or negative feeling concern-
ing the issue. The cognitive component consists of
the individual's beliefs concerning the issue. When
the attitude issue is an action or behavior, the
relevant cognitive structure is considered to be the
individual's beliefs about the instrumental utility of
the action for the attainment or blocking of his or
her goals weighted by the value placed on such goals.
In the first two studies a 9-point rating scale of
overall favorability toward acting as a subject in
psychological research was used as the affective
index. This scale was anchored at one extreme by
the term Very Favorable and at the other extreme
by the term Very Unfavorable, and a neutral point
 ATTITUDES, CONFORMITY, AND BEHAVIOR
was explicitly indicated. Similar scales have been
used by Kothandapani (1971), Ostrom (1969), and
Rosenberg (1968) to measure the affective compo-
nent of the attitude. In the third study a 16-item
semantic differential evaluative scale was used in
addition to the self-rating scale in order to make the
cognitive and affective scales of comparable length.
Development of the cognitive index was somewhat
more complex. Goals that appeared possible relevant
to the attitude issue were selected by the- author
from lists presented by Carlson (1956), Rokeach
(1968), and Rosenberg (19S6). These goals were
submitted to a group of judges (4 psychology gradu-
ate students and 40 introductory psychology stu-
dents) who were asked to indicate whether each goal
was relevant to the attitude issue, whether there
were marked redundancies between the goals, and
whether were goals relevant to the attitude issue
which were not included in the list. Based on the
judges' responses, the number of goals was reduced
to 12. Examples of goals in the final list include:
helping others, advancing self-knowledge, having
new and interesting kinds of experience, and having
lots of free time.
In the final version of the attitude questionnaire,
these 12 goals were rated on two 9-point scales. On
one the respondent was asked to indicate the extent
to which he believed each goal would be achieved
(or blocked) by volunteering as a subject. This scale
was anchored by the phrase completely achieved at
one end (scored as +4) through a neutral point (0),
to completely blocked (—4) at the other end. The
other scale was used to evaluate each goal; this scale
was similar to the "belief scale" described above, but
it was anchored by the terms extremely positive goal
(+4) and extremely negative goal (—4). The over-
all cognitive index was calculated by finding the
product of the two ratings for each goal and
summing across goals (see Rosenberg, 1960). Space
was also included at the end of the questionnaire
for subjects to include and rate on the two scales
goals they considered relevant to the issue which
were not in the list of 12 presented to them.
Nine-point rating scales were also provided in the
third study for respondents to indicate how certain
they felt about their attitude: how important they
considered the issue and how much thought they
had given to the issue in the past.
Subjects
A total of 242 students from introductory psychol-
ogy courses at the University of Michigan were used
as subjects in the three studies. Of these, 48 subjects
were dropped from various analyses in the studies
because of their absence at the time of an attitudinal
or behavioral measure, or suspicion concerning some
aspect of the experimental procedure.
Procedure
In all studies the initial attitude questionnaire was
administered during regular class meetings by the
instructors. The questionnaire was described as part
of "a general survey being done within the depart-
85
ment of psychology." Subjects were asked to put
their names on the completed forms, since there was
some possibility that the department might want to
relate their answers to a later questionnaire. In Ex-
periment 2 -the attitudes scales were readministered
3 weeks after the initial assessment.
In the first two studies the behavioral measure
was taken 3 weeks after presentation of the attitude
questionnaire (in Experiment 2 after presentation of
the second questionnaire). An experimenter, intro-
duced as a graduate student in .psychology, was given
S minutes at the beginning of a class session to re-
cruit volunteer subjects for a research project. The
students were -told that the study would take ap-
proximately 1 hour of their time and would hope-
fully prove to be interesting and educationally bene-
ficial. They were also told that they could not be
paid for their time and that their participation in
the experiment would not count toward the 3 hours
of "subject time" that was required as part of their
course. Sign-up sheets were then passed around the
classes so that students who were interested in
volunteering could indicate when they would be able
to come to the designated location for the experi-
ment. Volunteers were given an opportunity to sign
up for any time between 9 a.m. to S p.m. on any
one of three designated days. Students who signed
up and did indeed show up at the proper place and
time participated in an experiment unrelated to
this study.
The behavioral measure in Experiment 3 differed
from that in the first two studies. The change was
made in order to better control situational pressures
relevant to the behavior. Subjects were recruited
from 'their classes to take part individually in an
experiment as part of their course requirement. They
were given a wide choice of times to sign up
ranging from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through
Friday of a given week. Of the students who had
answered the initial attitude questionnaire, IDS
signed up in class as subjects for the study. An
additional 29 students were contacted by telephone
and scheduled to participate in the experiment. Of
the students who had filled out the earlier atti-
tude questionnaire, 127 actually showed up for the
experiment.
When each subject arrived at the designated lab,
he or she was seated in a waiting area to await
being called by the experimenter. Another subject
(in reality an experimental confederate) also ar-
rived in the lab at the same time. The confederate
was always of the same sex as the subject. Both
the subject and the confederate were greeted in the
same fashion by the experimenter and were taken to
an area of the lab where numerous pieces of equip-
ment had been placed. After seating the subject and
confederate, the experimenter asked them whether
they would be willing to return for an additional
two experimental sessions after the first one had
been completed. The confederate was first asked
whether he or she was willing to return, and then
the real subject was asked.
Under somewhat similar circumstances Blake and
Mouton (19S7) found that a naive subject was more
86 Ross NORMAN
likely to volunteer when a confederate seated next
to him agreed to do so than if the confederate
refused. For half of the subjects the confederate's
response was congruent with the subject's initial
attitude (e.g., the confederate agreed to come back
when the subject had stated a positive attitude as
measured by the averaged affective-cognitive scale).
For the other half of the subjects, the confederate's
response was incongruent with their attitudes.
Although the confederate's response was predeter-
mined, the study was run using the experimental
blind, so that during each session neither the experi-
menter nor the confederate knew whether the con-
federate's response was congruent or incongruent
with the subject's attitude. The experimenter and
confederate were also kept ignorant of whether
any particular subject had shown high or low af-
fective-cognitive consistency on the earlier attitude
questionnaire.
The main behavioral criterion in this third study
was whether the subject agreed to come back for the
additional sessions. It was, however, impractical to
have all of the subjects who indicated they would
come back actually do so. Thus, for most subjects
who agreed to attend the additional sessions, an
explanation of the deception and the true nature of
the study was immediately given. In order to deter-
mine if signing up to come back involved a real
behavioral commitment, 25 of the subjects who
agreed to return were given a number of question-
naires to fill out in the lab and were then asked to
come back at the later time they had indicated. Of
the 25 subjects tested in this way, 23 actually did
come back and were then debriefed. On this basis
and because of the close correspondence between
signing up for a study and actually showing up
that was found in Experiments 1 and 2, we may
conclude that the behavioral criterion used in this
third experiment was of real consequence.
When subjects were debriefed, they were asked
whether they had been suspicious that there was
deception involved in any aspect of their experi-
ence during the session. Eight subjects indicated
having suspicions: Five said they were suspicious
about the confederates, and three indicated suspi-
cions about the request for them to come back for
the extra sessions. These eight subjects were dropped
from the sample, although their inclusion would not
have had a significant impact on the results. Data
from the two other subjects were discarded because
they answered the volunteering request before the
confederate. None of the subjects indicated being
suspicious of a relation between the attitude ques-
tionnaire and the experimental session. No connection
was implied by either the class instructor or the
experimenter between the request for subjects and
the earlier attitude questionnaire. Questioning of stu-
dents in the classes after the studies were completed
indicated that none of them had inferred any such
connection.
RESULTS
Affective-cognitive consistency was mea-
sured in the manner suggested by Rosenberg
(1968). Subjects in each experiment were
rank ordered in terms of the overall favor-
ability implied by the weighted cognitive
index and also on the basis of the affective
index.1 Affective-cognitive consistency was
denned as the discrepancy between the indi-
vidual's position in the two rankings: The
higher the absolute value of the discrepancy,
the lower was the affective-cognitive consist-
ency. In each study subjects were split at the
median into a high- and low-consistency
group.2 The correlation between the cogni-
tive and affective scores for the high-consist-
ency groups were, of course, highly signifi-
cant (r = .87, .89, and .88, respectively, for
the three studies, p < .01 in each case;
whereas for the low-consistency subjects the
correlations were nonsignificant (r = —.18,
-.12, and -.04).
Subjects holding extreme attitudes may be
more likely to act in the manner implied by
their stated attitudes than subjects who have
less polarized attitudes. For this reason, it
seemed desirable to compare the affective and
cognitive scores for subjects who were classi-
fied as high (vs. low) in structural consist-
ency. In all three studies the high- and low-
consistency groups did not differ significantly
in terms of the means and standard deviations
of their affective scores, cognitive scores, or
an averaged affective/cognitive score (calcu-
lated after converting both scales to a com-
mon metric). Any differences in the predictive
validity of their attitudes cannot, therefore,
be due to differences in the extremity of their
stated feelings or beliefs.
1
Some subjects wrote in on their questionnaire
and rated on the appropriate scales goals which were
not in the original list provided. The results reported
include these extra goals; however, the pattern of
results is not changed if the extra goals are not
included in the cognitive index.
2
There are circumstances under which this may be
a poor measure of discrepancy. For example, if a
number of respondents gave highly positive re-
sponses on one scale and highly negative responses
on the other, then individuals giving neutral re-
sponses on both scales would be scored as high in
discrepancy. It might, therefore, be advantageous to
use an index of consistency based on the difference
between the deviations of scores on the two scales
from their neutral midpoint. When this is done with
the current data, the classification of subjects as high
or low in consistency was very similar to that
obtained using Rosenberg's index.
 ATTITUDES, CONFORMITY, AND BEHAVIOR 87

TABLE 1
CORRELATION OF ATTITUDE SCORES WITH VOLUNTEERING BEHAVIOR

Study 2
Attitude component Study 1 Study 3
(« = 26} (n = 117)
Test 1 Test 2
(n - 53) (n = 39)

All subjects
Affective .15 .14 .31 .23*
Cognitive .21 .50** .53** .35**
Affective-cognitive .18 .37** .47** .25*
High-consistency subjects (» = 14) (n = 26) (n = 20) (n = 59)
Affective .62* .53** .53* .47**
Cognitive .40 .50* .49* .49**
Affective-cognitive .51 .53** .51* .44**
Low-consistency subjects (n = 12) (n = 27) (w = 19) (n = 58)
Affective -.28 -.22 .24 -.04
Cognitive -.15 .51* .56** .19
Affective-cognitive -.18 .26 .39 .15

* p < .05.
**P <.01.

Test oj Main Hypotheses: Relation of there is an increase in cognitive-affective con-

Attitudes to Behavior
For the first two studies a composite index
was used as the behavioral criterion. If a
subject did not sign up to volunteer he was
given a score of zero, if he signed up but did
not come he was given a score of 1, and if
he volunteered and showed up he was given
a score of 2." Verbal agreement to return
for the additional session was the behavioral
measure in Experiment 3.
The correlation between verbal attitude
reports and behavior are presented in Table 1.
In all three studies (for the moment ignoring
the second questionnaire of Experiment 2)
the affective index was found to be signifi-
cantly stronger in its relation to behavior
when consistent with the cognitive index than
when there was inconsistency between the
two (0 = 2.26, p<.05; z = 2.71, p < .01;
z = 2.89, p < .01 for Experiments 1, 2, and 3,
respectively).
Concerning the results of the second ques-
tionnaire given in Experiment 2, the differ-
ence between high- and low-consistency sub-
jects in the predictive validity of the affective
index does not reach statistical significance
(2 = .997, ns). This might be expected if
8
For Experiments 1 and 2 only the correlation
between attitude and this composite behavioral index
is reported. The pattern of results is the same, how-
ever, if point-biserial correlations are calculated with
signing up to attend or actually attending the
experimental sessions as the behavioral criterion.
sistency for initially low-consistency subjects
between the first and second administration
of the questionnaire. In checking this pos-
sibility, it was found that while the cognitive-
affective correlation for low-consistency sub-
jects was —.22 in the first testing, at the
time of the second testing the correlation had
increased to .37. Such a finding is compatible
with Rosenberg's postulate that the assess-
ment procedure may make affective-cognitive
inconsistency salient to some subjects, result-
ing in a change in affect and/or cognition
and the development of a better articulated
attitude.
In contrast to the supportive results ob-
tained with the affective index, the effect of
affective-cognitive consistency on the predic-
tive validity of the cognitive measure appears
less clear-cut. In Experiment 3, although the
effect is in the predicted direction (a higher
correlation with behavior for high-consistency
respondents), it does not quite reach con-
ventional levels of statistical significance
(z = 1.29, p < .10, one-tailed). In the second
study the difference between high- and low-
consistency respondents is negligible for both
questionnaires (z = .048, .280); but in the
third study the results are significantly in the
predicted direction (z — 1.89, p < .05, one-
tailed). The results of the third study provide
the strongest evidence in the set of experi-
ments for the proposition that the consistency
of cognition and affect influences the extent
 Ross NORMAN
to which the cognitive index can be used to
predict behavior. The use of a longer affective
scale in Experiment 3 may have resulted in
a more reliable index of affect and therefore
conceivably a more valid test of the hypothe-
ses than in the first and second studies. At
any rate, considering the suggestive results
of Experiment 1 and the significant results
of Experiment 3 there is reason to believe
that affective-cognitive consistency may mod-
erate the predictive validity of the cognitive
as well as the affective scale.
Results using an averaged affective-cogni-
tive scale are also presented in Table 1. The
difference in the predictive validity of this
averaged score for high- and low-consistency
subjects reaches a one-tailed probability level
of .OS in Experiments 1 and 3 (z = 1.66 and
1.69, respectively); but it does not approach
significance in Experiment 2 (z — 1.12 and
.433 for the two testings).
Attitude Stability
The test-retest reliability of attitude
toward volunteering was assessed on the 51
subjects in Experiment 2 who were present at
both the first and second administration of
the questionnaire. The results are presented
in Table 2. For the high-consistency subjects
the affective scale is, as predicted, more reli-
able (over time) than for low-consistency
subjects (z = 3.11, p < .01). The cognitive
index shows high stability for all subjects.
On the whole, the effect of affective-cognitive
consistency on the stabiltiy of the two indices
parallels the findings with regard to the
initial predictive validity of the scales in
Experiment 2.
TABLE 2
TEST-RETEST RELIABILITY OF MEASURES OP
ATTITUDE TOWARD VOLUNTEERING : SUBJECTS
DIFFERING IN AFFECTIVE-COGNITIVE
CONSISTENCY, STUDY 2
Affective Cognitive
Subjects index index
All" .60 .84
High-consistency1" .85 .86
Low-consistency" .32 .81
a
n = 51.
bn^ =• 25.
|= 26.
TABLE 3
RELATION or CONFEDERATES AND SUBJECTS
VOLUNTEERING FOR EXTRA SESSIONS,
STUDY 3
Confederates' response
Subject's response
Volunteered Didn't volunteer
High affective—cognitive
consistency subjects
Volunteered 13
Didn't volunteer 13 14
Low affective-cognitive
consistency subjects
Volunteered 22 9
Didn't volunteer 8 19
Conformity in Behavior
Experiment 3 was also designed to test
the hypothesis that subjects showing low
consistency in their attitudes would conform
more to the confederate's behavior than would
high-consistency subjects. Table 3 summarizes
the relationship between subjects' and con-
federates' responses to the request that they
come back for the extra time.
A 2 X 2 X 2 chi-square analysis was per-
formed on Table 3 (Winer, 1962, pp. 629-
632). The three factors used were affective-
cognitive consistency, confederate's response,
and subject's response. There was a signifi-
cant relation between the confederate's re-
sponse and subject's response, x 2 (0 —8 - 02 >
p < .005, indicating a definite overall con-
formity effect. If affective-cognitive consist-
ency moderates subjects' tendency to conform,
we would also expect a significant three-way
Consistency X Confederate's Response X Sub-
jects' Response interaction. This interaction
only approaches a .10 significance level,
X 2 ( l ) =2.60.
The considerations which led to the con-
formity hypothesis also lead us to expect that
the low-consistency subjects will show greater
conformity to the confederate than would
high-consistency subjects only in those cases
where the confederate's response was incon-
gruent with the subjects' previously stated
attitude. It is only when such incongruency
exists that situational forces are presumably
being pitted against stated attitude in the
determination of behavior. Under such cir-
 ATTITUDES, CONFORMITY, AND BEHAVIOR
cumstances low-consistency subjects, because
of their presumed uncertainty and vacuity,
should be more likely than high-consistency
subjects to follow the lead of the confederate.
When the confederate's response is congruent
with the subject's stated attitude, both situ-
ational and attitudinal pressures imply the
same behavior, and there should therefore be
a strong relation between the confederate's
and subject's responses for all subjects re-
gardless of whether they are acting primarily
on the basis of their own attitude or conform-
ity. The summary of data relevant to this
conjecture is presented in Table 4. The rele-
vant chi-square value for testing whether the
difference in conformity between high- and
low-consistency subjects is greater under con-
ditions of incongruency than congruency
again only approaches significance at the .10
level, X 2 ( l ) =2.35.
Overall, the results of these analyses do
not provide statistically significant support
for the prediction that affective-cognitive
consistency moderates conformity. However,
because the results tend to approach signifi-
cance, it might be advisable at this point to
withhold a final conclusion on the validity of
this hypothesis.
Necessity of the Affective-Cognitive
Distinction
It might be argued that the distinction be-
ing made between the affective and cognitive
components of attitude is meaningless or ir-
relevant. Both types of scales could be mea-
suring the same aspect of attitude and the
affective-cognitive consistency index might,
according to this view, simply indicate the
general reliability of the subjects' responses
across a set of relatively homogeneous items.
Consistent responding across test items has
traditionally been considered an important
index of test reliability and might plausibly
facilitate accurate behavioral predictions.
However, the theory underlying the current
research assumes that the consistency between
the affective and cognitive responses (consid-
ering the two as conceptually separate) gives
more information about the predictive poten-
tial of verbal attitudes than would an index
of reliability based on a random division of
items. In order to check this assumption, in
89
TABLE 4
SUBJECTS' TENDENCY TO CONFORM TO CONFEDERATE'S
RESPONSE UNDER CONDITIONS OF CONGRUENCY
AND INCONGRUENCY, STUDY 3
Subject's response High-consistency Low-consistency
subjects subjects
Congruent
Conformed 21 22
Didn't conform 9 9
Incongruent
Conformed 11 19
Didn't conform 17 9
Note. Congruency defined by relation of confederate's re-
sponse to averaged affective/cognitive index.
each of the three studies subjects were classi-
fied as consistent or inconsistent in respond-
ing across randomly divided sets of scales
(ignoring the affective-cognitive distinction).
No significant differences in strength of the
attitude-behavior relation or tendency to con-
form were found between subjects classified
as high and low in consistency on the basis
of random splits. This suggests that while
affective-cognitive consistency is a concept
with behavioral implications, in these studies
overall consistency (based on random group-
ings of items) is not.
Consistency: Issue Specific or Response
Style?
A subject who generally gives little thought
to the responses he makes on an attitude
questionnaire would probably score lower on
our index of affective-cognitive consistency
than one who gives more careful considera-
tion to his responses. If such a general re-
sponse style is substantially influencing the
index of structural consistency, we might
expect subjects to show significant correla-
tions across issues in the amount of affective-
cognitive consistency that they exhibit. In
order to check for the possibility of such a
general response style, in the second study
affective and cognitive scales similar to those
already described were developed and admin-
istered concerning two issues in addition to
volunteering: (a) prohibition of cigarette
smoking within classrooms and (b) a pro-
posal that all students should be requested
to take at least one psychology course in their
program of studies. These additional scales
90 Ross NORMAN
were administered just once at the time of the
second testing session.
There was little relation between the af-
fective-cognitive consistency that the indi-
vidual respondents displayed in reacting to
the various attitude issues. The correlations
varied between —.20 and .18, none of them
approaching statistical significance. Thus
there is little evidence that the affective-
cognitive consistency index is significantly
influenced by general response style.
Relation oj Affective-Cognitive Consistency
to Other Self-Ratings
Rosenberg (1968) suggested that degree of
affective-cognitive consistency is associated
with a subject's certainty and involvement
concerning an attitude issue. In Experiment
3, however, no significant relation was found
between subjects' affective-cognitive consis-
tency and their ratings of certainty, issue im-
portance, or how much thought they had
given to the issue in the past (rs ranged be-
tween .03 and .14).
Order of Scales
In the questionnaire used in the first two
studies the affective scale items preceded the
items of the cognitive scale. Both possible
orders were used in Experiment 3 to see if
there would be greater consistency between
reported beliefs and feelings using one se-
quence rather than the other. There was no
evidence of a significant difference; the affec-
tive-cognitive correlation was .45 when the
cognitive items preceded the affective scale
and .54 when the reverse ordering was used.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
On the whole, the results are supportive of
the hypotheses that the predictive validity of
both cognitive and affective scales is mod-
erated by affective-cognitive consistency. All
three studies have shown the predictive valid-
ity of the affective scale to be a function of
its consistency with an individual's belief
structure. The strongly suggestive finding of
the first study and the statistically significant
evidence of the third study indicate that the
strength of the relation between the cognitive
scale and behavior is also a function of af-
fective-cognitive consistency.
For the moment, however, several of the
results obtained in the second study remain
somewhat anomalous. In that study it was
found that the predictive validity of cognition
was not a function of its relation to affect.
While the difference in this regard between
the second and third studies might be ex-
plained by the use of different affective in-
dices, such an explanation does not account
for the somewhat different pattern of results
between the first and second studies. In terms
of design, the only difference between the
latter two studies is the use of an attitude
retest in the second. There is no apparent
reason why such a difference in design should
affect the overall validity of the cognitive
scales; but a replication of the test-retest
design using a multi-item measure of affect
might help clarify some of the issues involved.
Experiment 3 does not offer statistically
significant support for the prediction that
degree of affective-cognitive consistency af-
fects the extent to which subjects will con-
form to others in behaviors that are relevant
to the attitude issue. This hypothesis was
derived from Rosenberg's (1968) suggestion
that structural consistency is related to the
certainty and involvement an individual feels
with regard to an attitude issue. The failure
to find a relation between the consistency
index and self-rating of uncertainty or issue
importance somewhat compromises this postu-
late. It may be that subjects found the mean-
ing of the terms certain or important to be
ambiguous in the context in which it was
used, and the measure was therefore a poor
one. Possibly other techniques of measuring
certainty or involvement (e.g., the "own
categories" technique suggested by Sherif &
Sherif, 1967) may, in the future, be found to
be related to affective-cognitive consistency.
In the three experiments reported there was
a 3-4 week delay between attitudinal and
behavioral measures. This was done for two
related reasons: (a) to minimize any experi-
mental demand characteristics that would in-
fluence subjects' tendency to act in accord
with their stated attitudes and (b) because
the major challenge to attitude researchers
appears to be the prediction of later behavior
in situations at least somewhat different from
the attitude measurement setting. However,
the design used leaves some ambiguity as to
whether the low predictive validity of the
 ATTITUDES, CONFORMITY, AND BEHAVIOR 91
stated attitudes of subjects showing low af- quantitative analysis of social problems. Reading,
fective-cognitive consistency is simply a func- Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970.
tion of the instability of these attitudes over Corey, S. M. Professed attitudes and actual behavior.
Journal of Educational Psychology, 1937, 28, 271-
time. The possibility exists that attitude mea- 280.
sures for low-consistency subjects, while not Fishbein, M. Attitude and the prediction of be-
predictive of future behavior, may predict havior. In M. Fishbein (Ed.), Readings in atti-
behavior displayed at about the same time as tude theory and measurement. New York: Wiley,
1967.
the attitude measure. Such a possibility re- Katz, D., & Stotland, E. A preliminary statement to
mains to be investigated. There are, of course, a theory of attitude structure and change. In S.
great difficulties in getting contemporaneous Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study of a science
attitude and behavior measures in credible (Vol. 3). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.
circumstances that would not involve strong Kernan, J. B., & Trebbi, G. C. Attitude-dynamics as
a hierarchical structure. Journal of Social Psy-
experimental demand characteristics. chology, 1973, 89, 193-202.
Despite these problems and unresolved Kothandapani, V. Validation of feeling, belief, and
issues, the results of the present studies indi- intention to act as three components of attitude,
cate the value of assessing both the affective and their contribution to the prediction of contra-
ceptive behavior. Journal of Personality and So-
and cognitive components of an attitude be- cial Psychology, 1971, 19, 321-333.
fore attempting to make behavioral predic- LaPiere, R. T. Attitudes vs. actions. Social Forces,
tions. Consideration of affective-cognitive 1934, 13, 230-237.
consistency is intended to supplement issues Newcomb, T. Individual systems of orientation. In
emphasized in most past research on the S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study of a science
(Vol. 3). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.
attitude-behavior relation. Such research has Osgood, C. E., Suci, C. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H.
focused on the importance of other disposi- The measurement of meaning. Urbana: University
tions and situational factors in addition to of Illinois Press, 1957.
attitudes in the determination of behavior. Ostrom, T. M. The relationship between the affective,
behavioral, and cognitive components of attitudes.
These "other variables" approaches have Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969,
made an important contribution, but it seems 5, 12-30.
probable that through consideration of the Rokeach, M. Beliefs, attitudes and values. San
structural characteristics of attitude, the pre- Francisco: Josey-Bass, 1968.
diction of social behavior can be improved Rosenberg, M. J. Cognitive structure and attitudinal
affect. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychol-
further. The most important contribution of ogy, 1956, S3, 367-372.
the current research is in providing evidence Rosenberg, M. J. A structural theory of attitude
that the importance of attitudinal factors in dynamics. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1960, 24, 319-
341.
the determination of behavior may be a func- Rosenberg, M. J. Hedonism, inauthenticity, and
tion of the structural characteristics of the other goals toward expansion of a consistency
relevant attitudes. theory. In R. P. Abelson et al. (Eds.), Theories of
cognitive consistency: A sourcebook. Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1968.
REFERENCES
Rosenberg, M. J., & Hovland, C. I. Cognitive, af-
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. Attitudinal and normative fective, and behavioral components of attitudes.
variables as predictors of specific behaviors. Jour- In M. J. Rosenberg et al. (Eds.), Attitude organi-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 27, zation and change. New Haven, Conn.: Yale
41-57. University Press, 1960.
Bern, D. J. Beliefs, attitudes, and human affairs. Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. W. The own categories
Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1970. procedure in attitude research. In M. Fishbein
Blake, R. R., & Mouton, J. S. The study of social (Ed.), Readings in attitude theory and measure-
conduct within the framework of adaptation-level ment. New York: Wiley, 1967.
theory. In M. Sherif & M. O. Wilson (Eds.), Triandis, H. C. Attitude and attitude change. New
York: Wiley, 1971.
Emerging problems in social psychology. Nor-
man: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange, Wicker, A. W. An examination of the "other varia-
bles" explanation of attitude-behavior inconsis-
19S7.
tency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
Carlson, E. R. Attitude change through modification ogy, 1971, 19, 18-31.
of attitude structure. Journal of Abnormal and Winer, B. J. Statistical Principles in Experimental
Social Psychology, 1956, 52, 2S6-261. Design. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.
Converse, P. E. Attitudes and non-attitudes: Con-
tinuation of a dialogue. In E. R. Tufte (Ed.), The (Received March 6, 1974)