PART I

INTRODUCTORY
A. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
What is a constitution?
It is a written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the
fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and by
which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and
useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic (Justice Malcom).
The purpose of the Constitution is:
 to prescribe the permanent framework of a system of government;
 to assign to the several departments their respective powers and duties; and
 to establish certain first fixed principles on which government is founded.

What is the timeline of the Philippine Constitution?

1. The First Philippine Republic, June 12, 1898.
 The term BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION refers to a policy of the United States
towards the Philippines as described in a proclamation by U.S. President
William McKinley issued on December 21, 1898. The proclamation was
issued after Spain was defeated in the Spanish–American War but before
fighting began in the Philippine–American War. Prior to the proclamation, the
United States had defeated Spain during the naval Battle of Manila Bay on
May 1, 1898.
 Subsequently, on June 12, 1898, Emilio Aguinaldo declared the Philippines
independent and established a revolutionary government whose the Filipino
revolutionary armed forces surrounded Manila and the occupying American
Army. This created a stand-off between opposing armies that would erupt in
fighting in early 1899.

2. The 1899 Malolos Constitution

 The Malolos Constitution was the first republican constitution in Asia.
 It declared that sovereignty resides exclusively in the people, stated basic civil
rights, separated the church and state, and called for the creation of an
Assembly of Representatives to act as the legislative body.
 It also called for a parliamentary republic as the form of government.
  The president was elected for a term of four years by a majority of the
Assembly.
 It was titled "Constitución Política", and was written in Spanish following the
declaration of independence from Spain, proclaimed on January 20, 1899, and
was enacted and ratified by the Malolos Congress, a Congress held in Malolos,
Bulacan.

3. The Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898

 On 12 August 1898, the Protocol of Peace was signed directing five Americans
and five Spanish commissioners to meet in Paris to discuss peace terms
between US and Spain.
 Felipe Agoncillo was sent by Aguinaldo to Washington to serve as representative
of the revolutionary government of the Philippines; however, Pres. McKinley
declined to recognize him as such.
 The commission met from October to December 1898, and agreed upon that
some colonies of Spain including the Philippines be ceded to the United States.
 On 10 December 1898, without Filipino representation and consultation, the
Treaty of Paris was concluded.
 It was signed by representatives from the US Government namely: Cushman
Davis, William Frye, Whitelaw Reid, George Gray and William Day. The Spanish
delegation on the other hand was composed of Eugenio Montero Rios,
Buenaventura Abarzuza, Jose de Garnica, Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia
and Rafael Cerero.
 The Treaty of Paris was made up of thirteen articles that stipulate the
conditions, obligations, as well as the benefits that the Governments of Spain
and United States could enjoy over the ceded islands. The first three articles
provided Spain’s relinquishment of her claims over its former colonies including
Cuba, Puerto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, and the Philippine
Islands. Article III stated that an amount of $20, 000,000 will be paid by the US
to Spain after the treaty’s ratification.

4. The Taft Commission

 On March 16, 1900, US President William McKinley appointed the then Judge
William Howard Taft to head the second Philippine Commission, which would
 also be known as the Taft Commission. Taft would become Governor-General of
the Philippines and later, the president of the US.
 McKinley wanted to hasten the transition of the Philippine military government
into a civil one. The Taft Commissions was given executive and legislative
powers it could use to achieve the President’s objective.
 The Commission arrives in the Philippines on June 3, 1900.
 It began legislative work on September 1, 1900 the first law it passed set aside
P2 million for the construction of treads and bridges.
 From September 1900 to August 1902, the Commission was able to enact 440
pieces of legislation for the Philippines. Some of these laws included the
Municipal and Provincial codes, which established municipal and provincial
governments all over the country, and laws organizing the Philippine
Constabulary and the countries judicial system. Aside from enacting laws the
commissions also visited various provinces and help it in the government peace
efforts

ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

The Philippines was a US Territory from December 10, 1898 to March 24, 1934
and therefore under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government of the United States.
Two acts of the United States Congress passed during this period can be
considered Philippine constitutions in that those acts defined the fundamental political
principles and established the structure, procedures, powers and duties of the
Philippine government.

5. The Philippine Bill of 1902 (The Philippine Organic Act of 1902)

 The Philippine Organic Act of 1902, sometimes known as the "Philippine Bill of
1902", was the first organic law for the Philippine Islands enacted by the US
Congress.
 It provided for the creation of a popularly elected Philippine Assembly, and
specified that legislative power would be vested in a bicameral legislature
composed of the Philippine Commission (upper house) and the Philippine
Assembly (lower house).
 Its key provisions included a bill of rights for the Filipinos and the appointment
of two non-voting Filipino Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to represent
the Philippines in the US House of Representatives.
6. The Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) of 1916, the Philippine Legislative
(Senate and House of Representatives)
 The Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, sometimes known as "Jones Law",
modified the structure of the Philippine government by removing the Philippine
Commission as the legislative upper house and replacing it with a Senate
elected by Filipino voters, creating the Philippines' first fully elected national
legislature.
 This act also explicitly stated that it was and had always been the purpose of
the people of the US to end their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to
recognize Philippine independence as soon as a stable government can be
established therein.
 Principal organic act of the Philippines until November 15, 1935 when the
Philippine Commonwealth was inaugurated under the 1935 Constitution.

7. The Tydings–McDuffie Act; The Commonwealth of the Philippines

 Though not a constitution itself, the Tydings–McDuffie Act of 1934 provided
authority and defined mechanisms for the establishment of a formal constitution
via a constitutional convention.

8. The 1935 Constitution

 The 1935 Constitution was written in 1934, approved and adopted by the
Commonwealth of the Philippines (1935–1946) and later used by the Third
Republic (1946–1972).
 It was written with an eye to meeting the approval of the US Government as
well, so as to ensure that the US would live up to its promise to grant the
Philippines independence and not have a premise to hold onto its possession on
the grounds that it was too politically immature and hence unready for full, real
independence.
 The original 1935 Constitution provided for unicameral National Assembly and
the President was elected to a six-year term without re-election.
 It was amended in 1940 to have a bicameral Congress composed of a Senate
and House of Representatives, as well the creation of an independent electoral
commission. The Constitution now granted the President a four-year term with
a maximum of two consecutive terms in office.
  A Constitutional Convention was held in 1971 to rewrite the 1935 Constitution.
The convention was stained with manifest bribery and corruption. Possibly the
most controversial issue was removing the presidential term limit so that
Ferdinand E. Marcos could seek election for a third term, which many felt was
the true reason for which the convention was called.
 In any case, the 1935 Constitution was suspended in 1972 with Marcos'
proclamation of martial law, the rampant corruption of the constitutional
process providing him with one of his major premises for doing so.

THE 1943 CONSTITUTION

José P. Laurel, President of the Second Philippine Republic, addresses the
National Assembly at what is now the Old Legislative Building to approve the 1943
Constitution.
The 1943 Constitution was drafted by a committee appointed by the Philippine
Executive Commission, the body established by the Japanese to administer the
Philippines in lieu of the Commonwealth of the Philippines which had established a
government-in-exile. In mid-1942 Japanese Premier Hideki Tōjō had promised the
Filipinos "the honor of independence" which meant that the commission would be
supplanted by a formal republic.
The Preparatory Committee for Philippine Independence tasked with drafting a
new constitution was composed in large part, of members of the prewar National
Assembly and of individuals with experience as delegates to the convention that had
drafted the 1935 Constitution. Their draft for the republic to be established under the
Japanese Occupation, however, would be limited in duration, provide for indirect,
instead of direct, legislative elections, and an even stronger executive branch.
Upon approval of the draft by the Committee, the new charter was ratified in
1943 by an assembly of appointed, provincial representatives of the Kalibapi, the
organization established by the Japanese to supplant all previous political parties.
Upon ratification by the Kalibapi assembly, the Second Republic was formally
proclaimed (1943–1945). José P. Laurel was appointed as President by the National
Assembly and inaugurated into office in October 1943. Laurel was highly regarded by
the Japanese for having openly criticised the US for the way they ran the Philippines,
and because he had a degree from Tokyo International University.
The 1943 Constitution remained in force in Japanese-controlled areas of the
Philippines, but was never recognized as legitimate or binding by the governments of
the United States or of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and guerrilla
organizations loyal to them. In late 1944, President Laurel declared a state of war
existed with the United States and the British Empire and proclaimed martial law,
essentially ruling by decree. His government in turn went into exile in December
1944, first to Taiwan and then Japan. After the announcement of Japan's surrender,
Laurel formally dissolved the Second Republic.
Until the 1960s, the Second Republic and its officers, were not viewed as a
legitimate Philippine government or as having any standing, with the exception of the
Supreme Court, whose decisions, limited to reviews of criminal and commercial cases
as part of a policy of discretion by Chief Justice José Yulo continued to be part of the
official records. This was made easier by the Commonwealth government-in-exile
never constituting a Supreme Court, and the formal vacancy in the position of Chief
Justice for the Commonwealth with the execution of José Abad Santos by the
Japanese).
It was only during the Macapagal administration that a partial political
rehabilitation of the Japanese-era republic took place, with the official recognition of
Laurel as a former president and the addition of his cabinet and other officials to the
roster of past government officials. However, the 1943 Constitution was not taught in
schools, and the laws of the 1943-44 National Assembly never recognized as valid or
relevant.

9. The 1973 Constitution

 The 1973 Constitution, promulgated after Marcos' declaration of martial law,
but having been in the planning process for years before this, was supposed to
introduce a parliamentary-style government.
 Legislative power was vested in a unicameral National Assembly whose
members were elected for six-year terms.
 The President was ideally elected as the symbolic and purely ceremonial head of
state chosen from amongst the Members of the National Assembly for a six-
year term and could be re-elected to an unlimited number of terms.
 Upon election, the President ceased to be a Member of the National Assembly.
During his term, the President was not allowed to be a member of a political
party or hold any other office.
 Executive power was meant to be exercised by the Prime Minister who was also
elected from amongst the sitting Assemblymen.
 The Prime Minister was to be the head of government and Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces.
 This constitution was subsequently amended four times (arguably five,
depending on how one considers Proclamation № 3 of 1986, see below).
 From 16–17 October 1976, a majority of barangay voters (also called "Citizen
Assemblies") approved that martial law should be continued and ratified the
amendments to the Constitution proposed by President Marcos.

a. POLITICAL QUESTION
Basis: Separation of Powers

JAVELLANA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
THE PLEBISCITE CASE
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2,
which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17,
1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines.
Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No.
6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the
election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970,
and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June
1, 1971.
While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the
President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under
Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued
Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or
rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as
setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution on January 15, 1973.
 On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission
on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin
said “respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No.
73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter
alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the
calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the
same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be
answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose,
are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no
proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January
15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there
being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”
On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and
open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
On December 23, 1972, the President announced the postponement of the
plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution.
No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when
General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be
held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said General
Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of December
17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for
purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”
Because of these events relative to the postponement of the
aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being,
from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions
under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially.
Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled
to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to
Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative
authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the
plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the
leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more
imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
 “In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. 
L-
35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as
possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”
The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a
resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said
“urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16,
1973.”
Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners
in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of
restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a
restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on
Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head,
Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head,
Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee
and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and
substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task,
from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or
other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results
allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period
comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions
quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”
On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution
requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer
to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and
setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the
case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary
of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of
the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a
copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President.
Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the
Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection
therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had,
according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said
Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.
 THE RATIFICATION CASE
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the
sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to
restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.
This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and
registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and
voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had
announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his
Cabinet, respondents including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and
the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election,
hence null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No.
1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and
objective.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable
or political question, and therefore non-justiciable.
It is a justiciable and a non-political question.
To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon
whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with
the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of
ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the
provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of
the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in
accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is
justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our
1935 Constitution) shall show.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions.
The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the
court.
The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those
lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in
the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies
were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications
prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote
in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of
those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of
the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be
considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on
ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in
plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the
American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major
characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the
Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records
that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election
returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the
supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies
as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without
complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that
there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by
the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of
Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme
set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and
 honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the
Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have
ratified the revised Constitution.

3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or

without valid ratification) by the people.
Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the
1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,"
independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the
COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied
upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged
president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department
of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the
citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not
adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge
that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and
suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.

4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.

The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices
of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote
recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts.
Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of
another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not
constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said
acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of
Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the
people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to
declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their
compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions,
some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued
subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said
 Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of
the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or
acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is
well to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President
for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both
Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas,
Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a
plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935
Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case,
petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie
showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been
acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution
is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the
Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said
proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection
in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the
provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional

Convention in force.
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance
thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando
and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the
third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the
people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the
Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are
not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION (PBA) VS. COMELEC

 FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883
which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections)
for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in
conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding
office after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional
“resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7
of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election
for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such
positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing)
the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the
winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten
(10) days after his proclamation.”
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the
cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign,
vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as
acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in
intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have
not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is
clean, fair and honest.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional.
After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to dismiss. On the other hand, 5 Justices
voted to declare the statute unconstitutional. In accordance with Javellana v.
Executive Secretary, of the view that as there were less than ten votes for
declaring BP 883 unconstitutional. The petitions should be dismissed.

2. Whether or not the Supreme Court should allow incumbent President Marcos to
run on that said special election.
On the second issue, it turned out to be a political question. It can only be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election.
Thus, it is outside the ambit of the courts.
 The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their
ballot, either to the give the incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new
President.

b. SECTION 1, ARTICLE VII; EXPANDED JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

(when there is grave abuse of discretion)

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

ARAULLO VS. AQUINO

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed
the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government
projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects
to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what
happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will
be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as
“savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed
to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the
General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
 Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an
incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato
Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does
not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-
Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain
Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various
petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Among their contentions was: DAP is unconstitutional because it violates
the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly
the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of
the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of
Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).

ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1),
Art. VI, Constitution).
No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP
was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it
did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury
otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
 which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned
via the DAP.

2. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by

the executive.
No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds
refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited
by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget
deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the
case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

3. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that
the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government)
are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive
were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even
though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-
existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to
them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are
still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the
GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.

On the issue of what are “savings”

These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared
by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only
occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned.
The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving
 project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with
under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are
already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and
then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

4. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is

constitutional.
No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for
the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

5. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an
act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they
received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers,
and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

LANSANG VS. GARCIA

LANSANG DOCTRINE:
It is within the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to inquire
into the veracity of the factual bases recited by the Executive in a
proclamation ordering the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, for the purpose of determining whether or not the
Executive acted arbitrarily in concluding from the evidence before him
that there was indeed a rebellion and that public necessity, as
contemplated in the Constitution, required such suspension.
FACTS:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus
in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist
groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by
Garcia for interrogation and investigation.
Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ
averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.

HELD:
The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was
subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had
the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul
the same if no legal ground could be established.
Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this
matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified
information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC
and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners.
In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive
and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the
government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided
to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

AYTONA VS CASTILLO
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed
petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank.
Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon,
President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he
issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad
interim appointments made by former President Garcia.
There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by
the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed
Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank.
Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that
he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the
new President, should be considered void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President

Garcia were valid.

HELD:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous
President Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration.
He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming
President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass
or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use powers as
incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail
himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up
vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted.
But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of
almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President
may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential
prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all
vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby
deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments.

ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO

FACTS:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through
the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and
Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively.
P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to
Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the
Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively.
However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He
bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the
Philippine trust company.
In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of
money to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were
cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and
delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an
abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000.
The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which
the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the
latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which
created a special committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the
estates.
The special committee created by the resolution called and examined
various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault.
An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the
apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government’s paying to Burt
the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two
estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949.
The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who
benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000
were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same
date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine
National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000;
and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for
P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc.,
with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash,
which he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of
this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case.
As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then
approved a resolution that cited him for contempt.
It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in this
petition.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.
YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the
power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry,
subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The
inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question
which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be
material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The
materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative
action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the
sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and
not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon
the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives.
There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e.
 abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations
are disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be
transgressed.

3. WON the privilege against self-incrimination protects the petitioner from

being questioned.
NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important
question, which is the name of that person to whom witness gave the
P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate
that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily
implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave
P440,000 to a person to him unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or
evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt,
assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.” Since according to
the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to
a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, Court
found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that
person might incriminate him.

10. The 1986 Freedom Constitution; Proclamation No. 3

 Immediately following the 1986 People Power Revolution that ousted Marcos,
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation № 3 as a provisional
constitution.
 It adopted certain provisions from the 1973 Constitution while abolishing
others.
 It granted the President broad powers to reorganize government and remove
officials, as well as mandating the President to appoint a commission to draft a
new, more formal Constitution.
 This document, described above, supplanted the "Freedom Constitution" upon
its ratification in 1987.

11. The 1987 Constitution; Date Of Effectivity: February 2, 1987

 On March 25, 1986, following the People Power Revolution which ousted
Ferdinand E. Marcos as President, and following on her own inauguration,
Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation 3, declaring a national policy to
 implement the reforms mandated by the people, protecting their basic rights,
adopting a provisional constitution, and providing for an orderly transition to a
government under a new constitution.
 On April 23, President Aquino issued Proclamation № 9, creating a
Constitutional Commission (popularly known as the "ConCom") to frame a new
charter to supersede the Marcos-era 1973 Constitution. Aquino appointed 50
members to the Commission; the members were drawn from varied
backgrounds, including several former congressmen, former Supreme Court
Chief Justice Roberto Concepción, Roman Catholic bishop Teodoro Bacani, and
film director Lino Brocka.
 Aquino also deliberately appointed five members, including former Labour
Minister Blas Ople, who had been allied with Marcos until the latter's ouster.
 After the Commission had convened, it elected Cecilia Muñoz-Palma as its
president. Muñoz-Palma had emerged as a leading figure in the anti-Marcos
opposition movement following her retirement as the first female Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court.
 The Commission finished the draft charter within four months after convening.
 Several issues were heatedly debated during the sessions, including on the form
of government to adopt, the abolition of the death penalty, the continued
retention of the Clark and Subic American military bases, and the integration of
economic policies into the Constitution. Brocka would walk out of the
Commission before its completion, and two other delegates would dissent from
the final draft.
 The ConCom completed their task on October 12, 1986 and presented the draft
constitution to President Aquino on October 15, 1986. It was ratified by a
nationwide plebiscite on February 2, 1987.
 Three other constitutions have effectively governed the country in its history:
the 1935 Commonwealth Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, and the 1986
Freedom Constitution. The earliest constitution establishing a "Philippine
Republic," the 1899 Malolos Constitution, was never fully implemented
throughout the Philippines and did not establish a state that was internationally
recognized, due in great part to the impending American occupation during its
adoption.

IN RE SATURNINO BERMUDEZ
FACTS:
In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the
court if the provision of the Section 5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to
wit: “The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected
in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992,” refers to the then-incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or the previously-
elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino.

After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino were
declared the winners, Aquino and Laurel were installed into the position last
February 25, 1986 after the infamous People Power Revolution. The next
regular election for the President and Vice-President was held last May 2, 1992.

ISSUE: Whether the aforecited article applies to the then-incumbent President

and Vice-President, or the previously elected President and Vice-President.

HELD:
The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:
1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory
relief. Rules of Court states that it is the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who
has the jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. Also, incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during
the period of their incumbency and tenure.
2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no
personality to use, and his allegation was manifestly gratuitous. The
legitimacy of the Aquino government was not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines
are the judge, and the people have made judgment.