MEMO

URGENT PLEASE

TO: MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER STAFF AND MANAGEMENT

FROM: JESSICA RICHMOND, CHEIF ENGINEER

MORTON THIOKOL, INC

DATE: DECEMBER 30, 1985

SUBJECT: NECESSITY TO RESCHEDULE LAUNCH OF SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER

1. BRIEF

The forecasted temperature, a low approximately 26°-29°F at the time of the Challenger
launch, is significantly less than any previous launch or test. Primary o-ring damage has
proven to be significant at lower temperatures and the secondary o-ring frequently fails . If
the current launch date and time is kept as scheduled, the outcome and damage would be
detrimental to our mission and reputation.

2. EVIDENCE

The coldest launch to date was 53°F and displayed substantial primary o-ring damage.
Secondary o-rings have failed at providing a safety net upon breakdown of the primary o-
ring, and thus cannot be relied on to prevent destruction of the entire vessel and loss of
crew (Winsor, 1988). Secondary o-rings malfunction due to joint rotation, which widens the
gap beyond what an o-ring can fill before causing fatal errors. Please refer to Figure 1 on the
following page to view the hazardous relationship between low temperatures and o-ring
wear. In Figure 1, a damage index has been assigned based on, "the severity-weighted total
number of incidents of o-ring erosion, heating and blow-by," (Tufte, 1997).

3. RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION

Resechedule the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger to a date with forcast temperatures
above 65°F to avoid catastrophic failure of mission and loss of life.
FIGURE 1:

Corelation of Temperature and O-ring

Damage
35

30

25

20

15

10

0
81 ° 79° 78° 76° 76° 75° 75° 73° 72° 70° 70° 70° 70° 69° 68° 67° 67° 67° 66° 63° 58° 57° 53° 29°

Degrees Fahrenheit

*This chart was created from data presented in Tufte's (1997) data analysis (page 22).

As displayed above, temperatures between 81° and 66°F are safe and provide minimal potential of
damage, whereas with temperatures below 57°F , the damage index increases exponentially and failure
is guaranteed.
 References

Tufte, E. R. (1997). The Decision to Launch the Space Shuttle Challenger. Visual and Statistical
Thinking: Displays of Evidence for Making Decisions (pp. 16-31). Cheshire, CT: Graphics
Press.

Winsor, D. A. (1988, September). Communication Failures Contributing to the Challenger

Accident: An Example for Technical Communicators. IEEE Transactions on Professional
Communication, 31 (3), 101-107.