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COMPLEXITY AS A SYSTEM PROPERTY†

a
ROBERT ROSEN
a
Department of Physiology and Biophysics , Dalhousie University , Halifax, Nova Scotia,
Canada
Published online: 06 Apr 2007.

To cite this article: ROBERT ROSEN (1977) COMPLEXITY AS A SYSTEM PROPERTY†, International Journal of General Systems,
3:4, 227-232

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 Int. J. General Systems © Gordon and Breach Science Publishers Ltd.
1977, Vol. 3, pp. 227-232 Printed in Great Britain

COMPLEXITY AS A SYSTEM PROPERTYt

ROBERT ROSEN
Department afPhysiology and Biophysics, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scalia, Canada.
(Received May 15, 1975; illf1lialform July 20, 1975)

Complexity is generally viewed as an intrinsic property of certain kinds of systems, or at least, as a property of a specific
description of such systems. The view towards complexity taken in the present note is different; namely, that complexity
reflects the necessity for many distinct modes of description of a system. This in turn depends upon the number of ways we
can effectively interact with a system, and ultimately on the number of distinct subsystems which available observational
techniques make accessible to us. A number of important implications of this point of view, bearing particularly on system
analysis in biology, and on reductionism as a general analytic strategy, are pointed out. The relation between the concepts of
complexity, error and emergence is briefly explored.

INDEX TERMS Systems, complexity.

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INTRODUCTION Our views regarding the concept of "complexity"

The early successes of science, particularly physics,
arose from its ability to take apparently incom-
prehensible situations, such as the motions of
celestial bodies, and explain them on the basis of
simple and immutable dynamical laws. It is im-
possible to overestimate the impact which New-
Ionian mechanics had upon Western thought; if the
whimsy of supernatural agents could be eliminated
from the heavens, then surely any phenomenon,
however complex it might appear, could likewise be
understood on the basis of laws as basically simple
and universal as those of celestial mechanics. This
conviction has informed all of modern science, and
has molded scientific development in all areas in
innumerable ways.
The notion that all complex processes could be
understood in terms of underlying simple universal
laws is indeed an article of faith, but one which has
been put increasingly to the test during the past
twenty-five years. Previously we have tended to
sidestep problems arising from complexity; we
could argue that these problems could be dealt with
if necessary, but since there were many simpler and
more tractable problems at hand, we would concern
ourselves with those. We are no longer able to do
this; social, biological and technological problems
of the first magnitude now bombard us from all
sides, demanding imminent resolution, and these
problems force us to confront directly the problems
of complexity.
t'This paper was prepared with the support of NIH grants
#2ROI HD05136-04 and # I POI HD07328-01, and NASA
Grant # NGR33015002.
227
have tended to be as richly varied as complexity
itself. There have always been scientists uneasy with
the view that all complexities could be reduced or
explained by simple laws, and not all of them can be
dismissed as "vitalists" or "holists." Bertrand Russ-
ell remarks somewhere that if asteroids were much
more common in the solar system than they in fact
are, the effects of their gravitational perturbations
upon the planets would have made the general-
izations of Copernicus and Kepler, and ultimately
the dynamics of Newton, impossible, and goes on 10
state that "thus we see how complexity can defeat
science." Von Neumann t argued that there was a
kind of "threshold" of complexity, below which the
world behaved with its familiar regularities, but
above which entirely new modes of behavior
appeared (such as self-reproduction, evolution and
free will) which were sui generis, with no counter-
parts in systems of lesser complexity. We have all
heard it said that complex systems are coulltel'-
intuitive, meaning that their behavior departs from
what "common-sense" (i.e., simple rules) suggests
their behavior ought to be. To what extent are such
observations consistent with the faith that, because
we can explain celestial mechanics in terms of simple
universal laws, we can explain any complexity in
similar terms?
The present note in intended as a contribution to
this question.
2 THE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM
One view of complexity, implicit in the remark of
von Neumann cited above, is that it is a system
 22H
property of the same character as any other system
property, and that it can in fact be measured. Thus a
good place to begin in a study of complexity is with a
study of general system properties and their
measurement. We shall here consider only those
system properties which can be perceived as
pertaining to the system at an instant of time, and
shall exclude those properties which are manifested
only over time (indeed, it is one of the tenets of
dynamical theory that these temporal properties
can be predicted from a knowledge of system
properties at a particular instant).
Let us suppose' that wc can represent our
interactions with any given system in a particular
canonical form: that any such interaction can be
replaced by a series of interactions' with special
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known systems which we call measuring instru-
mellts. A system interacting with a measuring
instrumcnt will result in a modification of the
measuring instrument culminating in a numerical
readout. Thus any observable property of the
system in which wc are interested can be trans-
formed into a set of numerical readings on some
appropriate measuring instruments; and con-
vcrscly, any set of numerical readings on the
measuring instruments refers to an observable
property (orjeature) ofthc system being observed.
Thus, if we allow our system to interact with a
measuring instrument M 1 at an instant of time, we
obtain a certain amount of information about what
our system is like at that instant. This information
takcs the form of a number, which we assign as the
value of the particular observable quantity meas-
ured by M I' If we wish. more information about
what the system is like, the only way to obtain it is to
interact the system with another measuring instru-
ment M 2 at the same instant, obtaining a second
number, t he value obtained by the observable M 2 al
that instant. If we wish still more information, we
must interact the system with a third measuring
instrument M), obtaining a third number, and so
on.
Complete information regarding the system at an
instant of time requires the values obtained by all
possible measuring instruments upon interaction
with the system at that instant (we leave aside
problems of quantum uncertainty; these do not
change the character of the argument). It turns out,
in general, that this information is highly re-
dundant; the values obtained on some of the
measuring instruments are functions of the values
obtaincd on others. If we can find a set ofmeasuring
instruments which is (a) of minimal size, and (b)
R. ROSEN
such that the values obtained by interacting the
system with any measuring instrument are definite
functions of those in the minimal set, then we say
that the minimal set defines a set of state variables
for the system. These state variables have the
property that any information pertaining to the
system in question at an instant of time are in
principle known when the values of the state
variables at that instant are known. In this way, we
can identify the instantaneous states of our system
with sets of numerical variates, and the slate space of
the system with a manifold. It should be noted that,
as a corollary of this definition, if two instantaneous
states of a system are different at all (i.e., give
different readings on some measuring instrument
M) then they already must give ditTerent readings on
at least one of the measuring instruments which
define the state variables. It should also be noted
that there is nothing unique about a set of state
variables,
In practice, of course, we do not have at our
disposal all of the possible measuring instruments,
but only a certain subset of them. If we treated that
subset as if it were the total set, we could proceed to
define a set of state variables relative to that subset,
and obtain thereby a description of the in-
stantaneous states of our system. Such a description
would be a relative description, and would in
general be quite different from the "absolute"
description involving all possible observable quan-
tities. Moreover, two such relative descriptions,
each defined by a difTerent subset of the set of all
possible observable quantities, would not only ditTer
from the "absolute" description, but would also
differ from each other. We have previously con-
sidered this problem of the relativity of system
descriptions (Rosen ').
To give some idea of the dimensions of the above
concepts, let us consider the situation in which a
system of interest is specified by a finitenumber of
state variables Xl"'" x•. Let us make the simplest
possible dynamical assumption about the system's
temporal behavior; namely, that the rate at which
each of the state variables is changing in a state is
determined only by that state. We then have, locally,
the familiar dynamical equations
i= 1,.. "n. (1 )
governing the change of state with time, and each
initial state of the system generally determines an
entire system trajectory, a curve parameterized by
 COMPLEXITY AS A SYSTEM PROPERTY
time winding through the Euclidean II-dimcnsional
space which represents the space of states of the
system. Now if F is any observable quantity, then by
definition F must be a function of the state variables;
F = F(x 1"'" x n ) inherits a dynamics from the
dynamical relations which govern the Xi' and this
can be computed if that dynamics is known. But if
we look at F directly with the measuring instrument
which measures it, and do not look at the Xi' we will
merely see a temporally varying quantity, with no
underlying substructure.
If G is another such observable quantity, it may
turn out that the dynamical relations governing F
and G may be put into the form
dF =cI> (F G)
dt v .
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i
(2)
In this situation, it will appear to us that the state
space of the system is two-dimensional, quite
different from the "real" system described by (I).
That is, we have found a "subsystem," specified by
the observable quantities F and G, with quite a
dilTerent description and set of properties than those
of the "real" or "total" system from which it was
obtained. There can be many such subsystems;
indeed, there exist dynamical systems (I) which are
ulliversal in the sense that they contain "sub-
systems" which inherit allY prescribed dynamics
whatsoever. 2 These subsystems are all present in the
original system, and which one we actually "see" is
specified entirely by how we choose to interact with
the system (i.e., which measuring instruments we
apply to the system).
3 ABSTRACTION, ANALYSIS,
REDUCTIONISM
We are going to define a complex system as one with
which we can interact effectively in many different
kinds of ways, each requiring a different mode of
system description. That is, a complex system is one
for which we have at our disposal alarge number of
subsets of measuring instruments, each of which
gives rise to a dilTerent mode of description of the
system. Another way of saying this is that a complex
system is one which allows us to discern many
subsystems (in the sense we used that term above),
depending entirely on how we choose to interact
with the system.
The above definition seems peculiar in several
ways. For one thing, it requires that complexity is
F
229
not an intrinsic property of systems, but rather
arises from the number of ways in which we are able
(or desire) to interact with a system. Indeed, from
what we said in the preceding system, allY system
can be made to appear complex in this sense. But a
moment's reflection will reveal that this is quite in
accord with our ordinary experience. A system like a
stone typically is regarded as simple, because we
interact with it in only a few ways. For a geologist,
who multiplies the number of ways in which he
interacts with a stone, such a system can appear
infinitely complex. Thus complexity is indeed a
function of the number of ways available to interact
with a system.
Another peculiarity of the definition is the
following. We said that the appearance of com-
plexity arises from the use of different subsets of the
set of all available measuring instruments, and the
corresponding different modes of system de-
scription which arise therefrom. But surely we could
put all the available subsets together, and obtain a
unified (if still relative) description. It turns out,
however, that the problem of reconciling such
alternate descriptions is a very deep problem,
closely related to ideas of structural stability." In
general, merely juxtaposing alternate modes of
description does not in general lead to a more
comprehensive description which embraces all of
the components.
Intuitively, how does one approach a complex
system scientifically? One attempts to analyze the
system into a family of simpler subsystems. By
definition, a simpler subsystem is one which is
capable of fewer modes of interaction than the
original system (at least, with respect to the
measuring instruments we are using). By charac-
terizing these simpler subsystems, we may hope to
obtain an understanding of how these subsystems
can interact with each other, and thereby, an
understanding of the original system from which the
subsystems were isolated.
Insofar as an analytic procedure isolates a
subsystem from a system, it involves a process of
abstraction. In general, observable quantities pre-
sent in the original system are discarded in the
extraction of the subsystem. These observable
quantities represent potential interactive capacities,
and their removal means precisely that the sub-
system is capable of fewer interactions than was the
original system. This is indeed the sense in which it is
true that a subsystem is simpler than the system
from which it was taken, and in fact comprises a
general definition of subsystem, as was used
 DO R. ROSEN
implicitly in the preceding section. It is the hope of
an analytical procedure to specify subsystems which
each retain some subfraction of the interactive
capacities of the original system, so that each
interactive capability is captured in one of the
subsystems of the analysis, and the total capabilities
of the original system can be recaptured by putting
the subsystems back together appropriately.
It is clear that not every mode of system
decomposition or analysis into subsystems will have
such a property. Suppose we consider a simple
linear dynamical system; e.g., a set of n chemicals
reacting by first-order kinetics. Such a system can be
described by the dynamical equations
(3 )
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Wc might try to isolate subsystems consisting of the
individual reacting species. These are certainly
.~impler than the system from which they are
abstracted, but (at least at this kinetic level) they
allow none of the properties of the original system to
be inferred from them. Thus, although the Xi
represent the observable quantities we choose to
measure, and in which we are directly interested,
they do not provide a useful mode of analysis of the
system.
Actually, of course, when confronted by a system
like (3), we proceed with a mathematical analysis.
We introduce nell' state variables
n is not that it advocates analysis of complex systems
lIj=Uj(xJ, ...,x,,)= L fiijx
j= 1
j,
choosing the numbers fJij so that the matrix of rate
constants (aij) assumes a particularly simple (dia-
gonal) form. If we can do this, then the dynamics of
the system, in the new state variables, can be written
dll,. I of subsystems, or any mode of analysis, from being
-=)~·ll· i= , ... ,11. (4 )
dt "
These new state variables u, are usually regarded
as convenient mathematical fictions. However, they
arc by definition observable quantities of the system
(i.e., functions of the state variables) and as such
could be measured directly if we could interact with
the system appropriately. The Ui have the property
that they decouple the dynamical equations, so that
instead of having a highly interactive (and hence
complex) system of n equations, we have a system of
11 dccouplcd simple first-order equations which can
be directly solved. Each Il, specifies a subsystem, in
the precise sense noted above, and these are the
subsystems which are appropriate for analysis. This
is true even though we cannot measure the U i
directly, and are interested in the directly observable
quantities Xi'
This example leads to the next important point.
What is "natural" from the standpoint of easy
measurability, and hence easy isolability of sub-
systems, can often be most' unnatural from the
standpoint of effective analysis of complex systems.
In the above example, the "natural" subsystems are
the Ili> not the Xi' The mere ease of isolation of a
subsystem does not at all imply that the subsystem
will be analytically useful. Thus in biology the
conspicuous properties of cells has Jed to the "cell
theory," that every biological property is to be
understood by means of analysis into constituent
cells. But the cell is often not the basic unit of
biological function, and the attempt to preserve the
cell as the analytical unit may actually render
analysis impossible. And this even though the cell is
indeed simpler than the entire organism.
This type of "vested interest" in an analytical unit
pervades much of the science of complex systems.
To insist on the cell as the ultimate unit of biological
organisms, or on individual organisms as the
ultimate unit of social structures, is often quite
inappropriate for the analysis of many properties of
the higher structures. This kind of "vested interest"
is often called reductionism, and is of course most
conspicuous in molecular biology. Its basic feature
into simpler subsystems (this is unavoidable in any
casejbut rather that it advocates, in advance, a set
of abstract subsystems which it posits to be the only
admissible units for analysis. But as we have seen,
the relativity of system descriptions, together with
the multiplicity of descriptions which provide the
very definition of complexity, preclude anyone class
universally valid.
In short, there are two features which must be
exhibited by a successful analysis of a complex
system into subsystems:
1) The subsystems must be simpler than the
system from which they were abstracted;
2) The subsystems must allow the properties of
interest in the original system to be reconstructed
from the properties of the subsystems.
To these features, experimental science also appends
a third: that the subsystems so abstracted must be
"natural," in the sense that they are easily com-
 COMPLEXITY AS A SYSTEM PROPERTY
patible with contemporary observational tech-
niques. Indeed, it is often argued that simplicity plus
"naturality" in this sense will imply the requisite
reconstructibility. This, however, is in general false;
indeed, it is precisely the subsystems which will
allow reconstructibility that are the "natural" units
of analysis in a given situation, however far removed
they may be from presently available observational
techniques.
4 COMPLEXITY, ERROR
AND EMERGENCE
A subsystem abstracted from a complex system, in
the sense described above, may be regarded as a
model of that system. The model shares certain
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properties with the original system, but other
properties have been abstracted away. The philo-
sophy of analysis of complex systems posits that a
sufficiently comprehensive family of such models
will allow us to reconstruct the properties of interest
of the original system (and here is should be stated
explicitly that different families of models may be
necessary to understand different sets of properties
of the original system).
Any such model, be it a real physical subsystem
(such as a molecular fraction removed from a cell) or
a mathematical abstraction (such as the functions 1/;
in (4) above) has simpler interactive capacities than
the real system does, by definition. The model is
what the real system would behave like if it had no
other interactive capabilities besides those retained
in the model. In environments in which no
interactions are possible other than those retained
in the model, the real system and the model would
behave identically.
However, in any real environment, the real
system will in general exhibit interactions besides
those retained in the model. These interactions are
in fact unpredictable from the model (since the
dynamical variables through which they occur have
been abstracted away to create the model). But since
all the dynamical variables are "linked" with each
other through the dynamics which govern the real
system, these unpredictable interactions will sooner
or later affect those observable quantities preserved
in the model. The result will be a deviation between
what the real system is actually doing, and what the
simple model predicts it will be doing. This
deviation is the basis for the concept of error in
system theory.
23t
When we say, for example, that a mutation
represents an "error" in the cellular coding system,
what we actually mean is something like the
following: DNA is capable of many interactions
besides those involved in its coding functions. Some
of these interactions can affect the coding functions.
When such an interaction occurs, there will be a
deviation between what our simple model tells us
ought to be coded, and what actually is coded. This
deviation we call a mutation, and we say that the
DNA has behaved erroneously.
Likewise, when we say that a neuron, or a
communication channel is "noisy," we mean pre-
cisely that the real physical system is exhibiting
interactions not comprehended in a simple model of
that system, and that these interactions are affecting
the modelled activities. The typical way of treating
this is to superimpose a stochastic variability on the
model. In formal terms, this stochastic aspect is
intended to reintroduce into the model the effect of
all those degrees of freedom which were abstracted
out in constructing the model.
In this view, error is the result of replacing
simplicity by complexity. Its inevitable correlate is
loss of individual functions, which presuppose
simple systems capable of only those interactions
which support the functions in question. It is in this
sense that senescence of organisms, and the failure of
mechanical artifacts and social institutions, can be
regarded as the result of "error"; they are uncon-
trollable deviations between the behavior of an
abstract functional model, and the behavior of a real
system, with interactive capabilities not present in
the model. "Error correction," which involves the
intervention in the real system on the basis of yet
another simple model, cannot in principle solve this
problem.
On the other hand, such "error" is in fact the
driving force for biological evolution, and for the
emergence of new properties in interacting systems.
Emergence has always been a puzzle, precisely
because its roots were sought in simple models,
where the very basis for its occurrence in real
systems was abstracted away. From the viewpoint
expounded in the present note, it is seen as the
inevitable corollary of the greater richness of
interactive capabilities in a real system than is
present in any abstraction from that system.
The above considerations represent a sketch of a
more general development, which will be presented
elsewhere.
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