Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Admissibility
Reyes vs. CA
HELD
No. The trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of
Respondents, Eufrocina and Efren Tecson, although the affiants were not
presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946
provides that the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases
even in a suppletory character." The same provision states that "In the
hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy,
affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in
evidence".
HELD
There are guiding principles in rape cases as cited in People vs. Abrecinoz: x
x x (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. Thus, the credibility of the complainant is a paramount
importance, and if her testimony proves credible, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof.
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Agustin vs. CA
Constitutionalit
y of DNA
paternity
testing
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged
biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules
of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the
applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
HELD
No. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Relevance
It was also alleged that appellee, Sears, sold to appellee, Heesen, one of said
Higgins Model 51 hunting rifles; that said rifle was negligently designed or
manufactured by appellee, Sears, in that the safety mechanism moved
readily and in a dangerous manner from a "safe" to a "fire" position. In
addition, it was alleged that the rifle in this dangerous condition known to
appellee, Sears, was sold to appellee, Heesen, with the knowledge that it
would be used for hunting purposes and that appellee, Sears, negligently
failed to warn appellee, Heesen, of the dangerous and defective condition of
the rifle.
The complaint further alleged that on the afternoon of October 15, 1958, in
Colfax County, New Mexico, appellee, Heesen, negligently permitted the rifle
to discharge while hunting and that as a proximate result of the joint and
concurrent negligence of both appellees, appellant sustained a severe and
disabling wound and injury to his chest, requiring hospital and surgical care.
HELD
Yes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
The Court hold that the testimony as to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale,
who manufacture the safety device on the Higgins Model 51, and the
reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt
Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which
have the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51, was
relevant to the issue of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51
was unsafe or safe.
The testimony of these witnesses, all experts in their field, was upon the
ultimate issue of fact of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51
was dangerous and defective or unsafe, and was properly the subject of
expert testimony. Opinion evidence on an ultimate issue of fact does not
attempt or have the power to usurp the functions of the jury, and this
evidence could not usurp the jury's function because the jury may still reject
these opinions and accept some other view.
In 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 775, p. 647, the rule is stated as follows:
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the experts to
express their opinion.