This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been
fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812185, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Band Energy Difference for Source Attribution in
Audio Forensics
Da Luo, Member, IEEE, Paweł Korus, Member, IEEE, and Jiwu Huang, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Digital audio recordings are one of the key types
of evidence used in law enforcement proceedings. As a result,
the development of reliable techniques for forensic analysis of
such recordings is of principal importance. One of the main
problems in forensic analysis is source attribution, i.e., verifying
whether a certain recording was acquired with a given device.
While this problem has been widely studied for other types
of multimedia signals, there are very few techniques for audio
recordings. Moreover, reported evaluation results were obtained
from extremely small datasets on the order of a dozen devices.
The goal of this paper is to propose a new feature set, the
band energy difference (BED) descriptor, for source attribution
of digital speech recordings. We demonstrate that a frequency
response curve extracted from sample recordings can serve
as a robust fingerprint that carries significant discriminative
power and can characterize the recording device. We study
two sub-problems of source attribution: (a) identification of a
recording device among a list of possible candidates (device
identification); and (b) confirmation that a suspected device
has indeed been used to acquire the recording in question
(device verification). For our evaluation, we prepared two novel
datasets: a controlled-conditions dataset with 31 devices; and an
uncontrolled-conditions dataset with 141 devices. Our experimen-
tal evaluation demonstrates that the proposed BED descriptor is
effective for both device identification and verification. In the
former task, we reached an accuracy of over 96%. In the latter,
we obtained a high true positive rate of 89% while maintaining
a fixed low false positive rate of 1%.
Index Terms—Audio forensics, source attribution, recording
devices identification, band energy difference response, micro-
phone fingerprint.
I. I NTRODUCTION
OURT proceedings and law enforcement procedures
C increasingly rely on a variety of multimedia data that
can be easily acquired by ubiquitous smart mobile devices.
This work was supported in part by the NSFC (U1636202,
61602318, 61631016) and in part by Shenzhen R&D Program
(JCYJ20160328144421330) and in part by the Beijing Key Laboratory
of Advanced Information Science and Network Technology under Grant
XDXX1602.
D. Luo is with the Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Media Security, College
of Information Engineering, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China, and also
with the Computer and Network Security Institute, Dongguan University of
Technology, Dongguan, China (e-mail: luoda@szu.edu.cn).
P. Korus is with Tandon School of Engineering, New York University, USA
and also with the Department of Telecommunications, AGH University of
Science and Technology, Kraków Poland. The presented research was carried
out while he was with the Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Media Security,
College of Information Engineering, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China
(e-mail: pkorus@agh.edu.pl).
J. Huang is with the Guangdong Key Laboratory of Intelligent Infor-
mation Processing and Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Media Security, Col-
lege of Information Engineering, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China (e-
mail:jwhuang@szu.edu.cn).
1556-6013 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
1
Digital photographs, and audio and video recordings are com-
monly used as evidence. To ensure their credibility, the field
of multimedia forensics has developed numerous techniques
to assess the origin, processing history and authenticity of
the acquired data. Source attribution is one of the most
important problems in this field, and encompasses two main
problem classes: a) identification - which involves linking an
investigated recording to one of several suspected acquisition
devices; b) verification - which involves confirmation that an
investigated recording was acquired by a specific acquisition
device. Both problems have two principal variations where the
goal is to confirm either the model or a specific instance of
the acquisition device.
The source attribution problem for digital photographs has
been studied in detail, leading to reliable verification pro-
tocols [1–7]. The fundamental principle of camera instance
attribution involves matching sensor pattern noise signatures -
a consistent bias of individual pixels of the imaging sensor
stemming from manufacturing imperfections. Similar tech-
niques also exist for video cameras [8] and scanners [9, 10].
In camera model attribution, the typical approach involves
exploiting machine learning techniques trained on low-level
image features [11, 12].
In contrast to digital images, source attribution techniques
for audio recordings are still in an early stage of develop-
ment. Contemporary forensic investigations of audio record-
ings rely primarily on manual comparisons of waveforms and
spectrograms against reference material acquired in similar
conditions [11]. Due to the complexity of possible sounds,
recording environments and distorting factors, the goal is to
authenticate the whole acquisition context, which includes,
but is not limited to the used microphone. One of the best-
established analysis methods involves authentication of the
electric network frequency signature which allows one to
roughly confirm the location of the recording as well as expose
its prospective discontinuities [13].
Adoption of machine learning methods is still in its infancy
and remains limited to academic research. Most existing stud-
ies rely on generic acoustic features, such as Mel-frequency
cepstral coefficients (MFCCs), and use very small datasets
including approximately a dozen devices (see Section II for
a detailed summary of existing research). In contrast, mature
camera attribution protocols have been tested on large scale
datasets with thousands of individual devices representing up
to 150 distinct models [14]. Hence, significantly larger datasets
will be needed to reliably assess the performance of existing
and future methods.
In this paper we address the problem of microphone attri-
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812185, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
bution and focus on speech recordings obtained using smart-
phones. We propose a new feature set, the band energy
difference descriptor, and demonstrate its efficiency for two
typical attribution problems: device identification and veri-
fication. The proposed feature set is compact and easy to
compute. It allowed us to obtain over 96% classification
accuracy with a standard support vector machine classifier.
Our evaluation is performed on two novel datasets: (a)
controlled-conditions recordings from 31 smart-phones; and
(b) uncontrolled-conditions recordings from 141 smart-phones.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest and most
comprehensive evaluation of this kind to date.
The main contributions of our work include the following:
• proposal of a compact feature set, called a band energy
difference descriptor, which characterizes the frequency
response of the device; we demonstrate that the proposed
feature set provides meaningful and discriminative fea-
tures that work effectively in both device identification
and verification;
• creation of two novel datasets with recordings obtained
in controlled and uncontrolled conditions; both datasets
are significantly larger than their previously used coun-
terparts.
• extensive evaluation of the proposed and state-of-the-art
techniques on the created data-sets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related
work on source attribution of audio recordings. The proposed
descriptor is described in detail in Section III, along with the
considered device identification and verification procedures.
Section IV presents the results of our experimental evaluation.
We conclude in Section V. For the sake of research repro-
ducibility, the code of our method and the data-sets used in
our evaluation can be obtained online1 .
II. R ELATED W ORK
Research on machine-learning-based source attribution of
audio recordings began with the pioneering work of Kraetzer et
al., who proposed a set of intra-window and inter-window fea-
tures based on time-domain, frequency-domain and cepstral-
domain characteristics [15]. A follow up study improved the
detection accuracy by using decision fusion with two multi-
class classifiers: a decision tree and a linear logistic regression
model [16]. Example features included in the newest ver-
sion (v.3.0.1) of the Kraetzer’s descriptor include parameters
like zero cross rate, entropy, RMS amplitude, pitch, spectral
smoothness, Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients, etc. In total,
the descriptor includes 592 intra-window and 17 inter-window
features. For details, the reader is referred to [17].
Despite the variety of the included features, feature rank-
ing performed by Kraetzer et al. in [17, 18] revealed that
the discriminative power of this descriptor relies mostly on
MFCCs and filtered MFCCs. Based on this descriptor, a
learning algorithm can be trained to distinguish between
different microphones. The method has been tested on up to 8
microphones, and to the best of our knowledge, it still awaits
large-scale evaluation.
1 The data will be published online later.
1556-6013 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
2
A similar approach was later discussed by Hanilçi et al.
who also used MFCCs to identify the brand and model of
cellphones that acquired a given recording [19]. The authors
used a dataset with 14 cellphone models and considered both
vector quantization (VQ) and support vector machines (SVMs)
for classification. In a follow up study, Hanilçi et al. further
optimized acoustic features for cellphone recognition [20].
They considered Mel-frequency, linear frequency and Bark
frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs, LFCCs and BFCCs,
respectively) as well as linear prediction cepstral coefficients
(LPCCs). Their evaluation covered various strategies of feature
optimization including feature normalization, cepstral mean
normalization, cepstral mean and variance normalization, and
delta and double-delta coefficients. The study concluded that
while baseline MFCCs outperformed other types of features,
adoption of cepstral mean and variance normalization yields
superior performance for LPCCs (with only slightly better
results than MFCCs).
An alternative approach proposed by Garcia-Romero and
Espy-Wilson [21] uses Gaussian mixture models to distinguish
between microphones and improve speaker recognition accu-
racy. In this case, a set of GMM parameters is essentially
used as a joint speaker-microphone pair descriptor. Similar to
other studies, the method has been tested on a small dataset
(8 landline telephone handsets and 8 microphones) and awaits
large-scale evaluation.
A Gaussian mixture model was also used by Kotropoulos
and Samaras [22], who extracted MFCCs from individual
frames of a recording and trained a GMM with diagonal
covariance matrices. The template for each device was con-
structed from Gaussian super-vectors (GSVs). The described
method was evaluated on a dataset of 21 cell-phones repre-
senting 7 different brands. The authors reported identification
accuracy of 97.6% with the use of neural networks with
radial basis function (RBF) kernels. Zou [23] also employed
GSVs with MFCCs to characterize sparse representations
(fingerprints) of 14 cell phones.
Eskidere used a GMM classifier and compared its per-
formance on various acoustic features including MFCCs,
LPCCs, and perception-based linear predictive coefficients
(PLPCs) [24]. He tested the algorithm on 16 different micro-
phones and concluded that the best identification accuracy can
be obtained with LPCCs. The obtained identification accuracy
reached 99.6% for a speaker-independent model (100% in the
speaker-dependent case).
Panagakis and Kotropoulos proposed using random spectral
features (RSFs) extracted from averaged spectrograms by pro-
jection onto Gaussian random matrices [25]. They considered
a sparse-representation classifier and obtained identification
accuracy of 95.55% on a dataset with 8 landline telephone
handsets. In a follow-up study [26], the same authors included
additional labeled spectral features and improved the identifi-
cation accuracy reaching 97.58%.
In their most recent paper, Panagakis and Kotropou-
los [27] proposed a new classification approach based on over-
complete dictionaries, where each feature vector is represented
as a linear combination of atoms from a dictionary. The
features are extracted by averaging spectrograms and MFCCs
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812185, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
and taking their random projection in a similar manner as
for RSFs. The classifier selects the device, whose atoms
yield the lowest reconstruction error in a regularized sparse
representation. The described approach was tested on a dataset
with 8 landline telephone handsets, and the best variant under
consideration achieved a classification accuracy of 97.67%.
Jahanirad et al. considered a related problem of source de-
vice identification for VoIP calls made from smartphones [28]
and computers [29]. Their approach uses the entropy of
MFCCs extracted from silent frames of the recordings. The
authors tested many variants of the feature set and several
popular classifiers. They reported a classification accuracy of
99.9% on two datasets with: (a) 21 smartphones [28]; and (b)
up to 10 Mac computers or PCs [29].
Cuccovillo et al. proposed a feature vector for microphone
discrimination and used it for audio tampering detection [30]
and source attribution [31]. The features were based on blind
channel estimation. In a recent follow-up study, they adapted
their descriptor to an open-set classification approach [32].
While the authors reported good classification results across
various compression settings (the Rand index measure of at
least 94%), the approach was tested on only 8 acquisition
devices (both smartphones and computers).
Finally, the problem has also been approached from the
perspective of statistics. Statistical methods based on fre-
quency coefficients were considered by Buchholz et al. [33].
Malik and Miller proposed an interesting novel approach that
extracts higher-order statistical features from the estimated
scale-invariant Hu moments of the bicoherence magnitude
spectrum [34]. For microphone identification, they used cross-
correlation between bicoherence phase spectra. Similar to
previous studies, the method was tested on 8 microphones, and
also awaits large-scale evaluation. In a recent paper, Eskidere
considered wavelet-based features [35], which compared fa-
vorably to MFCCs on a dataset with 14 acquisition devices of
various types (notebooks, MP3 players, smart-phones, digital
voice recorders, etc.).
III. BAND ENERGY DIFFERENCE DESCRIPTOR
This section introduces the proposed feature set, referred
to as a band energy difference (BED) descriptor. The audio
acquisition pipeline begins with conversion of mechanical
motion of a diaphragm into an electrical signal. The result-
ing signal is then quantized and post-processed. Finally, the
recording is compressed for storage or transmission (popular
formats include AMR, MP3, WMA and M4A). The details
of this pipeline differ among manufacturers leading to minor
variations and artifacts that can be used for forensic analysis.
We observed that some frequency bands tend to exhibit
significant deviations of their energy compared to adjacent
bands. This behavior is consistent across multiple devices
and various recording conditions, including different speakers
and recording environments. Example deviations are shown in
Fig. 1 for 6 smart-phones from 2 manufacturers. The reported
statistics were collected from 300 audio clips recorded in
different locations and with different speakers. To capture
these variations, we consider a feature descriptor computed
1556-6013 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
3
from the differences in energies of adjacent frequency bands.
The resulting descriptor can discriminate between different
recording devices for various acquisition contexts.
A. Descriptor Computation
The proposed descriptor is computed as follows. First, the
audio recording s is divided into N -sample frames s(t) with
t = 1, . . . , T being the index of the frame. Then, an N -element
window H is applied to every frame, yielding:
x(t) = Hs(t) . (1)
In our experiments, we used the popular Hamming window.
We found that the choice of the window function has negli-
gible impact on the achievable classification performance. In
Appendix A, we report the obtained results for other window
functions.
In the next step, a discrete Fourier transform is computed for
every frame, yielding X(t) . Let Xk denote the k-th element
of X. The feature vector for each frame is defined as:
 (t) (t)
(t) 1 |Xk+1 | − |Xk | >= 0,
Fk = (2)
0 otherwise,
where k = 1, 2, ..., N/2 − 1 due to the spectrum’s symme-
try. The final descriptor D of the recording is obtained by
averaging the features for all frames:
T
X
D= F(t) . (3)
t=1
The above procedure leads to a compact, efficiently com-
putable descriptor with N/2 − 1 dimensions. Fig. 2 shows
example descriptors (N = 256) for 11 smart-phones obtained
in 2 different locations with four different speakers. It can be
observed that certain characteristics revealed by the descriptor,
e.g., peaks in certain locations remain stable despite variations
in the recorded content and the recording conditions.
Discriminative capability of the proposed descriptor can also
be observed in Fig. 3 which shows a t-SNE [36] mapping
of BED descriptors from 31 smart-phones (one speaker and
one recording environment). Most of the devices form clearly
separable clusters, even in the 2-dimensional projection of the
descriptors. This clearly demonstrates the potential utility of
this descriptor in forensic applications. A detailed analysis of
its performance for both device identification and verification
will be presented in Section IV.
B. Source Attribution Framework
Source attribution involves two main sub-problems, illus-
trated in Fig. 4 [11]:
• Device identification is a multi-class classification prob-
lem and involves a candidate list of devices, one of which
is known to be the correct acquisition device. A classifier
is then trained to distinguish between the devices.
• Device verification is a two-class classification problem
which aims to confirm whether a questioned recording
was acquired by a specific target device.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812185, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Huawei (a)
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Huawei (b)
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Huawei (c)
Fig. 1. Examples of statistical artifacts captured by the proposed BED descriptor: red circles mark the most significant deviations of band energy difference
for 6 smart-phones from 2 manufacturers; the statistics were obtained from 300 audio clips recorded in different locations with different speakers.
This section will describe in detail the procedures that a
forensic analysis should follow. For both sub-problems, we use
a support vector machine2 (SVM) with a radial basis kernel
as a classifier. The parameters of the SVM (C, γ) were found
using grid search in the exponential ranges [−5, 7] and [−3, 7]
for C and γ, respectively. The classifiers were trained on
audio features extracted from 2 second-long, non-overlapping
segments. Such a length has been determined by previous
research to be sufficient for the application at hand [11].
1) Device identification: In the device identification sce-
nario, our framework requires the following inputs: (1) a
speech recording, whose source needs to be identified; (2)
suspected smart-phones, one of which is known to be the
original recording device.
To train an identification model, it is necessary to record
training samples with all of the suspected devices described
above. The recording conditions should match the questioned
recording as closely as possible, in particular with respect
to the recording environment (see Section IV-C for more
information about the robustness of the descriptor).
Based on the example recordings, the next step is to
extract BED descriptors according to the procedure from
Section III-A. A multi-class classification model is then trained
based on the above descriptors. Finally, the questioned record-
ing is processed by the trained identification model, which
determines the most likely acquisition device.
2 We have also tried other classifiers and obtained similar, albeit slightly
worse results (for all considered forensic features). Specifically, we observed
approx. 2% deterioration for the Fisher linear discriminant (FLD) ensem-
ble [37] and a further 1.5% drop for a neural network with dropouts. The
deterioration was consistent for both device identification and verification
problems.
1556-6013 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
4
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
iPhone (a)
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
iPhone (b)
0.6
0.4
0.2
iPhone (c)
2) Device verification: In the device verification scenario,
our framework requires the following inputs: (1) a speech
recording, whose source needs to be verified; (2) the target
smart-phone that is claimed to have recorded the clip; (3) other,
non-target smart-phones to provide representative counter-
examples. To train a verification model, it is necessary to
record training samples with all of the devices described
above. Similar to the identification scenario, the recording
conditions should match the questioned clip as closely as
possible.
Based on the example recordings, the next step is to extract
BED descriptors and train a two-class classifier to distinguish
between the target device and the non-target devices. Hence,
one class is trained with examples from the target device
and the second class is trained with examples from randomly
chosen non-target devices. The impact of various aspects
of choosing non-target devices, including their number and
models, will be addressed in detail in Section IV-F. In order
to guarantee a low false positive rate, the classifier should be
trained to yield posterior probabilities of its decisions. Then,
a proper decision threshold can be chosen based on n-fold
cross validation on the above training set. This issue will be
addressed in Section IV-F.
IV. E XPERIMENTAL E VALUATION
To validate our approach, we conducted an extensive experi-
mental evaluation, which covered both of the source attribution
problems introduced in Section III-B: device identification
and verification. In addition to the proposed descriptor, we
considered two baseline approaches: (1) a 12-dimensional
vector of MFCC coefficients; (2) Kraetzer’s 609-dimensional
audio forensic feature (AFF) vector [17]. In the following
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812185, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
5

(iPhone) M1@A F1@A M2@A F2@A M1@C F1@C M2@C F2@C

#1
(Xiaomi)
#4
(iPhone)
#7
(iPhone)
#10
(Xiaomi)
#13
(Xiaomi)
#16
(iPhone)
#19
(Xiaomi)
#22
(Oppo)
#25
(Xiaomi)
#28
(Huawei)
#31

Fig. 2. Example band energy difference (BED) descriptors for 11 smart-phones (successive rows) obtained in various recording conditions (successive
columns): two different locations (denoted as A and C) and 4 different speakers - two males (M1 , M2 ) and two females (F1 , F2 ).

description, the above approaches will be referred to as MFCC
and Kraetzer’s AFF, respectively.
A. Datasets
Noting the lack of large-scale datasets in previous studies,
we prepared two novel datasets for our evaluation: (1) a
controlled-conditions dataset with 31 devices (CC dataset); and
(2) an uncontrolled-conditions dataset with 141 devices (UC
dataset). A brief description of the structure and the acquisition
protocols is presented below. A detailed list of the recording
devices can be found in supplementary materials.
Most of the presented experiments were performed on the
CC dataset which guarantees that our feature set can capture
device-specific characteristics. It also allows to assess sensitiv-
ity to the recording conditions. The UC dataset demonstrates
the scalability of the proposed descriptor, even in challenging
conditions of numerous similar devices and recording contexts.
a) Controlled-conditions dataset: This dataset contains
uncompressed3 recordings of human speech, acquired using
31 different smart-phones. All recordings were acquired in
3 Due to recording software limitations, we could not record raw WAV audio
on iPhones. Instead, we used the M4A format with the default bit-rate.
mono mode with a 44,100 Hz sampling rate. We recorded a
2-minute clip for each of 4 individual speakers (2 males, and
2 females) in 4 locations (office 1, office 2, hall, platform)
leading to 16 unique configurations. For each speaker, we
recorded a different utterance. To ensure that each phone is
recording the same content, we compiled a 9-minute long
reference clip that was played back and recorded with all
smart-phones simultaneously (in batches of 5 phones per
session). To ensure good quality, we recorded the initial speech
with a Takstar TS-6800 wireless professional microphone and
used speakers from Logitech Lapdesk N550 for playback.
Individual speakers in the reference clip were separated by a
distinct monotone beep, padded with a few seconds of silence.
The final clips were obtained by automatic segmentation and
synchronization of the recordings based on the beeps.
b) Uncontrolled-conditions dataset: This dataset con-
tains compressed (MP3/M4A with 128 kbps) recordings of
human speech, acquired using 141 different smart-phones.
Similar to the CC dataset, all recordings were obtained in
mono mode with 44,100 Hz sampling. The recordings are
10 minutes long and represent various content, speakers, and
recording locations (some locations/speakers are featured in
many recordings). This data-set contains multiple recordings

1556-6013 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812185, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
6

iphone MI
iphone MI
MI4LTE iphone
iphone iphone
iphone iphone
Meizu iphone
MI iphone
Meizu MI
Zukz iphone
iphone Huawei
Nexus MI
Samsung iphone
OPPO Note
Xperia MI
Vivo Letv
Huawei

Fig. 3. Visualization of the discriminative power of the proposed BED descriptor: 2-D t-SNE projection of BED descriptors for 31 smart-phones in a selected
location for a selected speaker; it can be observed that even in the projected 2-D space, the devices are easily separated.

Fig. 4. Two main source attribution scenarios: a) device identification with N-class classification problem; b) device verification with a two-class classification
problem.

1556-6013 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812185, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
7

Location A (office 1) Location B (foffice 2) Location C (hall) Location D (platform)

TABLE I
AVERAGE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY FOR DIFFERENT FRAME LENGTHS ;
TRAINING TIME IS REPORTED RELATIVE TO THE SHORTEST FRAME . M1@A 99 76 81 75 74 52 56 55 84 57 62 63 54 35 45 37

F1@A 77 100 78 80 54 72 51 59 51 82 55 67 37 52 40 39
Device identification [%] Device verification [%] Training
N M2@A 84 77 99 83 59 51 71 58 70 58 82 68 46 38 58 42
time
UC dataset CC dataset UC dataset CC dataset
F2@A 86 88 92 99 65 63 65 74 71 68 76 87 45 45 51 55
512 98.54 96.64 98.04 96.80 7-11×
256 99.07 96.59 97.64 96.53 3.5-4.5× M1@B 67 48 54 50 100 81 85 84 64 42 46 43 43 31 34 24
128 98.80 95.14 97.62 95.86 1.5-2×
64 96.70 93.01 97.15 95.67 1× F1@B 53 67 49 57 85 100 78 90 40 55 44 48 33 38 32 31

testing configuration
M2@B 49 44 63 48 80 74 99 87 44 39 58 45 35 32 39 29

F2@B 55 58 58 63 87 89 90 98 51 47 52 57 41 40 42 42
obtained with the same models/brands of the phones. The most
M1@C 83 53 60 57 69 39 45 44 99 70 76 75 55 36 39 37
notable groups include 44 iPhones, 25 Huawei phones, and 25
F1@C 58 86 57 64 45 68 42 51 74 99 72 81 40 53 34 39
Xiaomi phones.
M2@C 70 60 82 66 53 37 65 50 91 75 100 87 46 41 60 44

77 72 77 87 59 52 56 68 88 86 93 99 52 48 50 55
B. Parameter Selection F2@C

M1@D 57 36 40 40 46 35 34 37 54 31 37 42 100 72 82 86
Computation of the proposed descriptor involves choosing
the frame length N . To determine the best frame length, we F1@D 41 57 39 43 39 47 35 38 40 55 37 46 87 100 86 90

performed both device identification and verification on the M2@D 39 32 58 38 40 31 50 34 37 32 59 39 86 73 100 86

UC and CC datasets. Based on the obtained results (Table I) F2@D 46 44 48 54 42 41 36 48 48 40 49 59 93 87 96 100

we chose frame length N = 256 for future experiments since M1@A F1@A M2@A F2@A M1@B F1@B M2@B F2@B M1@C F1@C M2@C F2@C M1@D F1@D M2@D F2@D

it delivered the best results in device identification (averaged training configuration

for UC and CC datasets), and nearly the best results in device

Fig. 5. Classification accuracy in a cross-configuration scenario where training
verification, while requiring a reasonable training time (the is performed in different conditions than testing; configurations correspond to
reported values correspond to the typical range for both the the Cartesian product of 4 recording locations (A,B,C and D) and 4 speakers:
device identification and verification scenarios). male 1 (M1 ), male 2 (M2 ), female 1 (F1 ) and female 2 (F2 ).

C. Generalization Capability of the BED Descriptor
To investigate the robustness of the proposed descriptor, we
considered a cross-configuration scenario where the training
samples are chosen from one context (i.e., a {speaker, loca-
tion} pair) and the testing samples from another. The results
for the device identification scenario are collected in Fig. 5.
The reported values correspond to the average classification
accuracy. It can be observed that when the training and
testing configurations match, the identification accuracy is
nearly 100% (see the diagonal). It can also be observed that
the proposed descriptor is fairly robust to the speakers (see
red/orange squares around the diagonal) but more sensitive
to the background noise of the recording environment. Note
that despite obvious performance deterioration, the accuracy is
always considerably better than for random guessing (≈3.2%).
D. Training Protocols
While it is relatively easy to replicate the recording environ-
ment, acquiring more speech samples from a specific person
may be more challenging. Moreover, a single trained model
should be able to handle challenging scenarios with multiple
speakers. Hence, to address the sensitivity of the proposed
descriptor to the speaker’s voice, we considered a cross-
speaker4 training protocol, i.e., designate a target speaker
for testing and train the classifier on speech examples from
the remaining 3 speakers. Such an approach gives a more
representative assessment of expected model performance, and
4 We also considered an analogous cross-environment scenario, where 3
environments are used for training and the remaining one is used for testing.
See Appendix B for the obtained device identification results.
hence was used in the experiments described below. For the
sake of statistical sufficiency, we repeated the training 20 times
with random division of the data into training and testing
samples.
E. Device Identification Performance
1) CC Dataset: Tab. II compares the average identification
accuracy of the considered descriptors. The best result for each
configuration is marked in bold. The proposed BED descriptor
delivers the best performance for most of the configurations
(15 out of 16). In the remaining 1 configuration, it is only
slightly worse than the state-of-the-art Kraetzer’s AFF set.
The raw MFCC descriptor is significantly inferior for all
configurations. A detailed confusion matrix for the proposed
BED descriptor is shown in Tab. III. The average identification
accuracy is 96.6% with the worst per-phone accuracy of 88%
and a median of 98%.
2) UC Dataset: In this experiment, we performed device
identification on the large-scale UC dataset. A single SVM
classifier was trained to distinguish between 141 devices.
The obtained average classification accuracies for the MFCC,
Kraetzer’s AFF and BED descriptors are 93.8%, 98.0% and
99.1%, respectively. The distributions of the scores along the
diagonal of the confusion matrix are shown in Fig. 7.
F. Device Verification Performance
1) CC Dataset: The device verification scenario is a two-
class classification problem. Hence, training a classifier in-
volves choosing non-target devices. This process is expected
to introduce additional variations to the analysis, and hence

1556-6013 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812185, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
8

MFCC : TPR (96.9%) / FPR (9.7%) MFCC : TPR (36.7%) for FPR=1%
100 100
true / false positive rate [%]

true positive rate [%]

80 80

60 60

40 40

20 20

0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

device ID device ID
Kraetzer’s AFF : TPR (99.4%) / FPR (8.8%) Kraetzer’s AFF : TPR (54.0%) for FPR=1%
100 100
true / false positive rate [%]

true positive rate [%]

80 80

60 60

40 40

20 20

0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

device ID device ID
BED : TPR (99.8%) / FPR (6.8%) BED : TPR (88.9%) for FPR=1%
100 100
true / false positive rate [%]

true positive rate [%]

80 80

60 60

40 40

20 20

0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

device ID device ID

Fig. 6. Comparison of true/false positive rates in the device verification scenario: (top) MFCC features; (middle) Kraetzer’s AFF; (bottom) proposed descriptor;
(left) SVM decision for a default decision threshold; (right) true positive rates for fixed false positive rate of 0.01.

TABLE II 100
C OMPARISON OF DEVICE IDENTIFICATION PERFORMANCE WITH
CROSS - SPEAKER TRAINING
correct detection rate [%]

Identification accuracy [%] per target speakers 90

Loc. M1 F1 M2 F2 Av.
MFCC
Office 1 89.6 ± 0.14 89.9 ± 0.18 83.7 ± 0.16 73.4 ± 0.06 84.2 80
Office 2 86.5 ± 0.27 93.9 ± 0.33 79.1 ± 0.24 77.4 ± 0.34 84.2
Hall 84.9 ± 0.04 91.3 ± 0.08 88.6 ± 0.11 79.8 ± 0.09 86.1
Platform 86.7 ± 0.06 92.6 ± 0.12 85.0 ± 0.34 77.8 ± 0.19 85.5
Kraetzer’s AFF 70
Office 1 92.5 ± 0.30 94.3 ± 0.19 85.1 ± 0.15 86.2 ± 0.19 89.5
Office 2 90.5 ± 0.24 89.3 ± 0.31 79.4 ± 0.58 82.0 ± 0.39 85.3 MFCC Kraetzer’s AFF BED
Hall 89.9 ± 0.31 94.8 ± 0.12 89.6 ± 0.22 86.7 ± 0.27 90.3
Platform 94.8 ± 0.25 95.8 ± 0.07 88.9 ± 0.06 92.9 ± 0.32 93.1 Fig. 7. Distribution of correct classification rates for the MFCC, Kraetzer’s
Proposed BED descriptor AFF and BED descriptors on the large-scale UC dataset.
Office 1 96.3 ± 0.10 96.1 ± 0.06 96.2 ± 0.08 94.7 ± 0.16 95.8
Office 2 96.3 ± 0.09 97.1 ± 0.07 95.1 ± 0.08 96.7 ± 0.09 96.3
Hall 97.3 ± 0.03 92.7 ± 0.07 97.2 ± 0.04 97.5 ± 0.02 96.2
Platform 98.0 ± 0.02 97.9 ± 0.02 98.3 ± 0.08 98.1 ± 0.05 98.1 we repeated the experiment 20 times to assess the strength
of this variation. In the experiments on the CC dataset, we

1556-6013 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812185, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
9

TABLE III
C ONFUSION MATRIX OF THE PROPOSED BED DESCRIPTOR IN THE DEVICE IDENTIFICATION SCENARIO WITH CROSS - SPEAKER TRAINING

97 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

1 90 . 3 . . 2 . 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . 99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 6 . 89 . . 1 . 3 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . 100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 . . . . 99 . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6 1 . . . . 97 . 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 . . . . . . 91 . 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8 3 . 1 . . 2 . 93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 . . . . . . 2 . 97 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 . . . . . 1 . 1 . 98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11 . . . . . . . . . . 96 . . . 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12 . . . . . . . . 2 . . 97 . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . .
13 . . . . 3 . . . . . . . 90 . . . . . . . 3 2 . . . . . . . . .
14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15 . . . . . . . . . . 1 . . . 98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . .
16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 . . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . .
17 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . . . 94 . . . 3 . . . . . . . 1 . .
18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . . . 99 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19 . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . 99 . . . . . . . . . . . .
20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 . . . . . . . . . . .
21 . 1 . . 1 . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . 88 2 . . . 1 . . 5 . .
22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 . . . . . . . . .
23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 . 95 . . . . . . . .
24 . . . . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 97 . . . . . . .
25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . 99 . . . . . .
26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 . . . . .
27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 . . . .
28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 . . .
29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 . .
30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 .
31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 98

used 10 non-target devices for model training, and treated the 1

remaining 20 devices as unseen samples for validation. The

0.9
impact of choosing a different number of devices, including
true positive rate

devices from the same brand, will be explored in detail below.

Fig. 6 shows variations in the true/false positive rates for
each of the phones. The left column illustrates the default
threshold chosen by the SVM training algorithm. Similar to
previous experiments, the raw MFCC descriptor is clearly
inferior while the Kraetzer’s AFF and the proposed BED
descriptors seem to provide comparable performance, with
somewhat better results for the latter. While the true positive
rates exhibit very good performance, the false positive rates
reach unacceptable levels and exhibit significant variations
across devices.
The right column of Fig. 6 shows a more practical setting,
where the threshold for each model is individually adapted
to fix a constant false positive rate at 1%. In this case, the
proposed BED descriptor achieved an average TPR of 88.9%
and significantly outperformed both the MFCC descriptor
(TPR 36.7%) and Kraetzer’s AFF (TPR 56.6%). The trade-
off for all descriptors can be clearly observed on the receiver
operation characteristics (ROC) in Fig. 8.
2) UC Dataset: In this experiment we evaluated device
verification performance on the large-scale UC dataset. In
contrast to the previous evaluation, we focused on two main
aspects: (1) the impact of the number of non-target phones; and
(2) the impact of same-brand phones used in the construction
of the non-target class. The results for both scenarios are
shown in Fig. 9.
In the former scenario, we randomly chose 5, 10, or 20
devices to form the non-target class. The remaining 135, 130,
and 120 devices were used for verification. The experiment
0.8
0.7
MFCC
0.6 Kraetzer’s AFF
BED
0.5
0.01 0.05 0.1
false positive rate
Fig. 8. Comparison of receiver operation characteristics (ROC) in the
device verification scenario; the curves are averaged over all frames from
all configurations and 20 random repetitions of the experiment.
was repeated 20 times with randomized devices selection.
We used the default threshold for the SVM classifier. It
can be observed that the true positive rate saturates, and
even slightly deteriorates after a certain number of devices is
reached. However, even for 20 non-target devices, the median
TPR exceeds 99%. More importantly, adding more devices
consistently improves the false positive rate which is more
important in the device verification setting.
In the second scenario, we randomly chose 10 devices of
the same brand to form the non-target class. We used the
remaining devices of the same brand for verification. We show
the results for phones produced by Apple, Huawei and Xiaomi
which are represented in our dataset by 44, 25, and 25 devices,
respectively. The results are shown in the right column of
Fig. 9. Although as expected, the most numerous group of

1556-6013 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812185, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
10

100 100 TABLE IV

true positive rate [%]

true positive rate [%]

AVERAGE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY DIFFERENCE WITH RESPECT TO
THE DEFAULT H AMMING WINDOW.
99 99

Device identification [%] Device verification [%]

Window name
98 98
UC dataset CC dataset UC dataset CC dataset
Hanning -0.14 +0.27 +0.15 +0.31
97 97 Chebyshev -0.09 +0.29 +0.12 +0.18
5 10 20 Apple Huawei Xiaomi
number of non-target phones Gaussian -0.03 +0.13 +0.06 +0.14
brand of non-target phones
12 12
false positive rate [%]

false positive rate [%]

10
8 8
6 6
4 4
2 2
0 0
5 10 20
number of non-target phones
Fig. 9. Device verification performance on the UC dataset: (left) grouped by
the number of devices that form the non-target class; (right) grouped by phone
brand when the non-target class is trained with same-brand phones only.
Apple phones yields the worst performance, the proposed BED
descriptor still delivers true positive rates of nearly 99% with
false positive rates of approximately 6%. For the remaining
brands, we observed even better results.
V. C ONCLUSIONS AND F UTURE W ORK
Our study investigated a novel construction of spectral-
domain audio features in the context of audio forensics. We
focused on the problem of source attribution which involves
either identification or verification of the recording device.
During our evaluation, the proposed band energy difference
descriptor clearly outperformed state-of-the-art audio forensic
feature extractors. We observed the greatest improvement in
the device verification setting for fixed low false positive rates,
which is a key requirement in practical applications.
In our future work, we plan to address the robustness of
the proposed descriptor. Our ultimate goal is to develop a
reliable training and verification protocol, capable of trustwor-
thy authentication with a single trained model. However, to
address this issue, it is crucial to utilize large datasets with a
broad range of recording conditions. Currently however, such
datasets are not available in the research community.
Our current evaluation was performed on two new datasets,
created specifically for this study. Both datasets are signifi-
cantly larger than their counterparts in previous studies [11, 17,
18] and contain 31 and 141 devices, respectively. While these
datasets already constitute a major step forward with respect
to the existing literature, we acknowledge that even larger
datasets will be necessary for reliable large-scale evaluation.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Dr C. Kraetzer for providing us the
source code of their forensic feature extractor.
10
A PPENDIX A
I MPACT OF THE W INDOW FUNCTION
In our experiments, we used the popular Hamming window.
We have also experimented with other window functions, but
observed negligible differences in performance. Below, we
Apple Huawei Xiaomi report the results obtained with three other window functions:
brand of non-target phones
Hanning, Chebyshev, and Gaussian widows. For each window,
we performed a complete evaluation for both device identifi-
cation and device verification scenarios. The experiment was
repeated 20 times with randomized division into training and
testing sets. The obtained results are collected in Table IV.
The numbers are reported relative to the default choice of the
Hamming window. The observed differences are negligible,
which shows that the proposed descriptor is not affected by
the window function.
A PPENDIX B
C ROSS - ENVIRONMENT T RAINING
The results reported in the main body of the paper were
obtained with cross-speaker training, which involved training
a classifier on speech samples of 3 speakers, and testing on
the remaining 4th speaker, the target speaker. We consider
such an approach the most appropriate since: (a) recordings
with multiple speakers should ideally be handled by a single
trained model; and (b) it is often more practical to replicate
the recording environment than the speaker (who may not be
available, or may decline to participate).
For the sake of completeness, in this appendix we report the
obtained device identification results (the CC dataset) for an
analogous cross-environment approach. The results (Table V)
confirm our observations from Section IV-C on descriptor
generalization, which revealed certain similarities between the
locations Office 1 and Hall, and distinct characteristics of
the Platform environment. The results are consistent for all
speakers. Although we observed some loss in the descriptors’
discrimination capability, even the worst observed accuracies
(≈62%) are significantly greater than random chance (≈3.2%).
R EFERENCES
[1] S. Bayram, H. T. Sencar, N. Memon, and I. Avcibas, “Source camera
identification based on cfa interpolation,” in Proc. of IEEE Int. Conf.
Image Processing, 2005, pp. III–69–72.
[2] K. S. Choi, E. Y. Lam, and K. Y. Wong, “Automatic source camera
identification using the intrinsic lens radial distortion,” Optics Express,
vol. 14, no. 24, pp. 11551–11565, 2006.
[3] J. Lukáš, J. Fridrich, and M. Goljan, “Digital camera identification from
sensor pattern noise,” IEEE Transacations on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 205–214, 2006.
[4] A. E. Dirik, H. T. Sencar, and N. Memon, “Source camera identification
based on sensor dust characteristics,” in IEEE Workshop on. Signal
Processing Applications for Public Security and Forensics, 2007.

1556-6013 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2812185, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
11

TABLE V [23] L. Zou, Q. He, and X. Feng, “Cell phone verification from speech
C OMPARISON OF DEVICE IDENTIFICATION PERFORMANCE WITH recordings using sparse representation,” in Proc. of IEEE Int. Conf.
CROSS - ENVIRONMENT TRAINING Acoustics Speech and Signal Processing, 2015, pp. 1787–1791.
[24] Ö. Eskidere, “Source microphone identification from speech recordings
Identification accuracy [%] per target environment based on a gaussian mixture model,” Turkish Journal of Electrical
Engineering & Computer Sciences, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 754–767, 2014.
Speaker Office 1 Office 2 Hall Platform [25] Y. Panagakis and C. Kotropoulos, “Automatic telephone handset
Proposed BED descriptor identification by sparse representation of random spectral features,” in
ACM Proceedings on Multimedia and Security, 2012, pp. 91–96.
M1 92.14 ± 0.07 77.42 ± 0.15 92.95 ± 0.08 61.74 ± 0.28
[26] Y. Panagakis and C. Kotropoulos, “Telephone handset identification by
F1 95.68 ± 0.26 74.48 ± 0.10 88.92 ± 0.37 63.88 ± 0.21
M2 92.51 ± 0.13 74.13 ± 0.23 92.09 ± 0.16 68.27 ± 0.17 feature selection and sparse representations,” in IEEE Int. Workshop on
F2 94.67 ± 0.19 78.66 ± 0.12 92.19 ± 0.20 62.45 ± 0.39 Inf. Forensics and Security. IEEE, 2012, pp. 73–78.
[27] Y. Panagakis and C. Kotropoulos, “Telephone handset identification
by collaborative representations,” Int. Journal of Digital Crime and
Forensics, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 1–14, 2013.
[28] M. Jahanirad, A. Wahab, N. B. Anuar, M. Idris, and M. N. Ayub, “Blind
[5] C.-T. Li, “Source camera identification using enhanced sensor pattern source mobile device identification based on recorded call,” Engineering
noise,” IEEE Transacations on Information Forensics and Security, vol. Applications of Artificial Intelligence, vol. 36, pp. 320–331, 2014.
5, no. 2, pp. 280–287, 2010. [29] M. Jahanirad, N. B. Anuar, and A. Wahab, “Blind source computer
[6] X. Kang, Y. Li, Z. Qu, and J. Huang, “Enhancing source camera device identification from recorded voip calls for forensic investigation,”
identification performance with a camera reference phase sensor pattern Forensic Science International, vol. 272, pp. 111–126, 2017.
noise,” IEEE Transacations on Information Forensics and Security, vol. [30] L. Cuccovillo, S. Mann, M. Tagliasacchi, and P. Aichroth, “Audio tam-
7, no. 2, pp. 393–402, 2012. pering detection via microphone classification,” in IEEE Int. Workshop
[7] M. Chen, J. Fridrich, M. Goljan, and J. Lukas, “Determining image on Multimedia Signal Processing, 2013, pp. 177–182.
origin and integrity using sensor noise,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics [31] L. Cuccovillo, S. Mann, P. Aichroth, M. Tagliasacchi, and C. Dittmar,
Security, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 74–90, 2008. “Blind microphone analysis and stable tone phase analysis for audio
[8] S. Bayram, H. Sencar, and N. Memon, “Efficient techniques for sensor tampering detection,” in International AES Convention, NY, USA, Oct
fingerprint matching in large image and video databases,” in IS&T/SPIE 2013.
Electronic Imaging. International Society for Optics and Photonics, [32] L. Cuccovillo and P. Aichroth, “Open-set microphone classification via
2010, pp. 754109–754109. blind channel analysis,” in IEEE Int. Conf. Acoustics, Speech and Signal
[9] N. Khanna, A. K. Mikkilineni, G. T. C. Chiu, J. P. Allebach, and E. J. Proc., 2016, pp. 2074–2078.
Delp, “Scanner identification using sensor pattern noise,” in Proc. [33] R. Buchholz, C. Kraetzer, and J. Dittmann, “Microphone classification
SPIE 6505, Security, Steganography, and Watermarking of Multimedia using fourier coefficients,” in Proc. of the International Workshop on
Contents IX, Feb. 2007, p. 65051K. Information Hiding, Darmstadt, Germany, June 2009.
[10] N. Khanna, A. K. Mikkilineni, and E. J. Delp, “Scanner identification [34] H. Malik and J. Miller, “Microphone identification using higher-order
using feature-based processing and analysis,” IEEE Transacations on statistics,” in Proc. AES Int. Conf. Audio Forensics, 2012, pp. 2–5.
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 123–139, 2009. [35] Ö. Eskidere, “Identifying acquisition devices from recorded speech
[11] C. Kraetzer and J. Dittmann, “Microphone forensics,” in Handbook of signals using wavelet-based features,” Turkish Journal of Electrical
Digital Forensics of Multimedia Data and Devices, A. Ho and S. Li, Engineering & Computer Sciences, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 1942–1954, 2016.
Eds. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2015. [36] L. Van der Maaten and G. Hinton, “Visualizing data using t-SNE,”
[12] F. Marra, G. Poggi, C. Sansone, and L. Verdoliva, “A study of Journal of Machine Learning Research, vol. 9, pp. 2579–2605, 2008.
co-occurrence based local features for camera model identification,” [37] J. Kodovsky, J. Fridrich, and V. Holub, “Ensemble classifiers for
Multimedia Tools and Applications, pp. 1–17, 2016. steganalysis of digital media,” IEEE Transactions on Information
[13] C. Grigoras, “Digital audio recording analysis: the electric network Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 432–444, 2012.
frequency criterion,” International Journal of Speech Language and the
Law, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 63–76, 2005.
[14] M. Goljan, J. Fridrich, and T. Filler, “Large scale test of sensor
fingerprint camera identification,” in IS&T/SPIE Electronic Imaging.
International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2009, pp. 72540I–
72540I.
[15] C. Kraetzer, A. Oermann, J. Dittmann, and A. Lang, “Digital audio
forensics: A first practical evaluation on microphone and environment
classification,” in Proc. of the Workshop on Multimedia and securityg,
Dallas, Texas, USA, 2007, pp. 63–74.
[16] C. Kraetzer, M. Schott, and J. Dittmann, “Unweighted fusion in
microphone forensics using a decision tree and linear logistic regression
models,” in ACM workshop on Multimedia and Security, 2009, pp. 49–
56.
[17] C. Krätzer, Statistical pattern recognition for audio-forensics: empirical
investigations on the application scenarios audio steganalysis and
microphone forensics, Ph.D. thesis, Magdeburg, Universität, 2013.
[18] C. Kraetzer, K. Qian, M. Schott, and J. Dittmann, “A context model for
microphone forensics and its application in evaluations,” in IS&T/SPIE
Electronic Imaging. International Society for Optics and Photonics,
2011, pp. 78800P–78800P–15.
[19] C. Hanilçi, F. Ertaş, T. Ertaş, and Ö. Eskidere, “Recognition of brand
and models of cell-phones from recorded speech signals,” IEEE Tran.
Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 625–634, 2012.
[20] C. Hanilçi and F. Ertas, “Optimizing acoustic features for source
cell-phone recognition using speech signals,” in ACM Workshop on
Information hiding and multimedia security. ACM, 2013, pp. 141–148.
[21] D. Garcia-Romero and C. Espy-Wilson, “Automatic acquisition device
identification from speech recordings,” in Proc. of IEEE Int. Conf.
Acoustics Speech and Signal Processing, 2010, pp. 1806–1809.
[22] C. Kotropoulos and S. Samaras, “Mobile phone identification using
recorded speech signals,” in IEEE Int. Conf. Digital Signal Processing,
2014, pp. 586–591.

1556-6013 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.