Professional Documents
Culture Documents
lenges that overwhelm the regional situation due to the policies of American
hegemony and Zionist terrorism,
Out of the position of deep realization of the historic stage through which
our country is passing,
Under the staggering production of a sound political life and the disappoint-
ing results of the state institutions’ performance and their alleged attempts at
development,
Before the regression of the state situation due to a combination of many fac-
tors surging from the unbalanced nature of the Lebanese political system and
the wrong practices by the men of authority that led to deepening the status of
corruption, favoritism and migration of qualifications, besides establishing the
sectarian, confessional and regional divisions,
In the light of all that, and after four years, during which we had the honor
of contribution in serving the Lebanese from the parliamentarian post, we run
with you for the scheduled parliament elections with established responsibility
and greater insistence on shouldering the trust that our dear Lebanese people
made us carry to complete the course of all the noble martyrs who died while
defending our sacred soil and the dignity, freedom, future and welfare of our
people, on top of whom the Master of the Islamic Resistance martyrs Sayyid
Abbas Mussawi and Shaykh of its martyrs Shaykh Raghib Harb (May Allah be
pleased with them).
As has always been the case, Hizbullah will continue to be, with a greater
drive and increasing responsibility, the party of Resistance and Liberation, the
party of steadfastness and construction and the party of change for a better sta-
tus, according to the following program:
2 Election Programs 70
logic of the theatrical negotiations that seek to establish Israel’s position at
the expense of the people of the land.
– Protecting the Lebanese civilians will remain essential in the Resistance
performance, this protection being a major objective and main role per-
formed by the Resistance with wisdom, awareness and responsibility.
– We will carefully endeavor with all the Lebanese people (of all religious
denominations and walks of life), that they continue to embrace the Resis-
tance and to continue to be the source from which the Resistance derives
its strength and presence. The sought-after liberation – if Allah is willing
– will be a gift to all the Lebanese and a major contribution to construct-
ing a country with complete sovereignty and a state of consideration and
estimation in the arena of regional and international conflict.
– We will continue seeking to achieve more effective state involvement in
the operation of liberation and to embrace the Resistance men, and the
prisoners, detainees and martyrs’ families, plus provide the steadfastness
requirements through establishing and developing foundations for these
ends, besides supporting any action that assists in fighting normalization
and cultural invasion along with rejecting any form of reconciliation with
the enemy.
2 Election Programs 72
ing specialization scholarships and the sponsoring of top students, strengthen-
ing research methods to get out of the currently adopted dictation method and
allowing for developing talents and qualifications.
Reinforcing the labor movement and the syndical frameworks is a civil and
political obligation that ought to be free from pressure, intimidation,and harass-
ment that are being practiced by the authorities at times of crises and critical
phases. Moreover, justice for teachers and university professors in achieving
their various demands, without procrastination and postponement is an urgent
measure for the stability of these two sectors. Therefore, Hizbullah affirms its
persistence in supporting the syndical movement and supplying it with political
and popular support and power.
2 Election Programs 74
Dear Lebanese People,
From the stance of representing the people, with the religious, national and
ethical dimensions and responsibilities that this representation entails, and with
the full realization of the magnitude of the complications and obstacles that
our Lebanese society is experiencing, and with our realization of the long time
needed to achieve all that our people anticipate, Hizbullah’s candidates are com-
mitted to doing their utmost best to put into effect this electoral program that
will formulate the framework for the political-legislative role of Hizbullah’s par-
liamentary bloc.
“But seek, thanks to what Allah gave you, the Hereafter, and do not forget your
part in the here and now [the present world]. Be charitable, as Allah has been
charitable to you, and do not seek corruption in the land; for Allah does not like
the seekers of corruption” (28:77).20
2 Election Programs 76
We work to continuously keep the Resistance on guard as well as the readi-
ness of the populace and the official [Lebanese] stance to defend our country
against any aggression or “Zionist” threat. [This is in line with] our continued
convictions and belief in facing the Israeli enemy in order to prevent its schemes
and dangerous projects from materializing in the region [Middle East].
In order to continue the path and aims of liberation we stress the following:
– Exhort the government to decree and execute a developmental service-
oriented socio-economic program for the liberated areas and their peripher-
ies, and work on the reconstruction and development of human resources,
the economic cycle, and the return of all the displaced, without discrimi-
nating against them and giving their cause the appropriate care without
humiliating them and forcing them to seek favors.22 (Italics are added for
emphasis).
– The continuation of different and rapid efforts in order to liberate the pris-
oners of war, detainees, and the purified bodies of the martyrs. The activa-
tion and development of the necessary social care for the families of the
martyrs, the liberated prisoners of war and detainees, and the wounded
and handicapped of the Resistance.
– Being cautious to safeguard our rights, security, and national interests in
order to accomplish a total liberation of Lebanese soil and exercise total
sovereignty over our land and territorial waters without compromising
any part of it, especially in regard to points of territorial disagreement23
and the Shib‘a Farms.
– Resisting normalization [of relations with Israel], opposing the cultural
conquest, refusing coexistence with the Zionist invaders [by not] giving
legitimacy to their “Rapist Entity”, and refusing the naturalization [of the
Palestinians living in Lebanon]24 and insisting on their right of return to
their land in Palestine.
2 Election Programs 78
4 Engage in a continual effort in order to make the necessary funding
required for alternative agricultural products available.
5 Decrease the role of the middleman between the farmer and the consumer
by activating the role of cooperative agricultural farms.
6 Fortify the interests, of domestic products and protect them through con-
tracts and agreements.
7 Reduce the cost of insecticides, fertilizers, electricity, and water.
8 Give due attention to natural resources, and prepare the ground for
exploiting them, and searching for them, especially oil and water.
Fourth: The building of the state of law and institutions, and the promotion of
political participation
Our concern is focused on: the development of political life and the establish-
ment of social justice among all the Lebanese without any discrimination; the
building of a stable country; of a fruitful future that offers equal opportunities
to all individuals, groups, and geographical areas, and where all people are equal
in rights and duties, we [Hizbullah] will continue to work so that the following
will materialize:
– Establish the “National Body for the Abolishment of Political Sectarianism”.
– Accord special attention to the youth in order to activate their role in pub-
lic and political life, and to found specialized centers in order to rehabili-
tate the youth on different levels or scales.
– Strengthen the role of women and open the doors for them to participate
in the building and activation of public life.
– Enact an election law that is conducive to the development of political life
and which better represents the political programs according to propor-
tional representation, and reduce the voting age [from 21] to 18 in order
to offer the youth the opportunity to express their genuine nationalistic
choices.
– Strengthen the role of political parties, the institutions of civil society, and
the associations and syndicates [that are engaged] in the public life.
– Develop surveillance and accountability bodies, and activate their role
free from the politics of arbitrary decisions and the centers of power.
– Accomplish administrative and political reform, and fight and prevent
corruption and waste.
– Accomplish an administrative decentralization law.
– Accomplish a new and modern naturalization law.
2 Election Programs 80
Encourage private initiatives and work; ensure the availability of work for
Lebanese manual labor; work to put an end to the aggravated unemployment
problem.
1 Hizbullah’s principles dictate that the populace constitutes the main pillars
behind its movement. From this perspective, Hizbullah is under a respon-
I Core Program
1 Administration and organization:
– Find a unified internal order for the employees that takes into account
the need to develop municipal work.
– Be strict in enforcing remuneration and punishment as well as a rota-
tion policy targeting the appraisal of employees by developing a special
magnetic card for that purpose.
– Consider serving the citizens as a legal and ethical obligation.
– Employ state-of-the-art communication and technology as well as
rehabilitate, train, and modernize the administrative cadre in order to
efficiently render services to the citizens.
– Apply accountability, objectivity, and transparency to dealing with the
citizens in taking decisions and on a procedural basis.
– Regularly publish a brochure, which clearly indicates the accomplish-
ments of the municipalities and their activities as well as a detailed
appraisal of the employees and their responsibilities to the municipal
councils, in order to build a two-way street with the public and keep it
informed.28
2 The efficiency of the municipal council and boosting the confidence of the
citizens in it:
– Make sure that the members of the municipal councils are conversant
with the municipal and administrative rules and regulations.
– Assemble efficient municipal committees, composed of specialized and
authoritative individuals that could be chosen from outside the munici-
pal council, according to a promulgated internal order, specifying their
role and jurisdiction, making sure that the same person cannot partici-
pate in more than two committees.
– Lay out an annual plan, to be adopted by the municipal council, and
followed up by regular appraisal sessions.
– Maintain good relations with the authority of administrative surveil-
lance and public institutions.
2 Election Programs 82
– Maintain good relations with the deputies of the region and cooper-
ate with them in order to effectively follow up people’s administrative
transactions or “dossiers” (mu‘amalat) and the developmental projects.
– Establish dialogue sessions between the municipal council and the citi-
zens, which include debating the projects and submitting a summary of
the municipal achievements as well as the impediments facing it. Also,
listen to the problems and complaints of the citizens.
– Launch campaigns that encourage the submission of innovative proj-
ects and reward these projects with valuable financial prizes.
– Sponsor conflict resolution by peaceful means between feuding
families.
– Establish a special “complaint box”, and respond in an efficient way to
the complaints of the people.
– Use transparency and accountability in executing promises.
– Establish committees assembled from the people in order to react and
interact with the municipal work.
– Erect big bulletin boards at the center of the towns and villages in order
to communicate the decisions and news of the municipal councils.29
4 Developmental projects
A Guiding plans:
– Study the possibility of redefining the municipal enclosures or bound-
aries with respect to the projects and studies of every town.
– Form specialized committees within the central committees in various
districts or areas.
– Lay out “guided planning” (mukhatat tawjihi) in conformity with the
demographic, social, and touristic stance of the towns concerned, con-
sidering the present situation and the benefit of each and every town.
Also, activate the role of the municipality by voicing its opinion during
the propagation of studies and guided planning by the official govern-
mental institutions.
– Supervise (public) works taking place within the municipal domain.
2 Election Programs 84
– Help private companies to construct housing complexes for low income
families in an attempt to help the youth32 to get married and solve the
escalating problem of housing.33
6 Social care
A Consolidating the resistance society (in order to substantiate the already
existing “resistance identity”)
– Naming the streets within the municipal jurisdiction in such a way
as to reflect the identity of the village, town, or city (article 49 of the
municipal law).
– Erecting monuments (article 62 of the municipal law).
– Protecting the youth from the causes of immorality or vices (article
62 of the municipal law) by erecting gyms, public gardens, children’s
playgrounds as well as helping in ridding society of social problems.
– Caring for the oppressed families (article 49 of the municipal law).
2 Election Programs 86
– Fighting illiteracy in society and establishing pedagogical and educa-
tional training courses.
– Reducing child labor and dealing with difficult cases through guidance,
rehabilitation, and working effectively to find them schools.
– Establishing training and vocational courses for mothers in order to
help them to perform their role in a satisfactory way by helping them
raise more income for their families. Also, finding or building day care
centers (for children) in order to help working women.
– Upgrading contact with specialized international associations in order
to guide the nursing mother and give her what she needs.
– Constructing gardens for children and the old aged.
– Helping the poor as much as possible, especially the elderly, to pay state
and municipal taxes.
– Making health and social care available for the elderly, orphans, handi-
capped and the needy through municipal associations and other gov-
ernmental and private institutions.
– Celebrating grandfather’s, grandmother’s, mother’s, and children’s day
and honoring the eldest man or woman with special celebrations and
meetings, or by according them media coverage.38
D Pedagogical care
– Honoring directors, faculty, and educational staff.
– Setting up educational training courses and reinforcements for the
public degree [state diplomas].
– Celebrating the “Day of Victory and Resistance” (25 May)39 in the
domain of the municipal school.
– Celebrating “Teacher’s day” at schools located within the municipality.
– Working on rehabilitating public schools located within the municipal
domain.
– Adopting (as a course of action) and encouraging the organization of
cultural and technical fairs.
– Working on the erection of a public library and cultural center.40
2 Election Programs 88
7 Stress the need for establishing a comprehensive socio-economic program
aimed at stamping out poverty by boosting productive sectors such as
agriculture, industry, and trade, which are conducive to rendering basic
services to the Lebanese citizens.
Fellow Lebanese…
On the threshold of parliamentary elections due on the seventh of June, we
are all invited to take advantage of this opportunity in order to re-orientate
political choices and to address the imbalance in power which has produced
a series of crises that negatively impacted the life of the nation and placed the
country in a spiral of instability.
The parliamentary election, though seasonal, is greatly important at this stage
as it is the entrance to the renewal of political life, the stabilization of national
options, and a repeat of the declaration of commitment to Lebanon as a coun-
try, not an arena belonging to the mercenary. This obliges us all to deal with the
elections with the necessary seriousness and responsibility.
Lebanon has been, over the past four years, in difficult throes particularly
since the adoption of resolution 1559, some of the stipulations of which formed a
gateway to internal civil strife and opened the doors of the country to the winds
of regional and international interventions and sharp and dangerous divisions
where international forces, the United States of America being at their forefront,
took advantage of these divisions and tensions to draw the Lebanese arena into
its sphere of influence, thereby flouting the national interests of unity, reconcili-
ation and genuine sovereignty.
When we sat down at the dialogue table, we were prompted by hope that
this would be an opportunity for the reformulation of the national consensus
beyond the reality of line ups and away from the dominance logic, because we
believed, and still believe, that preserving the homeland, its unity and its causes
can only prevail in the spirit of understanding and dialogue. We have always
been supporters of Islamic unity in word and in deed, and strive for national
Fellow Lebanese…
The resistance you have wagered on, and given your confidence to, with the
help of your sacrifices has created the honorable historical situation of protect-
ing the country and the future of its generations. This resistance was, still is, and
will continue to be at your side through all important matters and calamities.
Thanks to the great sacrifices and offerings made by its martyrs, wounded
and prisoners… and at their forefront offerings are made by martyr leaders
Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, Shaykh Raghib Harb, and Hajj Imad Mughniyyé. This
resistance, which has achieved the liberation of a greater part of the Lebanese
2 Election Programs 90
territory as well as the largest number of prisoners and bodies of martyrs… is
determined to complete the liberation of the remaining occupied territories,
particularly in the Shib‘a Farms and Kfar Shuba hills.
While it places its powers and capabilities in the context of strengthening
Lebanon’s strength, in this same context we believe that any defense strategy
around which a consensus is to be formed must start from the axiom of benefit-
ing from the existing capabilities of the resistance, the army, and the people,
alongside a plan to develop, strengthen and integrate these capabilities, particu-
larly those of the Lebanese army, to be able to confront the “Israeli” occupation,
threats and ambitions in our land and water resources.
Fellow Lebanese…
Consolidating the bonds of national unity, strengthening stability and civil
peace, state-building within the rule of law and institutions, the preparation of
sound environments for a true culture of national citizenry, the rehabilitation
of the spirit of belonging to a nation and land, the achievement of brotherhood,
justice and equality among citizens… are, from our point of view, all duties that
are sacrosanct.
Therefore, our adherence to the national charter, as expressed in the Ta’if
Accord and all chartered items included in the constitution, urge us along to
struggle with you for the creation of a balanced authority, one that respects and
implements this charter and does not depart from it, nor abuse it or its requi-
sites; an authority entrusted with the national destiny, proper application of the
law, respect for freedom and management of public affairs… to address social,
economic and developmental issues and problems, an authority which does not
accumulate debts nor squander public funds, that does not cripple the judi-
ciary nor cause regulatory institutions to be absent, an authority that does not
upset the national balance in development and administration, an authority that
does not, through its policies, widen the economic and social gaps between the
Lebanese, an authority that concerns itself with supporting the national army’s
capacity, to strengthen its potential, and raise the readiness of all security forces,
one that fights crime rather than toys with it and uses it as a scarecrow for intim-
idation and a path to politicization.
We insist on Lebanon being a home for all its citizens, and on our hostility
to “Israel”. We support and back our Palestinian brothers in their struggle to
liberate their land and sanctities. We reject all forms of settlement, partition and
federalism. Our desire is to build the best distinguished brotherly relations with
the Syrian Arab Republic and develop cooperative relations with other broth-
erly and friendly states. These represent a system of constants and axioms for us
from which we will not depart.
In Political Reform
B Election Law
The proper pathway to reform lies in the completion of a modern electoral law
based on proportional representation, certainly alongside the completion of the
constitutional amendment on lowering the voting age to eighteen, in addition
to the completion of another amendment, the separation of Parliament from
Cabinet.
C Balanced Development
The principle of balanced development represents one of the pillars of politi-
cal reform, for which reason it was stipulated in the covenantal constitution’s
preface. In order to achieve this, we call for the reintroduction of the Ministry
of Planning, subject to ten- or five-year plans, which observe the needs of all
regions in the various sectors.
D Decentralized Administration
The Constitution’s preface stipulates the reconsideration of administrative divi-
sions, taking into account national assimilation, the preservation of coexistence
and administrative decentralization according to: granting broader administra-
tive powers to micro-units (municipalities, governorships, provinces), designed
to enhance development opportunities, and facilitate a speedy completion of
transactions and administrative tasks.
2 Election Programs 92
E Judicial System
Since the Lebanese constitution states that the judiciary is an independent
authority, alongside the two legislative and executive authorities, and since a
fair and impartial judicial system guarantees the rule of law and safeguards the
rights of individuals and the community as a whole, and thus no reform can
occur without political reform, we see the need to work on completing and
implementing the law which deals with the organization of the judiciary under
the authority of the highest independent judicial body.
In Administrative Reform
Administrative reform is a significant challenge in all societies, smooth and effi-
cient management is a characteristic of the modern state, whereby management
reform aims to alleviate citizens’ burdens, mobilize energies and skills, and for
the swift and satisfactory completion of tasks.
In moving toward this goal, work efforts should be focused according to the
following:
A A comprehensive plan of guidelines drawn up by the management, which
describes its needs and fills in vacancies.
B A focus on scientific competence and practical skills.
C Modernization, automation, networking of information and fighting red-
tape in bureaucracy.
D Activation of control and accountability, strengthening and fortifying the
control institutions (the Civil Service Council, Central Inspection, Gen-
eral Board of Corrections, the Office of Accounting).
E The development of laws and regulations employed in the management
and budget area, to ensure speedy accomplishment of tasks, stopping
waste and the elimination of bribery.
F To adopt a scientific and systematic plan in the process of recruiting staff,
especially senior staff (levels I and II), in the context of promoting effi-
ciency and good performance in the public administration.
G Work on implementing the law to establish the two districts of Baalbek-
al-Hermel and Akkar, and completing the issuance of practical decrees in
this regard.
The ultimate goal is to fight poverty and social marginalization, this requires
joint efforts from both public and private sectors, to focus on economic activi-
ties and provide employment opportunities, to be directed toward rural and
remote areas.
2 Election Programs 94
administrative independence, ensure its development and enhance its scientific
research capabilities.
Addressing outstanding issues is also required, such as full-time professors,
promotions, support of the contracting fund and the revival of the LU Students
National Union.
As for the general education sector, duty calls for the introduction of a com-
prehensive education scheme, with emphasis on raising the level of teaching
qualifications to provide schools with the necessary requirements, securing
their fuel supply for the winter season, advancing the school fund, re-mapping
the distribution of schools according to balanced development requirements, in
addition to developing educational institutes, education inspection and the pro-
motion of its powers, implementing compulsory education as well as making
education free of charge, promoting public, vocational and technical education
and addressing the longstanding demands of teachers from different levels in a
positive and responsible spirit.
2 Election Programs 96
G As for the Communications Sector, what is required is the preservation of
this national wealth through development of the sector and the improve-
ment of its services, along with providing more facilities for the consum-
ers, with low-priced, better service always being the goal.
Environment Protection
The environment in Lebanon has been exposed to a wide process of destruction
and violation: from the burning of forests, to the work of indiscriminate cutting
of trees, to the chaos of stone quarries and crushing plants, to polluting rivers
with sewage, to the indiscriminate dumping of solid wastes, all of which calls on
us to sound the alarm and declare a state of national emergency to achieve the
following:
A The adoption of a plan of guidelines that is scientific, environmentally
friendly and final for the stone quarries and crushers.
B To expedite the completion of the construction of sewage plants in all
regions.
C Run a modern study for best solid waste disposal methods, for converting
waste into energy rather than burying it in the ground.
D The provision of effective fire-combating means (aircrafts, etc…), strin-
gent prevention of tampering with the environment, and fighting infringe-
ments on sea shores and river banks.
E Launch a national campaign to stop the deforestation of Lebanon in coop-
eration with domestic and foreign organizations and associations that are
interested in this matter.
Dear Lebanese,
This is our vision and commitment.
This is our pledge, the pledge of the martyrs, of Sayyid Abbas, Shaykh Raghib
and Hajj Imad, and just as we have always been, we will stay with you and by
you, faithful to and supportive of the resistance; based on this vision and this
platform we approach you asking for your valued and precious confidence.
Peace and God’s mercy and blessings be upon you
Hizbullah
2 Election Programs 98
Indeed, we accept the parliamentary majority. Well, at previous ceremonies,
I used to say that there is a difference between parliamentary majority and pop-
ular majority. The parliamentary majority might or might not be the popular
majority. Anyway, we accept the parliamentary majority. As for the popular
majority, it seems that it needs centers for studies and statistics to review figures
closely so as to know who gains the popular majority. I believe that we all can
resort to the ballot boxes to help us in deciding the popular majority (as we
resorted to ballot boxes to decide the parliamentary elections), and if most of
the votes in sum were for the interest of the other party, I will accept that they
are also the popular majority.
Now we accept the results regardless of our evaluation of the election process
and the means used in this regard, despite the huge expenditure which will be
clearly illustrated within days, the sectarian, factional – and at times racial –
incitement which was illustrated during the election campaign days, the accusa-
tions and lies which aimed at intimidating the public opinion, especially within
some sects and some districts and the overt foreign interference. Anyway, I will
not interfere in such an evaluation. I just wanted to point this out. We will have
our evaluation of the election process from A to Z, just as the other forces will
make such evaluations, although that will not influence our acceptance of the
results.
In this framework and as we are talking about results and accepting results,
I would like to point out two big lies (which have been prompted through the
election campaign) that have been thwarted. As these points are directly related
to us, especially the Opposition and more precisely to Hizbullah, I feel that I am
obliged to single them out and clarify them.
First, lie number one is the political rhetoric that has been exploited for
months regarding the Opposition as seeking to cripple elections and ruining
the political and security status to prevent elections from taking place. [It was
being said that] if the Opposition would find out that it was losing the elections
and not moving towards a parliamentary majority while voting was taking place
it would destroy the ballots and blur the situation. Also [it was said that] after
counting the votes or when the results would be announced, the Opposition
would not accept the results and would challenge the parliamentary elections
and consider them illegitimate and consequently push the country towards
political, popular and security crises. This has been said, if not by all Loyalist
leaderships (to be on the safe side), by most of them.
Well today (Monday) here I am at your service. The results were announced,
and we are dealing with them normally. This is the first proof of the big lie
invested in the election campaigns. The election day was normal, natural and
excellent. The security status was excellent and stable. The turnout was huge. The
vote counting was calm. Results were announced, and no problems occurred.
I Dialogue
National dialogue is the only avenue to find solutions to Lebanon’s crises on
stable and firm bases that are a reflection of a unifying consensual will. The fol-
lowing conditions must be obtained to ensure its success:
A The participation of parties that have a political, popular and national
standing with a round table as the venue.
B Transparency, openness, and placing the interests of the nation above any
other interest, through the reliance on self-driven will and free and com-
mitted Lebanese decision-making.
C Include all national issues that require general consensus.
II Consensual Democracy
Consensual democracy remains the fundamental basis for governance in Leb-
anon because it is the effective embodiment of the spirit of the Constitution
and of the essence of the pact of shared coexistence. From this standpoint, any
approach for dealing with national issues according to a majority-minority for-
mula depends on historic and social conditions for practicing effective democ-
racy in which the citizen becomes an independent value.
105
– that guarantees accurate and just popular representation and contributes to
the accomplishment of the following objectives:
1 Activate and develop the role of political parties in achieving civil society.
2 Limit the influence of political money and sectarian fanaticism.
3 Make available equal opportunities for using the various means of the
media.
4 Ensure the required means to enable the Lebanese expatriates to exer-
cise their voting rights.
We ask the government and parliament to commit to the shortest possible dead-
line to enact the required electoral law.
IX Lebanese-Palestinian Relations
Addressing the Palestinian file requires a comprehensive approach that asserts,
on the one hand, the respect by the Palestinians of the authority of the Lebanese
state and their compliance with its laws and, on the other hand, the reaffirma-
tion of solidarity with their cause and the recovery of their rights, in accordance
with the following rules:
A The social condition of the Palestinians requires strong attention to im
prove their living conditions and secure a decent standard for a dig-
nified human life on the basis of bilateral cooperation and the human
rights charter, in addition to facilitating their movement inside and out-
side Lebanese territory.
B The Right of Return of the Palestinians is a fundamental and permanent
right, and the rejection of the settling of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
is an issue that has the consensus of the Lebanese people and cannot be
conceded under any circumstances.
C Define the relationship between the Lebanese state and the Palestinians
in a single institutional Palestinian framework that would be a legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people in Lebanon in a manner condu-
cive to proper coordination and cooperation.
D The issue of putting an end to Palestinian weapons outside the camps and
controlling the security situation inside them should be dealt with as part
of a serious, responsible and close dialogue between the Lebanese govern-
ment and the Palestinians, leading to the exercise of the state’s authority
and laws over the entire Lebanese territory.
X The Protection of Lebanon and the Preservation of its Independence and Sover-
eignty
In conformity with the decisions of the Arab Foreign Ministers in the Arab
League meeting held on May 11, 2008, in order to contain the Lebanese situa-
tion, the ministerial committee headed to Beirut from 14 to 15 May in order to
meet with the Lebanese leaders to discuss the situation in Lebanon and agree
on the implementation of the Arab Initiative in an effort to contain the perilous
situation that is hovering over Lebanon, and in light of the consultations per-
formed by the committee on the basis of the principles of the Lebanese constitu-
tion and the Ta’if Agreement, the following points were agreed upon:
– Welcoming the Lebanese Cabinet’s decision to agree to the Army’s deci-
sion pertaining to the head of security at the airport and Hizbullah’s tele-
communications network.
– Putting an immediate end to the infighting, the withdrawal of all fighters
from the streets, and opening all roads as well as the International Airport
and the Beirut Port.
President Bashar al-Assad on Tuesday issued Decree No. 358 for the year 2008
stipulating the establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon.
Article (1):
Diplomatic relations are established between the Syrian Arab Republic and the
Lebanese Republic.
Article (2):
A diplomatic mission of embassy level is created in the capital of the Lebanese
Republic.
Article (3):
The Lebanese capital, Beirut, is classified in the eighth category of the Decree
No. 78 dated 28.2.2006.
Article (4):
This decree is to be enforced upon publishing.
The two sides stressed in the final statement their commitment to consolidate
the Syrian-Lebanese ties which are based on reciprocal respect of sovereignty
and independence of each country.
Π
Praise be to the Lord of all creation, and peace be upon the last of all prophets,
our master Muhammad, upon his pure kin, his worthy companions, and on all
divine prophets and messengers.
God our Lord has said in his Glorious Book: “And those who strive in Our
Cause, We will certainly guide them to Our Paths: for verily Allah is with those
who do right”. (Al Ankabut: 69)
And the Almighty also said: “O ye who believe do your duty to Allah, seek the
means of approach unto Him and strive with might and main in His cause: that
ye may prosper.” (Al Mai’da: 35)
115
Contents
Foreword | 116
2 Lebanon | 122
2.1 Homeland | 122
2.2 The Resistance | 123
2.3 The State & the Political System | 125
2.4 Lebanon and Palestinian-Lebanese Relations | 128
2.5 Lebanon and Arab Relations | 129
2.6 Lebanon and Islamic Relations | 130
2.7 Lebanon and International Relations | 131
Epilogue | 137
Foreword
These givens integrate within a wider international scene, which in itself lends a
hand to uncovering the US dilemma and the retreat of unipolar domination in
favor of some form of pluralism, the profile of which is still unclear.
The global financial crisis only served to deepen the predicament experi-
enced by the oppressive world order. Its plunging of the US economy into chaos
and deficit was a clear reflection of the extent to which the arrogant capitalism
model has been structurally affected.
We can therefore say that we are amidst historical transformations that
foretell a retreat of the US as a supreme world power, the disintegration of the
unipolar world order, and the historical commencement of the Zionist entity’s
accelerated decline.
At the heart of such transformations, resistance movements emerged as a
focal and strategic certainty on the current world scene, this of course being
the result of the central role these movements assumed in terms of creating or
encouraging that part of change which relates to our region.
The resistance in Lebanon, and particularly by our Islamic Resistance, had
led the confrontation against occupation and hegemony starting two and a half
decades ago. The Resistance held fast to this option at a time when the inaugu-
ration of the American Era was being presented to the world as if the end of
all history was about to be marked. In light of prevailing power balances at the
time, some perceived the option of Resistance as an illusion, a form of political
recklessness or negligence that contrasts with rational, levelheaded thinking.
In spite of this, the Resistance2 pressed on with its rightful struggle – its Jihad
march – never in doubt of the cause’s virtue or of its own ability to create victory
through ceaseless confidence in God Almighty, affiliation to the Arab nation
as a whole, commitment to Lebanon’s national interests, trust in its own con-
stituents, and upholding of the basic human values of righteousness, justice and
freedom.
Throughout its long Jihad progression and its substantive victories – led by
halting the Israeli occupation of Beirut and Mount Lebanon in 1982, forcing
foreword 117
Israeli retreat to Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiyyé, all the way to the July 1993 Israeli
aggression, the April 1996 aggression, the May 2000 liberation and the July 2006
war on Lebanon – the Resistance has laid the anchors for its credibility and
standards even before crafting out its victories. From a liberating force to a com-
mander of balance and confrontation to a power of defense and deterrence, the
Resistance has built on its development phases to finally add an internal politi-
cal role, one that is pivotal and influential for the creation of the capable and
impartial Lebanese state.
In tandem, the Resistance was destined to develop its political and human
status. It was therefore elevated from being a national Lebanese merit to becom-
ing a celebrated Arab and Islamic value as well. Today, the Resistance has
become an international human value, with its model representing a source of
inspiration and its achievements a paradigm to be emulated by all those seeking
freedom and independence across the world.
In spite of Hizbullah’s recognition of all the promising change that prevails,
and in spite of what we perceive as the enemy’s swerve between ineffective war
strategies and an inability to impose conditional compromises, Hizbullah does
not underestimate the magnitude of impending challenges and risks, and by no
means considers the confrontational road ahead to be paved or undervalues the
scale of sacrifices that would be required if this convoy of resistance is to reclaim
human rights and contribute to the arousing of the Arab nation. Nevertheless,
in retrospect, the Party now makes its choices with higher lucidity, stronger will
and further trust in God, in itself and in its constituents.
In this context, Hizbullah shall outline what represents the Party’s main
political-intellectual framework as well as views and standpoints towards the
challenges that lie ahead.
It is evident that any regional conflict across the world today has to be viewed in
light of prevailing global strategies. The American threat is not local or restrict-
ed to a particular region, and as such, confrontation of such a threat must be
international as well.
Doubtlessly, such a confrontation is difficult and delicate, as it bears a histori-
cal aspect and is consequently a battle of generations that requires the employ-
ment of all powers. Our Lebanese experience has taught us that difficulty does
not mean impossibility. In contrast, interactive and vigorous people led by wise,
informed and prepared leaders who worked hard to accumulate achievements
ended up reaping one victory after another. As true as this situation is vertically
throughout history, it is also horizontally true through geographic and geo-
political extension.
American oppression has left our nation and its people with no choice but
to resist for a better life, for a more humane future, for brotherly diversity and
interdependence, for peace and harmony – exactly as religious prophets and
great historical reformers have intended, and precisely as the spirit of humanity
would want the world to be.
2 Lebanon
2.1 Homeland
Lebanon is indeed our homeland and that of our fathers and forefathers, just
as it shall be the homeland to our children, our grandchildren and genera-
tions to come. Lebanon is the homeland to which we have offered the dear-
est of sacrifices and the most treasured of martyrs in order to safeguard it as
dignified and sovereign. We want Lebanon to be the homeland to all Lebanese,
equally, a homeland that embraces them all and that takes pride in all of their
accomplishments.
We want Lebanon to be one and united – land, people, government and insti-
tutions. We refuse any form of division or federation, whether camouflaged or
blatantly declared. We want Lebanon to be free, sovereign and independent,
generous, impregnably strong and able, a presence within the equations of the
2 Lebanon 123
loyal patriotic Lebanese people found no other option but to exercise their
patriotic, moral and religious rights and duties of defending the land. Their clear
choice was to launch an armed popular resistance to confront the Zionist men-
ace and permanent aggression on their lives, livelihoods and future.
Restoring the nation through armed resistance was launched as a goal, espe-
cially in light of the grave occupational circumstances and the absence of a capa-
ble Lebanese state. Reclaiming both occupied land as well as political author-
ity were to form the prelude for the restoration of the State and the rebuilding
of its constitutional institutions. Most importantly, the aim was to re-establish
those national values that form the pillars of a nation: National Sovereignty and
National Dignity. These values are what confer on freedom its true dimensions.
Freedom was not to remain a slogan; it was literally manifested by the Resistance
through the liberation of land and man. This national value became the fulcrum
for modern Lebanon, a country that is to be reckoned with on the world map,
one with re-established respect on the international scene, and the compatriots
of which take pride in as the homeland of freedoms, culture, knowledge and
diversity, just as it is the homeland of dignity, sacrifice and heroism. All of these
dimensions put together were crowned by the Resistance through achieving lib-
eration of most of the occupied land in the year 2000, and through recording
a historic victory against Israel during the July 2006 war on Lebanon. A live
experience of homeland defense was presented, one that is exemplary to other
peoples and nations who carry the quest of guarding the nation, protecting its
independence and safeguarding its sovereignty.
The Resistance accomplished its national triumph with the support of a faith-
ful populace and with the collaboration of the Lebanese Army. The enemy wit-
nessed a historic defeat as its objectives were successively thwarted, while the
Resistance emerged, with its fighters and martyrs, and along with it the people
and Army of Lebanon, as a grand victor. Such a victory laid the foundations
for a new era in the region, at the core of which are the role and function of the
Resistance as a deterrent to enemy aggression, an assurer of that level of protec-
tion which is necessary for national independence, sovereignty, public defense
and the conclusion of territorial liberation.
This role, along with the functional duty it represents, remains a permanent
national need as long as the Israeli menace and its far-reaching ambitions con-
tinue to threaten our land and water resources, and as long as a capable and
solid Lebanese government is absent. It is even more so in light of the power
imbalances between the Lebanese state and its military enemy – an imbalance
that usually forces weak states and targeted peoples to search for optimizing
their capacities amidst threats of dominion from powerful countries. Constant
Israeli threat requires Lebanon to create a permanent defense formula that is
based on matrimony between a popular Resistance which contributes to such
2 Lebanon 125
which necessitated the formation of a higher national council for the achieve-
ment of such an aim.
Until the Lebanese achieve this historical and sensitive feat – abolition of
political sectarianism – and do so through national dialogue, and as long as
the political system continues to be based on sectarian grounds, consensual
democracy remains the fundamental basis for governance in Lebanon, for such
a type of democracy is what would embody the spirit of the constitution and the
essence of the co-existence Charter.
Based on this, any contemplation of national issues that is based on majority
and minority considerations would continue to hinge on the actual realization
of those historical and social prerequisites for the effective exercise of democ-
racy, where the citizen represents a value in and of himself.
The will of the Lebanese to live together under a plethora of dignity and
equality in rights and duties necessitates that they constructively cooperate in
order to effectively achieve true national partnership, for such partnership is
the best possible formula for protecting their diversity and ensuring complete
stability, especially after an era of insecurity that was brought about by various
political systems founded on the tendency to monopolize, annul or exclude the
other.
Consensual democracy is an appropriate political blueprint for achieving real
participation by all. It represents a confidence factor for national constituencies,
and significantly contributes towards paving the way for building the reassuring
state that all citizens would feel has been built for them.3
The State that we look forward to participating in building along with the rest
of the Lebanese is:
1. The State that protects public freedoms, and provides the appropriate
background environment for the exercise of such freedom.
2. The State that safeguards national unity and national cohesion.
3. The State that is capable of protecting the land, the people, national
sovereignty and independence; one that has a strong, capable and well-
equipped national army, and effective security institutions that are vigilant
in guarding the security and interests of the people.
4. The State that is founded on modern, effective and cooperative institu-
tions, ones that are organized around clear and specific functions, authori-
ties and duties.
5. The State that is committed to applying the rule of law on all constituents
within a framework of respect for public freedoms, and impartial appli-
cation of citizens’ rights and duties, irrespective of religious sect, home
region or the citizen’s views.
6. The State where proper and correct parliamentary representation can only
be achieved through a modern Electoral Law which allows Lebanese vot-
2 Lebanon 127
16. The State that diligently works to curb emigration from Lebanon, that
emigration which is draining the homeland of its young generations, fam-
ilies, wealth of capabilities and human capital, within what seems to be a
comprehensive and realistic scheme.
17. A State that supports its expatriate citizens in every corner of the world,
defends and protects them, and benefits from their spread, status and
positions in the service of national issues.
The establishment of the Lebanese State with these provisions and conditions
is the goal of this Party and of every honest and sincere Lebanese citizen. We
in Hizbullah shall exert every effort towards achieving this noble national goal,
and will do so in collaboration with the various political and popular groups
who share this vision.
2 Lebanon 129
resistance movements amidst their most difficult of circumstances, and through
seeking to coordinate Arab efforts towards securing the interests of the region
and confronting its challenges.
We hereby emphasize the need to adhere to the privileged/distinguished
relations between Lebanon and Syria, for this is in the common political, secu-
rity and economic interest of both countries. The interest of both peoples, the
imperatives of geopolitics and the requirements for Lebanese stability as well as
the confrontation of common challenges, all summon such adherence. We also
call for putting an end to all negative sentiment that has marred bilateral rela-
tions over the past few years, and urge the return of such relations to their mode
of normalcy as soon as possible.
2 Lebanon 131
between the arrogant and the wretched, the oppressor and the oppressed, the
haughty occupier and the pursuer of freedom and independence.
Hizbullah also considers that unilateral dominance tips the international bal-
ance for peace, security and stability.
The US administration’s unwavering support for “Israel”, its funding of Israe-
li aggressions, and its sanctioning of Israeli occupation of Arab territories, in
addition to US dominance over international organizations, exercise of double-
standards in the issuance and implementation of international resolutions,
adoption of intervention policies in the affairs of other communities, militariza-
tion of the world, espousal of the logic of mobile wars in the realm of interna-
tional conflicts, and instigation of unrest and turbulence throughout the world
consign the US administration as an enemy to our nation and people, and place
the brunt of primary and fundamental responsibility for the creation of interna-
tional imbalances and turmoil on US shoulders.
As for European policies, these oscillate between incapacity and ineffective-
ness on the one hand, and unjustified tagging along with American guidelines
on the other, a fact that renders the Euro-Mediterranean movement hollow in
comparison to and in favor of Atlantic dominion, that which rests on colonialist
pillars.
Subscription to American politics – especially during this era where such
politics are manifesting historic failure – is a strategic mistake that will only
serve to aggravate the problems, obstacles and complications in Euro-Arab
relations.
Europe has an exceptional responsibility towards our region, one that is a
product of Europe’s colonialist legacy that had inflicted grave damage, the con-
sequences of which are still being suffered by our people.
Because the people of Europe have had a history of resistance against occupa-
tion, it is the moral and humanitarian duty of Europe – before being the political
duty – to recognize the rights of other peoples to freedom from the occupier on
the basis of a clear distinction between resistance and terrorism.
In our view: The prerequisite for stability and cooperation in the realm of
Euro-Arab relations calls for the building of a more independent, equitable and
objective European approach. It would be impossible to construct a common
political and security dynamic range without achieving such a transformation
that is capable of treating those defects and shortcomings which lie at the source
of crises and instability.
On the other hand, we look with great interest and appreciation at the liber-
alization, independence and dominance rejection experiences of Latin America
countries. We see vast grounds for overlap between the endeavors of these coun-
tries and the resistance movements of our region, overlap which should lead to
the creation of a more equitable and balanced international order.
Epilogue
Such are our views and visions. While seeking them, we were ardent in the search
of truth and virtue. The standpoints and commitments we have manifested have
been drafted with truth and loyalty, for we are believers in righteousness; we
speak in its defense and sacrifice in its quest until martyrdom. Throughout, we
seek only the contentment of God our Creator, Lord of the heavens and earth,
and hope only for the rectitude, well-being, and happiness of our umma (Mus-
lim nation) and people, both in this world and in the Hereafter.
God our lord, you know that our deeds were neither conquests for the post
of sultan nor a search for benefit amongst the wreckage, but were meant for
the revival of virtue, the abolition of falsehood, the defense of your oppressed
followers, the upholding of justice on your land and an appeal to your approval
and nearness. For this our martyrs have died, and for this we continue to strive.
You have promised us one of the two better goals: either victory or the honor of
encountering you through martyrdom.7
epilogue 137
Our promise to you Lord and to all of your oppressed servants is that we shall
remain men who are true to their covenant, who await your promise, and who
stand firm, unswerving.8
Question: The Manifesto’s reference to the civil rights of the Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon in general seems like any political speech made by any Lebanese
political force on Lebanese civil rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
Considering Hizbullah’s seventeen years of experience in parliament and in
government, of being one way or another inside the decision-making circle,
how can we imagine that the party will take a step to transform the motto of
giving Palestinian refugees in Lebanon their civil rights into an actual process?
Answer: This subject was contained in the ministerial statement of the previ-
ous government, but unfortunately prevalent tension in the country at the time
prevented anyone from achieving anything at this and most other levels. The
priority was focused on finding an exit from the state of tension. The current
government which reflects a national coalition, cooperation and unity govern-
ment has explicitly mentioned this item, and I believe this subject is taken seri-
ously by the prime minister as well as a number of political forces; we too will
invest our efforts.
Ultimately, this issue depends on follow-up efforts spent in the context of
State institutions, the government, and certain aspects are also related to Par-
liament House work. God willing, we will spend the necessary efforts with the
political forces with whom we meet on this objective, within the mentioned
constraints, to assure that they maintain their cause and identity. A forbiddance
is always presented that giving civil and social rights to Palestinians may lead to
their resettlement, and that such an action forms one of only two and no other
options: offer civil rights as a lead up to naturalization or keep the Palestinian
refugees in their current tragic living situation.
We suggest there is a compromise, whereby they can be given civil and social
rights that do not lead to naturalization and resettlement, one which preserves
their identity and cause. This issue will certainly need following up and effort
but definitely more action than talk.
Question: Ongoing talk about the Lebanese resistance, its role, its support and
adopting it as a strategic choice is offset by internal dispute among some Leba-
nese sides, disputes which prevent the resistance from performing the expected
active role described in the political manifesto. How do you find a way out of
this?
Question: By specifying the centrality of the resistance role, function and its
defense strategy foundations, have you in a sense already reached a resolve on
the defense strategy and therefore there is no point of having the dialogue table?
Answer: There is nothing new in what I said today on the issue of resistance. The
issue of seeking to find a form of cooperation between the national army and the
popular Lebanese resistance… Now this form of cooperation requires confir-
mation, elaboration and discussion, and I have already raised this matter at the
dialogue table in the last two sessions before the July war. It is our known vision,
and in saying so we are not disclosing a secret; and today the various political
forces are putting their visions of a defense strategy at the dialogue table in order
to come to a conclusion, which will then be drafted.
Of course, the rest asked us to submit our vision in writing after I made a
verbal submission of our idea of a defense strategy. We have no problem doing
that after we give everyone the chance to share and discuss their own ideas of
a defense strategy. Furthermore, the discussions of all the proposed ideas may
further develop our position and ideas. But until now experience has been one
of cooperation between the resistance and the army governed by a good set of
controls. An experience that has proved successful, so much so that we are able
to say we can benefit from this experience in order to protect the country and to
formulate a defensive strategy; this requires discussion and more details.
Regarding the subject of the state having exclusivity to the decisions of peace
and war, we have already acknowledged that the state is responsible for the
political decision-making in all public affairs. To us this is not a topic of debate.
Some say they need to hear us say it, and I am prepared to testify this in front of
witnesses (and the whole world can be my witness), we have no problem with
that.
The problem lies in the absence of the State and its duty. It is not enough to
put this responsibility and privilege on the state when it is absent. I ask the State
to be present, strong and capable to take the decision, and to the contrary, I am
ready to go further than this – if you remember my speech on September 22
after the July war, we were clear that once we have a strong, capable, fair State
that is able to protect the country and liberate the land, we would not even need
to discuss a defense strategy, because then it is the state that would be protecting
the country… the reason why popular resistance came into existence in the first
place.
Here we say that we concede and acknowledge, even if I consider it a purely
theoretical debate, because the decision of war and peace in the region is in the
hands of “Israel”, not the Lebanese state, or in the hands of the resistance, nor in
the hands of the Arabs or Muslims unfortunately, the ones who take the deci-
sions of war and peace in the region are only America and “Israel”.
Answer: First: here we have provided a political document but have not dealt
with aspects of belief, ideology, or intellectual culture. I like to be clear that our
position on the question of al-waliyy al-faqih is an intellectual, ideological and
religious one and not a political position subject to review.
Second: To ask the question, how do we combine the two, our allegiance to
the faqih and engagement in political life of Lebanon and the building of State
institutions, the answer to that is simple, proof of the possibility of something
occurring is its occurrence.
We have been engaged in Parliament through an effective parliamentary
bloc, we have participated in parliamentary elections in the years 1992, 1996,
2000, 2005 and also the recent elections. We participated in successive govern-
ments through ministers who were present and active, we also joined the 2005
Lebanese government, but political conditions and tensions in the country pre-
vented us and the entire Cabinet from making any real achievements.
Having said that proves in our opinion that there is no contradiction between
our understanding of our commitment to the Jurisprudent and our sense of
engagement in political life and participation as a Lebanese society segment,
of some weight I might add, in the building of State institutions as presented
earlier.
On the second part of the question, you are actually restarting a dispute all
over again. Anyway, in the negotiation sidelines on forming a national unity
government, this subject was well covered in debates with a number of political
forces, Prime Minister Shaykh Sa‘d al-Hariri at their forefront, and everyone
feels the results are reassuring enough that there is no need to raise issues or
questions of this nature.
Answer: No, the document is clear that the resistance remains the essential task,
and I do not think we pushed it down to second place, it remains a first level
priority and still exists within us, but we can say we have raised the subject of
contribution in the national project of State-building to first level as well.
Because the most important conditions of state-building is institution build-
ing, founded on a bedrock of peace, stability and security, which come from hav-
ing a secure, strong and immune homeland capable of facing constant “Israeli”
threats. This is why I believe the real and effective presence of the resistance is
one of the most important conditions to enable the Lebanese to build the state
of their choice.
On arming the LAF, we consider any attempt to arm the LAF a good endeav-
or, and have no “Vetoes” or problems in this regard.
As a result of the US administration’s conduct and performance, our posi-
tion towards it is clear in that we do not have enmity against the US as such, but
we do have a purely topical animosity in this regard. We do not have problems
with the US if it decides to arm the LAF to a level making it capable of providing
defense for the country. Yet I believe the US and its allies in the world have not
and will not arm the LAF to defend Lebanon. But that should not deter efforts in
that regard.
We have no objection if the government tries asking other countries to arm
the LAF, and we offer assistance in this regard during the elections. The Islamic
Republic of Iran is open to offering such assistance and so are Syria and some
other Arab countries.
Arming the LAF does not require miracles, only investments, mainly on the
intellectual level, and the level of will, determination, military doctrine and
military fighting school according to the Lebanese defense strategy we adopt.
Thus arming the Lebanese army and rendering it able to defend the homeland
becomes possible in my opinion so long as we do not insist on our enemy to
equip and strengthen our armed forces, which they will never do.
Question: A new Lebanese Cabinet will win a confidence vote in about a week,
made up of both pro-government and opposition camps, whereas up until now
the opposition within the government has not been Hizbullah and its allies, but
a basic team of March 14 Christians, i.e. pro-government!
Answer: I think it is too early to say for certain that things are going in this
direction, in any case, we in the allied political forces in the opposition are now
represented in government through our Ministers, and we have declared that
our presence in government would not be on the basis of opposition and pro-
government, but rather our ministers will be in their ministries serving all the
Lebanese people.
We have also declared our keenness to be over and done with barricades, to
work as one team instead, and we insist on this approach. I imagine coalitions
and political lineups may continue outside the Cabinet, which is natural, but
inside it we may witness different opinions, varying ideas and stands. We may
see members from opposition and pro-government share similar views and vote
orientations, while members of the same camps may differ on certain topics or
issues.
This allows for subjectivity in handling different files within the Cabinet,
which helps serve higher national interests, rather than give priority to the inter-
ests of our own political alliances, parties or religious sects.
I believe this is the logic of the coming period.
Question: 1). It was said you expressed satisfaction with PM Hariri’s position, but
how do you view the statements made by some members of his parliamentary
bloc against the resistance, and that having the resistance listed in the Ministe-
rial Statement actually contravenes Resolution 1701?
2). Where is Hizbullah heading in its relationship with the Progressive Social-
ist Party (PSP) and the Future Movement?
Another point is that you did mention national consensus, yet we hear talk of
the party having lost popular legitimacy after the recent parliamentary elections
despite it being listed in the Ministerial Statement. The question is what do you
say to those who claim the resistance has lost its popular legitimacy?
Answer: We have been clear that we consider Lebanon our country. On the
debate about whether Lebanon is a finite country or not, I would like to say that
this country is a blessing in light of its variety and geography and the many great
historic accomplishments it has made. As for having to announce it as a finite
homeland, His Eminence Sayyid Musa al-Sadr was very clear on the subject,
and he used to speak on behalf of this entire path, when he considered Lebanon
a finite homeland.
But anyone may say it is finite only to abandon this view at a later moment,
hence such slogans do not offer reassurance to the people as much as our una-
nimity, accord and consensus do in matters that govern our country.
Incidentally, all national, pan-Arab and Islamic movements have their own
visions of the Arab or Islamic nation, and the subject of “Sykes-Picot”10 division
plan of the Arab and Islamic world into smaller entities. We believe an Arab
union of these smaller entities under an agreement which preserves the inde-
pendence of all countries and respects each nation’s thoughts and ideologies can
bring about an added group strength, this way individuals not only can continue
to dream up and talk of an Arab or Islamic nation, but even see global earth as
one nation home.
If we are to take events and facts into account, we find this to be the ideal for-
mula. Naturally, there are other Islamic movements with their own strict views
on the subject, but there is no problem with having differences.
As for pairing between the Resistance and the LAF, I did say that as long as
there is an imbalance in strength and an absence of the strong capable state, this
pairing would be essential, but if the strong and capable state is established, such
a formula would become redundant and no longer necessary, because then the
State would assume the full responsibility of defending the country.
On the arrest warrants I mentioned during the electoral campaigns, I spoke
about the general situation of the arrest warrants in the Biqa‘ area, and not only
pertaining to drugs.
I want to bring to attention that there are thirty thousand arrest warrants
against people in the Biqa‘, a part of them are related to building without permit,
infringements, errors in land divisions, etc…
The 30,000 warrants are not all for drugs, drug cultivation and trafficking.
During election times we did not ask for an amnesty or a pardon, but we asked
for forming a legal, parliamentary, ministerial or justice and rights committee,
to meet and look into these warrants, some of which date back twenty or thirty
years.
Answer: As I said in the manifesto, we have no objection, and we are keen to see
the Arab nation, governments and peoples, the other resistance and political
forces benefit from the resistance’s accomplishments and triumphs.
Among the advantages is that the resistance began to enjoy a status which we
employ wherever it can bring unity and uniformity, sometimes we do so away
from media spotlights to avoid causing official, political and media embarrass-
ment to others.
On the Yemen subject, we had a position and sent out appeals on more than
one occasion, but in fact we did not offer mediation, because of the complex-
ity of the situation in Yemen and our estimation that our mediation might be
counterproductive, as was the case with certain other political currents, such as
the Sadrist movement under the leadership of His Eminence Sayyid Muqtada
al-Sadr.
They contacted the Yemeni embassy and offered a delegation from the Sad-
rist movement to act as mediators between the disputing sides in Yemen, but
President ‘Ali Abdallah Saleh described the offer to mediation as evidence that
the Sadrist movement is linked to the Huthis, even though it does not form any
evidence.
Here, I am describing things as they are… at a time when we read in some
newspapers especially Arabic ones, that Hizbullah finances, trains and arms the
1975
13 April witnessed the beginning of the 16-year Lebanese civil war.
1976
In response to an official request by the Lebanese government, on 20 July,
the Syrian army entered Lebanon as a contingent to the Quwwat Al-Rad‘ Al-
‘Arabiyya (Arab Deterrent Forces) in order to help the Lebanese government
enforce law and order in the civil-war-torn Lebanon.
1978
Hizbullah came into being in 1978 when Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, one of its
primary founders and its second secretary general, came back from Najaf to
Lebanon and in the Biqa‘ established the religious and ideological founda-
tions of the party, along with other Lebanese and Iranian clergy and cadres.
Sayyid Abbas established religious seminaries (hawzas) and started his Islamic
propagation or call (da‘wa), in B‘albak, in the Biqa‘. This also coincided with
the arrival of dissident Iranian clergy and military personnel (most notably Ali
Akbar Muhtashami and Mustafa Shamran), who established religious and mili-
tary training centers with substantial material and spiritual backing from Imam
Khumayni who was himself banished in Najaf for a period of thirteen years.
On 14 March Israel launched “Operation Litani” by invading Lebanon and
eventually occupying a 500 square kilometer “Security Zone”, which included 61
cities and villages. On 19 March, the UNSC issued resolution 425 calling for the
unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon, a resolution that
fell on deaf ears. In order to help restore the Lebanese state’s sovereignty, the UN
151
established the UNIFIL, a 5,000 interim peacekeeping force, which was sent to
Lebanon as of 23 March.1 However, Israel did not allow the UNIFIL to deploy all
the way to the border.
On 31 August, Imam Musa al-Sadr, the leader of the Lebanese Shi‘a commu-
nity and the head of the Islamic Shi‘ite Higher Council, disappeared in Libya
under mysterious circumstances. All of these factors were conducive to the
emergence of Hizbullah’s rudimentary foundations that crystallized in the birth
of its religious ideology.
1979
On 1 February, Imam Khumayni landed in Tehran, thus ushering in the vic-
tory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran on 11 February. Many Lebanese Shi‘ites
were inspired by Imam Khumayni’s revolutionary ideology, which led them
to actively mobilize and struggle for a more active role in the Lebanese politi-
cal system. Thus, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Sayyid Abbas Al-
Musawi, together with his students and other leading ‘ulama, officially founded
“The Hizbullah of Lebanon”.
1982
At a time when the Arabs and the international community were preoccupied
with the Iraq-Iran war, on 6 June Israel invaded Lebanon for a second time
through its “Peace for Galilee” operation. From 8 to 13 June, the Khaldé battle
(which was spearheaded by many of Hizbullah’s founding cadres, many of whom
were wounded) heralded the initiation of Hizbullah’s military wing, the “Islamic
Resistance”. Khaldé, a small town near Beirut, was the only location where the
Israeli invasion was temporarily halted because of the stiff resistance it met, a
resistance that resulted in heavy Israeli casualties (16 dead and 176 wounded)
and led the Israelis to change their military strategy and tactics.
As early as July, the political framework of Hizbullah was embarked upon, a
task that passed through different stages, most notably in 1984-85.
On 23 August, Bashir Jumayyel, the head of the Phalangist Christian militia,
was elected president.
On 21 August, the Multi-National Forces, made up of contingents of US,
French, UK, and Italian forces, landed in Beirut in order to supervise the imple-
mentation of the agreement between the PLO and Israel. The agreement dictated
the withdrawal of PLO fighters, cadres, and leaders from Beirut, including Yas-
ser Arafat who left Beirut on 30 August.
In Tyre, in south Lebanon, on 31 August during the fourth anniversary of
the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, a massive popular uprising, in the
hundreds of thousands, paid allegiance to al-Sadr, avowing that Israel would
remain the enemy, shouting: “Israel is the absolute evil, and dealings with it are
1983
January witnessed the first massive launch of Katyusha rockets at Israel’s north-
ern settlements as well as the capture of the first Israeli soldier by the Islamic
Resistance. The Israeli soldier died from wounds suffered during his abduction,
and his body was left behind.
In March Shaykh Raghib Harb, the leader of the popular uprising in the
south, was captured by Israeli forces.
On 13 April, Hizbullah conducted its second martyrdom operation when ‘Ali
Safiyyeddine detonated his car in an Israeli convoy in Dayr Qanun al-Nahr kill-
ing 6 soldiers and wounding 4 others.
On 18 April the US Embassy in West Beirut was targeted by a suicidal attack
resulting in the death of 63 people, of whom 17 were Americans, including the
entire Middle East contingent of the CIA.
On 17 May, Israel and the Lebanese government signed a peace agreement.
In July Israel withdrew from Mount Lebanon to the Awwali River, near Sidon,
in the south. October witnessed the ‘Ashura uprising in Nabatiyyé, in the south,
in response to Israeli’s defilement of the ritual.
On 14 October Hizbullah conducted its third martyrdom operation when
Ja‘far Al-Tayyar blew himself up in Tyre in a UNRWA building housing Israeli
soldiers, killing 29 soldiers, as acknowledged by Israeli sources.
1983 153
On 23 October the “Islamic Jihad” committed twin suicidal attacks against
the Marine’s barracks and the French paratroopers, which resulted in the death
of 241 American and 58 French soldiers.
It is worth mentioning that Hizbullah put a lid on an aborted double suicidal
operation when the car of the two suicide bombers got blown up prematurely
on its way to Tyre.
In November the Israeli air force started targeting Hizbullah’s training bases
in the Biqa‘. On 23 November the Israelis released 4,500 Lebanese and Palestin-
ian detainees from the Ansar detention camp (in southern Lebanon) and 63
other Palestinians in exchange for the release of one Israeli pilot and six soldiers.
1984
Hizbullah’s Shura Council, or main decision-making body, passed through dif-
ferent stages from 9 members to 5 and finally settled on 7 as of 1984. Hizbul-
lah released several political declarations bearing its name and established its
politburo.
In March the Lebanese parliament abrogated the 17 May 1983 agreement with
Israel.
On 18 June Hizbullah’s mouthpiece and weekly newspaper al-‘Ahd first
appeared.
On 16 February Saykh Raghib Harb, Hizbullah’s most influential resistance
leader in the south, was assassinated by Israeli forces.
On 20 September the US Embassy in East Beirut was targeted by a suicide
operation.
1985
On 16 February Hizbullah published its “Open Letter” or Political Manifesto,
ushering the birth of its political ideology. The Open Letter officially announced
the establishment of Hizbullah, and its military wing, the Islamic Resistance.
The Open Letter was read by Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid, its spokesman at
that time. In February Israel withdrew from Sidon.
In March Israel blew up the Husayniyya (religious gathering place) of Ma‘raké
and assassinated two leading Hizbullah cadres.
In April Israel withdrew from Nabatiyyé and Tyre.
The Jalil Operation on 20 May between the General Command of the Pop-
ular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Israeli government
resulted in the release of 1,150 Lebanese and Palestinian detainees from the Atlit
detention camp in Israel, in exchange for three Israeli soldiers.
In June the Israeli Army announced that it had finalized its withdrawal and
established an 1100 square kilometer “Security Zone”, which included 168 cities
and villages. The “Security Zone” comprised around 15% of Lebanese territory
1986
On 16 February the Islamic Resistance captured two Israeli soldiers in an opera-
tion in the Kunin area of Bint Jubayl. Israel launched a limited incursion into 17
villages for six consecutive days in order to retrieve the two soldiers, but to no
avail. The Islamic Resistance waged a relentless war against the SLA posts, aim-
ing at occupying them and destroying them, killing and detaining all members,
then blowing up the entire post.
In October an Israeli jet fighter was downed, and Ron Arad, the assistant
pilot, was captured.
Hizbullah standardized the practice of videotaping military operations
against Israeli forces in order to convey the exact number of Israeli dead and
wounded to the Israeli public, thus belying Israeli claims of low casualties.
1987
On 15 June, the Lebanese government issued the official double annulment of
the 17 May 1983 Agreement and the 3 November 1969 Cairo Agreement.
Nasrallah assumed the newly established “chief executive officer” post, in
addition to being a member of the Consultative Council, which is Hizbullah’s
highest leading panel. This year witnessed the reinvigoration of the war of attri-
tion against SLA posts in an unprecedented manner.
December marked the beginning of the first Palestinian “stones” Intifada
(popular uprising).
1988
The first major military encounter and direct confrontation took place between
the Islamic Resistance and the Israeli Army in an Israeli attack on Maydun, in
the Western Biqa‘. On 11 March Hizbullah conducted its fifth martyrdom opera-
tion when ‘Amer Kalakish blew himself up in an Israeli convoy near the Mtulé
settlement at the Lebanese border killing 12 Israeli soldiers and wounding 14
others.
The Amal-Hizbullah control war – secular Shi‘ites against Islamist Shi‘ites –
started on 5 April in the south and spread to the Dahiya on 6 May, which led to
the ousting of Amal fighters from the Dahiya. This control war ended more than
two years later in November 1990.
The Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation (CCSD), Hizbullah’s
think tank, was founded.
1986 155
On 9 May Hizbullah’s al-Nour radio station started broadcasting. On 19
August Hizbullah conducted its sixth martyrdom operation when Haytham
Dbuq blew himself up in an Israeli convoy on the Marji‘yun road, killing one
Israeli soldier and wounding three others, according to Israeli military sources.
The seventh operation occurred on 19 October when Abdallah ‘Atwi blew him-
self up near the Fatima Gate on the border between Lebanon and Israel, killing
eight soldiers and wounding another eight, as acknowledged by Israeli sources.
The tenure of the then Lebanese President Amin Jumayyel ended without the
Lebanese parliament electing a successor. (It is worth mentioning that Jumayyel
was “voluntarily” banished to France from 1988 till 2000.) So, on 23 Septem-
ber 1988, Jumayyel appointed General Michel ‘Aun, the Lebanese Army Com-
mander, to head a military government composed of three Christians and two
Muslims. Deeming the appointment unconstitutional, Muslim spiritual leaders
met and issued a fatwa banning any Muslim from participating in the military
government. So General ‘Aun virtually ruled the Christian areas in East Beirut
and Mount Lebanon, while the rest of the country was under the mandate of
prime minister Salim Al-Hoss, who formed a second government in West Bei-
rut. Thus, at that time, Lebanon had two governments, a situation that lasted for
almost two years.
1989
Hizbullah held its first conclave and revealed the identity of its leaders and cad-
res. The conclave resulted in the creation of the post of the secretary-general
and the election of Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli as Hizbullah’s first secretary-general.
On 28 July the Israeli army abducted Shaykh Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd, a leading
Hizbullah cadre, from his hometown, Jibshit.
In an attempt to drive the Syrian Army out of Lebanon, on 14 March, General
Michel ‘Aun, waged a “Liberation War” against the Syrian forces who had been
present in Lebanon since 1976.
On 9 August Hizbullah conducted its eighth martyrdom operation when
Shaykh As‘ad Birru blew himself up in an Israeli convoy across the Marji‘un
road killing five soldiers and wounding five others, according to Israeli military
sources.
The Ta’if Agreement, a “bill of rights” or a blueprint for national reconcili-
ation and reform aimed at a more equitable political system for all sectarian-
confessional groups, was drafted and ratified between 30 September and 22
October in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia. On Saturday, 22 October at 10:45 pm, it was offi-
cially announced, from the Palace of Conventions at Ta’if, that the civil war was
ended. ‘Aun issued a decree dissolving the parliament, but it fell on deaf ears.
1991
In line with the Ta’if Agreement, in March the Lebanese government officially
declared the dissolution of the militias. The end of April was set as a deadline
for the militias to hand in their heavy weapons and to close their military and
training centers. Hizbullah was a notable exception, and to a lesser extent Amal.
Starting on 22 May, Hizbullah held its second conclave and elected Sayyid
‘Abbas Al-Musawi as its second secretary-general. Unlike the first conclave in
which the seven members of the Shura Council were nominated, in the second
conclave they were elected. On 3 June Hizbullah’s al-Manar TV station was cre-
ated.
The first swap operation between Hizbullah and Israel, which was medi-
ated by the UN2, took place in three installments, between 11 September and 1
December. Israel released 91 Lebanese detainees (one from an Israeli prison and
90 from the Khyam detention camp, including ten women), and the remains of
nine fighters, in exchange for information about two Israeli soldiers who were
detained by Hizbullah on 16 February 1986.
1992
16 February witnessed the assassination of Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, his wife,
and his son, by an Israeli helicopter. Two days later, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah,
Hizbullah’s third secretary-general, was elected as well as Shaykh Na‘im Qasim
as deputy secretary-general. Both Nasrallah and Qasim retain their posts to the
present day.
Israel attacked the two villages of Kafra and Yatir, an act that was met with
forceful resistance from Hizbullah fighters.
Hizbullah started employing the Katyusha weapon as a deterrent strategy to
protect Lebanese civilians from Israeli aggressions.
Hizbullah launched its political program as a distinct manifestation (or
extension) of its political ideology.
Hizbullah participated in the first parliamentary elections, which had been
frozen for a period of twenty years due to the Lebanese civil war. The Party won
1990 157
all of the twelve seats on its election list: eight were reserved for party members,
and four for affiliated sympathizers: two for Sunnis and two for Christians (a
Greek Catholic and a Maronite): ‘Ali Ammar, Ibrahim Bayan (Sunni), Muham-
mad Berjawi, Muhammad Fnaysh, Munir al-Hujayyri (Sunni), Rabi‘a Kayruz
(Maronite), Muhammad Ra‘d, Sa‘ud Rufayyel (Greek Catholic), Sayyid Ibrahim
Amin Al-Sayyid, ‘Ali Taha, Khudr Tlays, Muhammad Yaghi.
On 21 September Ibrahim Dahir conducted Hizbullah’s ninth martyrdom
operation when he targeted an Israeli convoy on the Jarmaq road, killing and
wounding 25, according to Hizbullah.
1993
During its third conclave, Hizbullah re-elected Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah as its
secretary-general, and Shaykh Na‘im Qasim as deputy secretary-general. It is
important to note that the Islamic Resistance was rewarded by electing Hiz-
bullah’s “Central Military Commander”, Hajj Muhsin Al-Shakar, as one of the
seven-member Shura Council.
23-31 July: “The seven-day war” or the Israeli “Operation Accountability”
erupted as a direct result of the Islamic Resistance’s killing of seven Israeli sol-
diers. “The seven-day war” led to the death of 130 people, mostly Lebanese civil-
ians, and it displaced around 300,000. “Operation Accountability” resulted in
an unwritten agreement between Hizbullah and Israel to sideline the civilians
on both sides of the border. (Italics added for emphasis.)
On 13 September, when Hizbullah was protesting peacefully against the Oslo
Agreement, the Lebanese Army and ISF (Police) killed thirteen Hizbullah sup-
porters – including two women – and wounded 40 because they took to the
streets when the Hariri government imposed a ban on demonstrations.
1994
21 April: the Lebanese state jailed Samir Geagea, the leader of the right-wing
Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), and banned the LF.
In October the Islamic Resistance stormed the Israeli post of Dabshé. Hiz-
bullah exploited the camera as a primary weapon in its psychological warfare
against Israel by airing, through its al-Manar TV, details of the operation and the
Israeli casualties.
On 31 May an Israeli commandos unit abducted Hajj Mustafa al-Dirani, an
Islamic Amal leading cadre, from his hometown, Qsarnaba, in the Biqa‘.
1995
On 17 May Imam Khamina’i appointed Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s
secretary-general, and Shaykh Muhammad Yazbik, Hizbullah’s Shura Coun-
cil member, as his religious deputies (wakilayn shar‘iyyan) in Lebanon “in the
1996
On 20 March ‘Ali Ashmar conducted Hizbullah’s eleventh martyrdom opera-
tion in the Town of Rub Thalathin in al-‘Daysé, killing two according to Israeli
military sources.
From 11-18 April, the Israeli military operation of the “Grapes of Wrath”
ended with the Qana massacre, where more than 100 Lebanese civilians, seek-
ing shelter in a UN complex, were killed by Israeli shelling. The Israeli aggression
resulted in what became known as the “April 1996 Understanding/Agreement”
that protected both Israeli and Lebanese civilians from military operations. The
UN, France, Syria, and the US mediated the 26 April written Agreement between
Israel and Hizbullah, which established the “Monitoring Group for the Under-
standings of Operation Grapes of Wrath”. The “Grapes of Wrath” led to the death
of more than 150 Lebanese civilians and displaced around half a million others.
(Italics added for emphasis.)
In the parliamentary elections Hizbullah managed to keep ten seats: seven
were occupied by party members; two by Sunnis and one by a Maronite Chris-
tian, non-party members. Only the head of Hizbullah’s Parliamentary Bloc was
a clergyman, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid. Here is a list of the names with
(O) and (N) beside the names to denote old [i.e. previously elected] and new,
respectively: Abdallah Qasir (N), Ammar al-Musawi (N), Nazih Mansur (N),
Husayn al-Hajj Hasan (N), Ibrahim Bayan, Sunni (O), Muhammad Fnaysh (O),
Isma‘il Sukariyyé, Sunni (N), Rabi‘a Kayruz, Maronite (O), Muhammad Ra‘d
(O), Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid (O).
1996 159
Under German sponsorship, on 21 July Hizbullah exchanged the bodies of
two Israeli soldiers (kidnapped on 16 February 1986) and 17 SLA collaborators
for 45 Lebanese detainees and 123 remains.
1997
In February, while attempting to avoid being spotted by Hizbullah, 73 Israeli
soldiers were killed on board of two helicopters, which collided into each other
while they were on a mission aimed at deploying troops in south Lebanon.
On 7 April a swap operation between Hizbullah and Israel resulted in the
exchange of three Lebanese detainees for the body of a dead SLA sergeant.
Conflict between Hizbullah’s identity and the Lebanese state sovereignty: on
4 May, Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli founded the “Revolution of the Hungry”, and on
4 July he called for civil disobedience against the Lebanese government, which
culminated in blocking roads on 26 October.
On 5 September the Israeli operation of al-Ansariyyé resulted in the death of
twelve high-ranking officials of an elite Israeli military commando while not a
single member of the resistance was injured.
On 12 September, Sayyid Hadi Nasrallah, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah’s son, died
in a confrontation with the Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon.
On 3 November, Hizbullah formed Al-Sarayah Al-Lubnaniyya Li-Muqawa-
mat Al-Ihtilal Al-Israeli or the Multi-confessional Lebanese Brigades to fight
Israel (Lebanonization of the resistance).
1998
Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli was officially expelled from Hizbullah by a political
declaration issued on 24 January. On 30 January a violent military confrontation
erupted between the Lebanese army and al-Tufayli’s supporters, who occupied
Hizbullah’s religious seminary in ‘Ayn Burday, near B‘albak, by military force.
The bloody face-off ended with the destruction of Tufayli’s headquarters and
the Lebanese state’s issuing of an arrest warrant against him. However, to this
day, Tufayli is still at large. After solving the internal discord problem, Hizbullah
held its fifth conclave between 20 June and the end of July. Nasrallah was elected
for a third term. For this move to be made, Hizbullah had to amend its internal
bylaws by deleting the stipulation that the secretary-general cannot serve for
more than two consecutive terms.
The May-June 1998 municipal elections – that reflect true populace represen-
tation and which had not been carried out since 1963 – were carried out only
after pressure and lobbying from Hizbullah. The Lebanese government used the
pretext of lack of financial and technical resources and manpower, but Hizbul-
lah insisted on the reactivation of the elections. Eventually, Hizbullah won a
landslide victory in its main constituencies (with the exception of the B‘albak
1999
On 28 February the Islamic Resistance blew up the convoy of Erez Gerstein, the
Israeli brigadier-general in Lebanon, which resulted in his immediate death.
Gerstein was the highest-ranking Israeli soldier to be killed in 17 years.
In early June Israeli forces and SLA withdrew from Jezzin (a predominantly
Christian enclave) that comprised around 6% of the “Security Zone”, thus reduc-
ing the total size of the “Security Zone” to 9% of the Lebanese territory.
Through German mediation, Israel released, in two installments, thirteen
Lebanese freedom fighters, five of whom were released on 26 December from
the Israeli Ayalut detention camp, in exchange for a promise from Hizbullah to
help track the missing Israeli pilot, Ron Arad, whose plane was gunned down
over south Lebanon in 1986. On 30 December ‘Ammar Husayn Hammud con-
ducted Hizbullah’s twelfth martyrdom operation on the road to al-Qlay‘a, killing
seven Israeli soldiers and wounding seven others, according to Hizbullah, while
according to Israeli military sources the operation resulted in no Israeli casual-
ties due to premature detonation on behalf of the suicide bomber.8
2000
In February the Islamic Resistance blew up the farm of the SLA’s second man in
rank, ‘Aqil Hashim, who died in the blast.
On 19 April Israel released thirteen Lebanese detainees from the Israeli Ayalut
detention camp.
On 24 May Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon after 22 years of occupa-
tion. (Israel failed to relinquish the Lebanese Shib‘a farms, which are a bone of
contention between Israel and Lebanon.)
On 28 September the second Palestinian Intifada was inaugurated in the
wake of Sharon’s visit to the Dome of the Rock (al-Masjid al-Aqsa).
1999 161
Hizbullah won twelve seats in the parliamentary elections held in the sum-
mer. Hizbullah’s nine candidates, along with two Sunnis and one Maronite
Christian, received the highest number of votes in the country. In the 2000 par-
liamentary elections all Hizbullah’s representatives in the parliament were civil-
ian (no ‘ulama). ‘Ali Ammar (O); Muhammad Berjawi (O); Abdallah Qasir (O);
Muhammad Fnaysh (O); Nazih Mansur (O); Muhammad Ra‘d (O); Husayn
al-Hajj Hasan (O); Ammar al-Musawi (O); Husayn Yaghi (O); George Najm,
Maronite (N); Ibrahim Bayan, Sunni (O); Mas‘ud al-Hujayyri, Sunni (N).
On 7 October Hizbullah captured three Israeli soldiers from the Leba-
nese Shib‘a farms. On 15 October, Hizbullah lured and apprehended Elhanan
Tannenbaum, a retired Israeli Mossad colonel.
2001
In Hizbullah’s sixth conclave that ended on 30 July 2001, Nasrallah was re-
elected for life, and Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid and Hajj Jawad Nureddine
replaced Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d and Hajj Muhsin Shakar in the Shura Council.
Hizbullah placed its media institutions under the direct command of Nasrallah,
aided by the head of the Political Council and that of the Executive Council.
This was done in order to upgrade the role of Hizbullah’s media, and pursue its
ideological hegemony. Also, Hizbullah abolished its “Central Planning Coun-
cil”, and strengthened internal audit and accountability mechanisms. From this
perspective, the roles and duties of the municipal councils were expanded (hori-
zontally) and upgraded (vertically).
2002
On 27-28 March the Arab Summit was held in Beirut, and the Arab initiative of
ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was propagated.
In late March/early April, the Israeli army conducted a deadly incursion into
the West Bank. Hizbullah responded by conducting twelve-day military opera-
tions in the Shib‘a farms in order to buttress the Intifada.
On 10 June in light of the revival of the prisoner-exchange negotiations and
as a goodwill gesture towards Hizbullah, Israel released Muhammad al-Birzawi,
a Hizbullah fighter, who had been detained since 1987.
2003
On 21 August Israel returned the remains of two Hizbullah fighters in return
for a meeting between the detained Mossad colonel and the German mediator.
In response to a suicide operation in Israel a day earlier, in which 19 Israeli
civilians died, on 5 December Israeli jets violated Lebanese airspace and bombed
an alleged Palestinian training camp near Damascus. This was the first Israeli air
strike on Syria in thirty years, since the end of the October 1973 war.
2004 163
lence, thus giving weight to the hidden hand explanation or the conspiracy
theory. He called on the cabinet and parliament to hold emergency sessions to
discuss the issue, and he called on the government to launch an investigation
into what had happened.
30 May: Hariri visited Nasrallah and conducted a meeting with him in the
house of the latter’s political advisor/aide.
31 May: Conceding to Nasrallah’s demands, the Lebanese cabinet held an
urgent meeting in which it vehemently condemned the 27 May shootings and
offered, as blood money, around $33,000 for each victim. The cabinet asked the
Justice Minister and the Defense Minister to conduct an investigation into the
unrest and report directly to it.
Between June and 16 August, Hizbullah held its seventh conclave. Shura
Council members retained their same functions. Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hiz-
bullah’s secretary-general became the head of the Jihadi Council. The most
salient administrative amendment was Hizbullah’s division of the south into two
geographical areas: the first south of the Litani river, and the second to its north.
Both function under the auspices of one central organizational leader in order
to secure organizational structures that are capable of improving local adminis-
tration and activate polarization. In addition, Shaykh Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd was
appointed as the head of Hizbullah’s social institutions. Shaykh Hasan Izzed-
dine, Hizbullah’s spokesman at the Central Press Office, was appointed as Hiz-
bullah’s political representative in the south, and Nasrallah’s media aide or advi-
sor, the engineer Hajj Muhammad Afif, replaced him.
2 September: The UN Security Council issued Resolution 1559 censuring Syr-
ian intervention in Lebanese affairs and criticizing both Syria and Lebanon for
the intended constitutional amendment that will extend President Lahud’s ten-
ure for three more years, to 25 November 2007. Among other things, Resolu-
tion 1559 called on the Lebanese government to disband and disarm Lebanese
militias, which is a direct reference to Hizbullah since it is the only Lebanese
political party that still bears arms.
3 September: The Lebanese parliament amended the constitution, thus allow-
ing President Lahud to remain in office for a second half-tenure, or a three-year
term.
1 October: A failed assassination attempt targeted MP Marwan Hamadé in
West Beirut and left his bodyguard dead and wounded his driver.
11 November: On Hizbullah’s Martyrs day, the party set a precedent in its
“balance of terror” with Israel. For the first time since its founding, Hizbullah
flew an unmanned drone, which is a small spying plane supplied with state of
the art cameras and is capable of carrying 40 to 50 kilograms of explosives and
can be programmed to hit any target in Israel, for fourteen minutes. It took
pictures of the northern Israeli settlement of Keryat Shmona. Israel confirmed
2005
29 January: Hizbullah’s first annual celebration of the “Day of Freedom” mark-
ing the watershed prisoner release operation a year ago.
14 February: ex-PM Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated by a massive suicide
truck bomb. The assassination polarized the country into two political group-
ings: March 8 and March 14. The Western-backed March 14 group, which ini-
tiated the Cedar Revolution, is led by the Sunni Future Movement, but also
included the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt
and the Christian Phalange and Lebanese Forces. And while Hizbullah is the
leading party in the March-8 coalition along with another Shi‘a group Amal, the
party of the Speaker of the Parliament, this group also contains the Free Patri-
otic Movement (FPM) of Michel ‘Aun11, Lebanon’s largest Christian party and
several more marginal Christian parties. March 14 is supported by the United
States, EU, and Saudi Arabia, and preaches an armed ceasefire with Israel. Con-
2005 165
versely, March 8 attains its regional support from Syria and Iran and has a more
social justice agenda that is linked to its doctrinal struggle against Israel. Since
then, political instability has reigned in Lebanon, a country known for its fragile
democratic tradition.
8 March: Hizbullah organized a pro-Syrian demonstration. Around half a
million Hizbullahis along with their supporters and sympathizers filled the
streets of the capital waving Lebanese flags. Nasrallah delivered a speech calling
for national unity, dialogue, and coexistence.
14 March: The “Cedar Revolution”: one million people took to the streets in
Downtown Beirut to demand the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the truth
about Hariri’s assassination.
19 April: Omar Karami’s government resigned, and Nagib Miqati’s 14-mem-
ber Cabinet took office. The cabinet included Trad Hamadé, a Hizbullah affili-
ated sympathizer (non-official member), for the first time in its history.
26 April: Syria ended its military presence in Lebanon after all its remaining
14,000 soldiers along with its intelligence personnel left Lebanon after a 29-year
presence.
7 May: Michel ‘Aun returned to Lebanon after being banished to France for
almost 15 years.
23 May: The UN verified the Syrian military pullout from Lebanon.
29 May-19 June: Hizbullah contested the first parliamentary elections after
the Syrian withdrawal on the basis of a temporary four-partite alliance between
Sa‘d Hariri’s “Future Trend”, Amal, and the PSP. Hariri’s “Future Trend” and his
allies won 72 seats out of the 128. Hizbullah won 14 seats, adding two seats to
its previous gains. Here is a list of the 14 names: Muhammad Ra‘d (O); Muham-
mad Fnaysh (O); Muhammad Haydar (N); Hasan Fadlallah (N); Hasan Hubal-
lah (N); Amin Sherri (N); Ali Ammar (O); Pierre Serhal, Maronite (N); Isma‘il
Sukariyyé, Sunni (N); Kamel al-Rifa‘i, Sunni (N); Ali al-Miqdad (N); Husayn
al-Hajj Hasan (O); Jamal al-Taqsh (N); Nawwar al-Sahili (N).
27 June: Trad Hamadé signed a memo allowing the Palestinians who were
born in Lebanon to work.
Early July: Syrian trade embargo begins; a de facto economic embargo.
18 July: 100 MPs voted for the parole of Samir Geagea – the leader of the
right-wing, outlawed Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), who served a jail sentence
for eleven years – and the Sunni Islamists who served a five-year jail sentence.
19 July: Fu’ad al-Sanyura forms the first cabinet after Syrian withdrawal,
where Hizbullah joins with an official member, MP Muhammad Fnaysh, and an
ally, Trad Hamadé.
22 July: Condoleezza Rice visits Lebanon, the first visit of a Secretary of State
since Colin Powell’s visit in May 2003.
30 July: Sanyura’s cabinet wins a parliamentary vote of confidence of 92 votes.
2006
1 January: The Belgian judge/prosecutor Serge Bramerts/Brammertz took over
from Detliv Mehlis as the head of the UN Commission investigating the Hariri
murder.
5 February: After one day of mobs torching the Danish Embassy in Damas-
cus as a protest against the cartoons of the Prophet, mobs in the Christian East
Beirut neighborhood also attempted to set the Danish Embassy on fire. May-
2006 167
hem erupted, and many shops, cars, and Churches were vandalized, and the
population was verbally abused. Lebanese security forces failed to bring the
matter to order, and as a result the Minister of Interior resigned, and Lebanon
offered Denmark a formal apology.
6 February: In order to contain the negative repercussions of what had hap-
pened and prevent Christian-Muslim discord, the leader of the FPM, General
Michel ‘Aun, and Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah met in a symbolic Church across the
old “green line” and signed a historic ten-point understanding addressing politi-
cal, economic, administrative, and security issues, as well as the relations with
Syria. The understanding also addressed domestic affairs such as administrative
reform, election law, fighting corruption, and the investigations into the Hariri
murder.
2 March: The inauguration of the “National Convention of Dialogue” in the
Lebanese parliament under the patronage of the Speaker, Nabih Berri. Four-
teen leading Lebanese politicians, including Nasrallah, participated in the
proceedings.
4 May: UNSC adopted Resolution 1680, which, among other things, called on
Syria to normalize relations with Lebanon.
30 May: The Lebanese judiciary exonerated Sultan Abu Al-‘Aynayn, the sec-
retary-general of the Fatah Movement in Lebanon.
1 June: The mocking of Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, in a TV comedy show,
sparked Hizbullah’s constituency to take to the streets, threatening to go all the
way to the Christian heartland and burn the LBCI. After Hizbullah’s MPs failed
to contain and control the infuriated masses, in an unprecedented move, Nas-
rallah addressed the masses in person, via the Hizbullah media, asking them to
immediately vacate the streets. They obeyed.
30 June: In the wake of the formation of a Lebanese-Palestinian Commit-
tee to discuss the plight of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, a delegation of
Lebanese ministers, including the Hizbullah-affiliated minister Trad Hamadé,
visited the Palestinian refugee camps.
12 July: In an attempt to free Samir al-Quntar, the oldest-serving Arab prisoner
in Israeli jails and other Lebanese POWs, Hizbullah kidnapped two Israeli sol-
diers (Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser) in a cross-border raid. Eight Israeli
soldiers died in the confrontations that ensued on that day, an eventuality that
triggered the July 2006 War.
12 July - 14 August: Israel’s 34-day offensive against Lebanon.
26 July: The Rome conference failed to agree on a ceasefire to end the 15-day
conflict. Sanyura launched his Seven Points.
11 August: UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1701, which called for a
complete cessation of hostilities in Lebanon.
2007
22 January: Nasrallah’s mobilization speech: He contended that the strike that
was organized for the next day would determine the destiny of Lebanon for
future generations, and he warned about domestic infighting and a division in
the Lebanese Army.
23 January: After 53 days of sit-ins and protests in downtown Beirut, the Hiz-
bullah-led opposition crippled the country through a general strike, coupled
with the blocking of main roads, burning wheels, etc. On 25 January, coinciding
with the Paris III conference, the civil unrest continued, and dangerous actions
reminiscent of the civil war were undertaken: sniping, automatic weapons, gun-
fire, mayhem, burning cars, destruction of property, etc. In an unprecedented
move, Nasrallah issued a fatwa calling on his supporters and all the Lebanese to
vacate the streets immediately.
27 January: Tufayli held a conference in ‘Ayn Burday12 (B‘albak) vehemently
censoring Hizbullah’s leadership, accusing Nasrallah of executing Khamina’i’s
policies in Lebanon. (Khamina’i has openly and repeatedly declared that Leba-
non will be the battleground where the US will be defeated.)
2007 169
7-8 February: Around midnight, at least two incidents of crossfire were
reported between the Lebanese Army and the IDF after an Israeli bulldozer
crossed the Blue Line in an attempt to remove mines across the border. This
was the first reported incident (military confrontation) between the two parties
since the cessation of hostilities on 14 August 2006.
8 February: The Lebanese Army confiscated a weapons truck from Hizbul-
lah. Hizbullah demanded its return; the Lebanese Army refused, arguing that
the weapons would be used to confront the IDF in the south.
14 February: The divide between the March-14 and March-8 camps was
painstakingly visible when the two parties were separated by a mini metal “Ber-
lin wall”.
21 March: Serge Bramerts/Brammertz submitted his seventh report to the
UNSC, which unanimously issued Resolution 1748 on 27 March that officially
extended the mandate of his Commission for a year, starting June, i.e. till June
2008. (UNSC Resolution 1747 enforced the 1701 ban against arms smuggling.)
2 April: Seventy Lebanese legislators supportive of the Sanyura cabinet, the
March-14 trend, met at the parliament and ratified a letter asking the UNSC to
found the International Tribune as soon as possible. On 10 April, PM Sanyura
forwarded the letter to Ban Ki-Moon, the UN secretary-general, arguing that
impediments standing in the way of ratifying the statutes of the tribunal were
mainly related to the paralysis of the legislature.
8 April: Nasrallah’s “Easter speech”: In an attempt to end the deadlock with
the Lebanese Cabinet, Nasrallah lowered his demands from veto power to a
national referendum or early legislative elections.
17-21 April : Ban Ki-moon dispatched Nicolas Michel, the UN Undersecre-
tary-general for Legal Affairs, to Lebanon in order to discuss the issue of the
tribunal with Lebanese state officials and the opposition leaders. Michel, who
was instrumental in drafting the text of the pact on the tribunal between the
UN and the Sanyura government, insisted the UN had no intention of getting
involved in the nitty-gritty of domestic Lebanese politics, especially the debates
surrounding the tribunal. After a meeting between Hizbullah’s resigned Min-
ister of Power Fnaysh and Michel, Fnaysh refused to hand Michel the party’s
reservations on the tribunal, maintaining Hizbullah’s discourse of only doing so
to a national unity government.
5 May: Nasrallah in a talk show with the Iranian Satellite TV “Al-‘Alam” (The
World), recorded one day earlier, tried to calm the waters.
30 May: UNSC Resolution 1757 established, under chapter seven, the Interna-
tional Tribunal of the Hariri murder, effective June 10.
13 June 13: Walid ‘Ido, a March-14 MP, was assassinated by a car bomb in
Roushé, Ras Beirut. The explosion claimed the life of his son Khalid, and eight
other civilians. In a political declaration, Hizbullah vehemently condemned
2007 171
their assets, including those of Qasim ‘Ulayq and Hasan Shami, their respective
directors.
28 July: Nasrallah’s first “victory speech”, delivered at Bint Jubayl, was trans-
mitted live via al-Manar TV by projection on a large screen to Hizbullah’s con-
stituency.
3 August: Nasrallah’s second “victory speech” delivered at Marjat Ra’is al-
‘Ayn, Ba‘albak, the Biqa‘, “the reservoir of the Resistance” at 20:30 hours local
time, was transmitted live via al-Manar TV by projection on a large screen.
6 August: By-elections in Matn and Beirut to replace the two assassinated
March-14 MPs Pierre Jumayyel and Walid ‘Ido. Amine Jumayyel, Pierre’s father,
lost by 418 votes to FPM candidate Kamile Khoury. Muhammad Itani from the
Future Trend won 22,988 votes, while the next candidate received 3,556 votes.
Voter turnout was 48% in Matn and 18.9% in Beirut. In Beirut, Hizbullah and
Amal got around 7,000 votes, although they did not officially participate in the
by-elections because they considered the Cabinet as unconstitutional.
14 August: Nasrallah’s third “victory speech” delivered at the Raya field, Sfeir
in Dahiya, the southern suburb of Beirut, transmitted live via al-Manar TV by
projection on a large screen.
24 August: UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1773, which extended the
UNIFIL’s mandate for one year until 31 August 2008, thus maintaining the status
quo and extending the “cessation of hostilities” for another year. And so, even
though one year had passed since the end of hostilities, there was no ceasefire.
31 August: On the occasion of the 29th anniversary of the disappearance
of Imam Musa al-Sadr, Nabih Berri launched his initiative, which practically
eroded the Hizbullah-led opposition’s demand for the formation of a national
unity Cabinet, even “half an hour before the presidential elections”, and shelved
the demand till the election of a new president, as the March-14 group had
repeatedly requested.
6 September: Israel violated Syrian airspace and apparently attacked a sup-
posed nuclear facility.
19 September: Around 17:30 hours, a powerful explosion rocked the eastern
sector of Beirut, killing the Phalangist MP Antoine Ghanem and eight others
(including two of his bodyguards) and wounded 56. The Lebanese government
blamed Fatah al-Islam (FI) militants for the assassination, which came just two
days after his return from a two-month vacation outside Lebanon. This was the
eighth assassination of an anti-Syrian politician – the fourth MP from the anti-
Syrian governing majority – since the high-profile assassination of PM Rafiq
Hariri in 2005.
25 September: The two-thirds quota required for the election of a new presi-
dent was not met. The Speaker scheduled another parliamentary session on 23
October.
2008
8 January : In the wake of President Bush’s visit to the Middle East and one day
before the visit of the chief of Arab diplomacy, the secretary-general of the Arab
League, Amr Musa, and one day after Shakir al-‘Absi released his first message
2008 173
via the al-Qa‘ida-affiliated website threatening the Lebanese Army with retribu-
tion, one of his cells targeted the UNIFIL with a roadside bomb – for the first
time outside the area of their operations at Rmaylé, near the northern entrance
of Sidon – slightly wounding two Irish soldiers.
Two Katyusha rockets were fired from southern Lebanon into northern
Israel.
State prosecutor, John Fahd, issued thirty arrest warrants against affiliates of
al-Qa‘ida.
10 January: Nasrallah delivered a speech on the first day of ‘Ashura.15
10-11 January: The ISF and LA arrested Shaykh Nabil Rahim, the main coordi-
nator between al-Qa‘ida’s groups in Lebanon and FI, along with his aide Bassam
Hammud (alias Abu Bakr al-Turkmani) and Rahim’s leading student, Zakariyya
Trabulsi.16
11 January: The Speaker postponed the eleventh round of the parliamentary
session to elect the president to 21 January.
15 January: Around 16:30 hours local time: A reconnaissance vehicle of the US
Embassy was targeted by a roadside bomb in the Karantina area, in the Chris-
tian East Beirut. Three people died and twenty were wounded, including two
Lebanese employees. Jeffrey Feltman, the outgoing US Ambassador to Leba-
non, had been invited by the March-14 group to the Phoenicia Hotel in order
to be honored for his services to Lebanon. Attacking a US Embassy convoy is
unprecedented. This attack came in the wake of Bin Laden’s tape, which called
for derailing Bush’s visit to the Middle East by launching attacks on US interests
in the region.
Nasrallah delivered a speech on the sixth day of ‘Ashura.
17 January: Nasrallah delivered an important speech on the conception of
martyrdom: “Islam considers that the gravest sin, after shirk (partnership with
God) is killing the dignified self (an innocent human being).17
19 January: Nasrallah, in person, and not on a giant TV screen, delivered
a speech on the 10th day of ‘Ashura in Dahiya. It was the first time since the
22 September 2006 “Victory Speech” that Nasrallah appeared in person – pro-
tected by a sea of people, who gave him the perfect human shield. Nasrallah
revealed for the first time since the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers on 12
July 2006 that Hizbullah had many body parts of Israeli soldiers in its posses-
sion, including a near-complete body. He boasted that the Israeli Army (IDF),
which prided itself on evacuating all its dead and wounded, failed to accomplish
that due to the relentless attacks of the Hizbullah fighters. Nasrallah reiterated
what he mentioned in the first anniversary of the “Divine Victory” on 14 August
2007: “If Israel launches a new war on Lebanon, we [Hizbullah] promise them
a war that will change the course of the [Arab-Israeli] battle, and will change
2008 175
8 May: In a press conference, Nasrallah considered the government’s deci-
sions as “a declaration of war”.19 After this fiery speech, Sunni-Shi‘ite sectarian
fighting raged in the West Beirut streets. The next day, Hizbullah controlled
West Beirut which houses key government ministries.
11 May: Hizbullah controlled al-Shouf, Jumblatt’s den. Subhi al-Tufayli held a
press conference condemning Hizbullah’s actions.
12 May: For the nineteenth time, Berri postponed the 13 May session to elect
the president to 10 June at 12:00 noon.
14 May: Heading an Arab committee, the secretary-general of the Arab
League, Amr Musa, arrived via Beirut International Airport after turf battles
claimed the lives of around 80 people.
16 May: The Higher Shi‘ite Council sacked Mufti ‘Ali al-Amin after he vehe-
mently criticized Amal and Hizbullah.
21 May: The Doha Accord: After five days of intense negotiations between
the March-14 and March-8 groups, Hizbullah achieved a resounding political
victory by obtaining the one-third veto power in the Cabinet. After eighteen
months of political stalemate, a political settlement was reached. Hizbullah’s
media announced that national unity had been achieved after 537 days. Berri
announced from Doha, Qatar, the disbanding of the sit-in in downtown Beirut.
Solidere’s20 market stock jumped from $ 29.8 to $ 40.
25 May: After six months of vacuum in the seat of the presidency, something
unprecedented in Lebanese history, the consensus president Sulayman was
elected by 118 votes out of 127 MPs.21
26 May: Hizbullah celebrated the eighth anniversary of the nearly complete
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon through a fiery speech by its secretary-general,
Nasrallah, who stressed that Hizbullah abides by the Ta’if Agreement and would
honor the Doha Accord to the letter.22
1 June: The Israeli citizen Nasim Nisr – Hizbullah’s detainee in an Israeli
prison who was arrested in Israel on 27 June 2002 – was released as a goodwill
gesture to an upcoming groundbreaking prisoner release in which Israel would
get back the two soldiers Hizbullah abducted on 12 July 2006. Israel got back the
remains of five of its soldiers who died during the confrontations with Hizbullah
in the Second Lebanon War. Nisr’s mother was born a Jew, but she converted to
Islam. Nisr resided in Bazuriyyé. He was accused of spying for Hizbullah and
had already served his six-year sentence.
19 June: Truce between Hamas and Israel for the duration of six months start-
ed at 3:00 GMT.
23 June: Vienna conference, Austria: An international donors conference for
the rebuilding of Nahr al-Barid and its vicinity raised $122 million, including
$22 million from the US.
2008 177
tion of not exchanging dead Israeli soldiers for living Arab POWs; 3) halting any
exchange operation till the fate of Ron Arad is fully revealed.24
18 July: Burial of eight Hizbullah fighters fallen in the July 2006 war.
18 August: Hizbullah and the Salafi movement signed a watershed 8-point
Understanding.
28 August: A Lebanese Army helicopter was shot down in the south while
it was flying over a Hizbullah stronghold, and its pilot was killed. Hizbullah
described the incident as “tragic”. The Lebanese Minister of Defense tried to
absolve Hizbullah by arguing that the downed helicopter looked different than
the others the Army has and that the Lebanese flag was not visible on it.25 (Usu-
ally, and as routine dictates, the LA informs Hizbullah of such flights over its
controlled areas in order to avoid it being mistaken for an Israeli helicopter).
29 August: The Council of Ministers appointed John Qahwaji as the new
Commander of the LA.
10 September: The assassination of the pro-Syrian MP Salih al-‘Aridi, a senior
member of Youth and Sports Minister Talal Arslan’s Lebanese Democratic Party
(LDP).
2008 179
Arab regimes for their “complicity in the assault”, especially Egypt, but praised
Syria for its resistance stance.
31 December: The foreign ministers of the Arab league held an emergency
meeting in Beirut at 11:00 am. Nothing emerged except rhetoric.
2009
9 January: Fatah al-Islam operatives succeeded in firing three Katyusha rockets
at northern Israel, lightly wounding two people. It was the first time since the
end of the “Second Lebanon War” that the IDF returned fire.
26 January: Fourth session of national dialogue.
10 February: Israeli general elections.
21 February: Fatah Al-Islam fired two Katyusha rockets at northern Isra-
el. One fell short and exploded in Lebanese territory; the second wounded a
20-year old woman in Ma‘alot, northern Israel. The IDF retaliated by firing eight
shells. PM Sanyura blasted Israel for violating UNSC resolution 1701 while, at the
same time, vehemently censured the shooters.
2 March: Fifth session of national dialogue.
16 March: Lebanon opened its first embassy in Damascus five months after
establishing diplomatic relations with Beirut.
24 March: Lebanon approved the Syrian ambassador.
28 April: Sixth session of national dialogue.
29 April: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) released the four generals
Jamil al-Sayyid, Ali al-Hajj, Raymond Azar, and Mustafa Hamdan, who were
detained in connection with the 2005 bombing. The STL said that the court’s
pre-trial judge, Daniel Fransen, had received the request from prosecutor Dan-
iel Bellemare to decline to seek continued detention of the generals. The pros-
ecutor concluded that the evidence was insufficient at this time to warrant filing
indictments against these four generals.
25 May: Nasrallah delivered a reconciliatory speech aiming at easing the ten-
sions before the elections and reaching out to the other side.
26 May: Agreement on the appointment of the ten members of the constitu-
tional council, the body that looks into the constitutionality of the elections and
takes the decisions in impeachment (ta‘n) cases.
27 May: Syrian ambassador ‘Ali Abd al-Karim arrived in Beirut and assumed
his job at the Syrian embassy, located in Makdisi Street, Hamra, West Beirut.
1 June: Seventh session of national dialogue.
3 June: Israeli spokesman Sivan Shalom warned that Hizbullah’s victory in
the elections would lead to grave dangers in the Middle East.
4 June: A precedent: Around 11,500 civil servants (public sector employees)
voted ahead of the elections (since they themselves would be running the show
on 7 June, i.e. supervising the electoral boxes). Turnout was almost 80%. The
2009 181
1 September: the Kuwiati daily “Al-Ra’i” reported that Daniel Bellemare,
the chief judge appointed by the UN Tribunal to investigate Lebanese PM Rafiq
Hariri’s murder28, interrogated al-‘Absi in a Syrian prison.29
24 November: Nasrallah met with Assad in Damascus (New TV, as reported
by al-Nahar).
25 November: Reconciliatory meeting between ‘Aun and Jumblatt at the pres-
idential palace in B‘abda, the first since Jumblatt’s visit to ‘Aun in Paris mid-April
2005.
30 November: Nasrallah announced Hizbullah’s new Manifesto through an
extensive press conference.
2 December: ‘Aun met Cardinal Sfeir, and the Cabinet approved the policy
statement with the reservation of five March-14 ministers. As a ritual practice
and from the stance of upholding state sovereignty, five March-14 ministers
registered their reservations regarding the policy statement: the two Lebanese
Forces ministers Ibrahim Najjar and Salim Wardé; the two Phalangist ministers
Michel Phar‘un and Salim al-Sayyigh; and Butrus Harb.
9 December: In a surprise visit that lasted only a few hours, ‘Aun met Bashar
al-Assad at the “People’s Palace” in Damascus.
12 December: Hizbullah’s MP Dr. ‘Ali Fayyad gave a lecture at the Sorbonne,
Paris.
14 December: President Michel Sulayman visits the US and holds a meeting
with President Barack Obama.
19-20 December: A groundbreaking visit by Sa‘d al-Hariri to Damascus
where Bashar al-Assad bent the protocol and hosted him in the Tishrin Presi-
dential Palace that is reserved for presidents and kings. The meeting resulted
in “positive and constructive talks” that diffused around five years of tensions
between the two countries (ironically putting Hizbullah’s manifesto into effect
and the policy statement also).
2010
10 January: A watershed reconciliatory meeting between Hizbullah and the PSP
in Shwayfat in order to close the bad chapter of 11 May 2008 for good.
11 January: After 72 days of the first meeting at the presidential palace, Jum-
blatt visited ‘Aun at Rabyé. The meeting was intended to calm the waters of the
popular base of both. March-8 MP Sulayman Franjiyyé affirmed that Hizbullah’s
weapons were preventing the naturalization of the Palestinians in Lebanon.
12 January: In response to rumors that claimed that the Palestinian refugee
camps had become a safe haven for al-Qa‘ida, Abu Muhjin – the Emir of the
jihadi Salafi ‘Usbat Al-Ansar in ‘Ayn al-Hilwé – asserted on behalf of all the Pal-
estinian factions in the camps: “We will not allow any person who does not
2010 183
List of Abbreviations
185
PSP Progressive Socialist Party
SLA South Lebanon Army (now defunct)
SSNP Syrian Social Nationalist Party
STL Special Tribunal for Lebanon
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency (for Palestine Refugees in
the Middle East)
UNSC United Nations Security Council
187
Hadith (Sunna) traditional accounts of the sayings and doings
of Prophet Muhammad, which became an
important source for determining Islamic Law.
They are made up of two parts: the names of the
transmitters (isnad); and the text (matn)
Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca
Al-hala al-Islamiyya Islamic religious-political sphere
Halal religiously sanctioned
Haqiqat truth
Haram religiously prohibited
Hikma divine wisdom
Hisbi (obeying) the religious and moral instructions
of Islam. It can also cover a wide range of finan-
cial, administrative, political, and social matters.
In short, hisbi matters are things that God does
not allow us to forsake
Hizbullah “Party of God”
Hizbullahi A member or follower of Hizbullah
Hujja apodictic proof
Husnayayyn outcomes or rewards of jihad (martyrdom and
victory)
Ijtihad making religious decisions on the basis of inde-
pendent reasoning
Ilgha’ al-ta’fiyya al-siyas- the abolition of political sectarianism in the
siyya fi al-nufus, qabla mentality, before abolishing it in the texts
al-nusus
‘Ilm religious knowledge
Al-‘ilm al-muhit or al-iha- the Imam is the most learned in all branches of
tah fi al-‘ilm religious knowledge
Infitah “opening-up” or Hizbullah integration in the
Lebanese public sphere
‘Isma (ma‘sum) entails the impeccability, sinlessness, and infal-
libility of the Imams
Al-istikhlaf bi al-nass wa the Shi‘ites consider the Imamate a divine
al-ta‘yyin appointment
Al-istikhlaf bi al-shura wa the Sunnis consider the Caliphate as a political
al-bayy‘a process that is the product of consensus
Istishhad martyrdom
Jahiliyya pre-Islamic pagan period in Arabia
Al-Jihad al-asghar (smaller jihad): struggle (holy war) against the
enemies of Islam
Glossary 188
Al-Jihad al-akbar (greater jihad): struggle against the self (jihad
al-nafs) or individual’s service for the cause of
religion
Jizya poll tax
Juhhal ignorant people
Kafir infidel
Khass wa ‘amm private and public
Khums (one-fifth) a religious tax comprising 20% of a person’s sur-
plus on income over necessary living expenses.
Half is paid to the marja‘ as the representative
of the Imam (sahm al-Imam), and half to the
Sayyids
Kitman concealment
Khususiyyat specificities or particularities
Lebanonization Hizbullah’s enrolment in Lebanese domestic
political life
Ma‘nawi moral influence
Madad support and reinforcement
Marja‘ al-taqlid/ muqallad The supreme Islamic legal authority to be emu-
lated or accepted for emulation by the majority
of the Shi‘a in matters of religious practice and
law
Marja‘iyya religious authority
Al-mas’uliyya al-shar‘iyya legitimate and religious responsibility to the
marja‘ or muqallad
Al-mas’uliyya al-shar‘iyya is loosely translated as “legitimate and religious
wa al-taklif al-shar‘i al-Ilahi responsibility”
(taklif)
Mubaya‘a homage and pledge of allegiance, usually to God
Mujahidin those who carry out jihad or freedom fighters
Mujtahid a ‘alim or a high ranking Shi‘ite jurist who exer-
cises ijtihad or independent reasoning
Muqallad see marja‘ al-taqlid
Muqalidin followers of the muqallad in law and ritual
Murshid ruhi spiritual guide or leader
Mustad‘afin oppressed
Mustakbirin oppressors
Muwatana citizenship
Nass textual designation, or the specific designation
of an Imam by the preceding Imam
Al-Qada leaders
Glossary 189
Rahbar leader of the Islamic Revolution. This title was
assumed by Khumayni, and after his death, it
was accorded to Khamina’i when he became the
official marja‘ al-taqlid in 1995
Fi sabili Allah in the way of God
Salat prayer
Sawm fasting
Shahada martyrdom
Shahid martyr
Shari‘a The whole set of norms, morals, and laws
(divine or Islamic law) derived from the Islamic sources (mainly
Qur‘an and hadith) pertaining to the various
aspects of life of individual Muslims and the
Muslim umma
Al-Sirat al-Mustaqim The “Straight Path” or the path of the righteous
Sunna (hadith) Traditions: the sayings and doings of Prophet
Muhammad, which are considered the second
source of Islamic Law (shari‘a), the Qur’an
being the first
Al-ta‘a strict obedience and discipline, which conveys a
religious connotation
Ta‘bi’a mobilization
Tafsir textual, literal, or scriptural interpretation of the
Qur‘an
Tahkim arbitration
Taklif religious-legal obligation
Al-taklif al-shar‘i al-Ilahi delegated responsibility/obligation of the muqa-
lidin towards the muqallad
Taqiyya expedient dissimulation
Taqlid emulation
Taqwa piety
Ta’wil Shi‘ite hermeneutics or allegorical interpreta-
tion of the Qur‘an
Thawabit fixities, immutable principles, established sets of
values and norms
‘Ulama Muslim religious scholars
Umma the entire community of Muslims
‘Urfan Shi‘ite theosophy
Wajib religious duty or obligation
Wakilayn shar‘iyyan religious deputies
Wilaya spiritual guidance
Glossary 190
Wilayat al-Faqih governance of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult
Wilayat al-umma ‘ala the self-governance of the umma
nafsiha
La yughsl wa la yukaffan neither washed nor wrapped in a burial shroud
Yaqin strong conviction
Yutashhad/ istashhadu martyred
Zahir exoteric
Zakat almsgiving
Zu‘ama feudal leaders
Glossary 191
Notes
abstract
introduction
1 The Open Letter was published as “Al-Nass Al-Harfi Al-Kamil li-Risalat Hizbul-
lah ila al-Mustad‘afinin [The Original Text in Full of Hizbullah’s Open Letter to
the Oppressed]”, al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH, 22 February 1985),
5-8. The Open Letter was read at the Uza‘i mosque one week earlier, on Satur-
day, February 16, 1985, by Hizbullah’s spokesman at the time, Sayyid Ibrahim
Amin al-Sayyid.
2 Al-Intiqad is Hizbullah’s official mouthpiece and weekly newspaper. It was esta-
blished on 18 June 1984 as al-‘Ahd, but changed its name and orientation in 2001,
thus conveying a “secular” image by dropping the Qur’anic substantiation (5:56),
on the right side, and removing the portrait of Khumayni and Khamina’i, on
the left side. The last issue of al-‘Ahd was number 896, dated 6 April 2001 or 12
Muharram 1422 AH; the first issue of al-Intiqad was number 897, dated 20 April
2001 or 26 Muharram 1422 AH. The last hard-copy issue of Al-Intiqad was num-
ber 1267, dated 30 May 2008. Since number 1268, dated 6 June 2008, Al-Intiqad
was only available electronically and initially published bi-weekly on Fridays
and Tuesdays, until it settled as a Friday weekly once more, but with only the
date, no number. See http://www.alintiqad.com/
193
3 Hizbullah is not monopolizing the use of religion, as Roy seems to imply, rather
the party employs the word Hizbullah in an extended, inclusive, and progres-
sive sense, which includes all believers from all religious denominations. Hajj
Muhammad Al-Jammal, Hizbullah’s spokesman at the time, argued along these
lines on the occasion of receiving a Danish delegation – composed of students,
researchers, and faculty, mainly from Arhus University and the University of
Southern Copenhagen, and some Danish journalists – at the Central Informa-
tion Office, 30 March 1999. Cf. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a
New Umma. Revised and updated edition. London: Hurst and Company, 2004,
249, 329.
4 Cf. As‘ad Abu Khalil, “Ideology and Practice of Hizbollah in Lebanon: Islami-
zation of Leninist Organizational Principles”, Middle Eastern Studies, 27 (July
1991), 3, 395; and Roy, op. cit, 247-248.
5 Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Ma‘ Al-Hikma fi Khat Al-Islam [Wis-
dom in the Way of Islam]. Beirut: Dar Al-Wafa’, 1985, 46-54. This bears some
similarity to the Prophetic tradition where the Prophet spent 13 years in Mecca
practicing his call and succeeded in converting only 83 people to Islam. When
his life was in danger, according to Islamic belief, God ordered him to emigrate
to Medina. He heeded and consolidated his call, and made Medina the base for
spreading the mission of Islam.
6 “Now, whether or not an Islamist movement [Hizbullah] becomes truly radical
hinges on whether or not it rejects the very validity and legitimacy of the local
state and seeks universal revolution to undermine it in the name of the ideal
umma (italics in original)… Yet other Muslim radicals, perhaps non-violent,
possess utopian views that perceive the creation of an ‘Islamic state’ as the
solution to all problems, or as a way to empower the Muslim world and restore
the power of the Muslim civilization”. Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political
Islam. New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2003, 17, 88.
7 By political Maronism, Hizbullah means the leading Maronite notables and
their retinue, which constitute the symbols of the Lebanese political system.
Their retinue included the Sunni prime minister (PM) and the Shi‘a speaker who
were completely under their command, blindly exercising their political whim
and will. The late PM Sami al-Solh said that the PM was only “ketchup” in the
hands of the president. Thus, from 1943 to 1990 the Muslims, in general, and
the Shi‘ites, in particular, had been politically marginalized since the Maroni-
tes wielded economic and political power and had absolute control over the
country’s resources and riches. Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology.
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006, 23.
8 Muhammad Z‘aytir, Nazra ‘ala Tarh Al-Jumhuriyya Al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan [ A
look at the Proposal of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon]. Beirut: Al-Wikala Al-
Sharqiyya lil-Tawzi‘, 1988.
Notes 194
9 Muslim attitudes towards the Maronites might have been influenced, in part, by
the Maronite role outlined by the French colonial mandate following the Sykes-
Picot Agreement of 1916, which partitioned the Levant between the French
(Lebanon and Syria) and the British (Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq). The National
Pact of 1943, which is an oral agreement not drafted in the 1926 Constitution,
stipulated that the PM be Sunni Muslim, the Speaker Shi‘ite, and the following
Maronites: The President of the Republic; the Commander of the Army; the
Governor of the Central Bank (BDL); and the Head of the Labor Unions (GLC).
However, article 95 of Section 6 of the 1943 Constitution – which was amen-
ded by a constitutional law issued on November 9, 1943 – gave some hope for
the Shi‘ites of a fairer representation in the future: “Temporarily and from the
stance of justice and national reconciliation, the sects are represented in a just
manner in public employment and in the formation of the Council of Ministers,
without harming state interest”. Alagha, op. cit., 23.
10 Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Al-Islam wa Mantiq Al-Quwwa [Islam
and the Logic of Power]. Beirut: Dar Al-Huruf, 1987, 258ff.
11 Imam Khumayni issued a fatwa stressing that the Lebanese system is
illegitimate and criminal. In 1986 Khamina’i clarified Khumayni’s fatwa, arguing
for the necessity of the Muslims to rule Lebanon since they comprise the
majority of the population. (Tawfiq Al-Madini, Amal wa Hizbullah fi Halabat
al-Mujabahat al-Mahaliyya wa al-Iqlimiyya [Amal and Hizbullah in the Arena
of Domestic and Regional Struggles]. Damascus: Al-Ahli, 1999, 162-163; Wad-
dah Sharara, Dawlat Hizbullah: Lubnan Mujtama‘an Islamiyyan [The State of
Hizbullah: Lebanon as an Islamic Society], 4th. ed., Beirut: Al-Nahar, 2006, 342).
The chief of staff of the Iranian revolutionary guards in Lebanon stressed that
Hizbullah and the Revolutionary Guards are going to bring down the Maronite
regime just as the Iranians brought down the Shah. (Al-Anwar 9 February 1988)
12 Residents within an Islamic state holding limited rights and required to pay a
tax in lieu of almsgiving (zakat).
13 Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, “Reflections on the Muslim-Christian
Dialogue”, a lecture delivered at the American University of Beirut, 22 Decem-
ber 1987.
14 Sharara, op. cit., 348.
15 “The Union of Muslim ‘Ulama” was established in the wake of the Israeli inva-
sion in June 1982.
16 Al-Harakat Al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan [Islamic Movements in Lebanon]. Beirut:
Al-Shira‘, 1984; and ‘Ali Al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizbullah fi Al-’Amal Al-Islami [Hiz-
bullah’s Method of Islamic Mobilization]. Tehran, Maktab Al-I‘lam Al-Islami:
Al-Mu’assa Al-‘Alamiyya, 1985, especially 147-163.
17 Imam Khumayni, Al-Kalimat Al-Qisar: Al-Islam wa A‘malina [Short Words:
Islam and our Works], p. 193, as cited in: Rafiq Sulayman Fidda, Athar Al-Imam
Notes 196
33 Daniel Sobelman, Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbullah After the Withdrawal
from Lebanon. Memorandum no. 69. Tel Aviv University: Jaffee Center for stra-
tegic Studies, 21, 23.
34 Ibid., 103.
35 Two leading cadres in the Islamic Resistance were assassinated by blowing up
their cars: Ghalib Awali on 19 July 2004 and Ali Husayn Salih on 2 August 2003.
The Lebanese government and Hizbullah accused Israel of being behind these
assassinations; Israel repeatedly denied any involvement or responsibility in
these attacks.
36 The late Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (d. 4 July 2010) was the
highest ranking religious authority in Lebanon and the local authority of emu-
lation (marja‘) who still has following among the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon
and who wielded power and influence over the Islamists. Many considered him
Hizbullah’s spiritual leader, a charge which he persistently denied. It is interes-
ting to note that Fadlallah’s declaration of ‘id al-fitr at the end of Ramadan in
2002, which coincided with that of the (Sunni) Mufti of the Lebanese Republic,
split the Dahiya, Hizbullah’s main constituency in Beirut, between Hizbul-
lah’s adherents of the Iranian religious authority and Fadlallah’s followers who
celebrated the ‘id a day before the Hizbullahis. Such eventualities increase the
tensions between Hizbullah and the Iranians, on the one hand, and Fadlallah
and his followers, on the other.
37 See “ ‘Abna’ Al-Tufayli’ Yuhajimun Nasrallah [Tufayli’s Followers Chastise Nas-
rallah]”, al-Safir 5 July 2004.
38 Compiled from al-Safir 17 and 18 August 2004; Lebanese daily newspapers of 18
August 2004; and “Hizbullah’s Seventh Conclave: Vivid Organization, Stability
of Leadership, and A Follow-up on Recent Events”, al-Intiqad 1071 (20 August
2004).
39 At the time of the appointment, Rima Fakhry was a 38-year-old mother of four.
She has been a Hizbullah member since the age of 18. She also holds a BSc in
Agriculture from the American University of Beirut. Al-Safir 5 January 2005;
Daily Star 6 and 7 January 2005; al-Intiqad 1091 (7 January 2005).
40 This seems to suggest, more and more, the credibility of Hizbullah’s infitah
policy.
41 See Lebanese daily newspapers of 20 November 2009, especially al-Safir 11452;
and al-Safir 11454 (24 November 2009).
42 No wonder the conclave took a lot of time since a new manifesto was also in the
works.
43 http://www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=16230&cid=199; http://english.
moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=9567&cid=214
Notes 198
how effectively it mobilizes its resources.” Richard T. Schaefer and Robert P.
Lamm, Sociology. Sixth Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1998, 584.
1 Primary documents
1 The Open Letter was published as “Al-Nass Al-Harfi Al-Kamil li-Risalat Hizbul-
lah ila al-Mustad‘afinin [The Original Text in Full of Hizbullah’s Open Letter to
the Oppressed]”, al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH, 22 February 1985),
5-8. The Open Letter was read at the Uza‘i mosque one week earlier, on Satur-
day, 16 February 1985, by Hizbullah’s spokesman at the time, Sayyid Ibrahim
Amin al-Sayyid.
2 The word husnayayyn in (9:52) is taken to refer to martyrdom (of the self) and
victory (for the umma): “Say: ‘Do you expect from us anything other than one
of the two fairest outcomes (martyrdom and victory); while we await that Allah
will smite you with punishment, either from Him, or at our hands?’ So wait and
watch, we are waiting and watching you.”
3 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 5.
4 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 5. It is most likely that this verse
shelters Hizbullah with a religious legitimacy for its political ideology. The verse
refers to the idea of free choice and free will, whereby in the end the people
(believers) find out that religion is the Truth. Thus, religion is found through
freedom of choice, and not by imposition of the truth. The application of this
is that Hizbullah will not impose its faith or ideology on anyone. The choice is
ultimately left to the individual, but s/he must beware of the Qur’anic injunc-
tion. My interpretation is borne out by the following explanation: “Our choice
in our limited Free-will involves a corresponding personal responsibility. We
are offered the Truth: again and again it is pressed on our attention. If we reject
it, we must take all the terrible consequences which are prefigured in the Fire
of Hell. Its flames and roof will completely enclose us like a tent. Ordinarily
there is water to quench the heat of thirst: here the only drink will be like
molten brass, thick, heavy, burning, sizzling. Before it reaches the mouth of the
unfortunates, drops of it will scald their faces as it is poured out”. A. Yusuf Ali,
The Holy Qur’an: Translation and Commentary. Fourth printing. Lahore: Islamic
Propagation Center, 1993, 738.
5 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 5. According to Shaykh Na‘im
Qasim, the three terms denoted in bold above are the constituents of Hizbul-
lah’s religious ideology: 1) belief in Shi‘a Islam; 2) wilayat al-faqih (guardianship
of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult); 3) and jihad (struggle) fi sabili Allah (in the
way of God). Na‘im Qasim, Hizbullah: Al-Manhaj, Al-Tajriba, Al-Mustaqbal
Notes 200
19 Ironically, this expression is reminiscent of al-Qa‘ida and Bin Laden’s discourse,
who might have appropriated the term from Hizbullah, their ideological
enemies.
20 A direct reference to the suicidal attacks against the US Embassy in West Beirut,
on the one hand, and Marines barracks and the French paratroopers headquar-
ters, on the other. See the “Chronology of Events”.
21 In reference to Hizbullah’s first suicidal operation by Ahmad Qasir on 11
November 1982 and the third suicidal operation by Ja‘far Al-Tayyar on 14 Octo-
ber 1984. See the “Chronology of Events”.
22 At the time of the publication of the Open Letter, the IDF had already with
drawn from Sidon; in April it withdrew further south from Nabatiyyé and Tyre;
and finally in June it withdrew to its 1978 established “Security Zone.” See the
“Chronology of Events”.
23 A reference to the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon.
24 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 6.
25 A common aphorism is the following: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
26 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 6.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 By the “Lebanese political system”, Hizbullah was referring to “political Maro-
nism”, or the sectarian division of governmental and vocational posts, where the
Maronites appropriate the top positions, including the President of the Repu-
blic; the Commander of the Army; the Governor of the Central Bank (BDL);
and the head of the Labor Unions (GLC).
31 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 6.
32 A political-military consortium of the Christian right militias. Now it is
defunct. The “Lebanese Front” and the “Lebanese Forces” are in quotation
marks because Hizbullah does not grant either any legitimacy whatsoever.
33 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 6-7.
34 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 7.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Cf. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) nationalist discourse of: “In you
is a power, which if actualized will change the course of history”.
38 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 7.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 7-8.
42 Ibid., 8.
43 Ibid.
Notes 202
including Hizbullah, seem to be theists. After all, God is transcendent: “No one
knows God but God” (la y‘rif Allah illa Allah). This seems in line with what
Imam ‘Ali has said: “incapability of cognizance is cognizance” (al‘ajzu ‘ann
al-idrak idrak). The solution might be the hadith qudsi: “I [God] was a hidden
treasure and I wanted to be known, so I created and through me, they knew me”
(kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan fa aradtu an u‘raf fa khalaqtu al-khalq fa bi ‘arafuni).
[I think this hadith is related to the Islamic explanation of cosmology. Although
there is a controversial discussion among Islamic scholars about the validity of
this hadith, making it highly vulnerable to criticism, there seems to be a clue in
the Qur’an to justify this hadith since it is written that human beings are created
in the image of God. Thus, the existential aspect of human life is related to or
goes back to or is ultimately referred back to God. It is worth mentioning that
Ibn ‘Arabi argued that this hadith is correct through God’s revelation to him
(sahih bi-al-mukashafa), which is a speculative way of defending his argument].
The weakness is that human beings never fully understand God; this is the
true understanding. Thus, one does not know God, but only the signs of God,
i.e. ‘alam (creature) and verses of the scripture, both are referred to as aya, and
both are signs; this is the way God reveals Himself to us. That is why we say Rab
al-‘alamin (God of the creatures). Thus, human beings understand the signs,
not the absolute, and Hizbullah seems to imply and abide by this interpretation.
In short, when Hizbullah opposes itself and its discourse to the oppressors
(al-qawn al-zalimin), it is indirectly claiming truth on its side. Therefore, there
is an aspect of relativism in Hizbullah’s discourse. It is worth mentioning that
from a theological perspective, aya has different meanings; however, it is very
important to look at the generic meaning. The generic meaning of aya is sign,
but the specific meaning is a sentence in the scripture (verse). Both uses are
warranted in the Qur’an. Generic sense: “There are in the creation of Heavens
and the earth and the alteration of night and day real signs [ayat] for people and
understanding” (3:190); verse in the scripture: “Yet they are not all alike. Within
the People of the Book, there is an upright nation [group] who recites Allah’s
revelations/signs [ayat], throughout the night, while prostrating themselves”
(3:113).
49 http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/hizballah-back-
ground.html (Last accessed August 2005).
50 http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/statement01.html
(Last accessed August 2005).
51 http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.htm (Last accessed August
2004).
52 Hizbullah believes that Israel has nuclear capabilities to wipe out all Arab coun-
tries, at least by destroying their capital cities. However, extending that claim to
all Muslim countries seems a bit exaggerated and untenable.
2 election programs
Notes 204
10 It is ironic to note that three decades after the end of the Lebanese civil war, the
file of the displaced citizens has still not been closed.
11 This was accomplished in 2003 by the government-sponsored Center of
Research and Development (Markaz Al-Buhuth wa Al-Inma’). However, till now
there is no unified national history textbook at the university level, precisely
because the notion of consensual history is entirely lacking.
12 http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/hizballah-plat-
form.html (Last accessed August 2005). As translated from a four-page docu-
ment entitled “Al-Barnamaj Al-Intikhabi Li-Hizbullah”, issued by Hizbullah’s
Central Press Office in the summer of 1996. In the translation, I denote where
every page ends in the original Arabic text.
13 Yusuf ‘Ali argues, “The Way of God (al-sirat al-mustaqim) is a Straight Way.
But men have strayed from it into all directions. And there are numerous Paths
by which they can get back to the Right Way, the Way in which the purity of
their own nature, and Will and mercy of God, require them to walk. All these
numerous Paths become open to them once they give their hearts in keeping to
God and work in the right Endeavor (jihad) with all their mind and soul and
resources. Thus they will get out of the Spider’s web of this frail world and attain
eternal Bliss in the fulfillment of their true destiny”. The Holy Qur’an…, 1048.
14 I prefer this translation: “But those who struggle [jahadu] in Our cause, surely
We shall guide them in Our ways [paths]; and God is with the good-doers”
(29:69). This Qur’anic justification is usually used to sanction jihad, or holy war.
Theologically it falls within the domain of the controversy regarding free will
and predestination. Those who argue for free will employ this verse by claiming,
“God will help us if we struggle”. Thus, Hizbullah broadens the mandate of the
term jihad employing it in the elections, and does not confine it only to the
battlefield. This falls within the earlier distinction made between jihad in the
battlefield (smaller jihad) and jihad against the self (greater jihad), which is the
context in which this verse is employed.
15 Ibid., p. 1.
16 Ibid., p. 2.
17 Ibid., p. 3.
18 Ibid., p. 4.
19 My translation is based upon “The Electoral Program of Hizbullah: Priorities
and Continuations”, Al-‘Ahd 863 (18 August 2000), 4.
20 Based on this Qur’anic verse, one can argue that Hizbullah’s engagement in the
elections is based on the stance that one should not neglect the here and now,
the present life for the sake of the hereafter since any Hizbullahi aspires for
“felicity in this world and the world to come” (al-sa‘ada fi al-darayyn). Yusuf ‘Ali
comments on the verse by arguing, “That is, spend your wealth on charity and
good works. It is God who has given it to you, and you should spend it on God’s
Notes 206
34 Ibid., 9.
35 Ibid., 10.
36 Ibid., 10-11.
37 In the Pre-Ta’if Lebanese constitution, there was an article placing women,
children, and handicapped in the same clause (al-mar’a wa al-tifl wa al-mu‘aq).
Hizbullah added old age to this category/classification.
38 Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat…, 11.
39 This refers to the Israeli withdrawal that was completed by 24 May 2000. The
Lebanese state declared 25 May as the “Day of Liberation” and added it to the
calendar of official holidays.
40 Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat…, 12.
41 Ibid., 13.
42 It is estimated that there are 20 million Lebanese expatriates; 5 times more than
the total population of Lebanon, which is estimated to be 4 million. See “The
diaspora: Lebanon’s secret weapon against economic collapse ”, AFP (Agence
France-Presse), 20 July 2004.
43 Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat…, 14.
44 Ibid., 15.
45 Ibid., 16.
46 Although Hizbullah did not publish a full-fledged political program, its 2005
election program could be discerned in the speeches and stances of its leaders,
most notably Shaykh Na‘im Qasim. See Qasim’s interview with al-Intiqad 26
April 2005: “Our alliances are political par excellence and are based on a poli-
tical program”; Qasim’s speech on 29 April 2005 commemorating the death of
Prophet Muhammad; and al-Nour 5:00 GMT News 30 April 2005.
47 http://www.alintiqad.com/essaydetailsf.php?eid=5564&fid=20; http://english.
moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=8199&fid=29
48 http://enduringamerica.com/2009/06/10/lebanons-election-text-of-Hiz-
bullahs-concession-speech-8-june/; http://www.alintiqad.com/essaydetails.
php?eid=8474&cid=27 (Last accessed: 10 July 2009).
1 http://www.tayyar.org/files/documents/fpm_hezbollah.pdf;http://english.
moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=4442&fid=25 http://www.moqawama.
org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=467&fid=19 (Last accessed: 18 July 09).
2 Shaykh Na‘im Qasim, Hizbullah: Al-Manhaj, Al-Tajriba, Al-Mustaqbal [Hizbul-
lah: The Curriculum, the Experience, the Future]. Seventh revised and updated
edition. Beirut: Dar Al-Mahajja Al-Bayda’, 2010, 275-9; Joseph Alagha, Hizbul-
lah: Al-Tarikh Al-Aydiyulugi wa Al-Siyasi 1978-2008 [Hizbullah: The Ideological
Notes 208
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (1975-2010)
1 According to the UN website, the “UNIFIL was created in 1978 to confirm Israeli
withdrawal from Lebanon, restore the international peace and security, and help
the Lebanese Government restore its effective authority in the area.” http://www.
un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/index.html
2 See Nasrallah’s speech on the 5th day of Muharram, 1425 A.H., 24 March 2004.
3 (Obeying) the religious and moral instructions of Islam. It could also cover a
wide range of financial, administrative, political, and social matters.
4 One-fifth: a religious tax comprising 20% on a person’s surplus of income over
necessary living expenses. Half is paid to the marja‘ as the representative of the
Imam (sahm al-Imam), and half to the Sayyids, in conformity with the Shi‘ite
interpretation of the Qur’anic verse (8:41).
5 Al-Safir 18 May 1995.
6 It is worth mentioning that this name has a religious/Qur‘anic connotation.
When the Prophet participated in a battle, it was called a ghazwa; when he did
not, it was called a sariyya, singular of saraya.
7 See “Hizbullah: Identity and Role” in “Hot Spot” (Nuqta Sakhina) on Al-Jazeera
TV, 24 September 1998. The entire episode is based on interviews with Hizbul-
lah’s leading cadres, rank and file as well as journalists and political analysts
considered close to the party. The above-mentioned statement was made by
Nasrallah and commented upon by Ibrahim al-Amin of al-Safir.
8 Sobelman, Rules of the Game…, 47-48.
9 See Nasrallah’s speech in the commemoration of “Jerusalem Day” on 12 Novem-
ber 2004. http://www.nasrollah.org/audio/hassan/2004/quds12112004.html
10 Rima Fakhry is a 38-year-old mother of four. She’s been a Hizbullah mem-
ber since the age of 18. She also holds a BS in Agriculture from the American
University of Beirut. Al-Safir 5 January 2005; Daily Star 6 and 7 January 2005;
al-Intiqad 1091 (7 January 2005) http://www.alintiqad.com
11 It is noteworthy that the FPM shifted its allegiance from March 14 to March 8
after it signed a ten-point understanding with Hizbullah on 6 February 2006.
12 It is of symbolic significance because it is the same place where the deadly
confrontations took place between the Lebanese Army and Tufayli’s followers in
1998.
13 Al-Safir 10756 (23 July 2007), 1; 14. Al-Hayat (23 July 2007), 7.
14 Back then BDL funded both cabinets. This possibility seems out of the question
these days because of the severe public debt that is rupturing Lebanon.
15 Al-Safir 10894 (11 January), p. 4.
16 Al-Safir 10894 (11 January), p. 5.
17 An outline of the speech appeared briefly on the al-Intiqad website, but it was
not included in the forthcoming issue of Al-Intiqad 1251 (26 January 2008) as
Notes 210
Index
211
Azar, Raymond 180 Camp David 48, 163
Campaign 29, 81, 83, 102
B‘abda 174, 182 election 99-100, 104
Balanced development 68, 92, media 23
94-95 military 197
B‘albak 23, 110, 151, 160-161, 170 national 97
B‘albak-Hirmel 101-102 Cancerous gland 19, 30, 49, 121
Bayan, Ibrahim 158, 160, 162 Cantons 32
Bazuriyyé 176 Capitalism 21, 47, 117, 119
Beirut 23, 43, 56, 57, 59-61, Cartoons of the Prophet 168
101-102, 110-113, 117, 123, Cast Lead 179, 210
152-154, 156, 162-166, 168-169, Cedar Revolution 166
171-176, 179-183, 187, 193-197, Central Information Office 23, 27,
200-201, 204, 206-210 165, 194
Beirut Declaration 110, 112 Central Military Commander 22,
Bellemare, Daniel 180, 182, 210 158
Berjawi, Muhammad 158, 162 Central Planning Council 24, 162
Berri, Nabih 140, 168-169, 172, Christians 15-19, 22, 26, 43,
176, 183 46-47, 134, 144, 156, 158, 181
Bin Laden 37, 174, 196, 201 CIA 153
Bint Jubayl 155, 159, 172 Civil rights 19, 33, 139
Bipolarity 29 Civil society 72, 79, 95, 106, 140,
Biqa‘ 23, 25, 39, 49, 57, 64, 66, 69, 171
73, 75, 78, 102, 147, 151, 154- Civil war 46, 58, 65, 151, 156-158,
155, 158, 163, 172 169, 200, 205
Birru, Shaykh As‘ad 156 Civilization 59, 75-76, 119-121,
al-Birzawi, Muhammad 162 194, 197
Blanford, Nicholas 196 Coexistence 18, 33, 46, 76-77, 92,
Blue Line 163, 169-170, 206 105, 112, 136, 146, 166
Bramerts/Brammertz, Serge 168, Colonialism 32, 34, 52-53, 59, 122
170 Common Understanding between
Brezhnev 48 Hizbullah and the FPM 105-110
Burj Hammud 42, 200 Compassion 17
Bush, President George W. 31, Compassionate 63, 75, 98
119-120, 133, 174 Conclaves 15, 22-23, 25-27, 36
Confessionalism 58, 206
Cabinet 13, 28, 45, 92, 110-111, Consensual democracy 13, 32, 36,
141, 143-145, 164, 166-167, 105, 126, 139, 198, 208
169-170, 172, 175-177, 179, Consultative Center for Studies and
182, 206, 209 Documentation (CCSD) 155,
Cairo Agreement 155 158, 196
Index 212
Convention 107, 156, 168-169, 206 Eastern Bloc 22
Corruption 28, 51, 66, 70, 75, 79, Economic development 80
95, 106-107, 127, 168 Education 59, 62, 67-68, 72-73,
Council of Ministers 13, 167, 169, 79-80, 86-87, 94-96, 127
178, 195 Egypt 48, 51, 60, 180
Cousseran, Jean-Claude 171 Elections see parliamentary
Crusaders 175 elections, municipal elections
Cuisenaire, Bernard 171 Electoral law 67, 92, 105-106, 126,
Culture 40, 61, 76, 91, 103, 119, 146
124, 143, 148, 196 Embargo 59, 156-157
Environment 73, 81, 85, 87, 91,
Dabshé 158 96-97, 108, 126, 130-131
Dahir, Ibrahim 158 Equality 71-72, 91, 106, 126
Dahiya (Southern Suburb) 29, EU 28, 30-31, 165-166, 180, 185
155, 164, 172, 174, 187, 197 Euphrates 48
Dayr Qanun al-Nahr 153 Executive Council 23-24, 26, 28,
Decree 77, 80, 93, 113, 156, 179 159, 162
Detainees 64, 71, 77, 109, 137, Executive Shura 23, 159
154, 157, 160-161
Devil 15, 44, 54, 98 Fadlallah, Ayatullah Al-Sayyid
Dhimmis, ahl al-dhimma 18, 187 Muhammad Husayn 16-18, 29,
Dignity 16, 20, 32, 41-42, 44, 56, 194-195, 197
65, 70, 73, 75-76, 82, 103, 120, Fadlallah, Hasan 166, 181, 196
123-124, 126 Fadlallah, Husayn 29
Dikwané 42 Fahd, John 174
Diplomatic Relations 109, 113, Fahd, King 48
179-180 Fakhry, Rima 27, 165, 197, 209
al-Dirani, Mustafa 158, 163 Fatah 168, 171
Discrimination 57-58, 69, 76, 79, Fatah al-Islam 173, 179-181, 185
82 Fatwa (religious edict) 54, 156,
Disintegration 20, 117, 119, 130, 167, 170, 187, 195
172 Favoritism 67, 70-71, 206
Displaced 43, 67, 73, 77, 80, 158- Fayyad, Ali 181-182
159, 205 Federalism 32, 91, 127, 146
Displacement 34, 102, 128 Feltman, Jeffrey 174
Divine Victory 175 Fez 48
Doha Accord 11, 176-177 Fitna 20, 34, 53, 187
Dominion 35, 121, 124, 131-133 Flayhan, Basil 178, 210
Double standards 30 Fnaysh, Muhammad 158, 160,
Drone 165 162, 166-167, 170, 181
D‘un, ‘Ali 23 Ford, Robert 181
Index 213
France 20-21, 25-26, 43, 46, 156- Hamdan, Mustafa 180
157, 159, 165, 171, 177, 179, Hammud, ‘Ammar Husayn 161
196 Hammud, Bassam 174
Franjiyyé, Sulayman 183 Handicap 66, 77, 86-87, 207
Fransen, Daniel 180 Harakat Al-Tawhid Al-Islamiyya 20
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) Harb, Butrus 182
166, 168-169, 172, 179, 181, Harb, Shaykh Raghib 39-40, 64,
185, 189, 208-209 70, 90, 153-154, 183, 202
Freedom fighters 40, 49-50, 161, Hariri, Rafiq 88, 107, 158, 164-
189 168, 171, 173, 175, 178, 182,
French paratroopers 154, 201 210
Fuller, Graham E. 194 Hariri, Sa‘d 143, 145, 166, 181-182
Future Trend 166, 172 Haydar, Muhammad 166
Hayy al-Sulum 164
Gaza 32, 135-137, 167, 171, 179, Hawi, George 178
210 Health 58, 68-69, 73, 80, 85, 87,
Geagea, Samir 158, 166, 168, 177 96, 173
Gerstein, Erez 161 Hegemony 24, 26, 30-32, 43-44,
Ghandur, Salah 159 55, 70, 76, 101, 116-121, 133,
Ghanem, Antoine 172, 210 162, 196, 198
Ghazwa 209 Hezbollah 207
Globalization 32, 119 Hisbi 159, 188
Goldwasser, Ehud 168, 177 Hizb al-Shaytan (Party of the Devil)
The Good Loan 172 15
Granada 47 Hizballah 203, 205
Grapes of Wrath 24, 159 Hizbullah (Party of God) 11, 13,
Great Satan 25, 30, 60 15-33, 35-36, 39-40, 45, 49,
Greater Israel 48 56-65, 69-70, 73-75, 79, 81,
Guardianship 15, 40, 51, 67, 199 88-90, 97, 99, 101-102, 104-105,
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 112, 115, 118, 128, 130-132,
51, 185 138, 143-145, 148-149, 151-173,
175-179, 181, 183, 188, 193-
Habash, George 175 197, 199-209
Habib, Philip 42, 200 Homeland 32, 89, 107, 122-124,
Hadith 29, 188, 190, 203 128, 144, 146-147
al-Hajj, Ali 180 Honor 32, 49-50, 55, 65, 69-70,
al-Hajj, François 174, 178 86-87, 137, 174, 176, 183
al-Hajj Hasan, Husayn 160, 162, Honorable 46, 69-70, 74, 90, 110,
166, 181 134
Hamadé, Marwan 165 al-Hoss, Salim 156
Hamadé, Trad 166-168 Huballah, Hasan 166
Index 214
al-Hujayyri, Mas‘ud 162 Islamic Jihad 154
al-Hujayyri, Munir 158 Islamic jihadi movement 16, 153,
Human rights 56-59, 62, 107, 109- 204
110, 118 Islamic movement 13, 130, 147,
Humiliation 41-43, 59, 76 195
Husayn, Saddam 51 Islamic order 17-18, 21, 45
Husayniyya 86, 154 Islamic Republic 17-18, 51, 61, 78,
Husnayayyn 188, 199, 208 131, 144, 194, 204
Hutayt, Wafa’ 27, 165 Islamic Resistance 24, 39, 43,
Huthis 148-149 49-50, 52, 59, 61, 64, 70, 75-76,
81, 88, 90, 117, 152-155, 158,
‘Id, Wissam 175, 178 161, 167, 183, 197, 208
Identity and goals 60-62 Islamic Revolution 16, 19, 21-22,
Identity construction 26, 36 40, 51-52, 60-61, 131, 152, 190,
‘Ido, Walid 171-172, 178 202
(anti-)Imperialism 15, 20 Islamic Shi‘ite Higher Council 152
Industry 72, 78, 89, 94, 169, 178 Islamic socialism 16
Infidelity (kufr) 20, 43, 47 Islamic State 15, 17, 32, 40, 187,
Infitah 22, 25-26, 161, 188, 197 194-195, 201
Injustice 16, 41, 56-57, 59, 82, 133, (Pan-)Islamism 15, 19, 33
138, 159 Islamization 17, 194
Integration 18, 25, 96, 94, 131, Israel 18-22, 24-26, 30-36, 39,
137, 188 41-43, 46, 48-52, 54-57, 61, 64,
Internal Security Forces (ISF) 158, 77, 84, 91, 107, 110, 119, 123-
174-175, 178, 185 125, 131-132, 134-136, 142-143,
International community 22, 123, 151-163, 165-167, 169, 171-180,
152, 167 182-183, 197, 200, 203-204, 206
International Forces 50, 89 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 43,
International organization 42, 55, 49, 59, 170, 175, 177, 180, 185,
132 201, 210
Intifada 39, 135, 155, 162-163, 208 Italian forces 152
al-Intiqad 193, 197-198, 206-210 Izzeddine, Shaykh Hasan 27, 164
Invasion 25, 47, 56-57, 60, 71, 123,
125, 130, 136, 152-153, 155, Jabal ‘Amil 49
195, 200 Jalil Operation 154
Iran 19-20, 22, 33, 40, 47, 51-52, al-Jammal, Hajj Muhammad 194
60-61, 78, 131, 144, 152, 166, Jarmaq road 158
181, 183, 196 al-Jazeera 171, 179, 209-210
Iraq 22, 25, 32, 40, 51, 61, 119- Jerusalem 35, 60
121, 130, 152, 163, 173, 195-196 (Liberation of) Jerusalem 20, 43,
Iraq-Iran war 22, 152, 196 61, 116, 134, 137, 173
Index 215
Jerusalem Day 209 Khaybar 19
Jews 19, 30, 42, 48, 56, 175, 181 Khumayni, Ruhallah 17-21, 29,
Jezzin 61, 161 37, 39-41, 51, 54, 60, 131, 151-
Jibshit 153, 156 152, 190, 193, 195-196, 202
Jihad (struggle) 15-16, 20-22, 39, Khums 159, 189
41, 49-50, 54, 76, 117, 121, 135, Khususiyyat (specificities) 13, 189
154, 175, 188-189, 199, 202, Khyam 157, 161
205, 210 Krayyem, Nayef 23
Jihad al-Bina’ 87, 183 Kunin 155
Jihadi Council 23, 26-27, 159, 164 al-Kurani, ‘Ali 195
Jishi, Hasan 183 Kurani, Husayn 202
Jisr al-Basha 200
Jubayl (Byblos) 42, 102, 200 Lamm, Robert P. 199
Judaism 134 Latin America 30, 132, 149
Judaization 35, 133-134 Lebanese Army 23, 43, 50, 76, 87,
Judicial 28, 93, 106, 127 91, 98, 111, 124, 144, 156, 158,
July 2006 War 27, 29, 118, 124, 160, 164, 169-170, 172, 174,
169, 173, 177-178, 182 178, 185, 209
Jumayyel, Amin 43, 153, 156, 200 Lebanese Forces 42, 46, 158, 166,
Jumayyel, Bashir 42-43, 152-153, 182, 185, 200-201
200 Lebanese Front 46, 201
Jumayyel, Pierre 169, 171-172 Lebanon 17, 22, 31-33, 36, 39-50,
Jumblatt, Walid 144, 166, 172 52, 56-61, 63-69, 71, 74-78, 80,
Jurisconsult 187, 191, 199 88-93, 97, 100, 102, 105, 107,
Jurisprudent 15, 20, 29, 40, 63, 109-110, 113, 116-119, 121-129,
112, 143, 187, 191, 199 131, 135-136, 138-141, 143-144,
Jurist 20, 34, 40, 53-54, 131, 187, 146-147, 149, 151-154, 156-157,
189 159-162, 164-181, 183, 186,
193, 195-198, 200-210
Ka‘ba 208 Lebanonization 160-161, 189
Khaldé battle 152 Leenders, Reinoud 25, 196
Khalil, Hasan 23, 26 Legislative 11, 13, 24, 73, 75, 89,
Karami, Omar 166 93, 111, 170
Karantina 174 Legislature 170, 181
Karbala’ 39 Liberation theology 16, 29
Katyusha 153, 157, 174, 180-181 Liberation War 156
Kawtharani, Maher 177 Libya 152
Kayruz, Rabi‘a 158, 160 Litani river 27, 96, 151, 164
Keryat Shmona 165 Loyal 64, 66, 72, 75, 81, 102, 108,
al-Khamina‘i, al-Imam 131, 159, 124, 137
167, 170, 190, 193, 195, 202 Loyalist 98-100, 104
Index 216
Loyalty to Resistance Bloc 28, 102 Mer‘ib, Usama 175
Merit 65, 67, 106-107, 118
al-Madini, Tawfiq 195-196 Middle East 31, 43, 48, 52, 64, 76,
Madrid Conference/negotations 79, 90, 119-120, 153, 174-175,
136 181, 186, 208
Magen Avraham synagogue 181 Military wing 22, 43, 88, 152, 154,
al-Manar 56, 97, 157-158, 165, 177, 200
172, 175, 196, 198, 210 Militia 152, 157, 164, 200-201
Mandate 28, 156, 167, 170, 172, Minority 18, 105, 125-126
179, 181, 195, 205-206 Miqati, Nagib 166
Manifesto 11, 13, 15, 22, 24-25, al-Miqdad, Ali 166, 181
28-34, 36, 39-40, 115-116, Mobilization 31-32, 36, 51, 116,
118-119, 138-140, 146, 148-149, 118-119, 121, 127, 131, 169,
154, 182-183, 193, 196-198, 208 183, 190, 195, 198
Mansur, Nazih 159, 162 Ki-Moon, Ban 170-171
Ma‘raké 154 Mu’allim, Walid 179
March 8 165-166, 170-171, 173, Mughniyyé, Imad 24, 26-27, 90,
176, 178, 181, 183, 209 175, 177, 183, 189
March 14 144, 165-166, 170-174, Mujahidin see freedom fighters
176, 178-179, 181, 182, 209 Muharram 29, 193, 209
Marine’s barracks 154, 201 Muhtashami, Ali Akbar 151
marja‘ (religious authority to Multi-National Forces 152
emulate) 26, 53, 64, 189-190, Municipal elections 24, 88, 160,
197, 209 163
Marji‘yun 111, 156 Musa, Amr 173, 176
Martyrs’ Day 169 al-Musawi, ‘Abbas 22, 64, 89-90,
The Martyr’s Foundation 172 151-152, 157, 183, 202
Martyrdom (operations) 15, 21, al-Musawi, Ammar 159, 162
39, 54, 61, 64, 137, 149, 153, al-Musawi, Husayn 181
155-156, 158-159, 164, 174, al-Musawi, Ibrahim 28
188, 190-191, 199, 208 Mustad‘afin see oppressed
Marxist 15-16, 204 Mustakbirin see oppressors
Massacre 35, 42, 46, 123, 128, 133, Mutahhari, Murtada 54
153, 159, 200
17 May 1983 agreement 43, 153- Nab‘a 42, 200
155, 200 Nabatiyyé 118, 153-154, 201
Maydun 155 al-Nabulsi, al-Saykh al-‘Allama ‘Afif
Mecca 187-188, 194, 208 167
Medina 18-19, 194, 204 Najaf 61, 151
Mehlis, Detlev 167-168 Najjar, Ibrahim 182
Merciful 63, 65, 98, 115 Najm, George 162
Index 217
Nasrallah, Sayyid Hadi 160-161 Oppressors 15-16, 29, 34, 39,
Nasrallah, Sayyid Hasan 21-30, 36, 40-41, 47, 50, 52-53, 55, 64-65,
97, 107, 138, 155, 157-160, 162, 189, 203
164, 166-169, 172-176, 180, Oslo Agreement 136, 158
182-183, 196-198, 202, 209
National Convention of Dialogue Pact 105, 170, 195
168 Palestine 19, 31-32, 34, 36, 41,
National defense strategy 33, 110, 47-48, 50, 56-57, 60, 76-77, 84,
125 116, 119, 121, 123, 128-130,
National dialogue 28, 105, 110- 133, 135-137, 143, 154, 173,
111, 126, 140, 178-181 175, 179, 185-186, 195, 198
National Pact 195 Palestinian camps 42
NATO 30-31, 41-43, 48, 185 Palestinian refugees 33, 36, 109,
Naturalization 67, 73, 77, 79-80, 128, 137, 139, 168, 186
139, 183 Pan-Arabism 33
Nepotism 206 Pan-Islamism 15, 19, 33
New World Order 22 Paris III conference 169
Nicaragua 47 Parliamentary Bloc Council 23,
Nile 48 159
Nisr, Nasim 176 Parliamentary elections 63-65,
Normalization 19, 36, 66, 71, 69, 75, 88-89, 98-101, 103, 106,
76-77, 136-137 143, 145, 158-159, 162, 166, 177
Norton, Augustus Richard 202 Parliamentary majority 99, 101,
al-Nour radio 27, 156, 207 103, 146
Nureddine, Jawad see Imad Peace process 34, 136
Mughniyyé Peace settlement 24
Peace for Galilee operation 152
Occupied Territories 59, 76, 84, 91 PFLP 154, 157, 185
Open Letter 11, 15-17, 19, 22, Phalange 42-44, 46, 50, 152, 166,
24-26, 28-29, 31-35, 40, 154, 169, 172, 182, 200
161, 183, 193, 196, 199, 201- Phar‘un, Michel 182
202, 208 PLO 51, 152-153, 157, 179, 183,
Operation Accountability 158 185, 200
Operation Litani 151 Pluralism 117
Operation Radwan (‘Amaliyat Polarization 27, 59, 106, 164
al-Radwan) 177 Political Council (Politburo)
Oppressed 15-16, 29-30, 39-41, 23-24, 26-28, 159, 162, 165
43-47, 50-53, 55, 60, 63-64, Political declarations 15-16, 19,
68-69, 76, 82, 85, 112, 132-133, 26, 154
137-138, 189, 193, 199 Political equation 13
Index 218
Political ideology 15-19, 21, 131, Rahim, Shaykh Nabil 174
154, 157, 199 Ramadan 197
Political Maronism 17-18, 44, 46, Rapist Entity 49, 55, 97
194, 201 Rashid, ‘Ali 23
Political party 13, 164 Reactionary 51-52
Political program 22, 27, 63-65, Reagan, President Ronald 48
79, 130, 138, 157, 165, 207 Realpolitik 27
Political protest 13, 181 Regev, Eldad 168, 177
Political Sectarianism 28, 32, Religio-Judicial Council 26, 28
64-66, 71, 79, 92, 125-126, 139- Religious ideology 15, 152, 199
140, 183, 188, 204 Religious seminary 23, 60, 160
Political system 13, 16-17, 24, 30, Renaissance 40, 122, 130
32, 36, 43-45, 58, 64, 70-71, 116, Resistance movement 13, 30, 33,
123, 125-126, 152, 156, 194, 201 36, 117, 121, 130-132, 136, 149,
Powell, Colin 167 163
Press conference 28, 30, 36, 89, 97, Resistance society 66, 85
138, 176, 182-183, 198 Resolution 425 151
Primary documents 11, 39, 199 Resolution 1559 89, 164, 165
Prisoner exchange 162-163, 177 Resolution 1680 168
Public debt 78, 94, 209 Resolution 1701 145, 169, 180,
Public sphere 24, 188, 204 182
PSP 145-146, 166, 182, 186 Resolution 1747 170
Revolution of the Hungry 160
Qabalan, ‘Abd al-Amir 176 Rice, Condoleezza 167
Qahwaji, John 178 al-Rifa‘i, Kamel 166, 181
al-Qa‘ida 37, 174-175, 183, 201 Right of Return 33, 36, 77, 109,
Qana 159 129, 137
Qasim, Shaykh Na’im 22-23, Rmaylé 174
25-26, 28, 36, 157-158, 199, 207 Rome conference 169
Qasir, Abdallah 23, 159, 162 Rotation policy 29, 82
Qasir, Ahmad 153, 201 Roy, Olivier 194
Qasir, Samir 178 Rub Thalathin 159
Qawuq, Shaykh Nabil 23 Rufayyel, Sa‘ud 158
Qibla 134, 208
Qiyam (Values) 29 Sabra 42, 153, 200
al-Qlay‘a 161 Sadat, President Anwar 52
Qsarnaba 158 al-Sadr, Musa 54, 147, 152, 172,
Qum 60-61 174, 176, 202
Quntar, Samir 168, 177 al-Sadr, Sayyid Muhammad Baqir
54, 202
Ra‘d, Muhammad 22, 24, 28, 162 Safiyyeddine, ‘Ali 153
Index 219
Safiyyeddine, Hashim 23, 26, 28, Shuqayr, Wafiq 176
159 Sharara, Waddah 195
al-Sahili, Nawwar 166, 181 Shari‘a 17, 46, 51, 187, 190
Saint-Cloud 171 Shatila 42, 153, 200
Salafi Movement 112, 178 Sherri, Amin 166
Saleh, president ‘Ali Abdallah 148 Shib‘a Farms 77, 88, 91, 108-110,
Salih, Ali Husayn 197 125, 162
Sallukh, Fawzi 179 Shura Council 22-28, 154, 157-
Salman, Talal 138 159, 162, 164, 167
al-Sanyura, Fu’ad 166, 169-170, Sidon 118, 153-154, 174, 201
177, 180 SLA 155, 159-161, 168
Al-Saraya Al-Lubnaniyya Small Satan 25
Li-Muqawamat Al-Ihtilal Sobelman, Daniel 25-26, 197, 209
Al-Israeli (The Multi- Social Justice 15-17, 79, 166
confessional Lebanese Brigades Social movement 13, 17, 26, 129
to fight Israel) 160 Socialism 21
Sariyya (pl. sarayya) 209 Socio-economic 77-78, 89, 138,
Satan 47 164
Saudi 179 Social services 96
Saudi Arabia 51, 148-149, 156, Solana, Javier 28, 181
166 Al-Solh, Riyad 169, 194
al-Sayyid, Ibrahim Amin 24, 26, Soviet Union 22, 47, 119
28, 154, 158-160, 162, 193, 199 Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)
al-Sayyid, Jamil 180 167, 171, 180, 186
al-Sayyigh, Salim 182 Srur, Muhammad 177
Schaefer, Richard T. 199 SSNP 186, 201
Second Lebanon War 167, 180 Statement of Purpose 59-60
Sectarianism 46-47, 67, 69, 129, Stockholm conference 169
140, 206 Suicide 21, 61, 153-154, 161, 163,
Security Zone 50, 66-67, 151, 154, 175, 179
161, 204, 210 Sukariyyé, Isma‘il 160
September 11 119, 120 Sukariyyé, Walid 181
Grand Sérail 169 Sulayman, Husayn 177
Serhal, Pierre 166 Sulayman, Michel 111, 113, 176,
Seven Points 169 177, 182
Sfeir, Cardinal 182 Sykes-Picot Agreement 147, 195,
Shah (of Iran) 19, 52, 195 208
al-Shakar, Muhsin 22, 24, 158, 162 Syria 33, 60, 75, 77, 88, 109, 113,
Shalom, Sivan 181 129-130, 144, 159, 163-164,
Shami, Hasan 172 166-168, 178-181, 183, 195
Shamran, Mustapha 151
Index 220
Taha, ‘Ali 158 United Nations Interim Force in
Ta’if Agreement 28-29, 32, 58, 91, Lebanon (UNIFIL) 186
110, 125, 156-157, 176, 204, 207 United Nations Security Council
Taklif 21, 41, 65, 189-190 (UNSC) 151, 168-172, 180,
Tal al-Za‘tar 42, 200 182, 186
Tannenbaum, Elhanan 162 Unity of the Muslims 19-20, 34, 53
al-Taqsh, Jamal 166 UNRWA 153, 186
al-Tayyar, Ja‘far 153, 201 US Administration 20, 31, 36, 51,
Tehran 152, 167, 181, 195, 202 132, 136, 144, 172, 196, 200
Tel Aviv 197
Terrorism 30-32, 35, 56-57, 70, 77, Veto 55, 144
108, 120, 132-133 Veto power 13, 169-170, 176, 177
Tikrit 51 Vice 41, 127
Tishrin 182 Victory Speech 172, 174
Tluys, Khudr 23, 158 Vietnam 47
Trabulsi, Zakariyya 174 Views and Concepts 56-62
Tuéni, Gebran 108, 167, 178 Violence 56-57, 60, 62, 111-112,
al-Tufayli, Shaykh Subhi 22-23, 164, 180
26, 156, 160, 170, 176, 197
Tyre 118, 152-154, 210 Wa‘d project 183
Wadi Abu Jmil 181
‘Ubayd, Shaykh Abd al-Karim 27, Wadi ‘Araba Accord 136
64, 156, 163-164 Wadi Khaled 67, 204
UK 22, 152, 177, 196 Wakilayn shar’iyyan (religious
‘ulama 20, 53-55, 152, 162, 190, deputies) 159, 190
195, 202 Wardé, Salim 182
‘Ulayq, Qasim 172 Weapons 46, 88, 104, 109-110,
Umma 20, 21, 33, 40-44, 48-50, 143, 157, 167, 169-170, 179, 193
52-55, 59, 61, 64, 76, 112, 134, Westoxification 20, 196
137, 190-191, 194, 199, 206, 208 Wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of
UN Commission investigating the the jurisprudent) 15, 17, 39,
Hariri murder 167-168 41, 60, 191, 199
Understanding with the Salafi Al-waliyy al-faqih 40, 143
Movement 112 Women’s Organization 27, 165
United Nations (UN) 55, 57, 86, World view 13, 29
107, 109, 113, 159, 164, 166-
168, 170, 182, 209 (Mr.) X 54
UNDP 87, 186
UNICEF 87, 186 Yaghi, Husayn 162
UNIFIL II 169 Yaghi, Muhammad 23, 158
Unipolar 22, 31, 117, 119
Index 221
Yazbik, Shaykh Muhammad 26, Zionism 48, 52
28, 159 (Anti-)Zionism 15, 19-20
Zionist entity 19, 25, 30-31, 33-34,
Zakat 187, 191, 195 36, 39, 41, 48, 50, 59, 61, 64,
al-Zawahiri, Ayman 175 66, 76-77, 84, 90, 116-117, 121,
Zaydan, Khudr 177 123, 128, 133, 135-137
Z‘aytir, Muhammad 17-18, 194
Index 222