El sentimiento tiene entre sus objetos a las sensaciones y las sensaciones agradables; las

representaciones; los actos de sensación; los cambios y las modificaciones de la conciencia.

“All these objects of feeling, qua objects of feeling, have one feature in common: they are
felt as ‘absolutes,’ as given unities, and not as interrelated pluralities. Feeling is always
directed upon an absolute, or a single ‘field,’ even when the field contains plurality and
diversities. It does not necessarily change when the ingredients in the field changes. Feeling
is not knowledge, but it is essential to knowledge”. 419.
“Is it not possible to see in this confusion an attempt by Tetens to find the mode of mind
which ‘can accompany all of my representations’ and ‘except in relation to which they would
be nothing to me, even less than a dream?’ In short, I am suggesting that Tetens’ feeling, as
a cognitive factor, resembles what Kant calls the unity of apperception. In favor if this
interpretation is the fact that in at least one place, Tetens identified feeling with ‘inner sense’
and ascribed to it the role Kant would give to empirical apperception. The principal
differences, which makes a very great deal of difference in their whole philosophies, is this:
Tetens thinks feeling is a passivity of mind (though he does occasionally speak of the ‘act of
feeling’), like the inner sense which merely surveys a field of experience as a unitary absolute
before other active faculties break it up into objects and relations; Kant sees that the
apparently original field (which he calls the ‘manifold’) must be ‘run through’ and ‘held
together’ by an act of synthesis. Therefore Kant cannot identify apperception with inner sense
or feeling, as apparently Tetens did”. 419-420.