Professional Documents
Culture Documents
That on or about January 20, 2002, in the evening, at Brgy. The RTC Ruling
Cabanaetan, Municipality of Mabini, Province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable In a Decision9 dated December 8, 2010, the RTC found
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the
treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole,
their superior strength and at night time, armed with an and ordered to pay jointly and severally Rolando's heirs the
unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as
and feloniously shoot ROLANDO NECESITO y F ABRIGAS which death indemnity, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages. 10
caused his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs. 5 In so ruling, the R TC gave credence to the direct,
straightforward, and categorical eyewitness testimony of
The prosecution alleged that between 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock in Reynaldo positively identifying each of the accused-
the evening of January 20, 2002, eyewitness Reynaldo appellants as co-perpetrators of the crime, further noting that
1|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Reynaldo had no ill-motive to falsely testify against them. On case, the appeal shall be made by a mere notice of appeal
the other hand, it found the defense testimonies to be filed before the CA.20 In this case, Ramos and Salonga clearly
untenable, as they were riddled with various inconsistencies availed of a wrong mode of appeal by filing a petition for
and contradictions. Further, the RTC found the presence of review on certiorari before the Court, despite having been
the circumstance of abuse of superior strength which sentenced by the CA of reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, in
qualified the killing to Murder, considering that the accused- the interest of substantial justice, the Court will treat their
appellants took advantage of their combined strength and petition as an ordinary appeal in order to resolve the
their several weapons to overcome their unarmed victim and substantive issue at hand with finality.
assure the success of their felonious design. In view of the
foregoing, the RTC concluded that accused-appellants "are At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an
equally guilty of the crime of Murder aggravated with the use appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
of unlincensed firearm, there having been proven the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
existence of implied conspiracy between them." 11 the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA.12 raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent
The CA Ruling to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
In a Decision 13 dated April 28, 2015, the CA affirmed accused- penal law.21
appellants' conviction for the crime of Murder with the Use of
an Unlicensed Firearm with modification, increasing the As will be explained hereunder, the accused-appellants
awards of civil indemnity and moral damages to ₱75,000.00 should only be held liable for simple Murder, and not Murder
each and imposing legal interest of six percent (6%) per with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.
annum on all monetary awards from finality of the judgment
until fully paid. 14 It held that Reynaldo was able to positively To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following
identify accused-appellants as Rolando's killers, given that he elements must be established: (a) that a person was killed; (b)
was only seven (7) meters away from the situs criminis. The the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by
CA likewise held that the accused-appellants took advantage any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248
of their combined superior strength as they even used several of the Revised Penal Code; and (d) the killing is not parricide
weapons to render the unarmed victim completely or infanticide. 22
defenseless. 15
In the instant case, the prosecution, through the testimony of
Hence, the instant consolidated cases. eyewitness Reynaldo, had established beyond reasonable
doubt that: the accused-appellants chased, ganged up, and
Dissatisfied, Nacional filed a Notice of Appeal, 16(G.R. eventually, killed Rolando, and likewise, it was shown that
No.221425) while Ramos and Salonga filed a petition for they deliberately used weapons (i.e., gun and bamboo stick),
review on certiorari before the Court (G.R. No. 218466). which rendered Rolando defenseless from their fatal attacks.
Thus, such killing was attended with the qualifying
The Issue Before the Court circumstance of abuse of superior strength, 23 which perforce
warrants accused-appellants' conviction for Murder.
The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not
the CA correctly upheld accused-appellants' conviction for the The foregoing notwithstanding, the courts a quo erred in
crime of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm. convicting accused-appellants of Murder with the Use of an
Unlicensed Firearm.
The Court's Ruling
Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of
Preliminarily, the Court notes that Nacional elevated the
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
matter before the Court thru a Notice of Appeal17(G.R. No.
circumstance." There are two (2) requisites to establish such
221425) filed before the CA; on the other hand, Ramos and
circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject
Salonga filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or
Court (G.R. No. 218466). 18As a general rule, appeals of
possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or
criminal cases shall be brought to the Court by filing a petition
permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; 19
establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies
except when the CA imposed the penalty of "reclusion
with the prosecution.24
perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty," in which
2|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five
(5) gunshot wounds which led to his demise, it is unclear from
the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able
to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b)
assuming arguendo that such firearm was recovered,
whether or not such firearm was licensed. The Court notes
that the disquisitions of the courts a quo were silent
regarding this matter. As the Information alleged that
accused-appellants used an unlicensed firearm in killing
Rolando, the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this
allegation.25 Having failed in this respect, the Court cannot
simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an
aggravating circumstance.
SO ORDERED.
3|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
March 7, 2018 Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 17
which was denied in an Order18 dated March 3, 2016. Thus,
G.R. No. 232189 he elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari,
19
ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, Petitioner praying that the RTC Orders be set aside to the extent that
vs. they allowed the counterclaim to remain for independent
CYNTHIA B. BANA, Respondent adjudication before the same trial court.20
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the In a Decision21 dated February 23, 2017, the CA dismissed the
Decision2 dated February 23, 2017 and the Resolution3 dated petition for lack of merit.22 It found no grave abuse of
June 6, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. discretion on the part of the RTC, holding that under Section
146138, which affirmed the Orders dated May 29, 20154 and 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has been
March 3, 20165 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, filed by the defendant before the service upon him of the
Branch 109 (RTC) in Civil Case No. R-PSY-14-17714-CV that: petitioner’s motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be
(a) granted petitioner Alex Raul B. Blay’s (petitioner) Motion limited to the complaint.23
to Withdraw; and (b) declared respondent Cynthia B. Baña’s
(respondent) Counterclaim for independent adjudication. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration,24 which was
denied in a Resolution25 dated June 6, 2017; hence, this
The Facts petition.
On September 17, 2014, petitioner filed before the RTC a The Issue Before the Court
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,6 seeking that
his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
account of his psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's
of the Family Code.7 Subsequently, respondent filed her counterclaim for independent adjudication before the same
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim8 dated December 5, trial court.
2014.
The Court’s Ruling
However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and
thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw9 his petition. In her The petition is meritorious. Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of
comment/opposition10 thereto, respondent invoked Section Court provides for the procedure relative to counterclaims in
2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court (alternatively, Section 2, Rule the event that a complaint is dismissed by the court at the
1 7), and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as plaintiffs instance, viz. :
remaining for the court's independent adjudication. 11 In turn,
petitioner filed his reply,12 averring that respondent's Section 2.Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as
counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be
action due to her failure to file a manifestation therefor dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Motion to court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
Withdraw, which - according to petitioner - was required proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant
under the same Rules of Court provision. In particular, prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for
petitioner alleged that respondent filed the required dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
manifestation only on March 30, 2015. However, The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
respondent's counsel received a copy of petitioner's Motion defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate
to Withdraw on March 11, 2015; hence, respondent had only action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
until March 26, 2015 to manifest before the trial court her motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim
desire to prosecute her counterclaims in the same action. 13 resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in
the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without
The RTC Ruling prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court.1âwphi1
In an Order14 dated May 29, 2015, the RTC granted
petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw petition.15 Further, it As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim
declared respondent's counterclaim "as remaining for has been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon
independent adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal - as in this case -
fifteen (15) days to file his answer thereto.16 the rule is that the dismissal shall be limited to the
4|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
complaint. Commentaries on the subject elucidate that fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
"[i]nstead of an ‘action’ shall not be dismissed, the present a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to
rule uses the term ‘complaint’. A dismissal of an action is harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever
different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this possible. In short, every meaning to be given to each word or
reason, since only the complaint and not the action is phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of
dismissed, the defendant inspite of said dismissal may still the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used
prosecute his counterclaim in the same acton."26 in association with other words or phrases and its meaning
may be modified or restricted by the latter."28
However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule
17, if the defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim in By narrowly reading Section 2, Rule 1 7 of the Rules of Court,
the same action, he is required to file a manifestation within the CA clearly violated the foregoing principle and in so doing,
fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his erroneously sustained the assailed RTC Orders declaring
counterclaim may be prosecuted in a separate action. As respondent’s counterclaim "as remaining for independent
explained by renowned remedial law expert, former adjudication" despite the latter's failure to file the required
Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his treatise on the manifestation within the prescribed fifteen (15)-day period.
matter: As petitioner aptly points out:
Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the [I]f the intention of the framers of the Rules of Court is a
dismissal of the complaint to which a counterclaim has been blanket dismissal of the complaint ALONE if a counterclaim
interpose, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. has been pleaded prior to the service of the notice of
Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the dismissal then there is NO EVIDENT PURPOSE for the third
defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate (3rd) sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 17.
action or to have the same resolved in the same action.
Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should x x x x29
render the corresponding order granting and reserving his
right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should [I]t is clearly an ABSURD conclusion if the said provision will
he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same direct the defendant to manifest within fifteen (15) days from
action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must receipt of the notice of dismissal his preference to prosecute
manifest within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's his counterclaim in the SAME ACTION when the same
motion to dismiss. x x x27 AUTOMATICALLY REMAINS. If the automatic survival of the
counterclaim and the death of the complaint as being ruled
In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule by the Court of Appeals in its questioned Decision is indeed
17 to that portion of its second sentence which states that true, then the third sentence should have required defendant
the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, to manifest that he will prosecute his counterclaim in a
the CA ignored the same provision's third sentence, which SEPARATE [and not - as the provision reads - in the same]
provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who ACTION.30 (Emphases and underscoring in the original)
interposes a counterclaim prior to the service upon him of
the plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may be clearly inferred Petitioner's observations are logically on point. Consequently,
therefrom, should the defendant desire to prosecute his the CA rulings, which affirmed the patently erroneous R TC
counterclaim, he is required to manifest his preference Orders, must be reversed. As it should be, the RTC should
therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the plaintiff's have only granted petitioner's Motion to Withdraw and
motion to dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim may be hence, dismissed his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
prosecuted only in a separate action. Marriage, without prejudice to, among others, the
prosecution of respondent's counterclaim in a separate
The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the action.
passing of the fifteen (15)-day period triggers the finality of
the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
conduct of further proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of February 23, 2017 and the Resolution dated June 6, 2017 of
respondent's counterclaim, in the same action. Thus, in order the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146138 are hereby
to obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file the REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED solely
required manifestation within the aforesaid period; granting petitioner Alex Raul B. Blay’s Motion to Withdraw his
otherwise, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in Civil Case No.
separate action. R-PSY-14-17714-CV. The aforesaid dismissal is, among others,
without prejudice to the prosecution of respondent Cynthia
It is hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that "[t]he B. Baña's counterclaim in a separate action. SO ORDERED.
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
5|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
March 14, 2018 unlawfully, and knowingly possess or have under his control
three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing
G.R. No. 230065 white crystalline substance weighing zero point zero three
seven (0.037) gram, zero point zero two five (0.025) gram and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee zero point zero one nine (0.019) gram or in the total weight of
vs. zero point zero eight one (0.081) gram of methamphetamine
MARCELINO CRISPO y DESCALSO alias "GOGO" and ENRICO hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
HERRERA y MONTES, Accused-Appellant
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
DECISION
The prosecution alleged that at around 1:30 in the afternoon
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: of November 19, 2012,8 a confidential informant (CI) tipped
the Manila Police District Station 4 (MPD) of the alleged illegal
drug activities of a certain alias "Gogo" (later identified as
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-
Crispo) at Ma. Cristina Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Thus, after
appellants Marcelino Crispo y Descalso alias "Gogo" (Crispo)
coordinating with the operatives of the Philippine Drug
and Enrico Herrera y Montes (Herrera; collectively, accused-
Enforcement Agency, the MPD organized a buy-bust
appellants) assailing the Decision2 dated March 17, 2016 of
operation at the said area, with Police Officer (PO) 2 Dennis
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 0711 7, which
Reyes (P02 Reyes) as the poseur buyer. Upon arrival at the
affirmed the Decision3 dated October 24, 2014 of the
area at around 5:30 in the afternoon of even date, the CI and
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 (RTC) in Crim. Case
P02 Reyes saw Crispo talking to his runner, Herrera, and
Nos. 12-293828 and 12-293829 finding: (a) accused-
decided to approach them. As they went nearer, Herrera
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
approached the CI and P02 Reyes, while Crispo remained
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise
about five (5) to six (6) meters away. P02 Reyes then signified
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002";
his intention of buying shabu, prompting Herrera to get the
and (b) Crispo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
marked money from him, and thereafter, approach Crispo in
Section 11, Article II of the same law.
order to remit the money and get a sachet containing white
crystalline substance from the latter. When Herrera handed
The Facts
over the sachet to P02 Reyes, the latter performed the pre-
arranged signal, directly causing his backups to rush into the
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before scene and apprehend accused-appellants. Upon frisking
the RTC charging accused-appellants of the crime of Illegal accusedappellants, the arresting officers recovered three (3)
Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and Crispo of the crime of Illegal other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory portions of from Crispo. The accused-appellants and the seized items
which state: were then taken to the barangay office where the arresting
officers, inter alia, conducted the inventory and photography
Crim. Case No. 12-293828 in the presence of two (2) barangay kagawads, as indicated in
the Receipt of Property/Evidence Seized.9 After examination10
That on or about November 19, 2012, in the City of Manila, at the Crime Laboratory, it was confirmed that the sachets
Philippines, the said [accused-appellants], conspiring and seized from accused-appellants contain methamphetamine
confederating together and mutually helping each other, not hydrochloride, or shabu.11
being then authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give
away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged12
willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and jointly sell one (1) and offered their version of the events. According to Crispo,
heatsealed transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT he was just on board a tricycle going to his niece's house
ZERO TWO THREE (0.023) gram of white crystalline substance when suddenly, a car with five (5) policemen in civilian
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous clothes blocked the tricycle's path. One of the policemen then
drug.1âwphi1 poked a gun at Crispo, and told him, "Mga pulis kami,
sumama ka sa presinto." Fearful for his life, Crispo complied.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6 Upon arrival at the police station, the policemen demanded
from him ₱30,000.00 for his release; otherwise, they will
Crim. Case No. 12-293829 plant evidence against him. The policemen then proceeded to
show him four (4) sachets of shabu which will be used against
That on or about November 19, 2012, in the City of Manila, him. For his part, Herrera averred that he was riding a bicycle
Philippines, [Crispo], not being then authorized by law to when he accidentally bumped a brown van. Three (3) men
possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, then alighted from the van, arrested him, and took him to the
6|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
police station. Thereat, an affidavit was purportedly prepared April 3, 2017. Attached thereto is a duplicate copy of
for him and that he signed the same even without reading it Herrera's Certificate of Death22 issued by the Officer of the
out of confusion.13 Civil Registrar General.
The RTC Ruling Under Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, the
consequences of Herrera's death are as follows:
In a Decision14 dated October 24, 2014, the RTC found
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal
crimes charged and, accordingly, sentenced them as follows: liability is totally extinguished:
(a) for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the RTC sentenced
accused-appellants to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and to pay a fine in the amount of PS00,000.00; and (b) for and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the R TC sentenced only when the death of the offender occurs before final
Crispo to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the judgment;
indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as xxxx
maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00. 15
In People v. Jao,23 the Court eloquently summed up the
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish all effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his
the elements of the crimes charged as it was shown that liabilities,24 as follows:
accused-appellants sold to P02 Reyes one (l) sachet of shabu
and that after their arrest, three (3) more sachets of
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling
shabuwere found in Crispo’s possession. On the other hand,
herein:
the RTC did not give merit to accused-appellants' imputation
of ill-motive against their arresting officers after finding it
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
unsubstantiated.16
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed17 to the CA.
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
The CA Ruling directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. "25
In a Decision18 dated March 1 7, 2016, the CA affi1med the
RTC ruling.19 It held that the prosecution had established Thus, upon Herrera's death pending appeal of his conviction,
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crimes the criminal action against him is extinguished inasmuch as
charged. Further, the CA ruled that the absence of there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. As
representatives from the DOJ and the media during the such, the criminal case against him is hereby dismissed, and
conduct of the inventory is not fatal to the prosecution of declared closed and terminated.26
accused-appellants, so long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved.20
II.
8|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Q: Who signed the inventory? that the chain of custody rule is observed and thus, remove
any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or
A: [The] Barangay Kagawad[s], sir. contamination of evidence which could considerably affect a
case. However, minor deviations may be excused in situations
xxxx where a justifiable reason for non-compliance is explained. In
this case, despite the non-observance of the witness
requirement, no plausible explanation was given by the
[Atty. Rosemarie G. Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales)]: Mr. Witness,
prosecution .. In fact, the poseur-buyer, P02 Reyes, only
according to you, you already proceeded to the barangay?
feigned ignorance as to the reason why no representatives of
the DOJ and the media were present during the inventory of
[P03 Rodriguez]: Yes, ma'am.
the seized items:
xxxx
[Atty. Gonzales): By the way, Mr. Witness, prior to the
operation considering that you would be conducting a buy-
Q: Mr. Witness, were you able to see when the markings of bust operation, was there any coordination with the DOJ?
the evidences (sic) were done?
[P02 Reyes): I do not know if [SP03 Agapito Yadao, the buy-
A: Yes, ma'am. bust team leader,) did that, ma'am.
Q: Where were you at that time? Q: How about with any media representative?
Q: How about the accused at that time, where were they? xxxx
A: They were with us also, ma'am. Q: Mr. Witness, when these evidences (sic) were likewise
being marked was there any presence of the DOJ now?
Q: Were they assisted [by] any counsel at that time?
A: None, ma'am.
A: None, ma'am.
Q: How about the presence of the media now?
Q: Were there any members of the DOJ?
A: None, ma'am.
A: None, ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Were there any members of the media?
Q: Why was there none?
A: None, ma'am.
A: When we arrested them we immediately proceeded to
Q: According to you the inventory of the evidences (sic) were the Barangay[.]
witnessed by the Kagawads?
Q: That's the only your (sic) explanation?
A: Yes, ma' am.
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: An these kagawads? Who called the kagawads?
Q: Despite the fact that it is a buy-bust operation which was
A: We, ma'am. prepared by your office?
Q: They were already at the area when they arrived? A: Yes, ma'am.
A: Yes, ma'am.46 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) Q: With all documents prepared and Pre-operation Report
prepared?
The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as
well as representatives from the DOJ and the media to ensure A: Yes, ma'am.
9|L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Q: You just merely did not consider getting all the required prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for
persons to comply with Sec. 21? noncompliance with the aforesaid provision, Crispo’s
acquittal is perforce in order.
A: I do not know with Yadao, ma'am.47 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring
pronouncement in recent jurisprudence on the subject
At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these matter:
required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated
items inadmissible.48 However, a justifiable reason for such The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government
failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law
secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
RA 9165 must be adduced.49 In People v. Umipang,50 the malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible
Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot
effortswere employed in contacting the representatives be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
enumerated under the law for "[a] sheer statement that protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including
representatives were unavailable - without so much as an the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the
explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
look for other representatives, given the circumstances - is to against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities,
be regarded as a flimsy excuse."51 Verily, mere statements of however praiseworthy their intentions.
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the
required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified
non-compliance.52 These considerations arise from the fact in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of
that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x.57
beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have
of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and the positive duty to prove compliance with the procedure set
consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended. As such,
knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but
the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA also justify any perceived deviations from the said
9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state procedure during the proceedings before the trial court.
reasons for their non-compliance, but mustin fact, also Since compliance with the procedure is determinative of the
convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and
comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that
given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.[[53]] any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even
threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the
grounds or show that special circumstances exist which would records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure
excuse their transgression, the Court is constrained to had been completely complied with, and if not, whether
conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such
purportedly seized from Crispo have been compromised. It is reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to
settled that in a prosecution for the sale and possession of acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.58
dangerous drugs under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy
burden of proving not only the elements of the offense, but WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as follows: (a) Crim.
also to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti, failing in Case No. 12-293828 is hereby DISMISSED and declared
which, renders the case for the State insufficient to prove the CLOSED and TERMINATED insofar as accused-appellant
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.54 Enrico Herrera y Montes is concerned due to his supervening
death pending appeal; and (b) The appeal of accused-
Verily, the procedural lapses committed by the arresting appellant Marcelino Crispo y Descalso is GRANTED. The
officers, which were unfortunately left unjustified, militate Decision dated March 1 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against G.R. CR HC No. 07117 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Crispo, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus Accordingly, he is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The
delicti had been compromised.55 It is well-settled that the Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody
substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple for any other reason.
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment
to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. 56 As such, since the SO ORDERED.
10 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
March 14, 2018 money as payment. As Año placed the money inside his
pocket, P02 Ayad introduced himself as a policeman, causing
G.R. No. 230070 Año to flee. Fortunately, P02 Ayad caught Año and asked him
to empty his pockets which produced the two (2) ₱100.00
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee bills. Due to the commotion caused by Año's relatives who
vs. were preventing his arrest, the team moved at a distance of
NESTOR AÑO y DEL REMEDIOS, Accused-Appellant around 100 meters from the place of arrest, marked the
confiscated sachet, and completed the inventory thereat.
Barangay Captain Leo S. Buenviaje (Brgy. Captain Buenviaje)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
witnessed and signed the Inventory of Seized/Confiscated
Items,9 photographs were also taken in the presence of Año,
Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the Decision2 dated
P02 Ayad, and PO1 Acuin.10 On the same day, P02 Ayad
December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
delivered the seized sachet to the Crime Laboratory where it
H.C. No. 06127, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated October
was turned over to Police Inspector Forensic Chemist Beaune
1, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch
V. Villaraza (FC Villaraza) for examination. In Laboratory
76 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 11427 finding accused-appellant
Report No. D-198-09,11 FC Villaraza confirmed that the seized
Nestor Año y Del Remedios (Año) guilty beyond reasonable
sachet was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
doubt for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4
shabu, a dangerous drug.12
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002."
Upon arraignment, Año pleaded not guilty and denied the
charges leveled against him. He claimed that on said date, he
The Facts
was at home celebrating the 4th birthday of his nephew when
suddenly, three police officers whom he identified to be P02
This case stemmed from an Information5 filed before the RTC, Ayad, PO1 Ortilla, and PO1 Acuin, forcibly arrested him and
charging Año with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, brought him to the police station for inquiry. The following
the accusatory portion of which reads: day, he learned that he was being charged of drug pushing.13
That on or about the 3rd day of August 2009 in the In a Decision14 dated October 1, 2012, the RTC found Año
Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- Drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165, sentencing him to suffer
named accused, without having been authorized by law, did the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00. 15
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver
and give away to poseur buyer, P02 Ruel T. Ayad, 0.03 gram
The RTC found all the elements for the prosecution of sale of
of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-
dangerous drugs present, noting that the identity of Año as
sealed transparent plastic sachet which substance was found
the seller of the illegal drug was clearly established when he
positive to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
was arrested in fiagrante delicto during a buy-bust
also known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, in consideration of
operation.16
the amount of Php.200.00, in violation of the above-cited law.
Aggrieved, Año elevated his conviction before the Court of
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Appeals (CA).17
12 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
While the fact of marking and inventory of the seized item integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and
was established by the attached Inventory of ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that
Seized/Confiscated Items,37 the records are glaringly silent as any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even
to the presence of the required witnesses, namely, the threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the
representatives from the media and the DOJ. To reiterate, appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the
Section 21 (1) of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure
10640, as well as its IRR requires the presence of the had been completely complied with, and if not, whether
following witnesses during the conduct of inventory and justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such
photography of the seized items: (a) the accused or the reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.
seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (b) any elected
public official; and (c) a representative from the media and WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
the DOJ.38 In their absence, the prosecution must provide a December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
credible explanation justifying the noncompliance with the No. 06127 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
rule; otherwise, the saving clause under the IRR of RA 9165 accused-appellant Nestor Año y Del Remedios is ACQUITTED
(and now, the amended Section 21, Article II of RA 9165) of the crime charged. The Director of Bureau of Corrections is
would not apply. ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being
lawfully held in custody for any other reason.1avvphi1
Here, no such explanation was proffered by the prosecution
to justify the procedural lapse. It then follows that there are SO ORDERED.
unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the items seized
from Año, thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, which resultantly warrants his acquittal. 39
It is well-settled that the procedure under Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse
ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.40
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified
in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x.41
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee In view of this development, the criminal action, as well as
vs. the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto,
AGAPITO DIMAALA y ARELA, Accused-Appellant is ipso facto extinguished.11
He is likewise ordered to pay the family of Rodrigo Marasigan In People v. Culas,13 citing People v. Layag,14 the Court
the following: explained the effects of the death of an accused pending
appeal on his liabilities, as follows:
PhP 75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
PhP 75,000.00 as moral damages; extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
PhP 36,000.00 as actual damages;
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense
PhP 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
14 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
November 29, 2017 Petitioner was eventually granted a Writ of Possession,17 after
respondent received the amount of ₱l 7,822,362.74,
G.R. No. 229335 representing 100% of the zonal value of the subject
properties.18
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS (DPWH) The RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine
vs. the just compensation for the properties19 which, thereafter,
BELLY H. NG, represented by ANNABELLE G. WONG submitted its Commissioner's Report20 dated June 10, 2013,
recommending the amounts of ₱7,000.00/sq. m. and
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: ₱12,000.00/sq. m. as the just compensation for the subject
lots and the improvements thereon, respectively, and the
payment of six percent (6%) legal interest therefor, reckoned
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1
from the time of taking.21
assailing the Decision2 dated July 1, 2016 and the Resolution3
dated January 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 102033, which affirmed the Decision4 dated Dissatisfied, respondent objected22 to the recommended just
November 26, 2013 and the Order5 dated January 16, 2014 of compensation of ₱7,000.00/sq. m. for the subject lots,
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 270 (RTC) contending that the same "is not [the] real, substantial, full,
in Civil Case No. 38-V-13, fixing the just compensation for the ample[,] and fair market value" of her lots,23 considering that
subject lots at ₱15,000.00/square meter (sq. m.) and the the just compensation for nearby properties24 expropriated
replacement cost of the improvements thereon at for the C-5 Northern Link Project25 had been fixed by the
₱12.000.00/sq. m, hut deleting the award of consequential same RTC at ₱15,000.00/sq. m.26 She likewise objected to the
damages and reducing the legal rate of interest on the imposition of six percent (6%) interest, insisting that the same
obligation from twelve percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per should be pegged at twelve percent (12%) interest p.a.,27 in
annum (p.a.). line with the rulings in Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) v.
Imperial28 and in Republic of the Philippines (Republic) v. Ker
& Company, Limited.29 However, she accepted the value of
The Facts
₱l2,000.00/sq. m. fixed as the replacement cost of the
improvements.30
On February 12, 2013, petitioner the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works
On the other hand, petitioner filed its comment,31 interposing
and Highways (DPWH; petitioner), filed before the RTC a
no objection to the ₱7,000.00/sq. m. valuation for the subject
complaint6 against respondent Belly H. Ng (respondent),
lots and the imposition of six percent (6%) legal interest
represented by Annabelle G. Wong7 , seeking to expropriate
recommended by the board of commissioners,32 citing the
the lots registered in the name of respondent under Transfer
letter33 dated July 30, 2013 of the Office of Director Patrick B.
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. V-921888 and V-921919 with a
Gatan, Project Director, Infrastructure Right-of-Way and
total area of 1,671 sq. m. (subject lots), together with the
Resettlement - Project Management Office, DPWH.34
improvements thereon with an aggregate surface area of
However, it failed to attach a copy of the said letter.
2,121.7 sq. m. (collectively, subject properties), located in
Kowloon Industrial Compound, Tatalon Street, Brgy. U gong,
Valenzuela City,10 for the construction of the Mindanao The RTC Ruling
Avenue Extension Project, Stage II-C (Valenzuela City to
Caloocan City).11 Petitioner manifested that it is able and In a Decision35 dated November 26, 2013, the RTC fixed the
ready to pay respondent the amounts of ₱6,684,000.00 (i.e., just compensation for the subject lots at ₱15,000.00/sq. m. or
at ₱4,000.00/sq. m.) and ₱ll,138,362.74,12 representing the the total amount of ₱25,065,000.00, taking into account: (a)
combined relevant zonal value of the subject lots and the the classification of the subject lots as industrial, their
replacement cost of the improvements thereon, location, shape, and their being not prone to flood;36 and (b)
respective1y.13 a previous case37 involving a neighboring property
expropriated for the C-5 Northern Link Project which was
In her answer,14 respondent contended that the offer price is valued at ₱15,000.00/sq. m. by the same RTC.38 It adopted
unreasonably low, and that she should be compensated the the replacement cost of ₱12,000.00/sq. m. recommended by
fair market value of her properties at the time of taking, its appointed commissioners or the total amount of
estimated to be at ₱25,000.00/sq. m. Moreover, the fair and ₱25,460,400.00, noting that respondent accepted said
just replacement cost of the improvements on the subject recommendation.39 Consequently, it ordered petitioner to
lots should be in the amount of ₱22,276,724.00,15 pursuant to pay respondent the aforesaid amounts with twelve percent
Section 10 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of (12%) legal interest p.a., reckoned from the time of taking of
Republic Act No. (RA) 8974.16 the properties, less the provisional deposit of ₱l7,822,362.74,
plus consequential damages and attorney's fees.40
15 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration,41 but was effective at the time of the filing of the complaint, shall
denied in an Order42 dated January 16, 2014, prompting it to govern.54
file an appeal43 before the CA.
Under Section 10 of the IRR, the improvements and/or
The CA Ruling structures on the land to be acquired shall be appraised using
the replacement cost method, thus:
In a Decision44 dated July 1, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC
rulings, but deleted the award of consequential damages and Section 10.Valuation of Improvements and/or Structures. -
reduced the legal interest to six percent (6%) p.a., computed Pursuant to Section 7 of [RA 8974], the Implementing Agency
from the date of the RTC Decision until full satisfaction.45 shall determine the valuation of the improvements and/or
structures on the land to be acquired using the replacement
The CA upheld the just compensation of ₱15,000.00/sq. m. cost method. The replacement cost of the
fixed by the RTC for the subject 1,671-sq. m. lots on the basis improvements/structures is defined as the amount necessary
of relevant factors, such as the BIR zonal valuation of the to replace the improvements/structures, based on the
land, tax declarations and the Commissioner's Report, as well current market prices for materials, equipment, labor,
as the market value of the properties within the area.46 It contractor's profit and overhead, and all other attendant
likewise sustained the value of ₱12,000.00/sq. m. fixed as the costs associated with the acquisition and installation in place
replacement cost of the improvements with an aggregate of the affected improvements/structures. In the valuation of
surface area of 2,121.7 sq. m. or the total amount of the affected improvements/structures, the Implementing
₱25,460,400.00, holding that: (a) the amount of Agency shall consider, among other things, the kinds and
₱l1,138,362.74 proposed by petitioner was inconceivably quantities of materials/equipment used, the location,
lower than the current construction cost of a configuration and other physical features of the properties,
commercial/warehouse which was at ₱32,000.00/sq. m., and prevailing construction prices. (Emphasis supplied)
even as early as November 2009; and (b) petitioner did not
interpose any objection to the said amount.47 The replacement cost method is premised on the principle of
substitution, which means that "all things being equal, a
However, the CA ruled that the award of consequential rational, informed purchaser would pay no more for a
damages was improper, considering that the entirety of the property than the cost of building an acceptable substitute
subject properties is being expropriated, hence, there is no with like utility."55
remaining portion that may suffer an impairment or decrease
in value.48 It likewise reduced the legal interest to six percent Accordingly, the Implementing Agency should consider: (a)
(6%) p.a., in line with the amendment introduced by the construction costs or the current market price of materials,
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board in BSP-MB equipment, labor, as well as the contractor's profit and
Circular No. 799,49 Series of 2013.50 overhead; and (b) attendant costs or the cost associated with
the acquisition and installation of an acceptable substitute in
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,51 which place of the affected improvements/structures.56 In addition,
was, however, denied in a Resolution52 dated January 23, the case of Republic v. Mupas (Mupas)57 instructs that in
2017; hence, the instant petition. using the replacement cost method to ascertain the value of
improvements, the courts may also consider the relevant
The Issue Before the Court standards provided under Section 558 of RA 8974, as well as
equity consistent with the principle that eminent domain is a
concept of equity and fairness that attempts to make the
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
landowner whole. Thus, it is not the amount of the owner's
not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the
investment, but the "value of the interest" in land taken by
replacement cost for the improvements fixed by the RTC, and
eminent domain, that is guaranteed to the owner.59
the award of attorney's fees.
RESOLUTION In a Decision14 dated October 30, 2014, the RTC found the
recommendation of the commissioners to be reasonable and
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: just, and accordingly: (a) fixed the just compensation for the
subject lot at ₱9,000.00/ sq. m.; (b) directed petitioner to pay
the same, less the provisional deposit of ₱550,000.00; and (c)
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1assailing
imposed legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a.
the Decision2 dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of
on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104473, which affirmed the
of the subject lot until full payment.15
Decision3 dated October 30, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela City, Branch 172 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 49-V-08,
imposing legal interest on the unpaid balance of the just Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed16 before the CA, questioning
compensation for the subject lot at the rate of twelve percent the just compensation of ₱9,000.00/sq. m. and the award of
(12%) per annum (p.a.) computed from the time of the taking twelve percent (12%) interest rate p.a., instead of six percent
of the property until full payment. (6%) p.a.17 as provided under Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.18
The Facts
The CA Ruling
On January 23, 2008, petitioner the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Department of In a Decision19 dated September 13, 2016, the CA affirmed
Public Works and Highways, filed4 before the RTC a the RTC Decision, holding that the commissioners, in their
complaint5 against an unknown owner for the expropriation recommendation, observed the parameters20 set forth under
of a 200-square meter (sq. m.) lot located in Barangay Ugong, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974,21 and the findings of the
Valenzuela City, identified as Lot 1343-A-2-A-2-G, (LRC)Psd- RTC was amply supported by the evidence on record. 22
315943 (subject lot),6 for the construction of the C-5
Northern Link Road Project, otherwise known as North Luzon Hence, the instant petition claiming that the CA did not rule
Expressway (NLEX) Segment 8.1, traversing from Mindanao A on the issue of the applicable rate of interest which, in this
venue in Quezon City to the NLEX in Valenzuela City.7 case, should be at twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the filing of
the complaint until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at six
Petitioner thereafter applied for, and was granted8 a writ of percent (6%) p.a. until full payment.
possession over the subject lot on May 5, 2008, and was
required9 to deposit with the court the amount of The Issue Before the Court
₱550,000.00 (i.e., at ₱2,750.00/sq. m.) representing the zonal
value thereof (provisional deposit).10 The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC's
On August 28, 2012, respondent Leonor Macabagdal imposition of interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a.
(respondent), represented by Eulogia Macabagdal Pascual, on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking
was substituted as partydefendant upon sufficient showing of the subject lot until full payment.
that the subject lot is registered in her name under Transfer
Certificate Title No. (TCT) V-103067. Respondent did not The Court's Ruling
oppose the expropriation, and received the provisional
deposit.11 The petition is partly meritorious.
The RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner
the just compensation for the subject lot, which thereafter for the property taken, but to compensate him for the loss
submitted its Commissioners' Report (Re: Just thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld
Compensation)12 dated May 23, 2014, recommending a fair in a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the
18 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
taking, when the loss resulted.23 Indeed, the State is not just compensation for the subject lot, which shall be
obliged to pay premium to the property owner for computed at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the
appropriating the latter's property; it is only bound to make date of the taking on May 5, 2008 until June 30, 2013.
good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just
consideration to the circumstances availing at the time the compensation due respondent shall earn legal interest at the
property was taken.24 rate of six percent (6%) p.a.
In addition, the Court also recognizes that the owner's loss is WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision
not only his property, but also its income-generating dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
potential.1âwphi1 Thus, when property is taken, full G.R. CV No. 1044 73 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
compensation of its value must be immediately paid to MODIFICATION imposing legal interest at the rate of twelve
achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance of the
income lost.25 The value of the landholdings should be just compensation, as determined by the Regional Trial Court
equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due, of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, reckoned from the date of the
and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for taking on May 5, 2008 to June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, at six
the unRaid balance of this principal sum after taking has percent (6%) p.a. until full payment. The rest of the CA
been completed.26 This shall comprise the real, substantial, Decision stands.
full, and ample value of the expropriated property, and
constitutes due compliance with the constitutional mandate SO ORDERED.
of just compensation in eminent domain.27
In this case, from the date of the taking of the subject lot on
May 5, 2008 when the RTC issued a writ of possession 28 in
favor of petitioner,29 until the just compensation therefor was
finally fixed at ₱9,000.00/sq. m., petitioner had only paid a
provisional deposit in the amount of ₱550,000.00 (i.e., at
₱2,750.00/sq. m.). Thus, this left an unpaid balance of the
"principal sum of the just compensation," warranting the
imposition of interest. It is settled that the delay in the
payment of just compensation amounts to an effective
forbearance of money, entitling the landowner to interest on
the difference in the amount between the final amount as
adjudged by the court and the initial payment made by the
government.30
20 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court as he failed to attach a accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true
certification of non-forum shopping as well as material copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts,
portions of the record (e.g., affidavits referred to in the MTC certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Decision, transcript of stenographic notes of the MTC, Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of
documentary evidence of the parties). 16 the pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition.
Undaunted, Curammeng filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with Compliance17 dated November 6, 2014, praying for the The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a
relaxation of procedural rules so that his petition will be certification under oath that he has not theretofore
reinstated and given due course. He explained that the failure commenced any other action involving the same issues in
to comply with the rules was only due to a plain oversight on the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
the part of his counsel's secretary. To show that such failure divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is
was unintentional, he attached his certification of non-forum such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of
shopping as well as copies of the pertinent records of the the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar
case.18 action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions
In a Resolution19 dated June 30, 2015, the CA denied thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
Curammeng's motion for lack of merit. It held that promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or
Curammeng failed to give any convincing explanation which agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphases
would constitute a compelling reason for a liberal application and underscoring supplied)
of the procedural rules on appeal.20
It must be stressed that since a petition for review is a form
Hence, this petition. of appeal, non-compliance with the foregoing rule may
render the same dismissible.1âwphi1 This is in furtherance of
The Issue Before the Court the well-settled rule that "the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to
not the CA correctly dismissed Curammeng' s petition for
avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the
review based on procedural grounds.
requirements of the rules, failing which the right to appeal is
invariably lost."22 Verily, compliance with procedural rules is a
must, "since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication
of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
The Court's Ruling resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice."23
The petition is meritorious.
Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules of procedure
Appeals of cases decided by the RTCs in the exercise of its will tend to obstruct rather than serve the broader interests
appellate jurisdiction are taken by filing a petition for review of justice in light of the prevailing circumstances of the case,
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.21 Section 2, thereof, such as where strong considerations of substantive justice are
provides that such petitions shall be accompanied by, inter manifest in the petition, the Court may relax the strict
alia, material portions of the record which would support the application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its
allegations of said petitions as well as a certification of non- equity jurisdiction.24 The Court's pronouncement in Heirs of
forum shopping, viz.: Zaulda v. Zaulda25 is instructive on this matter, to wit:
SEC. 2.Form and contents.-The petition shall be filed in seven The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but
(7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the if it would be attained by precipitate, if not preposterous,
court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) application of technicalities, justice would not be served. The
state the full names of the parties to the case, without law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice.
impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is
petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material a more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a
dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case
a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the on appeal rather than dispose of the case on technicality
specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false
committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."
21 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a circumstances (e.g., the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to surrender which Curammeng argues to be existent in his
establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than case), if any, pursuant to the principle that an appeal in
for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on criminal cases opens the entire case for review.28
technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. In sum, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in rules of procedure in order to afford Curammeng the fullest
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal, rather than
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. At this to deprive him of such and make him lose his liberty on
juncture, the Court reminds all members of the bench and procedural blunders which he had no direct hand in.
bar of the admonition in the often-cited case of Alonso v. Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the CA for
Villamar [16 Phil. 315, 322 (1910)]: resolution of the appeal on its merits.
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to Resolutions dated October 20, 2014 and June 30, 2015 of the
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36802 are hereby
deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to
vested rights in technicalities.26 (Emphases and underscoring the Court of Appeals for resolution of the appeal on its
supplied) merits.
25 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the of the parents' right.
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners are
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this Court
he has no standing."42 has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal
standing, especially when paramount interest is involved.
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able
breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take
(2) the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of
to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as the petitioners to show that they have been personally
amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance. injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act."46
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce
Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality
affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review.
still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these
Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew issuances on the right of parents to rear their children and
Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine
Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in
danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of
On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John overarching significance to the public, which, therefore,
Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among
Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they others, the standing requirement.
are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances'
coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive
Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a aspect of this case.
consequence thereof.
II.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of
whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to A. Void for Vagueness.
rear their children as they have not shown that they stand
before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors
constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be
to travel and of parents to rear their children, this Court must
noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian
first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew
Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the
Ordinances are void for vagueness.
petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental
right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances
Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only
are void for not containing sufficient enforcement
stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa,
parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with
whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim
that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and,
to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even
consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in
though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the
court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK
enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew
still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was
offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus,
authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew
acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that
Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine
the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or
personal interest in the controversy. More particularly, identification of the child to show his age. 47
Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation
26 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The arguments are untenable. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common arbitrary application based on individual impressions and
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ personal predilections.52
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48 without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the
Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness for vagueness doctrine.
doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly
identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are
because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators.
and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly
that one may act accordingly.49The void for vagueness state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still
doctrine is premised on due process considerations,which bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory
are absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as
opined that: amended, provides:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional Section 7.Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may
uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal
uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence
cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases of these documents, age may be based on information from
where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.
well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a (Emphases supplied)
definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This
perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew
due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA
constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53
"void-for-vagueness."50 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA
10630,54minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions. 55 It
parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one
apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal
assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances
ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the should be read and implemented in conjunction with related
ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms statutory law.
related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are,
however, matters of policy that are best left for the political Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel
branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor violating the
curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the
in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting
show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement any competent proof of identification establishing their
stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law authorizes
enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of
conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done
ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law
agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the
conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and
Borough of Middletown,51 it was ratiocinated that: not to have the ordinances invalidated.
27 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances their own household to direct the rearing of their children is
as void for vagueness is denied. basic in the structure of our society."62 As in our Constitution,
the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only
B. Right of Parents to Rear their described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier
Children. "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the
State in the upbringing of their children. 63 The rationale for
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are the State's deference to parental control over their children
unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without (Bellotti),64 as follows:
substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this
right includes the right to determine whether minors will be [T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their
required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is State commonly protects its youth from adverse
primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's governmental action and from their own immaturity by
interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.57 requiring parental consent to or involvement in important
decisions by minors. But an additional and more important
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained. justification for state deference to parental control over
children is that "the child is not [a) mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of
him for additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and
their children:
underscoring supplied)
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
be stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child,
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
the [Sltate may act to promote these legitimate interests."66
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development
health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or
of moral character shall receive the support of the
welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
may override the parents' qualified right to control the
upbringing of their children."67
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children
(i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to
development of their moral character are characterized not
support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties.
only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means
State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather,
that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising
complementary to parental supervision.In Nery v. Lorenzo,68
their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to
this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in
exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this
protecting minors, viz. :
provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to
ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free,
independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For [Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens
indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of
additional obligations to society."[T]he duty to prepare the persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are
child for these [obligations] must be read to include the in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have
elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of the political community to look after their welfare. This
teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to
essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United
responsible citizens."59 States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."69
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a
substantial measure of authority over one's children."60 In
Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty
States (US) remarked that "constitutional interpretation has to aid parents in the moral development of their children,70
consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal
28 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the time on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason dictates
parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable
full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons
free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents rights.
and others, teachers for example, who have the primary
responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared
support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear their
responsibility."71 children.
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions C. Right to Travel.
designed to aid parents in their role of promoting their
children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew
length, these ordinances further compelling State interests Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They claim
(particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which,
prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny
limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a
children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile
lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are
physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the other less restrictive means for achieving the government's
night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances
children are prone to making detrimental decisions during suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing
this time.72 legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.79
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) -
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the
accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not
recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of
claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in
inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere
child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered
Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern
authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours
Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application of
when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality,
the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of
the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances
challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"81 viz.:
in public places without parental accompaniment during the
curfew hours.73 In this respect, the ordinances neither
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily
dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply
apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority
protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations
to influence or control their minors' activities. 74 As such, the
not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a
reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up
statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
his or her child.
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied
to the litigants.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew
Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is
at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with
that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
better opportunities to take a more active role in their
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims
children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle
that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if
(Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city government
the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
"was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
children from the perils of the street but are unable to control
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
the nocturnal behavior of those children." 76 Curfews may also
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend
29 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every person -
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it work where they desire or where they can best pursue the
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart ends of life.92
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to
parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to
assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause education, free expression, assembly, association, and
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to travel with other
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:
those third parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion,
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n speech, assembly, and association require one to move
restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, about, such movement must necessarily be protected under
the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US the First Amendment.
Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment, 83 and Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent
that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in that First Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights.
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held One court has eloquently pointed this out:
that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed
against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed
to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad
by the First Amendment to freedom of travel and
statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society
movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to
of constitutionally protected expression. "'85
their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any
reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall,
In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason,
was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be raised on people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets
the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are
Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably
violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment.
raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm (Emphases supplied)
of freedom of expression."87
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an interest justify restrictions even if made against fundamental
overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to
curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not
Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State96
the strict scrutiny test. may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided
that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.97
fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit: The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically
the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second
requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law,"
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's
move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610, 98
the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general as amended, RA 977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA
30 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for
Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended. children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ...
sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603,
which explicitly authorizes local government units, through [On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on]
their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood
children. It reads: and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
Article 139.Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal that could be detrimental to them.x x x.
councils may prescribe such curfew hours for children as
may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce xxxx
curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or
guardians and the local authorities. [On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the
upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth
from adverse governmental action and from their own
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this important decisions by minors. x x x.
case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In
other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as xxxx
required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise
of the right to travel. x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive
of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.119
this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
enjoy constitutional rights,108but the exercise of these rights
is not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They are always Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme
subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets
parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens to minors, as compared to adults:
patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts
the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this
employment.113 With respect to the right to travel, minors are against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range
required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action
Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a are the crippling effects of child employment, more especially
foreign country by themselves or with a person other than in public places, and the possible harms arising from other
their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State activities subject to all the diverse influences of the
has broader authority over the minors' activities than over [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation
similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's
general interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of
may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary
though these limitations do not generally apply to adults. action.
In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) It is true children have rights, in common with older people,
justifications for the differential treatment of the minors' in the primary use of highways. But even in such use streets
constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other
vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may
critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing:118
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they
generally are protected by the same constitutional are singled out on reasonable grounds.
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults,
31 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the
judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)
classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a
classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as
intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being with
not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but the compelling State interests justifying the assailed
requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test classification that interferes with the exercise of a
applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a
tests.125 suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131Thus, the
government has the burden of proving that the classification
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and
our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or
strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the
it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same interest.132
constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has
broader authority over minors than over adults does not a. Compelling State Interest.
trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny. 128 In Nunez
v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that: Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include
constitutionally declared policies.133This Court has ruled that
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and
curfews implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the care for them as parenspatriae constitute compelling
parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. interests to justify regulations by the State. 134 It is akin to the
The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less paramount interest of the state for which some individual
"fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis liberties must give way.135 As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti
of those rights may differ: framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in
imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their
majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by welfare.
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The
Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that
has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of
coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their
greater range of interests that justify the infringement of exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
minors' rights. criminal pressure and influences which may even include
themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal
when applicable, warrant differential analysis of the curfews on minors, recognizes that:
constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti
test [however] does not establish a lower level of scrutiny [b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be
for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a neglected of their proper care and guidance, education, and
juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug
courts to determine whether the state has a compelling state addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of
interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on committing criminal offenses;
adults. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in
regulating minors differently than adults, we do not believe [d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-
that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and
burdens on minors' fundamental rights.x x x. member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or
meander in public or private roads, streets or other public
32 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe
justification; to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials
with their finger on the pulse of their home community
xxxx clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the
opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective
reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering or of reducing juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases and
wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national
laws; Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local
governments of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming
regulate the movement of minor children during night time prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or
by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, perpetrators, in their respective localities.139
abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial or detrimental to their development; Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary
to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these under the general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court
minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the thus finds that the local governments have not only
tendency of growing number of youth spending their conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate
nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to
unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the
elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
furthering their nefarious activities[.]136
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied,
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the Court now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set
the information gathered by the City Council to support its forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or
passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may provide the least restrictive means to address the cited
serve as a guidepost to our own eatment of the present case. compelling State interest - the second requirement of the
Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the strict scrutiny test.
entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a
safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when
left unsupervised during the late hours of night: The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from
the fundamental premise that citizens should not be
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise
its curfew would materially assist its first stated interest-that of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted,
of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent
acted on the basis of information from many sources, necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's
including records from Charlottesville's police department, a compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental
survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the United regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts
States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly
police reports from other localities. On the basis of such drawn.141
evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that
keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing
will make for a safer community. The same streets may have standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still
a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity,
during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a whether it be social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present
series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to
Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to
sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or travel but also on their other constitutional rights.143
participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn,
that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to
these criminal influences at an early age may persist in their
33 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
freely exercise their religion and to free speech.145 It observed (j) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also
that: exempts minors from the curfew during these specific
occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve,
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day
alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday,
Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
local Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them
from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the This Court observes that these two ordinances are not
various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect
x x. the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel
at night from school or work.148 However, even with those
xxxx safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent,
the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of
could not even attend the city council meetings if they ran religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression,
past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on among others.
the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a
deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited,
speech. and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The
Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of
xxxx constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless,
it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail
below:
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn
ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church
very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-
muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and
Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is
home by a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in
association activities. (Emphases supplied) legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or
church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and
intellectual development, yet, such participation is not
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective
exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the
Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not. Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the
curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively
prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the
(such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults,
coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by
similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate
their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b)
activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise
those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines,
their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes
and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by
virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate
outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city
working at night.146 council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their
right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions,
to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to
night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these
traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription
running errands under the supervision of their parents, does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect
guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as
becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These
34 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
legitimate activities are merely hindered without any private activity sponsored by the city, barangay,
reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the school, or other similar private civic/religious
Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the organization/group (recognized by the community)
Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not that supervises the activity or when the minor is
narrowly drawn. going to or returning home from such activity,
without any detour or stop; and
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be
completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are (h) When the minor can present papers certifying
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the that he/she is a student and was dismissed from
curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a
the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring
provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary supplied)
thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite
the presence150 of any separability clause.151 As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of
exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of
first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably
minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following assemble, and of free expression.
exceptions:
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of
Section 4.EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following exceptions guarantees the protection of these
circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of
ordinance; association by enabling minors to attend both official and
extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to
guardian; peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered
by these items given that the minors' attendance in the
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, official activities of civic or religious organizations are
graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas
extra-curricular activities of their school or Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is
organization wherein their attendance are required sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by
or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew
are out and unable to go home early due to hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows
circumstances beyond their control as verified by the minor-participants to move to and from the places
the proper authorities concerned; and where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous
exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only
prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an
the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within
emergency situation such as conflagration,
the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law
prominent.
enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. 1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and
This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of Admonition;
fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing
the nature or import of her actions. The State, as 2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand
parenspatriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of and Admonition, and a warning about the
harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet legal impostitions in case of a third and
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years subsequent violation; and
deserve its protection.153
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to
inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND
against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the
safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the discretion of the Court,PROVIDED, That the
curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is complaint shall be filed by the
reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and PunongBarangay with the office of the City
hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring
no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with supplied).
the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from
crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar Thus springs the question of whether local governments
laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a)
the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case. community .service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine;
and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties
on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
SEC. 57.Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not
proper - as it was raised - to further discuss the validity of its be considered an offense and shall not be punished if
penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended. committed by a child.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances
parent/s or guardian under Section 8 thereof, 154 does not enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status
impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas offenses such as but not limited to, curfew violations,
Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-
or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors
service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of against public order or safety such as, but not limited to,
the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness,
to the fine imposed therein.155Meanwhile, the Manila public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling,
Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall
the age and frequency of violations, to wit: be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be
imposed on children for said violations, and they shall
SEC. 4.Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay
youth violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of
as follows: their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be
provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be
36 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative
the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in
programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or
for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166
education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as
regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less
similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear,
penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is their objectives are to formally inform and educate the
the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions must be
regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations
thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A. A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to
reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the
"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined
wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or fine"; 158 as "a severe or formal reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary
"[p ]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not
who commits a deliberate or negligent act." 159 Punishment, in restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law";168 while the
tum, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal
confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault
against a person who has violated the law."160 by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more
than just a warning or admonition."169 In other words,
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to
mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply
regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn
thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate the erring individual including the public against repeating or
intervention programs, such as community-based committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the
programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the same law. erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp
disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a
service is a valid form of intervention program that a local penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could amended.
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare
of minors. For one, the community service programs provide Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably
minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and
accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of
social stigma caused by jail detention. RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear,
and compliance with the law and legal orders. More categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty
importantly, they give them the opportunity to become shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile
productive members of society and thereby promote their status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of
integration to and solidarity with their community. reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew
violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of
likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On
is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing the other hand, the impositions of community service
disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they
generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel do not constitute penalties.
or warning against fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law
Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued CONCLUSION
warning or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary
defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances
warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is,
oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to
37 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the
concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has
passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the
only issuance out of the three which provides for the least
restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the
Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that
enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights
during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly
drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", has also been construed to include parental
permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the
manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of
the local government unit.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
38 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
April 24, 2017 complaint to quiet their respective titles over the subject
lands and remove the cloud cast upon their ownership as a
G.R. No. 189950* result of petitioners' refusal to recognize the sales.7
BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAGSANTILLAN, DIXON For their part, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss8 dated
BILAG, REYNALDO B. SUELLO, HEIRS OF LOURDES S. BILAG, November 4, 2004 on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-HANAOKA, and HEIRS OF NELLIE prescription/laches/estoppel, and res judicata. Anent the first
BILAG, Petitioners, ground, petitioners averred that the subject lands are
vs. untitled, unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite
ESTELA AY-AY, ANDRES ACOP, JR., FELICITAS AP-AP, SERGIO Reservation which were long classified as lands of the public
AP-AP, JOHN NAPOLEON A. RAMIREZ, JR., and MA. TERESA domain. As such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as
A. RAMIREZ, Respondents it is the Land Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of
Lands) which is vested with the authority to determine issues
DECISION of ownership over unregistered public lands.9
39 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The CA Ruling and produces no effect.1âwphi1It remains a basic fact in law
that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision
In a Decision18 dated March 19, 2009, the CA set aside the of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A
dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R, and accordingly, remanded void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.
the case to the court a quo for trial. 19 It held that Civil Case All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
No. 3934-R was an action for injunction where respondents from it have no legal effect. 25
sought to enjoin petitioners' alleged entry into the subject
lands and their introduction of improvements thereat; Now, on the issue of jurisdiction, a review of the records
whereas Civil Case No. 5881-R is an action to quiet title where shows that the subject lands form part of a 159,496-square
respondents specifically prayed, inter alia, for the removal of meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as
the cloud upon their ownership and possession of the subject Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 situated at Sitio
lands. In this light, the CA concluded that while these cases Benin, Baguio City. Notably, such parcel of land forms part of
may involve the same properties, the nature of the action the Baguio Townsite Reservation, a portion of which, or 146,
differs; hence, res judicata is not a bar to the present suit. On 428 square meters, was awarded to Iloc Bilag due to the
the issue of laches, prescription or estoppel, the CA pointed reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No.
out that in view of respondents' allegation that they have 211, as evidenced by a Decision 26 dated April 22, 1968
been in possession of the subject lands since 1976, their promulgated by the then-Court of First Instance of Baguio
action to quiet title is imprescriptible.20 City.
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration 21 which In a catena of cases, 27 and more importantly, in Presidential
was, however, denied in a Resolution22 dated September 3, Decree No. (PD) 1271,28 it was expressly declared that all
2009; hence, this petition. orders and decisions issued by the Court of First Instance of
Baguio and Benguet in connection with the proceedings for
The Issue Before the Court the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record
211, covering lands within the Baguio Town site Reservation
The petition is meritorious. are null and void and without force and effect. While PD 1271
provides for a means to validate ownership over lands
forming part of the Baguio Town site Reservation, it requires,
At the outset, it must be stressed that in setting aside the
among others, that a Certificate of Title be issued on such
Order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R due to the
lands on or before July 31, 1973. 29 In this case, records reveal
inapplicability of the grounds of res judicata and
that the subject lands are unregistered and untitled, as
prescription/laches, the CA notably omitted from its
petitioners' assertion to that effect was not seriously disputed
discussion the first ground relied upon by petitioners, which is
by respondents. Clearly, the award of lots 2 and 3 of the
lack of jurisdiction.
159,496-square meter parcel of land designated by the
Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 -
Jurisprudence has consistently held that "[j]urisdiction is
which includes the subject lands - to Iloc Bilag by virtue of the
defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try,
reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211,
and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative
is covered by the blanket nullification provided under PD
body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it
1271, and consistently affirmed by the prevailing case law. In
must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject
view of the foregoing, it is only reasonable to conclude that
matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
the subject lands should be properly classified as lands of the
matter is the power to hear and determine the general class
public domain as well.
to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred
by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of
Therefore, since the subject lands are untitled and
the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
unregistered public lands, then petitioners correctly argued
Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
that it is the Director of Lands who has the authority to award
matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action." 23
their ownership.30 Thus, the RTC Br. 61 correctly recognized
Perforce, it is important that a court or tribunal should first
its lack of power or authority to hear and resolve
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject
respondents' action for quieting oftitle.31 In Heirs of Pocdo v.
matter presented before it, considering that any act that it
Avila,32 the Court ruled that the trial court therein correctly
performs without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and
dismissed an action to quiet title on the ground of lack of
without any binding legal effects. The Court's pronouncement
jurisdiction for lack of authority to determine who among the
in Tan v. Cinco,24 is instructive on this matter, to wit:
parties have better right over the disputed property, which is
admittedly still part of public domain for being within the
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null
Baguio Townsite Reservation, viz.:
and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights
40 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The DENR Decision was affirmed by the Office of the legal or equitable title over the disputed property, which
President which held that lands within the Baguio Townsite forms part of Lot 43, a public land within the Baguio
Reservation belong to the public domain and are no longer Townsite Reservation. It is clear from the facts of the case
registrable under the Land Registration Act. The Office of the that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, the heirs of Pocdo
President ordered the disposition of the disputed property in Pool, were not even granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land
accordance with the applicable rules of procedure for the Claim over Lot 43, which remains public land. Thus, the trial
disposition of alienable public lands within the Baguio court had no other recourse but to dismiss the case. 33
Townsite Reservation, particularly Chapter X of (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Commonwealth Act No. 141 on Townsite Reservations and
other applicable rules. In conclusion, RTC Br. 61 has no jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 5881-R as the plaintiffs therein (herein respondents) seek
Having established that the disputed property is public land, to quiet title over lands which belong to the public domain.
the trial court was therefore correct in dismissing the Necessarily, Civil Case No. 5881- R must be dismissed on this
complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court ground. It should be stressed that the court a quo's lack of
had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties subject matter jurisdiction over the case renders it without
have better right over the disputed property which is authority and necessarily obviates the resolution of the
admittedly still part of the public domain. As held in Dajunos merits of the case. To reiterate, when a court has no
v. Tandayag: jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is
to dismiss the action, as any act it performs without
x x x The Tarucs' action was for "quieting of title" and jurisdiction is null and void, and without any binding legal
necessitated determination of the respective rights of the effects. In this light, the Court finds no further need to discuss
litigants, both claimants to a free patent title, over a piece of the other grounds relied upon by petitioners in this case.
property, admittedly public land. The law, as relied upon by
jurisprudence, lodges "the power of executive control, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
administration, disposition and alienation of public lands with March 19, 2009 and the Resolution dated September 3, 2009
the Director of Lands subject, of course, to the control of the of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86266 are hereby
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources." REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 5881-R
is DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part
In sum, the decision rendered in civil case 1218 on October of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61.
28, 1968 is a patent nullity. The court below did not have
power to determine who (the Firmalos or the Tarucs) were SO ORDERED.
entitled to an award of free patent title over that piece of
property that yet belonged to the public domain. Neither did ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE,
it have power to adjudge the Tarucs as entitled to the "true Associate Justice
equitable ownership" thereof, the latter's effect being the
same: the exclusion of the Firmalos in favor of the Tarucs.
Records reveal that at the end of her shift on May 29, 2011, On May 31, 2011, Sanchez submitted an Incident Report
Sanchez passed through the SLMC Centralization Addendum17 (May 31, 2011 letter), explaining that the
Entrance/Exit where she was subjected to the standard questioned items came from the medication drawers of
inspection procedure by the security personnel. In the course patients who had already been discharged, and, as similarly
thereof, the Security Guard on-duty, Jaime Manzanade (SG practiced by the other staff members, she started saving
Manzanade), noticed a pouch in her bag and asked her to these items as excess stocks in her pouch, along with other
open the same.7 When opened, said pouch contained the basic items that she uses during her shift.18 She then put the
following assortment of medical stocks which were pouch inside the lowest drawer of the bedside table in the
subsequently confiscated: (a) Syringe 10cl [4 pieces]; (b) treatment room for use in immediate procedures in case
Syringe 5cl [3 pieces]; (c) Syringe 3cl [3 pieces]; (d) Micropore replenishment of stocks gets delayed. However, on the day of
[1 piece]; (e) Cotton Balls [1 pack]; (f) Neoflon g26 [1 piece]; the incident, she failed to return the pouch inside the
(g) Venofix 25 [2 pieces]; and (h) Gloves [4 pieces] medication drawer upon getting her tri-colored pen and
(questioned items).8 Sanchez asked SG Manzanade if she calculator and, instead, placed it inside her bag. Eventually,
could just return the pouch inside the treatment room; she forgot about the same as she got caught up in work, until
however, she was not allowed to do so.9 Instead, she was it was noticed by the guard on duty on her way out of SMLC's
brought to the SLMC In-House Security Department (IHSD) premises.
where she was directed to write an Incident Report explaining
why she had the questioned items in her possession. 10 She Consequently, Sanchez was placed under preventive
complied11 with the directive and also submitted an undated suspension effective June 3, 2011 until the conclusion of the
handwritten letter of apology12 (handwritten letter) which investigation by SLMC's Employee and Labor Relations
reads as follows: Department (ELRD)19 which, thereafter, required her to
explain why she should not be terminated from service for
To In-House Security, "acts of dishonesty" due to her possession of the questioned
items in violation of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
42 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Discipline.20 In response, she submitted a letter21 dated June filing of a criminal case against Sanchez did not preclude a
13, 2011, which merely reiterated her claims in her previous determination of her serious misconduct, considering that the
May 31, 2011 letter. She likewise requested for a case filing of a criminal case is entirely separate and distinct from
conference,22 which SLMC granted.23 After hearing her side, the determination of just cause for termination of
SLMC, on July 4, 2011, informed Sanchez of its decision to employment.37
terminate her employment effective closing hours of July 6,
2011.24 This prompted her to file a complaint for illegal Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed38 to the NLRC.
dismissal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
07-11042-11. The NLRC Ruling
In her position paper,25 Sanchez maintained her innocence, In a Decision39 dated November 19, 2012, the NLRC reversed
claiming that she had no intention of bringing outside the and set aside the LA ruling, and held that Sanchez was illegally
SLMC's premises the questioned items since she merely dismissed.
inadvertently left the pouch containing them in her bag as
she got caught up in work that day. She further asserted that
The NLRC declared that the alleged violation of Sanchez was a
she could not be found guilty of pilferage since the
unique case, considering that keeping excess hospital stocks
questioned items found in her possession were neither
or "hoarding" was an admitted practice amongst nurses in
SLMC's nor its employees' property. She also stressed the fact
the Pediatric Unit which had been tolerated by SLMC
that SLMC did not file any criminal charges against her. Anent
management for a long time.40 The NLRC held that while
her supposed admission in her handwritten letter, she
Sanchez expressed remorse for her misconduct in her
claimed that she was unassisted by counsel when she
handwritten letter, she manifested that she only "hoarded"
executed the same and, thus, was inadmissible for being
the questioned items for future use in case their medical
unconstitutional.26
supplies are depleted, and not for her personal benefit. 41 It
further held that SLMC failed to establish that Sanchez was
For its part,27 SLMC contended that Sanchez was validly motivated by ill-will when she brought out the questioned
dismissed for just cause as she had committed theft in items, noting: (a) the testimony of SG Manzanade during the
violation of Section 1,28 Rule I of the SLMC Code of conference before the ELRD of Sanchez's demeanor when she
Discipline,29 which punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., robbery, was apprehended, i.e., "[d]i naman siya masyado
theft, pilferage, and misappropriation of funds, with nataranta,"42 and her consequent offer to return the pouch;43
termination from service. and (b) that the said pouch was not hidden underneath the
bag.44 Finally, the NLRC concluded that the punishment of
The LA Ruling dismissal was too harsh and the one
In a Decision30 dated May 27, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) (1) month preventive suspension already imposed
ruled that Sanchez was validly dismissed31 for intentionally on and served by Sanchez was the appropriate
taking the property of SLMC's clients for her own personal penalty.45 Accordingly, the NLRC ordered her
benefit,32 which constitutes an act of dishonesty as provided reinstatement, and the payment of backwages,
under SLMC's Code of Discipline. other benefits, and attorney's fees.46
According to the LA, Sanchez's act of theft was evinced by her Unconvinced, SLMC moved for reconsideration47 which was,
attempt to bring the questioned items that did not belong to however, denied in a Resolution48 dated January 14, 2013.
her out of SLMC's premises; this was found to be analogous Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari49 before the CA.
to serious misconduct which is a just cause to dismiss her. 33
The fact that the items she took were neither SLMC's nor her The CA Ruling
co-employees' property was not found by the LA to be
material since the SLMC Code of Discipline clearly provides
In a Decision50 dated November 21, 2013, the CA upheld the
that acts of dishonesty committed to SLMC, its doctors, its
NLRC, ruling that the latter did not gravely abuse its
employees, as well as its customers, are punishable by a
discretion in finding that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.
penalty of termination from service.34 To this, the LA opined
that "[i]t is rather illogical to distinguish the persons with
It ruled that Sanchez's offense did not qualify as serious
whom the [said] acts may be committed as SLMC is also
misconduct, given that: (a) the questioned items found in her
answerable to the properties of its patients."35 Moreover, the
possession were not SLMC property since said items were
LA observed that Sanchez was aware of SLMC's strict policy
paid for by discharged patients, thus discounting any material
regarding the taking of hospital/medical items as evidenced
or economic damage on SLMC's part; (b) the retention of
by her handwritten letter, 36 but nonetheless committed the
excess medical supplies was an admitted practice amongst
said misconduct. Finally, the LA pointed out that SLMC's non-
43 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
nurses in the Pediatric Unit which was tolerated by SLMC; (c) Article 296.Termination by Employer. - An employer may
it was illogical for Sanchez to leave the pouch in her bag since terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
she would be subjected to a routine inspection; (d) Sanchez's
lack of intention to bring out the pouch was manifested by (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
her composed demeanor upon apprehension and offer to employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his
return the pouch to the treatment room; and (e) had SLMC representative in connection with his work;
honestly believed that Sanchez committed theft or pilferage,
it should have filed the appropriate criminal case, but failed xxxx
to do so.51 Moreover, while the CA recognized that SLMC had
the management prerogative to discipline its erring
Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this
employees, it, however, declared that such right must be
ground, the employer's orders, regulations, or instructions
exercised humanely. As such, SLMC should only impose
must be: (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to
penalties commensurate with the degree of infraction.
the employee, and (3) in connection with the duties which
Considering that there was no indication that Sanchez's
the employee has been engaged to discharge."59
actions were perpetrated for self-interest or for an unlawful
objective, the penalty of dismissal imposed on her was grossly
Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Sanchez
oppressive and disproportionate to her offense. 52
was validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful disregard and
disobedience of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Dissatisfied, SLMC sought for reconsideration,53 but was
Discipline, which reasonably punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e.,
denied in a Resolution54 dated April 4, 2014, hence, this
"theft, pilferage of hospital or co-employee property, x x x or
petition.
its attempt in any form or manner from the hospital, co-
employees, doctors, visitors, [and] customers (external and
The Issue Before the Court internal)" with termination from employment.60 Such act is
obviously connected with Sanchez's work, who, as a staff
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not Sanchez was nurse, is tasked with the proper stewardship of medical
illegally dismissed by SLMC. supplies. Significantly, records show that Sanchez made a
categorical admission61 in her handwritten letter62 - i.e.,
The Court's Ruling "[k]ahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-uwi] ng
gamit"63 - that despite her knowledge of its express
The petition is meritorious. prohibition under the SLMC Code of Discipline, she still
knowingly brought out the subject medical items with her. It
The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of is apt to clarify that SLMC cannot be faulted in construing the
employment, aptly called "management prerogative," gives taking of the questioned items as an act of dishonesty
employers the freedom to regulate, according to their (particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its attempt in any form or
discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, manner) considering that the intent to gain may be
including work assignment, working methods, processes to be reasonably presumed from the furtive taking of useful
followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work property appertaining to another.64 Note that Section 1, Rule
supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal 1 of the SLMC Code of Discipline is further supplemented by
and recall of workers.55 In this light, courts often decline to the company policy requiring the turn-over of excess medical
interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. In supplies/items for proper handling65 and providing a
fact, labor laws discourage interference in employers' restriction on taking and bringing such items out of the SLMC
judgment concerning the conduct of their business.56 premises without the proper authorization or "pass" from the
official concerned,66 which Sanchez was equally aware
thereof.67 Nevertheless, Sanchez failed to turn-over the
Among the employer's management prerogatives is the right
questioned items and, instead, "hoarded" them, as
to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or
purportedly practiced by the other staff members in the
proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide
Pediatric Unit. As it is clear that the company policies subject
certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to
of this case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to
assure that the same would be complied with. At the same
the employee, and evidently connected with the latter's
time, the employee has the corollary duty to obey all
work, the Court concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for a
reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer;
just cause.
and willful or intentional disobedience thereto, as a general
rule, justifies termination of the contract of service and the
dismissal of the employee.57 Article 296 (formerly Article 282) On a related point, the Court observes that there lies no
of the Labor Code provides:58 competent basis to support the common observation of the
NLRC and the CA that the retention of excess medical supplies
was a tolerated practice among the nurses at the Pediatric
44 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Unit. While there were previous incidents of "hoarding," it
appears that such acts were - in similar fashion - furtively
made and the items secretly kept, as any excess items found
in the concerned nurse's possession would have to be
confiscated.68 Hence, the fact that no one was caught and/or
sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not
mean that the so-called "hoarding" practice was tolerated by
SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe the justification behind the
violation of the company rules regarding excess medical
supplies is immaterial since it has been established that an
infraction was deliberately committed.69 Doubtless, the
deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the
employee cannot be countenanced as it may encourage him
or her to do even worse and will render a mockery of the
rules of discipline that employees are required to observe.70
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
45 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
March 11, 2015 I am very sorry for bringing things from [SLMC] inside my bag.
Records reveal that at the end of her shift on May 29, 2011, On May 31, 2011, Sanchez submitted an Incident Report
Sanchez passed through the SLMC Centralization Addendum17 (May 31, 2011 letter), explaining that the
Entrance/Exit where she was subjected to the standard questioned items came from the medication drawers of
inspection procedure by the security personnel. In the course patients who had already been discharged, and, as similarly
thereof, the Security Guard on-duty, Jaime Manzanade (SG practiced by the other staff members, she started saving
Manzanade), noticed a pouch in her bag and asked her to these items as excess stocks in her pouch, along with other
open the same.7 When opened, said pouch contained the basic items that she uses during her shift.18 She then put the
following assortment of medical stocks which were pouch inside the lowest drawer of the bedside table in the
subsequently confiscated: (a) Syringe 10cl [4 pieces]; (b) treatment room for use in immediate procedures in case
Syringe 5cl [3 pieces]; (c) Syringe 3cl [3 pieces]; (d) Micropore replenishment of stocks gets delayed. However, on the day of
[1 piece]; (e) Cotton Balls [1 pack]; (f) Neoflon g26 [1 piece]; the incident, she failed to return the pouch inside the
(g) Venofix 25 [2 pieces]; and (h) Gloves [4 pieces] medication drawer upon getting her tri-colored pen and
(questioned items).8 Sanchez asked SG Manzanade if she calculator and, instead, placed it inside her bag. Eventually,
could just return the pouch inside the treatment room; she forgot about the same as she got caught up in work, until
however, she was not allowed to do so.9 Instead, she was it was noticed by the guard on duty on her way out of SMLC's
brought to the SLMC In-House Security Department (IHSD) premises.
where she was directed to write an Incident Report explaining
why she had the questioned items in her possession. 10 She Consequently, Sanchez was placed under preventive
complied11 with the directive and also submitted an undated suspension effective June 3, 2011 until the conclusion of the
handwritten letter of apology12 (handwritten letter) which investigation by SLMC's Employee and Labor Relations
reads as follows: Department (ELRD)19 which, thereafter, required her to
explain why she should not be terminated from service for
To In-House Security, "acts of dishonesty" due to her possession of the questioned
items in violation of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
46 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Discipline.20 In response, she submitted a letter21 dated June filing of a criminal case against Sanchez did not preclude a
13, 2011, which merely reiterated her claims in her previous determination of her serious misconduct, considering that the
May 31, 2011 letter. She likewise requested for a case filing of a criminal case is entirely separate and distinct from
conference,22 which SLMC granted.23 After hearing her side, the determination of just cause for termination of
SLMC, on July 4, 2011, informed Sanchez of its decision to employment.37
terminate her employment effective closing hours of July 6,
2011.24 This prompted her to file a complaint for illegal Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed38 to the NLRC.
dismissal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
07-11042-11. The NLRC Ruling
In her position paper,25 Sanchez maintained her innocence, In a Decision39 dated November 19, 2012, the NLRC reversed
claiming that she had no intention of bringing outside the and set aside the LA ruling, and held that Sanchez was illegally
SLMC's premises the questioned items since she merely dismissed.
inadvertently left the pouch containing them in her bag as
she got caught up in work that day. She further asserted that
The NLRC declared that the alleged violation of Sanchez was a
she could not be found guilty of pilferage since the
unique case, considering that keeping excess hospital stocks
questioned items found in her possession were neither
or "hoarding" was an admitted practice amongst nurses in
SLMC's nor its employees' property. She also stressed the fact
the Pediatric Unit which had been tolerated by SLMC
that SLMC did not file any criminal charges against her. Anent
management for a long time.40 The NLRC held that while
her supposed admission in her handwritten letter, she
Sanchez expressed remorse for her misconduct in her
claimed that she was unassisted by counsel when she
handwritten letter, she manifested that she only "hoarded"
executed the same and, thus, was inadmissible for being
the questioned items for future use in case their medical
unconstitutional.26
supplies are depleted, and not for her personal benefit. 41 It
further held that SLMC failed to establish that Sanchez was
For its part,27 SLMC contended that Sanchez was validly motivated by ill-will when she brought out the questioned
dismissed for just cause as she had committed theft in items, noting: (a) the testimony of SG Manzanade during the
violation of Section 1,28 Rule I of the SLMC Code of conference before the ELRD of Sanchez's demeanor when she
Discipline,29 which punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., robbery, was apprehended, i.e., "[d]i naman siya masyado
theft, pilferage, and misappropriation of funds, with nataranta,"42 and her consequent offer to return the pouch;43
termination from service. and (b) that the said pouch was not hidden underneath the
bag.44 Finally, the NLRC concluded that the punishment of
The LA Ruling dismissal was too harsh and the one
In a Decision30 dated May 27, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) (1) month preventive suspension already imposed
ruled that Sanchez was validly dismissed31 for intentionally on and served by Sanchez was the appropriate
taking the property of SLMC's clients for her own personal penalty.45 Accordingly, the NLRC ordered her
benefit,32 which constitutes an act of dishonesty as provided reinstatement, and the payment of backwages,
under SLMC's Code of Discipline. other benefits, and attorney's fees.46
According to the LA, Sanchez's act of theft was evinced by her Unconvinced, SLMC moved for reconsideration47 which was,
attempt to bring the questioned items that did not belong to however, denied in a Resolution48 dated January 14, 2013.
her out of SLMC's premises; this was found to be analogous Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari49 before the CA.
to serious misconduct which is a just cause to dismiss her. 33
The fact that the items she took were neither SLMC's nor her The CA Ruling
co-employees' property was not found by the LA to be
material since the SLMC Code of Discipline clearly provides
In a Decision50 dated November 21, 2013, the CA upheld the
that acts of dishonesty committed to SLMC, its doctors, its
NLRC, ruling that the latter did not gravely abuse its
employees, as well as its customers, are punishable by a
discretion in finding that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.
penalty of termination from service.34 To this, the LA opined
that "[i]t is rather illogical to distinguish the persons with
It ruled that Sanchez's offense did not qualify as serious
whom the [said] acts may be committed as SLMC is also
misconduct, given that: (a) the questioned items found in her
answerable to the properties of its patients."35 Moreover, the
possession were not SLMC property since said items were
LA observed that Sanchez was aware of SLMC's strict policy
paid for by discharged patients, thus discounting any material
regarding the taking of hospital/medical items as evidenced
or economic damage on SLMC's part; (b) the retention of
by her handwritten letter, 36 but nonetheless committed the
excess medical supplies was an admitted practice amongst
said misconduct. Finally, the LA pointed out that SLMC's non-
47 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
nurses in the Pediatric Unit which was tolerated by SLMC; (c) Article 296.Termination by Employer. - An employer may
it was illogical for Sanchez to leave the pouch in her bag since terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
she would be subjected to a routine inspection; (d) Sanchez's
lack of intention to bring out the pouch was manifested by (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
her composed demeanor upon apprehension and offer to employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his
return the pouch to the treatment room; and (e) had SLMC representative in connection with his work;
honestly believed that Sanchez committed theft or pilferage,
it should have filed the appropriate criminal case, but failed xxxx
to do so.51 Moreover, while the CA recognized that SLMC had
the management prerogative to discipline its erring
Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this
employees, it, however, declared that such right must be
ground, the employer's orders, regulations, or instructions
exercised humanely. As such, SLMC should only impose
must be: (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to
penalties commensurate with the degree of infraction.
the employee, and (3) in connection with the duties which
Considering that there was no indication that Sanchez's
the employee has been engaged to discharge."59
actions were perpetrated for self-interest or for an unlawful
objective, the penalty of dismissal imposed on her was grossly
Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Sanchez
oppressive and disproportionate to her offense. 52
was validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful disregard and
disobedience of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Dissatisfied, SLMC sought for reconsideration,53 but was
Discipline, which reasonably punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e.,
denied in a Resolution54 dated April 4, 2014, hence, this
"theft, pilferage of hospital or co-employee property, x x x or
petition.
its attempt in any form or manner from the hospital, co-
employees, doctors, visitors, [and] customers (external and
The Issue Before the Court internal)" with termination from employment.60 Such act is
obviously connected with Sanchez's work, who, as a staff
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not Sanchez was nurse, is tasked with the proper stewardship of medical
illegally dismissed by SLMC. supplies. Significantly, records show that Sanchez made a
categorical admission61 in her handwritten letter62 - i.e.,
The Court's Ruling "[k]ahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-uwi] ng
gamit"63 - that despite her knowledge of its express
The petition is meritorious. prohibition under the SLMC Code of Discipline, she still
knowingly brought out the subject medical items with her. It
The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of is apt to clarify that SLMC cannot be faulted in construing the
employment, aptly called "management prerogative," gives taking of the questioned items as an act of dishonesty
employers the freedom to regulate, according to their (particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its attempt in any form or
discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, manner) considering that the intent to gain may be
including work assignment, working methods, processes to be reasonably presumed from the furtive taking of useful
followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work property appertaining to another.64 Note that Section 1, Rule
supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal 1 of the SLMC Code of Discipline is further supplemented by
and recall of workers.55 In this light, courts often decline to the company policy requiring the turn-over of excess medical
interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. In supplies/items for proper handling65 and providing a
fact, labor laws discourage interference in employers' restriction on taking and bringing such items out of the SLMC
judgment concerning the conduct of their business.56 premises without the proper authorization or "pass" from the
official concerned,66 which Sanchez was equally aware
thereof.67 Nevertheless, Sanchez failed to turn-over the
Among the employer's management prerogatives is the right
questioned items and, instead, "hoarded" them, as
to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or
purportedly practiced by the other staff members in the
proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide
Pediatric Unit. As it is clear that the company policies subject
certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to
of this case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to
assure that the same would be complied with. At the same
the employee, and evidently connected with the latter's
time, the employee has the corollary duty to obey all
work, the Court concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for a
reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer;
just cause.
and willful or intentional disobedience thereto, as a general
rule, justifies termination of the contract of service and the
dismissal of the employee.57 Article 296 (formerly Article 282) On a related point, the Court observes that there lies no
of the Labor Code provides:58 competent basis to support the common observation of the
NLRC and the CA that the retention of excess medical supplies
was a tolerated practice among the nurses at the Pediatric
48 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Unit. While there were previous incidents of "hoarding," it
appears that such acts were - in similar fashion - furtively
made and the items secretly kept, as any excess items found
in the concerned nurse's possession would have to be
confiscated.68 Hence, the fact that no one was caught and/or
sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not
mean that the so-called "hoarding" practice was tolerated by
SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe the justification behind the
violation of the company rules regarding excess medical
supplies is immaterial since it has been established that an
infraction was deliberately committed.69 Doubtless, the
deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the
employee cannot be countenanced as it may encourage him
or her to do even worse and will render a mockery of the
rules of discipline that employees are required to observe.70
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
49 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
March 13, 2017 Contrary to Law.7
G.R. No. 225965 The prosecution alleged that at around 8:00 to 8:30 in the
morning of March 14, 2009, an informant tipped the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee Caloocan City Police that a certain individual known as alias
vs "Popoy" was selling shabu in Baltazar Street, 10th Avenue,
PUYAT MACAPUNDAG y LABAO, Accused-Appellant Caloocan City. Acting on the tip, Police Chief Inspector (PCI)
Christopher Prangan (PCI Prangan) ordered the conduct of a
DECISION buy-bust operation in coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), with Police Officer 3 (P03)
George Ardedon (P03 Ardedon) designated as poseur-buyer,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO 1) Amel Victoriano (SPOl
Victoriano) and Police Officer 2 (P02) Jeffred Pacis (P02 Pacis),
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-
as back-up officers.8 After the team's final briefing, they
appellant Puyat Macapundag y Labao (Macapundag) assailing
proceeded to the target area where they saw Macapundag,
the Decision2 dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
who was then identified by the informant as "Popoy."
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06224, which affirmed the Joint
Consequently, P03 Ardedon approached Macapundag and
Decision3 dated June 13, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of
retorted "Brod, pakuha," followed by "Brod, paiskor naman."
Caloocan City, Branch 127 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 81014 and
Macapundag replied "Magkano?," to which P03 Ardedon
81015, finding Macapundag guilty beyond reasonable doubt
responded "Tatlong piso fang," and simultaneously handed
of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
the three (3) marked ₱l00.00 bills. Macapundag then took
(RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
four (4) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance,
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
gave one to P03 Ardedon, and returned the other three (3)
back to his pocket. Upon receiving the sachet, P03 Ardedon
The Facts gave the pre-arranged signal by holding his nape and then
held Macapundag, as the back-up officers rushed to the
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed scene. P03 Ardedon marked the plastic sachet he purchased
before the RTC accusing Macapundag of violating Sections 5 from Macapundag, while SPO 1 Victoriano marked the other
and 11, Article II of RA 9165, viz.: three (3) recovered from his pocket.9
Criminal Case No. 81014 Thereafter, they brought Macapundag to the police station,
where the seized items were turned over to P02 Randulfo
That on or about the 14th day of March, 2009 in Caloocan Hipolito (P02 Hipolito), the investigator on duty.10 Later, P02
City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Hipolito brought the items to the crime laboratory for
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without physical examination.11 Eventually, Forensic Chemical
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver to P0[3] GEORGE ARDEDON5 who Officer-PC! Stella Ebuen (PCI Ebuen) examined the specimen,
posed, as buyer, EPHEDRINE weighing 0.01 gram, a dangerous which tested positive for ephedrine, a dangerous drug.12
drug, without the corresponding license or prescription
therefore, knowing the same to be such. In his defense, Macapundag denied the charges against him.
He testified that he was arrested on March 12, 2009, and not
Contrary to Law.6 on March 14, 2009 as alleged by the prosecution. At around
noon of the said date, he claimed that he was just sitting in
Criminal Case No. 81015 his house when three (3) armed men suddenly entered and
looked for a certain "Rei." He told them that "Rei" lived in the
That on or about the 14th day of March, 2009 in Caloocan other house, but one of the men held and handcuffed him.
City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this He was then brought to the Sangandaan Police Station where
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without he was detained in a small cell. Later, he was asked to call
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and some relatives. When he replied that he only has his
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control three daughter, SPO 1 Victoriano hit him on the chest. After a few
(3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing days, the police demanded ₱50,000.00 from Macapundag's
daughter for his release. When he told them that he did not
EPHEDRINE weighing 0.02 gram, 0.01 gram & 0.02 gram, have that amount, he was hit again. On March 15, 2009, he
when subjected for laboratory examination gave positive was brought to the house of the fiscal for inquest. 13
result to the tests of Ephedrine [sic], a dangerous drug.
The RTC Ruling
50 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In a Joint Decision14 dated June 13, 2013, the RTC found Macapundag was charged with illegal sale and illegal
Macapundag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11,
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, for illegal sale and Article II of RA 9165.1avvphi1 In order to secure the
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively, finding conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of
that all the necessary elements thereof have been proven. In dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove the: (a) identity
particular, the prosecution was able to establish that P03 of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
Ardedon indeed purchased a sachet of ephedrine from and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment.23 On the
Macapundag in the amount of ₱300.00. Likewise, it was other hand, the prosecution must establish the following
shown that three (3) other sachets of ephedrine were elements to convict an accused charged with illegal
recovered from Macapundag upon his arrest. 15 The RTC possession of dangerous drugs: (a) the accused was in
further observed that the prosecution was able to possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous
demonstrate an unbroken chain of custody over the seized drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c)
items.16 Meanwhile, the RTC gave no credence to the latter's the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 24
defenses of denial and alibi in light of his positive
identification as the culprit, as well as the presumption of Notably, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug
regularity accorded to police officers in the performance of be established beyond reasonable doubt. In order to obviate
their duties.17 any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous
drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of
Aggrieved, Macapundag elevated his conviction before the custody over the same. It must be able to account for each
CA.18 link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the
moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence
The CA Ruling of the corpus delicti.25
In a Decision19 dated April 22, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC In the Appellant's Brief,26 Macapundag prayed for his
Decision in toto, finding that the prosecution had established acquittal in view of the police officers' non-compliance with
beyond reasonable doubt that Macapundag illegally sold and Section 21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and
possessed dangerous drugs in violation of Sections 5 and 11, Regulations (IRR). Particularly, he claims that they did not
Article II of RA 9165. In the same vein, the CA found that the make any inventory and failed to take pictures of the
integrity of the seized drugs was aptly preserved and the confiscated drugs along with him at the scene of his arrest.
chain of custody was not broken, notwithstanding the fact There was also no justification given as to why they failed to
that the procedural requirements in Section 21 of RA 9165 comply with these requirements of law.27
were not faithfully observed.20
The appeal is meritorious.
Hence, the instant appeal.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody
The Issue Before the Court rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in
handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not and evidentiary value.28 Under the said section, the
Macapundag's conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and
of dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized under Sections confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph
5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld. the seized items in the presence of the accused or the
person from whom the items were seized, his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
The Court's Ruling
and the Department of Justice, and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal
inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized
cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of
drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory
the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors
within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
examination.29
unassigned.21 The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that P03
to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
Ardedon (with respect to the sachet handed over by
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
Macapundag to him) and SPOl Victoriano (with respect to the
penal law.22
three sachets recovered from Macapundag upon his arrest)
marked the seized items immediately at the place of arrest.
However, the prosecution's witnesses failed to state whether
51 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
or not the police officers inventoried and photographed the ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
seized sachets in the presence of Macapundag or his suspects.42
representative. Likewise, they were silent as to the presence
of the other required witnesses, i.e., a representative from With the foregoing pronouncement, the Court finds
the Department of Justice (DOJ), any elected public official, petitioner's acquittal in order. As such, it is unnecessary to
and a member of the press.30 In fact, the prosecution did not delve into the other issues raised in this case.
even offer any inventory of the seized items or photographs
thereof as evidence.31 In this relation, it is observed that the WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
Evidence Acknowledgement Receipt32 and the Affidavit of April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
Attestation,33 which form part of the evidence of the 06224 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
prosecution, likewise failed to disclose that the seized items petitioner Puyat Macapundag y Labao is ACQUITTED of the
were actually inventoried or photographed in accordance crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
with the parameters provided by Section 21 of RA 9165 and ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being
its IRR; thus, their submission cannot constitute compliance lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
with the law.
SO ORDERED.
In People v. Sanchez,34the Court recognized that under varied
field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Section 21 of 9165 may not always be possible, and ruled that
Associate Justice
under the implementing guidelines of the said Section, "non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
of and custody over said items." However, the Court added
that the prosecution bears the burden of proving justifiable
cause.35
G.R. No. 174113 In a Decision7 dated December 7, 2000, the RTC found Cheng
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa
PAZ CHENG y CHU, Petitioner, vs. and, accordingly, sentenced her as follows: (a) for the first
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day
DECISION to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to
eight (8) years of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period (maximum); (b) for
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
the second count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to one
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
(1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision
Decision2 dated March 28, 2006 and the Resolution3 dated
correccional in its minimum and medium periods to six (6)
June 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8)
24871, which affirmed the conviction of petitioner Paz Cheng
years of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
y Chu (Cheng) for three (3) counts of the crime of Estafa
mayor in its minimum period (maximum); and (c) for the third
defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
Penal Code (RPC).
ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year,
eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional
The Facts in its minimum and medium periods to four (4) years, two (2)
months, and one (1) day to five (5) years, five (5) months, and
The instant case arose from the filing of three (3) separate ten (10) days of prision correccional in its maximum period to
Informations4 charging Cheng of the crime of Estafa defined prision mayor in its minimum period (minimum).8
and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226 (RTC), The RTC found that the prosecution has sufficiently proven
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75440, Q-98-75441 and through documentary and testimonial evidence that: (a)
Q-98-75442. According to the prosecution, private complaint Rodriguez indeed gave Cheng several pieces of jewelry for the
"Rowena Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and Cheng entered into an latter- to either sell and remit the proceeds or to return said
agreement whereby Rodriguez shall deliver pieces of jewelry jewelry if unsold to the former; and (b) Cheng neither
to Cheng for the latter to sell on commission basis. After one returned the jewelry nor remitted their proceeds to
month, Cheng is obliged to either: (a) remit the proceeds of Rodriguez within the specified period despite the latter's
the sold jewelry; or (b) return the unsold jewelry to the demands. In contrast, Cheng failed to substantiate her claims
former. On different dates (i.e., July 12, 1997, July 16, 1997, through the documentary evidence she presented while her
and August 12, 1997), Rodriguez delivered various sets of testimony was deemed to be incredible and not worthy of
jewelry to Cheng in the respective amounts of P18,000.00, belief.9
P36,000.00, and P257,950.00. Upon delivery of the last batch
of jewelry, Cheng issued a check worth P120,000.00 as full
Aggrieved, Cheng appealed10 to the CA.
security for the first two (2) deliveries and as partial security
for the last. When Cheng failed to remit the proceeds or to
The CA Ruling
return the unsold jewelry on due date, Rodriguez presented
the check to the bank for encashment, but was dishonored
due to insufficient funds. Upon assurance of Cheng, In a Decision11 dated March 28, 2006, the CA affirmed
Rodriguez re-deposited the check, but again, the same was Cheng's conviction for three (3) counts of Estafa, with
dishonored because the drawee account had been closed. modification as to the penalties, as follows: (a) for the first
Rodriguez then decided to confront Cheng, who then uttered count of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is
"Akala mo, babayaran pa kita?" Thus, Rodriguez was P257,950.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
constrained to file the instant charges. 5 imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) for
In defense, Cheng denied receiving any jewelry from
the second count of Estafa where the amount
Rodriguez or signing any document purporting to be
misappropriated is P36,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer
contracts of sale of jewelry, asserting that Rodriguez is a
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of
usurious moneylender. She then admitted having an unpaid
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
loan with Rodriguez and that she issued a check to serve as
minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as maximum;
security for the same, but was nevertheless surprised of her
and (c) for the third count of Estafa where the amount
arrest due to the latter's filing of Estafa charges against her.6
misappropriated is Pl8,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer
53 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as another, money, goods or any other personal property
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
days of prision mayor, as maximum.12 administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though
The CA agreed with the RTC's findings that the prosecution such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
had sufficiently established Cheng's guilt beyond reasonable or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
doubt, pointing out that Rodriguez's testimony was "'more property;
candid, credible and straightforward and that 'her demeanor
in the witness stand is worthy of belief" as opposed to that of xxxx
Cheng which is highly self-serving and uncorroborated.13
Further, the CA found that a modification of Cheng's penalties The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows: (1)
is in order to conform with prevailing law and jurisprudence the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal
on the matter.14 property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to
Undaunted, Cheng moved for reconsideration15 but was return, the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by the
denied in a Resolution16 dated June 26, 2006; hence, this offender of the money or property received, or denial of
petition. receipt of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation,
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4)
The Issue Before the Court demand by the offended party that the offender return the
money or property received.17 In the case of Pamintuan v.
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the People,18 the Court had the opportunity to elucidate further
CA correctly affirmed Cheng's conviction for three counts of on the essence of the aforesaid crime, as well as the proof
Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the needed to sustain a conviction for the same, to wit:
RPC.
The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the appropriation or
The Court's Ruling conversion of money or property received to the prejudice
of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words
"convert" and "misappropriate" connote the act of using or
The petition is without merit. Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC
disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of
states:
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed
upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.
punished by: In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a
legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; whereabouts.19 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
In this case, a judicious review of the case records reveals
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
that the elements of Estafa, as defined and penalized by the
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
afore-cited provision, are present, considering that: (a)
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
Rodriguez delivered the jewelry to Cheng for the purpose of
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
selling them on commission basis; (b) Cheng was required to
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
either remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the jewelry
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
after one month from delivery; (c) Cheng failed to do what
may be[.]
was required of her despite the lapse of the aforesaid period;
(d) Rodriguez attempted to encash the check given by Cheng
xxxx as security, but such check was dishonored twice for being
drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account;
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: (e) Rodriguez demanded that Cheng comply with her
undertaking, but the latter disregarded such demand; (j)
xxxx Cheng's acts clearly prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the
jewelry and/or its value.
54 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In a desperate attempt to absolve herself from liability, Cheng of the sale of jewelry - albeit deficient - by presenting it for
insists that Rodriguez admitted in her own testimony that the encashment on October 20, 1997, or more than two (2)
transaction between them is not an agency on commission months after the delivery of the last batch of jewelry. 22
basis, but a plain sale of jewelry with Rodriguez as the seller However, the check was dishonored for being drawn against
and Cheng as the buyer.1âwphi1 As such, Cheng's non- insufficient funds.23 This notwithstanding and with the
payment of the purchase price of the jewelry would only give assurance from Cheng that the check will be cleared,
rise to civil liability and not criminal liability.20 The pertinent Rodriguez presented such check for the second time on
portion of Rodriguez's testimony is as follows: November 4, 1997; but it .was again dishonored - this time
for being drawn against a closed account.24 As such, the fact
Q. After the delivery of these several items totaling that Rodriguez loosely used the words "payment" and "paid"
P257,950.00, what happened next? should not be taken against her and should not in any way
change the nature of her transactions with Rodriguez from an
A. She issued a check worth P120,000.00. agency on a commission basis to a full-fledged sale.
Moreover, even Cheng does not consider such check as
payment for the jewelry, but rather, as security for the loan
Q. What check is that?
she allegedly obtained from Rodriguez.
A. PDCP Bank, sir.
Indisputably, there is no reason to deviate from the findings
of the RTC and the CA as they have fully considered the
Q. What is this check for, Ms. Witness?
evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and
they have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary
A. As payment for the first and second transactions, sir, for reasons in concluding that Cheng is indeed guilty beyond
Pl8,000.00 and P36,000.00 and the excess amount is applied reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa by
for the third transaction. misappropriation defined and penalized under Article 315 (1)
(b) of the RPC. It is settled that factual findings of the RTC,
xxxx when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and
respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive
Q. So, all in all, you have sixty (60) days period with respect to when supported by the evidence on record,25 as in this case.
this item, and the first delivery expired I am referring to July
12, 1997 worth P18,000.00 which will mature on September WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
11, so, from September 11, what happened? March 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24871 are hereby
A. These were considered paid because she issued me a AFFIRMED.
check for the period of August 13, so I was expecting that. 21
(Emphases and underscoring supplied) Accordingly, petitioner Paz Cheng y Chu is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa defined and penalized
Essentially, Cheng posits that since Rodriguez "admitted" in under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and is
her testimony that the check issued by the former in the SENTENCED as follows: (a) for the first count of Estafa where
amount of Pl20,000.00 constituted full payment for the first the amount misappropriated is P257,950.00, Cheng is
and second batch of jewelry and partial payment for the last sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
batch, the transactions entered into by the parties should be indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months of
deemed in the nature of a sale. prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) for the second count of
Cheng is sadly mistaken. Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P36,000.00,
Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
The foregoing "admission" on the part of Rodriguez did not an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
change the fact that her transactions with Cheng should be of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of
properly deemed as an agency on a commission basis prision mayor, as maximum; and (c) for the third count of
whereby Rodriguez, as the owner of the jewelry, is the Estafa where the amount misappropriated is Pl 8,000.00,
principal, while Cheng is the agent who is tasked to sell the Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
same on commission. In the eyes of the Court, Rodriguez an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
merely accepted the check as full security for the first and of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
second batches of jewelry and as partial security for the last months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
batch. It was only when Cheng defaulted in her undertaking SO ORDERED.
pursuant to their agreement that Rodriguez was constrained
to treat the check as the former's remittance of the proceeds
55 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 201892 JULY 22, 2015 "representing the balance of the agreed financial obligation
of [his] father to [petitioner]." 13 After learning of the January
NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Petitioner, 30, 1998 Decision, respondent refused to pay the amount
vs. covered by the subject PN despite demands, prompting
MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, Respondent. petitioner to file a complaint 14 for sum of money and
damages before the court a quo on July 2, 1998, docketed as
DECISION Civil Case No. 98-0156 (collection case).
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Respondent filed his answer, 15 contending that petitioner has
no cause of action against him. He averred that he has fully
settled Rafael's obligation and that he committed a mistake in
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
paying more than the amount due under the loan, i.e., the
Decision2 dated November 4, 2011 and the Resolution 3 dated
amount of ₱229,200.00 as adjudged by the RTC-Imus in the
May 14, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
judicial foreclosure case which, thus, warranted the return of
81258 which recalled and set aside the Orders dated
the excess payment. He therefore prayed for the dismissal of
November 3, 2003 4 and January 14, 2004 5 of the Regional
the complaint, and interposed a compulsory counterclaim for
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 202 (court a quo) in
the release of the mortgage, the return of the excess
Civil Case No. 980156, and reinstated the Decision 6 dated
payment, and the payment of moral and exemplary damages,
August 28, 2003 directing petitioner Norlinda S. Marilag
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. 16
(petitioner) to return to respondent Marcelino B. Martinez
(respondent) the latter's excess payment, plus interest, and
to pay attorney's fees and the costs of suit. The Court A Quo's Ruling
The Facts In a Decision 17 dated August 28, 2003 (August 28, 2003
Decision), the court a quo denied recovery on the subject PN.
It found that the consideration for its execution was Rafael's
On July 30, 1992, Rafael Martinez (Rafael), respondent's
indebtedness to petitioner, the extinguishment of which
father, obtained- from petitioner a loan in the amount of
necessarily results in the consequent extinguishment of the
₱160,000.00, with a stipulated monthly interest of five
cause therefore. Considering that the RTC-Imus had adjudged
percent ( 5% ), payable within a period of (6) months. The
Rafael liable to petitioner only for the amount of
loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
₱229,200.00, for which a total of ₱400,000.00 had already
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
been paid, the court a quo found no valid or compelling
208400. Rafael failed'. to settle his obligation upon maturity
reason to allow petitioner to recover further on the subject
and despite repeated demands, prompting petitioner to file a
PN. There being an excess payment of Pl 71,000.00, it
Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
declared that a quasi-contract (in the concept of solution
before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90 7 (RTC-lmus) on
indebiti) exists between the parties and, accordingly, directed
November 10, 1995, 8 docketed as Civil Case No. 1208-95
petitioner to return the said amount to respondent, plus 6%
(judicial foreclosure case).
interest p.a.18 reckoned from the date of judicial demand 19
on August 6, 1998 until fully paid, and to pay attorney's fees
Rafael failed to file his answer and, upon petitioner's motion,
and the costs of suit. 20
was declared in default. After an ex parte presentation of
petitioner's evidence, the RTC-lmus issued a Decision 9 dated
In an Order 21 dated November 3, 2003 (November 3, 2003
January 30, 1998, (January 30, 1998 Decision) in the
Order), however, the court a quo granted petitioner's motion
foreclosure case, declaring the stipulated 5% monthly interest
for reconsideration, and recalled and set aside its August 28,
to be usurious and reducing the same to 12% per annum
2003 Decision. It declared that the causes of action in the
(p.a.). Accordingly, it ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the
collection and foreclosure cases are distinct, and
amount of ₱229,200.00, consisting of the principal of
respondent's failure to comply with his obligation under the
₱160,000.00 and accrued interest of ₱59,200.00 from July 30,
subject PN justifies petitioner to seek judicial relief. It further
1992 to September 30, 1995. 10 Records do not show that this
opined that the stipulated 5% monthly interest is no longer
Decision had already attained finality.
usurious and is binding on respondent considering the
suspension of the Usury Law pursuant to Central Bank
Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision,
Circular 905, series of 1982. Accordingly, it directed
respondent agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to petitioner
respondent to pay the amount of ₱289,000.00 due under the
which was pegged at ₱689,000.00. After making a total subject PN, plus interest at the legal rate reckoned from the
payment of ₱400,000.00,11 he executed a promissory note 12
last extra judicial demand on May 15, 1998, until fully paid, as
dated February 20, 1998 (subject PN), binding himself to pay
well as attorney's fees and the costs of suit.22
on or before March 31, 1998 the amount of ₱289,000.00,
56 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 23 of parties and singularity of the causes of action in the
which was denied in an Order 24 dated January 14, 2004, foreclosure and collection cases, such that the prior
prompting him to elevate the matter to the CA. 25 foreclosure case barred petitioner's recourse to the
subsequent collection case.
The CA Ruling
To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a ground for the
In a Decision 26 dated November 4, 2011, the CA recalled and dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation where in
set aside the court a quo 's November 3, 2003 and January another action is pending; between the same parties for the
14, 2004 Orders, and reinstated the August 28, 2003 Decision. same cause of action, such that the second action becomes
It held that the doctrine of res judicata finds application in the unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to
instant case, 27 considering that both the judicial foreclosure be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity
and collection cases were filed as a consequence of the non- of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
payment of Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation interests in both actions; ( b) identity of rights asserted and
secured by the real estate mortgage and the primary relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
consideration for the execution of the subject PN. Since res and ( c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such
judicata only requires substantial, not actual, identity of that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless
causes of action and/or identity of issue, 28 it ruled that the of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in
judgment in the judicial foreclosure case relating to Rafael's the other. 31 The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the
obligation to petitioner is final and conclusive on the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than
collection case. once regarding the same subject matter and for the same
cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a that the same subject matter should not be the subject of
Resolution 29 dated May 14, 2012; hence, this petition. controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible
conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the
stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid
The Issue before the Court
the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. 32
Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as
not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the
the whole cause must be determined in one action.33To be
dismissal of the collection case.
sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping
by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action,
The Court's Ruling but with different prayers, where the ~round of dismissal is
litis pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).34
The petition lacks merit.
In this relation, it must be noted that the question of whether
A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the a cause of action is single and entire or separate is not always
following elements concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar easy to determine and the same must often be resolved, not
the new action must be final; ( b) the decision must have by the general rules, but by reference to the facts and
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject circumstances of the particular case. The true rule, therefore,
matter and the parties; (c) the disposition of the case must be is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same
a judgment on the merits; and ( d) there must be as between act or contract which must, thus, be sued for in one action, or
the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, the several parts arise from distinct and different acts or
and causes of action.30 contracts, for which a party may maintain separate suits.35
After a punctilious review of the records, the Court finds the In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule
principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to the present is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action
case. This is because the records are bereft of any indication against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt,
that the August 28, 2003 Decision in the judicial foreclosure through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of
case had already attained finality, evidenced, for instance, by money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the
a copy of the entry of judgment in the said case. Accordingly, mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, 36 not
with the very first element of res judicata missing, said cumulative or successive, 37 and each remedy is complete by
principle cannot be made to obtain. itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the
real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection
This notwithstanding, the Court holds that petitioner's of the unpaid debt,38 except only for the recovery of
prosecution of the collection case was barred, instead, by the whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation
principle of litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity of the debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the
57 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
public auction sale of the mortgaged properties. 39 categorically PROMISE, UNDERTAKE and bind myself in behalf
Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is of my father, to pay to Miss NORLINDA S. MARILAG,
established that the mortgaged property was sold at public Mortgagee-Creditor of my said father, the sum of TWO
auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation. HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND PESOS (₱289,000.00),
Philippine Currency, on or before MARCH 31, 1998,
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor- representing the balance of the agreed financial obligation of
mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial foreclosure my said father to her. (Emphases supplied)
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in
order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing Executed at Pamplona I, Las Piñas City, Metro Manila, this
discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse 20th day of February, 1998.
to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of
the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis Sgd.
pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ
pending as it was not shown to have attained finality. Promissory 44
While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the Petitioner's contention that the judicial foreclosure and
promissory note executed by respondent who was not the collection cases enforce independent rights 45 must,
original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and therefore, fail because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 46
distinct contract of loan which would have given rise to a and the subject PN both refer to one and the same obligation,
separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are i.e., Rafael's loan obligation. As such, there exists only one
bereft of any indication that respondent's agreement to pay cause of action for a single breach of that obligation.
Rafael's loan obligation and the execution of the subject PN Petitioner cannot split her cause of action on Rafael's unpaid
extinguished by novation 40 the contract of loan between loan obligation by filing a petition for the judicial foreclosure
Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or of the real estate mortgage covering the said loan, and,
any act of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation thereafter, a personal action for the collection of the unpaid
is never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally balance of said obligation not comprising a deficiency arising
shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the from foreclosure, without violating the proscription against
old one, the parties to a contract must expressly agree that splitting a single cause of action, where the ground for
they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one, 41 dismissal is either res judicata or litis pendentia, as in this
which was not shown here. case.
On the contrary, it is significant to point out that: (a) the As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach
consideration for the subject PN was the same consideration Motor Co., Inc. v. lcaranga!.47
that supported the original loan obligation of Rafael; (b)
respondent merely assumed to pay Rafael's remaining unpaid For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor
balance in the latter's behalf, i.e., as Rafael's agent or has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single
representative; 42 and (c) the subject PN was executed after cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with
respondent had assumed to pay Rafael's obligation and made execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his
several payments thereon. Case law states that the fact that action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and
the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who has the foreclosure · of his mortgage. But both demands arise
assumed the obligation, will result merely in the addition of from the same cause, the nonpayment of the debt, and, for
debtors, not novation, and the creditor may enforce the that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though
obligation against both debtors. 43 for ready reference, the the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements,
subject PN reads in full: the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one
and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one
February 20, 1998 cause of action for a single breach of that obligation.
Plaintiff.then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split
PROMISSORY NOTE up his single cause of action by filing a complaint (or payment
of the debt, and thereafter another complaint (or foreclosure
₱289, 000.00 of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint
=========== will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to
file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively,
I, MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ son of Mr. RAFAEL MARTINEZ, of one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his
legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of No. 091 Anabu I- mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress
A, Imus, Cavite, by these presents do hereby specifically and for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts
58 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor. percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous,
(Emphases and underscoring supplied) unconscionable, and exorbitant. While Central Bank Circular
No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively
Further on the point, the fact that no foreclosure sale appears removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and
to have been conducted is of no moment because the unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said
remedy of foreclosure of mortgage is deemed chosen upon circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche
the filing of the complaint there for.48 In Suico Rattan & Buri authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which
Interiors, Inc. v. CA, 49 it was explained: would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets. Since the stipulation on the
x x x x In sustaining the rule that prohibits mortgage creditors interest rate is void for being contrary to morals, if not
from pursuing both the remedies of a personal action for against the law, it is as if there was no express contract on
debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, the Court said interest rate; thus, the interest rate may be reduced as
held in the case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Esteban reason and equity demand. (Emphases supplied)
Icarangal, et al. that a rule which would authorize the plaintiff
to bring a personal action against the debtor and As such, the stipulated 5% monthly interest should be
simultaneously or successively another action against the equitably reduced to l % per month or 12% p.a. reckoned
mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of from the execution of the real estate mortgage on July 30,
suits so offensive to justice and obnoxious to law and equity, 1992. In order to determine whether there was any
but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being overpayment as claimed by respondent, we first compute the
sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the interest until January 30, 1998 55 when he made a payment in
plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies. the amount of ₱300,000.00 on Rafael's loan obligation.
Hence, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit Accordingly, the amount due on the loan as of the latter date
for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action is hereby computed as follows:
for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, Principal ₱160,000.00
such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor
upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but Add: Interest from 07/30/1992 to
with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is 01/30/1998
to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. (Emphases supplied) (₱160, 000.00 x 12% x 5.5 yrs.) 105,600.00
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M.PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
60 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 169461 September 2, 2013 examine the latter’s witnesses. Without any objection from
the former, all exhibits offered by petitioner were admitted
FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, by the RTC. Meanwhile, respondent did not present any
vs. evidence to contradict petitioner’s application.9
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: In a Decision10 dated February 28, 2001, the RTC granted
petitioner’s application for the registration of the subject lots.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the It found that petitioner was able to substantiate its bona fide
Decision2 dated December 6, 2004 and Resolution3 dated claim of ownership over the subject lots as it was shown,
August 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP inter alia, that: (a) petitioner purchased Lot No. 1298 from its
No. 67635 which annulled and set aside the Decision 4 dated previous owner, Pio Benito Aguado, by virtue of a Deed of
February 28, 2001 and Amended Order5 dated September 4, Absolute Sale dated March 23, 1995, while Lot No. 1315 was
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 3 purchased from its previous owner, Glenn Manipis, as per
(RTC) in Land Reg. Case No. N-1554 (LRA Rec. No. N-69624), Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 2, 1995; (b) petitioner
setting aside the final decree of registration issued in favor of and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, peaceful,
petitioner First Gas Power Corporation (petitioner) over the continuous, public, and uninterrupted possession of the
parcels of land subject of this case. subject lots even before 1945; and (c) the subject lots had
already been declared for taxation purposes under the name
The Facts of petitioner and the corresponding realty taxes have been
equally paid by it.11 Finding petitioner’s application to be well-
founded and fully substantiated by evidence sufficient under
Through a Petition dated April 17, 1998 filed before the RTC,
the law, the RTC directed the registration of the subject lots
petitioner sought for the original registration of two parcels
in favor of petitioner and the issuance of the corresponding
of land situated at Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City, denominated
decree by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) upon finality
as Lot Nos. 1298 and 1315 (subject lots), both of Cad. 264 of
of its decision.12
the Batangas Cadastre, which consist of 4,155 and 968 square
meters, respectively.6 The case was docketed as Land Reg.
Case No. N-1554 (LRA Rec. No.N-69624) and, as a matter of On July 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion
course, was called for initial hearing. No oppositor appeared (manifestation with motion), manifesting to the RTC the
during the said hearing except Prosecutor Amelia Panganiban existence of an LRA Report dated November 24, 1998 (LRA
who appeared in behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General Report) which states that the subject lots were previously
(respondent). Consequently, the RTC issued the applied for registration and were both decided under
corresponding Order of Special Default and the reception of Cadastral Case No. 37 (Cad. Case No. 37) and, in this regard,
evidence was delegated to the Branch Clerk of Court.7 moved that the aforesaid decision be set aside. The said
manifestation with motion reads in part:
For land registration purposes, the subject lots were both
investigated and inspected separately by Special Land 2. LRA Record Book of Cadastral Lots on file in this Authority
Investigator Rodolfo A. Fernandez and Forester I Loida Y. shows that lots 1298 and 1315, Cad. 264, Batangas Cadastre
Maglinao of the Department of Environment and Natural were previously applied for registration of title in the
Resources (DENR) CENRO of Batangas City. Based on their Cadastral proceedings and were both decided under
findings, the subject lots are within the alienable and Cadastral Case No. 37, GLRO Record No. 1696, and are
disposable zone under project no. 13, lc map no. 718 issued subject of the following annotation, to quote:
on March 16, 1928. Also, in a letter dated January 18, 1999
from Robert C. Pangyarihan, Chief of the Surveys Division of "Lots 1298 (45-1)
the DENR Region IV – Land Management Sector, copy 1315 (61-1) Pte.De Nueva doc."
furnished the RTC, it is stated that the subject lots are not
portion of/nor identical to any approved isolated survey. 8 xxxx
During the reception of evidence, the government, through WHEREFORE, to avoid duplication in the issuance of titles
respondent, was given the opportunity to examine the covering the same parcels of land, the foregoing is
authenticity of the documents presented by petitioner in respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court with the
support of its application for land registration as well as cross- recommendation that x x x should the instant application be
61 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
granted, an order be issued setting aside the decision in the further informed the CA that decrees of registration had
cadastral proceeding with respect to lots 1298 and 1315, already been issued for the subject lots.20 In view of these
Cad[.] 264, under Cad. Case No. 37.13 (Emphasis and considerations, the CA proceeded and ruled that petitioner
underscoring supplied) should have raised in its application for registration the
existence of a decision in Cad. Case No. 37 as it is required to
In the same pleading, petitioner maintained its prayer for the prove its absolute ownership over the same and that no
issuance of a decree of registration in its favor.14 controversy regarding the matter of its ownership exists.21
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Amended Order15 dated Moreover, the CA pronounced that the RTC’s Amended Order
September 4, 2001, (a) setting aside any decision affecting which set aside the decision in Cad. Case No. 37 was in utter
the subject lots in Cad. Case No. 37 in view of petitioner’s disregard of the policy of judicial stability, stating further that
manifestation and motion and upon the LRA’s only the CA can annul judgments of the RTC. 22 Finally, the CA
recommendation; and (b) reiterating the issuance of the held that it was erroneous for the RTC to direct the issuance
corresponding decree of registration in favor of petitioner of the corresponding certificate of titles without determining
due to the finality of the RTC Decision, to wit: the bearing of the previous decision in Cad. Case No. 37 to
petitioner as the applicant.23
In view of the Manifestation and Motion filed by the
applicant thru counsel and upon recommendation of the Land Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration which was,
Registration Authority in its Report dated November 24, 1998 however, denied in a Resolution dated August 23, 2005. 24
together with the letter dated June 18, 1999 from Robert C. Hence, this petition.
Pangyarihan, Chief Survey[s] Division, DENR, Region IV, Land
Management Sector, stating that Lots 1298 and 1315 are not The Issue Before the Court
portion of/nor identical to any approved isolated survey, this
Court hereby sets aside any decision in the cadastral The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred
proceedings for Lots 1298 and 1315, Cad. 264, under Case No. in annulling and setting aside the RTC Decision and Amended
37, and hereby reiterates that the Land Registration Authority Order as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor
may now issue the corresponding decree of registration and of petitioner over the subject lots.
certificate of title as stated in the Decision dated February 28,
2001 which had attained finality. This amends the Order The Court’s Ruling
dated August 6, 2001.
The petition is bereft of merit.
SO ORDERED.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
It is a long-standing rule that an applicant who seeks to have
Claiming that the RTC’s Amended Order was tainted with a land registered in his name has the burden of proving that
grave abuse of discretion, respondent filed a petition for he is its owner in fee simple, even though there is no
certiorari (certiorari petition) before the CA which was opposition thereto. As held in Republic v. Lee:25
initially denied due course on November 26, 2001. Upon
reconsideration, the CA admitted respondent’s certiorari
The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no
petition and directed petitioner to file its comment thereto.
person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral
The parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. 17
or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the
same, even though there is no opposition presented against
The CA Ruling such registration by third persons. x x x In order that the
petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to
In a Decision18 dated December 6, 2004, the CA granted have the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting
respondent’s certiorari petition and thereby, annulled and set from the certificate of title, finally, issued, the burden is upon
aside the RTC Decision and Amended Order as well as the him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee
final decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner over simple."26 (Citation omitted)
the subject lots.1âwphi1
In this case, records disclose that petitioner itself manifested
At the outset, it noted that while the issue of the propriety of during the proceedings before the RTC that there subsists a
setting aside the decision in Cad. Case No. 37 was raised, the decision in a previous cadastral case, i.e., Cad. Case No. 37,
CA was not furnished a copy of the said decision. Thus, in a which covers the same lots it applied for registration.
Resolution dated September 30, 2004, it directed the LRA to Petitioner even posits in the present petition that it was
submit a copy of the same and, in relation thereto, the LRA apprised of the existence of the foregoing decision even
submitted a certification of status and certification of non- before the rendition of the RTC Decision and Amended Order
availability of the record for the subject lots. 19 The LRA through the LRA Report dated as early as November 24, 1998
62 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
which, as above-quoted, states that the subject lots "were the sound discretion by the judge (or the CA) as guided by all
previously applied for registration of title in the [c]adastral the attendant circumstances,33 as in this case.
proceedings and were both decided under [Cad. Case No. 37,
GLRO Record No. 1969, and are subject to the following Indeed, the Court can only commiserate with petitioner as it
annotation x x x: ‘Lots 1298 (45-1) [and] 1315 (61-1) Pte. has already gone through the rigors of proving its cause
Nueva doc.’"27 Since it had been duly notified of an existing before the RTC only to fall short of its ultimate objective. Yet,
decision which binds over the subject lots, it was incumbent the Court’s duty to uphold the principles of law and
upon petitioner to prove that the said decision would not jurisprudential pronouncements as herein discussed remains
affect its claimed status as owner of the subject lots in fee staunch and unyielding. Definitively, the Court cannot
simple. sanction the registration of the subject lots when there
stands an existing decision binding over the same. Neither
To note, the fact that the RTC did not order petitioner to can the Court allow the RTC to set aside the ruling of a co-
address the matter or that it did not properly determine the equal and coordinate court. Based on these reasons, the
effects of the existing decision to petitioner’s application does Court is therefore constrained to sustain the nullification of
not justify the latter’s entitlement to have the subject lots the RTC Decision and Amended Order as well as the final
registered in its name. Neither can the recommendation of decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner. Notably,
the LRA to have the case set aside be perceived as an ample this course of action is without prejudice to the re-filing of
justification for the RTC’s dispositions since this action is another application for registration wherein petitioner can
precluded by the doctrine of judicial stability as will be prove, among others, that the decision in Cad. Case No. 37
discussed below. These missteps just magnify the patent and does not affect its title to the subject lots. Petitioner may also
gross errors of the RTC in these proceedings. choose to pursue any other remedy available to it under the
law.
Further, as the CA correctly pointed out, land registration
proceedings are in rem in nature and, hence, by virtue of the In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it unnecessary to
publication requirement, all claimants and occupants of the delve into the other ancillary issues raised before it.
subject property are deemed to be notified of the existence
of a cadastral case involving the subject lots.28 In this regard, WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
petitioner cannot, therefore, take refuge on the lack of any Decision dated December 6, 2004 and the Resolution dated
personal knowledge on its part previous to its application. August 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
Case law dictates that a cadastral proceeding is one in rem 67635 are hereby AFFIRMED.
and binds the whole world.29 Under this doctrine, parties are
precluded from re-litigating the same issues already SO ORDERED.
determined by final judgment.30
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Moreover, as amply addressed by the CA, the RTC’s Amended Associate Justice
Order was issued in violation of the doctrine of judicial
stability. This doctrine states that the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any
court of concurrent jurisdiction.31 The rationale for the same
is founded on the concept of jurisdiction – verily, a court that
acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment
therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of
all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment.32 Therefore, as the RTC’s Amended Order was
issued in stark contravention of this rule, the CA correctly
ordered its nullification.
63 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013 On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent)
filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial
vs. Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim
JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
surnamed GARCIA, Respondents. petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support.7
DECISION
Private respondent's claims
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They
boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years
population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private
Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old;
as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the
pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful
National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is
comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray,
committed by the women's intimate partners such as their and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took
husbands and live-in partners."3 up law, and even when she was already working part time at
a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the
advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men,
(R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective her killed.9
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4 Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair
with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in
(VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, 2004. He even boasted to the household help about his
husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a private respondent, though, that he was just using the
common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of
further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left
responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In
prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent
providers, and other local government officials in responding on both arms and shook her with such force that caused
to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance. bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private
respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his
protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He
of judicial power to barangay officials. beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann
begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves,
The Factual Antecedents
petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware
of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said
64 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
of his cruelty to private respondent.11
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private danger of violence against the private respondent and her
respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on
while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted
She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner hereunder:
simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor
apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24
and is taking anti-depressant medications.12 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining
Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed
When private respondent informed the management of by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this
Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house
bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc.
the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of
respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private
private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling
family home, that private respondent should just accept his without any danger from the Respondent.
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his
paramour and has not sired a child with her.13 After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the
conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things,
but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers
deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously when re-entering the family home.
warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she
would not get a single centavo.14 The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner
police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to
construction of deep wells. He is the President of three take her children from her when he arrives from
corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Manila and finds out about this suit.
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he
and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children,
the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, mother and all her household help and driver from a
private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the
₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than temporarily residing.
₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or
same corporation together with the bills for utilities.15
otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly
or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of directly or indirectly her children, mother and
₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters
unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be
thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16 After private subject of a modified TPO in the future.
respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan,
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM
where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted,
caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the
thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner
Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel
has not given private respondent an accounting of the
all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also
businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions
be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in
of pesos.17
his possession or control.
65 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by
the children, including rental of a house for them, private respondent and returning the same to its rightful
and educational and medical expenses. owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or
reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business. more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the
bonuses and other cash he received from all the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March children.
2006, which himself and as President of the
corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet
the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed
accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the for by private respondent:
court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the
Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the
Indirect Contempt of Court. clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and
her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the
granting support pendente lite, and considering the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel,
financial resources of the Respondent and his threat otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single
centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of
BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in
MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties. Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private Protection Order by his counsel;
respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the
the following additional provisions: Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove
Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until
Starex Van which they are using in Negros 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the
Occidental. petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can
remove things from the conjugal home and make an
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and inventory of the household furniture, equipment and
occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued other things in the conjugal home, which shall be
use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever submitted to the Court.
they go to Manila.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for
bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties. clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within
24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty indirect contempt of Court;
Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus
rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and
50,000.00) per month until the matter of support all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within
could be finally resolved. 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel;
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational
TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the expenses of the children upon presentation of proof
grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice of payment of such expenses.23
rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked
66 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of other household helpers from a distance of 1,000
financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
and committed new acts of harassment against her and their subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily
children, private respondent filed another application 24 for residing, as well as from the schools of the three
the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not
contact the schools of the children directly or
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay
J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he
longer president, with the end in view of recovering the will have access to the children through the schools
Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long 4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including
firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the
Joseph Eduard.25 Court;
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to 5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of
school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental
incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006;
back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly and support in arrears from March 2006 to August
grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann
subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for 6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-
violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection 2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Php25,000.00;
Discrimination Act."
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with
filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to
complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the
with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's one taken by J Bros Tading;
belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's
(Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent 8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell,
filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola. 27 lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or
those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for Garcia only and those in which the conjugal
thirty (30) days, which reads as follows: partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J.
Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby: the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St.,
Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or properties which are conjugal assets or those in
committing, personally or through another, acts of which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner
violence against the offended party; Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest
in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-
contacting or otherwise communicating in any form 168814;
with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this
friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered
Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or
J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva disposition of these above-cited properties to any
Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo person, entity or corporation without the personal
Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall
security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's affix her signature in the presence of the Register of
Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her
67 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
signature will be forged in order to effect the His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision
encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud having been denied in the Resolution37 dated August 14,
her or the conjugal partnership of gains. 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court The Issues
extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and
gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show I.
cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or
modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT,
dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated
August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
II.
xxxx
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on CLAUSE.
August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty
(30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty
III.
(30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and
subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN
NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order,
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to
private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing
IV.
that it would only be an "exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO
PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed
before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for prohibition
V.
(CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
unwanted product of an invalid law." DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day
Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the The Ruling of the Court
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto. Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner
against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the
court dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by
the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court petitioner.
in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve
the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if
annul the protection orders issued by the trial court not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
constituted a collateral attack on said law.
68 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that
the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is xxx
"inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality."41 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
We disagree. judgments and orders of lower courts in:
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
constitutionality of a statute. treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are ordinance, or regulation is in question.
special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.
Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act xxxx
of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of
and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
Court designated from among the branches of the Regional earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of
mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that this Court.
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence
under the latter law, viz:
Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of
procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to
SEC. 7.Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of violence against women and their children under this
SEC. 20.Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file
law. In the absence of such court in the place where the
an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It
offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional
must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis
should not be issued.
supplied)
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any
City remains possessed of authority as a court of general
cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be
original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. 44 It is
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the
that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party
constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being
complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."46 The
which a defending party may have against an opposing
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power
to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one
party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
action or of a counterclaim therein.51 Finally, a third-party
Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v.
complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of
CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the
court, file against a person not a party to the action for
inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
respect of his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases
69 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily
statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. rules on summary procedure.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the
opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly
exclusio alterius. dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest
resolution of the case a quo because the right of private belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M.
very statute the validity of which is being attacked53 by No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for
petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory
result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued
R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of
non-issuance of a protection order. the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant
thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary
nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the manner.
same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari
need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a
Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid
viz: only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.
SEC. 25.Order for further hearing. - In case the court The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional
determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same
order containing the following: enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of
the United States declared, thus:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved; their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course,
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or
have been marked and will be presented; member of the community is immune from prosecution, in
good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to
and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity
present their direct testimonies in the form of
which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
affidavits; and
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations
omitted)
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both
parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo
possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity
until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears
of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis
stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex
supplied)
parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of
violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to
defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or
from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of
renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time
first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have,
until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the
time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of
extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be
constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of
necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed
70 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Petition that we should put the challenge to the The President Pro Tempore. x x x
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262. discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families
which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather
and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender
alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
the remedies under the law.60
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the
sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called
a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of two Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of
measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that
"Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 – there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the
providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in domestic environment.
isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to
women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse,64
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless
nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied
women who have not had the opportunity to file a case
protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent
against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not
portions of the deliberations:
decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to
include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by
Wednesday, December 10, 2003 the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the
already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr.
President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations,
and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this
domestic violence apart from against women as well as other Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will
members of the household, including children or the agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is
husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
address domestic violence of which the main victims or the empowered the women are, we are not given equal
bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the opportunities especially in the domestic environment where
female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger,
on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of more superior to the Filipino woman.
observation?
xxxx
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of
women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Relationship. They do not want to include men in this
domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the
by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the
committee came up with this bill because the family
family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing
members have been included in this proposed measure since
protective measures for victims. This includes the men,
the other members of the family other than women are also
children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with
possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
the family.65
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure
focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively
xxx
few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children
are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am
Wednesday, January 14, 2004 worried that there may not be enough protection extended
to other family members particularly children who are
xxxx excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more
or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The
71 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not xxxx
available in said law.
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about amendment.
granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may
use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the
However, we should also recognize that there are established amendment?
procedures and standards in our courts which give credence
to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family
relations and to protect the family as the basic social
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the
institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations
rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the
between men and women in our society, I believe we have an
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may
obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both
maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At
husband and wife and their immediate family members,
saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan.
particularly children.
Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the
children from this particular measure.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to
include other family members as a critical input arrived at
So, if I may propose an amendment –
after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs,
experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr.
The President Pro Tempore.To the amendment.
President.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors.
The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the
have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their
other senators.
fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find
out about these things.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on
the Floor.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children,
this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
recognized.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed
amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we
and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on
remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am
Leader.
not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed
amendment of Senator Legarda.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women
AND CHILDREN.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not
because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an
amendment to the amendment rather than object to the Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
amendment, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence]
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President. There being none, the amendment, as amended, is
approved.66
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
72 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the (Emphasis supplied)
members of Congress in limiting the protection against
violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we
only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall
entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the
and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The equal protection clause by favoring women over men as
choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the protection.
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the
legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a
violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently
The unequal power relationship between women and men;
shown in this case.
the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of against women all make for real differences justifying the
the laws. classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things of true equality."70
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union69 is instructive:
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the
National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid between women and men otherwise known as "gender-
the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people
man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It society. This perception leads to men gaining more power
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution over women. With power comes the need to control to retain
does not require that things which are different in fact be that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal controlling women to retain power.71
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
territory within which it is to operate.
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution manifestation of historically unequal power relations
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other between men and women, which have led to domination
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of over and discrimination against women by men and to the
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of violence against women is one of the crucial social
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of positions, compared with men."72
inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
social context of gender-based violence and developments in
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
quoted hereunder:
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
73 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist
violence against women. The patriarch of a family was movement was on the roll.
accorded the right to use force on members of the family
under his control. I quote the early studies: The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the
domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No
patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were seen less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case
in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women
whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately
of men. In law, they were treated as property. two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their
male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during
to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property the past year. The [American Medical Association] views
right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions these figures as "marked underestimates," because the
oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting
male dominated structure of society. them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor,
those who do not speak English well, and women who are
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family
in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is
and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s probably double the above estimates; or four million severely
and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to assaulted women per year."
limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus,
common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-
husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or
than their thumb. ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in
the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents
these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes
ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
more importance than preventing violence to women.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological
States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of
Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court women, is also common.
to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his
wife: Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers,
perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative...Many
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return
with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick to their husbands, in large part because they have no other
her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be
not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics
entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United
can invoke for himself. States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female
homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement
became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the
These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils Violence Against Women Act.
of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they
demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' In the International front, the women's struggle for equality
other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was was no less successful. The United States Charter and the
joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality
movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly
adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all
74 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993,
the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration
Reported on
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Cases World
conferences on the role and rights of women have been
regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and
Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status
of Women. Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full –
steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section
Incestuous
14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to 38 46 26 22 28 27 19
Rape
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention
on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all,
Attempted
Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act 194 148 185 147 204 167 268
RapeNo. 9262,
entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes."
(Citations omitted) Acts of
580 536 382 358 445 485 745
Lasciviousness
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
Physical
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018
Injuries
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723,
official statistics on violence against women and children
show that –
Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at
Harassment
5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported
(9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381
reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%.
xxx (T)he total number of women in especially RA 9262difficult 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974
circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417
physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608
cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out Threats
of a total 319 223 199 182 220 208 374
number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female
violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25
committed by the women's intimate partners such as their
husbands and live-in partners.73
75 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a
menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact
that the legislative classification may result in actual
inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for
every classification of persons or things for regulation by law
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 produces155inequality in some degree, but the law is not
thereby rendered invalid.78
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to
which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This other harm or coercion;
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law 87 and shall take all c) Prostituting the woman or child.
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing
on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines
or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim
likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
their respective protocols.
verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or
III. The classification is not limited to existing psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the
victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
conditions only, and apply equally to all members witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the common children.
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
77 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman
make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
not limited to the following: relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
"person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.
victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be
occupation, business or activity, except in cases related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under
the Family Code; the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v.
Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan,
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case
resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son
the conjugal, community or property owned in (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in
common; tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support;
harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
3. destroying household property;
mentally and physically.
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
or solely controlling the conjugal money or
due process clause of the Constitution.
properties.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an
rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006.
also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101 Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26,
as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why
preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be
be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the
his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued
her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor.
were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements complain that he was denied due process of law.
of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests,103 among which is protection Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the
of women and children from violence and threats to their respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the
personal safety and security. victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a
"blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, conjugal home.108
the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately
given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any
within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The SEC. 11.Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The
TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on protection order shall include any, some or all of the
the respondent.104 following reliefs:
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
81 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 229826, July 30, 2018 The prosecution alleged that on September 22, 2005 and
acting upon a tip from a confidential informant regarding
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.PATRICIA Cabrellos's alleged illegal drug activities in Ayungon, Negros
CABRELLOS Y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant. Oriental, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and the
Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Group
DECISION organized a buy-bust team, with PO3 Allen June Germodo
(PO3 Germodo) acting as poseur-buyer and PO2 Glenn
Corsame (PO2 Corsame) as immediate back-up. The buy-bust
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
team, together with the informant, then went to Cabrellos's
house. Thereat, the informant introduced PO3 Germodo as a
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-
shabu buyer. After PO3 Germodo gave Cabrellos the two (2)
appellant Patricia Cabrellos y Dela Cruz (Cabrellos) assailing
marked P500.00 bills, Cabrellos took out two (2) plastic
the Decision2 dated September 13, 2016 of the Court of
sachets containing suspected shabu from her bag and handed
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02020, which affirmed
it over to PO3 Germodo. Upon receipt of the sachets, PO3
the Joint Judgment3 dated February 25, 2015 of the Regional
Germodo placed Cabrellos under arrest, with the rest of the
Trial Court of Bais City, Negros Oriental, Branch 45 (RTC) in
buy-bust team rushing to the scene. The police officers
Crim. Case Nos. 05-0163-A and 05-0162-A finding Cabrellos
searched Cabrellos's bag and discovered seventeen (17) more
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Sale of
sachets containing suspected shabu therein. The police
Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
officers then brought Cabrellos and the seized items to the
defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, respectively,
Ayungon Police Station for the conduct of photography and
of Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known
inventory of the seized items. However, since only a barangay
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
kagawad was present at the Ayungon Police Station at that
time, the police officers brought Cabrellos and the seized
The Facts items to the Dumaguete Police Station wherein they
conducted a second inventory, this time in the presence of a
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before representative each from the DOJ and the media. Thereafter,
the RTC charging Cabrellos with violations of Sections 5 and the seized sachets were brought to the crime laboratory
11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portions of which where the contents thereof were confirmed to be
read: methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.8
Crim. Case No. 05-0163-A In her defense, Cabrellos testified that she was inside her
house tending to her child when suddenly, two (2)
That on September 22, 2005 at about 12:45 in the afternoon unidentified persons came into their house looking for her
at Barangay Iniban, Ayungon, Negros Oriental, Philippines, husband. When she told them that her husband was not
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above around, she was brought to the police station for selling
named accused, without lawful authority, did then and there shabu, and there, made to sign a document already signed by
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously SELL and DELIVER to a a barangay official. She was detained for three (3) months at
poseur buyer Methamphetamine Hydrochloride locally the Dumaguete Police Station before she was transferred to
known as Shabu, weighing 0.08 gram, a dangerous drug. Bais City Jail.9
Crim. Case No. 05-0162-A In a Joint Judgment10 dated February 25, 2015, the RTC
convicted Cabrellos of the crimes charged, and accordingly,
That on September 22, 2005 at 12:45 in the afternoon, more sentenced her as follows: (a) in Criminal Case No. 05-0163-A,
or less, at Barangay Iniban, Ayungon, Negros Oriental, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable P500,000.00; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 05-0162-A, to suffer
Court, the above named accused, did then and there willfully, the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of
unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, control and twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and
custody, 0.64 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, to pay a fine of P300,000.00.11
locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, without lawful
authority. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish
Cabrellos's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, considering that:
Contrary to law.7 (a) she was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to the
poseur-buyer; and (b) in the search incidental to her arrest,
she was discovered to be in possession of seventeen (17)
82 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
more sachets of shabu. On the other hand, it did not give instances, case law instructs that it is essential that the
credence to Cabrellos' bare denial as it stood weak in the face identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral
of the detailed and candid testimonies of the prosecution's certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an
witnesses.12 integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order
to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the
Aggrieved, Cabrellos appealed13 to the CA. dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken
chain of custody over the same and account for each link in
The CA Ruling the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.21
In a Decision 14 dated September 13, 2016, the CA affirmed
the RTC ruling.15It held that the testimonies of the police Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which
officers had established the fact that Cabrellos was caught in the police officers must follow when handling the seized
the act of selling illegal drugs, and that in the course of her drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
arrest, she was found in possession of more sachets value.22 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA
containing illegal drugs. In this regard, the CA ruled that the 10640,23 the apprehending team shall, among others,
police officers substantially complied with the chain of immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
custody requirement as the identity and evidentiary value of physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
the seized items were duly established and preserved. 16 presence of the accused or the person from whom the items
were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Hence, this appeal.
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
The Issue Before the Court
copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not from confiscation for examination.24 In the case of People v.
Cabrellos is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Mendoza,25 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ],
or any elected public official during the seizure and marking
The Court's Ruling of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-
The appeal is meritorious. busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation
cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it is the duty of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus
of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
or unassigned.17 "The appeal confers the appellate court full of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent custody."26
to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the The Court, however, clarified that under varied field
penal law."18 conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 27
In this case, Cabrellos was charged with Illegal Sale and Illegal In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and 9165 – which is now crystallized into statutory law with the
penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. In passage of RA 1064028 – provide that the said inventory and
order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged photography may be conducted at the nearest police station
with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must or office of the apprehending team in instances of
prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under
and the payment.19 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an justifiable grounds – will not render void and invalid the
accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the
Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.29 In
of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly
possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.20 In both RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure
83 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that Q: Where is your office located?
the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is A: It is located at PNP compound, Locsin St., Dumaguete
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity City.
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.30 In People v. Almorfe,31the Court explained that Q: After you arrived there, what happened then?
for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must A: I called the media representative and the DOJ.
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence Q: And did they arrive, the media representative and the DOJ
had nonetheless been preserved.32 Also, in People v. De representative?
Guzman,33 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for A: Yes.
non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
Q: After they arrived, what transpired at your office?
exist.34
A: We conduct (sic) again an inventory.
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the
Q: After conducting the second inventory, what did you do
police officers committed unjustified deviations from the
then, if any?
prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
A: After the inventory we made a request for PNP crime
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous
laboratory.36
drugs allegedly seized from Cabrellos.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
PEOPLE v. GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT + After the incident, PO3 Din received word from Barangay
Tanod Florentine Cano (Cano),[10] that the robbery suspects
RESOLUTION were last seen in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os. Thus, S/Insp.
George Ylanan (S/Insp. Ylanan) conducted an investigation in
the said barangay, and discovered that before the robbery
FIRST DIVISION
incident, Manago told Cano that three persons - namely, Rico
Lumampas, Arvin Cadastra, and Allan Sordiano - are his
[ G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016 ]
employees in his roasted chicken business, and they were to
stay in Manago's house. Further, upon verification of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, getaway vehicles with the Land Transportation Office, the
VS.GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. police officers found out that the motorcycle was registered
in Manago's name, while the red Toyota Corolla was
DECISION registered in the name pf Zest-O Corporation, where Manage
worked as a District Sales Manager.[11]
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
With all the foregoing information at hand, the police officers,
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused- comprised of a team including PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan,
appellant Gerrjan Manago y Acut (Manago) assailing the conducted a "hot pursuit" operation one (1) day after the
Decision[2] dated May 20, 2013 and the Resolution[3] dated robbery incident, or on March 16, 2007, by setting up a
November 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait. At around 9:30 in the evening
CEB-C.R. No. 01342, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated of even date, the red Toyota Corolla, then being driven by
March 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Manago, passed through the checkpoint, prompting the
Branch 58 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. CBU-79707, finding police officers to stop the vehicle. The police officers then
Manago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section ordered Manago to disembark, and thereafter, conducted a
11, Article II[5] of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[6] otherwise thorough search of the vehicle. As the search produced no
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." contraband, the police officers then frisked Manago, resulting
in the discovery of one (1) plastic sachet containing a white
The Facts crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The police officers seized the plastic
On April 10, 2007, an Information[7] was filed before the RTC, pack, arrested Manago, informed him of his constitutional
charging Manago of Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined rights, and brought him and the plastic pack to their
and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the headquarters. Upon reaching the headquarters, S/Insp.
accusatory portion of which reads: Ylanan turned over the seized plastic pack to PO3 Joel
Taboada, who in turn, prepared a request for a laboratory
That on or about the 16th day of March, 2007, at about 11:50 examination of the same. SPO1 Felix Gabijan then delivered
in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the the said sachet and request to Forensic Chemist Jude Daniel
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with Mendoza of the PNP Crime Laboratory, who, after conducting
deliberate intent, and without authority of law, did then and an examination, confirmed that the sachet contained
there have in his possession and under his control one (1) methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[12]
heat-sealed transparent plastic packet of white crystalline
substance weighing 5.85 grams containing In his defense, Manago denied possessing the plastic pack
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride [sic], a dangerous drug, recovered by the police officers. He claimed that at around
without being authorized by law. 11:50 in the evening of March 16, 2007, he was about to start
his vehicle and was on his way home from the office when a
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8] pick-up truck stopped in front of his car. Three (3) police
officers armed with long firearms disembarked from the said
According to the prosecution, at around 9:30 in the evening track. One of the officers knocked on the door of Manago's
of March 15, 2007, PO3 Antonio Din (PO3 Din) of the vehicle and asked for his driver's license, to which Manago
Philippine National Police (PNP) Mobile Patrol Group was complied. When the same officer saw Manago's name on the
waiting to get a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor when license, the former uttered "mao na ni (this is him)." Manago
two (2) persons entered and declared a hold-up. PO3 Din was then ordered to sit at the back of his car as the vehicle
identified himself as a police officer and exchanged gun shots was driven by one of the police officers directly to the Cebu
with the two suspects. After the shootout, one of the City Police Station. After arriving at the police station,
suspects boarded a motorcycle, while the other boarded a Manago was interrogated about who the robbers were and to
red Toyota Corolla. The plate numbers of the vehicles were divulge their whereabouts so that no criminal charges would
86 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
be filed against him. Manago claimed that he requested for a by Manago, as the getaway vehicle in the March 15, 2007
phone call with his lawyer, as well as a copy of the warrant robbery incident. Thus, the item found in the search, i.e., the
for his arrest, but both requests went unheeded. After he was plastic sachet containing shabu obtained from Manago, is
dispossessed of his laptop, wallet, and two (2) mobile phones, admissible in evidence and is enough to sustain a conviction
he was then photographed and placed in a detention cell. against him for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.[22]
Thereafter, he was brought to the Cebu City Prosecutor's
Office where he was charged with, among others, illegal Manago moved for reconsideration[23] and applied for bail
possession of shabu.[13] pending appeal, which were, however, both denied in an
Omnibus Order[24] dated May 12, 2009. Aggrieved, Manago
Prior to his arraignment, Manago filed a Motion to Dismiss for appealed his conviction before the CA.[25]
Lack of Probable Cause and/or Motion for the Suppression of
Evidence,[14] contending, inter alia, that there is neither The CA Proceedings
probable cause nor prima facie Evidence to conduct an arrest
and search on him; as such, the item seized torn him, i.e., the Upon Manago's motion to post bail, the CA rendered a
plastic sachet containing shabu, is inadmissible in evidence Resolution[26] dated August 13, 2010, allowing Manago to
pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.[15] post bail in the amount of P200,000.00, noting that the
However, in kn Order[16] dated May 31, 2007, the RTC denied quantity of the shabu seized from him was only 0.3852 grams,
the said motion. The RTC held that while (a) the police thus bailable, and that the Office of the Solicitor General did
officers, through PO3 Din, had no personal knowledge of not oppose Manago's motion.[27]
Manago's involvement in the robbery as they had to conduct
in investigation to identify him as the registered owner of the In a Decision[28] dated May 20, 2013, the CA affirmed Manago
motorcycle and (b) there was no in flagrante delicto arrest as „ conviction in toto. It held that the police officers conducted
Manago was merely driving and gave no indication that he a valid hot pursuit operation against Manago, considering
was committing an offense, the RTC nevertheless held that that PO3 Din personally identified him as the one driving the
there was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle, red Toyota Corolla vehicle used in the March 15, 2007
considering that PO3 Din had probable cause to believe that robbery incident. As such, the CA concluded that the
Manago was part of the robbery, because the latter was warrantless arrest conducted against Manago was valid, and
driving the getaway vehicle used in the March 15, 2007 consequently, the plastic sachet seized from him containing
robbery incident.[17] shabu is admissible in evidence as it was done incidental to a
lawful arrest.[29]
On July 12, 2007, Manago was arraigned with the assistance
of counsel and pleaded not guilty to the charge against Undaunted, Manago moved for reconsideration,[30] which was
him.[18] denied in a Resolution[31] dated November 6, 2013; hence,
the instant appeal.
During the course of the trial, the contents of the plastic
sachet were re-examined by the National Bureau of The Issue Before the Court
Investigation, revealing that out of the 5.7158 grams of white
crystalline substance contained in the sachet, only 0.3852 The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
grams is methamphetamine hydrochloride, while the rest is Manage's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of
potassium aluminum sulphate or tawas, which is not a RA 9165 should be upheld.
dangerous drug substance. Thus, Manago applied for and was
granted bail.[19] The Court's Ruling
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his element of immediacy within which these facts or
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from circumstances should be gathered. This required time
one confinement to another. element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police
officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith guarantees that the police officers would have no time to
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112. obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the
when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest
(a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to
a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the become contaminated and subjected to external factors,
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the
was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule
committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police
from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily
during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances,
transferred from one confinement to another. [36] gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating
essential that the element of personal knowledge must be these facts of circumstances before the police officer could
coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the effect a valid warrantless arrest.[38] (Emphases and
arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded underscoring supplied)
through the search incidental thereto will be rendered
inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the In this case, records reveal that at around 9:30 in the evening
1987 Constitution. In Pestilos v. Generoso,[37] the Court of March 15, 2007, PO3 Din personally witnessed a robbery
explained the requirement of immediacy as follows: incident while he was waiting for his turn to have a haircut at
Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor. After his brief shootout with the
88 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
armed robbers, the latter fled using a motorcycle and a red before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
Toyota Corolla. Through an investigation and verification persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction
made by the police officers headed by PO3 Din and S/Insp. of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the
Ylanan, they were able to: (a) find out that the armed robbers impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
were staying in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os; and (b) trace the moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place
getaway vehicles to Manago. The next day, or on March 16, to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless
2007, the police officers set up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is
where, at around 9:30 in the evening, the red Toyota Corolla not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
being driven by Manago passed by and was intercepted by be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the police officers. The police officers then ordered Manago the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of
to disembark the car, and from there, proceeded to search automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing
the vehicle and the body of Manago, which search yielded the violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such
plastic sachet containing shabu. Thereupon, they effected searches are made at borders or "constructive borders" like
Manago's arrest. checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. [40]
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The foregoing circumstances show that while the element of
personal knowledge under Section 5 (b) above was present - A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may
given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007 robbery entail the setup of military or police checkpoints - as in this
incident and even engaged the armed robbers in a shootout - case - which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per se
the required element of immediacy was not met. This is for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of
because, at the time the police officers effected the public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to
warrantless arrest upon Manago's person, investigation and motorists.[41] Case law further states that routine inspections
verification proceedings were already conducted, which in checkpoints are not regarded as violative of an individual's
consequently yielded sufficient information on the suspects right against unreasonable searches, and thus, permissible, if
of the March 15, 2007 robbery incident. As the Court sees it, limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely draws
the information the police officers had gathered therefrom aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
would have been enough for them to secure the necessary public fair grounds; (b) simply looks into a vehicle; (c) flashes
warrants against the robbery suspects. However, they opted a light therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the
to conduct a "hot pursuit" operation which - considering the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e)
lack of immediacy - unfortunately failed to meet the legal where the inspection of the Vehicles is limited to a visual
requirements therefor. Thus, there being no valid warrantless search or visual inspection; and (e) where the routine check is
arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the CA erred in ruling conducted in a fixed area.[42]
that Manago was lawfully arrested.
It is well to clarify, however, that routine inspections do not
In view of the finding that there was no lawful arrest in this give police officers carte blanche discretion to conduct
case, the CA likewise erred in ruling that the incidental search warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When
on Manago's vehicle and body was valid. In fact, the said a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search - as
search was made even before he was arrested and thus, opposed to a mere routine inspection - such a warrantless
violated the cardinal rule on searches incidental to lawful search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
arrests that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
be made. believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
For another, the Court similarly finds the RTC's ruling that the vehicle to be searched.[43]
police officers conducted a lawful warrantless search of a
moving vehicle on Manago's red Toyota Corolla untenable. In the case at bar, it should be reiterated that the police
officers had already conducted a thorough investigation and
In Caballes v. People,[39] the Court explained the concept of verification proceedings, which yielded, among others: (a) the
warrantless searches on moving vehicles: identities of the robbery suspects; (b) the place where they
reside; and (c) the ownership of the getaway vehicles used in
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent the robbery, i.e., the motorcycle and the red Toyota Corolla.
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its As adverted to earlier, these pieces of information were
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable already enough for said police officers to secure the
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant necessary warrants to accost the robbery suspects.
committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing Consequently, there was no longer any exigent circumstance
search and seizure have over the years been steadily that would have justified the necessity of setting up the
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the checkpoint in this case for the purpose of searching the
search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that subject vehicle. In addition, it is well to point out that the
89 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
checkpoint was arranged for the targeted arrest of Manago,
who was already identified as the culprit of the robbery
incident. In this regard, it cannot, therefore, be said that the
checkpoint was meant to conduct a routinary and
indiscriminate search of moving vehicles. Rather, it was used
as a subterfuge to put into force the capture of the fleeing
suspect. Unfortunately, this setup cannot take the place of -
nor skirt the legal requirement of - procuring a valid
search/arrest warrant given the circumstances of this case.
Hence, the search conducted on the red Toyota Corolla and
on the person of its driver, Manago, was unlawful.
SO ORDERED.
90 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
June 28, 2017 A.C. No. 8371 Complainants went to respondent's office wherein the latter
prepared a Notice of Appeal. Afterwards, complainants
SPOUSES GERARDO MONTECILLO and DOMINGA SALONOY, terminated respondent's legal services and engaged another
vs. lawyer to prepare their Memorandum of Appeal. On appeal,
ATTY. EDUARDO Z. GATCHALIAN, Respondent the ejectment case was remanded to the court of origin.9
91 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied m a The Court likewise finds respondent liable for failing to
Resolution18 dated September 23, 2016. immediately inform complainants about the trial court's
adverse decision. To emphasize, a lawyer has an obligation to
The Issue Before the Court promptly apprise clients regarding the status of a case as
expressed in Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR:
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
The Court's Ruling to the client's request for information.
The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and To be clear, a lawyer need not wait for their clients to ask for
recommendation. information but must advise them without delay about
matters essential for them to avail of legal remedies. In the
present case, respondent failed to immediately notify
Every lawyer is duty-bound to serve his clients with utmost
complainants about the adverse decision of the trial court.
diligence and competence, and never neglect a legal matter
Had the complainants not inquired with the trial court, they
entrusted to him. 19 A lawyer owes fidelity to the clients'
would have lost their opportunity to appeal. For this reason,
cause20 and, accordingly is expected to exercise the required
respondent is also administratively liable for negligence under
degree of diligence in handling their affairs. 21 Consequently,
Rule 18.04 of the CPR.
he is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote one's full attention, skill, and
competence to the case, whether it is accepted for a fee or As regards the proper penalty, recent cases show that in
for free. 22 The relevant provisions of the CPR read thus: similar instances where lawyers neglected their clients' affairs
by failing to attend hearings and/or failing to update clients
about court decisions, the Court suspended them from the
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
practice of law for six (6) months. In Caranza V da.de Saldivar
and diligence.
v. Cabanes,26a lawyer was suspended for failure to file a
pretrial brief and to attend the scheduled preliminary
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
conference. In Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag, 27 a lawyer was
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
likewise suspended for not attending pre-trial, failing to
shall render him liable.
inform clients about the dismissal of their case, and failing to
file position papers. In Spouses Aranda v. Elayda, 28 a lawyer
Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer's duties of suffered the same fate when he failed to appear in a
competence and diligence include not merely reviewing cases scheduled hearing despite due notice, which resulted in the
or giving sound legal advice, but also consist of properly submission of the case for decision. Consistent with these
representing a client before any court or tribunal, attending cases, the Court agrees with the IBP's recommendation to
scheduled hearings and conferences, preparing and filing the suspend respondent from the practice of law for six (6)
required pleadings, prosecuting handled cases with months.
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without
waiting for the client or the court to prod him to do so. 23 A
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian is
lawyer's negligence in fulfilling these duties subjects him to
found GUILTY of violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
disciplinary action. 24
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
Guided by these edicts, the Court rules that respondent failed effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY
to exercise the diligence required of lawyers in handling WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
complainants' case. Based on the records, he failed to file the dealt with more severely.
necessary motion to postpone the hearing due to a conflict in
his schedule, and as a result, complainants lost their
Let a copy of this this Resolution be furnished to the Office of
opportunity to present their evidence in the ejectment case.
the Bar Confidant, to be attached to respondent's personal
As complainants' counsel in the ejectment case, respondent
record as a member of the Bar.1âwphi1 Furthermore, let
was expected to exercise due diligence. He should have been
copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
more circumspect in preparing and filing the motion,
Philippines and Office of the Court Administrator, which is
considering the serious consequence of failure to attend the
directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their
scheduled preliminary conference - i.e. the defendant's
information and guidance.
failure to appear thereat entitles the plaintiff to a judgment, 25
as what happened in this case.
SO ORDERED.
92 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
February 15, 2017 G.R. No. 222541 in the middle of the night sometime in December 2007 when
she fetched her relatives from the bus terminal, which he
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner refused to perform. Rachel added that Jose would represent
vs. himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text
message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly), stating: "love,
D E C I S I O N PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: kung ayaw mo na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na
lang dito."12 Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang
asawa mo, ayaw mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa 'yo."
Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari1
On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly,
assailing the Decision2 dated May 29, 2015 and the
caught Jose and the other woman with their child inside their
Resolution3 dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745, which reversed the Decision4
any chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly
dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
drifted apart.13
City, Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891 declaring the
marriage of Jose O. Del Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del
Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of psychological Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran
incapacity pursuant to Article 365 of the Family Code, as smoothly during its early years, and it was only later in their
amended.6 marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in
drinking sessions.14
The Facts
Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley 15 and her
sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn Cabusora,16 which corroborated
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen
her allegations, as well as the testimony17 of Dr. Nedy L.
(17) years old, sometime in December 1983 at a party in
Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who prepared the Psychological Report18
Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.7 Very soon, they became
(Report) on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr. Tayag's
romantically involved.8
Report, which was primarily based on her interview with
Rachel and Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a Personality Disorder (APD) characterized by: (a) his lack of
domestic helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly provided
empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and
for Jose's tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and
his pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to his own
Jose eventually decided to get married on December 28, 1989
fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of
in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and
depth when it comes to his marital commitments; and (d) his
were blessed with a son, named Wesley, on December 1,
lack of remorse for his shortcomings.19
1993. On February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a
church ceremony held in the Philippine Independent Church,
For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition.
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.9
Jose maintained that: (a) he had dutifully performed all of his
marital and parental duties and obligations to his family; (b)
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic
he had provided for his family's financial and emotional
helper/caregiver and has been working there ever since, only
needs; and (c) he contributed to the building and
returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation.
maintenance of their conjugal home. He claimed that
Through her efforts, she was able to acquire a house and lot
although they occasionally had misunderstandings, they
in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija.10
nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out that
their first major argument was when Rachel decided to go to
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition11 for declaration of Hongkong to work; that they continued to communicate
nullity of marriage before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. through mail during her stay overseas; and that he remained
11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated supportive of Rachel and would advise her to give her family
to fulfill his essential marital obligations. In support of her the financial aid that they need so long as she would not
petition, Rachel claimed that: during their marriage, Jose sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-
conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband marital affair and having laid hand on Rachel and their son. 20
and father. According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and Jose presented as well the testimony of Faustino Rigos to
violent; he punched her in the shoulder a few days before support his allegations.21
their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused to
pay for the transportation expenses of his parents; he hit his The RTC Ruling
own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious,
which forced them to leave Jose's parents' house where they
In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the
were then staying; and he even locked her out of their house
marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the ground of
93 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and The petition lacks merit. The policy of the Constitution is to
testimony of Dr. Tayag, declaring that Jose's APD interferes protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
with his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties, institution,33 and marriage as the foundation of the family. 34
as he in fact even refused to take responsibility for his Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally
actions, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
him.23 parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to
nullify the marriage under Article 3635 of the Family Code, as
Jose appealed24 to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to amended, should refer to the most serious cases of
seek employment, squandering of their money on vices, personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
violent nature, and infidelity are not the serious, grave, and insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
permanent psychological condition that incapacitates him to the marriage.36 It should refer to no less than a mental - not
perform his marital obligations required by Article 36 of the merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly
Family Code, as amended. At most, they are personality incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
defects, i.e., immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness, must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
which may be considered as grounds for legal separation marriage, which, as provided under Article 6837 of the Family
under Article 5525 of the same code.26 Code, among others,38 include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help
The CA Ruling and support.39 In other words, it must be a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the
about to assume.40
ruling of the RTC,28 holding that the totality of the evidence
Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that
Jose is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that psychological
essential obligations of marriage.29 Particularly, the CA incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
declared that Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious
employment, his act of squandering their money on his vices, such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
and his temper and alleged propensity for violence were not ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical
so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
sufficient to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e.,
Family Code; at best, they showed that Jose was it must be incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond
irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature which the means of the party involved.42 The Court laid down more
nonetheless do not amount to the downright incapacity that definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
the law requires. Additionally, the CA pointed out that the Article 36 in Republic v. Molina43(Molina) whose salient points
root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its are footnoted below,44 that incorporated the basic
incapacitating nature, and the incapacity itself were not requirements the Court established in Santos.
sufficiently explained as Dr. Tayag's Report failed to show the
relation between Jose's "deprived childhood" and "poor Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that
home condition," on one hand, and grave and permanent an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be
psychological malady, on the other. Finally, it observed that dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
while Dr. Tayag's testimony was detailed, it only offered a Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological
general evaluation on the supposed root cause of Jose's incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
personality disorder.30 incurability can be duly established.45 The evidence need not
necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but
Rachel moved for reconsideration,31 which was, however, can come from persons intimately related to the spouses, i.e.,
denied by the CA in a Resolution32 dated December 1, 2015; relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the
hence, this petition. allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the
time of the marriage.46 In other words, the Molina guidelines
continue to apply but its application calls for a more flexible
The Issue Before the Court
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity.47 To be clear,
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
however, the totality of the evidence must still establish the
not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of
characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity, incurability, and
psychological incapacity.
juridical antecedence.
94 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared that therein has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the
respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could law's conception. Neither did the Report specify the reasons
not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not why and to what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his
personality which make her completely unable to discharge marital obligations.1awp++i1 Lastly, the Report hastily
the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and "poor
to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity. 49 In Taring v. home condition" that automatically resulted in his APD
Taring,50 the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable equivalent to psychological incapacity without, however,
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional specifically identifying the history of Jose's condition
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as during his adolescent years that could explain his behavior
[these] may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or during the marriage.
neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not
rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview
Family Code addresses."51 The Court equally did not consider Jose to determine, at the very least, his background that
as tantamount to psychological incapacity the emotional could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding
immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity, and other that his APD is rooted in his childhood or was already existing
behavioral disorders invoked by the petitioning spouses in at the inception of the marriage. To be sure, established
Pesca v. Pesca,52Republic v. Encelan,53Republic v. De Gracia,54 parameters do not require that the expert witness personally
and Republic v. Romero,55 to name a few, and thus dismissed examine the party alleged to be suffering from psychological
their petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. incapacity provided corroborating evidence are presented
sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters.57
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, Considering that her Report was based solely on Rachel's side
denies the petition. Based on the totality of the evidence whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony
presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to deserved the application of a more rigid and stringent
conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity standards which the RTC failed to apply.
amount to psychological incapacity.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's
showed that Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking sprees; immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of
(2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of
discharging his duties as a father to Wesley and as a husband the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize,
to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
represented himself as single; and (4) engaged in an extra- "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital
marital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other
dwelling on several occasions. Significantly, Rachel admitted failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married
that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr. person.58 There must be proof of a natal or supervening
Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply summarized disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in
Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
APD and proceeded to conclude that Jose's "personality flaw person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
is deemed to be severe, grave, and have become deeply obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with
embedded within his adaptive systems since early childhood the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.59
years, thereby rendering such to be a permanent component
of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family
despite any form of intervention."56 Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not themselves;60 a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is
explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized as not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient evidence
grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within establishing psychological incapacity within the context of
the jurisprudential parameters for establishing psychological Article 36, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility
incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the of the marital tie. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated
classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how and December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and to 102745 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition for
what extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the
his APD, sufficiently clear to conclude that Jose's condition Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
95 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 The Facts
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners, "Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -
vs. English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would
ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to
OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the
his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice
REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, was later compared to the actions of American
JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents. legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor
of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration
x-----------------------x has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists
in reference to political bills that "bring home the
G.R. No. 208493 bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents. 6 In
a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. appropriation of government spending meant for
ALCANTARA, Petitioner, localized projects and secured solely or primarily to
vs. bring money to a representative's district. 7 Some
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE scholars on the subject further use it to refer to
PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., legislative control of local appropriations.8
in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents. In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
x-----------------------x Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be
later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference
to certain funds of the Executive.
G.R. No. 209251
96 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post- those which would fall under the categories of,
enactment legislator participation broadened from among others, education, health and livelihood.22
the areas of fund release and realignment to the
area of project identification. During that year, the C. Post-Martial Law Era:
mechanics of the public works act was modified to
the extent that the discretion of choosing projects Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-
was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce 1992).
and Communications to legislators. "For the first
time, the law carried a list of projects selected by
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and
Members of Congress, they ‘being the
the restoration of Philippine democracy,
representatives of the people, either on their own
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form
account or by consultation with local officials or civil
of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the
leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel
"Visayas Development Fund" which were created
process commenced with local government councils,
with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and
civil groups, and individuals appealing to
₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of
Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that
development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas
were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s
areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the
allocation, and the amount each legislator would
clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
eventually get is determined in a caucus convened
legislators for a similar funding, prompted the
by the majority. The amount was then integrated
creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund"
into the administration bill prepared by the
(CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with
Department of Public Works and Communications.
an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local
Thereafter, the Senate and the House of
infrastructure and other priority community
Representatives added their own provisions to the
projects."
bill until it was signed into law by the President – the
Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF
barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the
funds were, with the approval of the President, to be
stalemate between the House of Representatives
released directly to the implementing agencies but
and the Senate.18
"subject to the submission of the required list of
projects and activities."Although the GAAs from
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of
allocations of the individual legislators, as well as
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was their participation in the identification of projects, it
apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law has been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives
was declared, an era when "one man controlled the were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each,
1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already without any limitation or qualification, and that they
introduced a new item in the General Appropriations could identify any kind of project, from hard or
Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and
Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks,
Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was medicines, and scholarships.27
under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum
allocations to individual legislators began, with each
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter,
assemblymen would communicate their project
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly
preferences to the Ministry of Budget and
stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made
Management for approval. Then, the said ministry
upon the submission of the list of projects and
would release the allocation papers to the Ministry
activities identified by, among others, individual
of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue
legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article
the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the
included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As
assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported
such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million
that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the
each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and
SLDP also began to cover not only public works
the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.
projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft
projects",21 or non-public works projects such as
97 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained legislators had the power to direct how, where and
the same provisions on project identification and when these appropriations were to be spent. 41
fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In
addition, however, the Department of Budget and E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-
Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports 2001).
to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations on the releases made In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and
from the funds.33 replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely,
the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44 and the
and the Vice-President, in consultation with the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program
implementing agency concerned, were directed to Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision
submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of
funded from their respective CDF allocations which Congress for the release of the funds.
shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President
and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority
the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in
House of Representatives and the Chairman of the the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation
Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the with the respective Representative of the District"
House of Representatives; while the list for the before PDAF funds were directly released to the
remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) implementing agency concerned was explicitly
months thereafter. The same article also stated that stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover,
the project list, which would be published by the realignment of funds to any expense category was
DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no
and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be amount shall be used to fund personal services and
disbursed for projects not included in the list herein other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF
required." provisions remained the same in view of the re-
enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing
provisions regarding the required lists and F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-
endorsements were reproduced, except that the 2010).
publication of the project list was no longer required
as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and
straightforward as it merely contained a single
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of special provision ordering the release of the funds
"Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other directly to the implementing agency or local
forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were government unit concerned, without further
reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same
(called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order single provision was present, with simply an
to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political expansion of purpose and express authority to
agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003
"formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive budgets of the Department of Public Works and
departments, they were not easily identifiable and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior
were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the consultation with Members of Congress on the
lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and aspects of implementation delegation and project
budget officials of the implementing agencies, as list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA
well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the was re-enacted.53
insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the
Department of Education (DepEd) School Building
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF
Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the
shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects
Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the
under the ten point agenda of the national
Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the
government and shall be released directly to the
School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made
implementing agencies." It also introduced the
upon prior consultation with the representative of
program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of
the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the
general programs and implementing agencies from
which a particular PDAF project may be
98 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was
The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President,
operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and
program menu concept was consistently integrated "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment
into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs. of funds was included, but with the qualification that
it may be allowed only once. The same provision also
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social
silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated Welfare and Development, Interior and Local
for the individual legislators, as well as their Government, Environment and Natural Resources,
participation in the proposal and identification of Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign
PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a)
Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd realignment is within the same implementing unit
School Building Program and the DPWH budget, and same project category as the original project, for
similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has
consultation with the concerned Member of not yet been obligated for the original scope of
Congress61 anent certain aspects of project work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the
implementation. concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated
which allowed formal participation of non- that the "identification of projects and/or
governmental organizations (NGO) in the designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the
implementation of government projects were priority list, standard or design prepared by each
introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x
with respect to the appropriation for school x." However, as practiced, it would still be the
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to individual legislator who would choose and identify
participate. For such purpose, the law stated that the project from the said priority list.74
"the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500
Million allotted for the construction and completion Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund
of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013
including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the
"Operation Barrio School" program, with capability 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013
and proven track records in the construction of PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as
public school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation implementing agencies if they have the technical
was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 capability to implement the projects.77 Legislators
GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 were also allowed to identify programs/projects,
that the Government Procurement Policy Board64 except for assistance to indigent patients and
(GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, scholarships, outside of his legislative district
2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the provided that he secures the written concurrence of
implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the legislator of the intended outside-district,
the Government Procurement Reform Act, to endorsed by the Speaker of the House. 78 Finally, any
include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the realignment of PDAF funds, modification and
procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the revision of project identification, as well as requests
implementing agency) may enter into a for release of funds, were all required to be
memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69 Finance, as the case may be.79
G. Present Administration (2010-Present). III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically
the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included an associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of
express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated Members of Congress, the present cases and the
for individual legislators and the Vice-President: recent controversies on the matter have, however,
Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to
down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30
99 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
include certain funds of the President such as the of the money trail became the banner story of the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996,
accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created "The publication of the stories, including those about
as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential congressional initiative allocations of certain
Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman,
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In sparked public outrage."94
enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need
to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens
and consolidate government efforts relating to the sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the
exploration, exploitation, and development of 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately,
indigenous energy resources vital to economic for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that
growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
government in the Malampaya natural gas field in become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to- Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD
910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds. Recently, or in July of the present year, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was allegations that "the government has been
created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years
the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was lawmakers and various government agencies for
similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More scores of ghost projects."96 The investigation was
than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-
accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN"
amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had
stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for
described as a special funding facility managed and "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy
administered by the Presidential Management Staff NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were
through which the President provides direct supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds,
assistance to priority programs and projects not the whistle-blowers declared that the money was
funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after
the share of the government in the aggregate gross its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal
earnings of PAGCOR.88 complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for
IV. Controversies in the Philippines. Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small recommended to be charged in the complaints are
part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or
"Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional representatives, the heads and other officials of
support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98
Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo
(Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA)
on the huge sums of government money that released the results of a three-year audit
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF
form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years
were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the
legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a audit was to determine the propriety of releases of
high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures
could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the
sphalting, concreting, and construction of school application of these funds and the implementation
buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that of projects by the appropriate implementing
Candazo identified were public funds intended for agencies and several government-owned-and-
medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total
100 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 documents, or failed to liquidate in whole
Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, or in part their utilization of the Funds.
representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total
PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have ● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as
been made nationwide during the audit period.102 some implementing agencies, of goods and
Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its services reportedly used in the projects
Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority were not compliant with law.
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers
made public, the highlights of which are as alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in
follows:103 the operation of the Malampaya gas project off
Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
● Amounts released for projects identified beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."104
by a considerable number of legislators According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria
significantly exceeded their respective Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as
allocations. of this writing, in the process of preparing "one
consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105
● Amounts were released for projects
outside of legislative districts of sponsoring V. The Procedural Antecedents.
members of the Lower House.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the
● Total VILP releases for the period CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
exceeded the total amount appropriated petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs. seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant
● Infrastructure projects were constructed procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
on private lots without these having been
turned over to the government. On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara
(Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
● Significant amounts were released to Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the
implementing agencies without the latter‘s Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork
endorsement and without considering their Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
mandated functions, administrative and prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents
technical capabilities to implement projects. Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their
respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and
● Implementation of most livelihood Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking
projects was not undertaken by the any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the
implementing agencies themselves but by "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever
NGOs endorsed by the proponent name it may be called, and from approving further releases
legislators to which the Funds were pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as
transferred. G.R. No. 208493.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B.
in spite of the absence of any appropriation Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes
law or ordinance. San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas)
filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
with law and regulations. Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated
August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica
Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System,"
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with
presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013
implementation of seven hundred seventy
which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-
two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion
sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and
were either found questionable, or
the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional
submitted questionable/spurious
and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
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respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the
(Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective partial lifting with respect to educational and medical
capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO,
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately merit.113
cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further,
they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of
release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF
and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their
the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30,
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27,
of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al.
the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and
remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient 1, 2013.
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto." 108 Also,
they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing
the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum,
for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral
discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds
Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the
from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
technicality of the issues material to the present cases,
PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor
208566.110
General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral
Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. would be able to competently and completely answer
Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August questions related to, among others, the budgeting process
23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was
declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear
issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such
funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were
release to fund priority projects identified and approved by
conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to
the Local Development Councils in consultation with the
submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven
executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department
(7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties
of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of
subsequently did.
Transportation, and Communication and the National
Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno
The Issues Before the Court
Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the
system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do
Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of not present political but legal questions which are within its
notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in province to resolve. A political question refers to "those
connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
(Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic
bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue
resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of
importantly, so that the government may be guided on how government but rather a legal one which the Constitution
public funds should be utilized in accordance with itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the
constitutional principles. contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that
the political branches of government are incapable of
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
the recognition that the preparation and passage of the More importantly, the present Constitution has not only
national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but
annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1,
Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer:
budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes
of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different involving rights which are legally demandable and
collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
government had already backtracked on a previous course of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded
questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its
true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying effect on the political question doctrine was explained as
the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not follows:143
resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of
repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review. To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the
reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine. power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there
and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has
105 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance,
against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of
branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein.
x x x (Emphases supplied) Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the
illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus
assert any superiority over the other departments; does not standi to file the instant cases.
in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the
executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the
Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare
co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis which
force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has
Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution been settled") are general procedural law principles which
of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar
endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the
that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation
grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
each great branch of government, within its own sphere,
contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle
solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint. rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions,
C. Locus Standi. there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however,
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal
person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a
by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to
standing."145 present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed,
there were direct releases of funds to the Members of
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole
capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate
they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has
Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the
System" under which the taxes they pay have been and presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the
continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the
taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the
usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 152
unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases. of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are
standing requirement given that the issues they have raised substantially the same, even though the parties may be
106 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be
absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage
ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has
relating to the same event have been put forward by the already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the
bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153 same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise:
"Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be
against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual
resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would
petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely
Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter,
activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially
legislature on executive power, since said power in an abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated
appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that the post-enactment identification authority of Members of
"the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve Congress on the guise that the same was merely
the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional
only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." 154 In inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the
deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is
the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent
the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has
belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-
with it the power to specify the project or activity to be enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of
funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the
and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing
proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress section of this Decision.
are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the
Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was
powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set
post-enactment identification authority to Members of any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis
holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF would not apply.
and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of
the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra- II. Substantive Issues.
relation of post-enactment measures contained within a
particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those A. Definition of Terms.
related to the area of project identification but also to the
areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of
issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may
these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel
be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason
System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork
against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.
110 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can a which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, by the provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based on
Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a
avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield
supplied) legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated
the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post- practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; 196
enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the
of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, in times of war or other national emergency, 197 or fix within
through which legislators have effectively intruded into the specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional or imposts within the framework of the national development
treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in program of the Government.198
fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not
been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be
Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to
during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193 implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling
Chief Justice Sereno: up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary
rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the operation (contingent rule-making).199 The conceptual
DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were
initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor
Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional The grant of the rule-making power to administrative
compatibility of how they were engineering the budget agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of
process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative
lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate
been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life,
provisions did was to codify in one section all the past the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the
we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF law."
Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do
not have, whether through formal measures written into the Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making
law or informal practices institutionalized in government power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.
the Constitution has vested as its own. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power. the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
a. Statement of Principle.
b. Application.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194
legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF
which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
111 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to
to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-
as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and
power to appropriate must be exercised only through exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes
by law." To understand what constitutes an act of effect as law after the required publication."205
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its
appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon,
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. explained that:206
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators
are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the
to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions
power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the
that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill,
perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been except that his will be a broader point of view.
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does
not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the
delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares
legislative department of the government, but in this respect
the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
it is a grant of power to the executive department. The
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional
exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
3. Checks and Balances. follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power. confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the
unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge
The fact that the three great powers of government are every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in
intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of
they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases
other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate supplied)
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. 203 The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on
a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as
be the President’s power to veto an item written into an well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Congress for approval through a process known as "bill Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President‘s
presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body,
Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads calculated to guard the community against the effects of
as follows: factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the
public good, which may happen to influence a majority of
Sec. 27.x x x. that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the
chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad
xxxx laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which
the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field
not object. of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the
distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the
bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the
112 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
item of appropriation as follows: further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the
which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
general provision of law which happens to be put into an indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence,
appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied) without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As
a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he
bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or
power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some
money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state
parameters of appropriation. that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues
considering that the implementing authority would still have
to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of
and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the
appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of
correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified
the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would,
singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise
in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of
known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the
the principle of non-delegability.
item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific
appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President
may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing
formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and
the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a b. Application.
specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be
considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x
subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the
appropriation may be validly apportioned into component legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of
percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item
percentage or value must be allocated for its own later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto
corresponding purpose for such component to be considered power of the President mandates that appropriations bills
as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose
pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213
practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE
(maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the
the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet
the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-
special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally sum appropriations are essential to financially address
square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted.
long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some
herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and
added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution textually-grounded.214
requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by The Court agrees with petitioners.
funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer,
or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion
therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds,
only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires
amount would be further divided among individual legislators
that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to
who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and
be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means
appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
113 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump- an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-
sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the
system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of
consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As senators.‘"220
petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system
forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the The Court agrees in part.
entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust,"
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of
legitimate projects.215 government should exercise their official functions only in
accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of
identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact
prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above- accountability from public officers.
characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79
Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the
multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the
missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in
materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either
connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
power of item veto. matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
"limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and
information that would aid in more stringently auditing the The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features
utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel,
the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators
agency."217 are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent,
Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,
budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in
to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same
essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
do not justify even commendable ends.218 Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that:
c. Accountability.
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially- thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
114 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be from ruling on this issue.
called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis
supplied) In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on
this score to be largely speculative since it has not been
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be
of project implementation – a matter before another office of able to propagate political dynasties.
government – renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office. 5. Local Autonomy.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in
post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel
and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of ARTICLE II
interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a
matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
on a case-to-case basis.
governments.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the
ARTICLE X
close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this
local autonomy.
matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not
strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
assessment. which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of
government units their powers, responsibilities, and
the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability,
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
4. Political Dynasties.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System
known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC),
enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to
wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more
accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in
specifically explicated as follows:
contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 2.Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that the territorial and political
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and
development as self-reliant communities and make them
underscoring supplied)
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is responsive and accountable local government structure
considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
"as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision government units shall be given more powers, authority,
does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable responsibilities, and resources. The process of
constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for decentralization shall proceed from the National Government
legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since there to the local government units.
appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on
xxxx
115 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national is to enable the representatives to identify projects for
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford.233
appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and
people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however,
community before any project or program is implemented in finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies
their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In
supplied) particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC without taking into account the specific interests and
reveal the policy of the State to empower local government peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this
units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self- regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
sustaining and effective contributors to the national genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As
Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228 a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add,
intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-
to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-
reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal President – who do not represent any locality, receive
corporations are the small republics from which the great one funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These
derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s
will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources original intent which is "to make equal the unequal."
and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds
involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic. under the effective control of each legislator and given unto
This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the them on the sole account of their office.
national government in purely local affairs which are best
resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control
units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of
letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are
Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the development, and coordinating development efforts within
Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are
principles on local autonomy since it allows district instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared
representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and
judgments in utilizing public funds for local development. 230 resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
The Court agrees with petitioners. individual legislators, who are national officers that have no
law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-
equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly
individual members of Congress, far more than the President put by petitioners in the following wise:236
and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local
constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 development council and initiate projects on his own, and
Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of
legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively personality-driven project identification has not only
small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork contributed little to the overall development of the district,
Barrel complement and link the national development goals but has even contributed to "further weakening
to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the
areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are government."
preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23,
2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to
reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine
Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
116 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be
unconstitutional. made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the
authorization or appropriation under the questioned
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time
resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past
involving the Presidential Pork Barrel. but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current
fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress),
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel. just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as
in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be
embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations
1. Validity of Appropriation.
act or in special provisions of laws of general or special
application which appropriate public funds for specific public
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and
purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation
Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which
measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and
respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the
certainly appears from the language employed (In re
Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since
Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or
they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of
appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of
Nevada v. La Grave:242
PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and
Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental
thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed
of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The word
allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a
to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of
amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the
view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words
are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the
made by law."239 argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and
specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation
The Court disagrees. law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a
determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates
the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of
intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation
a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same
for a particular public purpose. These two minimum
designations of amount and purpose stem from the very Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and Section 8.Appropriations. x x x
hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the
legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all
"does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words sources including receipts from service contracts and
or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation agreements such as application and processing fees,
by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all
an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent
"detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act
as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. of 1949; as well as the government share representing
As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241 royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and
similar payments on the exploration, development and
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special
prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and
117 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the 2. Undue Delegation.
President. (Emphases supplied)
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
reads: since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" gives the President
Sec. 12.Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the
(5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged
of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the
Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such
earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy
infrastructure development projects and to finance the resource development and exploitation programs and
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to projects of the government."244
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied) The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned While the designation of a determinate or determinable
principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal
910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain
revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-
from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be making authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of
used to finance energy resource development and (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known
exploitation programs and projects of the government and as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent
President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are
"after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth
gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second
amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence
projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent
specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF under which it is to be implemented.248
Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners
earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
These intermediate appropriations are the actual 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority
occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President
the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
the post-enactment determinations made by the individual purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of
law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to
an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, "energy resource development and exploitation programs
only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in and projects of the government" under the principle of
violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed. ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin
118 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be
specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the
the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation underlying framework of a system, especially public services
programs and projects of the government" states a singular and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and
and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as
reference of specific things from which the general phrase economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase
"for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to
development programs of the government; 250 and, third, the the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it
Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of
Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains
it is limited only to "energy resource development and legally effective and subsisting.
exploitation programs and projects of the government." 251
Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
completeness test since the policy of energy development is
clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under the same provision of law should nonetheless be
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel
stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently
System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners
This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of
equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be
Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the
Funds "to finance energy resource development and
complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their
exploitation programs and projects of the government,"
PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the
remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the
use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient
declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF
but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used –
Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s
as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed
lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from
purpose and intention of PD 910.
the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report).
amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘ Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and
submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as
amendatory provision may be readily examined under the follows:
current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to
resolve its constitutionality.
ARTICLE II
119 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard,
to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the
explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission: 256 list requested. (Emphases supplied)
While the manner of examining public records may be subject In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear
public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive
be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did
of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which
constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said
duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be information be equally released to the CoA, it must be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case. pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party
to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official
before Us, the public right to be enforced and the document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations.
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in While the Court recognizes that the information requested is
the Constitution. a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to
ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important
writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information interests of the government, it is constrained to deny
sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the petitioners‘ prayer on this score, without prejudice to a
constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied) proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may
choose to pursue through a separate petition.
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257
(Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only
does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such schedule/list
abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was and report and not in any way deny them, or the general
stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well - public, access to official documents which are already existing
defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and
and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these
act required." Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte,
the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. while the Court denied the application for mandamus
The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted: 258 towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners
therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents
sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
reasonable regulations,viz.:259
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records,"
the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
on matters of public concern. regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the
manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to
or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records
to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and
may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled
certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required.
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80
The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the
Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third
required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R.
alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is
No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v.
meritorious.
Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act
sought by petitioners, i.e.,
120 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain
who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by
the then First Lady Imelda Marcos." the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because
they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here. conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO
by the DBM.262
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional
Deliberations. The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether
budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently, or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is
off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The
limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared
remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the herein has the consequential effect of converting the
Executive‘s Social Funds."260 temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the
promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently
petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the enjoined.
prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence,
lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of
prayer on this score. "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical
impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular,
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF
Decision. funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is
promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s
interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation
accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In
response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for
enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated
year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A
September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific
reads as follows: authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not
exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the
purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013
which is subject to compliance with specific laws or
GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has
regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by
been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated
competent authority."263
by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the
TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements
thereto effected by the agencies concerned. Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only
evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to
pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the
and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the
continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds
control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even
as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second,
be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent
that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing
the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual
agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s
release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the
September 10, 2013 TRO.
NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As
may be determined from the statements of the DBM
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that
representative during the Oral Arguments:265
"the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of
funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued
issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]." 261 As such,
simultaneously with the SARO?
PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO,
should remain enjoined.
121 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
xxxx As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s
pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other
go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c)
commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure
NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in
the payees depending on the projects or projects covered by effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
the SARO and the NCA.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
or revoked? declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act,
such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and
there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by complied with. As explained in the recent case of
the DBM. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or
executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may
supplied)
lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law
of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not recognition of what had transpired prior to such
be treated as funds which have been "released." In this adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme
respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to
which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative
corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently ignored.‘"268
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund.
Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied
PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot
prospectively.
be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court
sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an
Conclusion
unconstitutional source.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
127 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
July 26, 2017 G.R. No. 219501 Meneses (Meneses) laid down the criteria and procedure for
the accreditation of courier service providers, as follows:
POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ALAN LA MADRID PURISIMA,
Petitioner 5. QUALIFICATIONS/CRITERIA FOR ACCREDITATION
vs.
HON. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, in her official capacity A Courier Service provided may be accredited under the
as the OMBUDSMAN OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, following conditions:
Respondent
5.1 Applicant must be a local entity with appropriate business
DECISION permits and is duly registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)[;]
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
5.2 It has completed and submitted all its reportorial
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by requirements to the [SEC];
petitioner former Police Director General Alan La Madrid
Purisima (Purisima), assailing the Decision2 dated July 29, 5.3 It has updated permits from [the local government unit
2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 138296 (LGU)] where its main office is located[;]
and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722, which affirmed the Order 3 dated
December 3, 2014 issued by respondent Conchita Carpio 5.4 It has paid all its income taxes for the year, as duly
Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman, preventively certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);
suspending Purisima during the pendency of the consolidated
cases against him before the Office of the Ombudsman.
5.5 It must have secured clearances from Directorate for
Intelligence (DI)[;]
The Facts
5.6 It must have an extensive network all over the Philippines;
In 2011,4 the Philippine National Police (PNP) entered into a and
Memorandum of Agreement5 (MOA) with WER FAST6
Documentary Agency, Inc. (WER FAST) without going through
5. 7 The application shall be made in the name of the
any public bidding. Under the MOA, the PNP undertook to
company represented by its President or any of its key
allow WER FAST to provide courier services to deliver firearm
directors as duly authorized in a board resolution for that
licenses to gun owners.7 In turn, WER FAST agreed to donate
purpose.14 (Emphases supplied)
equipment for an online application system for the renewal
of firearm licenses.8 PCSupt. Napoleon R. Estilles (Estilles),
On December 18, 2012, Purisima was appointed as PNP
then Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) under
Chief.15 Thereafter, or on February 12, 2013, Meneses issued
the Civil Security Group (CSG), signed the MOA on behalf of
a Memorandum16 addressed to Purisima (Meneses Memo),
the PNP. Based on the records, the incumbent PNP Chief
stating that the CSG has accredited WER FAST as the courier
approved the signing of the MOA on August 24, 2011.9
service to deliver the approved firearms license cards to gun
owners, and more importantly, recommended that the
Subsequently, the PNP's Legal Service (LS) was instructed to
delivery of license cards via courier be made mandatory:
review the signed MOA vis-a-vis a proposed revised MOA,
noting that the signed MOA had not been implemented. In a
7. In compliance [with] the policy guidance of the then
Memorandum10 dated August 7, 2012, the LS opined that the
TACDS, now the Chief, PNP, to implement the delivery of the
FEO should first formulate rules for accreditation, by which to
approved firearms license cards to the addresses supplied by
evaluate any company offering courier services, including
the applicants, this office has accredited WER FAST
WER FAST. It further suggested that the rules should include
Documentation Agency for the purpose, after complying with
the qualifications of the company to be accredited, the
all the documentary requirements stipulated in the FEO
required scope of courier services, the creation of an
Policy on Accreditation.
accreditation committee, provisions on strict confidentiality,
disclaimer, and grounds to terminate accreditation.11
RECOMMENDATION
Consequently, on November 19, 2012, the FEO Courier
Services Accreditation Board (Accreditation Board) was 8. Recommend that the delivery of firearms licenses cards of
constituted.12 In an undated memorandum13 entitled "Policy gun owners to their registered addresses, whether newly
on Accreditation of FEO Courier Service" (Accreditation purchased firearms or renewed firearm licenses be made
Policy), then CSG Director Police Director Gil Calaguio mandatory, to give force and effect to this new intervention
to monitor and control firearms in the hands of gun owners.
128 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
9. Approval of para 8 above.17 (Emphases supplied) preventively suspended Purisima and other PNP officers, for
six (6) months without pay.36
Purisima approved this memorandum on February 17, 2013. 18
It was only more than a month after the Meneses Memo was Purisima and another PNP official 37 filed their respective
issued, or on April 1, 2013, that the Accreditation Board petitions for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
issued Resolution Number 2013- 027,19 accrediting WER FAST No. 138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722,38 which were
as a courier services provider to all FEO clients relative to the consolidated in a Resolution dated January 30, 2015.39 While
licensing of firearms (FEO Resolution). these consolidated cases were pending before the CA,
Purisima resigned as PNP Chief40 and the preventive
The Proceedings Before the Ombudsman suspension period had lapsed.41
In 2014, two (2) complaints were filed before the Office of the The CA Ruling
Ombudsman against Purisima, WER FAST, and other PNP
officials relative to the PNP's directive for gun owners to avail In a Decision42 dated July 29, 2015, the CA dismissed the
of the courier delivery of firearm licenses via WER FAST. The petitions and affirmed the Ombudsman's assailed
first complaint20 filed by a private complainant charged Order.1âwphi1 On the procedural aspect, the CA held that
Purisima, Estilles, and WER FAST of violating Republic Act (RA) the petitions are moot in view of the lapse of the six-month
Nos. 6713,21 3019,22 7080,23 and 9184.24 He alleged, among period of preventive suspension. In particular, the CA noted
others, that: the MOA was not procured through competitive that Purisima received the Order on December 4, 2014.
bidding; it was executed before WER FAST obtained its SEC Counting from this date, his period of preventive suspension
certificate of registration; WER FAST is not authorized by the lapsed on June 4, 2015. Nevertheless, the CA proceeded to
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) to discuss the merits of the case.43
deliver mails/ parcels to the public; Purisima has close
personal ties with WER FAST's incorporator and high ranking On the merits, the CA held that the Ombudsman is authorized
officer; Purisima made mandatory the use of courier service under Section 24 of RA 677044 to preventively suspend
for license delivery in favor of WER FAST; and WER FAST was without pay any public officer or employee during the
inefficient in delivering the license cards.25 He later filed a pendency of an investigation. It added that the power to
Manifestation and Motion26 with attached Joint-Affidavit27 issue preventive suspension order is undoubtedly a part of
executed by several PNP officials positively identifying the Ombudsman's investigatory and disciplinary authority.45
Purisima as the one who directed FEO-CSG to accommodate
WER FAST as the sole courier delivery service of the firearms The CA further held that the Ombudsman did not gravely
license cards.28 Purisima filed his Counter-Affidavit29 on July abuse her discretion in preventively suspending Purisima for
25, 2014. irregularly accrediting WER FAST as courier service provider,
noting that the two (2) requisites46 for the validity of a
On October 9, 2014, the second complaint30 was filed by the preventive suspension order were present.47First, the
Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) - Office of the Deputy Ombudsman made a prior determination that the evidence
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement was strong based on the documents submitted to them and
Offices (MOLEO) against several PNP officers involved in the the following circumstances: (a) BIR certificate; (b) Director of
MOA's execution and WER FAST's accreditation as a courier Intelligence certificate; and (c) Department of Science and
service provider. Attached to the complaint were Technology (DOST) certificate.48 Particularly, WER FAST was
certifications from various government agencies attesting accredited despite non-payment of taxes for the years 2011
that WER FAST failed to meet the qualifications for to 2013 as shown by the BIR certification. The Director of
accreditation under the Accreditation Policy.31 As regards Intelligence likewise issued a certification that it has not given
Purisima, FFIB-MOLEO prayed that he be administratively clearances to WER FAST. Additionally, WER FAST's business
charged for gross negligence and/or gross neglect of duty, permits for the years 2011 to 2012 indicated "consultancy" as
with a prayer for preventive suspension. It alleged that its business, while its Articles of Incorporation stated that the
Purisima is administratively liable "for approving the corporation's primary purpose is to act as a business
recommendation of Meneses without verifying or checking consultant, engage in providing assistance in documentation
the records and capability of [WER FAST]."32 and registration. The DOST Postal Regulation Committee also
issued a certification that it has not accredited WER FAST as a
Purisima requested33 for additional time to file his counter- courier service provider. Notably, WER FAST had no proven
affidavit and was granted an inextendible period of ten (10) track record in courier service. It even engaged the services of
days from receipt of the Order34 dated December 1, 2014. LBC Express, Inc. precisely because the former lacked the
capacity to deliver firearms licenses. Furthermore, it was not
On December 3, 2014, without waiting for Purisima's counter- compliant with the DOTC's paid-up capital requirement of
affidavit, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order, 35which ₱500,000.00 to be accredited to operate as a courier service
129 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
in two or more administrative regions in the country. To declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or
highlight, WER FAST was accredited by PNP nationwide use."53 In Osmeña v. Social Security System of the Phils.,54the
despite having a paid-up capital of only ₱65,000.00.49Second, Court explained the consequence of a finding of mootness:
the charge filed against Purisima was Gross Negligence
and/or Gross Neglect of Duty, which if proven true, would In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a
constitute a ground for his removal from public office.50 Thus, petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated
the CA concluded that the concurrence of the foregoing by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline
elements rendered the preventive suspension order valid. jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness - save when, among others, a compelling
Aggrieved, Purisima filed the present petition. constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the
The Issues Before the Court public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading
judicial review.55
The issues before the Court are: (a) whether or not the
petition has been rendered moot and academic; and, (b) if in In this case, since the propriety or impropriety of Purisima's
the negative, whether or not the CA correctly held that the preventive suspension would essentially determine his
Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her discretion in entitlement to back salaries during the six-month period
preventively suspending Purisima. therefor, the Court holds that despite the lapse of the period
of his preventive suspension, there remains some practical
The Court's Ruling value or use in resolving his petition assailing the
Ombudsman's December 3, 2014 Order. Thus, by the same
logic in Capulong, this case cannot be considered as moot and
The petition is denied.
academic so as to obviate the Court from resolving its merits.
I.
II.
In Ombudsman v. Capulong51 (Capulong), the Court ruled that
The Ombudsman is explicitly authorized to issue a preventive
a case questioning the validity of a preventive suspension
suspension order under Section 24 of RA 6770 when two (2)
order is not mooted by the supervening lifting of the same:
conditions are met. These are: (a) the evidence of guilt is
strong based on the Ombudsman's judgment; and (b) any of
In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive
the three (3) circumstances are present - (I) the charge
suspension order against Capulong does not render the
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the courts
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
from passing upon the validity of a preventive suspension
performance of duty; (2) the charges would warrant removal
order, it being a manifestation of its constitutionally
from service; or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office
mandated power and authority to determine whether or not
may prejudice the case filed against him. Section 24 reads:
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
Section 24.Preventive Suspension.- The Ombudsman or his
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
As held in Capulong, the Court, in the exercise of its expanded
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
judicial power, may not be precluded from passing upon the
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
order's validity so as to determine whether or not grave
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the same. The
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal
result of a finding of a grave abuse of discretion means that
from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
the issuance is null and void from its very inception, and thus,
office may prejudice the case filed against him.
bars the same from producing any legal effects. Indeed, "[n]o
legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
void."52 As such, a public officer improperly placed under
preventive suspension should be restored to his original
position, and accordingly, should have earned his salaries as if In this case, the Court need not belabor on the presence of
he was not preventively suspended for the pertinent period. the second condition, considering that (a) one of the charges
against Purisima is gross neglect of duty; and (b) the criminal
and administrative charges (i.e., violations of RAs 6713, 3019,
"A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it
7080, and 9184, as well as gross neglect of duty) against
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
Purisima, if proven, would indeed warrant his removal from
supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
130 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
office. Since Section 24 uses the disjunctive "or",56 then the such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he
presence of any of the three (3) stated situations would be may need to suspend the respondent.
sufficient to comply with this condition.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from
As regards the first condition, case law states that the several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or
strength of the evidence is left to the determination of the destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the
Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before her; intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be
hence, the deliberate use of the words "in his judgment." In given the discretion to decide when the persons facing
Yasay, Jr. v. Desierto:57 administrative charges should be preventively suspended.62
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The rule is that whether the evidence of guilt is strong, as
required in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, is left to the However, as in any governmental power, the Ombudsman's
determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the authority to preventively suspend is not unlimited. When a
evidence before him. In the very words of Section 24, the complaint is virtually bereft of any supporting evidence or the
Ombudsman may preventively suspend a public official evidence so cited is, on its face, clearly inadmissible, then no
pending investigation if "in his judgment" the evidence deference ought to be accorded. Under these instances, the
presented before him tends to show that the official's guilt is Ombudsman may be said to have gravely abused her
strong and if the further requisites enumerated in Section 24 discretion in finding that the first condition was met.
are present. The Court cannot substitute its own judgment
for that of the Ombudsman on this matter, absent clear In the present case, the Ombudsman found that the evidence
showing of grave abuse of discretion.58 (Emphasis and of guilt against Purisima was strong enough to place him
underscoring supplied) under preventive suspension. Said finding cannot be said to
be tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it was based on
The Court's deference to the Ombudsman's judgment supporting documentary evidence,63 none of which were
regarding this condition not only stems from its policy of non- questioned to be inadmissible.1avvphi1 For one, the
interference with the Ombudsman's exercise of her Ombudsman considered the PNP officials' Joint Affidavit, 64
prosecutorial and investigatory powers;59 it is also a conscious expressing that Purisima exerted pressure and coercion over
recognition of the preliminary nature and purpose of a his subordinates to coordinate with WER FAST in relation to
preventive suspension order. It is well-established that:60 the courier delivery service. The Ombudsman also cited
several circumstances sourced from the documentary
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a evidence that should have prodded Purisima to verify WER
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The FAST' s credentials and. capability to provide courier services
purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused for the delivery of firearms licenses before he insisted on the
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of implementation of the MOA. These circumstances are: (a) the
his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with absence of a public bidding before the MOA was executed;
records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case (b) the absence of accreditation from the Accreditation Board
against him. If after such investigation, the charge is when Purisima approved the Meneses Memo; (c) the
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts Meneses Memo failed to mention the resolution supposedly
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, accrediting WER FAST; (d) the Accreditation Board accredited
removed or dismissed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) WER FAST despite the latter's lack of proof of compliance
with the Accreditation Policy; (e) WER FAST had no proven
Being a preventive measure essentially meant to ensure the track record in courier services and lacked the capacity to
proper course of a still ongoing investigation, the deliver the firearms licenses; (j) WER FAST failed to obtain the
Ombudsman should thus be given ample discretion to DOTC's accreditation for authority to operate courier
determine the strength of the preliminary evidence services; and (g) WER FAST's failure to donate the equipment
presented before her and thereafter, decide whether or not for the online system as stated in the MOA, among others.65
to issue such order against a particular respondent. In
Buenaseda v. Flavier,61 this Court explained: Since both conditions for the issuance of a preventive
suspension order against Purisima are present in this case,
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly the Court therefore holds that the Ombudsman acted within
authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the her powers when she issued the assailed December 3, 2014
discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or Order. In consequence, Purisima is not entitled to back
employees. In order to make an intelligent determination salaries during the period of his preventive suspension.
whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to
conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct As a final point, the Court clarifies that - contrary to
Purisima's stance - the Ombudsman did not violate his right
131 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
to due process nor did she prejudge the case when she issued SO ORDERED.
the preventive suspension order before he was able to file his
counter-affidavit for the second complaint.66 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Lastimosa v. Ombudsman67already settles that the
Ombudsman may issue a preventive suspension order prior
to the filing of an answer or counter-affidavit, considering
that the same is but a preventive measure:
xxxx
132 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
June 5, 2017 G.R. No. 211166 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
vs before final judgment;
PORFERIO CULAS y RAGA, Accused-Appellant
x x xx
RESOLUTION
In People v. Layag, 6the Court thoroughly explained the
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his
liabilities, as follows:
In a Resolution1 dated July 18, 2014, the Court adopted the
Decision2 dated July 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling
CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380 finding accused-appellant herein:
Porferio Culas y Raga (accused-appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape, the 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
pertinent portion of which reads: extinguishes his criminal liability [,] as well as the civil liability
[,] based solely thereon.1âvvphi1 As opined by Justice
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
conclusions of law in the July 25, 2013 Decision of the CA in final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380 and AFFIRMS said Decision civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
finding accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga GUILTY offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under paragraph strictiore."
1 (d), Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, with notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
MODIFICATIONS as to the amounts of civil indemnity and be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
damages awarded. Thus, [accused-appellant] is ordered to Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
pay the following amounts: (a) ₱l 00,000.00 as civil of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result
indemnity; (b) ₱l 00,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) of the same act or omission:
₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the monetary awards a) Law
from the dated of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
3
b) Contracts
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET ASIDE the Court's
Resolution dated July 18, 2014 in connection with this case;
(b) DISMISS Crim. Case No. BN-01-02-3754 before the
Regional Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15 by reason of
the death of accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga; and (c)
DECLARE the instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
134 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
March 13, 2017 G.R. No. 225608 Crim Case No. 74-SD(96)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at Brgy.
ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y RIGOR and JOEL ANGELES y DE [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
JESUS, Accused-Appellants Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused [Alejandro and Angeles],
DECISION together with two (2) other persons whose identities are still
unknown (John Doe and Peter Doe), conspiring,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent
to kill did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, box, beat and stab one [BBB] on the different parts of
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-
her body with the use of a pointed instrument, thereby
appellants Alberto Alejandro y Rigor (Alejandro) and Joel
causing her instantaneous death, to the damage and
Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles; collectively, accused-appellants)
prejudice of the said victim.
assailing the Decision2 dated June 3, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06495, which affirmed
with modification the Joint Decision3 dated August 20, 2013 Contrary to law.
of the Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva
Ecija, Branch 88 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96), 73- Upon Alejandro's arrest, he pleaded not guilty to the charges
SD(96), and 74-SD(96) convicting accused-appellants of the against him as stated in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and 74-
crimes of Simple Rape and Homicide, defined and penalized SD(96).7
under Articles 3354 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
respectively. While Angeles was still at large, the prosecution sought for
the amendment of the Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 72-
The Facts SD(96) and 73- SD(96) to convey a conspiracy between
accused-appellants in the rape cases against AAA. The R TC
On March 28, 1996, a total of three (3) separate Informations allowed the amendment of the Information in Crim. Case No.
were filed before the R TC, each charging accused-appellants 73-SD(96) to include Alejandro therein as a conspirator;
of one (1) count of Simple Rape and one (1) count of however, it disallowed the proposed amendment in Crim.
Homicide, viz.:5 Case No. 72-SD(96) to include Angeles therein as conspirator
on the ground that Alejandro had already been arraigned in
the latter case.8 The amended Information in Crim. Case No.
Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96)
73-SD(96) reads:
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30
o'clock [sic] in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of
o'clock in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of
[Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within
[Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [Alejandro], with lewd design, by means of force,
accused [Angeles], with lewd design, and in conspiracy with
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
one ALBERTO ALEJANDRO Y RIGOR @ "JESUS'', by means of
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one [AAA6
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
]gainst her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one
the said offended party. Contrary to law.
[AAA] against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
Contrary to law.9
That on or about the 5111 day of January 1996, at around
2:30 o'clock [sic] in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado],
Eventually, Angeles was arrested and arraigned in connection
Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
with Crim. Case Nos. 73-SD(96) and 74-SD(96), to which he
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
pleaded not guilty. Alejandro was likewise arraigned in Crim.
Court, the above-named accused [Angeles], with lewd design,
Case No. 73-SD(96) and pleaded not guilty as well.10
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge of one AAA against her will and consent, to the The prosecution alleged that on December 12, 1995, AAA
damage and prejudice of the said offended party. joined her co-worker for a vacation in the province of Nueva
Ecija as they were both laid off from work, and they stayed at
the one-storey house of the latter's 62- year old mother, BBB.
Contrary to law.
135 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Thereat, AAA would sleep at the papag while BBB slept on a the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
mattress on the floor. At around 2:30 in the morning of moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
January 5, 1996, AAA awoke to the sound of BBB's pleas for (c) in Crim. Case No. 7 4-SD(96), accused-appellants were
mercy. Aided by the kerosene lamp placed on the floor, AAA sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
saw BBB being mauled and stabbed to death by Alejandro indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of
and Angeles. Thereafter, Angeles approached AAA and prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
restrained her arms, while Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay
underwear down and started having carnal knowledge of her. BBB's heirs the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
After Alejandro was done, he switched places with Angeles the latter's death.16
and the latter took his turn ravishing AAA. As AAA was able to
fight back by scratching Angeles' s back, Angeles punched her In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to AAA's positive
on the left side of her face while Alejandro hit her left jaw identification of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the
with a piece of wood. AAA then lost consciousness and woke crimes charged, expressly noting that AAA had no ill motive
up in a hospital, while BBB succumbed to her injuries. 11 to falsely testify against them.1âwphi1 In this light, the RTC
found untenable accused-appellants' defenses of denial and
At the hospital, the police officers interviewed AAA and alibi, considering too that they have failed to show that it was
showed her several mugshots in order for her to identify her physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene when
assailants. AAA was then able to recognize Alejandro and the crimes against AAA and BBB were committed.17
Angeles from said mugshots and positively identified them as
the perpetrators of the crime. Medical records also revealed Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed18 to the CA.
that AAA was indeed sexually assaulted, while BBB died due
to "neurogenic shock" or severe pain secondary to "multiple The CA Ruling
blunt injury and fracture of the mandibular and facio-
maxillary bones."12
In a Decision19 dated June 3, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling with the following modifications: (a) in Crim. Case No.
In his defense, Angeles denied the charges against him and 72-SD(96), Alejandro was found guilty beyond reasonable
presented an alibi. He averred that on the night before the doubt of Simple Rape and, accordingly, was sentenced to
incident, he was at home with his wife and slept as early as suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
eight (8) o'clock in the evening. Upon waking up at seven (7) AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
o'clock in the morning of the next day, he was informed by ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
his brother-in-law of BBB's death. He further averred that his damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), Alejandro was
relationship with BBB was like that of a mother and son.13 found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of
Simple Rape, while Angeles was found guilty beyond
Similarly, Alejandro invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the same crime, and
He claimed that at around nine (9) o'clock in the evening prior accordingly, were separately sentenced to suffer the penalty
to the incident, he went home and slept. As testified by Noel of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of
Mendoza (Mendoza), Alejandro's relative by affinity, he asked ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
Alejandro to help him irrigate the rice field, but the latter and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of
declined. At around midnight, Mendoza went to Alejandro's Simple Rape; and (c) in Crim. Case No. 74- SD(96), accused-
house to personally fetch Alejandro, but considering that the appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
house was closed, Mendoza peeped through a hole and there Homicide and, accordingly, were each sentenced to suffer the
he saw Alejandro soundly asleep. Alejandro further claimed penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six
that he does not know both AAA and Angeles until the filing (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
of the charges against him.14 fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to solidarily
The RTC Ruling pay BBB's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and P525,000.00 as temperate
In a Joint Decision15 dated August 20, 2013, the RTC found damages. In addition, accused-appellants are likewise
accused-appellants guilty as charged and, accordingly, ordered to pay legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
sentenced them as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96), on all monetary awards from date of finality of judgment until
Alejandro was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion fully paid.20
perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and It held that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73- doubt accused-appellants' complicity to the crimes charged,
SD(96), accused-appellants were each sentenced to suffer the as they were positively identified by AAA who had an
penalty of reclusion perpetua and each ordered to pay AAA unobstructed view of their appearance when said crimes
136 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
were being committed. It likewise found the existence of infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed
conspiracy in the commission of said crimes, considering that all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is
accused-appellants: (a) cooperated in stabbing and mauling mortal and could cause the death of the victim without
BBB, resulting in her death; and (b) took turns in having carnal medical intervention or attendance."24
knowledge of AAA without her consent, while the other
restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting.21 On the other hand, pertinent portions of Article 335 of the
RPC (the controlling provision as the rapes were committed
Hence, the instant appeal. prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. [RA] 835325 in
1997) read:
The Issue Before the Court
Article 335.When and how rape is committed. - Rape is
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the any of the following circumstances:
aforesaid crimes.
1. By using force or intimidation;
The Court's Ruling
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
At the outset, the Court notes that during the pendency of unconscious; and
the instant appeal, Alejandro filed a Motion to Withdraw
Appeal22 dated January 19, 2017, stating that despite knowing 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
the full consequences of the filing of said motion, he still demented.
desires to have his appeal withdrawn. In view thereof, the
Court hereby grants said motion, and accordingly, deems the The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
case closed and terminated as to him. Thus, what is left
before the Court is the resolution of Angeles's appeal. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide be reclusion perpetua to death.
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors,
though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse xxxx
the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those
that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the
"Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b) said
such court competent to examine records, revise the
carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
or intimidation; or the victim was deprived of reason or
proper provision of the penal law."23
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve
(12) years of age or demented. The provision also states that
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to if the act is committed either with the use of a deadly
modify accused-appellants' convictions, as will be explained weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be
hereunder. Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher
penalty."26
Article 249 of the RPC states:
In this case, both the RTC and the CA were one in giving
Article 249.Homicide.- Any person who, not falling within the credence to AAA's positive identification that accused-
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the appellants conspired in stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the in the latter's death; and that thereafter, Angeles proceeded
next preceeding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide to rape her while Alejandro restrained her arms to prevent
and punished by reclusion temporal. her from resisting. Absent any cogent reason to the contrary,
the Court defer to the findings of fact of both courts and,
"To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the thereby, upholds Angeles's conviction for Rape in Crim. Case
following elements must be proved beyond reasonable No. 73-SD(96) and Homicide in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96),
doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed given that the elements of said crimes square with the
that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the established incidents. In People v. Antonio:27
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4)
that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying It is a fundamental rule that the trial court's factual findings,
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or especially its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are
137 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
accorded great weight and respect and binding upon this Anent the proper penalties to be imposed on Angeles, the CA
Court, particularly when affirmed by the [CA]. This Court has correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the best connection with Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), and the penalty of
position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and
testimonies because of its unique position of having observed one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity temporal, as maximum, as regards Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96).
is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can
observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, Finally, in line with existing jurisprudence, the Court deems it
hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the proper to adjust the award of damages as follows: (a) in Crim.
scant or full realization of an oath. These are significant Case No. 73-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to pay AAA the
factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as
of unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain (b) in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to pay the
facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect heirs of BBB the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
the result of the case.28 ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate
damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court deems it per annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid.31
appropriate to modify Angeles's conviction in Crim. Case No.
73-SD(96), as ruled by the CA. As adverted to earlier, the CA WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Alberto Alejandro y Rigor's
convicted Angeles for two (2) counts of Simple Rape in Crim. Motion to Withdraw Appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Case No. 73-SD(96) alone, ratiocinating that "Angeles must be instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED as to him.
held liable for two (2) counts of simple rape in Crim. Case No.
73- SD(96) for raping AAA and for aiding (or conspiring with) On the other hand, the appeal of accused-appellant Joel
Alejandro in raping her."29 Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles) is DENIED. The Decision dated
June 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
The CA erred on this matter. 06495 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to him,
as follows:
The accusatory portion of the amended Information in Crim.
Case No. 73-SD(96) states that "[Angeles], with lewd designs, (a) In Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is
and in conspiracy with one [Alejandro], by means of force, found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, Qualified Rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one [AAA] Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the
the said offended party."30 Plainly, the wording of the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as
amended Information reveals that it charged accused- moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with
appellants with only one (1) count of Rape. As such, it was legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all
error for the CA to convict Angeles with two (2) counts. Thus, monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until
Angeles must be convicted with one (1) count of Rape in fully paid; and
relation to Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96).
(b) In Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is
On a related matter, since the Information in Crim. Case No. found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
73- SD(96) was allowed to be amended to include Alejandro Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
as a co-accused and that accused-appellants were convicted Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to each
of such charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
conviction in said case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the RPC states that if the minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one
rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to
it was committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil
be Qualified Rape, as in this instance. Notably, this will no indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as
longer affect Alejandro as he had already withdrawn his temperate damages, with legal interest at the rate of six
appeal prior to the promulgation of this decision. percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
In sum, Angeles should be convicted of one (1) count of
Qualified Rape and one (1) count of Homicide. SO ORDERED.
138 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
G.R. No. 191667 April 17, 2013 Municipality on October 20, 2006 in the principal amount of
₱28,000,000.00 (Second Loan).12
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. Unlike phase 1 of the Redevelopment Plan, the construction
EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN, Respondent. of the commercial center at the Agoo Plaza was vehemently
objected to by some residents of the Municipality. Led by
DECISION respondent Eduardo Cacayuran (Cacayuran), these residents
claimed that the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: commercial center, as funded by the proceeds from the First
and Second Loans (Subject Loans), were "highly irregular,
violative of the law, and detrimental to public interests, and
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 is the March
will result to wanton desecration of the said historical and
26, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV.
public park."13 The foregoing was embodied in a Manifesto,14
No. 89732 which affirmed with modification the April 10,
launched through a signature campaign conducted by the
2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La
residents and Cacayuran.
Union, Branch 31, declaring inter alia the nullity of the loan
agreements entered into by petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank) and the Municipality of Agoo, La In addition, Cacayuran wrote a letter 15 dated December 8,
Union (Municipality). 2006 addressed to Mayor Eriguel, Vice Mayor Antonio Eslao
(Vice Mayor Eslao), and the members of the SB namely,
Violeta Laroya-Balbin, Jaime Boado, Jr., Rogelio De Vera,
The Facts
James Dy, Crisogono Colubong, Ricardo Fronda, Josephus
Komiya, Erwina Eriguel, Felizardo Villanueva, and Gerard
From 2005 to 2006, the Municipality’s Sangguniang Bayan
Mamuyac (Implicated Officers), expressing the growing public
(SB) passed certain resolutions to implement a multi-phased
clamor against the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a
plan (Redevelopment Plan) to redevelop the Agoo Public
commercial center. He then requested the foregoing officers
Plaza (Agoo Plaza) where the Imelda Garden and Jose Rizal
to furnish him certified copies of various documents related
Monument were situated.
to the aforementioned conversion including, among others,
the resolutions approving the Redevelopment Plan as well as
To finance phase 1 of the said plan, the SB initially passed the loan agreements for the sake of public information and
Resolution No. 68-20054 on April 19, 2005, authorizing then transparency.
Mayor Eufranio Eriguel (Mayor Eriguel) to obtain a loan from
Land Bank and incidental thereto, mortgage a 2,323.75
Unable to get any response, Cacayuran, invoking his right as a
square meter lot situated at the southeastern portion of the
taxpayer, filed a Complaint16 against the Implicated Officers
Agoo Plaza (Plaza Lot) as collateral. To serve as additional
and Land Bank, assailing, among others, the validity of the
security, it further authorized the assignment of a portion of Subject Loans on the ground that the Plaza Lot used as
its internal revenue allotment (IRA) and the monthly income
collateral thereof is property of public dominion and
from the proposed project in favor of Land Bank.5 The
therefore, beyond the commerce of man. 17
foregoing terms were confirmed, approved and ratified on
October 4, 2005 through Resolution No. 139-2005.6
Upon denial of the Motion to Dismiss dated December 27,
Consequently, on November 21, 2005, Land Bank extended a
2006,18 the Implicated Officers and Land Bank filed their
₱4,000,000.00 loan in favor of the Municipality (First Loan), 7
respective Answers.
the proceeds of which were used to construct ten (10) kiosks
at the northern and southern portions of the Imelda Garden.
After completion, these kiosks were rented out.8 For its part, Land Bank claimed that it is not privy to the
Implicated Officers’ acts of destroying the Agoo Plaza. It
further asserted that Cacayuran did not have a cause of
On March 7, 2006, the SB passed Resolution No. 58-2006,9
action against it since he was not privy to any of the Subject
approving the construction of a commercial center on the
Loans.19
Plaza Lot as part of phase II of the Redevelopment Plan. To
finance the project, Mayor Eriguel was again authorized to
obtain a loan from Land Bank, posting as well the same During the pendency of the proceedings, the construction of
securities as that of the First Loan. All previous the commercial center was completed and the said structure
representations and warranties of Mayor Eriguel related to later became known as the Agoo’s People Center (APC).
the negotiation and obtention of the new loan 10 were ratified
on September 5, 2006 through Resolution No. 128-2006.11 In On May 8, 2007, the SB passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-
consequence, Land Bank granted a second loan in favor of the 2007,20 declaring the area where the APC stood as
patrimonial property of the Municipality.
139 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
The Ruling of the RTC the proceeds coming from the Subject Loans and not from
public funds. Besides, Cacayuran was not even a party to any
In its Decision dated April 10, 2007,21 the RTC ruled in favor of of the Subject Loans and is thus, precluded from questioning
Cacayuran, declaring the nullity of the Subject Loans. 22 It the same.
found that the resolutions approving the said loans were
passed in a highly irregular manner and thus, ultra vires; as The argument is untenable.
such, the Municipality is not bound by the same. 23 Moreover,
it found that the Plaza Lot is proscribed from collateralization It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue
given its nature as property for public use.24 where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any
Aggrieved, Land Bank filed its Notice of Appeal on April 23, improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds
2007.25 On the other hand, the Implicated Officers’ appeal through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
was deemed abandoned and dismissed for their failure to file law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that
an appellants’ brief despite due notice.26 In this regard, only the act complained of directly involves the illegal
Land Bank’s appeal was given due course by the CA. disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. In other
words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must
Ruling of the CA be met namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation are
disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in
In its Decision dated March 26, 2010,27 the CA affirmed with doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed;
modification the RTC’s ruling, excluding Vice Mayor Eslao and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.31
from any personal liability arising from the Subject Loans. 28
Records reveal that the foregoing requisites are present in
It held, among others, that: (1) Cacayuran had locus standi to the instant case.
file his complaint, considering that (a) he was born, raised and
a bona fide resident of the Municipality; and (b) the issue at First, although the construction of the APC would be primarily
hand involved public interest of transcendental importance;29 sourced from the proceeds of the Subject Loans, which Land
(2) Resolution Nos. 68-2005, 139-2005, 58-2006, 128-2006 Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no denying
and all other related resolutions (Subject Resolutions) were that public funds derived from taxation are bound to be
invalidly passed due to the SB’s non-compliance with certain expended as the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as
sections of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the a security for the foregoing loans. Needless to state, the
"Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC); (3) the Plaza Lot, Municipality’s IRA, which serves as the local government
which served as collateral for the Subject Loans, is property of unit’s just share in the national taxes,32 is in the nature of
public dominion and thus, cannot be appropriated either by public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes,
the State or by private persons;30 and (4) the Subject Loans however, that although these funds may be posted as a
are ultra vires because they were transacted without proper security, its collateralization should only be deemed effective
authority and their collateralization constituted improper during the incumbency of the public officers who approved
disbursement of public funds. the same, else those who succeed them be effectively
deprived of its use.
Dissatisfied, Land Bank filed the instant petition.
In any event, it is observed that the proceeds from the
Issues Before the Court Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds
by the Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds coming from
private sources become impressed with the characteristics of
The following issues have been raised for the Court’s
public funds when they are under official custody.33
resolution: (1) whether Cacayuran has standing to sue; (2)
whether the Subject Resolutions were validly passed; and (3)
whether the Subject Loans are ultra vires. Accordingly, the first requisite has been clearly met.
B. Validity of the Subject Resolutions In fine, Land Bank cannot rely on the Subject Resolutions as
basis to validate the Subject Loans.
Land Bank avers that the Subject Resolutions provided ample
authority for Mayor Eriguel to contract the Subject Loans. It C. Ultra vires nature of the Subject
posits that Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC merely requires
that the municipal mayor be authorized by the SB concerned Loans
and that such authorization need not be embodied in an
ordinance.38 Neither can Land Bank claim that the Subject Loans do not
constitute ultra vires acts of the officers who approved the
A careful perusal of Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC shows same.
that while the authorization of the municipal mayor need not
be in the form of an ordinance, the obligation which the said Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the
local executive is authorized to enter into must be made object for which a corporation is created as defined by the
pursuant to a law or ordinance, viz: law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers
conferred upon it by law.43 There are two (2) types of ultra
Sec. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and vires acts. As held in Middletown Policemen's Benevolent
Compensation. - Association v. Township of Middletown:44
142 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
March 15, 2017 G.R. No. 224834 (SRO) consisting of shares with total value of ₱l Billion which
was earlier approved in a Board Resolution passed on
JONATHAN Y. DEE, Petitioner February 17, 2015. As per Alliance's Disclosure dated May 29,
vs 2015 filed before the Philippine Stock Exchange, such
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND postponement was made "to give the stockholders of
LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG [Alliance] better representation in the annual meeting, after
HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of ALLIANCE SELECT taking into consideration their subscription to the [SRO] of
FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as [Alliance]."7 This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file the
Director and Shareholder of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS instant Complaint (with Application for the Issuance of a Writ
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction)8 involving
x-----------------------x an intra-corporate controversy against Alliance, and its other
Board members, namely, George E. Sycip, Jonathan Y. Dee,
Raymund K.H. See, Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz, Antonio C. Pacis,
G.R. No. 224871
Erwin M. Elechicon, and Barbara Anne C. Migallos (Alliance
Board). In said complaint, Harvest All, et al. principally
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND
claimed that the subscription to the new shares through the
LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN
SRO cannot be made a condition precedent to the exercise by
KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods
the current stockholders of their right to vote in the 2015
International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a Director
ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived of their full voting
and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc.,
rights proportionate to their existing shareholdings. 9 Thus,
Petitioners,
Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia, the declaration of
vs.
nullity of the Board Resolution dated May 29, 2015
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E.
indefinitely postponing the 2015 ASM, as well as the Board
SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE
Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SR0. 10 The
T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON,
Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with filing
and BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS, Respondents.
fees amounting to ₱8,860.00 which they paid accordingly. 11
Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed an Amended Complaint:12(a)
DECISION deleting its prayer to declare null and void the Board
Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SRO; and
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: (b) instead, prayed that the Alliance Board be enjoined from
implementing and carrying out the SRO prior to and as a
Assailed in these consolidated petitions1 for review on condition for the holding of the 2015 ASM.13
certiorari are the Decision2 dated February 15, 2016 and the
Resolution3 dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of
in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, which reversed the Resolution4 jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay
dated August 24, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig the correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should have
City, Branch 159 (RTC) in COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-234 and, paid P20 Million, more or less, in filing fees based on the SRO
accordingly, reinstated the case and remanded the same to which was valued at Pl Billion. However, Harvest All, et al. did
the court a quo for further proceedings after payment of the not mention such capital infusion in their prayers and, as
proper legal fees. such, were only made to pay the measly sum of ₱8,860.00.
On the other hand, Harvest All, et al. maintained that they
The Facts paid the correct filing fees, considering that the subject of
their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM and not a
Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, claim on the aforesaid value of the SRO. Harvest All, et al.
Bondeast Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy S.C. likewise pointed out that they simply relied on the
Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own capacities, assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no intention to
minority stockholders of Alliance Select Foods International, defraud the government.14
Inc. (Alliance), with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a member of
Alliance's Board of Directors.5 As per Alliance's by-laws, its The RTC Ruling
Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is held every June 15. 6
However, in a Special Board of Directors Meeting held at In a Resolution15 dated August 24, 2015, the RTC dismissed
three (3) o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 2015, the Board the instant complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to Harvest
of Directors, over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's objections, passed a All, et al.'s failure to pay the correct filing fees.16 Citing Rule
Board Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015 ASM 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
pending complete subscription to its Stock Rights Offering SC,17 and the Court's pronouncement in Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr. (Lu),18
143 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
the RTC found that the basis for the computation of filing fees The Court's Ruling
should have been the ₱l Billion value of the SRO, it being the
property in litigation. As such, Harvest All, et al. should have The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied, while the petition
paid filing fees in the amount of more or less ₱20 Million and in G.R. No. 224871 is partly granted.
not just ₱5,860.00. In this regard, the RTC also found that
Harvest All, et al.'s payment of incorrect filing fees was done I.
in bad faith and with clear intent to defraud the government,
considering that: (a) when the issue on correct filing fees was
At the outset, the Court notes that in ruling that the correct
first raised during the hearing on the application for TRO,
filing fees for Harvest All, et al.'s complaint should be based
Harvest All, et al. never manifested their willingness to abide
on the Pl Billion value of the SRO - and, thus, essentially
by the Rules by paying additional filing fees when so required;
holding that such complaint was capable of pecuniary
(b) despite Harvest All, et al.'s admission in their complaint
estimation - both the RTC and the CA heavily relied on the
that the SRO was valued at Pl Billion, they chose to keep mum
on the meager assessment made by the Clerk of Court; and
Court's pronouncement in Lu.In Lu, the Court mentioned that
(c) while Harvest All, et al. made mention of the SRO in the
in view of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 which
body of their complaint, they failed to indicate the same in
introduced Section 21 (k)27 to Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
their prayer, thus, preventing the Clerk of Court from making
it seemed that "an intra-corporate controversy always
the correct assessment of filing fees.19
involves a property in litigation" and that "there can be no
case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of the
Aggrieved, Harvest All, et al. appealed20 to the CA.
subject matter cannot be estimated."28
The CA Ruling
However, after a careful reading of Lu, it appears that Harvest
All, et al. correctly pointed out29 that the foregoing
In a Decision21 dated February 15, 2016, the CA reversed the statements were in the nature of an obiter dictum.
RTC's order of dismissal and, accordingly, reinstated the case
and remanded the same to the court a quo for further
To recount, in Lu, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the case
proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees.22 Also
involving an intra-corporate controversy instituted therein,
citing Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
i.e., declaration of nullity of share issuance, is incapable of
04-2-04-SC, and Lu, the CA held that the prevailing rule is that
pecuniary estimation and, thus, the correct docket fees were
all intra-corporate controversies always involve a property in
paid.30 Despite such pronouncement, the Court still went on
litigation. Consequently, it agreed with the RTC's finding that
to say that had the complaint therein been filed during the
the basis for the computation of filing fees should have been
effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, then it would have ruled
the ₱l Billion value of the SRO and, thus, Harvest All, et al.
otherwise because the amendments brought about by the
should have paid filing fees in the amount of more or less ₱20
same "seem to imply that there can be no case of intra-
Million and not just ₱5,860.00.23 However, in the absence of
corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter
contrary evidence, the CA held that Harvest All, et al. were
cannot be estimated,"31viz.:
not in bad faith and had no intention of defrauding the
government, as they merely relied in the assessment of the
The new Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
Clerk of Court. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, the
amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC (July 20, 2004), expressly
CA ordered the reinstatement of Harvest All, et al.' s
provides that "[f]or petitions for insolvency or other cases
complaint and the remand of the same to the RTC for further
involving intra-corporate controversies, the fees prescribed
proceedings, provided that they pay the correct filing fees.24
under Section 7 (a) shall apply." Notatu dignum is that
paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section 7 thereof was omitted from
The parties moved for reconsideration,25 which were,
the reference. Said paragraph refers to docket fees for filing
however, denied in a Resolution26 dated May 25, 2016.
"[a]ctions where the value of the subject matter cannot be
Hence, these consolidated petitions.
estimated" and "all other actions not involving property."
145 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
At this juncture, it should be mentioned that the Court passed made to correct the anomaly created by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC
A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC38 dated October 5, 2016, which dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter dictum)
introduced amendments to the schedule of legal fees to be implying that all intra-corporate cases involved a subject
collected in various commercial cases, including those matter which is deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.
involving intra-corporate controversies. Pertinent portions of
A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC read: While the Court is not unaware that the amendments
brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016 only
RESOLUTION came after the filing of the complaint subject of this case,
such amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive
xxxx effect so as to make them applicable to the resolution of the
instant consolidated petitions as they merely pertained to a
Whereas, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and not substantive law. In
by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC effective 16 August 2004, Tan, Jr. v. CA,39 the Court thoroughly explained the
incorporated the equitable schedule of legal fees prescribed retroactive effectivity of procedural rules, viz.:
for petitions for rehabilitation under Section 21 (i) thereof
and, furthermore, provided under Section 21(k) thereof that The general rule that statutes are prospective and not
the fees prescribed under Section 7(a) of the said rule shall retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It
apply to petitions for insolvency or other cases involving has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one
intra-corporate controversies; which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or
xxxx attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or
considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolves to ADOPT a new
do not create new or take away vested rights, but only
schedule of filing fees as follows:
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
rights already existing, do not come within the legal
xxxx
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against
the retroactive operation of statutes." The general rule
4. Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court is against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is
hereby DELETED as the fees covering petitions for insolvency to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested
are already provided for in this Resolution. As for cases rights does not prevent the application of statutes to
involving intra-corporate controversies, the applicable fees proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where
shall be those provided under Section 7 (a), 7 (b) (1), or 7 (b) they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new
(3) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court depending on statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively
the nature of the action. applicable to all actions - those which have accrued or are
pending.
xxxx
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
This Resolution shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of at the time of their passage.1âwphi1 Procedural laws are
national circulation. The Office of the Court Administrator retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that
(OCA) is directed to circularize the same upon its effectivity. procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights
(Emphases and underscoring supplied) may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
Verily, the deletion of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 and in lieu violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
thereof, the application of Section 7 (a) [fees for actions adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
where the value of the subject matter can be procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The
determined/estimated], 7 (b) (1) [fees for actions where the reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to,
value of the subject matter cannot be estimated], or 7 (b) (3) nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that "a
[fees for all other actions not involving property] of the same person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
Rule to cases involving intra-corporate controversies for the litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
determination of the correct filing fees, as the case may be, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules
serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, the amendments of procedure."40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
concretize the Court's recognition that the subject matter of
an intra-corporate controversy may or may not be capable of In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et
pecuniary estimation; and on the other hand, they were also al.'s action as one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
146 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the
appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable
fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all
other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of
Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated
October 5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to the R
TC in order:
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
147 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
NENITA GONZALES, SPOUSES assailed Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen,
GENEROSA GONZALES AND Pangasinan, Branch 39, dated April 13, 2005 and August 8,
RODOLFO FERRER, SPOUSES G.R. No. 173008 2005, respectively, in Civil Case No. 16815, denying the
FELIPE GONZALES AND CAROLINA demurrer to evidence filed by herein respondents and instead
SANTIAGO, SPOUSES LOLITA dismissed petitioners' complaint.
GONZALES AND GERMOGENES Present:
GARLITOS, SPOUSES DOLORES
GONZALES AND FRANCISCO The Facts
COSTIN, SPOUSES CONCHITA
VELASCO, JR., J., The deceased spouses Bartolome Ayad and
GONZALES AND JONATHAN
CLAVE, AND SPOUSES BEATRIZ Marcelina Tejada (Spouses Ayad) had five (5) children: Enrico,
Chairperson,
GONZALES AND ROMY CORTES, Encarnacion, Consolacion, Maximiano and Mariano. The
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PERALTA, latter, who was single, predeceased his parents on December
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT AND CO- 4, 1943. Marcelina died in September 1950 followed by
PETITIONER NENITA GONZALES, ABAD, Bartolome much later on February 17, 1964.
Petitioners,
MENDOZA, and Enrico has remained single. Encarnacion died on
April 8, 1966 and is survived by her children, Nenita Gonzales,
PERLAS-BERNABE,JJ. Generosa Gonzales, Felipe Gonzales, Lolita Gonzales, Dolores
Gonzales, Conchita Gonzales and Beatriz Gonzales, the
- versus - petitioners in this case. Consolacion, meanwhile, was married
to the late Imigdio Bugaay. Their children are Mariano
Bugaay, Alicia Bugaay, Amelita Bugaay, Rodolfo Bugaay,
Letecia Bugaay, Lydia Bugaay, Luzviminda Bugaay and Belen
Bugaay, respondents herein. Maximiano died single and
Promulgated: without issue on August 20, 1986. The spouses of petitioners,
MARIANO BUGAAY AND LUCY except Nenita, a widow, and those of the respondents, except
BUGAAY, SPOUSES ALICIA Lydia and Belen, were joined as parties in this case.
BUGAAY AND FELIPE BARCELONA, In their Amended Complaint4 for Partition and
February 22, 2012 Annulment of Documents with Damages dated February5,
CONEY CONIE BUGAAY, JOEY
GATAN, LYDIA BUGAAY, SPOUSES 1991 against Enrico, Consolacion and the respondents,
LUZVIMINDA BUGAAY AND REY petitioners alleged, inter alia, that the only surviving children
PAGATPATAN AND BELEN of the Spouses Ayad are Enrico and Consolacion, and that
BUGAAY, during the Spouses Ayad's lifetime, they owned several
Respondents. agricultural as well as residential properties.
148 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
As affirmative defenses5, Enrico, Consolacion and the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial and set the
respondents claimed that petitioners had long obtained their same for hearing. In the Order10 dated August 29, 2003, Judge
advance inheritance from the estate of the Spouses Ayad, and Angeles granted respondents' motion for reconsideration
that the properties sought to be partitioned are now and/or new trial for the specific purpose of receiving and
individually titled in respondents' names. offering for admission the documents referred to by the
[respondents].11
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision 6
dated November 24, 1995, awarding one-fourth () pro- However, instead of presenting the documents
indiviso share of the estate each to Enrico, Maximiano, adverted to, consisting of the documents sought to be
Encarnacion and Consolacion as the heirs of the Spouses annulled, respondents demurred12 to petitioners' evidence on
Ayad, excluding Mariano who predeceased them. It likewise December 6, 2004 which the RTC, this time through Presiding
declared the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition Judge Dionisio C. Sison, denied in the Order13 dated April 13,
executed by Enrico and respondents, as well as all other 2005 as well as respondents' motion for reconsideration in
documents and muniments of title in their names, as null and the August 8, 2005 Order.14
void. It also directed the parties to submit a project of
partition within 30 days from finality of the Decision. Aggrieved, respondents elevated their case to the CA
through a petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of
On December, 13, 1995,7 respondents filed a motion discretion on the part of the RTC in denying their demurrer
for reconsideration and/or new trial from the said Decision. notwithstanding petitioners' failure to present the documents
On November 7, 1996, the RTC, through Judge Eugenio sought to be annulled. On March 23, 2006, the CA rendered
Ramos, issued an Order which reads: in the event that within the assailed Decision reversing and setting aside the Orders of
a period of one (1) month from today, they have not yet the RTC disposing as follows:
settled the case, it is understood that the motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial is submitted for resolution WHEREFORE, the instant
without any further hearing.8 petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed Orders of
Without resolving the foregoing motion, the RTC, the trial court dated April 13, 2006
noting the failure of the parties to submit a project of and August 8, 2005 are hereby both
partition, issued a writ of execution9 on February 17, 2003 SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof,
giving them a period of 15 days within which to submit their another Order is hereby issued
nominees for commissioner, who will partition the subject DISMISSING the Complaint, as
estate. amended.
149 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SO ORDERED.15 shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted
In dismissing the Amended Complaint, the appellate but on appeal the order of
court ratiocinated in the following manner: dismissal was reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right
In the light of the foregoing to present evidence.
where no sufficient evidence was
presented to grant the reliefs being
prayed for in the complaint, more The Court has previously explained the nature of a
particularly the absence of the demurrer to evidence in the case of Celino v. Heirs of Alejo
documents sought to be annulled and Teresa Santiago18 as follows:
as well as the properties sought to
be partitioned, common sense A demurrer to evidence is a
dictates that the case should have motion to dismiss on the ground of
been dismissed outright by the trial insufficiency of evidence and is
court to avoid unnecessary waste presented after the plaintiff rests
of time, money and efforts.16 his case. It is an objection by one of
the parties in an action, to the
Subsequently, the CA denied petitioners' motion for effect that the evidence which his
reconsideration in its Resolution17 dated June 2, 2006. adversary produced is insufficient
in point of law, whether true or
The Issues not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue. The evidence
In this petition for review, petitioners question contemplated by the rule on
whether the CA's dismissal of the Amended Complaint was in demurrer is that which pertains to
accordance with law, rules of procedure and jurisprudence. the merits of the case.
The Ruling of the Court In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain
The RTC Orders assailed before the CA basically whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the
involved the propriety of filing a demurrer to evidence after a judgment.19 Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a
Decision had been rendered in the case. demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court
renders its judgment.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
In this case, respondents demurred to petitioners'
SECTION 1.Demurrer to evidence after the RTC promulgated its Decision. While
evidence. - After the plaintiff has respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was
completed the presentation of his granted, it was for the sole purpose of receiving and offering
evidence, the defendant may move for admission the documents not presented at the trial. As
for dismissal on the ground that respondents never complied with the directive but instead
upon the facts and the law the filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion should be deemed
plaintiff has shown no right to abandoned. Consequently, the RTC's original Decision stands.
relief. If his motion is denied, he
Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in
granting the demurrer and dismissing the Amended
Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer
to evidence was clearly no longer an available remedy to
150 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC party to the unlawful detainer case against respondents
had correctly done. spouses Ramon and Annabelle Sabado (respondents).
The Facts
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed On May 3, 2007, HTPMI and respondents entered into a
Decision and Resolution of the CA are SET ASIDE and the Contract to Sell6 whereby HTPMI agreed to sell a real
Orders of the RTC denying respondents' demurrer are property located at Lot 26, Block 1, Eastview Homes,
REINSTATED. The Decision of the RTC dated November 24, Barangay Balimbing, Antipolo City (subject property) to
1995 STANDS. respondents. In consideration therefor, respondents paid
HTPMI the total amount of P869,400.00, consisting of a
SO ORDERED. P174,400.00 downpayment and the balance of P695,000.00
payable in 120 equal monthly instalments. The parties further
agreed that respondents' failure to pay any amount within
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
the stipulated period of time shall mean the forfeiture of the
Associate Justice
downpayment and any other payments made in connection
thereto, as well as the cancellation and rescission of the
Contract to Sell in accordance with law.7 Shortly thereafter, or
on August 16, 2007, HTPMI executed a Deed of Assignment 8
in favor of petitioner assigning, among others, its rights and
interests as seller in the aforesaid Contract to Sell with
respondents, including the right to collect payments and
execute any act or deed necessary to enforce compliance
therewith.9
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The MTCC Ruling
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
In a Decision15 dated April 3, 2013, the MTCC ruled in favor of
petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank (petitioner) assailing the
petitioner and, accordingly, ordered respondents to vacate
Decision2 dated October 29, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated
the subject property, and pay petitioner the amounts of
April 20, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
P661,919.47 as rent arrears from July 31, 2008 up to July 31,
135922, which reversed and set-aside the Decision4 dated
2010, P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, including costs of suit.16
November 28, 2013 and the Order5 dated April 28, 2014 of
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 98 (RTC) in
The MTCC held that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment,
SCA Case No. 13-1290 and ordered that Haus Talk Project
petitioner was subrogated to the rights of HTPMI under the
Managers, Inc. (HTPMI) be impleaded as an indispensable
Contract to Sell and, hence, is a real party in interest entitled
151 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
to institute the instant suit against respondents for the indispensable parties should be joined in a suit,
purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Contract to Sell. viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Further, the MTCC found petitioner's claim for compensation SEC. 7.Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in
in the form of rental just and equitable, pointing out that the interest without whom no final determination can be had of
same is necessary to prevent respondents from unjustly an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
enriching themselves at petitioner's expense. Finally, the Case law defines an indispensable party as "one whose
MTCC awarded petitioner attorney's fees and costs of suit interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation,
since it was compelled to litigate the instant complaint. 17 and without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and
Aggrieved, respondents appealed18 to the RTC. in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the
other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the
The RTC Ruling proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there
cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the
In a Decision19 dated November 28, 2013, the RTC affirmed court which is effective, complete, or equitable."30 "Thus, the
the MTCC's ruling in toto.20 It ruled that by virtue of the Deed absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
of Assignment executed by HTPMI in petitioner's favor, the actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act,
latter acquired not only the right to collect the balance of the not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
purchase price of the subject property, but also all the rights present."31 In Regner v. Logarta,32 the Court laid down the
of the assignor, including the right to sue in its own name as parameters in determining whether or not one is an
the legal assignee.21 indispensable party, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
An indispensable party is a party who has x x x an interest in
Respondents moved for reconsideration,22 which was, the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication
however, denied in an Order23 dated April 28, 2014. cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting
Undaunted, they elevated the case to the CA.24 that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the
subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of
The CA Ruling such nature that a final decree cannot be made without
affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a
In a Decision25 dated October 29, 2015, the CA reversed and condition that its final determination may be wholly
set aside the RTC's ruling, and accordingly: (a) remanded the inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also
case to the MTCC for HTPMI to be impleaded therein; and (b) been considered that an indispensable party is a person in
directed the MTCC to proceed with the trial of the case with whose absence there cannot be a determination between the
dispatch.26 Initially, it upheld petitioner's right as real party in parties already before the court which is effective, complete,
interest to file the instant suit as HTPMI's assignee. However, or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must
since legal title to the subject property was retained by be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
HTPMI pursuant to the provisions of the Deed of Assignment,
the latter is not only a real party in interest, but also an A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his
indispensible party which should have been impleaded as a interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable
plaintiff thereon and without which no final determination from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not
can be had in the present case. 27 necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree
which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration,28 which not an indispensable party if his presence would merely
was, however, denied in a Resolution 29 dated April 20, 2016; permit complete relief between him and those already
hence, this petition. parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject
matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a
The Issue Before the Court person to be an indispensable party that his presence will
avoid multiple litigation.33 (Emphases and underscoring
The primordial issue is whether or not the CA correctly ruled supplied)
that HTPMI is an indispensable party to petitioner's ejectment Guided by the foregoing parameters and as will be explained
suit against respondents and, thus, must be impleaded hereunder, the CA erred in holding that HTPMI is an
therein. indispensable party to the ejectment suit filed by petitioner
against respondents.
The Court's Ruling
Under the Deed of Assignment, HTPMI assigned its rights -
The petition is meritorious. save for the right of ownership - to petitioner under the
Contract to Sell:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all 2. RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACTS TO SELL. By this
assignment, the ASSIGNEE hereby acquires all rights of the
152 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell and under the law, Contract to Sell, which include the cancellation or rescission
including the right to endorse any and all terms and of such contract and resultantly, the recovery of actual
conditions of the Contracts to Sell and the right to collect possession of the subject property by virtue of this case.
the amounts due thereunder from the purchaser of the Hence, the courts can certainly proceed to determine who
Property. The ASSIGNOR for this purpose hereby names, between petitioner and respondents have a better right to
constitutes and appoints the ASSIGNEE [as its] attorney-in- the possession of the subject property and complete relief
fact to execute any act and deed necessary in the exercise of can be had even without HTPMI's participation.
all these rights. Notwithstanding the assignment of the
Contracts to Sell and the Receivables thereunder to the In sum, both the MTCC and the RTC are correct in ruling on
ASSIGNEE, the legal title to the Property and obligations of the merits of the instant unlawful detainer case even without
the ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell, including the the participation of HTPMI.
obligation to complete the development of the property and
the warranties of a builder under the law, shall remain the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
ASSIGNOR'S. x x x.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) dated October 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated April 20,
Verily, HTPMI's assignment of rights to petitioner must be 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 135922 are
deemed to include the rights to collect payments from hereby REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. The Decision dated
respondents, and in the event of the latter's default, to cancel November 28, 2013 and the Order dated April 28, 2014 of the
or rescind the Contract to Sell, and resultantly, recover actual Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 98 in SCA Case
possession over the subject property, as No. 13-1290, affirming in toto the Decision dated April 3,
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 2013 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Antipolo City,
TERMS AND CONDITIONS Branch 1 in SCA Case No. 093-10, are REINSTATED.
x x x x
The Facts
154 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
In its Comment/Opposition19 to respondent's affirmative The Court's Ruling
defense of improper venue, petitioner argued that Section 21
of the lease contract is not a stipulation as to venue, but a The petition has no merit.
stipulation on jurisdiction which is void.20 This is because such
stipulation deprives other courts, i.e., the Municipal Trial Rule 4
Courts, of jurisdiction over cases which, under the law, are VENUE OF ACTIONS
within its exclusive original jurisdiction, such as an action for
unlawful detainer.21 Petitioner further posited that
Section 1.Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or
respondent had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction
possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
of the Valenzuela-RTC and had waived any objections on
commenced and tried in the proper court which has
venue, since he sought affirmative reliefs from the said court
jurisdiction over the area wherein the
when he asked several times for additional time to file his
responsive pleading, set-up counterclaims against petitioner,
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
and impleaded PNCC as a third-party defendant.22
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision 17 dated
Associate Justice April 4, 2003 (RTC Decision) in respondents' favor, and
accordingly: (a) declared them as the true and lawful owners
of Lot 791; (b) nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 576,18
as well as TCT No. 29129; and (c) ordered petitioners to pay
respondents moral damages and litigation costs in the
amount of P20,000.00 each, as well as attorney's fees
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal value of
July 24, 2017 G.R. No. 223610
Lot 791.19 Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the CA,20
and subsequently, to the Court, but the same were denied for
CONCHITA S. UY, CHRISTINE UY DY, SYLVIA UY SY, JANE UY
lack of merit.21 The ruling became final and executory on April
TAN, JAMES LYNDON S. UY, IRENE S. UY,* ERICSON S. UY,
8, 2010, thus, prompting the Court to issue an Entry of
JOHANNA S. UY, and JEDNATHAN S. UY, Petitioners
Judgment22 dated May 4, 2010.
vs.
CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO, substituted by his heirs PAULITA
On August 17, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance
MANATAD-DEL CASTILLO, CESAR DEL CASTILLO, A VITO DEL
of Writ of Execution,23 manifesting therein that since the
CASTILLO, NILA C. DUENAS, NIDA C. LATOSA, LORNA C.
zonal value of Lot 791 at that time was ₱3,500.00 per square
BERNARDO, GIL DEL CASTILLO, LIZA C. GUNGOB, ALMA DEL
meter (sqm.) and that Lot 791 covers an area of 15,758 sqm.,
CASTILLO, and GEMMA DEL CASTILLO, Respondents
the total zonal value of Lot 791 was ₱55,153,000.00.24 Hence,
the attorney's fees, computed at twenty-five percent (25%)
DECISION
thereof, should be pegged at ₱13,788,250.00.25
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Acting on the said motion, the RTC ordered 26 petitioners to
file their comment or opposition thereto, which they failed to
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1filed by comply.27 Accordingly, in an Order28 dated November 22,
petitioner Conchita S. Uy (Conchita) and her children, 2010, the RTC granted the motion and ordered the issuance
157 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
of a writ of execution. On December 13, 2010, a Writ of Lot 791 in 1996, the year when the Quieting of Title Case was
Execution29 was issued, to which the sheriff issued a Notice of instituted, it being the computation least onerous to
Garnishment30 seeking to levy petitioners' properties in an petitioners; and (b) denied petitioners' Consolidated Motion
amount sufficient to cover for the ₱13,788,250.00 as for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
attorney's fees and ₱20,000.00 each as moral damages and
litigation costs. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari46with the
CA, assailing the RTC's twin Orders dated December 9, 2011
Threatened by the Notice of Garnishment, petitioners filed an and the Order dated May 17, 2012. Petitioners argued that
Omnibus Motion31 praying that the writ of execution be instead of just declaring the Notice of Garnishment void, the
quashed and set aside, and that a hearing be conducted to re- RTC should have also declared the writ of execution void
compute the attorney's fees.32 Petitioners maintained that because the Uy siblings were never served with summons;
the Writ of Execution is invalid because it altered the terms of and like the Notice of Garnishment, the Writ of Execution also
the RTC Decision which did not state that the zonal value altered the terms of the RTC Decision. Petitioners further
mentioned therein referred to the zonal value of the property added that the writ of execution was void because it made
at the time of execution.33 Before the RTC could act upon them liable beyond their inheritance from Jaime. They
petitioners' Omnibus Motion, they filed a Motion to Quash maintain that the estate of Jaime should instead be held
Writ of Execution on Jurisdictional Ground(s) (motion to liable for the adjudged amount and that respondents should
quash),34 claiming that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the have brought their claim against the estate, in accordance
Uy siblings in the Quieting of Title Case as they were never with Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.47
served with summons in relation thereto.35
The CA Ruling
The RTC Proceedings
In a Decision48 dated May 26, 2015, the CA affirmed the
On December 9, 2011, the RTC issued two (2) orders: (a) one assailed Orders of the RTC. The CA found no merit in the
granting petitioners' Omnibus Motion, nullifying the Notice of claim that the Uy siblings were never served with summons,
Garnishment, and setting a hearing to determine the proper pointing out that in a Manifestation/Motion 49 dated
computation of the award for attorney's fees; 36 and (b) November 26, 1997, their counsel in the trial proceedings,
another denying their motion to quash, since they never Atty. Alan C. Trinidad (Atty. Trinidad), stated that petitioners
raised such jurisdictional issue in the proceedings a quo.37 received the summons with a copy of the amended
complaint.50 It likewise refused to give credence to
On January 20, 2012, a hearing was conducted for the petitioners' denial of Atty. Trinidad's representation,
determination of attorney's fees.38 Thereafter, the parties observing that one of the Uy siblings, Ericson, even testified
were ordered to submit their respective position papers, 39 to in court with the former's assistance, and that none of them
which respondents complied with,40 presenting the following showed any concern or apprehension before the court, which
alternative options upon which to base the computation of they would have if indeed Atty. Trinidad was not authorized
attorney's fees: (a) ₱3,387,970.00, equivalent to twenty-five to represent them.51
percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791 in 1996, the year
when the Quieting of Title Case was filed; (b) ₱ll,424,550.00, Anent petitioners' argument that they cannot be held
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal value of personally liable with their separate property for Jaime's
Lot 791 in 2003, the year when the RTC rendered its Decision liability and that respondents should have filed a claim
in the same case; or (c) ₱15,758,000.00, equivalent to against Jaime's estate in accordance with Section 20, Rule 3
twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791 in of the Rules of Court, the CA held that such provision only
2010, the year when the RTC Decision became final and applies to contractual money claims and not when the
executory.41 subject matter is some other relief and the collection of any
amount is merely incidental thereto, such as by way of
On the other hand, instead of filing the required position damages, as in this case.52 Besides, petitioners had all the
paper, petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion for opportunity to raise such perceived error when they elevated
Reconsideration42 of the RTC's December 9, 2011 twin the case to the CA and to this Court, but they did not. 53
Orders. In said motion, petitioners contended that the RTC Following the principle of finality of judgment, the CA can no
failed to definitely rule on the validity of the writ of longer entertain such assignment of errors. 54
execution, and that it erred in holding that the RTC Decision
was already final and executory despite the absence of With respect to the validity of the writ of execution, the CA
summons on the Uy siblings.43 ruled that since the Writ of Execution made express reference
to the RTC Decision without adding anything else, the same
In an Order44 dated May 17, 2012, the RTC: (a) pegged the was valid, unlike the Notice of Garnishment which expressly
attorney's fees at ₱3,387,970.00,45 using the zonal value of
158 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
sought to levy ₱13,788,250.00 in attorney's fees and, in the of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
process, exceeded the purview of the said Decision.55 resolution of the case, and such will bar said party from later
on impugning the court's jurisdiction.64 After all, jurisdiction
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration,56 which over the person of the defendant in civil cases is obtained
was, however, denied by the CA in its Resolution 57 dated either by a valid service of summons upon him or by his
February 22, 2016; hence, the present petition. voluntary submission to the court's authority.65
The Issue Before the Court In this regard, petitioners cannot also deny Atty. Trinidad's
authority to represent them. As mentioned earlier, one of the
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA petitioners, Ericson, even testified with the assistance of Atty.
correctly upheld the twin Orders dated December 9, 2011 Trinidad.66 Indeed, if Atty. Trinidad was not authorized to
and the Order dated May 17, 2012 of the RTC. represent them, the natural reaction for petitioners was to
exhibit concern. Based on the records, however, there is no
indication that any of the petitioners or Ericson made even
The Court's Ruling
the slightest objections to Atty. Trinidad's representation.
This only confirms the CA's finding that such denial was a
The petition is partly meritorious.
mere afterthought and a desperate attempt to undo a final
and executory judgment against them.67
At the outset, it is well to reiterate that petitioners are
resisting compliance with the ruling in the Quieting of Title
As to petitioners' contention that respondents should have
Case, on the grounds that: (a) they were never served with
proceeded against Jaime's estate pursuant to Section 20, Rule
summons in relation thereto; and (b) they were merely
3 of the Rules of Court, it is well to point out that based on
impleaded as substitutes to Jaime therein, and as such,
the records, the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in
respondents should have proceeded against his estate
Jaime's place as defendant; rather, they were imp leaded in
instead, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
their personal capacities. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
However, a judicious review of the records would reveal that
Rules of Court, substitution of parties takes place when the
such contentions are untenable, as will be discussed
party to the action dies pending the resolution of the case
hereunder. and the claim is not extinguished, viz.:
159 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
Here, Jaime died on March 4, 1990,68 or six (6) years be(ore every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
private respondents filed the Quieting of Title period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere
Case.1âwphi1Thus, after Conchita filed an Answer69 informing technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of
the RTC of Jaime's death in 1990, the complaint was public policy which must be faithfully complied." 73 However,
amended70 to implead the Uy siblings. Accordingly, the Rules this doctrine "is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the
of Court provisions on substitution upon the death of a party power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the
do not apply and the Uy siblings were not merely substituted demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life,
in place of Jaime in the Quieting of Title Case. Instead, they liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or
were impleaded in their personal capacities.71 In this regard, compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a
petitioners' argument that they cannot be held solidarily cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
liable for the satisfaction of any monetary judgment or award the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack
must necessarily fail.72 of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; and (j) that the other party will not be unjustly
In this light, petitioners can no longer invoke Section 20, Rule prejudiced thereby."74
3 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
In this case, a punctilious examination of the records,
Section 20.Action and contractual money claims. - When the especially the Amended Complaint75 in the Quieting of Title
action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express Case reveals that the disputed Lot 791 was covered by TCT
or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final No. 29129 in the names of Jaime and Conchita. Thus, while
judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the the Uy siblings were indeed impleaded in their personal
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead capacities, the fact remains that they are merely succeeding
be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A to Jaime's interest in the said lot and title. As successors-
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be heirs, they cannot be personally bound to respond to the
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for decedent's obligations beyond their distributive shares.76
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. Verily, this is a special or a compelling circumstance which
(Emphasis supplied) would necessitate the relaxation of the doctrine of
immutability of judgment, so as to somehow limit the liability
A cursory reading of the foregoing provision readily shows of the Uy siblings in the payment of the monetary awards in
that like Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it applies in favor of respondents in the Quieting of Title Case - i.e., moral
cases where the defendant dies while the case is pending and damages and litigation costs in the amount of ₱20,000.00
not before the case was even filed in court, as in this case. each, as well as attorney's fees, equivalent to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 79177 - within the
value of their inherited shares, notwithstanding the finality of
At this point, the Court notes that if petitioners truly believed
the ruling therein.
that Jaime's estate is the proper party to the Quieting of Title
Case, they could and should have raised the lack of cause of
action against them at the earliest opportunity. Obviously, In sum, while the courts a quo correctly ruled that the Uy
they did not do so; instead, they actively participated in the siblings may be held answerable to the monetary awards in
case, adopted the answer earlier filed by Conchita, and even the Quieting of Title Case, such liability cannot exceed
litigated the case all the way to the Court. Petitioners cannot whatever value they inherited from their late father, Jaime.
now question the final and executory judgment in the For this purpose, the RTC is tasked to ensure that the
Quieting of Title Case because it happened to be adverse to satisfaction of the monetary aspect of the judgment in the
them. Quieting of Title Case will not result in the payment by the Uy
siblings of an amount exceeding their inheritance from Jaime.
After all, the other party, i.e., respondents, shall not be
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that "a
unjustly prejudiced by the same since Jaime's spouse,
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
Conchita, is still alive and the rest of the monetary awards
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect,
may be applied against her, if need be.
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the
court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly,
This principle, known as the doctrine of immutability of the Decision dated May 26, 2015 and the Resolution dated
judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay February 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to 07120 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION limiting
make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put the adjudged monetary liability of petitioners Christine Uy Dy,
an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional Sylvia Uy Sy, Jane Uy Tan, James Lyndon S. Uy, Irene S. Uy,
errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters Ericson S. Uy, Johanna S. Uy, and Jednathan S. Uy to the total
the judicious perception that the rights and obligations of value of their inheritance from Jaime Uy.
160 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the December 7, 2012 Decision of the
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE CA in CAG. R. CR-HC No. 04602 and AFFIRMS said Decision
Associate Justice finding accusedappellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a.
Romeo Antigo y Lantayan alias "Jon-Jon" GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape punishable under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A in relation to paragraph 5 of
Article 266-B, under RA 8353. Accordingly, he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
private complainant the following amounts: (a) ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and (c)
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, consistent with
existingjurisprudence.3
161 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
may also be predicated on a source of obligation accused-appellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code Antigo y Lantayan alias "Jon-Jon"; and (c) DECLARE the
enumerates these other sources of obligation from instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission: SO ORDERED.
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
162 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9
(RTC) in Sp. Civil Action No. 0357, and accordingly, sustained
the denial of petitioner Noel Navaja's (petitioner) motion to
quash filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna &
Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna, Bohol (MCTC-Jagna).
The Facts
166 | L O M A R D A P L S 2 0 1 9