SCASPECRO Case Digests PDF

A.Y.
2016-
2017

Special Proceedings
and
Special Civil Actions
Atty. Señga
CASE DIGESTS
INTERPLEADER 1
RCBC vs. METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION

G.R. No. 127913 September 13, 2001
FACTS:
Ley Construction contracted a loan from RCBC secured by a real estate mortgage. Because of Leycon’s
failure to pay, RCBC instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against it. RCBC emerged as the
highest bidder.
Leycon filed an action to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Meanwhile, RCBC consolidated its
ownership over the property since Leycon failed to redeem the same within the redemption period. Thus,
RCBC demanded rental payments from Metro Container Corporation, Leycon’s lessee of the property.
Later, Leycon filed a case for unlawful detainer against Metro. Not knowing whom to pay, Metro filed a
case for interpleader to compel Leycon and RCBC to litigate among themselves and to determine which
among them shall rightfully receive the monthly rentals.
Leycon and Metro entered into an amicable settlement which led to the dismissal of the interpleader case
insofar as they were concerned. Judgment was subsequently rendered in the unlawful detainer case,
ordering Metro to pay Leycon. They both moved for the dismissal of the case due to the amicable settlement.
Both motions were dismissed. The MRs were also denied.
The CA granted the petition for certiorari and set aside the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision in the unlawful detainer case rendered the interpleader action moot and
academic.
HELD:
YES. METRO filed the interpleader action because it was unsure which between LEYCON and RCBC was
entitled to receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject property. LEYCON was claiming payment
of the rentals as lessor of the property while RCBC was making a demand by virtue of the consolidation of
the title of the property in its name.
The reason for the interpleader action ceased when the MeTC rendered judgment whereby the court directed
METRO to pay LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises While RCBC, not being a party to
such case, could not be bound by the judgment therein, METRO is bound by the MeTC decision. When the
decision in the unlawful detainer case became final and executory, METRO has no other alternative left but
to pay the rentals to LEYCON. Precisely because there was already a judicial fiat to METRO, there was no
more reason to continue with the interpleader case. Thus, METRO moved for the dismissal of the
interpleader action not because it is no longer interested but because there is no more need for it to pursue
such cause of action.
INTERPLEADER 2
ZOILA CO LIM vs. CONTINENTAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-41818 February 18, 1976
FACTS:
Benito Tan is a stockholder of Continental Development Corporation, according to its books. He has been
demanding the corporation to release to him his certificates of stock but the former has not done so because
of an adverse claim by Zoila Co Lim. Lim alleged that her deceased mother was the real owner of the said
stocks. Both Tan and Lim threatened the company for punitive measures should it take any steps that may
prejudice their respective interests in the stocks. Therefore, Continental filed an action for interpleader.
Tan filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he is the one who is entitled to the stocks since he is the
recorded owner of the said stocks in the books of the corporation. Lim, on the other hand, alleged that the
stocks had previously been delivered in trust to Tan for Lim’s mother, the actual owner.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for interpleader is proper.
HELD:
YES. Since there is an active conflict of interests between the two defendants over the disputed shares of
stock, the trial court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint for interpleader, which
practically decided ownership of the shares of stock in favor of defendant Tan.
Rule 63, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court tells us when a cause of action exists to support a complaint
in interpleader:
Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person, who claims
no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
complainants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
Indeed, petitioner corporation is placed in the same situation as a lessee who does not know the person to
whom he will pay the rentals due to the conflicting claims over the property leased, or a sheriff who finds
himself puzzled by conflicting claims to a property seized by him. Thus, the two defendants should be given
full opportunity to litigate their respective claims.
INTERPLEADER 3
GREGORIO R. SY-QUIA, vs. THE SHERIFF OF ILOCOS SUR and FILADELFO DE LEON
G.R. No. L-22807 October 10, 1924
FACTS:
Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano Reyes Cheng-Kiangco executed a chattel mortgage in favor of
Gregorio R. Sy-Quia on their mercantile establishment, with all the merchandise therein contained, as
security for a debt. From its terms it may be inferred that it was the intention of the parties that the
mortgagors were to be permitted to sell the merchandise replenishing their stock from time to time and that
the new stock brought in should also be subject to the mortgage.
Subsequently, Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco executed another chattel mortgage on the same establishment
and all its contents in favor of the respondent Filadelfo de Leon.
The sheriff was requested to take possession of the mortgaged property and to sell it at public auction. He
seized the establishment and fixed the date of the sale. Meanwhile, De Leon presented an adverse claim to
the property by virtue of his chattel mortgage, alleging that the goods on which the chattel mortageg of Sy-
Quia was given had been sold long before the chattel mortgage in favor of De Leon was executed.
The sheriff suspended the foreclosure proceedings and instead filed an action for interpleader. A petition
for writ of mandamus was brought to compel the sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for writ of mandamus should be granted.
HELD:
NO. Though it, perhaps, would have been better practice for the sheriff to sell the property and hold the
proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of the action of interpleader, we, nevertheless, are of the opinion
that the facts shown do not justify our interference by mandamus. The sheriff might lay himself open to an
action for damages if he sold the goods without the consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does
not appear that the petitioner offered to give bond to hold him harmless in such an event. In these
circumstances, his action in suspending the sale pending the determination of the action of interpleader
seems justified.
INTERPLEADER 4
PAGKALINAWAN vs. RODAS

G.R. No. L-1806 February 25, 1948
FACTS:
In an ejectment case between Manuel Tambuting and Alfonso and Manuel Pagkalinawan, the MTC
rendered a decision ordering the latter to vacate the house in question and to pay the former the rentals.
Upon MR by the defendants, the CFI set aside the earlier decision. However, on MR filed by Tambunting,
the court ordered the defendants to pay and a writ of execution was issued. The defendants sought to stay
the execution on the ground that they had also filed an action for interpleader against Tambunting and Angel
de Leon Ong, from whom they received a notice advising them to stop paying rentals to Tambunting. In
connection with the interpleader case, the defendants deposited the rentals with the clerk of court.
The motion to stay the execution was granted but a subsequent order directed that the execution be
proceeded with. Thus, defendants filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to direct Judge Rodas to
desist from carrying out the writ of execution.
ISSUE:
HELD:
YES. It is true that the decision of the respondent judge orders the petitioners to pay the rentals directly to
the respondent Manuel Tambunting and provides for their ejectment in case of default. But it appears that,
in connection with the interpleader suit, said rentals were deposited with the clerk of court, of which fact
the respondent judge was informed by the petitioners. Such deposits, in our opinion, constitute a bona fide
compliance with the decision of the respondent judge, since it is undeniable that the petitioners were warned
by Angel de Leon Ong not to pay rentals to the respondent Manuel Tambunting.
Under the law, the defendants have a right to file the interpleader suit in view of the claim for rentals of
Angel de Leon Ong; and if the respondent Tambunting believes that he is legally entitled to said rentals, he
is free to move for withdrawal of the deposits made by the petitioners.
INTERPLEADER 5
UCPB vs. IAC

G.R. Nos. 72664-65 March 20, 1990
FACTS:
UCPB issued a manager’s check purchased by Altiura, payable to Makati Bel-Air. The said check was
partial payment for an office condominium unit sold by Makati Bel-Air.
Subsequently, UCPB received instructions from Altiura to hold payment on the manager’s check because
of a discrepancy in the actual area of the unit and the one stipulated in the contract of sale. Makati Bel-Air
and Altiura tried to settle their differences amicably but failed to come to an agreement.
UCPB filed an action for interpleader against the parties in order for them to litigate with each other their
respective claims over the funds represented by the manager’s check.
Meanwhile, Altiura filed a complaint for rescission of the contract of sale, which was consolidated with the
interpleader case. Makati Bel-Air alleged in its answer that it had rescinded the sale and relinquished any
claim it had over the funds, but incorporated therein a counterclaim for damages. UCPB filed a motion to
withdraw the complaint for interpleader as there was no longer any conflict as to who was entitled to the
funds covered by the manager’s check.
The trial court ordered the release of the funds to Altiura. It dismissed the interpleader action and Makati
Bel-Air’s counterclaim. Makati Bel-Air moved for reconsideration but without success.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for interpleader is proper.
HELD:
YES. Interpleader is a proper remedy where a bank which had issued a manager's check is subjected to
opposing claims by persons who respectively claim a right to the funds covered by the manager's check.
The Bank is entitled to take necessary precautions so that, as far possible, it does not make a mistake as to
who is entitled to payment; the necessary precautions include, precisely, recourse to an interpleader suit.
When the trial court granted petitioner's motion for withdrawal of its complaint-in-interpleader, as having
become moot and academic by reason of Makati Bel-Air's having cancelled the sale of the office unit to
Altiura and having returned the manager's check to the Bank and acquiesced in the release of the funds to
Altiura, the trial court in effect held that petitioner Bank's recourse to interpleader was proper and not a
frivolous or malicious maneuver to evade its obligation to pay to the party lawfully entitled to the funds
represented by the manager's check. Having done so, the trial court could not have logically allowed Makati
Bel-Air to recover on its counterclaim for damages against petitioner Bank.
INTERPLEADER 6
DEL CARMEN vs. SPS. SABORDO

G.R. No. 181723 August 11, 2014
FACTS:
As part of their capital, the Spouses Suico and their partners obtained a loan from DBP secured by four
parcels of land owned by the Spouses Suico and another lot owned by their business partner, Juliana Del
Rosario. Subsequently, they failed to pay their loan obligations thus DBP foreclosed the mortgage. After
they failed to redeem the foreclosed properties, DBP consolidated its ownership over the same.
DBP later allowed the Suico spouses and Flores spouses (as Del Rosario’s substitute) to repurchase the
subject lots by way of a conditional sale. Sps. Suico were able to pay the down payment and the first
monthly amortization, but no monthly installments were made thereafter. Threatened with the cancellation
of the conditional sale, the Suico and Flores spouses sold their rights over the said properties to Sps.
Sabordo, subject to the condition that the latter should pay the balance of the sale price.
Restituto Sabordo filed an original action for declaratory relief with damages and prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction raising the issue of whether or not the Sps. Suico have the right to recover from
respondents the lots in question. Alleging that they are ready to pay but cannot determine as to whom such
payment shall be made, the heirs of Sps. Suico filed a Complaint seeking to compel Sps. Sabordo and
Republic Planters Bank, with whom the property was mortgaged, to interplead and litigate between
themselves their respective interests and deposited the redemption price with the court.
Sps. Suico contended that the judicial deposit or consignation of the amount of P127,500.00 was valid and
binding and produced the effect of payment of the purchase price of the subject lots. Sps. Sabordo prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint alleging that the interpleader was improper since RPB was not laying any
claim upon the sum involved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not interpleader is the proper remedy.
HELD:
NO. In the instant case, petitioner and her co- heirs, upon making the deposit with the RTC, did not ask the
trial court that respondents be notified to receive the amount that they have deposited. In fact, there was no
tender of payment. Instead, what petitioner and her co-heirs prayed for is that respondents and RPB be
directed to interplead with one another to determine their alleged respective rights over the consigned
amount; that respondents be likewise directed to substitute the subject lots with other real properties as
collateral for their loan with RPB and that RPB be also directed to accept the substitute real properties as
collateral for the said loan. Nonetheless, the trial court correctly ruled that interpleader is not the proper
remedy because RPB did not make any claim whatsoever over the amount consigned by petitioner and her
co-heirs with the court.
INTERPLEADER 7
PARISCHA vs. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC.

G.R. No. 136409 March 14, 2008
FACTS:
Don Luis Dison Realty leased to the Parischas 9 units in its San Luis Building. The petitioners paid their
monthly rentals unil May 1992. However, after that, they refused to pay the stipulated rent on the ground
that they were unsure about the person authorized to receive payment and that they were prevented from
using the rooms, except for one. Because of such non-payment, a complain for ejectment was filed against
the Parischas.
The MeTC held that mere willingness to pay did not amount to payment of the obligation but still dismissed
the complaint for ejectment. The RTC reversed the said decision and ordered the Parischas to pay Don Luis.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may be validly ejected from the premises.
HELD:
YES. What was clearly established by the evidence was petitioners’ non-payment of rentals because
ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not justify their failure
to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court
on interpleader.
In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of the rentals. The
rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor
by reason of causes not imputable to him.
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be
made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to
protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability.
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making payments.
INTERPLEADER 8
ARREZA vs. DIAZ, JR.

G.R. No. 133113 August 30, 2001
FACTS:
Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a housing unit. It filed a complaint for interpleader in the
course of a case involving a conflict of ownership between Arreza and Diaz. The trial court ruled the case
in favor of Arreza.
The decision became final and Bliss executed a contract to sell its property to Arreza. Diaz was constrained
to deliver the property with all its improvements to Arreza. Thus, he filed a complaint againt Bliss and
Arreza for reimbursement of the cost of acquisition of the property and the improvements therein.
Arreza filed a motion to dismiss the case, citing the ground of res judicata in the interpleader case. The
motion was denied for lack of merit. The MR was likewise denied. CA also dismissed the petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diaz’ claims for reimbursement against Arreza are barred by res judicata.
HELD:
NO. The court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and
adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights, obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put
forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. That party in this case referred to respondent Diaz.
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties
in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive
pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules. The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly
authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication
of the controversy and its incidents.
Although the alternative defense of being builders in good faith is only permissive, the counterclaim for
reimbursement of the value of the improvements is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim. Thus, the
failure by the private respondents to set it up bars their right to raise it in a subsequent litigation.
Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz being in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim is now barred.
INTERPLEADER 9
BACLAYON vs. CA
G.R. No. 89132 February 26, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery or ownership and possession against spouses Bacalso. The trial
court rendered decision in favor of the spouses Bacalso, declaring them as owners of the subject lot. The
CA reversed such decision, declaring the heirs of Baclayon as the owners of the lot.
The petitioners then filed a motion for execution of judgment and possession which was opposed by the
private respondents. The latter argued that since they were found by the respondent court as builders and/or
planters in good faith, a reception of evidence to determine the correct value of the necessary and useful
improvements must be done first before ordering the execution. The Motion was granted by the trial court.
An appeal filed by the private respondents was dismissed.
A motion for writ of possession and demolition was filed by petitioners which was opposed by the
respondents based on the same grounds as their earlier opposition. The trial court judge ordered the removal
of the improvements on the property since reimbursement was refused. Upon private respondents’ petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, the CA ordered the RTC to receive petitioners' evidence to prove
that they are builders in good faith of the improvements and the value of the said improvements introduced
by them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents should be allowed to present evidence to prove that they are builders
in good faith of the improvements and the value of said improvements.
HELD:
NO. The rule is well established that once a decision has become final and executory the only jurisdiction
left with the trial court is to order its execution. To require now the trial court in a hearing supplementary
to execution, to receive private respondents' evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith of the
improvements and the value of said Improvements, is to disturb a final executory decision; which may even
cause its substantial amendment.
Although the alternative defense of being builders in good faith is only permissive, the counterclaim for
reimbursement of the value of the improvements is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim. Thus, the
failure by the private respondents to set it up bars their right to raise it in a subsequent litigation.
INTERPLEADER 10
BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-25138 August 28, 1969
FACTS:
Beltran and other residents of Project 4, QC leased their housing units from PHHC. They were assured that
after 5 years of continuous occupancy, they would be entitled to purchase the units. Later, PHHC announced
that the management, administration and ownership of Project 4 would be transferred to GSIS in payment
of PHHC’s debts to GSIS.
PHHC and the tenants agreed that the former will credit to the latter as down payment on the selling price,
30% of what had been paid as rentals. Pursuant to the PHHC-GSIS arrangement, collections from tenants
by the PHHC were delivered to the GSIS. However, when PHHC was assigned a new Chairman, he refused
to recognize all agreements previously entered into with the GSIS. GSIS insisted on its legal rights.
Thus, Beltran, in behalf of the residents of Project 4, filed a case for interpleader against GSIS and PHHC,
claiming that they did not know to who, they should pay the monthly amortizations. Both corporations filed
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
ISSUE:
HELD:
NO. Rule 63, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims
no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants." While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting claims between themselves with
regard to the management, administration and ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not
against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their complaint
that any corporation other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement,
ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments.
The record shows clearly that there were no conflicting claims by defendant corporations as against
plaintiff-tenants, which they may properly be compelled in an interpleader suit to interplead and litigate
among themselves. Both defendant corporations were agreed that PHHC should continue receiving the
tenants' payments, and that such payments would be duly recognized even if the GSIS should eventually
take over Project 4 by virtue of their turnover agreement.
INTERPLEADER 11
WACK WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB vs. WON

G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976
FACTS:
Wack Wack filed a complaint for interpleader against Lee E. Won and Bienvenido Tan, who were both
claiming ownership of membership certificate fee 201.
Won anchored his claim on an earlier decision rendered by the trial court and membership fee certificate
201 issued by the deputy clerk of court for ad in behalf of the president and secretary of People’s Bank and
Trust Company as transfer agent of Wack Wack. On the other hand, Tan’s claim is based on an assignment
made in his favor by “Swan, Culbertson and Fritz,” the original owner and holder of membership fee
certificate 201.
Both defendants filed motions to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. The trail court
dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants may be required to interplead.
HELD:
NO. There is no question that the subject matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee
certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. However, the Corporation in this case failed to act with
diligence, in view of all the circumstances, such that it may properly invoke the remedy of interpleader.
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been
rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the
conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the
adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is
obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter.
The instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently
liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a
collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his
rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit
would compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which
is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in
the said civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to
be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which
reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES 12
DANAO vs. TAPPA

G.R. No. 181303 September 17, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners allege that they are the owners of a parcel of land which they inherited from Anastacio Danao.
During Anastacio’s lifetime, he allowed Consuelo Pauig to build on and occupy the southern portion of the
property and agreed that the latter would vacate the land any time Anastacio might need it.
Petitioners claimed that the respondents, Consuelo’s relatives, continued to occupy the subject property
even after her death and built their residences thereon using permanent materials. The petitioners demanded
the respondents to vacate the premises, contending that they already need the same. However, the
respondents refused to do the same.
Thus, the petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint for reivindicacion, quieting of title and damages
against respondents. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, since the property
had an assessed value of less than P20,000. The MR was also subsequently denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal was proper.
HELD:
YES. To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed
before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word “may.” In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property
where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. A court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their
property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not
a case for declaratory relief.
VELARDE vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY

G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004
FACTS:
Social Justice Society filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC against Mike Velarde, Cardinal
Sin, Exec. Minister Erao Manalo, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Vro. Eliseo Soriano. The Petition prayed for
the resolution of the question whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in
endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock
to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions on the
separation of church and state.
All the respondents sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that it does not state a cause of action
and that there is no justiciable controversy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SJS has a legal interest in filing a petition for declaratory relief.
HELD:
NONE. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract
or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or
an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument
and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder. The essential requisites of the
action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief
fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner
and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right
of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were
in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show not only that
the law or act is invalid, but also that they have sustained or are in immediate or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some
indefinite way. There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts
imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of
suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.
TAMBUNTING vs. SUMABAT

G.R. No. 144101 September 16, 2005
FACTS:
The parcel of land in dispute was originally registered in the name of respondent spouses Sumabat. They
mortgaged the same to Tambunting to secure the payment of a loan. Because of the failure to pay,
Commercial House of Finance, Inc., as assignee of the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings but the
same did not push through because of a complaint for injunction filed by the respondents.
The respondents filed an action for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration of the extent of their actual
indebtedness. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the mortgage deed had already
been breached prior to the filing of the action. However, the motion was denied. The CFI rendered its
decision fixing the respondents’ liability and authorized them to consign the amount to the court for proper
disposition.
Later, the respondents received a notice of sheriff’s sale indicating that the mortgage had been foreclosed
by CHFI and that an extrajudicial sale would be held. The public auction proceeded and the property was
sold to CFHI as the highest bidder.
Upon petition by the respondents, the trial court nullified the foreclosure and extrajudicial sale. It held that
the decision fixing the liability of the respondent had long attained finality. The mortgage was extinguished
when respondents paid their indebtedness by consigning the amount in court. The petitioners moved for
reconsideration arguing that the CFI cannot take cognizance of the action for declaratory relief since there
was already a violation of the mortgage deed before the institution of the action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for declaratory relief may proceed.
HELD:
NO. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order, regulation or ordinance
before breach or violation thereof. The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the
rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement
or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or contract has
already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer
assume jurisdiction over the action.
Here, an infraction of the mortgage terms had already taken place before the filing of Civil Case. Thus, the
CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case in 1979. And in the absence of jurisdiction, its
decision was void and without legal effect.
MANGAHAS vs. PAREDES

G.R. No. 157866 February 14, 2007
FACTS:
Avelino Banaag alleged that he is the registered owner of the disputed property in Caloocan, as evidenced
by a TCT. The petitioners constructed houses without his knowledge and consent on the disputed property.
Despite several demands, the petitioners refused to vacate the premises. Thus, he filed a complaint for
ejectment against the petitioners before the MeTC.
On the other hand, the petitioners denied unlawfully depriving Banaag of the property, claiming to have
resided in the lot with the knowledge and consent of the true owner thereof, PIADECO. They filed a motion
to suspend the proceedings on the ground that the subject property is part of the Tala Estate and that a writ
of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining the MeTCs of QC and Caloocan from ordering the eviction
of all occupants of the Tala Estate. Such motion was denied by the MeTC holding that the writ has effect
only in QC.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Banaag, which ruling both the RTC and CA affirmed. Banaag filed a motion
for execution pending appeal which was granted. The petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief with
the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief may be filed directly with the SC.
HELD:
NO. The petitioners’ resort to this Court through petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Rule 63 of the Rules of Court which deals with actions
for declaratory relief, enumerates the subject matter thereof, i.e., deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, the construction or validity of statute or ordinance. Inasmuch as this enumeration is exclusive,
petitioners’ action to declare the RTC order denying their motion to suspend execution, not being one of
those enumerated, should warrant the outright dismissal of this case.
At any rate, since the complete records of this case have already been elevated, the Court resolved the
controversy on the merits.
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU vs. PEZA

G.R. No. 187853 November 26, 2014
FACTS:
Pres. Marcos issued PD 66 declaring the establishment of export processing zones in strategic locations in
the PH. Thus, Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) was created to operate, administer and manage
the different EPZs established. EPZA was declared exempt from all taxes. Mactan Export Processing Zone
was also established.
Subsequently, Philippine Economic Zone Authority was created and granted the power to regulate and
supervise the enterprises located in the economic zones. Pres. Ramos later issued EO 282 directing the
PEZA to assume and exercise all of EPZA’s powers.
The City of Lapu- Lapu demanded from PEZA real property taxes from 1992 to 1998 on the latter’s
properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. The city contended that there was no express provision
exempting PEZA from payment of real property taxes unlike EPZA’s exemption which was expressly
provided.
PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief with RTC of Pasay praying that the court declare it exempt from
the payment of real property taxes. The RTC argued that the PEZA remained tax-exempt regardless of
Section 24 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. The City insisted that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to entertain PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief because it should have been filed with the RTC of Lapu-
Lapu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC of Pasay had jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.
HELD:
NO. A petition for declaratory relief must satisfy six requisites:
First, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof
are doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there must have been no breach of the documents in
question; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between
persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth,
adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory relief against the City. The City
had already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment against the PEZA, in violation of the
PEZA’s alleged tax-exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject
matter of PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief, had already been breached. The trial court, therefore, had
no jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.
CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. BIR

G.R. No. 172457 December 24, 2008
FACTS:
Pres. Ramos issued Proclamation 420 to create a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in a portion of Camp John
Hay in Baguio City. By virtue of Sec. 3 of the Proclamation, the businesses located in the SEZ were granted
exemption from payment of taxes, both local and national, and the operation of the SEZ as special customs
territory providing for tax and duty free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment.
In line with the Proclamation, the BIR and BOC made issuances to be implemented within the CJH SEZ.
However, Sec. 3 was declared unconstitutional in part in another case. While the Mr for the case was
pending, the City Treasurer or Baguio sent a demand letter to CJH for payment of real property taxes. BOC
also demanded payment of duties and taxes.
CJH filed a petition for declaratory relief questioning the retroactive application by the BOC of the decision
in G.R. No. 119775. The RTC ruled that the petition for declaratory relief was not the appropriate remedy.
Moreover, the RTC held that Commonwealth Act No. 55 (CA No. 55) which proscribes the use of
declaratory relief in cases where a taxpayer questions his tax liability is still in force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedy of declaratory relief is appropriate in this case.
HELD:
NO. The proper subject matter of a declaratory relief is a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument,
or the construction or validity of statute or ordinance. CJH hinges its petition on the demand letter or
assessment sent to it by the BOC. However, it is really not the demand letter which is the subject matter of
the petition. Ultimately, this Court is asked to determine whether the decision of the Court en banc in G.R.
No. 119775 has a retroactive effect. This approach cannot be countenanced. A petition for declaratory relief
cannot properly have a court decision as its subject matter.
There are other remedies available to a party who is not agreeable to a decision whether it be a question of
law or fact. If it involves a decision of an appellate court, the party may file a motion for reconsideration or
new trial in order that the defect may be corrected. In case of ambiguity of the decision, a party may file a
motion for a clarificatory judgment.
One of the requisites of a declaratory relief is that the issue must be ripe for judicial determination. However,
CJH is not left without recourse. The Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) provides for the administrative and
judicial remedies available to a taxpayer who is minded to contest an assessment, subject of course to certain
reglementary periods.
OLLADA vs. CENTRAL BANK

G.R. No. L-11357 May 31, 1962
FACTS:
Ollada is a CPA who was authorized and accredited to practice accountancy in the office of the Central
Bank. Later, by reason of a requirement of the Import-Export Department of the bank that CPAs must
submit an accreditation under oath before they could certify financial statements of their clients applying
for dollar allocations with its office, Ollada’s previous accreditation was nullified.
Thus, Ollada for himself and on behalf of other CPAs, filed a petition for declaratory relief to nullify the
accreditation requirement alleging that the Central Bank acted in excess of its powers.
Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of cause of action. It contended that the
requirement does not regulate the practice of accountancy but only the manner in which CPAs should
transact business with the Central Bank.
Ollada applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Central Bank from enforcing the requirement
until final adjudication of the case. Central Bank opposed the issuance of the writ and manifested that it
was willing to delete certain parts of the application for accreditation of CPAs. The writ of preliminary
injuction was issued but subsequently set it aside. The RTC dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case was proper.
HELD:
YES. On the question of when a special civil action of this nature would prosper, we have already held that
the complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute or right has been
breached or violated. In the present case such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in the
petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself, respondent had already invaded
or violated his right and caused him injury — all these giving him a complete cause of action enforceable
in an appropriate ordinary civil action or proceeding. The dismissal of the action was, therefore, proper.
REPUBLIC vs. ROQUE

G.R. No. 204603 September 24, 2013
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the constitutionality of
the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3, for being void for vagueness; (b) Section 7, for violating
the right to privacy of communication and due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent
relationships; (c )Section 18, for violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of
attainder, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(d) Section 26, for violating the right to travel; and (e) Section 27, for violating the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, contending that respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for
declaratory relief. The RTC denied such motion. The MR was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents satisfied the requisites for declaratory relief.
HELD:
NO. Case law states the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first , the subject
matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order
or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction; third , there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth ,
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose
interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth , adequate relief is
not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
The Court observes that the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements are wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, private respondents’ petition failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or
are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed
provisions of RA 9372.
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the controversy at
hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed allegations in
private respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative and merely theorized.
As regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability
of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in the first place.
TANDA vs. ALDAYA

G.R. No. L-9322-23 January 30, 1956
FACTS:
Tanda instituted an action for the annulment of a contract of sale with right to repurchase with the the CFI.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring the contract valid and absolving Aldaya of the complaint. A
motion to set aside judgment and a motion for new trial filed by Tanda were both denied so he filed an
appeal to the SC. The SC affirmed the decision appealed from.
The decision became final and executory but Tanda initiated a case for declaratory relief contending that
the words “other written instrument” should be interpreted as including a court decision regardless of
whether it is final in character or otherwise. Aldaya filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the case
states no cause of action. The trial court decided in his favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a court decision is included within the purview of the words “other written instrument.”
HELD:
NO. Evidently, a court decision cannot be interpreted as included within the purview of the words “other
written instrument”, as contended by Appellant, for the simple reason that the Rules of Court already
provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified without
need of resorting to the expedient prescribed by Rule 66 (now Rule 63).
Thus, if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, he may file with the trial
court a motion for reconsideration or a new trial in order that the defect may be corrected. The same remedy
may be pursued by a party with regard to a decision of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court. A
party may even seek relief from a judgment or order of an inferior court on the ground of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence.
PDIC vs. CA
G.R. No. 126911 April 30, 2003
FACTS:
Respondents in this case jointly had 71 certificates of time deposits denominated as Golden Time Deposits,
with Manila Banking Corporation. On May 22, 1987, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a
Resolution prohibiting MBC to do business in the Philippines and placed its assets under receivership. Such
resolution was only served on MBC on May 26, 1987 when the receiver took over.
On May 25, 1987, the next banking day after the issuance of the Resolution, Jose Abad was at MBC for the
purpose of pre-terminating the GTDs and re-depositing the fund represented thereby into 28 new GTDs. Of
the 28 new ones, he pre-terminated 8 and withdrew the value thereof. Thereafter, respondents filed their
claims with the PDIC for the payment of the 20 remaining GTDs. PDIC only paid 3 claims and withheld
payment of the 17 remaining ones.
PDIC filed a petition for declaratory relief against the respondents for a judicial declaration of the
insurability of respondents’ GTDs. The respondents setup a counterclaim asking for payment of the
amounts represented by the GTDs. The RTC declared the GTDs to be deposit liabilities of MBC and hence,
are liabilities of PDIC as statutory insurer and ordered PDIC to pay the respondents. The CA affirmed the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may order PDIC to pay the respondents in the action for declaratory relief.
HELD:
YES. There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing
of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil
action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by
Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes
necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same
rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if
they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
MATALIN COCONUT CO., INC. vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF LANAO DEL SUR
G.R. No. L-28138 August 13, 1986
FACTS:
The Municipal Council of Malabang enacted a Municipal Ordinance making it unlawful for any person,
company or group of persons to ship out of the Municipality of Malabang, cassava starch or flour without
paying to the Municipal Treasurer or his authorized representatives the corresponding fee (P0.30 per sack)
fixed by the ordinance.
Matalin Coconut challenged the validity of the ordinance in a petition for declaratory relief alleging among
others that the ordinance is ultra vires and that it is unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory. The trial
court declared the ordinance null and void and ordered the Municipal Treasurer to refund to Matalin the
payments it had already made under the ordinance. A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was also
issued.
The Municipal Council filed a motion to dissolve the writ raising as assignment of error that the money
claim of Matalin should not have been adjudicated in the action for declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may adjudicate the money claim in the action for declaratory relief.
HELD:
YES. Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be converted into an ordinary action
and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final termination
of the case "a breach or violation of an ordinance, should take place." In the present case, no breach or
violation of the ordinance occurred. The petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the fees imposed by the
ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; the declaratory relief action was still proper because the
applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still remained to be resolved, although the matter could
also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid.
Respondents' contention, if sustained, would in effect require a separate suit for the recovery of the fees
paid by petitioner under protest. Multiplicity of suits should not be allowed or encouraged and, in the
context of the present case, is clearly uncalled for and unnecessary.
DBM vs. MANILA’S FINEST RETIREES ASSOCIATION, INC.

G.R. No. 169466 May 9, 2007
FACTS:
PD 765 was issued constituting the Integrated National Police (INP) to be composed of the Philippine
Constabulary as the nucleus and the integrated police forces as components thereof. PD 1184 or the INP
law was also issued to professionalize the INP.
Later, the PNP Law was enacted, which provided, among others, that the Philippine National Police would
initially consist of the members of the INP, as well as the officers and enlisted personnel of the PC.
A little less than 8 years later, RA 8551 amended the PNP Law. Under the new law, the PNP personnel,
stood to collect more retirement benefits than what INP members of equivalent rank, who had retired under
the INP Law, received. Thus, INP retirees filed a petition for declaratory relief, asking for same or identical
retirement benefits bestowed to PNP retirees.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the INP retirees and ordered the immediate adjustment of the
respondents’ retirement benefits. The CA upheld the same. The Petitioners dispute the decision, claiming
that a petition for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process, the only relief proper
under that setting being a declaration of the parties rights and duties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court correctly ordered the adjustment of the INP retirees’ benefits in the petition
for declaratory relief.
HELD:
YES. There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing
of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil
action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by
Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes
necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same
rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if
they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
The Court sees no reason for treating this case differently from PDIC and Matalin. This disposition becomes
all the more appropriate considering that the respondents, as petitioners in the RTC, pleaded for the
immediate adjustment of their retirement benefits which, significantly, the herein petitioners, as respondents
in the same court, did not object to. Being aware of said prayer, the petitioners then already knew the logical
consequence if, as it turned out, a declaratory judgment is rendered in the respondents’ favor.
CRISOLOGO vs. CENTENO

G.R. No. 20014 November 27, 1968
FACTS:
Spouses Crisologo filed a petition for consolidation of ownership in them as vendees a retro of two parcels
of land on the ground that Spouses Centeno failed to exercise their right of repurchase within the stipulated
periods. The petition was granted on January 28, 1955.
Subsequently, the Spouses Centeno filed a motion to set aside the aforementioned order. On July 27, 1956,
such motion was granted on the ground that the vendors had not been notified of the hearing. On motion
by the Spouses Crisologo, the court on February 27, 1957, reversed its decision finding that the vendors
were notified of the hearing. The CA set aside the decision and rendered judgment in favor of the Spouses
Centeno and remanded the case to the lower court.
Spouses Centeno alleged that the contracts of sale were really intended as equitable mortgages as securities
for usurious loans. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the vendors on October 26, 1960.
Spouses Crisologo contended that the lower court erred in not finding that the first order of January 28,
1955 was valid, final and executory and that all proceedings thereafter taken, including the vendors’ appeal
to the Court of Appeals and its decision rendered in said appeal setting aside the Order of February 27,
1957, and remanding the case for reopening and further proceedings, as well as the proceedings thereafter
taken, including the decision of October 26, 1960, are null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioners is correct.
HELD:
NO. In the instant case, the caption and title of the petition for consolidation of ownership named the
vendees as petitioners, but did not name the vendors as respondents, the said vendors were not duly
summoned and heard. In view thereof, the Order of January 28, 1955, was a patent nullity having been
issued contrary to the contentious proceeding contemplated in Article 1607 of the Civil Code, and the lower
court not having acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the vendors.
After the remand to the court below, the proceedings further taken wherein the vendors were named as
respondents and duly summoned and heard, after which on October 26, 1960, the appealed judgment was
rendered in favor of the respondents, were valid, being in accordance with the contentious proceeding
provided for in Article 1607 of the Civil Code.
RAMOS vs. CA
G.R. No. L-42108 May 10, 1995
FACTS:
Adelaida Ramos executed two deeds of conditional sale over Lots 4033 and 4221 as collateral for loans in
favor of her brother, Oscar Ramos, as creditor. When Adelaida failed to exercise her right of repurchase,
Oscar and his wife proceeded to consolidate their ownership over the two lots. Eventually, the CFI, acting
as probate court confirmed Oscar and his wife’s ownership over Lot 4033. The same court, as a cadastral
court, affirmed the petition for consolidation of ownership of the spouses over Lot 4221.
Despite the aforementioned events, Adelaida and Lazaro Meneses remained in possession of the properties
until 1964 when the petitioners took possession of the lots. Sometime in 1968, the spouses Ramos instituted
a case against the petitioners for declaration of nullity of orders, reformation of instrument and recovery of
possession, with prayer for preliminary injunction and damages. The trial court found that the deeds of
conditional sale were in fact equitable mortgages. The CA affirmed the decision.
Adelaida’s heirs subsequently substituted her in the case and argued that the dispositive portion of the lower
court's decision, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and this Honorable Court, did not direct the Spouses
Oscar Ramos and Luz Agudo to restore possession of the properties to Adelaida Ramos; and/or failed to
instruct the Register of Deeds of Tarlac to cancel the titles issued to Oscar Amos and Luz Agudo, to the
extent of the shares of Adelaida Ramos in the properties. They filed a motion for clarification praying that
the judgment of the trial court be amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment shall be allowed.
HELD:
YES. The amendment now being sought by the movants, although coming long after the subject judgment
had matured into finality, would not at all be unauthorized or improper considering the peculiar but
compelling circumstances under and by reason of which such an amendment is necessitated.
The legal bases for the issuance of certificates of title to the lots in favor of petitioners and third persons
having been set aside by the judgment of the trial court in said Civil Case No. 4168, with its recognition of
corresponding rights thereover by private respondents, this again ineluctably implies that the corresponding
certificates of title thereover be issued in favor of private respondents or their successors, and that the
certificates of title of petitioners and their transferees be consequently canceled.
Thus the motion for clarificatory judgment was allowed and the portion of the judgment was amended.
REPUBLIC vs. BATUIGAS

G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013
FACTS:h
Azucena Batuigas filed a petition for naturalization before the RTC. The OSG filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some lucrative
trade. The RTC denied the motion.
On the hearing to present evidence, the OSG did not appear thus Azucena was allowed to present evidence
ex parte. The trial court found that Azucena was able to support the allegations in her petition for
naturalization and granted the same.
The OSG filed an omnibus motion arguing that the law mandates public hearing in naturalization cases and
the presentation of evidence ex parte should not have been allowed. The RTC rejected the OSG’s argument
and that the notice of hearing to the OSG was already sufficient compliance with the public hearing
requirement.
The OSG appealed the judgment to the CA, contending Azucena’s failure to satisfy the income requirement.
The CA dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Azucena should be naturalized as a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
YES. We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding authorized by the law or
by the Rules of Court, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. "Such judicial
declaration of citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefor in a
naturalization proceeding."
This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition for
judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a
court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he
is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on
requirements required under CA 473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is
qualified for the grant of that privilege.
TAN vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-16108 October 31, 1961
FACTS:
A petition was filed with the CFI alleging that Eleuteria Tan is the common-law wife of Tan King Pock, a
Chinaman and that 9 minor children were born to them out of wedlock; and that she and her children were
registered as aliens. She asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel their registrations as aliens but
the Commissioner refused to do so. Thus, she prayed for the cancellation of their alien certificates of
registration.
Thereafter, the court issued an order suggesting that Eleuteria amend the petition into one for declaratory
relief, which she did. The OSG asked for the denial of the petition because it is not based upon any of the
grounds required by the rules as a ground for declaratory judgment and that the petition seeks a judicial
pronouncement as to her claim for citizenship, which must be threshed out in a proper action. The CFI
rendered judgment in Eleuteria’s favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for declaratory relief was proper.
HELD:
NO. Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action which may lie only when "any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by statute or
ordinance," demands construction thereof for a declaration of his rights thereunder. None of the above
circumstances exists in the case under consideration. And this Court has already held that there is no
proceeding established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a
declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties
to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise,
such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
If the petition be considered as one for declaratory judgment, the facts do not warrant the filing of the said
special civil action. If the petition seeks to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her and her
children's alien certificate of registration, this petition would not lie because such a remedy of cancellation
of alien certificate of registration can only be had by virtue of a judgment of a competent court, in an action
where the citizenship of parties is a material matter in issue, declaring the Filipino citizenship of the
petitioner and her children, and such declaration cannot be obtained directly because there is no proceeding
at present provided by law or the rules for such purpose.
SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK

G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
FACTS:
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, lured Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old into his apartment wherein he
detained the girl and raped her several times. Karen was rescued after 4 days. Bartelli was arrested and
detained. Criminal cases for serious illegal detention and 4 counts of rape were filed against him. Petitioners
also filed a case for damages with preliminary attachment.
The application for a writ of preliminary attachment was granted. The Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a
Notice of Garnishment to China Banking Corporation. However, China Bank invoked RA 1405 (Secrecy
of Bank Deposits) as its answer to the notice of garnishment. The sheriff claimed that the garnishment did
not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment legally
made by virtue of a court order. China Bank then invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.
The petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief, asking that Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
be declared as contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever,” has taken away the right of
petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered
in petitioners' favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act shall be made applicable to a foreign transient.
HELD:
NO. Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such
depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only
for a short time.
Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars with respondent
China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a
foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which
provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de
otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that
would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of
R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC AND 29
THE COA
PATES vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 184915 June 30, 2009
FACTS:
On February 1, 2008, the COMELEC First Division issued the assailed Resolution. Nilo Pates received a
copy of such Resolution on February 4, 2008. On Februrary 8, 2008, Pates filed his MR of the Resolution.
The COMELEC en banc denied the MR. Pates received the denial on September 22, 2008.
Under the chronology, the last day for filing of a petition for certiorari, which is 30 days from notice of the
final COMELEC Resolution fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008) because Pates only had 26 days to file
his petition after using up 4 days in preparing and filing his MR. Effectively, the last day for filing was
October 20, 2008, the following Monday after October 18. Pates only filed his petition on October 22, 2008
or two days late. Thus, the case was dismissed.
Pates filed an MR, invoking the fresh period rule and arguing that his petition was seasonably filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fresh period rule is applicable.
HELD:
NO. Rule 64 cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. Procedurally,
the most patent difference between the two i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to is Section 3
which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the
COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that
Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration
deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice. Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any compelling reason to
warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed to explain why his filing was
late. Other than his appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why we should adopt
and apply the fresh period rule to an election case.
THE COA
PAA vs. CA
G.R. No. 126560 December 4, 1997
FACTS:
Atty. Paa was dismissed as the Administrative Officer of the DOLE by its then Secretary Ma. Nieves
Confesor. He moved for reconsideration of the order but was unsuccessful. Thus, he appealed to the CSC.
The CSC found petitioner guilty of being notoriously undesirable and imposed upon him "the penalty of
dismissal from the service with all its accessories." He filed an MR but the same was denied by the CSC
on February 13, 1996.
On April 12, 1996, Paa filed with the CA a motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari under
Rule 45, alleging that he received a copy of the February 13, 1996 resolution on March 29, 1996 and he
had then until April 13, 1996 within which to file a petition for review under Rule 45. The CA denied the
motion for being the wrong mode of appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of the motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari under Rule 45
was properly denied.
HELD:
YES. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on 1 July 1997, a petition for review as
a mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals from decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax
Appeals and quasi-judicial bodies, including the Civil Service Commission, is governed by Rule 43 thereof.
Considering that petitioner announced in his motion for extension of time that he would be filing a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for peremptorily
denying the motion.
THE COA
LOKIN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 193808 June 26, 2012
FACTS:
In 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC submitted to the COMELEC a
"Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010
Elections." One was signed by Derla and the other by Cruz-Gonzales and Jose. The COMELEC gave due
course to the CIBAC’s manifestation, without prejudice to the determination which of the two entities is
the official representative of CIBAC.
Subsequently, President and Chairperson Villanueva submitted the certificate of nomination of CIBAC. It
was certified by Villanueva and Jose. Later, Derla submitted a second certificate of nomination which
included Lokin and Planas as nominees. The petitioners sought to nullify the certicate filed by Derla.
The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution expunging the Certificate of Nomination which included
the petitioners as representatives of a party-list group known as Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC). The COMELEC en banc affirmed the same. Thus, Lokin and Planas filed a petition for certiorari,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari shall be given due course.
HELD:
NO. The Court denied the petition for being filed outside the requisite period. The review by this Court of
judgments and final orders of the COMELEC is governed specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the immediately succeeding provision,
Section 3 thereof, which provides for the allowable period within which to file petitions for certiorari from
judgments of both the COMELEC and the COA. Thus, while Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of certiorari
as the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot be equated, as they provide for different reglementary periods.
Rule 65 provides for a period of 60 days from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme
Court, while Section 3 expressly provides for only 30 days.
Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued the second assailed
Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on 1 September
2010.16 Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three days it took petitioners to file the Motion
for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of 27 days or until 28 September 2010 within which to
file the Petition for Certiorari with this Court. However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1
October 2010, clearly outside the required period.
In this case, petitioners do not even attempt to explain why the Petition was filed out of time. Clearly, they
are aware of the applicable period for filing, as they themselves invoke the remedy under Rule 64 in
conjunction with Rule 65. Hence, there is no acceptable reason for their failure to comply with the proper
procedure.
THE COA
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY vs. COA

G.R. No. 213525 January 27, 2015
FACTS:
The Provincial Government of Antique and Fortune Life Insurance Company executed a MOA concerning
the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasures and tanods. It submitted a
disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre -audit. However, the payment was disallowed for lack of
legal basis. The LGU appealed but it was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed a petition for money claim in the COA. The COA denied the petition,
holding that only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group
insurance coverage for barangay workers.
The petitioner received a copy of the decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its MR on January 14, 2013.
The MR was denied, the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014. Thus, a petition for
certiorari was filed on August 12, 2014 but was dismissed for being filed out of time. Petitioner filed an
MR invoking the fresh period rule and that its Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review under Rule
42.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fresh period rule is applicable.
HELD:
NO. There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under
Rule 64. As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question
of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima facie
showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or
modification of the challenged judgment or final order. In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64
is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA).
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is
allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from
receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within
the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving
the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five
days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it
received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition.
However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.
THE COA
OSMEÑA vs. COA

G.R. No. 188818 May 31, 2011
FACTS:
The City of Cebu engaged the services of WT Construction and Dakay Construction and Development to
construct and renovate Cebu City Sports Complex. Osmeña, the then city mayor, was authorized by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to represent the City and to execute the construction contract.
While the construction was being undertaken, Osmeña issued 20 change/extra work orders to WT and
Dakay. Such orders were not covered by any supplemental agreement, nor was there a prior authorization
from the Sanggunian. The extra work was not covered by the necessary appropriation to effect payment.
WT and Dakay filed collection cases before the RTC. The RTC ordered the City to pay the companies for
the extra work performed. The decisions were affirmed on appeal. To satisfy the judgment debts, the
Sanggunian passed the required appropriation ordinances.
The City Auditor issued a notice disallowing the payment to WT and Dakay. The COA Regional Office
rendered judgment declaring that the amounts should be solely Osmeña’s liability as it was him who ordered
the extra work without the supplemental agreement required by law. COA’s National Director for Legal
and Adjudication sustained the decision on January 16, 2004.
On May 6, 2008, the COA affirmed the notices of disallowance. He filed an MR of the May 6, 2008 decision
on June 10, 2008. It was denied on June 8, 2009. The decision was received by the Office of the Mayor on
June 29, 2009, but Osmeña was in the US for medical reasons. He returned on July 15, 2009 and it was
only on July 27, 2009 when he filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the procedural rules should be relaxed and the petition allowed.
HELD:
YES. Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least be accompanied by an explanation of
why the party- litigant failed to comply with the Rules and by a justification for the requested liberal
construction. Where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, this Court may
relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its legal jurisdiction.
Osmeña cites the mandatory medical check-ups he had to undergo after his cancer surgery in April 2009 as
reason for the delay in filing his petition for certiorari. He could not require his office to attend to the case
as he was being charged in his personal capacity.
We find Osmeña’s reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the Rules. Although the service of the June
8, 2009 Resolution of the COA was validly made on June 29, 2009 through the notice sent to the Office of
the Mayor of Cebu City, we consider July 15, 2009 the date he reported back to office as the effective date
when he was actually notified of the resolution, and the reckoning date of the period to appeal. If we were
to rule otherwise, we would be denying Osmeña of his right to appeal the Decision of the COA, despite the
merits of his case.
THE COA
PORMENTO vs. ESTRADA

G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010
FACTS:
Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification, opposing Joseph Estrada’s candidacy for presidency.
However, his petition was denied by COMELEC Second Division. His MR was denied by the COMELEC
en banc. Pormento filed a petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition will stay the execution of the judgment of the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. Under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment,
final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even
pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private
respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections
where he garnered the second highest number of votes.
Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised on a person’s
second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in
this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial
controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief
may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As
such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an
actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence,
one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties.
There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent
events.
CERTIORARI (RULE 65) 35
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION vs. CA

G.R. No. 164561 August 30, 2006
FACTS:
Enrique Tamondong III was the Personnel Superintendent of CAPASCO. The supervisory personnel of
CAPASCO organized a union, known as CAPASCO Union of Supervisory Employees (CUSE) wherein he
was active and was elected as one of the officers. He was asked to stop his union activities but he refused
to do so. Thus, CAPASCO terminated his employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Tamondong then filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC, claiming that there was no just cause
for his dismissal, as he was merely exercising his right to self-organization. On the other hand, CAPASCO
claimed that he was a managerial employee, which means that he was prohibited from joining a union.
The LA ruled in favor of Tamondong, which the NLRC reversed. Upon MR, the NLRC affirmed its original
decision. Tamondong filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC. The CA granted the petition. The MR was denied. Hence, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was filed. Tamondong challenged this, asserting that a final decision of the CA is
appealable to the SC by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy.
HELD:
NO. The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against
a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) such tribunal, board, or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In this case, petitioners fail to meet the third requisite for the proper invocation of Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, to wit: that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. They simply alleged that the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion which amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution. They did not bother to
explain why an appeal cannot possibly cure the errors committed by the appellate court. It must be noted
that the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals was already a disposition on the merits; this Court has
no remaining issues to resolve, hence, the proper remedy available to the petitioners is to file Petition for
Review under Rule 45 not under Rule 65.
Additionally, the general rule is that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available
to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.
BANCO FILIPINO vs. CA

G.R. No. 132703 June 23, 2000
FACTS:
The General Banking Act provides that a bank is allowed to own the land and the improvements thereon
used as branch sites but only up to a maximum of 50% of the bank’s net worth. In 1979, Banco Filipino
had reached such allowable limit so it sold some of its holdings to Tala Realty. Banco Filipino leased the
branch sites from Tala, which was organized as a transferee corporation by majority stockholders of Banco
Filipino.
Banco Filipino alleged that a trust was created by virtue of the transactions since Tala was established to
warehouse the legal title of the properties for the beneficial interest of the bank. However, Tala demanded
payment of increased rentals from it, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to pay.
Because of such failure, Tala filed numerous ejectment suits against Banco Filipino. The bank then filed
actions for recovery of real properties in the RTC of Iloilo, Manila, QC, Malolos, and Lucena where it had
its branches. The motions to dismiss were filed on the ground of forum shopping and litis pendentia, which
were granted.
On June 27, 1996, the RTC denied the bank’s MR. The copy of the order was received on July 5, 1996 but
instead of filing an appeal, Banco Filipino filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA on
July 24, 1996. The CA dismissed the petition and denied the MR. The copy was received on January 7,
1998. Banco Filipino filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65 on March 9, 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy.
HELD:
NO. Banco Filipino's proper remedy from the adverse resolutions of the Court of Appeals is an ordinary
appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Nothing in the record of this case supports Banco Filipino's bare assertion that the
Court of Appeals rendered its assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion.
The availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from the decision of the Court of
Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for certiorari. This Court has often enough
reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only
when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal. Banco Filipino's recourse
to a special civil action for certiorari was borne not out of the conviction that grave abuse of discretion
attended the resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but simply because of its failure to file a
timely appeal to this Court.
CANDELARIA vs. RTC OF PAMPANGA

G.R. No. 173861 July 14, 2014
FACTS:
During an alleged buy-bust operation, Jay Candelaria and Eric Basit were arrested for delivering, with the
intention to sell, five cases of counterfeit Fundador Brandy. They were formally charged with a violation
of the Intellectual Property Code, based on the Joint Affidavit of the police operatives.
They pleaded not guilty to the offense upon arraignment. Thereafter, the petitioners filed a motion to
suppress/exclude evidence, claiming that the evidence against them were obtained in violation of their right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. They claimed that at the time the alleged counterfeit products
were seized, they were neither committing nor attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting
officers.
The RTC denied the motion, holding that any objection to an arrest must be made before the accused enters
his plea. Thus, they are already estopped from questioning the legality of the arrest. However, the RTC
based the denial on the Joint Affidavit of the arresting officers, holding that the search and seizure was
incidental to a valid warrantless arrest who were caught in flagrante delicto. Their MR was denied, so they
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
HELD:
NO. It is to be stressed that in every special civil action under Rule 65, a party seeking the writ whether for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, must be able to show that his or her resort to such extraordinary remedy
is justified by the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any mistake in the application
of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected only by appeal. The
determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of its
jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in
judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions
and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the
subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as errors and reviewed in the
appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.
The RTC’s denial of the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on its assessment that the evidence
sought to be suppressed/excluded is admissible, was done in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
Assuming that the RTC’s determination is erroneous, the mistake is clearly not an error of jurisdiction but
of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.
CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. GRECIA-CUERDO

G.R. No. 175273 February 4, 2014
FACTS:
The City of Manila, through its treasurer, Liberty Toledo, assessed the taxes of several business
establishments from January to December 2002, in addition to those due from the private respondents
pursuant to the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RCCM). Payment of the taxes was a precondition to the
issuance of business permits, thus private respondents were constrained to pay.
Thus, they filed with the RTC of Pasay a complaint to refund with the illegally collected local business tax
with prayer to issue a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC granted the same. The petitioner’s
MR was denied, thus they filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA denied the
petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the same is vested with the CTA. Petitioners filed an MR
but the CA denied the same. The petitioners filed with the SC a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition
filed with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute that the
assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely.
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which
to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is
sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.18 Considering that the present petition was filed
within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an
error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems
it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for
review on certiorari.
*The power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases
falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
REPUBLIC vs. CA and TRADERS ROYAL BANK

G.R. No. 129846 January 18, 2000
FACTS:
In 1986, The Office of the President issued four type “B” Treasury Warrants drawn against the Bureau of
Treasury (BTr), which were deposited in Traders Royal Bank for collection.
When the bank presented the warrants, they were cleared and the amounts were credited to the designated
payee accounts. However, petitioner subsequently found out that the payees’ indorsements on the warrants
had been forged. It demanded reimbursement but the bank refused to pay. Thus, the BTr filed a case for
collection against the bank. Trial then ensued.
After petitioner rested its case, Traders Royal bank filed a demurrer to evidence, which the RTC denied.
Upon MR, the RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint, which order was received by petitioner on February
7, 1995, so it had up to February 22, 1995 within which to file an appeal. On February 20, 1995, petitioner
filed an MR of the order of dismissal.
The MR was denied and the order was received on June 2, 1995, so that it had until June 4, 1995 to file an
appeal. However, the appeal was filed only on June 16, 1995 or 12 days beyond the 15-day reglementary
period. Thus, the dismissal became final. However, the fact was not noticed immediately so petitioner was
able to appeal. Respondent challenged the same, claiming that the appeal was filed out of time. The motion
was granted. Petitioner filed an MR but it was denied. The order was received on June 5, 1997. On August
4, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for review for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rule 65 is the proper remedy.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner’s remedy was to appeal to this Court from the resolutions, dated March 17, 1997 and May
20, 1997, of the appellate court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, it filed
this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 only on August 4, 1997. Apparently, petitioner resorted to this
special civil action because it had failed to take an appeal within the 15-day reglementary period which
expired on June 20, 1997. This, of course, cannot be done. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be
used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner has lost. Nor can it be contended that the only question
raised in this case is a jurisdictional question. Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There is no reason why the question being
raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitions, could not have been raised by it on appeal.
The outcome of this petition may be a bitter lesson for petitioner, but one mainly of its own doing. Not only
did it file its notice of appeal well beyond the reglementary period, it actually failed to appeal from the
order dismissing its case against private respondent. The inevitable consequence of such grave inadvertence
is to render the trial courts decision dismissing its case final and executory. The Court of Appeals thus acted
properly in dismissing petitioners appeal.
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC. vs. CA

G.R. No. 112288 February 20, 1997
FACTS:
American Home Assurance Company (AHAC) filed an action for sum of money against Delsan Transport
Lines in the RTC of Pasig. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of AHAC, a copy of which was received
by Delsan on August 21, 1991.
On September 9, 1991, Delsan, through its counsel Atty. Noel Montilla, filed a notice of appeal. On July
13, 1992, Delsan moved for the dismissal of its appeal on the ground that the earlier judgment had already
been satisfied. Attached to the motion was a “Satisfaction of Judgment,” signed by Montilla, on behalf of
Delsan and Atty. Manuel Camacho on behalf of AHAC. It was allegedly filed with the RTC.
Acting on the motion, the CA dismissed the appeal. However, AHAC filed on March 22, 1993 a motion
for execution of judgment in its favor, claiming that no money had actually been remitted to it. Delsan
opposed the motion for execution.
The RTC then ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of AHAC. Delsan filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction in the CA. In its comment, AHAC claimed that the
notice of appeal was filed late. The CA dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleges that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, hastily
concluding that the "Satisfaction of Judgment" was spurious. In its comment, private respondent urges that
the petition for certiorari should be dismissed outright, because what petitioner should have filed should be
a petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition must be dismissed outright.
HELD:
NO. Considering that the decision of the Court of Appeals is a final disposition of the matter before it,
private respondent's contention that the appropriate remedy of petitioner is to file a petition for review on
certiorari is well-taken. However, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
the interest of justice, we have decided to treat the present petition for certiorari as having been filed under
Rule 45, especially considering that it was filed within the reglementary period for the same. Petitioner's
counsel received the Court of Appeals resolution denying its motion for reconsideration on October 26,
1993 and filed this petition on November 8, 1993, which is within the 15-day reglementary period for filing
a petition for review on certiorari. It cannot therefore be claimed that this petition is being used as a
substitute for appeal after that remedy has been lost through the fault of petitioner. Moreover, stripped of
allegations of "grave abuse of discretion," the petition actually avers errors of judgment rather than of
jurisdiction, which are the subject of a petition for review.
GALICTO vs. AQUINO III

G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino issued EO 7 which provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed
compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs (government financial institutions),
following some findings that various GOCCs and GFIs have been granting themselves unwarranted
allowances, benefits and other allowances.
The petitioner, Jelbert Galicto, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO seeking to nullify EO 7 for being unconstitutional. He claimed that as
a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The respondents countered that certiorari is not
applicable to the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy.
HELD:
NO. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial,
quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory
act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief
under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to
assail the validity of EO 7.
For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer
must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting [to] lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is
and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate
upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature.
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010
FACTS:
RA 9372 otherwise known as the Human Security Act was signed into law on March 6, 2007, Following
its effectivity on July 15, 2007, several petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed by different
organizations such as IBP, KMU, BAYAN and GABRIELA, among others, who are joined by concerned
citizens and taxpayers.
Impleaded as respondents in the petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the
filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales
as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and
National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno,
and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National
Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resort to certiorari is proper.
HELD:
NO. Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or

officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted
without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
DANGAN-CORRAL vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190156 February 12, 2010
FACTS:
Leonor Dangan-Corral and Ernesto Fernandez were candidates for the position of mayor of the
Municipality of El Nido, Palawan during the May 14, 2007 elections. Corral was eventually proclaimed the
winner with 5,113 votes as against Fernandez's 3,807. Fernandez filed an election protest with the RTC.
On February 22, 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of Fernandez, declaring him as the duly elected Mayor of El
Nido Palawan, since It was judicially declared that some ballots were written by 1 or 2 persons. Thus,
Fernandez won by a margin of 465 votes.
On the same day, Corral filed her notice of appeal. On the other hand, Fernandez filed a motion for
execution pending appeal and set the same for hearing on Februrary 27, 2008. On the date of the hearing,
Corral filed her written opposition to the motion, but a hearing was still held. After the hearing, the RTC
judge granted the motion of execution of his decision pending appeal. Corral filed an MR but it was denied.
Thus, she filed a petition for certiorari before the COMELEC invoking grave abuse of discretion of the
RTC because the decision did not comply with the mandatory required form of decisions in election cases.
Subsequently, the petition for certiorari was dismissed. Corral filed an MR with the COMELEC En Banc
which dismissed the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
affirming the execution pending appeal of the decision of the RTC.
HELD:
YES. Sec. 2, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests provide that, “When ballots are
invalidated on the ground of written by one person, the court must clearly and distinctly specify why the
pair or group of ballots has been written by only one person. The specific strokes, figures or letters
indicating that the ballots have been written by one person must be specified. A simple ruling that a pair
or group of ballots has been written by one person would not suffice. The same is true when ballots
are excluded on the ground of having been written by two persons xxx”
In the present case, the victory of the protestant and the defeat of the protestee were not clearly established
in the Decision because of the RTC’s failure to conform to the prescribed form of the Decision. Because of
said infirmity, there is no certainty, it not being mentioned in the Decision, on whether the ballots of those
who voted through assistors were also invalidated or not, in conjunction with the lack of a specific number
of ballots invalidated for being written by one person. The ballots of those who voted through assistors, if
any, could validly be written by one person. It being unclear from the Decision whether these ballots, if
any, were invalidated, it follows that the victory of the protestant and defeat of the protestee are unclear and
not manifest therein.
Consequently, to allow the execution of such a grossly infirm RTC Decision in disregard of established
jurisprudence and clear and straightforward rules is arbitrary and whimsical and constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
QUO WARRANTO 44
ARQUERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 168053 September 21, 2011
FACTS:
On October 13, 1989, Congress approved RA No. 6765. Under the law, several schools were converted
into national schools and integrated with the Palawan National School (PNS) in the City of Puerto Princesa,
as branches thereof. The law provides that the Palawan Integrated National Schools (PINS) shall be headed
by a Vocational School Superintendent (VSS) who shall be chosen and appointed by the DepEd Secretary.
However, no VSS was appointed. Later, Arquero took over as Secondary School Principal of the PNS.
Thereafter, she was designated as OIC of the PINS.
Subsequently, all satellite schools of the PINS were placed under the direct supervision of the Schools
Division Superintendent for Palawan. Petitioner was instructed to turn over the administration and
supervision of the PINS branches or units.
The designation of petitioner as OIC of the PINS was withdrawn and Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent Norma B. Brillantes was designated in concurrent capacity as OIC of the PINS.
Dr. Giron filed a formal charge against petitioner who continued to defy the orders issued by the Regional
Office relative to the exercise of her functions as OIC of the PINS despite the designation of private
respondent as such. Thus, petitioner filed the Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunctive Writ against public and private respondents. Considering
that petitioner was appointed in a permanent capacity, she insisted that private respondents designation as
OIC of the PNS is null and void there being no vacancy to the position.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Arquero has a clear legal right to the position of OIC of PINS.
HELD:
NONE. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to
have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office. It may be brought by the
Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject
public office. In other words, the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested position.
Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo
warranto may be dismissed. It is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue
of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office.
The law created two positions – the VSS and the principal or secondary school head teacher of each of the
units or branches of the integrated school. The legislators clearly intended that the integrated schools shall
be headed by a superintendent. Admittedly, petitioner did not possess the qualifications to hold the position
and she was merely designated by the DepEd as the OIC of the PINS. At that time, she held in a concurrent
capacity, the permanent position of principal of the PNS. Having been appointed as OIC without the
necessary qualifications, petitioner held the position only in a temporary capacity. Thus, under RA 6765,
petitioner can only insist on her security of tenure as principal of the PNS but not as OIC of the integrated
school. Upon the withdrawal of her designation, her right to the contested position ceased to exist.
QUO WARRANTO 45
MORO vs. DEL CASTILLO, JR.

G.R. No. 184980 March 30, 2011
FACTS:
Generoso Del Castillo Jr., then Chief Accountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Accounting Center
of the AFP was charged by the Ombudsman with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. The OMB alleged that he made false statements in his SALN and acquire
properties manifestly out of proportion to his reported salary.
Later, through an order, the GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the Philippine Air Force Accounting Center
and Danilo Moro took over the former position of Del Castillo.
In the meantime, Del Castillo was placed under preventive suspension for 6 months and was eventually
ordered dismissed from the service. After six months, he tried to reassume his former post as GHQ Chief
Accountant since Moro was holding the position.
Del Castillo filed a petition for quo warranto against Moro, claiming that the latter was merely detailed as
GHQ Chief Accountant when the Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension. Since the
latter’s period of suspension already lapsed, he was entitled to resume his former post. For his part, Moro
pointed out that his appointment under was a permanent. The GHQ had already reassigned Del Castillo to
the PAF Accounting Center even before the OMB placed him under preventive suspension. Del Castillo
was, therefore, not automatically entitled to return to his former GHQ post despite the lapse of his
suspension. RTC dismissed the petition. CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to his former position.
HELD:
NO. An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against one who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. It may be brought by the Republic of the
Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office.
In this case, it was Del Castillo who filed the action, claiming that he was entitled as a matter of right to
reassume the position of GHQ Chief Accountant after his preventive suspension ended on March 11, 2007.
He argues that, assuming his reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center was valid, the same could not
exceed one year. Since his detail at the PAF took effect under SO 91 on April 1, 2006, it could last not later
than March 31, 2007. By then, Moro should have allowed him to return to his previous posting as GHQ
Chief Accountant.
But, as Moro points out, he had been authorized under SO 91 to serve as GHQ Chief Accountant. Del
Castillo, on the other hand, had been ordered dismissed from the service by the Ombudsman. Consequently,
he cannot reassume the contested position.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject
public office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action
for quo warranto may be dismissed. Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name,
months after the OMB ordered his dismissal from service. The dismissal order was immediately executory
even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo warranto or reassume the
position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.
QUO WARRANTO 46
VILANDO vs. HRET

G.R. No. 192147 August 23, 2011
FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras.
On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. On July
23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.
Meanwhile, petitions que involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were
filed before the COMELEC which reached the Court.
The COMELEC issued a Joint Resolution which resolved the disqualification cases against Limkaichong.
On petition for certiorari, the SC reversed the Joint Resolution and directed the petitioners to seek relief
before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto.
Renald Vilando and Jacinto Paras filed petitions for quo warranto against Limkaichong questioning for
eligibility for the office she was elected. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose
naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy.
Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichong’s citizenship, which
necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy. Limkaichong
claimed that she was a natural-born Filipino and that her citizenship cannot be assailed through a collateral
attack. HRET dismissed both petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Limkaichong should be disqualified as member of the HR.
HELD:
NO. Vilando’s argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the
citizenship of Limkaichongs father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning,
is devoid of merit.
In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To
prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’s
father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the
father. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for
its nullity.
True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging
ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Such power is regarded as
full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in
any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.
Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to
delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To
rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated,
is not permissible.
QUO WARRANTO 47
HON. LUIS M. GENERAL vs. HON. ALEJANDRO URRO

G.R. No. 191560 March 29, 2011
FACTS:
In 2004, Imelda Roces was appointed as Acting NAPOLCOM Commsissioner by PGMA. On July 21,
2008, PGMA appointed Luis General as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces, who died
the previous year. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta as acting NAPOLCOM
Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.
Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro in place of the petitioner, Constancia P. de Guzman in place of
Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. Urro’s appointment paper is dated
March 5, 2010; while the appointment papers of De Guzman and Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010.
After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory letters on March 22, 2010, the petitioner filed a petition,
questioning the validity of the respondents’ appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the
constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.
General filed a petition for quo warranto against Urro, claiming that Roces was supposed to serve a full
term of six years counted from the date of her appointment in October (should be September) 2004. Since
she failed to finish her six-year term, then the petitioner is entitled to serve this unexpired portion or until
October (should be September) 2010. He also contended that ecause of the mandatory word "shall," in the
law, the appointment issued to him was really a "regular" appointment, notwithstanding what appears in
his appointment paper. As a regular appointee, the petitioner argues that he cannot be removed from office
except for cause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not General is entitled to the remedy of quo warranto.
HELD:
NO. Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. Generally, quo
warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the proper party-plaintiff. However, under
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such action if he claims to be entitled
to the public office allegedly usurped by another. We stress that the person instituting the quo warranto
proceedings in his own behalf must show that he is entitled to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action
may be dismissed at any stage. Emphatically, Section 6, Rule 66 of the same Rules requires the petitioner
to state in the petition his right to the public office and the respondent’s unlawful possession of the disputed
position.
For a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the
contested office. His failure to establish this right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of
action; it is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his appointment,
continues in the undisturbed possession of his office.
Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not
have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its
temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a
quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal
deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.
QUO WARRANTO 48
MUNDER vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 194076 October 19, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfais Munder ran as mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and filed his certificate of candidacy
(CoC) on 26 November 2009. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip likewise filed a CoC and vied for the same
position in the same municipality.
On 13 April 2010, Sarip filed a Petition for Disqualification with the Comelec on the ground that Munder
was not a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. Sarip corroborated his by presenting a Certification
from Amerah M. Hadji Sarip - Election Officer of Bubong, Lanao del Sur that, in the election list, there
was no Alfais T. Munder born on 7 May 1987. He also presented a copy of a Voter Certification of one
Munder, Alfais Tocalo, residing at Rogero, Bubong, Lanao del Sur, whose date of birth was 05/07/1984,
and who was registered as a voter on 7/26/2003. On the other hand, petitioner Munder’s CoC for Mayor
contained the name of a candidate as Munder, Alfais Tocalo, 22 years old, with residence at Barangay
Montia-an, Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and whose date of birth was 05-07-1987.
In the 10 May 2010 elections, Munder won overwhelmingly with 4,793 votes, as opposed to Sarip who had
2,356 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, thus proclaimed Munder as
mayor on 15 May 2010.
In his answer to the petition for disqualification, Munder denied committing any misrepresentation in his
CoC. He also argued that false representations, dishonesty and mockery of justice were not grounds for
disqualification of a candidate under Comelec Resolution No. 8696. The Comelec Second Division
dismissed Sarip’s petition. However, the Comelec En Banc reversed the earlier ruling and disqualified
Munder. It ordered Munder to vacate the office and for the vice-mayor to assume the position of mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not quo warranto is the proper remedy.
HELD:
YES. The ground invoked by Sarip in his Petition for Disqualification against Munder - the latter’s alleged
status as unregistered voter in the municipality - was inappropriate for the said petition. The said ground
should have been raised in a petition to cancel Munders CoC. Since the two remedies vary in nature, they
also vary in their prescriptive period. A petition to cancel a CoC gives a registered candidate the chance to
question the qualification of a rival candidate for a shorter period: within 5 days from the last day of their
filing of CoCs, but not later than 25 days from the filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled. A petition for
disqualification may be filed any day after the last day of the filing of CoC but not later than the date of the
proclamation.
The Comelec Second Division stated that the last day of filing of the CoCs was on 21 December 2009.
Thus, the period to file a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy had already
prescribed when Sarip filed his petition against Munder.
In such a case, Sarip's remedy is not a Petition for Disqualification, but a Petition to Deny Due Course or
to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy which must comply with the prescriptive period. Otherwise, his remedy,
after Munder has been proclaimed is to file a quo warranto action with the Regional Trial Court to prove
that Munder lacks the eligibility required by law.
CHANGE OF NAME 49
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAPOTE

G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007
FACTS:
Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to
Giovanni Nadores. It was alleged that Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and
Diosdado Gallamaso. He was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as
such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them.
However, the father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, failed
to take up his responsibilities to him. Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he
desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s surname.
The trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition in a newspaper of general
circulation in Southern Leyte once a week for 3 consecutive weeks was likewise ordered. The trial court
also directed that the LCR be notified and that the OSG be sent a copy of the petition and order. Since there
was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte. The
OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from
Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone
assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.
HELD:
YES. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial
proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided
through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not
alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought
clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the
result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name.
In this regard, [appellee] Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in
a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the
OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG.
The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor
does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its
judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments
propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence
ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower
court were not adversarial enough.
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication
as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world
considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving
a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when
all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to
contest the petition.
CHANGE OF NAME 50
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRINGAS

G.R. No. 160597 July 20, 2006
FACTS:
In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged, among other things, the following: That per records in
the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her registered name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas
Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas
Bolante; and that the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private
records. Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to
the name she has always carried and used.
At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an Order giving respondent 5 days
within which to file a written formal offer of evidence to establish jurisdictional facts and set the
presentation of evidence proper on March 26, 2001. On June 5, 2001, the branch clerk of court, acting upon
the trial court’s March 26, 2001 directive for a resetting, issued a notice for a July 18, 2001 hearing.
Following another resetting, what actually would be the initial hearing was, after notice, scheduled on
September 25, 2001. At that session, respondent presented and marked in evidence several documents
without any objection on the part of the OSG, thru the duly deputized provincial prosecutor of Abra.
RTC: Granted the petition for change of name; affirmed by CA

REPUBLIC: The RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and petitioner failed to prove that the
petition is not resorted to for an illegal purpose because she failed to produce an NBI clearance
ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the petition
2) Whether or not the production of an NBI clearance is necessary in a petition for change of name
HELD: YES. As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name was filed on October 18,
2000 and set for hearing on February 20, 2001 via an Order issued on November 13, 2000. The notice of
hearing was published in the November 23, and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000 issues of the Norluzonian
Courier. Counted from the last day, December 7, 2000, of publication of the Order, the initial hearing
scheduled on February 20, 2001 is indeed within the four-month prohibited period prescribed under Section
3, Rule 103 of the Rules. However, that the trial court, evidently upon realizing the error committed
respecting the 4-month limitation, lost no time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due notice to
all concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling for September 25, 2001.
It is the Republic’s posture that the fact that the hearing took place on September 25, 2001, beyond the four-
month prohibited period, did not cure the jurisdictional defect since notice of the September 25, 2001 setting
went unpublished. Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the initial hearing which, to reiterate is
already outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules, the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed
no objection as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove
the jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very real sense, therefore, the petitioner Republic
fully and knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar circumstances obtaining
in this case and the requirements of fair dealing demand that we accord validity to the proceedings a quo.
2) NO. Due perusal of the requirements of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of
proof to establish the fact that a petitioner has no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon
the declaration and affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further fraud but for
a legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence
requiring a petitioner in a petition for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to prove that
the said petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud.
CHANGE OF NAME 51
GAN vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 207147 September 14, 2016
FACTS:
Emelita Basilio Gan (petitioner) was born on December 21, 1956 out of wedlock to Pia Gan, her father who
is a Chinese national, and Consolacion Basilio, her mother who is a Filipino citizen. Her birth certificate
registered in the Office of the LCR of Camarines Sur, indicates that her full name is Emelita Basilio.
On June 29, 2010, the petitioner filed a Petition for correction of name. The petitioner sought to change the
full name indicated in her birth certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." She claimed
that she had been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in her school records from elementary until college,
employment records, marriage contract and other government records.
On July 15, 2010, the RTC issued an Order, which noted that the petition filed sought not merely a
correction of entry in the birth certificate, but a change of name. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the
petitioner to make the necessary amendment to her petition to conform to the requirements of Rule 103.
The RTC later directed the LCR of Libmanan, Camarines Sur to change the petitioner's name in her birth
certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." The respondent sought reconsideration,
alleging that the petitioner, who is an illegitimate child, failed to adduce evidence that she was duly
recognized by her father, which would have allowed her to use his surname. The CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the change of name should be allowed.
HELD: NO. In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was born out
of wedlock; she did not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, .which would make her a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil
Code. If, at the time of the petitioner's birth, either of her parents had an impediment to marry the other, she
may only bear the surname of her mother pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may
use the surname of her father provided that she was acknowledged by her father.
However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed was duly
acknowledged by his father. The petitioner's evidence consisted only of her birth certificate signed by her
mother, school records, employment records, marriage contract, certificate of baptism, and other
government records. Thus, assuming that she is a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code,
she could still not insist on using her father's surname. It was, thus, a blatant error on the part of the RTC
to have allowed the petitioner to change her name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan.",
Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not give to an illegitimate child or a natural child not
acknowledged by the father the option to use the surname of the father. Thus, the petitioner cannot insist
that she is allowed to use the surname of her father.
CHANGE OF NAME 52
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERCADERA

G.R. No. 186027 December 8, 2010
FACTS:
On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera, represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact,
Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live
Birth - from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Dipolog City pursuant to RA 9048. The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however,
refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained because the Civil Registrar therein is not
yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed
before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048.
Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the
Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108. The RTC found the petition sufficient in form and substance and
directed the publication of the order and sending of copies to the OSG. However, the OSG entered its
appearance and deputized the OCP to assist in the case only on the very day of the hearing. Thus, the hearing
was reset on September 5, 2005. On September 15, 2005, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of
documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera never used the name
Marilyn in any of her public or private transactions. The RTC granted the petition.
The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It
mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name might seem innocuous enough to
grant but it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights. The lower
court, may not substitute one for the other for purposes of expediency. The CA upheld the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in granting the change of name under Rule 103
HELD: NO. The change of name contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with
Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided
by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for
the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess
the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes changes of
name, the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all
alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set
right under Rule 108.
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a
correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults
or error from. To change means to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute. From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the
lower court to remove the faults or error from her registered given name MARILYN, and to make or set
aright the same to conform to the one she grew up to, MERLYN. It does not take a complex assessment of
said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even
attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the
expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief.
CHANGE OF NAME 53
REPUBLIC vs. COSETENG-MAGPAYO

G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011
FACTS:
Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique
Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March
26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed a Petition to
change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating
that his mother Anna Dominique does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage. Respondent also
submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname
Coseteng, and the birth certificate of his child where Coseteng appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001
and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the
name JULIAN M.L. COSETENG.
The RTC of QC granted the petition and directed the LCR of Makati to delete the entry for the date and
place of marriage of his parents. The Republic’s MR was denied. The Republic contends that the deletion
of the entry on the date and place of marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect
of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person
must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 103 is the proper remedy.
HELD:
NO. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to
his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to
grant respondent’s application.
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry
in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was
registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before
the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
CHANGE OF NAME 54
GRANDE vs. ANTONIO

G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
FACTS:
Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although
Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were
born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his
own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the US with her two children in May 2007. This prompted
Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority,
Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Antonio, holding that the best interest of the children will be
promoted if they are under the parental authority and custody of their father. It also ordered the LCR of
Makati to change the surnames of the minors from Grande to Antonio.
The CA modified the decision, ruling that notwithstanding the father’s recognition of his children, the
mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons,
but retained the part where the surnames were changed to Antonio.
ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel his illegitimate children to use his surname upon
his recognition of filiation.
HELD:
NONE. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father
or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean
what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.16 Respondent’s position
that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide
by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate
child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive
and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be measured
is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea
that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 (which provides that upon recognition of
an illegitimate child, the surname shall be changed to that of the father) is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s
surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which
they will be known.
CHANGE OF NAME 55
REPUBLIC vs. HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996
FACTS:
On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y
Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the
jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness
to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the
aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the
first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in
keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and
friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents' residence.
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the
same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to
the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing
that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. The RTC granted the
petitions.
ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered
proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption
HELD: YES. The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption
proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue
to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded
in the civil register is a substantial change in one's official or legal name and cannot be authorized without
a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have,
wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which
the application is made should normally make its decree recording such change.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If
a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive
and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of liberal
construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents
and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein
there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not
subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the
Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law,
the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of
adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and
consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a
result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or
given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and
symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.
CHANGE OF NAME 56
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF

ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
FACTS:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and
Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married
on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let
him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name, they
anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and
sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since
they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name of
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition, finding that the reason given for the
change of name sought in the petition did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. Since the State has
an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.
According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is in the
best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change of name
and/or cancellation of entry.
ISSUE: Whether or not dropping the middle name should be allowed.
HELD: NO. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally
use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of
the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their
father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given
name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s surname
as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change
of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when
he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value
of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under
our laws.
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY 57
REPUBLIC vs. UY
G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
FACTS:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth.
Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on
February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. Her Certificate of Live
Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends
as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, PRC Board of Medicine Certificate,
and passport bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child
considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother. She also
contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and
are all Filipinos.
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly
granted. However, the NSO records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
After finding compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC granted the petition. The CA
affirmed the decision. The decision was challenged on the ground that indispensable parties were not
impleaded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
HELD:
YES. The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections
4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different
potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who
are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons
must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his
interest if he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise excused where the
interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive
awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed
through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open,
the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY OF FELIPE C.

ALMOJUELA
G.R. No. 211724 August 24, 2016
FACTS: For almost 60 years, petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela." However, when he
requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the NSO, he was surprised to discover that he was registered
as "Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela." Thus, he filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in his
NSO birth certificate. He alleged that he is the acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela and
Francisca B. Condeno, both deceased. He averred that while his parents did not marry each other, he has
been known to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using the said surname in all of
his official and legal documents. He also presented a copy of his birth certificate issued by the LCR of
Pandan, Catanduanes showing that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full name.
The RTC initially dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner's recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court was improper, as the petition did not involve mere correction of clerical errors but a matter of
filiation which should, thus, be filed in accordance with Rule 103 of the same Rules. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, maintaining that the issue of filiation is immaterial since he was only seeking a correction
of entry. He likewise insisted that the name "Jorge V. Almojuela" was clearly indicated thereon as the name
of his father.
The RTC ordered the correction of the entry. The OSG filed an MR on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The RTC denied the same. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. It held that although petitioner correctly
invoked Rule 108 of the Rules of Court in filing his petition, he, however, failed to strictly comply with the
requirements thereunder when he omitted to implead the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings, who
stand to be affected by the corrections prayed for, as parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the nullification of the correction of entry was proper.
HELD: YES. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of substantial
changes in the civil registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding. An adversary proceeding is
defined as one "having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of
which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it.
The Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential oppositors: one given to persons named in the
petition, and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction of an entry
in the civil registry should implead as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have
or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.
In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead both the Local Civil Registrar and his
half-siblings. Although he claims that his half-siblings have acknowledged and accepted him, the
procedural rules nonetheless mandate compliance with the requirements in the interest of fair play and due
process and to afford the person concerned theopportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has allowed the subsequent publication of
a notice of hearing to cure the petition's lack/failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties,
such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties;
(b) the parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; (c) there is no actual or presumptive
awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or, (d) when a party is inadvertently left out, these
exceptions are, unfortunately, unavailing in this case.
REPUBLIC vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
FACTS:
Merlina Olaybar requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that
she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of
the MTCC. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage
certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge
Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated,
because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied
having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She
believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave
her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. She also presented as witness a certain
Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed
celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.
Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
The RTC granted the petition. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision
on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the
entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of the entry of marriage was proper.
HELD: YES. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then
the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed
that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.
Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was
not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the
only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule
108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before
the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent;
the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated,
in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the
trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He left for Canada soon
after the wedding. When he returned to the Philippines to surprise Daisylyn, he was shocked to discover
that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and
filed a petition for divorce, which was granted.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.Thus, Gerbert
went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the NSO
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
pleading but offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s. However, the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition, holding that only
the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree; and
2) Whether or not the recognition of the divorce decree will authorize the cancellation of entry
HELD:
YES. The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert. To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe
a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
2) NO. The recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment
is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
civil registry. We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition
of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
FACTS: Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the Philippines in
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife
to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married in 2008 in QC. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay
and Maekara be declared void ab initio; and (3) for the RTC to direct the LCR of QC to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the NSO.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that only the husband or the wife can file the petition to
declare their marriage void. Fujiki moved for reconsideration and argued that Rule 108 is applicable.
Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to
cancellation or correction. The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The MR was denied
since the petition was a collateral attack on the validity of the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: YES. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded
by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of
a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts. A recognition of a
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither
can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
HABEAS CORPUS 62
G.R. No. 197597 April 8, 2015

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO
FACTS:
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo and other Filipinos were allegedly
in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. He later learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station
in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, who was one of the accused of 57 counts of
murder for allegedly participating in the Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi that time.
Salibo presented himself before the police station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not
Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao
Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the
police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents" tending to prove that a
certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009.
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that
evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the police
station for about 3 days. He was then transferred to the CIDG in Cotabato City wherein he was allegedly
made to sign and affix his thumbprint on documents. He was later transferred to QC Jail Annex.
Thus, Salibo filed before the CA an urgent petition for habeas corpus. He claimed that he is not the accused
Malang. The CA issued the writ and ordered the warden of QC Jail to produce the person of Salibo on the
scheduled date of hearing.
ASST. SOLICITORS: Since Salibo was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a
petition for habeas corpus was "no longer availing.”
SALIBO: The Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred
to by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused.
RTC: Granted Salibo’s petition and ordered his immediate release from detention; invalid warrant of arrest
CA: Reversed RTC; usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked; proper remedy was a Motion
to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a petition for habeas corpus.
HELD:
YES. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not
restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and,
therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang
Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his
name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence
of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an
offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed.
Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to
arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of
law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
HABEAS CORPUS 63
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING
G.R. No. 167193 April 19, 2006
FACTS:
On October 19, 2001, Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security
Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and
Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan. Kunting
was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention. Petitioner was
immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial
investigation.
Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division requested
the RTC for Kunting’s temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame, QC due to the high security risks
involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order. The RTC issued an Order,
directing Danipog, Jr. to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation. However, PNP-IG Director wrote to the Chief State Prosecutor requesting for
the transfer of venue of the trial from Isabela, Basilan, to Pasig City for the following reasons: (1) Several
intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the ASG
to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a
big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate
security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG.
On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.
HELD:
NO. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment
In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by
the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by the RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His
temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention.
Thus, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal
offense. Once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
HABEAS CORPUS 64
IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DAVID CRUZ

G.R. No. 137560 January 19, 2000
FACTS:
David Cruz was charged before the RTC of Pasig with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He
allegedly sold 2.7 grams of marijuana to another person. He filed an appeal. His counsel of record, Atty.
Carmelo L. Arcilla, was notified and required to file the appellant's brief within thirty (30) days from notice.
The notice was, however, returned unserved.
On October 3, 1994, the SC issued a Resolution referring the appeal to the CA in view of the effectivity of
RA 7659 and the promulgation of the case of People v. Martin Simon y Sunga, noting that as the quantity
of the marijuana involved in the case was less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty on the appellant was
not life imprisonment but one within the range of prision correccional to reclusion temporal.
A second notice to file appellant's brief was sent to the new address of David Cruz's counsel, as furnished
by Cruz. The notice was again returned unserved. Later, David Cruz filed an urgent motion to withdraw
appeal, with an indorsement by the Asst. Director of the Bureau of Corrections, stating that the legal effects
of the motion were explained to Cruz. The CA held in abeyance the resolution of the motion until the
Director explained the effects to Cruz, considering that by 1996, he would have served the maximum
penalty imposable and there were doubts if this was explained to him. The counsel still failed to file a brief.
Thus, the CA declared Cruz’s appeal as abandoned and dismissed the same. Maria Cruz, David’s mother,
filed a petition for habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be granted.
HELD:
YES. David, was tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. He was convicted on September 27, 1993 and sentenced to life imprisonment and its
accessory penalties. He was committed to the National Penitentiary on October 13, 1993. On December 31,
1993, RA 7659 took effect.
The penalty for the illegal sale of marijuana under the old law was "life imprisonment to death." Under
R.A. 7659, the penalty depended on the quantity of the drug. The sale of "750 grams or more of indian
hemp or marijuana" became punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty for the sale of less than
750 grams of marijuana was reduced to a range "from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua, depending
upon the quantity" of the drug.
In the instant case, the amount of marijuana for which David Cruz was convicted is 2.70 grams. The
imposable penalty for this amount under the Simon ruling is prision correccional which has a duration of
six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Presently, David Cruz has already served six (6) years and
three (3) months of his sentence which is way beyond the last day of prision correccional. The continued
detention of Cruz at the National Penitentiary has been admitted by the Solicitor General as already illegal.
David Cruz should therefore be released from prison without further delay.
An application for the writ of habeas corpus is made upon verified petition setting forth: (1) that the person
in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the officer or name of
the person by whom he is imprisoned or restrained; (3) the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of
his liberty; and (4) a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person. The writ of habeas
corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.
HABEAS CORPUS 65
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF PETE C. LAGRAN

G.R. No. 147270. August 15, 2001
FACTS:
Pete Lagran was convicted of 3 counts of violation of BP 22 wherein he was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 1 year for each count. By virtue of a commitment order, Lagran was committed to the QC
Jail on February 24, 1999 and was transferred to New Bilibid Prison on April 3, 1999.
On March 19, 2001, Lagran filed a petition for habeas corpus, praying for his immediate release as he had
allegedly completed the service of his sentence. Citing Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, he argued that
if the penalties or sentences imposed on the accused are identical, and such penalties or sentences emanated
from one court and one complaint, the accused shall serve them simultaneously. He stated that he has been
incarcerated for two (2) years and four (4) days, counted from February 28, 2001, thus, his detention in the
New Bilibid Prison is now without legal basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.
HELD:
NO. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the
nature of the penalties so permit. The penalties that can be simultaneously served are: (1) perpetual absolute
disqualification, (2) perpetual special disqualification, (3) temporary absolute disqualification, (4)
temporary special disqualification, (5) suspension, (6) destierro, (7) public censure, (8) fine and bond to
keep the peace, (9) civil interdiction, and (10) confiscation and payment of costs. These penalties, except
destierro, can be served simultaneously with imprisonment. The penalties consisting in deprivation of
liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. Where the accused is
sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should be served successively.
In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the offense
committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the prison terms simultaneously.
Applying the rule on successive service of sentence, we find that petitioner has not yet completed the service
of his sentence as he commenced serving his sentence only on February 24, 1999. His prayer, therefore, for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has no basis.
HABEAS CORPUS 66
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CEZARI GONZALES AND
JULIUS MESA
G.R. No. 170924 July 4, 2007
FACTS:
At around 1AM of 27 July 2003, 321 junior officers and enlisted personnel of the AFP entered and took
over the premises of the Oakwood. They disarmed the security guards of said establishment and planted
explosives in its immediate surroundings. The soldiers publicly announced that they went to Oakwood to
air their grievances against the administration of PGMA. They declared their withdrawal of support from
the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP PGMA and demanded her resignation and that of the members of her
cabinet and top officers of both the AFP and the PNP.
Among those involved were Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, both enlisted personnel of the Philippine
Navy. Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial with violation of the Articles of War.
They were, however, among the soldiers charged for coup d’etat. On 18 November 2003, a Commitment
Order was issued by the RTC committing custody of the persons of Gonzales and Mesa to the Commanding
Officer of Fort San Felipe Naval Base, Cavite City, but they were subsequently transferred to the Philippine
Marine Corps. They were later discharged from military service.
The RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed by the soldiers. The People filed an MR which was denied, so
a petition for certiorari was filed with the CA. Gonzales and Mesa posted their bail; thus, the Commander
of the Philippine Marine Corps was ordered to release them from custody, but they were not released. Pulido
filed a petition for habeas corpus on their behalf. In support thereof, it was argued that since Gonzales and
Mesa are no longer subject to Military Law as they had been discharged from the service on, and since they
are not charged before a court martial, the military authorities have no jurisdiction to detain them, and there
is no legal ground to detain them further because a court order for their release had already been issued.
The respondents prayed for a dismissal of the petition on the ground that the continued detention was
justified since there was still a petition for certiorari questioning the order granting bail and that petitioner
is guilty of forum shopping. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of forum shopping.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus may be granted when the validity of grant of bail and
release under bail are live questions before another Division of the Court.
HELD: NO. To support his contention that there was no forum shopping, petitioner asserts that the issues
in the petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus are not similar/identical. As to his non-disclosure of
respondents filing of the motion for reconsideration and the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner claims that
the same has no legal relevance to the Petition for Habeas Corpus because at the time he filed said petition,
the order granting bail subsisted and has not been reversed or modified; and no TRO or injunction has been
issued that would affect the efficacy or validity of the order granting the bail and the order directing the
release of Mesa and Gonzales.
For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari that questioned
the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.
However, the habeas corpus petition has been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of Mesa
and Gonzales from detention and, in the absence of an actual case or controversy, it is impractical to
consider and resolve issues involving the validity or legality of their detention.
HABEAS CORPUS 67
AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO MACARAIG

G.R. No. 182497 June 29, 2010
FACTS:
On April 14, 2008, PO1 Basser Ampatuan was asked by his Chief to report to the Provincial Director of
Shariff Kabunsuan, who brought him to PNP Maguindanao. He was not informed of the cause of his
restraint. The following day, he was brought to Manila and brought to Mayor Lim. In a press briefing, it
was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for killing two COMELEC officials. He was brought to
an inquest prosecutor and then turned over to the Regional HQ Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa.
After a week, the Chief Inquest Prosecutor ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan.
However, the Police Senior Superintendent and Police Chief Inspector refused to release him. This
prompted PO1 Ampatuan’s wife to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
According to the respondents, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was
killed on November 10, 2007 and an investigation conducted by the MPD yielded the identity of the
perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, he was commanded to the MPD for proper disposition.
Inquest proceedings were also held. PO1 Ampatuan was charged with grave misconduct (murder). Through
a memo, he was ordered to be placed under restrictive custody, pursuant to the PNP Chief’s power to place
police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against
him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.
On 24 April 2008, the RTC denied the petition for habeas corpus. It held that the PNP has its own
administrative disciplinary mechanism and as clearly pointed out by the respondents, the Chief PNP is
authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD: NO. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether
the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause
of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be
unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise,
again the writ will be refused.
While the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be released from
custody, said recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal action for murder that was filed with
the prosecution office is concerned and is without prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be
held under custody. In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave
Misconduct.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for
his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty.
HABEAS CORPUS 68
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA

[G.R. No. 158802. November 17, 2004]
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief:
First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de
Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial. These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly
exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing DNA testing on samples allegedly collected from the
petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment, Reynaldo de Villa was found guilty of rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity,
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The petitioners sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order determine the paternity of the
child allegedly conceived as a result of rape, but which was denied. However, June de Villa was undaunted.
He asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask
Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home
and gave it to the petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup as Container A. He then gathered
samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. These samples were placed in separate containers
with distinguishing labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA Analysis
Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the analysis.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed that
Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence
of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner’s sample and those of any of the other
samples, including Leahlyn’s. Based on this, June filed a petition for habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.
HELD: NO. The writ has very limited availability as a post-conviction remedy. A review of a judgment of
conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific
instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction
over the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus; if at all, these errors must be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner
prescribed by law. In the past, this Court has disallowed the review of a courts appreciation of the evidence
in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as this is not the function of said writ. A survey of
our decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in general, the writ of habeas corpus is a high
prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary
circumstances. We have been categorical in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be
used as a substitute for another, more proper remedy
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a re-
examination of the records of People v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents
and purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We are being asked
to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new
DNA evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas
corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.
WRIT OF AMPARO 69
G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008

ARMANDO Q. CANLAS vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N.
FACTS:
Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their
dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be
demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo on the
ground that unprincipled Land Officials participated in the issuances of fraudulent and spurious titles, which
are now in the hands of the private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writ of amparo
HELD:
NO. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was
affirmed with finality by this Court in previous cases, is not included among the enumeration of rights as
stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their
claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to
them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance
of the writ of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition
at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in
the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed
factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Furthermore, under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition,
only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of
the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court
will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the
Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
WRIT OF AMPARO 70
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO
FACTS:
Spouses Sanson filed a complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the petitioners. They alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in
Boracay and had been the possessors of said land when the petitioners, armed with bolos and carrying
suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by
force and intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against the objections of the private
respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure. On the other hand, the petitioners
claimed that they were the prior possessors of the land and the private respondents are the intruders.
The MCTC ruled in favor of private respondents and on appeal, the RTC granted the motion for issuance
of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issue a writ of demolition via a Special Order. Because
of this, the petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data and a writ of amparo.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of amparo
2) Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of habeas data
HELD:
1) NO. To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations
of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a
writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that
every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations by petitioners,
in support of which, several documents (some of which were unsubscribed) were submitted. On the whole,
what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property
issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the
private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the
extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is
alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to
the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or
is continuing.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a
continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely
property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal
prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
2) NO. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas data so that the PNP may release the report
on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private
WRIT OF AMPARO 71
respondents, so that the Court and the petitioners will have a copy of the same; and to produce the police
report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the
investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP.
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus
rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or
unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise
has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities
other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance
of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been
shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing
expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what
the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
WRIT OF AMPARO 72
G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010

MELISSA C. ROXAS vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS:
Melissa Roxas enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan-USA (BAYAN-USA). In April 2009, she volunteered to join BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting
an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission. In pursuit of her volunteer work,
petitioner brought her passport, P15,000 in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop
computer, external hard disk, iPod, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.
On May 19, 2009, after their survey work, Melissa, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandoc, rested in the
house of Mr. Jesus Paolo. While resting, 15 heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and
ordered them to lie on the ground face down. They were forcibly taken to ride a van. After she was informed
that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s
Army (CPP-NPA), Melissa was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she
believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors. She was interrogated and tortured for 5 days.
On May 25, 2009, petitioner was finally released. Before being released, however, the abductors gave her
a cellphone with a SIM card and a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password. She was also
sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her
and her family. She continued to receive calls from RC (one of the interrogators), so she threw away the
phone with the SIM card.
Thereafter, Melissa filed petitions for the issuance of the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data, impleading
public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on
the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. She also prayed for an
inspection order of Fort Magsaysay (the place where she believes she was detained) and a production order.
RTC: Issued the writs
CA: Extended the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data, but absolved public respondents so the
prayers for return of personal belongings, inspection order and production order were denied
PETITIONER: Invoked the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate high-ranking officials
ISSUES:
1) WON the doctrine of command responsibility may be invoked in an amparo petition
2) WON petitioner is entitled to the return of her personal belongings
3) WON petitioner is entitled to an inspection order
4) WON petitioner is entitled to the privilege of the writ of habeas data
HELD:
1) NO. It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility
as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and,
by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. Since
the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly
invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo
proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground
that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which
WRIT OF AMPARO 73
case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on
the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
2) NO. The prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether
there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.
An order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already
equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only
be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding.,
Matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a
person’s right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property
rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines
the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
3) NO. An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a
petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. A basic requirement
before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably
determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require
that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the
issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make
a prima facie case.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie
case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An
inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
4) NO. The CA granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from
"distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or
similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her
abduction and torture."
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record
that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner.
The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened
the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the
petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records
were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video
and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence
on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph.
WRIT OF AMPARO 74
G.R. No. 191805 November 15, 2011

NORIEL RODRIGUEZ vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti (Kagimungan), a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claimed that the military tagged
KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.
On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez boarded Carlos’ tricycle and upon his arrival at Brgy. Tapel, four men
forcibly took him and forced him into a car. During the drive, the men forced him to confess to being a
member of the NPA, but he remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military
camp. Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine
Army. During his stay there, he was repeatedly forced to admit to being a member of the NPA and was
tortured and threatened in the course of the interrogations. He was also forced to sign documents declaring
that he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the document, he received another beating.
Thus, he was compelled to sign.
On September 17, 2009, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived with some men from the CHR.
His mother, Wilma, talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma that he had
surrendered to the military and had long been its asset. The soldiers accompanied them to the CHR office,
where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Desperate
to return home, he was forced to sign the document. Subsequently, Rodriguez filed petitions for the writ of
amparo and writ of habeas data, with prayers for protection orders, inspection order and production of
documents and personal properties. The writs were granted by the SC.
OSG: Rodriguez was a double agent and had amicable relations with the military
CA: Denied the grant of interim reliefs; dropped PGMA as respondent
ISSUES:
1) WON petitioner is entitled to the interim reliefs prayed for after the writs have been issued;
2) WON the president may be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances
3) WON the other public respondents must be held responsible
HELD:
1) NO. It must be underscored that the reliefs prayed for are only available before final judgment. These
provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo
petition. Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In
any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails
the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo,
there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. The order restricting
respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
2) YES. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator
of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish
the perpetrators thereof.
WRIT OF AMPARO 75
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
However, aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her
responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she
should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to
investigate, punish or prevent it.
3) YES. Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay was a meticulous and straightforward account of his horrific
ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on account of his
suspected membership in the NPA. His abduction was corroborated by Carlos’ affidavit, wherein he
narrated in detail the circumstances regarding Rodriguez’s capture.
As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate the
physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers.
Furthermore, if it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he should
have unhesitatingly assured his family that he was among friends. Instead, he vigorously pleaded with them
to get him out of the military facility.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly contradictory,
contention of respondents that while Rodriguez had complained of his exhaustion from his activities as a
member of the CPP-NPA, he nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the NPA to become
a double-agent for the military.
The appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention and torture of Rodriguez,
respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the formers right to security when
they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives.
Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the contradictory defenses
presented by respondents, give credence to his claim that he had been abducted, detained and tortured by
soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military.
However, the case was dismissed as to the CHR officers as there was no substantial evidence to show that
they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security.
WRIT OF AMPARO 76
G.R. No. 186050 December 13, 2011

ARTHUR BALAO vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS: James Balao was abducted by unidentified armed men on September 17, 2008 in Tomay, La
Trinidad, Benguet. He was among those who founded Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA). Based on the
statements of eyewitnesses, on said date, a white van arrived and stopped in front of Saymor’s Store. 5 men
in civilian clothes who were carrying firearms alighted from the van and immediately approached the man
poking their guns on him. They grabbed and handcuffed him. One of the armed men addressed the people
witnessing the incident, saying they were policemen. Another warned that no one should interfere because
the man was being arrested for illegal drugs. Thereafter, they pushed the man inside the van. Before leaving
the place, one of the armed men was also heard telling the driver of the van that they are going to proceed
to Camp Dangwa. The witnesses later identified the man as James Balao after seeing his photograph which
appeared in posters announcing him as missing.
It was also alleged that James reported surveillances on his person to his sister Nonette, and to CPA
Chairperson Beverly Longid. James supposedly observed certain vehicles tailing him and suspiciously
parked outside his residence, one of which was a van with plate number USC 922. He also claimed to have
received calls and messages through his mobile phone informing him that he was under surveillance by the
PNP Regional Office and the AFP-ISU. Arthur Balao and his other siblings filed a petition for the issuance
of a Writ of Amparo with a prayer for issuance of inspection, production and witness protection orders in
favor of their brother.
RTC: Granted the writ of amparo but denied the issuance of the interim reliefs; denied respondents’ prayer
that PGMA be dropped as respondent
ISSUE: WON the privilege of the writ of amparo should be granted
HELD: NO. The participation in any manner of military and police authorities in the abduction of James
has not been adequately proven. The identities of the abductors have not been established, much less their
link to any military or police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being
held or detained upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial court
erred in granting amparo reliefs by ordering the respondent officials (1) to disclose where James Balao is
detained or confined, (2) to release him from such detention or confinement, and (3) to cease and desist
from further inflicting harm upon his person. Such pronouncement of responsibility on the part of public
respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence. However, we agree with the trial court in
finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are "very limited, superficial and one-sided."
The actions taken were simply these: (a) organization of the "Task Force Balao"; (b) conduct of ocular
inspection at the place of abduction; (c) taking of sworn statements of civilian witnesses, whose testimonies
did not prove much as shown by the continued disappearance of James Balao; (d) dialogue with implicated
military officials as well as family members and friends of James Balao; and (e) writing of letter to the
CPA. The Court does not want to second-guess police protocols in investigation but surely some things are
amiss where the investigation DID NOT INVESTIGATE the military officials believed to be behind the
abduction as they were merely invited to a dialogue and where the investigation DID NOT LEAD to Camp
Dangwa where the abductors were supposed to have proceeded as narrated by the witnesses. To the mind
of this Court, there is a seeming prejudice in the process of investigation to pin suspects who are not
connected with the military establishments. By any measure, this cannot be a thorough and good faith
investigation but one that falls short of that required by the Writ of Amparo. In order to effectively address
thru the amparo remedy the violations of the constitutional rights to liberty and security of James who
remains missing to date, the Court deems it appropriate to refer this case back to the trial court for further
investigation by the PNP and CIDG and monitoring of their investigative activities that complies with the
standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule.
WRIT OF AMPARO 77
G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009

Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege. Petitioner together with 50 others,
were brought to Camp Crame. In the evening of the same day, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors conducted
inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others
for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold
Departure Order No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold
Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others.
After finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion, the DOJ Panel of
Prosecutors filed an Information. The RTC dismissed the charge for rebellion against petitioner for lack of
probable cause. Thus, his counsel wrote a letter to the DOJ Secretary, requesting the lifting of HDO 45.
However, the HDO was still not lifted because there was an MR for the order of dismissal. Petitioner then
filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, claiming that the continued restraint on petitioner’s
right to travel is illegal.
CA: Denied the privilege of the writ of amparo; MR also denied
PETITIONER: The writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution
ISSUE:
WON the writ of amparo is also applicable to the person’s liberty to travel
HELD:
NO. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal
of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."
Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case
filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired
in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security,
for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ
may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has
failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.
WRIT OF AMPARO 78
G.R. Nos. 184379-80 April 24, 2012

LOZADA vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
FACTS: Former NEDA Secretary Romulo Neri sought the services of Jun Lozada as an unofficial
consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter avers that during the course of his engagement, he discovered
several anomalies in the said transaction involving certain public officials. These events impelled the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an investigation thereon, for which it issued a subpoena directing
Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January 2008. On that date, instead of appearing before the Blue Ribbon
Committee, Lozada left the country for a purported official trip to London, upon the instructions of then
Executive Assistant Undersecretary Manuel Gaite.
According to Lozada, upon disembarking from the aircraft, several men held his arms and took his bag.
Although he allegedly insisted on meeting with his family, he later realized that it was wiser to just follow
them, especially when he overheard from their handheld radio: "Hwag kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan
ang mga taga senado." Sec. Atienza then phoned Lozada, assuring the latter that he was with people from
the government, and that the former was going to confer with "ES and Ma’am." Lozada surmised that these
individuals referred to ES Ermita and former President Arroyo, respectively. He was taken to LSGH where
he met Violeta, his wife, and Carmen, his sister. A petition for writ of amparo was filed. Lozada filed a
motion for TPO and production of documents. The CA denied the privilege of the writ of amparo.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to the privilege of the writ of amparo
HELD: NO. Secs. 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the parties to establish their claims
by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. The use of this evidentiary threshold reveals the clear intent of the framers of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in
addressing amparo situations. In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already
ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced failed to meet the threshold of substantial evidence.
In this regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was
not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he
was led to the departure area of the airport, as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of
respondents. This Court does not find any evidence on record that Lozada struggled or made an outcry for
help when he was allegedly "grabbed" or "abducted" at the airport. He even testified that nobody held him,
and they were not hostile to him nor shouted at him. The foregoing statements show that Lozada personally
sought the help of Sec. Atienza to avoid the Senate personnel, and thus knew that the men who met him at
the airport were there to aid him in such objective. Surely, the actions of Lozada evinced knowledge and
voluntariness, uncharacteristic of someone who claims to have been forcibly abducted.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so that his
right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and
has consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo moot. Whether or not Lozada
was deprived of his liberty from the point when he was led inside the vehicle waiting for him at the airport
up to the time he was taken to La Salle Green Hills, petitioners’ assertions that Lozada and his family
continue to suffer various threats from respondents remain unproven.
As for the interim reliefs, it would be incongruous to grant petitioners’ prayer for a TPO and Inspection and
Production Orders and at the same time rule that there no longer exists any imminent or continuing threat
to Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no basis on which a prayer for the issuance of
these interim reliefs can be anchored.
WRIT OF AMPARO 79
G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010

RUBRICO vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS:
On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron based in
Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes Rubrico, then attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong
Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the air base without charges. Following a week
of relentless interrogation - conducted alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse
and mental harassment, Lourdes was released, but only after being made to sign a statement that she would
be a military asset. After her release, harassment, in the form of being tailed, still continued.
Lourdes filed with the Office of the OMB a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and
administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct against Capt. Angelo
Cuaresma, Ruben Alfaro, Jimmy Santana and a certain Jonathan, but nothing has happened; and the threats
and harassment incidents have been reported to the Dasmariñas municipal and Cavite provincial police
stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations.
Lourdes filed a petition praying that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the respondents to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the OMB to immediately file
an information for kidnapping. The CA dropped PGMA as respondent and dismissed the same as to the
others.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case as to the other respondents was proper
HELD: YES. None of Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB
has been implicated as being connected to, let alone as being behind, the alleged abduction and harassment
of petitioner. Their names were not even mentioned in the affidavits of Lourdes, Jean and Mary Joy.
As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory that
they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates
against petitioners. To the appellate court, "the privilege of the writ of amparo must be denied as against
them for the simple reason that petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly
abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family were, in fact, members of
the military or the police force." The two generals, the CA’s holding broadly hinted, would have been
accountable for the abduction and threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP.
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that
provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It would be inappropriate to apply to amparo proceedings
the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity
through omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of
amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability,
even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed.
This is not to say, however, that petitioners’ allegation on the fact of the abduction or harassment is
contrived. The reality on the ground, however, is that the military or police connection has not been
adequately proved either by identifying the malefactors as components of the AFP or PNP; or in case
identification is not possible, by showing that they acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government. For this reason, the Court is unable to ascribe the authorship of and responsibility for the
alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the harassment and threats on her daughters to individual
respondents.
WRIT OF AMPARO 80
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE vs. RAYMOND and REYNALDO MANALO
FACTS:
Raymond Manalo alleged that several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU
summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He and his brother,
Reynaldo were not able to attend. Later that day, armed soldiers entered their house looking for Bestre, his
mother said he was Raymond and not Bestre, but they still handcuffed him, forced him into a van and
blindfolded. Later, his brother was also brought inside the van. He recognized the men as CAFGU agents.
They were brought to a house where they were both repeatedly tortured and asked if they were members of
the NPA. In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat
him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect.
One night, Raymond attempted to escape. He came to know from some women he passed by that he was
in Fort Magsaysay. Unfortunately, some soldiers spotted him. Their detention there continued for about 3
months, then, they were transferred for 1-2 weeks in a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, then
to a house in Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan, for another 3 months. Gen. Palparan talked to them, and told
them that he would give them a chance to live as long as they follow what his instructions (not to go to
human rights rallies, hearings, etc.). Thereafter, they were shown to their parents, who were also warned
not to join rallies or they would never see their children again. Raymond and Reynaldo were then detained
in different places. They were still subjected to torture and instructed to use different names. They were in
Pangasinan when they managed to escape.
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to stop the Secretary
of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP and/or their officers and agents from depriving them
of their right to liberty and other basic rights. They also sought ancillary remedies. While the case was
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect. Forthwith, the Manalos filed a Manifestation and
Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition. The SC resolved to treat the original petition
as an amparo petition. The privilege of the writ was also granted.
ISSUE:
1) WON the grant of the privilege was proper, considering that the Manalos have already escaped;
2) WON the Manalos are entitled to the interim reliefs (production order and disclosure of place of
assignment of Hilario and Cajigas who were involved in the abduction)
HELD:
1) YES. While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families,
including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he
was caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who
wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private
citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are
forced to limit their movements or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the
perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as
face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances
of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an
apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute
threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo. Their right to
security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of
WRIT OF AMPARO 81
person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the
ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
2) YES. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law
enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the
government from the demand of the people such as respondents. Instead, the Amparo production order may
be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas,
whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant
in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure
would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation
to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also
relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical
interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from
victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to
prey of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WRIT OF AMPARO 82
G.R. No. 210759 June 23, 2015

SIEGFRED B. MISON vs. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS
FACTS:
On 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of Seoul, Republic of
Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and deportation of respondent
Ja Hoon Ku for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd.
Consequently, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request to Hon. Siegfred Mison,
Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration, for the immediate arrest and deportation of Ku to Korea for
being an undesirable alien.
Ku was then charged for being a risk to public interest. This was approved by the BI Board of
Commissioners. It issued a Summary Deportation Order. On the same day, BI officers, with the assistance
of the MPD-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. He was detained at the BI detention center.
The following day, Ku filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo with interim remedies. Judge
Gallegos issued a writ of amparo. Ku filed a motion for the issuance of a TPO. Mison opposed the same.
Judge Gallegos issued an Order granting the motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting Ku’s custody to the
Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine
National Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his immediate family.
Subsequently, a TRO was issued, enjoining the enforcement of said orders. A motion to dismiss the amparo
petition was also filed, but the judge denied the motion. Later on, he granted the privilege of the writ of
amparo to Ku, ordering his immediate release. However, a TRO was again issued to enjoin its enforcement.
ISSUE: WON the privilege of the writ was properly granted to Ku
HELD: NO. Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance
does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was
arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor
was there any refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had
any intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time.
More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within the
Bureau, Ku’s arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were well-
documented as evidenced by the Return of Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January 2014 and the After-
Mission Report dated 17 January 2014. In the Return of the Writ, petitioner readily disclosed to the trial
court that Ku was in the custody of the BI pursuant to a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation
Order. These documents and pleading show that there was never any intention on the part of the BI to re
move Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time.
According to Ku, what he seeks to obtain in filing an amparo petition is the protection it will give to his
person against the actions of some government officials who will likely take advantage of their positions
and use the power of the government at their command. It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the
parties to establish their claims by substantial evidence. Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku
was not able to present evidence that he was exposed to "life-threatening situations" while confined at the
BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has
access to his counsel. Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the amparo petition, was that
the BI would trump up charges against him so as to justify his detention. The fact remains, however, that
even before his arrest, deportation charges against him were already duly filed and ruled upon by the BI.
WRIT OF AMPARO 83
SPOUSES SANTIAGO vs. TULFO

G.R. No. 205039 October 21, 2015
FACTS:
Spouses Raymart and Claudine Santiago arrived at NAIA 3 aboard a Cebu Pacific flight from a vacation.
They waited for the arrival of their baggage but were eventually informed that it was offloaded and
transferred to a different flight. Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a complaint before the Cebu Pacific
complaint desk. As they were complaining, they noticed a man taking photos of Claudine with his phone.
Raymart approached the man and asked what he was doing. Suddenly, the man, later identified as Ramon
“Mon” Tulfo, allegedly punched and kicked Raymart, forcing the latter to fight back. When Claudine saw
the commotion, she approached Mon and the latter likewise allegedly kicked and pushed her back against
the counter. At that instance, Raymart rushed to defend his wife, while one Edoardo Benjamin Atilano
joined in the brawl. Immediately thereafter, several airport security personnel came to stop the altercation
and brought them to the Airport Police Department for investigation.
Days after the incident, respondents Raffy, Ben, and Erwin Tulfo, brothers of Mon, aired on their TV
program comments and expletives against petitioners, and threatened that they will retaliate. Thus,
petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo against the respondents. The RTC granted a
TPO in favor of the petitioners.
RESPONDENTS (Ben): the statements he uttered did not involve any actual threat and that he merely
expressed his strong sentiments to defend his brother.
RTC: Dismissed the petition on the ground that it is not a proper subject of the writ of amparo and ordered
the dissolution of the TPO
PETITIONERS: They need not undergo the human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings or enforced
disappearances, before their right to life, liberty, and security may be protected by a writ of amparo
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the petition for writ of amparo is correct
HELD: YES. In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has limited
the remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
“Extrajudicial killings,” according to case law, are generally characterized as “killings committed without
due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings,” while “enforced disappearances,”
according to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 9851 “means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons
by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”
Section 1 of the rule’s first paragraph, does state that the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life, liberty,
and security of the person desiring to avail of it, the same section’s second paragraph qualifies that the
protection of such rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof, which are more concrete cases that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and security. The
two paragraphs should indeed be read together in order to construe the meaning of the provision.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any case of
extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses above-described.
Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents' purported violation of their right to
life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect government
participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC and, perforce, must fail.
WRIT OF AMPARO 84
G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012

EDGARDO NAVIA vs. VIRGINIA PARDICO
FACTS:
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation with 2 uniformed
guards arrived at the house of Lolita Lapore. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find
her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with
them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric
wires and lamps in the subdivision.
According to petitioners, at the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects
admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post nearer to the house
of Lolita. Soon, Navia arrived and Buising informed him that the complainant was not keen in participating
in the investigation. Since there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong
then signed a statement to the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to
him, after which, Lolita and Bong went back to their house. Ben was left but later released after signing a
same statement. Upon Navia’s instructions, Dio and Buising went to the house of Lolita to make her sign
the logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody.
However, according to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully arrested,
shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation. Ben was allegedly
slapped and punched by Navia. He also begged Lolita and Bong not to leave him but the latter were scared
of Navia so they had to leave the security office.
Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation from the Malolos City Police Station requesting them to
appear thereat relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico about her missing husband, Ben. Petitioners
informed her that they released Ben and that they have no information as to his present whereabouts. Thus,
Lolita filed a petition for writ of amparo, which was issued by the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is entitled to the privilege of the writ of amparo
HELD:
NO. For the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are
missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance
was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts
of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo
petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision and their
principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been
presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. To
fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be
attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA 85
LEE vs. ILAGAN

G.R. No. 203254 October 8, 2014
FACTS: P/Supt. Neri Ilagan and Dr. Joy Margate Lee were former common law partners. In July 2011,
Ilagan visited Lee at the latter’s condominium. Later, he noticed that his digital camera was missing. On
August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan regarding a purported sex video between Ilagan and another
woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail.
Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a
criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct before the NAPOLCOM.
Ilagan filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data, claiming that Lee’s acts of reproducing the
subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and
uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of
the other woman. The RTC issued the same.
PETITIONER: Admitted that she reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she only did so to utilize
the same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan; and the petition should be dismissed because she
is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.
RTC: Granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data; Lee’s use of the subject video as evidence in the
various cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction
ISSUE: WON the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan was proper
HELD: NO. In order to support a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. The allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence
showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this
video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to
life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As
the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between
one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much
so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due
to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of
his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually
proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or
security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use
the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends - say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin
Ilagan's reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she
reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases she filed against Ilagan. Thus, the habeas data petition must be dismissed.
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010

MERALCO vs. ROSARIO LIM
FACTS: Rosario Lim, also known as Cherry, is an administrative clerk at the MERALCO. On June 4,
2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of
MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. It reads:
“Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON

NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG
GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….”
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Cherry reported the matter
to the PNP Plaridel Station. After around a month, Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s HR Staffing,
directed Cherry’s transfer to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector because of the threats which could compromise
her safety and security. Cherry appealed her transfer to the VP of HR so she could voice her concerns.
However, she did not receive any response. Thus, she filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data against petitioners, alleging that petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued
failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO
purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to
privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. She also prayed for a TRO to enjoin her
transfer to Alabang.
RTC: Recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political
activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by
petitioners’ refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her person.
ISSUE: WON an employee may invoke the remedies available under a writ of habeas data when an
employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein
HELD: NO. The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a
remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
The writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment
constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that
respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and
conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In
another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or
unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue
that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s
safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES vs. ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE
FACTS:
Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara, both minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school
students at STC Cebu. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party
they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves
clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were uploaded by Angela Tan on her Facebook profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher, learned from her students about the pictures that
some seniors posted. Julia, Julienne and Chloe Taboada were identified, among others. Escudero also saw
other pictures wherein Julia and Julienne were drinking liquor and smoking cigarettes. These pictures were
allegedly viewable by any Facebook user. Escudero then reported the matter to Kristine Tigol, STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge. STC found that the students deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the
Student’s handbook. As penalty, they were barred from joining the commencement exercises.
A week before graduation, Angela’s mother, Dr. Tan, filed a petition for injunction, praying that STC be
enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the rites Rhonda Vivares,
Julia’s mother, joined as an intervenor. The RTC issued a TRO, allowing the students to attend the
ceremony. However, STC still did not allow the students to participate in the rites since its MR still
remained unresolved. Thereafter, the petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data.
RTC: Dismissed the petition for habeas data
RESPONDENTS: Writ of habeas data only applies to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances; and it may not be issued against it because it is not engaged in the business of collecting,
storing or gathering data
ISSUE: WON there is an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security
of the minors involved in this case.
HELD: NONE. In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus,
the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence,
of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15 Without an actionable entitlement in the
first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas data petition will not prosper.
Furthermore, contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the
purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparo in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age."
As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only.
As to respondents’ contention that it is not engaged in the business of gathering, storing and collecting data,
nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of
a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data. Habeas data is a
protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences,
or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012

GAMBOA vs. CHAN
FACTS:
Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, Police Senior Superintendent
Marlou Chan was the OIC, and Police Superintendent William Fang was the Chief of the Provincial
Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.
On 8 December 2009, former PGMA issued A.O. 275, creating the Zeñarosa Commission,8 which was
formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating
them before the 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently. Upon the conclusion of its investigation,
the Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the OP a confidential report entitled "A Journey
Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President.”
Gamboa alleged that the PNP–Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and
her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,
thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. In a Report of
ABS-CBN on its evening news program and also on print media, Gamboa was named as one of the
politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. This constrained her to file a petition for habeas data. The
RTC issued the writ and required respondents to file a return.
RESPONDENTS: The Writ of Habeas Data was not the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching
of the reputation of Gamboa.
RTC: Inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, constituted a violation of her right to
privacy, but dismissed the petition for her failure to prove by substantial evidence that the information
originated from respondents and that they were the ones who forwarded the same
ISSUE: WON Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data
HELD: NO. This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the
Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however,
the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated
or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward
and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating
the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to
deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request
assistance from the latter. The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without
prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be
interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component
of intelligence-gathering and investigation.
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature. That
it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be
stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure.
In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation,
making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper. It is clear
that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a
lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

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IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF

ISSUE: Whether or not dropping the middle name should be allowed.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY OF FELIPE C.

REPUBLIC vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS

MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY

G.R. No. 197597 April 8, 2015