Drainage Networks Operations and Maintenance

Public Works Authority
Drainage Networks Operations and Maintenance

State of Qatar
PUBLIC WORKS AUTHORITY

ASSETS AFFAIRS
DRAINAGE NETWORKS OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT
PS-44 Site Response Procedure

(TEMPLATE)
REV Date Description Prepared Checked Reviewed Approved
T S Rajoo /
1 August 2018 Template V Vijayakumar F M Elhenawy Ali Muhannadi
M Kandiah
Signatures
Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 1 of 38

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Page ii 25 May 20
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Revision Status
Revision Date Amendment Document Owner Approval
20 June 2016 Draft V Vijayakumar ---
0 1 August 2016 Version 1 for Issue V Vijayakumar N Al-Yami
1 August 2018 Template V Vijayakumar Ali Muhannadi

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE ....................................................................................... 4
2. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 5
3. FACILITY AND ASSETS ..................................................................................................... 6
4. SITUATION ESCALATION AND NOTIFICATION................................................................... 9
5. RESPONSE .................................................................................................................... 12
6. RECOVERY .................................................................................................................... 22
APPENDIX A CONTACT INFORMATION .................................................................................... 23
APPENDIX B OPERATIONAL DATA AND SITE MAPS .................................................................. 24

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1. PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE
This Site Response Procedure has been written to ‫هذا الموقع كتب للمساعدة بتحقيق ولالستجابة السريعة الالزمة‬
aid in the rapid response required by DNO&M to ‫لتشغيل وصيانة الصرف الصحي عند حاالت الفشل التي تؤثر على‬
investigate and respond to failure situations that ‫تشغيل محطة‬
have the potential to, or impact on the operation of
Pumping Station PS-44. The purpose of the PS-44
Procedure is to guide DNO&M and onsite staff in
‫الغرض من هذه اإلجراءات هذه هي إدارة‬
managing those situations and return service to a
‫الحالت والعودة الى العمل المعتاد‬
Business as Usual state as soon as possible. .‫بأسرع وقت ممكن‬
The Procedure outlines how to manage potentially
disruptive situations through a coordinated
approach based on defined triggers and escalating ‫هذه اإلجراءات تحدد كيفية إدارة‬
actions allocated to individuals and teams. ‫والتعامل مع اإلضرابات من خالل نهج منسق على‬
‫اساس تعريف وتصعيد االجراءات المخصص لألفراد‬
The Procedure provides flowcharts, response .‫والمجموعات‬
actions, maps and operational data to support
DNO&M and onsite staff to respond to and recover
from these unplanned situations and manage them
‫ خرائط‬،‫ اجراءات االستجابة‬،‫ويقدم هذا االجراء رسم تخطيطي‬
effectively if they do occur, escalating from Business ‫وبيانات االزمة لتشغيل وصيانة الصرف الصحي ودعم فريق العمل‬
as Usual  Alert/Investigation  ‫في الموقع ولالستجابة و التعافي من لهذه الحاالت الغير متوقعة و‬
Incident  Emergency. --‫ متصاعدة من العمل كالمعتاد‬, ‫ادارتها بطريقة فعالة اذا ما حدثت‬
‫تنبيه‬---
‫طارئ‬---------‫الحادث‬-------- ‫التحقيق‬

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2. INTRODUCTION
The Incident and Emergency Response Plan (IEMP) is the overarching Plan to guide DNO&M in managing
a significant business disruption, including but not limited to 22 different situations. Beneath the IEMP
reside a number of other Plans and Procedures that guide response for specific situations which require
greater detail. These include the asset-specific Contingency Plans (including the Pump Stations
Contingency Plan), the Rainy Season Work Procedure, Site Response Procedures (such as this document)
and Standard Operating Procedures.
The Pump Stations Contingency Plan classifies PS-44 as a critical pump station. A critical pump station is
one which has a high consequence of failure, has limited bypass or isolation capability, and may be difficult
or expensive to repair. Failure of a critical pump station such as PS-44 could result in adverse impacts to
communities and assets due to resultant flooding and inundation of areas by foul, surface or ground
water.
The Site Response Procedure has been written with input of DNO&M personnel to aid in the response
required by DNO&M to control and mitigate the impacts caused by failure at PS-44. The primary objective
of this procedure is to provide detailed site level information to assist DNO&M in maintaining required
levels of service to customers through appropriate management of Incident and Emergency situations,
effective stakeholder communication, rapid reinstatement of asset operations and minimised health and
environmental impacts.
The Procedure describes how to escalate issues or abnormal situations at PS-44 from:
 a Business-as-Usual scenario, to
 an Investigation, to
 an Incident, and finally to
 an Emergency which could escalate to Pump Station failure.
The Procedure also identifies specific failure modes at PS-44, provides detailed on-site actions for each
failure mode under each Alarm Level, identifies specific on-site and off-site roles and responsibilities
during a disruptive situation or event, provides relevant asset operational data, location maps and contact
information, and outlines recovery actions that need to be taken to reinstate the facility to Business As
Usual in an acceptable time period.
The Procedure comprises of the following sections and is supported by two Appendices:
Section 1 - A Brief overview of the purpose of this Procedure and its use;
Section 2 - An introduction and outline of the overall Procedure including alerting the reader to adjacent
Contingency Plans;
Section 3 - A description of Pump Station PS-44 including outcomes from risk assessment;
Section 4 - Information on situation escalation and notification;
Section 5 - Incident and Emergency response actions for different failure situations;
Section 6 - Recovery actions after a potential failure situation;
Appendix A - Detailed communication and notification information;

Appendix B - Operational data, location maps and site photos to aid in coordinating appropriate response
to issues arising at PS-44.

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3. FACILITY AND ASSETS

3.1 Overview
Pumping Station PS-44 is a forwarding station to Doha South STW and handles foul sewer for major
portion of the Doha /Abu Hamour area. This station is deemed a critical pumping station as per the
Pumping Stations Contingency Plan and is classified as a Group 1 station managed in house by the
Pumping Stations section within DNO&M (unlike other groups which are managed by Framework
Contractors).
Under the Qatar Integrated Drainage Master Plan (QIDMP) it was initially planned to shut down PS-44 by
2020 under the IDRIS project. This decision was later changed and it was decided to keep the station to
allow for flexibility in flow diversion to Doha West STW and to reduce the load on the Doha South STW
and for future flow diversion from New Doha South to Doha West.
This pumping station has 5 upstream forwarding smaller pumping stations which adds to the quantity of
flow to the underground network system to be collected and forwarded by PS-44. These stations are: PS-
20/1, PS-20/2, PS-21/1, PS-28 and PS-44 A. The schematic diagram below (Figure 3.1) shows the flows
from feeding stations coming into PS-44, which is then forwarded on to the Doha South STW. The locations
of the PS-44 catchment boundary and its feeding stations are shown in Appendix B.
Figure 3.1
PS-44 Schematic
This pumping station has been configured to six dry installation pumps with two rising mains. Two of the
pumps are on duty, two pumps on assist and two on standby. The station has an operational capacity of
91,500 m3 per day with an average daily flow of 60,000 m3 per day. Further operational data for PS-44
and its feeding stations are provided in Appendix B.
The diagram below (Figure 3.2) shows a layout of the pump station including the key assets at the station.
Failure of any of these assets could impact the normal operation of the pumping station. A more detailed
station layout map is provided in Appendix B.

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Figure 3.2
PS-44 Layout and Key Assets
There is no bypass arrangement at the station (as at August 2016). Temporary bypass by overpumping
can be arranged by the Workshop Section. Internal bypass as a partial permanent solution through one of
the rising mains has been recommended. There is also a proposal for a permanent rising main to connect
PS-32 and Doha West STW. This is currently under feasibility study by the Infrastructure Affairs Design
Department.
Like many utility organisations worldwide, DNO&M is in the process of improving its asset management
through implementing an Enterprise Asset Management System (EAMS). The EAMS will assist in the
management of Pump Stations by providing a repository of Pump Station asset and operation data
including condition grade data that will be analysed for optimisation of operations and maintenance.
Appendix B provides operational data and layout maps for the pump station which in future will also reside
within EAMS.
3.2 PS-44 Risk Assessment
It is important to be mindful about the inherent risks within the facility, so that appropriate contingencies
can be planned and implemented to reduce the likelihood or consequences of such risks.
A detailed risk assessment of PS-44 assets and operations was undertaken in early 2016 to
a. understand vulnerable areas that can potentially fail within the station considering the current
control measures, and
b. identify additional risk mitigation actions so as to reduce the likelihood or impact of any identified
risks.

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The results of the PS-44 risk assessment were recorded in a risk register, a copy of which is located on
the Intranet.
The following recommendations came out of the risk assessment process.
3.2.1 Immediate Recommendations
Major works
a. Portable over-pumping connection required at this station urgently due to limited redundancy
provisions available
O&M works
a. Install two diesel pumps (100 litres/sec flow each) at PS-21 New as redundancy to enable diversion
to PS-13 New in case of failure at PS-44
3.2.2 Medium to Long Term Recommendations (require further analysis by Asset Management)
Major works
a. Construction of permanent overpumping connection to rising main (internal bypass system)
b. Construction of additional pressure main (PS-44 -> PS-32 Old and / or PS-44 -> Doha South)
c. Refurbishment of PS-21 New and upgrading the diversion to PS-13 New (-> PS-32 -> Doha West)
d. Construct permanent diversion via PS-20 -> Doha South
e. Construct permanent diversion from PS-44 A -> Doha South
f. Install dry submersible pump
O&M works
b. SOP to control feeding stations
c. SOP to implement network diversion
d. Emergency simulation exercises
e. Monitoring power consumption
f. Continuous monitoring, maintenance and overhauling, upgrade where required
g. Reliability Centered Maintenance programme
h. Wet well cleaning programme
i. Flowmeter installation and calibration
j. Operational levels in wet well and network to be as per QND
k. Modified fire protection for control panel
l. Fire Tracing system
m. Change to Woqod refuelling regulation
n. Corrosion assessment surveys
The above recommendations will form part of the asset investment management planning process for
this pumping station.

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4. SITUATION ESCALATION AND NOTIFICATION

4.1 Alarm Level Escalation for Pump Station Failure
An Alarm Level Escalation framework has been adopted by DNO&M to evaluate and categorise situations
that could escalate towards Pump Station failure. Figure 4.1 below illustrates the four levels of escalation.
•The normal execution of standard functional operations within DNO&M with no

operational abnormalities
Business As •An abnormal occurrence during Business-as-Usual could prompt an Investigation
Usual
•Level 1 Alarm
•A planned investigation into a Pump Station operational abnormality
Investigation •An Investigation could escalate to an Incident
•Level 2 Alarm
•Any unplanned reduction in Total Pump Station Capacity (TPSC)
Incident •An Incident could escalate to an Emergency
•Level 3 Alarm
•A situation where there is an unplanned reduction in TPSC below 105% AND available
pumps operating above 80% of remaining operational capacity
Emergency •An Emergency could escalate to a Failure
Figure 4.1
Alarm Level Escalation for Pump Station Failure
The above framework clearly differentiates for Pump Stations what represents an Incident and what
represents an Emergency and both reference an unplanned reduction in Total Pump Station Capacity
(TPSC), which is the trigger for a step up to a Level 2 Alarm.
The framework provides a mechanism for DNO&M personnel to understand, at any time, the Alarm Level
status of the Pump Station, and this can eventually be represented for all Pump Stations through GIS
mapping via EAMS. This improves transparency of asset status and of the dynamic risk inherent in a
complex operational system such as the Ashghal drainage network. The Alarm Level Escalation flowchart
is presented in the Pumping Stations Contingency Plan, along with additional response flowcharts.
Based on observations at site or SCADA observations, staff should notify relevant senior staff of emerging
situations so that an appropriate response can be taken and the Alarm Level escalated as required.
Typically, for a Level 1 Alarm (Investigation), a Site Foreman or the SCADA Team would notify the Area
Engineer regarding an observed operational abnormality at PS-44, including if escalation is likely. For a
Level 2 Alarm (Incident), the Site Foreman or the SCADA team would inform the Area Engineer who would
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in turn notify the PS HoS regarding the Incident, including if escalation is likely. For a Level 3 Alarm
(Emergency), the PS HoS would inform MDOM, Networks HoS and Engineering HoS. MDOM would inform
the Asset Affairs Director and the President about the situation and provide regular status updates.
Communications in all instances could be by any means, including phone, instant messaging, or radio and
confirmed by email. For every event, appropriate records need to be maintained by the Area Engineer
about when Alarm Level notifications were issued and when escalation or de-escalation of Alarm Levels
were undertaken.
4.2 Alarm Level Escalation for Specific Failure Modes

Alarm Levels for specific pumping station failure modes should be set by the Area Engineer in consultation
with the Pumping Station Head of Section (PS HoS). Any escalation or de-escalation of the Alarm Levels
on site should also be done in consultation with the PS HoS.
Although the Alarm Level Escalation Process shows escalation from Alert to Emergency, at the operational
level an event may originate at any point in the process.
The diagram in the following page provides the Alarm Level Escalation triggers for the following pumping
station failure modes.
 Penstock Failure
 High Flow Situation
 Pump Failure
 Rising Main Failure
 Power Failure
 External Flooding Situation
 Fire or Explosion
 Earthquake
 Malicious Threat/Action
Depending on the intensity of the event or failure mode, the site staff and Area Engineer in consultation
with the PS HoS can use this framework to escalate the situation on site, so that appropriate response
actions can be taken as outlined in Section 5.

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Figure 4.2
Alarm Level Escalation for PS Failure Modes

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5. RESPONSE
For generic site response actions, please refer to the Pumping Stations Contingency Plan.
5.1 Asset Failure - Response to specific asset failure modes
The following site specific failure modes have been considered in this Procedure
 Penstock Failure
 High Flow Situation
 Pump Failure
 Rising Main Failure
 Power Failure
 External Flooding Situation
For the above failure modes, site specific response actions for each Alarm Level are described below.
These site response actions are not prescriptive and should only be used as a guide. There may be
additional actions that need to be taken on site in order to effectively manage a particular failure situation.
All actions mentioned here should be discussed with the Incident or Emergency Manager before being
implemented and should be used in conjunction with the O&M Manual, SOPs, pump station schematics
and general repair procedures.

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PENSTOCK FAILURE – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS
BUSINESS AS USUAL
1. Observer notes and reports potential abnormality in penstock operation (e.g. Site Foreman, Area Engineer,
SCADA).
2. AE / SF to carry out investigation if there is abnormality in penstock operation.
LEVEL 1 - ALARM INVESTIGATION

1. SF verifies report, records details and informs AE.
2. AE outlines investigation requirements and SF conducts investigation (which may include enhanced monitoring).
3. SF to determine issue – minor leak or mechanical fault and attempts to fix leak / mechanical fault in consultation
with AE.
4. If there is no major issue, then AE and SF continue with routine monitoring and maintenance. However if the
penstock operation requires major repair, then escalate to incident level.
LEVEL 2 - ALARM INCIDENT

1. AE informs PS HoS about the incident.
2. AE to arrange for upstream feeding stations (PS 28, 20/1, 20/2, 21/1, 44A) to be controlled to prevent overflow
if required.
3. AE and SF to check the penstock valve and determine the reason for its failure to open, and assess options for
repair (e.g. replace spindle pin).
4. Initially lift the penstock gate manually until repair is complete.
5. Check if spare part is available on site, else check with the Workshop to arrange spare part.
6. SF along with the maintenance team to conduct major repair on site.
7. If the repair was successful, then restore normal pump station operations.
8. Implement recovery actions as outlined in Section 9.
9. If failure is imminent i.e. interventions are insufficient within network reconfiguration or diversion time, then
escalate to Emergency level.
LEVEL 3 - ALARM EMERGENCY

1. AE informs PS HoS who in turn informs Manager DNO&M (MDOM).
2. MDOM declares Emergency and assumes role of Emergency Manager and sets up Key Assessment Team (KAT).
The MDOM and KAT implements emergency response actions as suggested in the PS Contingency Plan.
3. In consultation with KAT, AE implements redundancy options on site (refer to Section 8.4).
4. If replacement required, then place order with supplier to provide replacement penstock.
5. If the replacement was successful, then restore normal pump station operations. AE to inform Emergency
Manager who then declares Emergency closed.
6. If the replacement was not successful, then continue to repair or replace the penstock valve to enable normal
operations to resume.

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HIGH FLOW SITUATION – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS
BUSINESS AS USUAL
High Level – 4.80 metres
High High Level – 5.50 metres
1. Observer (e.g. Site Foreman, Area Engineer, SCADA) monitors wet well level levels at pump station; notifies SF
of any abnormality in wet well levels.
2. AE / SF to carry out investigation if wet well levels are abnormally fluctuating or exceed “High Level”.

1. SF verifies observer’s report, records details and informs AE.
3. If wet well level falls below “High Level” then AE and SF continue with routine monitoring and maintenance, go
back to BAU.
4. If wet well level increases above “High Level” and exceeds “High High Level”, then escalate to Incident.

1. AE informs PS HoS about the incident.
2. AE, SF and PS maintenance team on standby at site to control flows at upstream feeding stations (PS 28, 20/1,
20/2, 21/1, 44A) if required.
3. AE monitors situation on site
a. If wet well level reduces, then AE and SF continue with routine monitoring and maintenance.
b. Implement recovery actions as outlined in Section 9.
c. If wet well level continues to increase above “High High Level” and failure is imminent i.e. interventions
are insufficient within Safe Shutdown Time*, then escalate to Emergency.

1. AE informs PS HoS of High flow situation who in turn informs Manager DNO&M.
3. In discussion with the Key Assessment Team (KAT), AE implements redundancy provisions on site (refer to
Section 8.4)*.
4. Have interventions successfully avoided potential failure?
a. If yes, then MDOM declares Emergency closed via general notification
b. If no, then KAT to prioritise containment and failure response actions.
c. Implement recovery actions as outlined in Section 9.
*Four hours storage time during night and 1.5 hours storage time during day is available before flooding happens. All redundancy provisions
and / or repairs must be implemented within this time.

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PUMP FAILURE – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS
BUSINESS AS USUAL
1. Observer notes and reports potential pump failure (e.g. Site Foreman, Area Engineer, SCADA)
2. AE / SF to carry out investigation if there is any abnormality in pump operation with no loss of pump station
capacity.

3. SF attempts to repair the operational abnormality in consultation with AE.
4. If successful, then AE and SF continue with routine monitoring and maintenance. However if the abnormality
results in any unplanned pump failure which reduces Total Pump Station Capacity (TPSC), then escalate to
Incident level.

1. AE to inform PS HoS regarding incident.
2. AE to deploy stand by pumps on site to replace any failed pumps.
3. SF to attempt manual startup of failed pumps. If the pumps do not start, then SF and AE to determine cause of
problem.
4. If the repair is minor, then SF along with the maintenance team to conduct repairs and rectify.
5. If major repair, then AE to liaise with Workshop department to mobilise additional foremen and equipment to
conduct repairs.
6. AE to be on standby to control flows at upstream feed stations (PS 28, 20/1, 20/2, 21/1, 44A) if required.
7. If the pump failure reduces TPSC below 105% and available pumps operate above 80% of remaining operational
capacity, then escalate to an Emergency.
8. Otherwise implement recovery actions as outlined in Section 9.

Section 8.4).*
4. If repairs are successful then AE and SF to restore normal operation of the pump station.
a. AE to inform Emergency Manager that pumps are operating normally.
b. MDOM declares emergency closed via general notification
5. Otherwise, AE and SF continue to conduct repairs until normal operations can be restored.
* Four hours storage time during night and 1.5 hours storage time during day is available before flooding happens. All redundancy provisions

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RISING MAIN FAILURE – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS
BUSINESS AS USUAL
1. Observer (e.g. Site Foreman, Area Engineer, SCADA) notes and reports rising main operational abnormality.
2. AE / SF to carry out investigation if there is a minor leak or pressure loss in any rising main.

3. SF attempts to fix the leak or blockage in the rising main.
4. If successful, then AE and SF continue with routine monitoring and maintenance. However if there is a major
leak, complete pressure loss or failure of any rising main, then escalate to Incident level.

1. AE informs PS HoS and AE / SF to shut down pump station immediately.
2. AE to be on standby to control feeding stations (PS 28, 20/1, 20/2, 21/1, 44A) to prevent overflow.
3. Change cross over valves to enable internal diversion of flow to the available rising main.
4. Add one additional pump to the available rising main.
5. AE and SF to then locate the major leak or block in the rising main and empty the rising main to enable repairs.
6. AE and SF to then determine the nature of the repair work. For minor repairs, SF or PS maintenance team to
conduct repairs. For major repairs, arrange for a Civil Contractor to conduct the repairs.
7. Liaise with Networks Department to deploy suction tankers to remove sewage overflow, contain the spill and
initiate cleanup of the spill.
8. If the repair is successful, then restore normal pump station operations. Otherwise, AE and SF to continue
repairs to fix the rising main.
10. If one rising main has failed and there are signs of failure in the second rising main, then escalate to Emergency
level.

3. In consultation with KAT, AE to implement redundancy provisions (refer to Section 8.4).*
4. AE and SF to then locate the leak in the second rising main and empty the rising main to enable repair.
5. AE and SF to then determine the nature of the repair work. For minor repairs, SF to conduct repairs. For major
repairs, arrange for the Workshop to conduct the repairs.
6. Liaise with Networks Department and Workshop to deploy suction tankers / pumps to remove sewage overflow,
contain the spill and initiate cleanup of the spill.
7. If repairs are successful then AE and SF to restore normal operation of the pump station.
a. AE to inform Emergency Manager that rising mains are working as normal.
b. MDOM declares emergency closed via general notification
8. Otherwise, AE and SF to continue repairs to fix the rising mains.
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POWER FAILURE – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS

BUSINESS AS USUAL
1. Observer (e.g. Site Foreman, Area Engineer, SCADA) notes and reports power failure.
2. AE / SF to carry out investigation if there is report of any unplanned external power outage or internal power
failure / MCC fault.

3. For external power failure, SF to contact Kahraama on 991 to determine expected duration of power failure. If
power is restored, then AE and SF continue with routine monitoring and maintenance. If not, and there is no
generator on site, then escalate to incident level.
4. For internal power failure, SF to determine type of failure (e.g. MCC) and attempt repair. If not successful and
MCC requires major repair, then escalate to incident level.

1. For external power failure
a. Continue monitoring situation with Kahraama until normal power is restored.
b. Run Generator and check diesel fuel levels. Note the diesel consumption rate.
c. If all power supplies (Kahraama or generator) are predicted to be unavailable within the Safe Shutdown
Time*, then escalate to Emergency Level.
2. For internal power failure
a. Implement temporary bypass of the MCC to locally control the pumps.
b. SF and AE to then determine the cause of MCC major failure and conduct repair.
c. If the repair is successful, then remove temporary bypass of MCC and restore normal pump operations.
d. Implement recovery actions as outlined in Section 9.
e. If the repair is unsuccessful, then install temporary MCC to control pumps until the repair can be
completed.
f. If the MCC needs replacement, then escalate to emergency level.

Section 8.4).*
4. For external power failure
a. If onsite generator is not operational, arrange with Workshop for mobile generator until power is
restored.
b. If power is restored then, AE to inform Emergency Manager who then declares Emergency closed. If
not, then continue with redundancy provisions.
5. For internal power failure
a. Place order with the supplier to provide replacement MCC. Use temporary MCC until replacement is
possible.
b. If the MCC is restored then, AE to inform Emergency Manager who then declares Emergency closed.

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EXTERNAL FLOODING – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS
BUSINESS AS USUAL
1. Observer notes and reports potential flooding (e.g. public, Site Foreman, Area Engineer, SCADA).
2. AE / SF to carry out investigation if there is evidence of any flooding on site.
3. SF to locate and contain the flooding.
4. If the flooding is contained, then AE and SF to continue with routine monitoring and maintenance.
5. If the flooding inhibits access or PS operations, then escalate to Incident level.
1. If the flooding is within the PS and inhibits PS operations,
a. SF to investigate the reason for the flooding (rainfall, leaking or damaged pipe, sewer block, pump or
valve failure, rising main failure or collapse etc.)
b. SF to then work with the PS maintenance team to contain the flooding.
2. If the flooding is outside of the PS in the adjoining network and inhibits PS access, AE to immediately liaise with
Networks and Workshop departments to deploy suction tankers or arrange for overpumping to remove sewage
overflow and initiate clean up.
3. If the flooding is contained, then AE and SF continue with routine monitoring and maintenance.
4. If flooding or flood damage severely impacts PS operations, then escalate to an Emergency.

3. AE to assess situation and liaise with the Networks Department to deploy emergency suction tankers to remove
sewage overflow and initiate clean up.
4. AE to liaise with Networks department to set up temporary bund and barriers to contain the flow and cordon
off the area from general public.
5. If required, AE to liaise with Workshop to deploy mobile pumps to provide additional pumping of sewage.
6. AE to communicate details of flooding to the Emergency Coordination Centre including location and extent of
flooding, direction of flow and impact on the environment and / or public.
Section 8.4).*
8. If the flooding has been contained, then
a. AE to inform Emergency Manager of containment of the flooding.
b. MDOM declares emergency closed via general notification.
9. If the flooding has not been contained, then
a. AE to continue liaising with Networks and Workshop to deploy additional pumping equipment or
suction tankers to contain the flow and clean up the area.

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5.2 Plant Failure - Redundancy Options

Below are a list of redundancy options that need to be considered on site during an Incident or
Emergency situation at PS-44. These should be considered in consultation with the Area Engineer and /
or the Pump Stations Head of Section. Consider the safe storage time available within the station (1.5 –
4 hours) before any of the redundancy options are pursued.
5.2.1 Reduce Flow to the Station
a. Control feeding stations spare capacity (PS 28, PS 20/1, PS 20/2, PS 21/1, PS 44A)
b. Divert flow from PS-44 catchment to PS-21 New

 Currently construction of a penstock in PS-44 catchment to divert flow to PS-21 New is
included in an ongoing tender for Pump Stations Risk and Contingency (DOM/1750/2016)
c. Divert flow from PS-21 New to PS-13 New

 This option takes flow to Doha West catchment (PS-21 New -> PS-13 New -> PS-32 - > Doha
West STW)
 PS-21 New is currently not operational
 PS-21 New pumps are faulty
 Rising main can be used, diameter 400 mm
 Call Workshop to install two temporary diesel pumps at 100 litres / sec at PS 21-New (if not
already available)
 Workshop to operate the pumps to provide total flow of 200 litres / sec to divert to PS-13
New
 Continue diversion until as required by the Area Engineer or the Pump Stations HoS
d. Divert flow from PS-21/1 to PS-23

 This option takes flow to Doha West catchment (PS 21/1 -> PS-23 - > PS-32A - > Doha West
STW)
 Connection already available for diversion
 Call Networks to install Pneumatic stopper
 Continue diversion until as required by the Area Engineer or the Pump Stations HoS
5.2.2 Overpumping
a. Construct temporary overpumping connection to rising main

 Refer to “PS-44 Site Layout Map” in Appendix B
 Minimum safe flow required 80 percent or 800 litres / sec
 Call Workshop to install diesel pumps which can provide a total flow of 800 litres / sec as a
minimum
 Workshop to construct temporary overpumping connection
 Place workshop pumps at the inlet manhole
 Start overpumping from the inlet manhole to the rising mains (each rising main can take up
to 500 litres / sec
 Increase total flow to 1,000 litres / sec if possible
 Continue until as required by the Area Engineer or the Pump Station HoS

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b. Construct temporary overpumping connection to adjoining catchment of PS-30

 Refer to “PS-44 Catchment Overpumping Route Map” in Appendix B
 Call Workshop to set up overpumping connection
 Request for Workshop to provide
o Diesel pump(s) that can provide flow of 120 litres / sec
o Hose at least 850 metres in length
o Flange size required – 500 mm (need to be fabricated at Workshop)
o Ducting required – 8-inch
 Workshop to arrange for pumping from manhole 44/1/33/2/2 to manhole 30/B/7/16
 Workshop to arrange for traffic management at both locations
 Continue until as required by the Area Engineer or the Pump Station HoS
c. Permanent overpumping connection to rising main

 Currently construction of a permanent overpumping connection is included in an ongoing
tender for Pump Stations Risk and Contingency (DOM/1750/2016)
5.2.3 Reduce Consequences or Impact
a. Request for pumps and / or tankers to be send to the low points on the PS-44 network.
Based on GIS and historical data, the low points on the PS-44 network could be any of the following,
but these need to be confirmed.
 Near PS-44 Station boundary (see Figure 5.1)
 Near PS 21-New Station (see Figure 5.2)
 Near Cambridge School, Al Maamoura
 Behind Dar Al Salam Mall
b. Divert flow via SGW network to PS SW5 only as a measure of last resort to avert a crisis situation and
if nothing else works (refer to “PS 44 Site Layout Map” in Appendix B).

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Figure 5.1
Low Network Points – Near PS 44 Station Boundary
Figure 5.2
Low Network Point – Near PS 21 New

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6. RECOVERY
Recovery is often viewed as the final phase of Emergency management, following Planning, Preparedness
and Response. Recovery activities focus on restoration of service, assets and activities back to Business As
Usual practice. Backup systems are generally not intended for long term use, so once engaged a pathway
and timeframe should be agreed to restore full normal operations and retire any backup or temporary
measures used to manage the situation. These should be returned, where appropriate, to standby mode.
Clean up of any flood areas, should be prioritized on the basis of minimizing impacts to human health,
particularly exposure of the public to foul water.
For an Emergency situation involving the possible loss of the Pump Station or damage to reputation, the
KAT will play a key role in recommending to the EM who in turn will inform site staff actions to promote
recovery and appropriate sequencing. Procedures in the PS-44 O&M Operating Manual should be adhered
to for recharging pumps and rising mains. The EM or KAT, prior to demobilization of their roles, may
recommend follow up monitoring during and after the repair process to aid in the detection of further
failures or to monitor the effectiveness of any interventions. Such monitoring may include additional
instrumentation and/or asset inspections.
Post event, the following immediate site recovery actions are recommended:
• Area Engineer to liaise with Municipality, Networks and / or Workshop sections to deploy pumps
/ suction tankers to remove sewage overflow and initiate clean up;
• Site Foreman to regularly monitor the facility, assets and / or equipment to make sure that they
have reached normal operating conditions;
• Site Foremen to physically check water levels at PS-44 catchment pump stations to ensure that
they have reached normal operating level;
• SCADA to remotely monitor the upstream stations to ensure that normal operating conditions are
maintained;
• Release any emergency equipment or tools (e.g. tankers, emergency pumps etc.)
The following actions should be implemented at a later stage:

• Participate in a survey of the facility and its assets to confirm any asset damage;
• Prepare an Post Incident Report which details the nature of the Incident including response and
recovery actions undertaken to return the situation to BAU
• Submit preventive maintenance request for the facility;
• Re-examine and potentially re-prioritise PS-44 condition assessment, based on mode of failure
and the possibility of occurrence on other similar pump stations;
• Prepare and submit any required technical reports;
• Run failure mode scenarios to exercise this Site Response Procedure.

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APPENDIX A CONTACT INFORMATION

Title Contact Details
Landline Mobile
Management
Director of Asset Affairs
Ahmed Mohamed Sharif 4452 7222 5503 7555
Drainage Operations and Maintenance Manager
Khalid Al Obaidli 4452 7117 3333 8801
Drainage Operations and Maintenance Assistant Manager
Nasser Al Yami 4452 7171 5556 8559
Head of Pump Stations
PS-44 Engineers and Foremen

PS-44 Area Engineers
AE Mechanical - Aimen Mohammed Ahmed Sideeq 4452 7293 6674 7773
AE Electrical - Ahmed Salim Taha 4452 7241 5560 2296
PS-44 Site Foremen
SF Mechanical - Rajesh 5530 0513
SF Electrical – Sunil Kumar 5531 7590
Other PS Section Engineers

Area Engineer Mechanical
Vishnu C V 4452 7261 5581 5697
Ahmed Attia 4452 7246 5585 5916
Area Engineer Electrical
Fathy Mohammed 4452 7263 5581 7378
Sreejith Karunakaran 4452 7229 3310 6199
Ali Al Mohanaddi 4452 7295 5585 5054
External Stakeholders
Police, Fire Services & Emergency Services 999
Kahra Maa 991
Other
DNO&M Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC) 4452 4426 (phone)
Located at Asset Affairs depot, Wholesale Market Street 4452 4441 (fax)
SCADA Team Phone 5581 6860
Customer Service Unit (Complaints Office) 4495 4420

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APPENDIX B OPERATIONAL DATA AND SITE MAPS

This Appendix contains the following:
 PS-44 Operational Data

 PS-44 Feeding Stations Operational Data
 PS-44 Site Layout Map
 PS-44 Catchment Boundary
 PS-44 Feeding Stations and Catchments
 PS-44 Adjoining Catchments
 PS-44 Rising Main Locations
 PS-44 Adjoining Network Map
 PS-44 Catchment Overpumping Route Map
 PS-44 Facility Photos

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PS-44 OPERATIONAL DATA

1. GENERAL INFORMATION
1.1 Name of PS-44 (O&M manual reference: CR 465 – CR 477)

Pump Station
1.2 Group Team B (In house Station)
1.3 Brief PS-44 is a forwarding station to Doha South STW and handles foul sewer for major
Description portion of the Doha /Abu Hamour area.
PS-44 has been configured to 6 dry installation pumps with two rising mains.
1.4 Pump Station

Schematic
1.5 Location &

Landline
GIS Coordinates: X 227734.500000 Y 387673.031200

Address: Abu Hamour, Zone 56, PIN No. 56092136
Landline: 4458 0129 / 4458 3236

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1.6 Fire Warden

(FW) The fire warden for this site is the Site Foreman (SF).
Site Access &

1.7
Security
No access restrictions to this site.
The site is located in a gated compound with a master lock.
1.8 Data Sheet Pump Station

Service Sewage
Station Type Dry Well
Electricity No G6178
Q-Tel No 562691
Water No 1029201
Date Commissioned 2005
Number of Wet Wells 2
Number of pumps 6
Safe Down Time 4 hours in the night, 1 to 1.5 hours in the day
Average Day Run Hours 16 hours
Operational Capacity 91,500 m3/day
Average Daily Flow 60,000 m3/day
Station Loading Normal
Rising Mains
No. 2 (each rising main connecting three pumps)
Material DI
Surge Tank Yes
Flow Meter Yes
Diameter 700 mm
Crossover chamber Yes
Flow through each rising main 500 litres / sec

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1.9 Major Failure Yes

History
16 June 2005
Penstock valve failed to open after closing. Overpumping was arranged from the inlet
chamber into the wet well.
20 March 2006
The control panel (MCC) caught fire and the whole MCC was damaged due to failure of
the capacitor. Temporary control panels were arranged to operate pumps.
2. PUMPS INFORMATION
2.1 Pump
Configuration
Schematic
2.2 Back Up Permanent Back Up Pump

Pumps & Available on site: No
Motors
Temporary Back Up Pump
Available on site: No
Back Up Motor
Available on site: Yes, one spare.
3. POWER SUPPLY INFORMATION
3.1 Stand By One standby generator (714 kVA) available on site.

Generator
Generator is operated in auto mode, automatically starts up when the main power supply
fails.
Generator power is sufficient to run two pumps at the same time.
No back up generator if standby fails (Note: Capacity of standby generator is currently

being increased to provide 100% power supply in case of power failure)
Fuel supply: Diesel
4. STORAGE & OVERFLOW INFORMATION

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4.1 Storage Time 6 hours during night and

(hours) 1.5 hours during day.
4.2 Overflow Nil overflow provisions.

Provisions /
Arrangement
4.3 Overflow Flooding at the lowest point on the network (near American School Doha)
Consequence
Spill into local surroundings; possibly affecting residential areas and compounds in the
Abu Hamour area.
5. BYPASS INFORMATION
5.1 Permanent No permanent bypass arrangement in place.

Bypass
Arrangement Internal bypassing through rising main will commence in late 2016
There is also a proposal to connect PS-32 and DW STW which is under feasibility study by
IA Design Department
5.2 Provisions for Overpumping difficult due to the large size of the catchment
Temporary
Bypass
6. OTHER INFORMATION
6.1 Fire Alarm and There is a fire alarm system in place.

Control
System No fire control system, but there are fire extinguishers.
6.2 Hazardous No
Substances on
Site
6.3 Adjacent Site Five pump stations

Dependencies
6.4 Lifting Three types of lifting equipment

Arrangements a. EOT double girder overhead cranes (2 Nos)
b. Jib cranes with manually operated chain blocks (4 Nos)
c. Sump pump lifting beam (1 No)
6.5 Screen One screen at inlet which is currently being replaced with new one

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PS-44 FEEDING STATIONS OPERATIONAL DATA
PS-20/1
Group Team A (Catchment 13)
Location Mamoura
Station Type Sewage / Submersible
Operational Capacity 20 l/s – 30 l/s (2015)
Average Daily Flow 531 m3 / d (2012)
Number of Pumps 2 pumps (1 duty, 1 assist)
Number of Rising Mains 1 (150 mm dia)
Safe Down Time (hours) 6 hours
Provision for diverting flow / bypass Yes - Overpumping connection
PS-20/2
Location JBK Villas
Operational Capacity 2,074 m3 / day (2012)
Average Daily Flow 297 m3 / day (Jul 2015)
Number of Pumps 2 pumps (1 duty, 1 assist) (16 l / s )
PS-28
Group Team B (Catchment 22)

Location Al Kulaifat Al Jadeeda
Station Type Sewage / Dry Well
Operational Capacity 4,320 m3 / day (2012)
Average Daily Flow 496 m3 / d (Jul 2015)
Number of Pumps 2 pumps (1 duty, 1 assist) (60 l / s and 20 l / s)

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PS-21/1
Doha & Rayyan Sewage Scheme Al Ghanim Jadeed
Location
Area
Operational Capacity 1,728 m3 / day
Average Daily Flow 1,456 m3 / day
Number of Pumps 2 pumps (1 duty, 1 assist) (15 l/s)
PS-44 A
Group Team B
Location Ain Khalid, near Safari Hypermarket
STREET 1114 ,PS-R1
BARWA CITY, ZONE 56, STREET 1114
Operational Capacity 20,049 m3 / d
Average Daily Flow 2,000 m3 / d
Number of Pumps 2 pumps (1 duty, 1 assist)
Number of Rising Mains 1
Safe Down Time (hours) 2 hours day, 3 hours night

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PS-44 SITE LAYOUT MAP

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PS-44 CATCHMENT BOUNDARY

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PS-44 FEEDING STATIONS & CATCHMENTS

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PS-44 ADJOINING CATCHMENTS

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PS-44 RISING MAIN LOCATIONS

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PS-44 ADJOINING NETWORK MAP

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PS-44 CATCHMENT OVERPUMPING ROUTE MAP

State of Qatar
FACILITY AND ASSET PHOTOS


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PUBLIC WORKS AUTHORITY

PS-44 Site Response Procedure

REV Date Description Prepared Checked Reviewed Approved

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 1 of 38

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 2 of 38

1. PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE ....................................................................................... 4

3. FACILITY AND ASSETS ..................................................................................................... 6

4. SITUATION ESCALATION AND NOTIFICATION................................................................... 9

APPENDIX A CONTACT INFORMATION .................................................................................... 23

APPENDIX B OPERATIONAL DATA AND SITE MAPS .................................................................. 24

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 3 of 38

1. PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 4 of 38

Appendix A - Detailed communication and notification information;

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 5 of 38

3. FACILITY AND ASSETS

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 6 of 38

3.2 PS-44 Risk Assessment

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 7 of 38

The following recommendations came out of the risk assessment process.

3.2.1 Immediate Recommendations

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 8 of 38

4. SITUATION ESCALATION AND NOTIFICATION

•The normal execution of standard functional operations within DNO&M with no

4.2 Alarm Level Escalation for Specific Failure Modes

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 10 of 38

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 11 of 38

5.1 Asset Failure - Response to specific asset failure modes

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 12 of 38

PENSTOCK FAILURE – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS

LEVEL 1 - ALARM INVESTIGATION

LEVEL 2 - ALARM INCIDENT

LEVEL 3 - ALARM EMERGENCY

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 13 of 38

HIGH FLOW SITUATION – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS

LEVEL 1 - ALARM INVESTIGATION

LEVEL 2 - ALARM INCIDENT

LEVEL 3 - ALARM EMERGENCY

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 14 of 38

PUMP FAILURE – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS

LEVEL 1 - ALARM INVESTIGATION

LEVEL 2 - ALARM INCIDENT

LEVEL 3 - ALARM EMERGENCY

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 15 of 38

RISING MAIN FAILURE – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS

LEVEL 1 - ALARM INVESTIGATION

LEVEL 2 - ALARM INCIDENT

LEVEL 3 - ALARM EMERGENCY

POWER FAILURE – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS

LEVEL 1 - ALARM INVESTIGATION

LEVEL 2 - ALARM INCIDENT

LEVEL 3 - ALARM EMERGENCY

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 17 of 38

EXTERNAL FLOODING – SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS

LEVEL 3 - ALARM EMERGENCY

Rev: 1 Date: August 2018 Ref: TEMPLATE Page 18 of 38

5.2 Plant Failure - Redundancy Options

5.2.1 Reduce Flow to the Station

b. Divert flow from PS-44 catchment to PS-21 New

c. Divert flow from PS-21 New to PS-13 New