Appellant's Brief - Filed

Case: 19-1068 Document: 00117426823 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/16/2019 Entry ID: 6246967
No. 19-1068
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
AUSTIN TROUT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
v.
ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL DE BOXEO, INC.
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
MIGUEL J. ORTEGA NUÑEZ

USCA No. 94262
CANCIO, NADAL, RIVERA & DIAZ, P.S.C.
PO BOX 364966
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00936-4966
Tel: (787) 622-2222
Fax: (787) 622-2238
mortega@cnrd.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Austin Trout
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ...................................................................2
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ………….3
Whether the Honorable Court Erred when it ruled that the Contract
Venue Clause contained in Section 35(d) of the WBO’s Championship
Regulations is not controlling over the instant controversy.
Whether the Honorable District Court erred when it ruled that

Defendant WBO did not waive any and all rights with respect to the
enforcement of an arbitration clause.
Whether the Honorable District Court erred when it did not rule: 1)
that the arbitration forum intended by the WBO is unreasonable and
unjust; or 2) that hearing the case in said forum would constitute a
clear and patent inequity or would be unreasonable or unjust; or 3)
that enforcement of said clause would defeat the State's public policy.
Whether the Honorable Court erred when it ruled that the claims
under the Muhammad Ali boxing Reform Act are bound by the
purported arbitration agreement.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................4
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................................6
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................12
VI. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................12
A. The Honorable Court Erred when it ruled that the Contract Venue
Clause contained in Section 35(d) of the WBO’s Championship
Regulations is not controlling over the instant controversy.
B. The Honorable District Court erred when it ruled that Defendant

WBO did not waive any and all rights with respect to the enforcement
of an arbitration clause.
C. The Honorable District Court erred when it did not rule: 1) that the
arbitration forum intended by the WBO is unreasonable and unjust;
or 2) that hearing the case in said forum would constitute a clear and
patent inequity or would be unreasonable or unjust; or 3) that
enforcement of said clause would defeat the State's public policy.
D. The Honorable Court erred when it ruled that the claims under the
Muhammad Ali boxing Reform Act are bound by the purported
arbitration agreement.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ...................................................................31
VIII. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(A)......................34
IX. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................35

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................................................................2
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(l) ..........................................................................................2, 18
28 U.S.C. § 1367 ........................................................................................................2
28 U.S.C. § 1391 ........................................................................................................2
28 U.S.C. §2071 .........................................................................................................3
28 U.S.C. §2072 .........................................................................................................2
28 U.S.C.A. §1291 and §41 .......................................................................................2
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)..............................................................................................6
FRAP 3 (a) (1) and 4 (a) (1) (A) ................................................................................3
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act,

15 U.S.C. § 6309(d) (hereinafter the “Muhammad Ali Act”) ...................................2
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 USCS §§ 6301 et seq ................................5
Section 2 of the Muhammad Ali Act .......................................................................29
Section 35(d) of Appellee Organización Mundial

de Boxeo, Inc’s ........................................... 3, 4, 6, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 31
Section 6309(d) of the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act,

15 USCS §§ 6301 et seq ..........................................................................................28
Cases
Britto v. Prospect Chartercare SJHSRI, LLC,

909 F. 3d 506, 511 (1st Cir. 2018) ...........................................................................13
Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc.,

50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995). ............................................................................17
Collazo-Rosado v. Univ. of P.R., 765 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 2014)) ........................13
Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2018) .............................13
Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1327 (1st Cir. 1993). ................................13
FPE Found. v. Cohen, 801 F.3d 25 ................................................................... 17, 23
In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 226 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2002) ..................17
Joca-Roca Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan, 772 F.3d 945 (1st Cir. 2014) ..................22
Lang v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 813 F.3d 447, 454 (1st Cir. 2016) ....................13
Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 15(1st Cir. 2005) ...................17
Paine Webber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 593 (1st Cir. 1996) ................................23
Pelletier v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 549 F.3d 578, 580 (1st Cir. 2008) ......................13
Rafael Rodriguez Barril, Inc. v. Conbraco Industries, Inc.,

619 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2010). ...............................................................................15
Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2003) .....................................17
Restoration Preservation Masonry v. Grove Eur. Ltd.,

325 F.3d 54, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2003) ................................................................... 17, 23
Rivera Colón v. AT & T Mobility, PR, Inc., 913 f.3d 200 (1st Cir. 2019) ..............13
Tyco Int'l (U.S.) Ltd. v. Swartz (In re Tyco Int'l Ltd. Sec. Litig.),
422 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2005) ............................................................................... 22, 23
Unisys P.R., Inc. v. Ramallo Bros. Printing,

128 P.R. Dec. 842, 1991 Juris P.R. 69 (P.R. 1991) .................................................23
No. 19-1068
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
AUSTIN TROUT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
v.
ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL DE BOXEO, INC.
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AUSTIN TROUT
TO THE HONORABLE COURT:
The herein above-named appearing party, Austin Trout (hereinafter referred
to as the “Plaintiff-Appellant” and/or Austin Trout), hereby presents his Appellant’s
Brief pursuant to Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
(“Fed.R.App.P.”).
I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
(A) The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico Court has
federal question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6309(d) (hereinafter the
“Muhammad Ali Act”). This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court also has diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(l) because the matter in controversy exceeds
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states.
There is complete diversity of citizenship.
This District Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The contract
at issue in this case provides for disputes to be resolved in the Puerto Rico federal
judicial district. The forum selection clause in the contract demonstrates that Puerto
Rico is a convenient forum for the defendants and that they consent to personal
jurisdiction herein. Also, there is no forum more convenient or more centrally
located for all of the parties than the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico. Accordingly, venue is proper in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391.
(B) The Honorable Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has jurisdiction over
this appeal under 28 U.S.C.A. §1291 and §41; the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, drawn under the authority of 28 U.S.C. §2072; and the rules promulgated
2
by this Honorable Circuit of Appeals for the First Circuit under the authority of 28
U.S.C. §2071.
This is an appeal from a final decision of the District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico, granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and dismissing the
Complaint in its entirety
(C) On September 30, 2019, the Honorable District Court entered and notified
the Parties a Judgment dismissing the Complaint on the basis of the terms and
conditions of an Opinion and Order issued and entered on that same date.
Addendum 1-13. On October 29, 2018, Plaintiff-Appellant filed a motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied on November 26, 2018. On December 19, 2018,
Plaintiff Appellant Notice of Appeal with the district clerk in accordance with FRAP
3 (a) (1) and 4 (a) (1) (A). Addendum 14-15.
(D) This appeal is from a final judgment that disposes of all parties’ claims.
Addendum 13.
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Whether the Honorable Court Erred when it ruled that the

Contract Venue Clause contained in Section 35(d) of the WBO’s
Championship Regulations is not controlling over the instant
controversy.
B. Whether the Honorable District Court erred when it ruled that

Defendant WBO did not waive any and all rights with respect to the
enforcement of an arbitration clause.
3
C. Whether the Honorable District Court erred when it did not rule:
1) that the arbitration forum intended by the WBO is unreasonable and
unjust; or 2) that hearing the case in said forum would constitute a
clear and patent inequity or would be unreasonable or unjust; or 3)
that enforcement of said clause would defeat the State's public policy.
D. Whether the Honorable Court erred when it ruled that the claims
under the Muhammad Ali boxing Reform Act are bound by the
purported arbitration agreement.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The instant appeal is not about the merits of the allegations contained in the
Complaint nor the Amended Complaint. Rather, the appeal requires the revision of
the decision of the District Court to dismiss in its entirety a three year old case and
send it to arbitration. Therefore, the crux of the appeal lies in the procedural track of
the case. A revision of the procedural track of the case reveals several realities that
cannot be overlooked nor taken lightly.
First, the procedural track of the case will establish that Section 35(d) of
Appellee Organización Mundial de Boxeo, Inc’s. (hereinafter the “WBO”) Rules
and Regulations specifically establish that in any case in which the WBO is made a
party, said case can only be litigated in the state or federal courts of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, the procedural track of the case will
establish as well that the WBO spent 21 months arguing in the state and federal
courts of New Mexico that Section 35(d) of the WBO Rules and Regulations
4
unequivocally required the parties to litigate the instant claim in the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.
Said averments, for such an extended period of time, constitute a waiver of
any arbitration rights. Moreover, the WBO further waived any rights to arbitration
when it engaged in actions totally inconsistent with an arbitration demand, such as
actively engaging in discovery, to the point of requesting an extension of the
discovery deadline on two different occasions.
Additionally, the evidence on the record clearly establishes that: 1) the
arbitration forum intended by the WBO is unreasonable and unjust; or 2) that hearing
the case in said forum would constitute a clear and patent inequity or would be
unreasonable or unjust; or 3) that enforcement of said clause would defeat the State's
public policy.
Finally, the appeal deals with the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15
USCS §§ 6301 et seq, and how the claims under this legislation are not subject to
arbitration, as the Act provides jurisdiction to state and federal courts and given the
fact that allowing the claims under this statute to go to arbitration will defeat the
whole purpose of the Act, which is to regulate and penalize wrongful acts by
sanctioning organizations in boxing such a Defendant/Appellee WBO.
5
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Plaintiff filed the Complaint on November 16, 2015. Plaintiff originally filed
his complaint in the New Mexico State Court. Appendix 5-88.
2. On February, 9, 2016, Defendant WBO filed a Notice of Removal in the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. See, Docket No.
1.
3. Once the instant case was removed to federal court, as per Defendant WBO’s
express request, the WBO then moved the Court to dismiss the case for
improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). The WBO filed its motion to
dismiss on February 12, 2016, this is, three (3) days after filing its notice of
removal. Appendix 89-96.
4. In said request for dismissal for improper venue, Defendant WBO
unambiguously averred that “The WBO Regulations of World Championship
Contests governing the parties contain a valid, unambiguous venue selection
clause that requires the parties to litigate this action in the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico”. Appendix 89.
5. Furthermore, in its request for dismissal, Defendant WBO specifically cites
Section 35(d) in support of its request for dismissal for improper venue.
Appendix 90.
6
6. On February 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed its opposition to the WBO’s request for
dismissal. Appendix 120-127.
7. On March 11, 2016, Defendant WBO filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition
contained in Docket No.6. Appendix 128-136.
8. On August 3, 2016, the Honorable Court denied Defendant WBO’s motion to
dismiss. Appendix 137-148.
9. On August 23, 2016, Defendant WBO filed a Motion for Transfer of Venue to
the District of Puerto Rico. Appendix 149-163.
10.On August 23, 2016, Defendant WBO filed Defendant Organización Mundial
de Boxeo, Inc.’s Amended Motion for Transfer of Venue to the District of
Puerto Rico. Appendix 193-207.
11.In the very first paragraph of the referenced motion, Defendant WBO
unambiguously establishes its request for this claim to be litigated in the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico:
Defendant Organización Mundial de Boxeo, Inc. (“WBO”) moves

the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for an order transferring
this action to the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico. The Court should transfer this action to the District
of Puerto Rico because the WBO Regulations of World
Championship Contests that govern this dispute contain a valid
and mandatory forum-selection provision that requires Plaintiff to
litigate his claims in the state or federal courts of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico…Accordingly, WBO requests that
the Court enforce the forum-selection clause and transfer this
action to the District of Puerto Rico.
7
Appendix 193.
12.On July 5, 2017, the Honorable Court rendered an Opinion and Order,
transferring the instant case to the United States District Court for the District
of Puerto Rico. Appendix 244-261.
13.On August 28, 2017, Defendant WBO answered the original Complaint. Said
answer to the Complaint also contained a request for the instant case to be sent
to arbitration. Appendix 265-279.
14.The request for arbitration contained in Docket No. 27 constitutes the first
request for arbitration in the instant case.
15.On September 15, 2017 Plaintiff Austin Trout filed an Amended Complaint.
Appendix 280-305.
16.On October 31, 2017, Defendant WBO filed its answer to the Amended
Complaint. Said answer to the Complaint also contained a request for the
instant case to be sent to arbitration. Appendix 336-361.
17. On November 13, 2017, Appellant Trout filed a Response in Opposition to
Motion to Compel arbitration. Appendix 362-392.
18. On November 24, 2018, the WBO filed its reply to the opposition to the
motion to compel arbitration. Appendix 393-401.
19.On November 30, 2017, Appellant Trout filed his sur-reply to the motion to
compel arbitration. Appendix 404-418.
8
20.On February 19, 2018, the appearing party served Defendant WBO with its
Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents1.
Appendix 505.
21.On February 20, 2019, plaintiff served three notices of deposition to
individual executives of the WBO. Appendix 506.
22.On March 7, 2018, the parties jointly requested an extension of the discovery
deadline until July 16, 2018. Appendix 419-424.
23.On April 3, 2018, counsel for the WBO sent a letter to the undersigned in
which it requested an extension of the agreed upon term for the production of
the outstanding discovery. Appendix 507-508.
24.On April 11, 2018, Defendant WBO produced its answers to the outstanding
discovery. Appendix 509.
25.On May 1, 2018, the appearing party served Defendant WBO with his
objections to Defendant WBO’s answers to the outstanding discovery.
Appendix 510.
26.Also on May 1, 2018, Defendant WBO served Plaintiff with its First Request
for Production of Documents. Appendix 511.
1Appellant Trout served his Frist Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on
February, 2016, while the case was still at the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
9
27.On June 1, 2018, Plaintiff produced to Defendant WBO its initial expert
witness disclosures, consisting of the retained expert’s curriculum vitae, the
engagement letter, and the expert’s case list. Appendix 430.
28.On June 8, 2018, Defendant WBO served Plaintiff with its First Request for
Admissions and its First Set of Interrogatories. Appendix 467.
29.On June 13, 2018, Defendant WBO filed its Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Expert
Witness. Appendix 425-429.
30.On June 13, 2018, the 30(b)(6) deposition of the WBO was taken. Appendix
1.
31.On June 14, 2018, the deposition of Diana Meléndez was taken. Appendix 2.
32.On June 27, 2018, the Parties, jointly, requested a second extension of the
discovery deadline. In it, the parties submitted a proposed discovery schedule
with a discovery deadline of October 16 2018, including expert discovery.
Appendix 439-447.
33.On June 29, 2018, the Honorable Court partially granted the joint motion for
extension of time. The Honorable Court extended the discovery deadline for
September 30, 2018. Such extension included expert discovery. See, Docket
No. 68.
34.On July 31, 2018, Plaintiff’s expert produced his report. Appendix 513.
35.On August 15, 2018, Plaintiff’s deposition was taken. Appendix 3.
10
36.On August 16, 2018, the deposition of Mr. Bob Spagnola was taken.
37.On August 17, 2018, the deposition of Mr. Luis Batista Salas was taken.
38.On August 30, 2018, the WBO produced its expert witness report, which
consisted of 70 pages, excluding exhibits. Appendix 514.
39.On September 18, 2018, the WBO’s expert witness deposition was taken in
Chicago, Illinois. Appendix 4.
40.On September 21, 2018, the deposition of Mr. Louis Bourke was taken in Las
Cruces, New Mexico.
41.On September 24, 2018, the deposition of Plaintiff’s expert witness, Alberto
Fernandez Pelegrina was taken.
42.On September 30, 2019, the Honorable District Court granted the WBO’s
request for arbitration and dismissed the case in its entirety. Appendix 468-
480.
43.On October 29, 2018, Appellant Trout filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Appendix 481-502.
44.On November 6, 2018, the WBO filed its opposition to Appellant Trout’s
motion for reconsideration. Appendix 515-523.
45.On November 20, 2018, Appellant Trout filed a reply to Appellee’s opposition
to the motion for reconsideration. Appendix 524-532.
11
46.On November 26, 2018 the Honorable District Court denied Appellant’s
motion for reconsideration. See, Docket No. 81.
47.On December 19, 2018, Appellant Trout filed his Notice of Appeal.
Appendix 533-534.
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appearing party, Plaintiff/Appellant Austin Trout respectfully
requests from the Honorable Court to reverse the judgment entered by the
Honorable District Court on September 30, 2018 and November 26, 2018 and
to remand the case to the District Court for the continuance of the Proceedings.
The referenced motion should be denied because: 1) Section 35(d) of
the WBO’s Championship Regulations govern the forum selection for and
dispute between Plaintiff and the WBO; 2) the WBO waived any and all rights
to invoke an arbitration clause; 3) the arbitration clause is unreasonable and
unjust and/or because hearing the case in said forum would constitute a clear
and patent inequity or would be unreasonable or unjust and; 4) Plaintiff’s
claims are derived from federal legislation rather than from the WBO Rules
and Regulations.
VI. ARGUMENT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
12
Generally, the Court of Appeals will review an order compelling arbitration
on a spectrum of interwoven standards. At one end, when the appeal raises "solely
legal issues as to the enforceability of an arbitration clause," the appeal court will
look at it with a clean slate, or de novo. Rivera Colón v. AT & T Mobility, PR, Inc.,
913 f.3d 200 (1st Cir. 2019); Pelletier v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 549 F.3d 578, 580
(1st Cir. 2008); see also Britto v. Prospect Chartercare SJHSRI, LLC, 909 F. 3d 506,
511 (1st Cir. 2018) (explaining de novo review in this context). The same de novo
review applies when the facts surrounding the agreement are undisputed and the only
question is whether they contractually bound themselves to arbitration on those
undisputed facts. See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2018).
Therefore, the Court should review the determination of the district court in the
instant appeal de novo. See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 60. That means that the appeals
court will not provide any deference to the district court's conclusion and look at the
legal issues with clear eyes. See In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1327
(1st Cir. 1993). And it also means that the Honorable Court "can affirm on any
ground appearing in the record--including one that the [district] judge did not rely
on." See Lang v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 813 F.3d 447, 454 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing
Collazo-Rosado v. Univ. of P.R., 765 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 2014)).
Under the referenced scope of review, let us discuss the previously identified
errors from the Honorable District Court.
13
A. The Honorable District Court Erred when it ruled that the

Contract Venue Clause contained in Section 35(d) of the WBO’s
Championship Regulations is not controlling over the instant
controversy.
Section 35(d) of the WBO Championship Regulations states:
These Regulations are to be interpreted in conformity with the Laws of

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. All WBO Participants agree and
consent that the exclusive venue for any or all action in which the
WBO is made a party, whether it is to enforce, interpret or declare
the application of these Regulations or to appeal from any
determination of the WBO, including, but not limited to a
determination of the Complaints and Grievance Committee, may
be maintained only in the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, or, if applicable, in the U.S. District Court for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Appendix 117.
Several matters established in the above referenced section are of particular
importance to the controversy at hand. First, the referenced section establishes that
the WBO’s Regulations are to be interpreted in conformity with the Laws of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Second, any and all action in which the WBO is
made a party (as in the present case) may be brought only in the state or federal
courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Since the courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are the only forum
where a claim against the WBO can be filed, and since some of the claims in the
instant case arise from the WBO’s transgression of its very own championship
14
regulations, the only forum in which this case can be litigated is in the courts of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and not in an arbitration forum.
Defendant WBO cannot establish that Section 35(d), contained in its own,
self-drafted Regulations: (1) was the product of fraud or overreaching; (2) its
enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust;(3) the proceedings in the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico will be so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that the WBO will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in
court; or(4) enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in
which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision. Rafael
Rodriguez Barril, Inc. v. Conbraco Industries, Inc., 619 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2010).
To the very contrary, Defendant WBO has unambiguously moved the
Honorable Court, all through the docket, to litigate this case in the federal forum,
specifically the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. Not only
did it moved the court to litigate this case in this District, but it prevailed in its intent.
Appendix 244-261. Defendant WBO’s request for removal to this District was
granted, on the unequivocal grounds that Section 35(d) was controlling, and no party
requested a reconsideration of said order. Appendix 251.
Section 35(d) of the WBO Championship Regulations is clear in its terms: the
only venue in which a claim against the WBO can be brought is the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico. The WBO is the only defendant in this case. The WBO has
15
consistently request from the Honorable Court to litigate this case in the District
Court of Puerto Rico. Defendant WBO prevailed in its request to litigate this case in
the District of Puerto Rico. There is simply no legal reason, or procedural window,
to try the present case elsewhere. Defendant WBO’s request for this case to be sent
to arbitration must be denied.
B. The Honorable District Court erred when it ruled that Defendant WBO
did not waive any and all rights with respect to the enforcement of an
arbitration clause.
In order to determine whether the WBO waived any right to arbitration the
Honorable Court must evaluate: [1] whether the party has actually participated in the
lawsuit or has taken other action inconsistent with his right, . . . [2] whether the
litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the parties were well into
preparation of a lawsuit by the time an intention to arbitrate was communicated by
the defendant to the plaintiff, . . . [3] whether there has been a long delay in
seeking the stay or whether enforcement of arbitration was brought up when
trial was near at hand. . . . Other relevant factors are [4] whether the defendants
have invoked the jurisdiction of the court by filing a counterclaim without
asking for a stay of the proceedings,. . . [5] whether important intervening steps
(e.g. taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in
arbitration . . .) had taken place, . . . and [6] whether the other party was
affected, misled, or prejudiced by the delay. Tyco Int'l (U.S.) Ltd. v. Swartz (In
16
re Tyco Int'l Ltd. Sec. Litig.), 422 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2005); FPE Found. v. Cohen,
801 F.3d 25; Restoration Preservation Masonry v. Grove Eur. Ltd., 325 F.3d 54, 60-
61 (1st Cir. 2003) (our emphasis).
As federal policy strongly favors arbitration of disputes, a "waiver is not to be
lightly inferred," thus reasonable doubts as to whether a party has waived the right
to arbitrate should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Restoration Pres. Masonry,
Inc. v. Grove Eur. Ltd., 325 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2003). However, "an arbitration
provision has to be invoked in a timely manner or the option is lost." Rankin v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2003); see Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage
Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 15(1st Cir. 2005) ("Undue delay in bringing arbitration . . . is
inconsistent with the desire to arbitrate.") (emphasis added).
Waivers of arbitral rights need not be express, but may be implied from the
particular circumstances. See, Restoration Pres., 325 F.3d at 61 (noting that "there
are no per se rules," and that belated assertions of a right to arbitrate must be assessed
in "context"); In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 226 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2002)
(noting that there is no "bright line" rule as to waiver); Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v.
Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995).
1. Defendant WBO waived any and all rights to invoke an arbitration

clause.
The one and only reason the Honorable Court has Case Civil No. 17-1953 was
filed in the District of Puerto Rico is because the WBO invoked the District of Puerto
17
Rico’s jurisdiction. The WBO did not invoke the Honorable Court’s jurisdiction in
implicit terms. Rather, the WBO did so explicitly:
This action is a civil action in which this court has original jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §1332, and is one which may be removed to this Court
by WBO pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1), in that
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00, exclusive of
interests and costs, and is between citizens of different states. Thus, this
action may properly be removed to this Court under 28 U.S.C.
§§1441(b) and 1446.
See, Docket 1, page 2.
Not only did the WBO invoke the Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, it did so by
arguing that the article within the WBO Regulations that governed the jurisdictional
controversy was, precisely, Section 35(d) of said regulations.
“The WBO Regulations of World Championship Contests governing

the parties contain a valid, unambiguous venue selection clause that
requires the parties to litigate this action in the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico”.
Appendix 89.
The Contract Venue Provision here is mandatory. In clear language,

it provides that “exclusive venue… may be maintained only in” the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for actions concerning enforcement
or interpretation of the WBO Regulations. See WBO’s Exhibit A,
Section 35(d)(emphasis added). This provision does not merely
permits the parties to litigate in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
it requires it. K & V Scientific, 314 F.3d at 500 (explaining that the
use of the term ‘only’ is evidence that the parties intended to limit
jurisdiction to a particular forum.) This lawsuit clearly arises out of the
Regulations because Plaintiff contends that the WBO violated certain
provisions of the Regulations. See Compl. ¶¶ 33, 36, 37, 41, 42.
18
Therefore the Contract Venue Provision governs this dispute, and it

must be enforced.
Appendix 146-197.
The Contract Venue Provision unequivocally mandates that the

parties litigate this matter in the state or federal courts of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for any actions that arise under the
WBO Regulations (“…exclusive venue for any or all action in
which the WBO is made a party, whether it is to enforce, interpret
or declare the application of these Regulations…”).Plaintiff attached
the Regulations to his Complaint and relies upon them as the
substantive base for every single one of his claims. Compl., at Exhibit
B. Plaintiff must not be permitted to defy the Contract Venue
Provision by seeking to litigate his claims elsewhere.
Appendix 200.
The previous docket references were all drafted and submitted by the
WBO. In the previously referenced paragraphs, the WBO unequivocally: 1. invokes
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court; 2. represents that the parties are required to
litigate this matter in the state or federal courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
and; 3. states that Section 35(d)is controlling.
Again, these are all WBO representations and averments, which are
subject to the precepts of FRCP 11(b). All of these averments and requests were
filed within the Honorable Federal District Court of New Mexico before any
request for arbitration was sought.
Ever since the instant claim was filed in the New Mexico state court in
November, 2015, the WBO could have requested the arbitration. It did not. Instead,
19
the WBO requested the case to be removed to federal court, expressly invoking the
federal jurisdiction of the court. When the case was at the federal district court in
New Mexico, the WBO could have requested the case to be sent to arbitration. It did
not. To the contrary, the WBO invoked the jurisdiction of the Puerto Rico District
Court, arguing that Section 35(d) is controlling and that the parties have a legal
requirement to litigate the case in Puerto Rico’s state or federal courts.
There is no bright-line rule for a waiver of arbitral rights, and each case is to
be judged on its particular facts. Tyco Int'l (U.S.) Ltd. v. Swartz (In re Tyco Int'l Ltd.
Sec. Litig.), 422 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2005); Rankin,336 F.3d at 12.
In the instant case, the complaint was originally filed on November 16, 2015.
See, Docket No. 1. Defendants request for arbitration was filed on August 28, 2017.
See, Docket No. 27. As stated, the WBO could have requested arbitration since
November 2015. Instead, the WBO spent 21 months invoking the jurisdiction of the
federal court, and wholly and specifically arguing said petition under Section 35(d)of
the WBO World Championship Regulations.
By the explicitly invoking the Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, by
unequivocally invoking the controlling nature of Section 35(d), and by requesting
the case to be litigated in this district, the WBO effectively waived any right to
arbitration.
2. The WBO has taken action inconsistent with arbitration.
20
This controversy (whether the instant claim should be sent to arbitration) was
fully briefed for the Honorable District Court’s ruling by November 30, 2017.
Appendix 404-418. Since then, both parties actively engaged in discovery,
including factual and expert discovery in Puerto Rico and the mainland, and have
jointly requested the Honorable Court for an extension of the discovery deadline on
two different occasions. Item 20 through 41 of the Statement of Facts summarizes
the discovery activity between the parties in the instant claim.
In all, the parties have exchanged written discovery in excess of 800 pages,
have taken 8 depositions and have exchanged expert reports. Discovery was all but
finished. As a matter of fact, the Honorable Court’s opinion and order sending the
case for arbitration was issued on the very last day of discovery, to which a 10 day
period for the filing of dispositive motions was to follow, as per the latest extension
of the discovery deadline. See, Docket No. 68.
Therefore, after the controversy was fully briefed, the parties engaged in
discovery at a rather fast pace. Not only that, when faced with an expiring discovery
deadline, the WBO requested the Honorable Court for an extension of time, twice.
Written discovery, depositions, expert discovery were performed, at a cost of tens of
thousands of dollars to the Plaintiff who, after been taken by the WBO to federal
court almost 3 years ago, now sees his case going back again to square one.
21
The WBO has taken other action inconsistent with any arbitration right, and
important intervening steps (e.g. taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures
not available in arbitration . . .) have taken place. Tyco Int'l (U.S.) Ltd. v. Swartz (In
re Tyco Int'l Ltd. Sec. Litig.). Therefore, the WBO has waived any right to
arbitration.
3. Plaintiff will suffer prejudice from the stay.
To be sure, prejudice is essential for a waiver, but the required showing is
"tame at best." Joca-Roca Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan, 772 F.3d 945 (1st Cir. 2014).
In the controversy at hand, Plaintiff is required to demonstrate a "modicum of
prejudice". Tyco Int'l (U.S.) Ltd. v. Swartz (In re Tyco Int'l Ltd. Sec. Litig.).
The WBO took Appellant Trout on a 21 month ride on federal court, just to
ask for arbitration once the case was brought to the District of Puerto Rico. The 21
month ride turned into little less than 36 months. This was, clearly, a dilatory practice
on part of the WBO. We must not forget that arbitration is "not meant to be another
weapon in the arsenal for imposing delay and costs in the dispute resolution
process”. Tyco Int'l (U.S.) Ltd. v. Swartz (In re Tyco Int'l Ltd. Sec. Litig.).
Plaintiff performed the intended discovery, at extraordinary costs, which
included 8 depositions, written discovery and expert reports. As per the order
contained in Docket No. 68, discovery was to end on September 30, 2018 and
dispositive motions were to be filed on or before October 10, 2018.
22
This delay of 3 years has been extremely prejudicial to Plaintiff, and it is not
attributable to him. Therefore, Plaintiff was affected, misled, or prejudiced by the
delay. Tyco Int'l (U.S.) Ltd. v. Swartz (In re Tyco Int'l Ltd. Sec. Litig.), 422 F.3d 41
(1st Cir. 2005); FPE Found. v. Cohen, 801 F.3d 25; Restoration Preservation
Masonry v. Grove Eur. Ltd., 325 F.3d 54, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2003).
C. The arbitration clause cannot be applied in the instant claim because the
forum chosen is unreasonable and unjust and/or because hearing the case in
said forum would constitute a clear and patent inequity or would be
unreasonable or unjust.
Given that the parties have selected Puerto Rico law in the agreement at issue
(Appendix 45), and the fact that there is a cause of action under Article 1802 of the
Puerto Rico Civil Code, the Court must rely on Puerto Rico contract law to interpret
the agreement. See, Paine Webber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 593 (1st Cir. 1996).
In Unisys P.R., Inc. v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, 128 P.R. Dec. 842, 1991 Juris
P.R. 69 (P.R. 1991) the Puerto Rico Supreme Court found a solution to the issues
that previous case law left unsolved, guiding its analysis to United States precedent.
[T]he current federal doctrine favors [choice-of-law] clauses. The opposing party
has the burden of proving the clause's inapplicability.
A series of guidelines have been established through case law for determining
non-applicability of the forum selection clause. Among them, we find: 1) that the
forum chosen is unreasonable and unjust; or 2) that hearing the case in said
23
forum would constitute a clear and patent inequity or would be unreasonable
or unjust; or 3) that the clause is invalid because it was negotiated under fraud
or deceit; or 4) that enforcement of said clause would defeat the State's public
policy. Id.
1. The arbitration clause cannot be applied in the instant claim

because the forum chosen is unreasonable and unjust and/or because
hearing the case in said forum would constitute a clear and patent
inequity or would be unreasonable or unjust.
In essence, what Defendant WBO intends is to send the present case to an
arbitration proceeding in which the WBO would be both a party and a judge.
Section 34 of the WBO Championship Regulations states:
SECTION 34. COMPLAINTS AND GRIEVANCES
Any WBO Participant, including, but not limited to a Boxer, Manager,

or Promoter who is or could be affected by a determination of the World
Championship Committee who wishes to contest such a determination
must, as his or her sole and exclusive remedy, file a Complaint pursuant
to the WBO Appeal Regulations. In all cases the complaint shall be
referred to the WBO President, who may attempt for a reasonable
period to resolve the complaint amicably. The WBO President may
reject a complaint or he may refer it to the Complaints and Grievance
Committee which shall determine the complaint or grievance in
accordance with the WBO Appeals Regulations.
Appendix 44.
Therefore, as per the WBO’s regulation, this claim will be referred by the
President of the WBO (against whom very serious allegations are averred in the
24
Amended Complaint, See, Appendix 295, 297, 301, 302) will originally receive the
complaint and later submit it to the Grievance Committee within the WBO.
Article 1 of the Appeals Regulations of the WBO states as follows:
ARTICLE: 1
Three persons designated by the President will
constitute the WBO Grievance Committee. They
shall not be members of the Executive Committee.
The Members of the Grievance Committee shall be
nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Executive Committee.
See, Docket No 34-3.
Once again, the members of the Grievance Committee are designated by
Defendant WBO’s President. Not only that, but the members of the Grievance
Committee can be replaced by the WBO’s President and Executive Committee at
will:
ARTICLE: 2
Of the three members of the Committee, one
designated by the President will exercise the function
of Chairman. The Chairman and all other members of
the Committee have indeterminate terms and, and are
subject to replacement by the nomination of the
President of the WBO and confirmation of their
replacement by the Executive Committee.
25
Therefore, pursuant to the process by which Defendant WBO wishes the
present case to be tried, the entity presiding over Plaintiff’s claim are subject to
removal by the Defendant in the instant case.
Finally, pursuant to the WBO’s purported arbitration agreement, whatever this
WBO controlled entity decides would constitute a binding arbitration:
ARTICLE: 7
The decision of the Grievance Committee is a final
Arbitrations within the contemplation of 32 LPRA
Section 3201 et. seq. and the US Arbitration Act, Title
9 of the United States Code, and the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
of July 30, 1975 and the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration
Awards of June 10, 1958. All WBO participants
stipulate and agree that the nature of the sport requires
a prompt, final and uniform resolution of all disputes
concerning application of these Regulations by a
tribunal experienced with the application of these
Regulations and with special knowledge and
experience in world championship professional
boxing.
SECTION 35. MISCELLANEOUS
(e) All WBO participants acknowledge and agree that the mandatory
resort to the WBO Appeals Regulation is the sole and exclusive remedy
for any claim, appeal
or contest that arises from any right or status that is or could be subject
to these Regulations or which results or could result from or relate to
the interpretation or
26
application of these Regulations. These WBO Appeals and Grievance

Committee determinations are Arbitrations within the contemplation of
the Arbitration Law of
Puerto Rico, 32 LPRA Section 3201 et. seq. and the US Arbitration Act,
Title 9 of the United States Code and the Inter-American Convention
on International
Commercial Arbitration of July 30, 1975 and the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards of June
10, 1958. All WBO participants stipulate and agree that the nature of
the sport requires a prompt, final and uniform resolution of all disputes
concerning application of these
Regulations by a tribunal experienced with the application of these
Regulations and with special knowledge and experience in world
championship professional boxing.
Appendix 117.
In a claim in which, apart from the obvious fact that it is a defendant, it is
alleged that Defendant WBO engaged in a pattern of corruption by illegally
manipulating its ranking system, allegations that could carry criminal charges under
the Muhammad Ali Act to the WBO and its President personally, defendant WBO
pretends to be party and judge.
There is simply no way the arbitration forum would provide a fair opportunity
to plaintiff to pursue his claim. There can be no presumption of fairness, to the
contrary. This is not a claim between to boxers or between a boxer and a manager.
This is a claim between a boxer and the WBO.
This is precisely why Section 35(d) of the WBO Championship Regulations,
and not Section 35(e), governs. Section 35(d) provides the precise forum for claims
in which the WBO is a party.

27
The existence of the referenced clause makes perfect sense. Cases in which
the WBO is a party cannot undergo an arbitration process in which the WBO is the
presiding judge. Section 35(d) is the only section within the WBO championship
Regulations that governs the present claim in terms of forum selection.
The arbitration clause Defendant WBO intends to compel constitutes an
unreasonable forum and trying the case in said forum would constitute a clear and
patent inequity or would be unreasonable or unjust.
D. The claims under the Muhammad Ali boxing Reform Act cannot be
bound by the purported arbitration agreement.
Plaintiff’s causes of action do not derive solely from the WBO’s rules and
regulations. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Appendix 280-305) contains causes of
action that emanate from federal legislation. Such is the case of the claims brought
under the Muhammad Ali Act. Appendix 295-298.
Jurisdiction for private claims under the Muhammad Ali Act is clearly vested
upon the courts of law, be it state court or federal court. Therefore, at a minimum,
the claims under the Muhammad Ali Act cannot be subject of an arbitration
proceeding, much less when the Defendant party would preside over it:
In its pertinent part, Section 6309(d) of the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform
Act, 15 USCS §§ 6301 et seq., states:
(d) Private right of action. Any boxer who suffers economic injury as a
result of a violation of any provision of this Act [15 USCS §§ 6301 et
seq.] may bring an action in the appropriate Federal or State court and
28
recover the damages suffered, court costs, and reasonable attorney’s

fees and expenses.
If allowed, compelling the arbitration of the claims under the Muhammad Ali
Act will defeat the purpose of the Act. Leaving Sanctioning Bodies, as the term is
defined in the statue which includes the WBO, free to circumvent the muster of
courts of law over claims alleging the WBO is violating the Muhammad Ali Act,
and will be able to ventilate such claims in arbitration before a panel designated by
the President of the WBO, who can dismiss any member of said panel at will. The
findings of Congress in Section 2 of the Muhammad Ali Act clearly show an intent
of Congress to regulate the actions of Sanctioning Bodies (such as the WBO) by way
of establishing uniform national procedures:
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Professional boxing differs from other major, interstate

professional sports industries in the United States in that it operates
without any private sector association, league, or centralized industry
organization to establish uniform and appropriate business practices
and ethical standards. This has led to repeated occurrences of
disreputable and coercive business practices in the boxing industry, to
the detriment of professional boxers nationwide.
(2) State officials are the proper regulators of professional boxing

events, and must protect the welfare of professional boxers and serve
the public interest by closely supervising boxing activity in their
jurisdiction. State boxing commissions do not currently receive
adequate information to determine whether boxers competing in their
jurisdiction are being subjected to contract terms and business practices
which may violate State regulations, or are onerous and confiscatory.
29
(3) Promoters who engage in illegal, coercive, or unethical

business practices can take advantage of the lack of equitable business
standards in the sport by holding boxing events in States with weaker
regulatory oversight.
(4) The sanctioning organizations which have proliferated in

the boxing industry have not established credible and objective
criteria to rate professional boxers, and operate with virtually no
industry or public oversight. Their ratings are susceptible to
manipulation, have deprived boxers of fair opportunities for
advancement, and have undermined public confidence in the
integrity of the sport.
(5) Open competition in the professional boxing industry has

been significantly interfered with by restrictive and anticompetitive
business practices of certain promoters and sanctioning bodies, to the
detriment of the athletes and the ticket-buying public. Common
practices of promoters and sanctioning organizations represent
restraints of interstate trade in the United States.
(6) It is necessary and appropriate to establish national

contracting reforms to protect professional boxers and prevent
exploitive business practices, and to require enhanced financial
disclosures to State athletic commissions to improve the public
oversight of the sport.
Allowing the WBO to have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
Muhammad Ali Claims through arbitration will be contrary to the spirit of the Act
and will severely dilute a boxer’s ability to claim relief under the Act, as well as it
will deprive courts of the ability to enforce compliance with the Act. The claims
under the Muhammad Ali Act cannot be sent to an arbitration proceeding.
30
VII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
The instant case should not have been dismissed by the Honorable District
Court, for various reasons.
First, the clear and unambiguous language of Section 35(d) demands that, in
any case in which the WBO is made a party, the only venue in which said case can
be filed is the state or federal courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico:
These Regulations are to be interpreted in conformity with the Laws of

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. All WBO Participants agree and
consent that the exclusive venue for any or all action in which the
WBO is made a party, whether it is to enforce, interpret or declare
the application of these Regulations or to appeal from any
determination of the WBO, including, but not limited to a
determination of the Complaints and Grievance Committee, may
be maintained only in the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, or, if applicable, in the U.S. District Court for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Appendix 117.
In addition, the WBO waived any and all rights to invoke a arbitration clause.
This waiver is two-folded. First, for 21 months the WBO requested the case to be
transferred from the courts of New Mexico to the Federal District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico. The WBO request was exclusively made under Section 35(d)
of the WBO Rules and Regulations. The WBO’s request for transfer of venue under
Section 35(d) was granted and was not appealed. Furthermore, the WBO engaged in
31
a rather extensive and costly discovery for the Plaintiff, which also amounts to a
waiver of any arbitration claim.
The WBO would be party and judge in a case in which serious allegations,
that could carry criminal consequences to the WBO and its officials, are being
averred against it. This makes the WBO arbitration forum unreasonable and unjust
because hearing the case in said forum would constitute a clear and patent inequity
or would be unreasonable or unjust.
Finally, any and all claims under the Muhammad Ali Act cannot be sent to
arbitration, since the Act allocates jurisdiction in the state and federal courts of law
for private actions of boxers. Simply put, to allow the WBO to ventilate claims
against it under the Muhammad Ali Act under its purported arbitration forum will
effectively allow the WBO to never face a court of law for claims against it under
the Muhammad Ali Act, defeating the purpose and spirit of such a novel, and noble,
Act.
Mr. Austin Trout has spent the last 41 months trying to pursue his claims in a
court of law. Through all these years, Mr. Trout has employed an enormous amount
of time and hundreds of thousands of dollars in defending his case. To send this case
to arbitration would amount to a failure of justice. Mr. Trout came forward 41
months ago. It is time for him to be heard. The judgment of the Honorable District
Court should be reversed.
32
The appearing party, Plaintiff/Appellant Austin Trout respectfully requests
from the Honorable Court to reverse the judgment entered by the Honorable District
Court on September 30, 2018 and November 26, 2018 and to remand the case to the
District Court for the continuance of any and all further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 16th day of April of the year 2019.

PO BOX 364966
403 Ave. Muñoz Rivera
Hato Rey, P.R. 00918-3345
Tel: (787) 767-9625
Fax: (787) 622-2238
s/ MIGUEL J. ORTEGA NUÑEZ
USCA No. 94262
mortega@cnrd.com
33
VIII CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(A)

Certificate of Compliance with Type-Volume Limitation,
Typeface Requirements and Type Style Requirements.
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 7,413 words excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this
brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Word, in “Times
New Roman” 14 point font.

PO BOX 364966
Hato Rey, P.R. 00918-3345
Tel: (787) 767-9625
Fax: (787) 622-2238
s/ MIGUEL J. ORTEGA NUÑEZ
USCA No. 94262
mortega@cnrd.com
34
IX CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this same date I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send
notification of such filing to the attorneys of record: David P. Lutz, Esq.,
dplutz@qwestoffice.net; David W. Bunting, Esq., dbunting@rodey.com; Andrew
W. Horn, Esq., lawofficehorn@msn.com; Joseph C. Laws, Esq.,
lawofficesofjosephlaws@gmail.com; Edward Ricco, Esq., ericco@rodey.com.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 16th day of April, 2019.
CANCIO, NADAL, RIVERA & DÍAZ, PSC

PO Box 364966
San Juan, PR 00936-4966
Hato Rey, PR 00918-3345
Tel. (787) 767-9625
Fax (787) 622-3461
S/ MIGUEL J. ORTEGA NÚNEZ
Miguel J. Ortega Núñez
USDC 220609
Court of Appeals Bar No. 94262
mortega@cnrd.com
35

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Case: 19-1068 Document: 00117426823 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/16/2019 Entry ID: 6246967

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL DE BOXEO, INC.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIGUEL J. ORTEGA NUÑEZ

I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ...................................................................2

II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ………….3

Whether the Honorable District Court erred when it ruled that

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................4

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS ...............................................................................6

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................12

VI. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................12

B. The Honorable District Court erred when it ruled that Defendant

VII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ...................................................................31

VIII. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(A)......................34

IX. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................35

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................................................................2

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(l) ..........................................................................................2, 18

28 U.S.C. § 1367 ........................................................................................................2

28 U.S.C. § 1391 ........................................................................................................2

28 U.S.C. §2071 .........................................................................................................3

28 U.S.C. §2072 .........................................................................................................2

28 U.S.C.A. §1291 and §41 .......................................................................................2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)..............................................................................................6

FRAP 3 (a) (1) and 4 (a) (1) (A) ................................................................................3

Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act,

Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 USCS §§ 6301 et seq ................................5

Section 2 of the Muhammad Ali Act .......................................................................29

Section 35(d) of Appellee Organización Mundial

Section 6309(d) of the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act,

Britto v. Prospect Chartercare SJHSRI, LLC,

Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc.,

FPE Found. v. Cohen, 801 F.3d 25 ................................................................... 17, 23

Rafael Rodriguez Barril, Inc. v. Conbraco Industries, Inc.,

Restoration Preservation Masonry v. Grove Eur. Ltd.,

Unisys P.R., Inc. v. Ramallo Bros. Printing,

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL DE BOXEO, INC.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AUSTIN TROUT

TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

The herein above-named appearing party, Austin Trout (hereinafter referred

to as the “Plaintiff-Appellant” and/or Austin Trout), hereby presents his Appellant’s

Brief pursuant to Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6309(d) (hereinafter the

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(l) because the matter in controversy exceeds

There is complete diversity of citizenship.

jurisdiction herein. Also, there is no forum more convenient or more centrally

Complaint in its entirety

Addendum 1-13. On October 29, 2018, Plaintiff-Appellant filed a motion for

3 (a) (1) and 4 (a) (1) (A). Addendum 14-15.

II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A. Whether the Honorable Court Erred when it ruled that the

B. Whether the Honorable District Court erred when it ruled that

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

cannot be overlooked nor taken lightly.

Appellee Organización Mundial de Boxeo, Inc’s. (hereinafter the “WBO”) Rules

District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.

Said averments, for such an extended period of time, constitute a waiver of

when it engaged in actions totally inconsistent with an arbitration demand, such as

actively engaging in discovery, to the point of requesting an extension of the

discovery deadline on two different occasions.

Additionally, the evidence on the record clearly establishes that: 1) the