Indian Geotechnical Conference – 2010, GEOtrendz

December 16–18, 2010

IGS Mumbai Chapter & IIT Bombay

Assessing Risks of Breaching of Earth Dams and Natural

Landslide Dams

Zhang, L.M. Peng, M. Xu, Y.

e-mail: cezhangl@ust.hk e-mail: pengming@ust.hk e-mail: xuyao@ust.hk

Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, The Hong Kong University of

Science and Technology, Hong Kong

ABSTRACT
Both man-made earth dams and natural landslide dams pose enormous risks to the public because of the potentially
catastrophic floods generated by breaching of such dams. In order to manage the dam breaching risks, it is
necessary to evaluate the structural safety of dams, possible breaching modes and breach size, outflow hydrograph,
flood routing in the downstream river, and potential losses of lives and properties due to dam breach floods. It is
also necessary to prepare emergency plans and evaluate actions to betaken to mitigate the risks. In this paper,
results of recent research on three key issues in dam breaching risk assessment (i.e., failure modes and processes,
breaching parameters, and flood risk assessment) are presented, and a case study on Tangjishan Landslide Dam is
presented to illustrate the risk assessment procedure.

1. INTRODUCTION When a man-made dam deteriorates seriously or when

The world data as of 2000 indicate that there are about
50,000 large man-made dams in operation (ICOLD 2010).
A large dam has a height of not less than 15 m or stores
more than 3 million m 3 of water in the reservoir.
Approximately 80% of the world dams are earth or rockfill
dams. In China, the total number of existing dams is as
large as 85,000, of which about 37,000 are distressed dams
(Chen 2008). The potential risks posed by failure of
distressed dams could be enormous. In August 1975, an
extreme storm caused the breach of two large embankment
dams (the Banqiao and Shimantan dams) and 60 smaller
dams in Henan Province, China. Eleven million people
were affected and the death count reached 26,000 (Ru and
Niu 2001; Xu et al. 2009). As social and economical
development goes on, dam safety has drawn increasing
attention from the public in recent years.
Another type of dams is natural landslide dams.
Landslide dams form where narrow steep valleys are bordered
by high rugged mountains (Costa and Schuster, 1988). The
formation of most landslide dams (82%) was trigged by
rainfall, snowmelt, and earthquakes. Over 257 landslide
dams formed during the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake (Cui et
al. 2009). Landslide dams may also pose great risks to the
public. For instance, the formation of Tangjiashan Landslide
Dam in 2008 caused the evacuation of 250 thousands people
living downstream the dam.
a landslide dam just forms, the engineer has many questions
to answer:
(1) Would the dam collapse?
(2) If yes then when would the dam break or under
what conditions would the dam break?
(3) What would be the flood from breaching of the
dam?
(4) How long would the flood last?
(5) How effective would any rescue work be to prevent
or delay the failure of the dam?
(6) What are the consequences of the dam failure?
How many people downstream the dam would be
affected?
(7) How many people should be evacuated and when
should they be evacuated?
(8) What is the accuracy of the above estimates?
In this paper, results of recent research on three key
issues in dam breaching risk assessment (i.e., failure modes
and processes, breaching parameters, and flood risk
assessment) are presented. A case study on Tangjishan
Landslide Dam is presented to illustrate the risk assessment
procedure. The focus of the paper is not the probabilistic
methodologies involved in risk analysis, but the physical
processes involved in assessing the risks of breaching of
earth dams and natural landslide dams.
82 L.M. Zhang, M. Peng and Y. Xu

2. DAM BREACHING DATABASES downstream. The extent of breaching depends on the

Database of Earth and Rockfill Dam Failure Cases
In the past few years, HKUST collected more than 1609
dam failure cases from the literature (Xu and Zhang 2009;
Zhang et al. 2009) and compiled these failure cases into a
database. Among these cases, 66% are earth dams. Details
of the characteristics of the dams (geographic information,
dam type, dam height and volume, construction time etc.),
the reservoir (surface area, volume, and geometry etc.) and
the failure information are collected. The failure cases are
from over fifty countries, including the US, India, and the
UK, but excluding China. The dam failures in China are
compiled in a separate database by China Institute of Water
Resources and Hydropower Research (IWHR). The
information from the database forms the basis for studying
the characteristics of failed dams, dam breaching
parameters, and dam breaching processes.
Database of Landslide Dams
HKUST compiled another database of 1239 landslide dams,
including 257 cases formed during the 12 May 2008
Wenchuan earthquake. Out of all the 1239 landslide dam
cases in the database, 53% (659 cases) occurred in China,
duration of overtopping and the properties and structure of
the embankment (Chang and Zhang 2010). The erosion
characteristics are different for granular and cohesive
embankments. For granular embankments, surface slips
take place quickly due to the flow on the downstream slope;
and hence granular materials are removed rapidly layer by
layer. Towards the end of the erosion process, the breach
tends to flatten, depending upon the materials and the
general slope of the foundation surface. Fig. 1 shows the
breaching process of a granular embankment by
overtopping. According to the definitions by Wahl (1998),
the breach initiation phase involves stages 1-2 while the
breach development phase involves stages 3-7 in Fig. 1.
间
Separating Point
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
(a)
1-2

14% (175 cases) in Japan, 8% (95 cases) in USA, 6% (72 3-7

cases) in Italy, 2% (28 cases) in New Zealand and 17%
(b)
(210 cases) in other places.
Fig. 1: Breaching Process of a Granular Embankment by
3. FAULIRE PROCESSES AND FAILURE MODES Overtopping: (a) Side View, (b) Downstream View (Breach
Failure Processes Initiation Phase: Stages 1-2 & Breach Development Phase:
Stages 3-7)
The breaching of an earth embankment is an erosion
process of the embankment materials by flow of water either For cohesive embankments, erosion often begins at the
over or through the dam. The former leads to overtopping embankment toe and advances upstream, undercutting the
of the dam and subsequent external erosion while the latter slope and causing the removal of large chunks of materials
gives rise to seepage erosion or piping. Wahl (1998) divided due to tensile or shear failure of the soils on the steepened
the whole breaching process into two phases: the breach slope. In some cases a series of stairstep headcuts forms on
initiation phase and the breach development phase. In the the downstream face of the dam. Fig. 2 shows the breaching
breach initiation phase, the outflow from the dam is small, process of a cohesive embankment by overtopping, in which
consisting of a slight overtopping or a small flow through 间
间
Separating Point
a developing pipe or seepage channel. In the breach
development phase, the outflow and erosion develop rapidly.
In the following, breaching characteristics of embankment
dams by overtopping and seepage erosion/piping are 3 2 1
6 5 4
discussed separately. 7
(a)
Overtopping
Overtopping occurs as the result of insufficient spillway 1-4

capacity or extreme flood exceeding design criteria. The 5- 7

water flow over the embankment from overtopping
(b)
introduces tractive shear stress on the downstream surface.
Fig. 2: Breaching Process of a Cohesive Embankment by
The erosion process begins at a weak point where the
Overtopping: (a) Side View, (b) Downstream View (Breach
tractive shear stress exceeds a critical resistance that keeps Initiation Phase: Stages 1-4 & Breach Development Phase:
the material in place. Then, it proceeds under the action of Stages 5-7)
flowing waters with the eroded material being transported
Assessing Risks of Breaching of Earth Dams and Natural Landslide Dams
the breach initiation phase involves stages 1-4 while the
breach development phase involves stages 5-7. If a granular
embankment contains a vertical cohesive core, the core will
erode in a manner similar to that for a cohesive
embankment. If the core is sloped with structural support
from the downstream shell, the core will fail structurally
after the downstream shell is eroded away.
Seepage Erosion/Piping
Another common cause of failure of embankment dams is
seepage erosion/piping. McCook (2004) emphasized the
distinction between seepage erosion and piping to help
differentiate between the phenomena of flow through cracks
or structural contacts versus flow through granular media.
Piping is defined as the progressive removal of soil particles
from a soil mass by percolating water, leading to the
development of channels. Piping often occurs in granular
embankments. Cohesive embankments offer a greater
erosion resistance than granular fills do, and hence are less
likely to suffer from piping. Seepage erosion occurs when the
water flowing through a crack or defect erodes the soil from
the walls of the crack or defect. Similar to overtopping, the
2
1
(a1)
1-2
(b1)
Collapse
坍塌
4 3
(a2)
3-4
(b2)
5 Fig. 4: Breaching Process of a Cohesive Embankment by
6
(a3)
5-6
(b3)
Fig. 3: Breaching Process of a Granular Embankment by
Seepage Erosion/Piping: (a) Side View, (b) Downstream
Materials above the Pipe Becomes Unstable and Collapses,
View (Breach Initiation Phase: Stages 1-4 & Breach
Development Phase: Stages 5-6)
breaching characteristics by seepage erosion/piping are also
different for granular and cohesive embankments. At the
original stage of seepage erosion/piping, soil particles are
83
often removed slowly by seeping water. Then, a pipe is
initially formed in the downstream slope after a significant
amount of material has been carried away. Once the pipe is
formed, the erosion process becomes rapid and the pipe
advances upstream. For granular embankments, the
materials above the pipe collapse when the pipe is sufficiently
large, which is followed by a similar process as in the case of
overtopping. Fig. 3 shows the breaching process of a granular
embankment by seepage erosion/piping, in which the breach
initiation phase involves stages 1-4 while the breach
development phase involves stages 5-6.
For cohesive embankments, the portion of the materials
above the pipe may keep stable, and hence the initial pipe in
the downstream slope continues to advance till the upstream
slope face. A penetrated pipe is finally formed through the
embankment. Fig. 4 shows the whole breaching process of a
cohesive embankment by seepage erosion/piping, in which
the breach initiation phase involves stages 1-3 while the
breach development phase involves stages 4-5.
3
2
1
(a1)
1-3
(b1)
4
5
(a2)
4-5
(b2)
Seepage Erosion/piping: (a) Side View, (b) Downstream View
(Breach Initiation Phase: Stages 1-3 & Breach Development
Phase: Stages 4-5)
Failure Modes
Without channelized spillways or other protected outlets,
landslide dams commonly fail by overtopping, while earth
and rockfill dams fail by both overtopping and piping.
Fig. 5 presents and compares the failure modes of landslide
dams and man-made earth and rockfill dams. Out of the
144 landslide dam failure cases with known failure modes,
91% (131 cases) failed by overtopping, 8% (12 cases) by
piping, and 1% (1 case) by slope failure.
84 L.M. Zhang, M. Peng and Y. Xu

The distribution of the failure modes of landslide dams

100
is different from that of man-made dams. The corresponding

Percentage of landslide dams that failed

87% lasted ≤ 1 year
79% lasted ≤ 3 months
percentages for 176 man-made earth and rockfill dam 80 83% lasted ≤ 6 months

below indicated age (%)

failure cases (Xu and Zhang, 2009) are 58% by overtopping, 71% lasted ≤ 1 month
37% by piping and 5% by slope failure, respectively. 60
51% lasted ≤ 1 week
40
150
91% Landslide dams 34% lasted ≤ 1 day

120 Man-made earth and rockfill dams 20

58%
Number of cases

8% lasted ≤ 1 hour
90 0
37% 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
60 Age of landslide dams at time of failure (day)

30 Fig. 6: Age of Landslide Dams at Time of Failure (204 Cases)

8% 5%
1%
0 Differences Between Earth Dams and Landslide Dams
Overtopping Piping Slope failure
Earth dams and landslide dams differ significantly in their
Failure mode
formation processes and should be treated differently in
Fig. 5: Failure Modes of Landslide Dams (144 cases) and assessing their risks. The main differences in the two types
Man-made Earth and Rockfill Dams (176 cases) of dams are:
Longevity of Dams (1) A landslide dam is part of a natural landslide
Table 1 shows the ages of 1065 man-made earth dams at deposit, while an earth or rockfill dam is
the time of failure. A dam is most likely to fail within its usually well designed and constructed.
first five-year service, especially during the first year after (2) Landslide dams consist of heterogeneous rock
construction. and soil materials, so that their mechanical
Landslide dams last from several minutes to several parameters such as erodibility and
thousand years, depending on factors such as volume, size, permeability vary significantly across the dams
geometry, and sorting of blockage materials; rates of and are rather uncertain. The geometry of
seepage through the blockage; and rates of sediments and landslide dams is also irregular.
water that flow into the newly formed lake (Costa and (3) Soils in landslide dams are not compacted
Schuster, 1988). The longevity of 204 landslide dam cases sufficiently; thus, their erodibility and
in the HKUST database covers a large range from 6 permeability are generally higher than those
minutes to 20000 years. Fig. 6 shows the longevity of man-made earth and rockfill dams.
distribution for the historical landslide dam cases. 87% (4) Given the same reservoir capacity, landslide
of the cases lasted less than 1 year; 83% less than 6 dams are usually more massive. When
months; 71% less than 1 month; 51% less than 1 week breaching occurs, more soil materials need to
and 34% less than 1 day. be eroded, which may increase the breaching
duration and lower the peak discharge.
Table 1: Ages of 1065 Earth Dams at Failure
(5) Landslide dams are usually wider and gentler,
Age Range (Year) Number of Cases Percentage (%)
which reduce the chance of piping failure and
Under Construction 32 3.0 slope failure.
0-1 89 8.4
1-5 80 7.5 (6) Landslide dams often form in remote
5-10 38 3.6 mountainous areas, which are difficult to
10-15 38 3.6 monitor; so fewer performance data are
15-20 26 2.4 available.
20-30 36 3.4 (7) Limited flood control measures (e.g. spillways)
30-40 21 2.0
40-60 36 3.4
and seepage control measures (e.g. corewalls
60-80 22 2.1 and filters) are available in landslide dams;
80-100 10 0.9 therefore, most of them failed in a short period
100-150 10 0.9 after formation.
>150 4 0.4
Unknown 623 58.5 4. BREACHING PARAMETERS
Sum 1065 100.0 Typically, dam breaching parameters can be divided into
Assessing Risks of Breaching of Earth Dams and Natural Landslide Dams 85

two groups: geometric and hydrographic parameters. A dam breaching parameters is also compared. The dam erodibility
breach often has a trapezoidal shape, with the geometric is found to be the most important factor, influencing all
parameters of breach depth Hb, breach top width Wt, average the five breaching parameters. The reservoir shape
breach width Wave, and breach bottom width Wb as shown coefficient and the failure mode also play important roles
in Fig. 7. Any combination of three of these geometric in the prediction models.
parameters determines the breach shape and size. Table 2: Summary of Empirical Relations for Estimating the
Hydrographic parameters include peak outflow rate Qp Breaching Parameters of Earth Dams
and failure time Tf. After the onset of breaching, the outflow (a) Full-variable equations
through the breach increases till it reaches a peak and then
decreases till there is no longer any water in the reservoir Parameter Equation and Coefficients1
0.199 −1.274
or the breaching process ceases to develop. Failure time Tf Qp H   Vw1/ 3 
is defined as the period from the inception to the completion = 0.175  d    e DT + FM + ER
gVw5/ 3  Hr   Hw 
of the breaching process (Singh and Snorrason 1984). Peak Failure mode
According to Fell et al. (2003), in most cases it has not outflow rate Dam type DT Erodibility ER
FM
been possible to identify the time of initiation of erosion, Qp 2
CW –0.503 Ove.3 –0.705 High4 –0.007
and the first signs of erosion tend to be in the progression CF2 –0.591 3
Pip. –1.039 Med.4 –0.375
phase. Therefore, from a practical standpoint, failure time HF2 –0.649 – – Low4 –1.362
is often recorded at the start of the breach development Hb H 
phase. Failure time Tf in this study is also regarded as the = 0.453 − 0.025  d  + DT + FM + ER
Hd  Hr 
breach development time. The time for initiation has been Failure mode
Breach Dam type DT Erodibility ER
recorded where it is possible, e.g., from increased seepage depth Hb FM
2
flows. CW 0.145 Ove.3 0.218 High4 0.254
CF2 0.176 Pip.3 –0.239 Med.4 0.168
Hd = dam height HF2 0.132 – – Low4 0.031
0.092 0.508
Hb = breach depth
Wt H   Vw1/3 
W t = breach top width = 1.062  d    e DT + FM + ER
Hb  Hr   Hw 
Wb = breach bottom width
Breach top Failure mode
Dam type DT Erodibility ER
width Wt FM
CW2 0.061 Ove.3 0.299 High4 0.411
CF2 0.088 Pip.3 –0.239 Med.4 –0.062
Wt
HF2 –0.089 – – Low4 –0.289
0.133 0.652
Hb
Wave H   Vw1/ 3 
= 0.787  d    eDT + FM + ER
Hd Wb Hb  Hr   Hw 
Average Failure mode
breach Dam type DT Erodibility ER
FM
Fig. 7: Geometric Parameters of a Dam Breach width Wave CW 2
–0.041 Ove.3 0.149 High4 0.291
CF2 0.026 3
Pip. –0.389 Med.4 –0.140
Breaching Parameters of Earth and Rockfill Dams HF2 –0.226 – – Low4 –0.391
Two sorts of prediction models have been developed: 0.707 1.228
Tb H   Vw1/ 3 
empirical formulas based on case study data and physically- = 0.304  d    eDT + FM + ER
Tr  Hr   Hw 
based prediction models. Xu and Zhang (2009) summarized
Breaching Failure mode
the development of these two sorts of models. Based on the Dam type DT
FM
Erodibility ER
time Tb
information from a dataset of 182 earth and rockfill dam CW 2
–0.327 Ove.3 –0.579 High4 –1.205
failure cases, Xu and Zhang (2009) proposed a CF2 –0.674 Pip.3 –0.611 Med.4 –0.564
multiplicative regression model to develop empirical HF2 –0.189 – – Low4 0.579
relationships between five breaching parameters (breach Note:
1
depth, breach top width, average breach width, peak outflow Hd = dam height, Hr = 15 m, Vw = released water volume, Hw =
rate, and failure time) and five selected dam and reservoir drop of water level, Tr = 1 hour, g = 9.8 m/s2.
2
control variables (dam height, reservoir shape coefficient, CW = dam with corewalls, CF = concrete faced dam,
dam type, failure mode, and dam erodibility). These HF = homogeneous/zoned-fill dam.
3
empirical relations are summarized in Tables 2(a) and 2(b). Ove. = overtopping, Pip. = piping.
4
The relative importance of each control variable to the dam High, Med., and Low = high, medium, and low erodibility,
respectively.
86 L.M. Zhang, M. Peng and Y. Xu

(b) Simplified equations dams is less sensitive to dam height, since a larger volume
Parameter Equation and Coefficients the models for landslide dams (Table 3) are applied to
Qp  V 1/3 
−1.276
Table 3: Summary of Empirical Relations for Estimating the
= 0.133  w  e FM + ER Breaching Parameters of Landslide Dams
gVw5 / 3  Hw 
Peak outflow (a) Full-variable equations
Failure mode FM Erodibility ER
rate Qp Para- Erodibility
Overtopping –0.788 High –0.089 Equation1
meter Coefficient, α
Piping –1.232 Medium –0.498
Qp H d -1.417 H d -0.265 Vd1/3 -0.471 High 1.276
– – Low –1.433 1/ 2 5/ 2
=( ) ( ) ( )
g Hd Hc Wd Hd
Hb H  Qp Med. –0.336
= ER − 0.025  d  V 1/ 3
Hd  Hr  ( l )1.569 e a
Hd Low –1.532
Breach depth Failure mode FM Erodibility ER
Hb – Hb H H V 1/3 High –0.316
Overtopping High 1.072 = ( d ) 0.882 ( d ) -0.041 ( d ) -0.099
Piping – Medium 0.986 Hc Hc Wd Hd
Hb Med. –0.520
– – Low 0.858 Vl1/ 3 0.139 a
( ) e
0.558 Hd Low -2
Wt  V 1/ 3  FM + ER
= 0.996  w  e
Hb  Hw  Wt H H V 1/ 3 High 1.683
= ( d )0.752 ( d )0.315 ( d )-0.243
Breach top Failure mode FM Erodibility ER Hc Hc Wd Hd
width Wt Wt Med. 1.201
Overtopping 0.258 High 0.377 Vl1/3 0.682 a
( ) e
Piping –0.262 Medium –0.092 Hd Low -2
– – Low –0.288
0.739 Wb H H V 1/ 3 High 0.775
 V 1/ 3  = 0.004( d ) + 0.050( d ) − 0.044 ( d )
Wave FM + ER Hd Hc Wd Hd
= 5.543  w  e Wb Med. 0.532
Hb  Hw  Vl1/ 3
Average + 0.088( )+ a
breach width Failure mode FM Erodibility ER Hd Low -2
Wave Overtopping –1.207 High –0.613
Tb H H V 1/ 3 High –0.635
Piping –1.747 Medium –1.073 = ( d )0.262 ( d )-0.024 ( d )-0.103
Tr Hc Wd Hd
– – Low –1.268 Tb Med. –0.518
0.654 1.246 Vl1/ 3 0.705 a
Tb H   Vw1/ 3  ( ) e
= ER  d    Hd Low -2
Tr  Hr   Hw 
Breaching Failure mode FM Erodibility ER Note:
time Tb –
1
Hd = dam height, Wd = dam width, Hc = 1 m, Vd = dam volume,
Overtopping High 0.038
Piping – Medium 0.066 Tr = 1 hour, g = 9.8 m/s2.
2
– – Low 0.205 No records are available for the low erodibility coefficient
cases.
Breaching Parameters of Landslide Dams (b) Simplified equations
Breaching of landslide dams is sometimes studied by using Erodibility
Parameter Equation
empirical equations for man-made earthen dams. This is Coefficient, α
not reasonable because of the aforementioned distinct Qp H d -1.371 Vl1/ 3 1.536 a
High 1.236
differences between these two types of dams. Based on Qp 1/ 2 5/ 2
=( ) ( ) e Med. –
g Hd Hc Hd 0.380
records of 52 landslide dam cases with detailed breaching Low –
High 1.615
–
information in the HKUST landslide dam database,
Hb H V 1/3 0.500
–
empirical models for estimating the breaching parameters Hb = ( d ) 0.923 ( l ) 0.118 e a Med.
Hc Hc Hd 0.673
of landslide dams are developed following the similar Low –
procedure in Xu and Zhang (2009). The empirical relations High 0.588
Wt H V 1/ 3
are summarized in Table 3. Wt = ( d )0.911 ( l )0.271 ea Med. 0.148
Hc Hc Hd
Comparison of Breaching Parameters of Earth Dams Low –
and Landslide Dams High 0.624
Wb H V 1/ 3
Wb = 0.003( d ) + 0.070( l ) + a Med. 0.344
Figs. 8 and 9 compare the values of peak flow rate and Hd Hc Hd
Low –
breach duration for man-made earth and rockfill dams and –
landslide dams, respectively. The peak outflow rate, Qp, High
Tb H V 1/ 3 0.805
increases with dam height or lake volume outflow rate for Tb = ( d )0.293 ( l )0.723 ea Med.
–
Tr Hc Hd 0.674
both types of dams as shown in Fig. 8. Qp from landslide
Low –
Assessing Risks of Breaching of Earth Dams and Natural Landslide Dams 87

predict the peak outflow rate from landslide dams, the mean breaching duration (by 64% using Xu and Zhang’s models).
bias factors (i.e. the mean of the ratios of measured flow Separate models should be used.
rate to predicted flow rate) of the models are about 1.01,
20 Man-made arth and rockfill dams
which is close to unity. However, if the models for earth Landslide dams
Landslide dams induced by the Wenchuan earthquake
and rockfill dams (Table 2) are used to predict the peak 16

Breaching duration (hour)

outflow rate from landslide dams, the mean bias factors 12

will be 0.34, which means that the equations for earth and 8
Man-made earth and rockfill dams Landslide dams

rockfill dams may, on average, overestimate the peak flow

4
rate from landslide dams by nearly 200%.
0
0 40 80 120 160 200 240
Man-made earth and rockfill dams Dam height (m)
1000000
Landslide dams
Landslide dams induced by the Wenchuan earthquake
(a)
Peak outflow rate (m 3 /s)

100000

Man-made earth and rockfill dams

10000 20 Landslide dams
Landslide dams induced by the Wenchuan earthquake

Breaching duration (hour)

Landslide dams 16
1000
12
Landslide dams
100 Man-made earth and rockfill dams
8
Man-made earth and
4 rockfill dams
10
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
Dam height (m) 0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000

Lake volume (million m 3 )

(a)
(b)
1000000
Man-made earth and rockfill dams
Man-made earth and
Fig. 9: Comparison of Breaching Durations of Landslide Dams
Landslide dams
Landslide dams induced by the Wenchuan earthquake rockfill dams and Earth and Rockfill Dams: (a) Influence of Dam Height; (b)
Peak discharge (m 3 /s)

100000
Influence of Lake Volume
10000

1000
100
10
0.1
Fig. 8: Comparison of Peak Outflow Rates from Failure of
Landslide Dams and Earth and Rockfill Dams: (a) Influence of
Dam Height; (b) Influence of Lake Volume
The breaching duration of a landslide dam is generally
longer than that of a man-made dam with the same dam
height or lake volume, as shown in Fig. 9. The main reason
is that the volume and width of the landslide dam are
typically larger and the downstream slope is typically
gentler, which reduces the erosion velocity during
breaching. The breaching duration is statistically only
weakly related to the dam height as shown in Fig. 9(a). A
higher dam dose not definitely have a longer breaching
process, because the breach often does not develop to the
bottom of the dam. On average, the actual breaching
duration of landslide dams is 2.76 times of that predicted
using the equations for earth and rockfill dams.
In summary, the direct application of the prediction
models for man-made dams to landslide dams would lead
to overestimation of the peak outflow rate (by about 200%
using Xu and Zhang’s models) and underestimation of the
Landslide dams 5. RISK ASSESMENT AND MANAGEMENT
The procedure of general risk assessment has been described
by many researchers. In the case of dam failure risk
1 10 100 1000 10000
assessment, the following steps may be followed.
Lake volume (million m3) Information Collection and Observation
(b) When a dam is reported to be unsafe or a landslide dam
has just formed, it is necessary to set up an observation
plan to closely monitor the safety of the dam, including
but not limited to reservoir water level, inflow into the
reservoir, leakage from the dam, movements of the dam,
and the weather conditions.
At the same time, all necessary information required
for evaluating the structural safety of the dam and possible
consequences of failure should be collected. Such
information includes geologic profiles and the material
zoning within the dam, geotechnical properties of the dam
materials, the river network downstream the dam,
population distribution and statistics, land use, business
operations etc. If such information is not available then
necessary exploration or surveys are required.
Evaluation of Structural Safety of the Dam and
Possible Failure Modes
The structural safety of the dam giving expected loading
conditions should now be assessed. Reliability theory may
be a valuable tool in this step considering the high level of
uncertainties in the dam materials and loadings. For many
88 L.M. Zhang, M. Peng and Y. Xu

landslide dams, it is certain that these dams will be
overtopped at a later time. The questions are when will
overtopping occur and whether the dam will fail by piping
or not before the dam is overtopped. Risk mitigation
measures, such as the construction of division channels,
are usually very effective at an early stage.
Determination of Dam Breaching Parameters
In this stage, the possible breach size and the corresponding
dam breaching hydrograph should be estimated. It is
understandable that any estimates are associated with a high
level of uncertainty.
Flood Routing and Inundation Analysis
How the dam breaching flood travels along the down-stream
river should now be studied so that inundation zones can
be identified and the population to be affected by the flood
can be warned ahead of the arrival of the flood. Analysis
tools such as BREACH (Fread, 1988) and HEC-RAS
(Institute for Water Resources, 2008) are useful in
preliminary flood routing analysis.
All these measures are costly. Optimal decisions on
risk mitigation measures can be made through a cost-benefit
analysis.
6. EXAMPLE: BREACHIING OF TANGJIASHAN
LANDSLIDE DAM, SICHUAN, CHINA
Tangjiashan Landslide Dam, with a dam height of 82 -
124 m, a dam width of 612 m, a dam volume of 20.4 million
m3 and a reservoir capacity of 316 million m3, is the largest
landslide dam induced by the Ms 8.0 Wenchuan earthquake
in May 2008. The dam mainly consists of three layers of
soil and rock materials: gravelly soil 5 - 15 m in thickness,
strongly weathered cataclasite 10 - 15 m in thickness, and
weakly weathered cataclasite as shown in Fig. 10. The
gravelly soil and strongly weathered cataclasite are of
medium erodibility.
Spillway

Estimation of Risks 803m

The consequences of dam breaching floods can be divided Gravelly soil

Strongly weathered cataclasite
into four categories (Bonnard, 2009): 82m Weaklyweathered cataclasite

(1) Social Impact: Deaths and injuries in both body Breach

and mind. Bed rock

(2) Physical Impact: Direct impact as property loss

800
(e.g. buildings, lifelines, and vehicles). 740.0m
752.2 m
Gravelly soil
Elevation (m)

750

(3) Economic Impact (Indirect impacts): Primary 700

Strongly weathered cataclasite

Weakly weathered cataclasite

sector (e.g. agricultural and mining); secondary 650
Bedrock
sector (e.g. industrial and craft production), 600
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400

tertiary sector (e.g. service activities and trade). Distance (m)

Fig. 10: Cross section of Tangjiashan Landslide Dam: (a)

(4) Environmental Impact: Environmental loss like
forests, air, water, earth.
Accordingly, risks can be divided into four categories.
In each category, the total risk is the sum of the risks caused
by all possible events, and the risk in one event is the
product of the occurrence probability of the event and the
resulting consequence when this even occurs. The
assessment of the four categories of risks is rather difficult.
Particularly, one event may evolve over time and becomes
a disaster chain (Zhang 2009). An example has been
presented by Peng et al. (2010) to illustrate how the loss of
human life can be estimated.
Risk Mitigation Decision
Risks can be reduced by decreasing the probability of
failure of the dam (e.g. decreasing the loadings, i.e., use
of a division channel to decrease the reservoir volume
and in turns the dam breaching flood, or increasing the
resistance, i.e., strengthening the dam), or reducing the
elements at risk (e.g. evacuating the population
downstream the dam).
Across the River; (b) Along the River
The locations of seven towns downstream the dam are
shown in Fig. 11. The landslide dam is located at 3.5 km
upstream of Beichuan Town and about 85 km upstream of
Mianyang City. Mianyang City has a population of 1.2
millions. There was a public panic when such a large
landslide dam was found. Would the landslide dam break?
When would the dam break? How large would the breaching
flood be? How many people would be at risk? When should
the population at risk be warned? How did warning at
different times compare?
The Chinese Hydro-Police Corps excavated a division
channel, with a length of 475 m, a width of 25 m and a
depth of 12 m. The channel lowered the crest elevation
from 752 m to 740 m, and reduced the lake capacity from
316 million m3 to 247 million m3. The water level rose 740
m at 7:08 am on 7 June 2008 with an overtopping flow
rate of less than 1 m3/s. The dam finally breached on 10
June 2008. The outflow rate increased rapidly and the dam
breached in the early morning of 10 June: 497 m3/s at 7:42
Assessing Risks of Breaching of Earth Dams and Natural Landslide Dams 89

am, 2190 m3/s at 10:00 am, and 6500 m3/s (the peak outflow part of the original crest of the natural dam. In the second
rate) at 11:30 am. The water level decreased to 714.1 m at case, predictions of the breaching parameters are made
14:00 pm on 11 June from the maximum level of 743.1 m using the models for landslide dams shown in Table 3. In
at 1:30 am on 10 June. The corresponding lake volume the third case, predictions are made using the equations
decreased from 247 million m3 to 86 million m3. The final for earth and rockfill dams in Table 2. The mean values of
breach has a depth of 42 m, a top width of 145- 235 m and the breaching parameters for the three cases are presented
a bottom width of 80-100 m. in Table 4. As expected, the equations for earth dams grossly
overestimate the breach size and peak flow rate.
For simulating flood routing, 5303 cross sections are
used to represent the river downstream the dam, 26 of which
having detailed elevation and distance data (Liu 2008).
Manning’s roughness factor values for both the river
channel and the floodplains are taken from Chow (1959).
Figs. 12 and 13 show the flow processes at three locations
in the actual case and the medium edodibility case (the
second case). The peak flow rate in the second case is much
larger than that in the actual case and the breaching time
is slightly shorter than that in the actual case. One of the
reasons is that the lake elevation in the second case is
752 m, while it is 740 m in the actual case.
The flood travel time becomes shorter as the peak flow
rate increases. Thus, earlier warning is needed for larger
peak flow rate cases. The flood in Mianyang City takes
longer to fade due to the lower flow velocity there.
7000
Dam Site
Fig. 11: Flood Routing in the River Downstream Tangjisshan 6000 Tongkou Town
Mianyang City
Landslide Dam /s) 5000
3
Flo
4000
HEC-RAS 4.0 is used to simulate the dam breaching w
rat
3000
progression and flood routing in the downstream river. Dam e
(m
2000
breaks and dike breaks can be simulated using this program
1000
given such breaching parameters as breach size, breaching
0
duration, and breaching progression. 6/10 6/10 6/10 6/10 6/10 6/10 6/10 6/10 6/10 6/10 6/11 6/11 6/11
To simulate breaching progression, three cases are 5:00 7:00 9:00 11:00 13:00 15:00 17:00 19:00 21:00 23:00
Time
1:00 3:00 5:00

studied as shown in Table 4. In the real case, the dam

Fig. 12: Flow Rates in the Real Case
Table 4: Three Cases of Breaching Analyses
14000
Item Measured Full–variable Full–variable Dam site
12000 Tongkou Town
Values Equations for Equations for Mianyang City
Landslide Dams Earth Dams 10000
Flow rate (m3/s)

Weir elevation 8000

740 752 752
(m) 6000
Wt (m) 145-235 165.1 263.4
4000
Wb (m) 80-100 59.2 177.5
Hb (m) 30 37.1 68.4 2000

Qp (m3/s) 6500 12316 36574 0

Tb (h) 14 8.1 5.9 6/16 6/17
23:00 1:00
6/17
3:00
6/17
5:00
6/17
7:00
6/17 6/17 6/17 6/17 6/17 6/17 6/17 6/17
9:00 11:00 13:00 15:00 17:00 19:00 21:00 23:00

breached 47 hours (from 7:08 of June to around 6:00 am of Time

9 June) after the water level reached elevation 740 m (the
weir elevation of the discharge channel). While in the
second and third cases, no discharge channel is considered,
and it is assumed that the dam breaches 47 hours after the
water level reaches elevation 752 m, which is the lowest
Fig. 13: Flow Rates in the Medium Erodibility Case
Dekay and McClelland (1993) suggested a model to
calculate the loss of life caused by flooding based on a
regression analysis of casualty data in 29 flooding cases.
Three parameters, namely population at risk (PAR),
90 L.M. Zhang, M. Peng and Y. Xu

warning time (WT) and flood force, are used in the model: second largest city in Sichuan Province, with a peak flow
LOL = PAR /{1 + 13.277( PAR ) 0.440
EXP[0.759(WT ) − of 7110 m3/s at 17:18 of 10 June. There was not much
(1) damage to property in Mianyang City either, as the design
3.790( Force) + 2.223(WT )( Force)]}
flood standards are 10800 m3/s for 20-year returned floods,
where “Force” = the flood severity. Equation (1) may 13000 m3/s for 50-year returned floods, and 14600 m3/s
be simplified by substituting zero or 1.0 for Force. If the for 100-year returned floods (Liu 2008).
PAR is located in a canyon, where the floodwater is likely
One may ask what would have happened if no
to be very deep and swift, “Force” equals 1.0. On the other
engineering measures had been taken to lower the failure
hand, if the PAR is located on a plain, where the floodwater
is likely to be shallow and slow, Force equals zero. risk (e.g. excavation of the division channel) and the
population at risk had not been evacuated. To answer this
The value of PAR is not equal to the total population.
Only those who are exposed to a certain level of flood are question, the losses of life in three cases of assumed warning
considered as population at risk. In order to obtain PAR, a times are evaluated: warning at the start of breaching,
physically-based human-water interaction model (Lind et warning when the peak flow occurs at the dam site, and no
al. 2004) for human beings to stay stable in a flow is applied. warning at all. The results of loss of life in the three cases
In the model human beings may loss stability when the are shown in Tables 5 and 6. From the results in the two
product of water depth, h, and velocity, v, reaches a certain tables, the following observations can be made:
limit. Based on experimental data, Lind et al. (2004) (1) The PAR is very sensitive to the peak flow rate. It
obtained the critical conditions of hv to maintain human changes from 17312 people in the real case to
stability in water flow: (hv) cr ranges from 0.65 to 44809 people in the second case, and 232607
2.13 m2/s with a sample mean of 1.22 m2/s and a COV of people in the third case, with the peak flow rates
0.27. In the present study, the critical condition of human of 6526 m 3/s, 12316 m 3/s, and 36547 m 3/s,
stability is selected as 1.22 m2/s. Based on the results of respectively.
the inundation analysis, the PAR values in the real case (2) The LOL is very sensitive to the warning time. If
and the two assumed erodibility cases (see Table 4) are the warning time is sufficient, very limited LOL
shown in Tables 5 and 6. might occur, whereas the LOL becomes large if
Table 5: Loss of Lives in the Real Case with Different no warning time is available. In the real case, the
Warning Times Beichuan Town was severely flooded, but no
Warning at Start Warning When Peak No casualty was caused because the PAR was
Population PAR of Breach Flow Occurs at Dam Warning
Location
(Person) (Person) evacuated ahead of time.
WT LOL WT LOL WT LOL
(h) (person) (h) (person) (h) (person) (3) If there is no warning time, the fatality rate (LOL/
Beichuan 30000 14926 7.83 0 0.17 428 0 691
Tongkou 7300 0 8.67 0 1.00 0 0 0 PAR) could be over 5.3% even though a large
Hanzeng 10000 0 8.83 0 1.17 0 0 0
Qianlian 16300 903 9.33 0 1.67 1 0 129
number of people are located far away from the
Longfeng
Shima
15000
20500
1484
0
9.83
10.33
0
0
2.17
2.67
0
0
0
0
175
0
dam site and in low force (plain) areas.
Mianyang 1127000 0 10.67 0 3.00 0 0 0
Total 1226100 17312 0 430 996 7. CONCLUSIONS
Both man-made earth dams and natural landslide dams
Table 6: Loss of Lives in the Medium Erodibility Case with
pose enormous risks to the public because of the potentially
Different Warning Times
catastrophic floods generated by dam failures. This paper
Warning at Start Warning When Peak
No Warning
Population PAR of Breach Flow Occurs at Dam looks into three key issues in dam breaching risk
Location
(Person) (Person)
WT LOL WT LOL WT LOL assessment, namely failure modes and processes, breaching
(h) (Person) (h) (Person) (h) (Person)
Beichuan 30000 28619 4.83 0 0.08 792 0 1007
parameters, and flood risk assessment. The following
Tongkou
Hanzeng
7300
10000
1267
2294
5.50
5.83
0
0
0.67
1.00
24
13
0
0
159
229
conclusions can be drawn:
Qianlian
Longfeng
16300
15000
4498
4991
6.33
6.67
0
0
1.50
2.00
4
2
0
0
342
364
(1) Man-made earth and rockfill dams most
Shima 20500 3140 7.17 0 2.33 0 0 276 commonly failed by overtopping and piping,
Mianyang 1127000 0 7.50 0 2.50 0 0 0
Total 1226100 44809 0 835 2377 whereas over 90% landslide dams failed by
In the real case, no fatality was caused in the dam- overtopping. Landslide dams seldom failed by
breaching event because of early warning and mass piping (8% only).
evacuation, although the water level increased more than (2) Breaching parameters are key inputs for breaching
7 m at Beichuan Town. The flood arrived at Mianyang, the flood risk assessment. Separate equations have
Assessing Risks of Breaching of Earth Dams and Natural Landslide Dams
been developed for estimating the breaching
parameters of earth dam and landslide dams. Soil
erodibility is an important parameter that governs
the breaching process. The two types of dams differ
significantly. If the equations for man-made dams
are used for landslide dams, the peak flow rate
could be overestimated on average by nearly 200%
while the breaching duration could be
underestimated by about 60%.
(3) The population at risk and the flood travel time
are very sensitive to the peak flow rate. Early
warning is shown to be an effective way of risk
mitigation. If the warning time is sufficient, very
few casualties might be resulted, whereas the loss
of life may become large if no warning time is
available.
(4) Each step of dam risk assessment is highly
uncertain. The reliability of any estimate should
be aware of in making risk mitigation decisions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research reported in this paper was supported by the
Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong SAR (622207),
the National Science Foundation of China (50828901) and
the Ministry of Science and Technology (2009BAK56B05).
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