Calalang v Williams

GR No. 47800
December 2, 1940

FACTS:

1. Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works
promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal
Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic.

2. Among others, the petitioner Calalang, concerned citizen, aver that the rules and
regulations complained of:
 infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well
being and economic security of all people;
 and that it constitutes unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

HELD:
1. YES, it still promotes social justice. In enacting the said law, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare.

2. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy

towards any given group (e.g. the poor - because social justice is bringing the greatest
good to the greatest number, not necessarily just the poor like the drivers of the animal-
drawn vehicles).

3. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy

towards any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither
communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

Social justice:
 "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

 the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
saluspopuliestsupremalex.

 must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers

and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
 SIBAL V. NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Sibal was employed respondent, Notre Dame of Greater Manila, as a school nurse.
Her compensation covered a 12-month basis, although in actuality, she was not required to
work for Christmas and summer vacations.
2. Respondent’s director, Fr. Enrique Gonzales, requested on March 10, 1976, that she shorten
her summer vacation, to which petitioner acceded. Sometime in April 1980, respondent
Gonzales again requested petitioner to report during that summer period to help in the library.
Petitioner contested this, and stated that there should be a necessary change in the terms and
conditions of her contract. In November 1980, Fr. Garcia replaced Fr. Gonzales. Respondent
Garcia informed petitioner that she should report during the summer and which the petitioner
also contested that her contract did not require her to report for work during the summer.
Respondent Garcia failed to verify her allegation and thus petitioner filed for a leave of
absence extending till the class opening.
3. Petitioner Sibal was assigned to teach health sciences for the school year 1981-1982 after two
teachers of the health subject had left the school. Sibal was not given the compensation for the
extra workload as other teachers received earlier. She later received a 13th month pay that was
only computed within a 10-month period.
4. Respondent Garcia again required Sibal to report for the summer in 1982 to update the
medical records to which petitioner objected. Respondent Garcia replied that her work with
updating the records was imperative and that she was not entitled to extra work as teaching
was allegedly part of her regular program as a school nurse.
5. As she was repeatedly denied her requests, petitioner filed a complain for non-payment of the
following: (1) vacation pay for four summer months; (2) compensation for teaching health
subjects; and (3) deficiency in the 1981 13th-Month pay. The respondent received a summons
from the Court on the day of school opening and petitioner at the same time received a letter
of termination from the school. The school also submitted to the Ministry of Labor and
Employment the said termination. Petitioner later amended the complaint and added: (1)
illegal dismissal, and; (2) unfair labor practice. Fr. Garcia was later replaced after receiving
several complaints from different personnel.
6. The Labor Arbiter later rendered a decision that the petitioner subsequently filed a
memorandum of partial appeal. The NLRC later affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Thus petitioner filed this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the award of separation pay instead of reinstatement is the proper remedy
under the circumstances;
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to compensation for teaching health subjects; and
3. Whether or not unfair labor practice existed which would entitle petitioner to moral damages?
HELD: Petition GRANTED. Appealed decision of respondent NLRC is SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
1. The respondent NLRC erred in sustaining the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The petitioner is
entitled to compensation for teaching health subjects. Although the subject Health is allied to
her profession, teaching and administering to the health needs of students are two different
and distinct jobs.
2. The Solicitor General submitted a valid justification that states “Petitoner had been the
subject of discrimination for over a year before she was ultimately dismissed… Finally,
petitioner’s travails culminated in her unceremonious termination without due process…
Termination without due process is specifically prohibited by Rule XIV Section 1… “No
worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after
due process.” The acts employed by the respondent makes them liable for moral damages
under Arts. 1701, 2219 No. 10, and 2220 of the Civil Code.
3. The Cour therefore ordered the respondent to REINSTATE the petitioner to her former
position without loss of seniority rights and backwages for three (3) years from the time of
her illegal dismissal; to pay her the regular extra compensation…; and the pay her moral
damages which will be determined by the NLRC.
 Maternity Children’s Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor
G.R. No. 78909 June 30, 1989

Facts:

 Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the

Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado,
as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as
from paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro City government.
 Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the
employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their
respective salaries.
 On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different
capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor
and Employment, Region X,for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was
docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86.
 On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and Welfare
Officers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the allegations in
the complaints. Based on their inspection report and recommendation, the Regional
Director issued an Order dated August 4, 1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58,
representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's employees.
 Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon.
Augusto S. Sanchez, who rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the
said Order in that deficiency wages and ECOLAs should be computed only from May
23, 1983 to May 23, 1986.
 On October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the Secretary of Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of merit.

Issue:
 Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the extent
of coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and
enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code.

Held:
 This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as
amended by E.O. No. 111. Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both
visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered
to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee
relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer
concerned.
 Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules,
and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other
monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards
(Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional
Office, dated September 16,1987).
 ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as
regards all persons still employed in the Hospital at the time of the filing of the
complaint, but GRANTED as regards those employees no longer employed at that time.
 SSS Employee Asso.v CA
175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning
the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued
a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction
while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on
the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the
petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to
strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the
petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held:
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as
strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to
any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt.
employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as
“government employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with
an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of
injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court
for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
 Bernardo vs NLRC
GR 122917 07/03/99

Facts:
Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993
by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly
worded agreement called ‘Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they
are dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as
money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent
bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article
280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as “special
workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the
Bank.”[12] Rather, they were “special” workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.

Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.

Held:
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a
period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be
allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the
contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer,
the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and
renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily,
the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the
conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these
facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other
words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee
should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied
person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:

“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled person shall be denied access to
opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the
same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits,
fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.”

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment
contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of
qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which
provides:

“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, x xx”

“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable

connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular
business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one
year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated
and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular,
but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.”

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and
renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily,
the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the
conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these
facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other
words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business
of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for
more than six months.
Petition granted
 Salazar vs. Achacoso and Marquez
G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990
FACTS:

A complaint against the petitioner Salazar was filed for withholding the complainant’s PECC
Card, it was further alleged that Salazar did not posses a license to operate as a recruitment
agency. POEA through its Director on Licensing and Regulation, issued a warrant of arrest and
seizure against the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure is
valid?

HELD:

Under the new Constitution, "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It is only a judge who may issue
warrants of search and arrest." Mayors may not exercise this power. Neither may it be done by a
mere prosecuting body. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process.