Flores vs.
Drilon
G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of
R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under
which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of
Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this case.
Paragraph (d) reads
(d) Chairman administrator —
The President shall appoint a
professional manager as
administrator of the Subic
Authority with a compensation
to be determined by the Board
subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Budget, who shall
be the ex oficio chairman of
the Board and who shall serve
as the chief executive officer
of the Subic Authority:
Provided, however, That for
the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this Act,
the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be appointed
as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic
Authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par.
(d), of R.A. 7227 is constitutional.
RULING:
The proviso violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts.
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution
provides:
No elective official
shall be eligible for
appointment or designation
in any capacity to any public
office or position during his
tenure.
Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his
position, no appointive
official shall hold any other
office or employment in the
Government or any
subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned
or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.
In the case at bar, the subject proviso
directs the President to appoint an elective official,
i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government posts (as Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is
precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks
to prevent, there is not doubt to conclude that the
proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of
the Constitution.
In any case, the view that an elective official
may be appointed to another post if allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the
clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2)
paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.
While the second paragraph authorizes holding of
multiple offices by an appointive official when
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, the first paragraph appears to be more
stringent by not providing any exception to the rule
against appointment or designation of an elective
official to the government post, except as are
particularly recognized in the Constitution itself.
The appointment of Gordon as Chairman of
the SBMA is null. However, despite his appointment
to the said office, Gordon did not automatically
forfeit his seat as Mayor of Olongapo City.
Where, as in the case of respondent
Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,
notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other
government posts, he does not automatically forfeit
his elective office nor remove his ineligibility
imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since
an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the
appointive position, his appointment or designation
thereto cannot be valid in view of his
disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision
should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the
Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may hold any other office
or employment in the Government . . . during his
term without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The difference
between the two provisions is significant in the
sense that incumbent national legislators lose their
elective posts only after they have been appointed
to another government office, while other
incumbent elective officials must first resign their
posts before they can be appointed, thus running
the risk of losing the elective post as well as not
being appointed to the other post.
As incumbent elective official, respondent
Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position
of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of
SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to
a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of
Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not
necessarily null and void; he may be considered a
de facto officer who may retain the benefits he may
receive from the position he may have assumed.
Marquez v. COMELEC
April 8, 1995; G.R. No. 112889
Ponente: Vitug, J.
Facts:
The petitioner, Bienvenido Marquez, is a defeated
candidate for the elective position in the Province
of Quezon in the May 11, 1992 elections. Before the
elections, the petitioner filed a petition for
cancellation against the private respondent,
Eduardo Rodriguez, before the COMELEC. The
petition was raised based on the allegation that the
candidacy of Rodriguez should be denied as it is in
violation of Section 40 (e) of the Local Government
Code which states that:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political
cases here or abroad(.)
It is raised that at the time Rodriguez filed his CoC, a
criminal charge against him for insurance fraud or
grand theft of personal property was pending
before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles,
California, USA. The COMELEC dismissed the
petition. On May 29, 1992, Rodriguez was
proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Marquez
then instituted quo warranto proceedings against
Rodriguez but was also denied by the COMELEC.
Hence, the filing of petition for certiorari in this
case.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodriguez should be disqualified
from holding an elective local office for facing a
criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a
warrant for his arrest making him a “fugitive from
justice” as it is in violation of Section 40(e) of RA
7160.
Held:
Yes. While the Court agrees with the private
respondent that construction placed upon law by
officials in charge of its enforcement should be
given with great and considerable weight, it
however ruled that when there clearly is no
obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must
merely be made to apply as it is so written. An
administrative rule or regulation can neither expand
nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to
it. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather
clear and it disqualifies a "fugitive from justice"
which includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.
Therefore, Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991,
to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive
from justice" to refer only to a person "who has
been convicted by final judgment." is an inordinate
and undue circumscription of the law.
MERCADO vs. MANZANO
307 SCRA 630
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado, private respondent
Eduardo B. Manzano and Gabriel V. Daza III were
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections were Manzano garnered
the highest votes. The proclamation of private
respondent was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain
Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but
of the United States.
In its resolution, the Second Division of the
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that
he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position. Private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration which remained pending even
until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to the resolution of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the
votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification which was opposed by private
respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, the
COMELEC enbanc rendered its resolution reversing
the ruling of its Second Division and declared
private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor
of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Thus, the board of canvassers proclaimed private
respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
Petitioner filed this instant petition for certiorari
seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC enbanc and to declare private respondent
disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of
Makati City.
ISSUE:
Whether Manzano is qualified to hold office as Vice
Mayor.
HELD:
YES. The filing of the certificate of candidacy is
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner’s
contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondent’s certificate of candidacy is
insufficient to constitute renunciation of his
American citizenship. Equally without merit is
petitioner’s contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private
respondent reaching the age of majority since no
law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to
be made upon majority age.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of
candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not
a permanent resident or immigrant of another
country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
mental reservation, private respondent has, as far
as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.
CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of
plaintiff Irene Sto. Domingo and father of the
litigating minors, died and buried was buried in Lot
No. 159, Block No. 194 of the North Cemetery
which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto.
Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6,
2021 per official recept dated June 6, 1971 with an
expiry date of June 6, 2021 . Full payment of the
rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by the said
receipt which appears to be regular on its face.
Apart from the aforementioned receipt, no other
document was executed to embody such lease over
the burial lot in question.
In accordance with Administrative Order No. 5,
Series of 1975 of the City Mayor of Manila
prescribing uniform procedure and guidelines in the
processing of documents pertaining to and for the
use and disposition of burial lots and plots within
the North Cemetery, etc., subject Lot No. 159 of
Block 194 in which the mortal remains of the late
Vivencio Sto. Domingo were laid to rest, was leased
to the bereaved family for five (5) years only,
subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as
ready for exhumation.
On the basis of such certification, the authorities of
the North Cemetery then headed by defendant
Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and
removal from subject burial lot the remains of the
late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., placed the bones
and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the
depository or bodega of the cemetery.
Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented
out to another lessee so that when the plaintiffs
herein went to said lot on All Souls Day in their
shock, consternation and dismay that the resting
place of their dear departed did not anymore bear
the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the
tomb.
Irene Sto. Domingo was informed that she can look
for the bones of her deceased husband in the
warehouse of the cemetery where the exhumed
remains from the different burial lots of the North
Cemetery are being kept until they are retrieved by
interested parties. According to her, it was just
impossible to locate the remains of her late
husband in a depository containing thousands upon
thousands of sacks of human bones. She did not
want to run the risk of claiming for the wrong set of
bones. She was even offered another lot but was
never appeased.
ISSUE: Whether the operations and functions of a
public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate
or proprietary function of the City of Manila.
HELD: Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a
political body corporate and as such endowed with
the faculties of municipal corporations to be
exercised by and through its city government in
conformity with law, and in its proper corporate
name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be
contracted with. Its powers are twofold in
character-public. Governmental powers are those
exercised in administering the powers of the state
and promoting the public welfare and they include
the legislative, judicial, public and political.
Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for
the special benefit and advantage of the community
and include those which are ministerial, private and
corporate. In McQuillin on Municipal Corporation,
the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation
proper has ... a public character as regards the state
at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and
private (so called) insofar as it is to promote local
necessities and conveniences for its own
community. In connection with the powers of a
municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its
public or governmental capacity, and private or
proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides
such properties into property for public use and
patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further
enumerates the properties for public use as
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and
public works for public service paid for by said
provisions, cities or municipalities, all other
property is patrimonial without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws.
Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared
that with respect to proprietary functions the
settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be
held liable to third persons ex contractu.
The Court further stressed:
The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or
employer must answer civilly for the negligence or
want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or
line of his employment, by which another who is
free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal
corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall
within tile operation of this rule of law, and are
liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when
the requisite elements of liability co-exist.
The Court added:
... while the following are corporate or proprietary
in character, viz: municipal waterworks, slaughter
houses, markets, stables, bathing establishments,
wharves, ferries and fisheries. Maintenance of
parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports among
others, are also recognized as municipal or city
activities of a proprietary character. (Dept. of
Treasury v. City of Evansvulle, Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60
N.E. 2nd 952, 954 cited in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra)
Under the foregoing considerations and in the
absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila which
was created by resolution of the Municipal Board of
August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904. The
administration and government of the cemetery are
under the City Health Officer (Ibid., Sec. 3189), the
order and police of the cemetery (Ibid., See. 319),
the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the
exhuming of remains, and the purification of the
same (Ibid., Sec. 327) are under the charge and
responsibility of the superintendent of the
cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore
prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use
and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the
North Cemetery through Administrative Order No.
5, s. 1975 (Rollo, p. 44). With the acts of dominion,
there is, therefore no doubt that the North
Cemetery is within the class of property which the
City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private
character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the
burial lot was leased in favor of the private
respondents. Hence, obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed
by the lessor and lessee remains as the law
between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual
provision entitles the other party to damages even
if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the
contract.
Under the doctrine of respondent superior,
petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious act
committed by its agents who failed to verify and
check the duration of the contract of lease. The
contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is
covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of
1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for
five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is
not meritorious for the said administrative order
covers new leases. When subject lot was certified
on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the
lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full
force and effect.
ANDAYA and EDGARDO L. INCIONG, petitioners,
vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT G.R. No. 126661.
December 3, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Andaya is the Regional Director of the
Regional Police while Inciong is the Regional
Director of the NPC. The position of City Director,
Cebu City Police Command (Chief of Police) became
vacant. Petitioner Andaya submitted to the City
Mayor, Cebu City a list of 5 eligibles for the mayor
to choose one to be appointed as the chief of police
of Cebu City. The mayor did not choose anyone
from the list of 5 recommendees because the name
of P/Chief Inspector Andres Sarmiento was not
included therein.
Petitioner Andaya refused to agree to Mayor Alvin
B. Garcia’s request to include the name of Major
Andres Sarmiento in the list of police officers for
appointment by the mayor to the position of City
Director (chief of police), Cebu City Police
Command. Petitioner Andaya’s refusal was based
on his contention that Major Andres Sarmiento was
not qualified for the position under NAPOLCOM MC
No. 95-04 specifically No. 8 thereof which provides
that the minimum qualification standards for
Directors of Provincial/City Police
Commands, include completion of the Officers
Senior Executive Course (OSEC) and the rank of
Police Superintendent. Due to the said impasse, the
City of Cebu filed with the RTC a complaint against
petitioner Andaya and Inciong.
Petitioners aver Sec. 51 of RA 6975 which which
only empowers the mayor to choose one (1) from
the five (5) eligibles recommended by the Regional
Police Director to be named chief of police. The
mayor cannot superimpose his will on the
recommending authority by insisting that his
protégé be included in the list of five eligibles from
which the chief of police is to be chosen.
ISSUE/s:
- W/N a mayor can require the Regional
Director to include the name of an officer in the list
of eligibles to be submitted to him (NO)

HELD:
It is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director
to name the five (5) eligibles for the position of
chief of police from a pool of eligible officers
screened by the Senior Officers Promotion and
Selection Board, Headquarters, Philippine National
Police, Camp Crame, Quezon City, without
interference from local executives. – Under
Republic Act No. 6975, Section 51, the mayor of
Cebu City shall be deputized as representative of
the Commission (National Police Commission) in his
territorial jurisdiction and as such the mayor shall
have authority to choose the chief of police from a
list of five (5) eligibles recommended by the Police
Regional Director. The City Police Station of Cebu
City is under the direct command and control of the
PNP Regional Director, Regional Police Command
No. 7, and is equivalent to a provincial office. Then,
the Regional Director, Regional Police Command
No. 7 appoints the officer selected by the mayor as
the City Director, City Police Command (chief of
police) Cebu City. It is the prerogative of the
Regional Police Director to name the five (5)
eligibles from a pool of eligible officers screened by
the Senior Officers Promotion and Selection Board,
Headquarters, Philippine National Police, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, without interference from
local executives. In case of disagreement between
the Regional Police Director and the Mayor, the
question shall be elevated to the Regional Director,
National Police Commission, who shall resolve the
issue within five (5) working days from receipt and
whose decision on the choice of the Chief of Police
shall be final and executory.
As deputy of the National Police Commission, the
authority of the mayor is very limited – in reality, he
has no power of appointment, and has only the
limited power of selecting one from among the list
of five eligibles to be named the chief of police. -
Actually, the power to appoint the chief of police of
Cebu City is vested in the Regional Director,
Regional Police Command No. 7.
The mayor can not require the Regional Director,
Regional Police Command, to include the name of
any officer, no matter how qualified, in the list of
five to be submitted to the mayor. The purpose is to
enhance police professionalism and to isolate the
police service from political domination.
[G.R. No. 125955. June 19, 1997]
WILMER GREGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents.
FACTS:
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his
position as Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of serious
misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged
by a certain Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco
ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second
District of the City of Manila. He won and assumed
office for three terms during the Elections of
January 18, 1988; May 11,1992 and ,May 8, 1995.
His right to office remain contested.
On May 13, 1995, petitioner Grego, filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for
Bascos disqualification, for the suspension of his
proclamation. Petitioner argues that Basco should
be disqualified from running for any elective
position since he had been removed from office as a
result of an administrative case pursuant to Section
40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code (the Code), which took
effect on January 1, 1992. Petitioner submits that
although the Code took effect only on January 1,
1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given
retroactive effect and applied to Bascos dismissal
from office which took place in 1981.
Respondent contends that Section 4[0] par. B of the
Local Government Code may not be validly applied
to persons who were dismissed prior to its
effectivity. To do so would make it ex post facto, bill
of attainder, and retroactive legislation which
impairs vested rights. It is also a class legislation and
unconstitutional on the account.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No.
7160 applies retroactively to those removed from
office before it took effect on January 1, 1992
HELD:
No. It is a settled issue that Section 40(b) of RA No
7160 does not have any retroactive effect. Statutes
are not to be construed as intended to have a
retroactive effect so as to affect pending
proceedings, unless such intent is expressly
declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the
language of the enactment. There is no provision in
the statute which would clearly indicate that the
same operates retroactively.
Borja vs COMELEC
GR 133495, September 3, 1998
Facts:
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected
vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a
term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989,
he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the
death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next
two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was
again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed
a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros
relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner
Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for
mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the
theory that the latter would have already served as
mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998
and would therefore be ineligible to serve for
another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections
ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private
respondent Capco disqualified from running for
reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for
reconsideration, majority overturned the original
decision.
Issue:
WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms
as Mayor?
Held:
No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides
that “…the term of office of elective local officials…
…shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.”
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that
“…no local elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected….”
The term served must therefore be one “for which
[the official concerned] was elected.” The purpose
of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of
the limitation on the number of terms an elective
official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a
term for which he was elected because he is simply
continuing the service of the official he succeeds,
such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term not withstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC
September 26, 1996; G.R. No. 125416
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Facts:
The Congress enacted on March 13, 1992 The Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992 (RA 7227)
for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone
(SSEZ). The said act also created the SBMA
(petitioner herein) to implement the declared
national policy of converting the Subic military
reservation into alternative productive uses. An
allocated budget of 20 billion was subscribed and
paid by RP to cover under the petitioner all lands
referred to under section 12 of RA 7227. Section 12
of RA 7227 states that:
Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. - Subject to
the concurrence by resolution of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipalities of Subic,
Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a
Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of
the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic,
Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the
Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as
embraced, covered and defined by the 1947
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines
and the United States of America as amended, and
within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of
Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special
Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be
delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the
President of the Philippines.
On November 24, 1992, the petitioner commenced
the implementation of its task when the American
Navy turned over the Subic military reservation to
the Philippine government. The Sangguniang Bayan
of Morong expressed its absolute concurrence upon
passing Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye
1993. However, private respondents herein
proposed the nullification of such act and proposed
conditions that should have been implemented
prior to Sangguniang Bayan of Morong’s absolute
concurrence. The latter acted upon the petition of
respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et al. by
promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye
1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to
amend certain provisions of R.A. No. 7227. The
private respondents, not satisfied with the act of
the said Sangguniang Bayan, resorted to their
power of initiative under Section 122 of the Local
Government Code.
The COMELEC denied the private respondents
petition for local initiative (Comelec Resolution No.
93-1623) stating that the subject thereof is a
RESOLUTION and not an ORDINANCE. Private
respondents instituted a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the Court against COMELEC to
set aside such resolution of the latter. On June 27,
1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed
Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and
guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum
proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan". On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition
contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 and
alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is intent
on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes
an amendment of a national law.”
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and
implementing Resolution No. 2848.
2) Whether or not the questioned local
initiative covers a subject within the powers of the
people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such
initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law.”
Held:
1) Yes. The process started by private
respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent
Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM
only. In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum
Act,[12] Congress differentiated one term from the
other, thus:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election
called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the
people through a proposition sent to Congress or
the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to courts may decide only actual controversies, not
approve or reject a legislation through an election hypothetical questions or cases.
called for the purpose. It may be of two classes,
namely: In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court
has authority to review Comelec Resolution No.
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse
petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part of discretion. However, it does not have the same
thereof, passed by Congress; and authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a has not been promulgated or approved, or passed
petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections
legislative bodies. itself has made no reviewable pronouncements
about the issues brought by the pleadings. The
It must be considered in this case that while Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in
initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is
referendum is begun and consented to by the law- really no decision or action made
making body. Initiative is a process of law-making
by the people themselves without the participation
and against the wishes of their elected
representatives, while referendum consists merely
of the electorate approving or rejecting what has
been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body.
Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative
are understandably more complex than in a
referendum where expectedly the voters will simply
write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself,
akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people,
hence the respondent Commission cannot control
or change the substance or the content of
legislation

2) No. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires

because the municipal resolution is still in the
proposal stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal

stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the
people reject it, then there would be nothing to
contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the
people have voted for it and it has become an
approved ordinance or resolution that rights and
obligations can be enforced or implemented
thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and
the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere
conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking,