Paul Stewart

PHI 375 Sec 001

Short Paper 2

April 30, 2012

Kant You Lie to Chainsaw McGraw?

In the ethical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, moral principles are considered to be categorical

imperatives, or absolute, unconditional requirements of behavior regardless of personal circumstances,

goals, or ends. But the absolute nature of these requirements, irrespective as they are of circumstances,

can potentially leave followers of Kant's ethical philosophy facing a dilemma when dealing with evil.

Christine Korsgaard explores this type of dilemma, finding in particular that deception can be found to

be morally permissible under certain circumstances, and that the maxim for that action can be willed as

a universal law without a contradiction in conception, according to Kant's Formula of Universal Law.

However, under Kant's Formula of Humanity, Korsgaard finds that deception is not permissible, a

result that stems from the ideal nature of his philosophy.

Consider the following scenario: Several months ago my roommate provided testimony at the

trial of the infamous serial killer Chainsaw McGraw. Recently, Chainsaw McGraw escaped custody and

is now at my front door disguised as a police officer. McGraw asks me if my roommate is at home.

However, I recognize McGraw, although he is unaware of my amazing powers of observation. It is

perfectly reasonably for me to suspect that McGraw plans to viciously murder my roommate, and

perhaps myself as well. Kant's Formula of Universal Law states “Act only in accordance with that

maxim through which you can at the same time that it become a universal law.” If everyone lied to

achieve a desired set of circumstances, according to Kant, a contradiction in conception arises: the

reliability of language would be completely undermined because no one would have any reason to

believe anything anyone else said. Since the maxim “I always lie to achieve a desired set of
circumstances” can't be willed as a universal law, lying to achieve a desired set of circumstances would

be considered immoral. If I lied to Chainsaw McGraw in order to save my roommate and myself from

being murdered, according to Kant I would be acting immorally because of the contradiction-in-

conception that my maxim incurs.

However, Korsgaard reaches a different conclusion than Kant because of the special nature of

these particular circumstances. While it is true, in general, that if everyone lied to achieve a desired set

of circumstances, the act of lying would undermine everyone's ability to lie, but the case of Chainsaw

McGraw at the door involves extraordinary circumstances. If the maxim is “I will lie about the location

of my roommate when murderers are at the door asking where my roommates are in order to save the

life of of my roommate” and I will that to be a universal maxim, “In every case where a murderer is at

the door asking about the location of a roommate, people will lie to save the roommate's life” then

McGraw would have no reason to believe anything he asked of me, provided that he was aware that I

knew who he was. But as Korsgaard points out, “a murderer who expects to conduct his business by

asking questions must suppose that you do not know who he is and what he has in mind.” There is

already deception at play on the part of McGraw, and so long as he doesn't realize that I've seen

through his deception, I can will my maxim to be universal without running into a contradiction in

conception, because my ability to deceive McGraw is not undermined unless he has a reason to believe

that I am aware of who he is.

On the other hand, the application of Kant's Formula of Humanity leads to a different outcome.

The Formula of Humanity can be expressed as “Act that you use humanity, whether in your own person

or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means,” where

“humanity” is defined as rational agency, or the ability to set goals and formulate plans to achieve

them. “Means” only have derived or extrinsic value, whereas “ends” have intrinsic value. If the way

we treat a person involves some maxim which they could not, in principle, give consent, then we would

be treating that person as having value only so far as that maxim was concerned; Korsgaard asserts that
“the question of whether another can assent to your way of acting can serve as a criterion for judging

whether you are treating her as a mere means.” Ultimately, deception is one of two fundamental

(although by no means the only) ways in which the Formula of Humanity can be violated. If Chainsaw

McGraw appears at my door asking after my roommate and I knowingly give him false information, no

matter what my motive is in doing so, with respect to the Formula of Humanity I have not given

McGraw a chance to assent to my way of acting, namely, the chance to assent to my deception. By

Kant's Formula of Humanity, it is never morally permissible to lie under any circumstances whatsoever

because doing intrinsically involves bypassing a person's ability to consent to being deceived. If a

person does consent to being deceived, then the contradiction arises: If a person knows he is being

deceived, then the deception has no ability whatsoever to achieve its end except what the victim of

deception gives it. He is not then, as Korsgaard points out, accepting the end the deceiver had in mind,

but one of his own, so the nature of the transaction has changed entirely.

Fundamentally, the idea of rational agency is that human beings each have the capacity to

reason for themselves what they will choose to believe, to think and to do. Any disruption of the ability

to make a personal choice involves treating that choice, or the goals of that person, as having no value.

Treating the goals of another person as having no value means regarding the rational agency of that

person as having no value. This is the basis for why deception and coercion are the two primary means

by which rational agency can be treated as having no value. Chainsaw McGraw, as a human being, has

a rational agency which has led him, through his own process of choice and reasoning, to desiring to

kill my roommate, and if I attempt to change his choice by deception or coercion then I am not

assigning any value whatsoever to his rational agency. By Kant's formula of Humanity, I can try to

appeal to Chainsaw McGraw's rational agency, but I cannot bypass it and act morally, no matter that

my motives for doing may be virtuous.

Kant believed each formulation of the categorical imperative was equivalent. However, in this

case the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity appear to say two different things. In
the case of the Formula of Universal Law, Korsgaard points out that willing the maxim as a universal

law is continent upon an act of deception already taking place, so that the maxim isn't necessarily

universal and only applies in special circumstances. With respect to the Formula of Humanity,

McGraw's act of deception uses me as a mere means, a condition to which I do not necessarily have to

passively submit myself to. As Kant himself wrote, “as men are malicious, it cannot be denied that to

be punctiliously truthful is often dangerous...if I cannot save myself by maintaining silence, then my lie

is a weapon of defense.” It isn't necessarily true that the two formulations then are coming to two

different conclusions about what is morally permissible. It is important to realize that Kant's categorical

imperative is based upon an ideal of human relationships and interactions. According to Korsgaard,

“morality itself sometimes allows or even requires us to do something that from an ideal perspective is

wrong,” such as using deception to save a roommate from a serial killer, or refraining from deception

and thus allowing a murder to take place-- I have already been put into a position where I am being

treated as a mere means so that any choice I might therefore make has been corrupted by Chainsaw

McGraw.