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Internal and External Conflict and Violence: Cross-Cultural Evidence and a New Analysis
Author(s): Marc Howard Ross

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), pp. 547-579
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Internal and External Conflict
and Violence
CROSS-CULTURAL EVIDENCE
AND A NEW ANALYSIS
MARC HOWARD ROSS

Department of Political Science
Bryn Mawr College
A general theory of conflict and violence (Ross, forthcoming) can help in understand-
ing the relationship between internal and external conflict. Looking at a sample of 90 pre-
industrial societies supports the proposition that the two have a moderate, positive
relationship. More important, however, the analysis identifies conditions under which the
two forms of political conflict are associated, and those under which they are differenti-
ated. The strengthand patternsof cross-cutting ties are very different in societies in which
internal and external conflict covary and societies in which internal and external conflict
are independent. Similarly, the structuralfeatures of society are central determinants of
whether targets of overt aggression are within a society, located outside it, or both. Finally,
dispositional (psychocultural) characteristics found in a society are the best predictors of
overall conflict levels, but are not useful in distinguishing between internal and external
targets. In the conclusion the elements of a general theory of conflict involving both struc-
tural and dispositional considerations are elaborated.
Any new publication on an already well-researched topic mustjus-

tify its existence by reconciling old theoretical controversies or present-
ing new evidence. I claim (modestly, of course) to do both with respect to
the relationship between internal and external conflict. New evidence
comes from data coded from ethnographicreports on a worldwide sam-
ple of 90 pre-industrialsocieties. My theoreticalcontributionis an articu-
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Support for this article was provided by a grant from the National
Science FoundationAnthropology Program (BNS82-0338 1). An earlier version was pre-
sented to the annual meeting of the Society for Cross-CulturalResearch in Boulder, Colo-
rado, February 1984.
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 29 No. 4, December 1985 547-579

? 1985 Sage Publications, Inc.
547

548 JO URNA L OF CONFLI'CT RESOL UTION
lation of those conditions under which internaland external violence are

related, and those conditions under which the two forms of violence are
independent.
Nation-states provide the basis for most studies in this area. Small-
scale, pre-industrialsocieties, typically studied by anthropologists, pro-
vide a data base for the dynamics of conflict behavior. Any theory of
politics, after all, ought to consider the human experience in the kinds of
societies in which humans have lived during almost all of our evolution-
ary history (Friedrich and Horwitz, 1968). If we can achieve validation
for contemporarytheories from these very different societies, then this
strengthenstheir credibility; if the theories are refuted, then we may need
to consider more fully the ways in which historical and social conditions
limit their application.
Like other recent studies, my results show that there is a positive cor-
relation between internaland external conflict in the pre-industrialsoci-
eties under study (Stohl, 1980). However, the way in which the two are
relateddiffers systematically across the cases. Societies in which internal
and externalconflict are highly associated-which we call generalizers-
are structurallyless integrated and less complex than those societies-
which we call differentiators-in which internal and external conflict
levels are very different. Second, lower internal integration and com-
plexity also distinguish societies that have relatively lower external, than
internal, conflict levels. Third, psychocultural dispositions, acquired
throughsocialization, affect the overall level of conflict a society engages
in, while the structuralfeaturesof a society determine whether the targets
for conflict and violence will be internal, external, or both. In the final
section we consider questions that this theoretical perspective raises and
its extension beyond the pre-industrialsocieties studied here.
WHAT IS TO BE EXPLAINED?
My emphasis here is on the conditions under which internaland exter-

nal conflict are closely associated and those under which they are inde-
pendent. Before addressing this question directly, it is useful to quickly
review existing studies, which suggest at least three different answers to
the question of how internaland externalconflict and violence are related
(Stohl, 1980).
A commonly held view is that internaland external conflict are nega-
tively related, either because outside enemies internallyunite a society or

Ross / CROSS-CULTURAL EVIDENCE 549
because internallydivided societies cannot risk outside conflicts (LeVine

and Campbell, 1972: 43-59). Frequentlyunderlying this argumentis the
drive-discharge or displacement hypothesis that considers alternative
targets of aggression functionally equivalent. In the ethnographiclitera-
ture, the often cited relationship between matrilocality (taking up resi-
dence with the bride's family), relative internal peace, and frequent
external warfare (Ember and Ember, 1971; Divale, 1974; LeVine and
Campbell, 1972) is explained in these terms (Murphy, 1957). The disper-
sion of men, Murphy argues, discourages internal conflict because it
would pit male fighters against their close relatives, but it encourages
fighting externally to discharge the high tension built up in a society.
Vayda (1961), writing about warfare among swidden agriculturalists,
also suggests that internal peace serves as a mechanism for external ex-
pansion. Sahlins (1961) suggests that the ability of segmentary lineage
systems to form internal alliances makes them particularly effective in
external conflicts. Referringto internationalbehavior, Haas and Whiting
(1956) argue that in terms of domestic stress, elites may use a real or
alleged outside threat to seek internal unity. In his review of empirical
studies in internationalrelations however, Stohl (1980) could only find
one small study providing empirical evidence for this position.
A second view is that internal and external conflicts are essentially in-
dependent. Structuraltheories of conflict typically identify very different
forces responsible for each form of violence and conflict and predict that
there will be little connection between the two. Looking at a sample of
traditional societies, Otterbein, for example, found no correlation be-
tween a society's internaland externalwar scores (1968: 286)'. Rummel
(1963) and Tanter (1966) factor analyzed a number of domestic and for-
eign conflict behaviors for 77 nations and produced separate factors for
each. When they regressed one upon the other, the two forms of conflict
were only weakly related, and Rummel (1968) argued that each was ex-
plained separately.
Probablythe best empirical supportexists for the position that internal
and externalconflict are positively associated. Psychologically, the argu-
ment rests on the mechanisms of generalization and habituation. Indi-
viduals and groups develop characteristicways of behavingtowardothers
and these patterns are found in relationships with those both inside and
outside their society (LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Sipes, 1975). Em-
pirical research in modern nations has produced a variety of studies that
I. In a later article Otterbein says that different forms of violent conflict are related
(1977: 697).

550 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
show a positive association between internaland externalconflict, at least

under certain conditions. A number of people have criticized Rummel
and Tanterfor consistently interpretingtheir modest correlationas show-
ing no connection (Stohl, 1980). Hass (1965) and Hazelwood (1973)
show thatdomestic stress is associated with externalconflict and warfare.
When Wilkenfeld reanalyzed Rummel and Tanter's data with time lags,
the connections between certain dimensions of internaland external con-
flict increased (1968; 1973). Hazelwood, Wilkenfeld (1973), and
Wilkenfeld and Zinnes (1973) find that the over-time correlations be-
tween internal and external conflict differ by type of political system.
Collins (1973), presentingdatafromjust one region of the world, Africa,
finds that domestic and foreign conflict can be highly related to each
other.
Internal and External Violence

in a Cross-Cultural Sample
Elsewhere we have presented a multiple regression model of internal

and externalconflict using data from 90 small scale, traditionalsocieties
(Ross, forthcoming), which is shown in Table 1 below. The sample is half
the societies in Murdockand White's (1969) standardcross-cultural sam-
ple and is listed in Appendix 1. It was used for three major reasons: (1)
anthropologists recognize its representativeness through careful sam-
pling of the major subregions and cultural groups in the pre-industrial
world; (2) the sample societies are sufficiently distinct and distant from
one another so that diffusion, or Galton's Problem (Naroll, 1973; Ross
and Homer, 1976) does not pose a plausible rival explanation for the
results; and (3) published codes for these societies are readily available
on a large number of economic, social structural,and socialization vari-
ables (Barry and Schlegel, 1980). Our own coding efforts, therefore,
could focus on political variables. Ross (1983) contains greater detail on
the sample, the coding procedures, and questions of reliability.
A factor analysis of 36 of the political variables produced five dimen-
sions, two of which are the focus of our attention here-internal and ex-
ternal conflict and violence. The specific variables associated with each
dimension, and their factor loadings, are listed in Appendix 2. Scales
created from each dimension are the sum of the scores of the variables
after they have been standardizedand weighted by their squared factor
loading. The internal conflict scale measures hostility and violence in-

cluding warfare within and between communities of the same society,

whereas the external conflict scale measures hostility and violence in-
cluding warfaredirected at other societies.
The regression models developed to explain differences between soci-
eties on these two dimensions considered both structural and disposi-
tional (psychocultural) roots of violence. The structural factors are
patterns of social or economic organization in a society that might pro-
mote or inhibit either internalor externalconflict. The dispositional vari-
ables are socialization practices that lay the groundwork both for adult
personalities and for the kinds of interpersonal relationships found in a
society involving self-concepts and views of others thatprovide a motiva-
tional basis for cooperative and conflictual behavior (for greater elabora-
tion see Ross, forthcoming).
The regression results (Table 1) show a common set of dispositional
variables associated with both internaland external violence, and differ-
ent sets of structuralfeaturesof these societies associated with each form
of violence. All the dispositional variablespredict both forms of conflict,
in the same direction and with somewhat the same magnitude. The effect
of the structuralvariables is quite different. Although there are particular
structuralvariablesassociated with either internalor externalconflict, no
structuralvariable is relatedto both in the same direction at a statistically
significant level. The magnitude of the structuraleffects differs by form
of conflict, and in a few cases the sign shifts too. (Appendix 3 contains the
specific definitions and sources for the independentvariables used here.)
The results involving dispositional variables show that societies with
child rearing practices that are low in affection, harsh, and that promote
male gender identity conflict are high on both internaland external vio-
lence. Structurally, internal violence is associated with weak cross-
cutting ties within a society; it is higher in decentralized societies with
strong groupings of coresident related males having common interests;
and it is weakly associated with polygyny. In contrast, external conflict is
positively associated with socioeconomic complexity; and among uncen-
tralized societies it is higher where there is high local-community inter-
marriage, and where cross-cutting ties in the society are strong.
2. In several situations, which are not the focus of attention here, the structuralvari-
able only has a significant impact on conflict behavior among the decentralized societies in
the sample. For a theoretical justification see LeVine and Campbell (1972: 48-49) and
Ross (forthcoming). To measure this effect the variable's score for a society is multiplied
by a dummy variable scored "1" for decentralized societies, those in which there is no
effective political authority beyond the local community, and '"O"for centralized cases.
The raw scores on this variable come from Tuden and Marshall (1972).

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Furthermore, there is a tendency for polygyny to be low in high external

conflict societies and such societies are more likely to be matrilocal. We
present these results hastily because our emphasis here is less on the
analysis of mechanisms underlying particularvariables than on the gen-
eral interpretationof these results, namely that there is a dispositional
foundationthat determines the level of conflict associated with a society,
be it internal or external, and that structuralconditions then direct the
conflict towardparticulartargets (Ross, forthcoming).
ANALYSIS
Our examinationof this hypothesis will take four steps. First we con-
sider the degree to which internaland externalconflict explain each other
by adding them to the models in Table 1. The results are statistically sig-
nificant, but theoretically unsatisfying. Second, we look at the internal/
external relationshipby comparing societies in which both forms of con-
flict and violence occur at similar levels, and those in which they are quite
different. Third, we contrast societies that are relatively high in internal
as opposed to external conflict. Our theory leads us to expect structural
variables to be good predictors of these two differences, whereas the dis-
positional variables should not be very powerful. Finally, we consider the
total amount of conflict, both internaland external, associated with a so-
ciety, expecting the dispositional, but not the structuralpredictors, to be
significant here.
AddingInternaland ExternalViolence:
Does It Alter the Models?
To consider the connection between internaland external violence we
first added each form of conflict to the regression using the other as the
dependent variable. The results, shown in Table 2, are clear. Internal
conflict is a good predictor of the level of external conflict, and external
conflict is an excellent predictor of internal conflict. Both terms are sig-
nificant in the new regressions. These results clearly support the argu-
ment that there is a "culture of violence" (Zimmerman, 1980; Gurr,
1970), which can be understoodin terms of our dispositional hypotheses.
Societies that are psychoculturally predisposed towardsviolence behave
more aggressively both internallyand externally.As a numberof modern

554 JO URNA L OF CONFLIC T RESOL UTION
TABLE 2
MultipleRegressions: Internaland ExternalConflict and Violence
with Internaland ExternalConflict and Violence Added to Model
Standardized Standard
R egression Error
Coefficient of Beta
Internal conflict and violence
External conflict and violence .32b .12
Strength of cross-cutting ties scale _ 34b .11
Intercommunity marriage in decentralized societies .06 .10
Matrilocalityd -.10 .10
Intercommunity trade .04 .10
fraternal interest group strength in decentralized .16 .10
societies
Polygyny .15 .09
Socioeconomic complexity .04 .14
Political power concentration -.05 .14
Harsh socialization practices .16 .09
Affectionate socialization practices -.18 .11
Male gender identity conflict .05 .10
Multiple R = .65 R Square= .42
External conflict and violence
Internal conflict and violence .23c .09
Strength of cross-cutting ties in decentralized societies .23c .10
Matrilocalityd .14 .09
Fraternal interest group strength .04 .11
Polygyny -.13 .09
Affectionate socialization practices -.33a .09
Male gender identity conflict .30a .08
Multiple R - .69 R Square = .47
NOTE: Sample size = 90 in the regressions; means have been substituted for missing
date in the regression.
a. Statistically significant at the .001 level.
b. Statistically significant at the .01 level.
c. Statistically significant at the .05 level.
d. Same results when patrilocality is substituted for matrilocality.
nations have shown as well, teaching a citizenry to fight outside enemies

often produces more fighters inside as well. Similarly, if violence is a
mechanism for dealing with internal opponents, why would we not ex-
pect it to be used with outsiders too? Of course, the argumentneed not be

made solely on psychological grounds. Structural factors are also in-

volved as when fighting, for example, internally or externally, creates
stress over the distribution of burdens and benefits that leads to more
violence.
Although we present this alternative regression model, we do not
present it in greater detail because, as a method for understandingpoliti-
cal violence, it has some theoretical weakness, in comparison to the
original model. When external conflict is regressed onto internal con-
flict, the sizes of the coefficients for the socialization variables are all
smaller, and now the only statistically significant variables are external
conflict and weak cross-cutting ties. In the case of external conflict, the
changes in the equation are much smaller when internal violence is
added. Although these two models indeed show the interrelatednessof
internaland externalconflict, and explain, for those who care about such
things, a bit more of the variance than the models in Table 1, they are not
necessarily a great help from a theoretical point of view. What we lose in
the case of internal conflict in particular, is an identification of the
mechanisms underlying violence that are far more useful than a model
simply demonstratingthat societies with high external conflict also have
high internalconflict and vice versa.3
Generalizers Versus Differentiators
Another way to consider the interrelationshipof internaland external

conflict is to note that although the two forms of conflict are moderately
correlated with each other, the association is certainly not perfect. This
means that although in most of the societies in the sample internal and
external conflict covary (the generalizers), there are also some where the
opposite is the case, when externalconflict is high and internalconflict is
low, and vice versa (the differentiators). How are the generalizers and
differentiatorsdifferent?Our previous argument is that whereas disposi-
tional factors will be good predictorsof the overall conflict level in a soci-
ety, it is particularstructuralconditions that explain whether the conflict
will be internal, external or both (Ross, forthcoming). If this argument is
correct, then the differences between differentiators and generalizers
should be structural, not dispositional, for dispositional factors will be
useful only for predicting levels of conflict, not its targets.
To examine this question we created a new variable by subtractinga
society's externalconflict score from its internalscore to measure the gap
3. A model we do not consider here would posit a causal sequence from dispositions to
external conflict and from external conflict to internal conflict.

between the two.4 Generalizing societies will get a low score, whereas
differentiatorsget a high score. Those differentiators in which external
conflict exceeds internal conflict get a negative score, and the score will
be positive when internal conflict is greater than external conflict. To
compare generalizers and differentiators, however, we want to use the
absolute value of the differences, for our comparison is between societies
in which either form of conflict is greater than the other, and those soci-
eties in which the differences are small.
We then reranthe regression in Table 1, changing only the dependent
variableto the newly createdgeneralization-differentiationmeasure. The
regression results, shown in Table 3, are fully consistent with our theo-
retical expectations. The three socialization variables are among those
with the smallest standardizedregression coefficients, whereas the struc-
tural variables have the largest ones. Dispositional variables do not dis-
tinguish between the two groups of societies anywhere near as well as
structuralones do. Table 3 shows three statistically significant ways in
which differentiatingand generalizing societies differ. In addition, there
are two other variables whose regression coefficients are not statistically
significant, but are sufficiently large and theoretically interestingenough
to merit discussion. Differentiating societies, as opposed to generaliz-
ers, have greater internal integration and are somewhat more complex.
They have greatercross-cuttingties and strongeridentification with com-
munities of the society beyond the local level, greater local-community
intermarriagein decentralized societies, they are more likely to be matri-
local, they show a lower tendency towards polygyny, they have weaker
fraternal interest groups (coresident male kin who undertakecollective
action) within the decentralized societies, and they are higher on socio-
economic, but not political, complexity.
4. The specific raw scores for each society on each variable are given in Appendix 3.
Because the range of the two variables differed, we set them equal here. Although this
gives each variablethe same range, we do not suggest thatthe "actual" level of internaland
external conflict in any society receiving the same score on each measure is somehow the
same. To make this argument would require both a theoretical elaboration and level of
measurement that we do not make. Our measures are, however, useful for ranking the
societies in the sample, and for providing a rough order of magnitude of each form of con-
flict. Comparisons between the two measures should, perhaps, be seen as comparisons of
ranks ratherthan absolute levels.
5. Theoretical, not statistical, significance, should be the primary guide in deciding
what variables to include in a model (Achen, 1982). Different regression procedures can
yield slightly different results. If backwardsdeletion is used here, all of these variables are
statistically significant (except for polygyny). The regression coefficients are virtually the
same, as is the R square, but deleting variables lowers the standarderror, hence they be-
come statistically significant.

TABLE 3
Differentiatingvs. GeneralizingSocieties Conflict and
Violence Absolute Difference(Internal/ExternalConflict)
Regression Error
Coefficient of Beta
Strength of cross-cutting ties scale .40a .11
Intercommunity marriage in decentralized societies .32b .13
Matrilocalityd .22c .10
Fraternal interest group strength in decentralized -.21 .11
societies
Polygyny -.14 .10
Harsh socialization practices -.06 .10
Affectionate socialization practices -.10 .10
Male gender identity conflict .07 .10
Multiple R = .58 R Square = .34
data in the regression.
c. Statistically significant at the .05 level.
d. Same results when patrilocality is substituted for matrilocality.
The stronger the cross-cutting ties linking groups and individuals

within and between communities in a society, the greater the differentia-
tion in targets of violence. Strong ties inhibit internal conflict and en-
hance external conflict, especially in decentralized societies (Table 1).
The existence of strong links in a society means thattargets of aggression
will be predictable, distinguishing systematically between friend and foe
in a structuralway that is likely to persist over time.
High local community intermarriagerates and weak fraternalinterest
groups also characterizedecentralizeddifferentiatingsocieties. A prefer-
ence for marriagewithin the local-community is perhapsassociated with
a strongerdefinition of insiders and outsiders, and friends and foes. Fra-
ternal interest groups, the groups of related males who are easily mobi-
lized into fighting units (Otterbein, 1968; Paige and Paige, 1981),
increase the generalizability of targets, whereas the absence of such
groups produces differentiation.

Matrilocal societies are differentiators, whereas patrilocal ones are

generalizers. This is probably best understood in terms of the conse-
quences of residence rules for alliance formationand conflict. In the soci-
eties we are considering, the most readily mobilized fighting group is
coresident male kin. Operatingto defend the interestsof fraternalinterest
groups characterizes societies in which the targets of aggression are as
likely to be internal as external. In matrilocal societies, the situation is
quite different. A number of previous studies find that matrilocality is
associated with external conflict and internal peace, although there is
some disagreement over the best way to think about the causal linkage
between the two (Ember and Ember, 1971; Ember 1974; Divale, 1974;
Otterbein, 1977; Ross, forthcoming).
Finally, the results show that the higher the level of socioeconomic
complexity, the greater the differentiation, meaning that more complex
systems may have either high internal or high external conflict, but not
both. Complexity is associated with greaterpredictabilityin the choice of
targets, probably a function of great coordination and control associated
with increasing differentiationin social and economic organization.
High InternalVersusHigh ExternalViolence

Our hypothesis that structuralfeatures of a society, as opposed to dis-
positional ones, ought to explain the difference between generalizers and
differentiatorsis well supported, but it provides no insights into the nature
of differentiation, that is, how societies with a propensity for either exter-
nal or internal conflict are different given that the differentiators could
have been high on either form of violence. What if we look at the differ-
ence between those societies in which external conflict is far higher than
internalconflict and those in which the gap between the two is in the other
direction? Once again, structuraldifferences ought to be greatest, for the
dispositional factors are relevant only to the levels of violence, not its
targets.
To examine this question the same measure is used as above-internal
conflict minus external conflict-but this time we do not take its absolute
value. When internalconflict is high and externalconflict is low, a society
receives a positive score; when the levels of each form of conflict are ap-
proximately the same, the score is low; and when external conflict ex-
ceeds internal conflict, the total score is negative. Before presenting the
regression results it would be helpful to point out that because internal
and external violence are themselves correlated (r = .39), this measure

TABLE 4
Internalvs. ExternalConflict Societies
(Internal/ExternalConflict)
Regression Error
Coefficient of Beta
Strength of cross-cutting ties scale -.42a .11
Intercommunity marriage in decentralized societies _ 35b .13
Matrilocalityc -.17 .10
Fraternal interest group strength in decentralized .18 .11
societies
Polygyny .19 .10
Socioeconomic complexity -.19 .14
Political power concentration .01 .15
Affectionate socialization practices .08 .10
Male gender identity conflict -.15 .10
b. Statistically significant at the .0 1 level.
c. Same results when patrilocality is substituted for matrilocality.
is highly correlatedwith the one we just used to distinguish between gen-

eralizers and differentiators. Because there are many more societies in
which internal and external conflict are in the same direction than soci-
eties in which they differ, there is a .78 correlation between the two
measures.
Consequently the regression results in Table 4 are interesting, but only
in part because they show again that structural, ratherthan dispositional
variables are important, as we hypothesized. What these results also
show are the structuraldifferences between those societies in which in-
ternal conflict predominates and those in which external conflict does.
Internalviolence is relatively greater than external violence when cross-
cutting ties are weak, where polygyny is high, and in decentralized soci-
eties in which local-community intermarriagerates are low. In contrast,
external conflict is relatively higher than internalconflict when there are
strong cross-cutting ties, and in decentralized societies with local-
community endogamy. In addition, there are several variables showing
interesting, although not statistically significant, effects in distinguishing
between internaland external conflict. An imbalance in favorof external

conflict is more common in societies that are matrilocal, and more com-
plex socioeconomically, whereas a preferencefor internalconflict occurs
more commonly in those decentralized societies with strong fraternalin-
terest groups and high polygyny.
Relatively high internalintegrationmeans that linkages among groups
within a society increase the likelihood of its engaging in external, as op-
posed to internal, conflict. In a sense then, one can see support in these
data for parts of the argument that internal and external conflict will be
inversely related. The point of our results is, however, that this conclu-
sion only holds with respect to the relative amount of each form of con-
flict, not its absolute level. Finally, one should remember that
generalizers are far more frequentin the sample thandifferentiatingsoci-
eties, so that this patternis somewhat rare.
The strong cross-cutting ties among groups and individuals in the
same society both minimize the severity of internalpolitical conflict and
enhance the unity of the society in the face of outside enemies. Although
this is not surprising, it is still satisfying to find empirical supportfor such
a proposition. As for the association with polygyny, an explanation
should probablyfocus on competition over women and the values of male
aggressivity associated with such competition (Divale and Harris, 1976).
The connection between local endogamy and external conflict is more
puzzling. It seems most reasonablethatsocieties with marriageinside the
local community would have the most difficulty establishing internalalli-
ances to fight externally. But this is not the case. Perhapsa crucial factor
is thatendogamy is associated with matrilocality,and both are more asso-
ciated with external, rather than internal, conflict. (One of the conse-
quences of this arrangementis that to reside matrilocally, a man does not
need to leave the community of his kin.) 6 Perhapsthe key to understand-
ing this finding is thatthe relationshipheld only in the decentralized soci-
eties (those in which there is no binding authority beyond the local
community), precisely where the political distinction between internal
and external conflict is most ambiguous.
Matrilocality, as we would expect from the above, is more common
among the exclusively external conflict societies. Socioeconomic com-
plexity is weakly and negatively relatedto internal, and positively related
to external, conflict. The association of internalconflict with strong fra-
ternal interestgroups in decentralized societies is, once again, fully con-
6. If the local-community intermarriagerate is deleted from the model, then the coef-
ficient for matrilocality increases in size and becomes statistically significant.

sistent with the association between organized male power and internal
conflict, as Paige and Paige (1981) argue.
OverallConflictLevels
Our theory of conflict not only expects structuralfactors to distinguish
between the cases where internaland externalconflict are found, but also
says that dispositional variables will be the best predictors of the overall
levels of conflict in a society. Initial support for this proposition comes
from the regressions in Table 1 that show the three dispositional
variables-harsh socialization practices, low affectionate socialization
practices, and length of post partum sex taboo for mothers (an indirect
measure of male gender identity conflict)-are related to both internal
and external conflict in the same direction and at about the same levels,
whereas this was not the case with any of the structuralvariables. Those
that were statistically significant in the one case either were not signifi-
cant in the other, or had the opposite sign.
If our theory is correct, dispositional, but not structural variables
should be particularlygood predictorsof the overall level of total conflict
in a society. To test this final hypothesis we added the internal and exter-
nal conflict scores for each society to produce a measure of total
conflict. Table 5 shows the regression results that support a weaker,
rather than a bolder, version of the hypothesis. The three dispositional
variables-low affectionate socialization practices, harsh socialization,
and male gender identity conflict-are the only three variables signifi-
cantly related to the total level of conflict in a society. At the same time,
there are several structuralvariables that, when included in the model,
although not achieving statistical significance, certainly are empirically
relevantin distinguishingbetween high and low conflict societies. Higher
conflict is found in societies that are more complex socioeconomically,
but where political power is less concentrated, although these two vari-
ables are positively related to each other (Ross, 1981). Perhaps the dis-
parity between technological sophistication and lack of political
mechanisms for maintainingpeace are relevanthere. A second group of
variables involves social organization. High conflict societies are more
likely to have weak cross-cutting ties, and, in the decentralized societies,
to have local community endogamy and strong fraternalinterest groups.
These variablesare primarilyassociated with internalconflict, and might
variously be seen as indicators of low integrationor causes of it.

TABLE 5
Total Conflict (Internal+ ExternalConflict)
Regression Error
Coefficient of Beta
Strength of cross-cutting ties scale -.07 .10
Matrilocalityc .04 .09
Fraternal interest group strength in decentralized .14 .10
societies
Polygyny .01 .09
Harsh socialization practices .24b .09
Affectionate socialization practices .423 .09
Male gender identity conflict .26b .09
c. Same results when patrilocality is substituted for matrilocality.
CONCLUSION: RETHINKING
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICT
The analysis presentedhere seeks to cast a new light on the question of

the relationship between internal and external conflict behavior. Al-
though internal and external conflict are positively related in the world-
wide sample of pre-industrial societies, the degree of association
between the two differs across the cases in the sample. The bulk of the
analysis involved the construction of three new variables from the origi-
nal measures of internaland external conflict to make three comparisons
that provided furthertests of the basic premise of the theory that disposi-
tional featuresof a society best explain its level of conflict, whereas struc-
tural aspects determine whether the conflict will be internal, external or
both. Comparing generalizing societies-those with roughly the same
levels of internal and external conflict-with differentiating societies,
those where one form is much higher thanthe other-and then comparing
those societies especially high on internalconflict with those high on ex-

ternal conflict, we found that a numberof structuralfeatures were differ-

ent in each group, but that the dispositional variables made virtually no
difference. In contrast, when the two conflict measures were combined to
produce a total conflict score, the analysis showed that dispositional pre-
dictors were much more powerful than structuralones.
The argumentthat dispositional factors are crucial in determiningthe
level of conflict associated with a society and that structuralfeatures de-
termine the choice of targets, is supportedin terms of the relative size of
the standardized regression coefficients and the criterion of statistical
significance. Although this conclusion is both parsimonious and pro-
vocative, it is also most useful to see the statistical evidence as consistent
with a weak, ratherthan the strong, form of this argument. For the struc-
tural features of society to be irrelevantin predicting overall conflict, the
coefficients for the structuralvariableswould have to be of similar magni-
tudes, but in opposite directions for the two regressions in Table 1, and
this is not the case. Rather,we find this is true with only one or two vari-
ables. More common is the patternin which a particularstructuralvari-
able is important in predicting one form of conflict, and then its
coefficient is near zero in the model for the other form. When we look at
total conflict (Table 5) we see that a structuralvariable may make some
contributionto explaining overall conflict because of its impact on either
internalor external conflict.
The reason for clarifying what the results do and do not allow us to
conclude about the relative contributionof each set of explanatoryfactors
is not intended to suggest major weaknesses in our argument. Instead, it
is to anticipate criticism of the theory on the grounds that our statistical
evidence does not providean open and shutcase. Consideringthe natureof
the data used, and considering the need to evaluate the theory using data
from other political systems as well, we think the data are as strongly
supportive as they might be at present. My goal here, however, is not to
dwell on the strengths and weaknesses of our data, but to focus on the
theory, discussing furtherimplications for the study of political violence,
and thinking about its possible relevance for understanding violence
within and between modern nations.
Taking DispositionsSeriously
as Causesof Conflict
Early socialization shapes adultbehavior.At one level this statementis
a social science truism, whereas at another, a source of real controversy.

Socialization as opposed to what? Which behaviors? How do we know?

How is it reasonableto suggest that socialization makes a difference, and
what kind of difference does it make?
Our evidence is that gross differences between societies in their so-
cialization practices on such questions as affection, warmth, punish-
ment, aggression and gender role conflict are especially crucial for
understandingconflict behavior. In a previous article we have attempted
to spell out some of the underlying psychodynamic mechanisms that
seem to be operating(Ross, forthcoming). Briefly, we argued that social-
ization provides individuals with a lens through which they see them-
selves and others, and that these perceptions are crucial in shaping their
actions as adults. Dispositions learned early in life are not simply relevant
on the perceptual level; they also involve specific behavioral patterns,
such as how to respond to insults, the use of physical aggression, or
whom to trust, which serve one throughoutlife.
Dispositions, then, are more than personality configurations, they are
also culturally learned and approved methods for dealing with others,
both inside and outside one's community. They are guides to behavior,
providing models for behavior in different situations. Dispositions are
not going to be equally important in explaining all behaviors. Both
Greenstein (1967) and B. Whiting (1980) suggest conditions under
which they will be particularly important. In situations that are highly
ambiguous, but very important to the individual, dispositional factors
will play an importantrole. J. Whiting (1974) suggests that religion and
explanationsfor illness are two behavior domains that meet the above cri-
teria and where what he calls projective behaviors, will be important.
Our argument is that conflict behavior frequently is projective as well.
Most conflict situationsare highly ambiguous, depending upon the social
mobilization achieved following selective interpretationof events. Al-
though participantshave little trouble in citing the "objective" basis of
differences, for instance "She [he, they] took my toy [land, water,
women]", what is equally striking to the outsider is the number of times
when the same, supposedly provocative, action occurs and is not fol-
lowed by any overt violence at all. This point is not trivial at all, for it
forces us to address the following propositions: (1) objective situations
don't cause overt conflict, it is the interpretationof such situations that is
crucial; and (2) if the same objective conditions produce differential re-
sponses, an explanation for conflict behavior requires more than the
identification of objective conditions underlying them.

Don't Throwthe Baby Out

with the Bathwater:StructuralConditionsCount, Too
If our argument is correct that dispositional factors can differentiate
between high and low conflict societies, it is also the case that disposi-
tions do a poor job in choosing among targets for aggression. Structural
conditions, meaning the social and economic organization of a commu-
nity, are particularlyimportanthere in understandingwho fights and who
cooperates with whom. Cross-cutting ties and identification that extends
beyond the local community, not surprisingly,diminish internalconflict,
but enhance it externally. Structuralarrangementsthat enhance the unity
of localized, male kin groups promote internal conflict. To some extent
this is the opposite side of the same coin, for those societies with strong,
localized fraternalinterest groups are also those with weak cross-cutting
ties.
Does this Have Anything

to Do with ModernNations?
The proposition that the theory advanced here is relevantto behavior
in political settings outside the small, pre-industrialsocieties in the sam-
ple is eminently testable. Not only does it have potential utility in under-
standing conflict behavior in modern nations, but it should be useful in
local communities, face to face groups and large organizations as well.
What problems might we have in extending this theory to explaining con-
flict behavior in modern nations? At least three broad problems can be
identified: (1) the problem of homogeneity of personality distributions,
(2) specification of the mechanisms underlying the linkage between dis-
positions and conflict behavior, and (3) the theoretical equivalence of the
structuralvariables identified in the model as crucial in the traditional
societies.
The problem of homogeneity of personality distributions is the diffi-
culty that the early wave of national character studies failed to address
adequately. Isn't it naive to assume that there is a modal personality that
can effectively describe the personalities of large nations that are them-
selves heterogeneous (Inkeles, 1972)? Doesn't it make more sense that
there is more variance within than between nations? If even in small,
isolated communities there is a good deal of variationin personality con-
figurations (Wallace, 1962), what kinds of assumptions can be made

about large nations? Although these questions are all reasonable, they
may be beside the point. Our argumentdoes not requireany assumptions
about the homogeneity of personalities in any community under study.
This is because our emphasis is on what we call psychocultural disposi-
tions, not personalities. Although personality is certainly an important
aspect of dispositions, it is not the only element. In our theory, the em-
phasis is on dispositions as behavioralpatterns, which are rooted in early
learning, but not necessarily tied to particularpersonality configurations
in a one-to-one way. Early learning may emphasize open expression of
aggression in ways that may be consistent with several different person-
ality configurations, but not all. Our data do not directly address the
question of personality in the societies under study, for we have no per-
sonality data about them. It is quite reasonable, however, to think that
personality is a chief mechanism through which dispositions are trans-
lated into actions. However, what is crucial to the argument here is that
for this translationto take place, one does not have to assume a one-to-one
correspondence. Rather, it makes more sense to think about a range of
personalities that are compatible with certain behaviors.
The second problem is the specification of mechanisms underlying the
translationof dispositions into actions. As we have just suggested, one
major way this is achieved is throughpersonality. In a previous paper, we
have suggested how an object relations approach to psychoanalytic
theory (Greenbergand Mitchell, 1983) can be utilized to link early expe-
riences to an internalized image of the self and others relevantfor under-
standing aggression. Crucial to this are concepts of identification,
attachment, repression, projection and displacement. Fornari (1975)
shows how the universal experience of losing a love object has crucial
implications for aggression throughthe process of "the paranoidelabora-
tion of mourning" in which the guilt one feels over the loss is projected
onto outsiders who then are attackedas the destroyers of the love object.
Although we all lose love objects throughdeath and other processes, hu-
man reactions to this loss can vary in terms of the guilt that is felt or re-
pressed, the hostility projected onto others, and the desire to harm them
as a reaction to one's own repressed rage.
But there are at least two other mechanisms beyond that of personality
thatare relevantto the conversion of dispositions into actions. One is sim-
ply social learning that emphasizes modelling of established culturalpat-
terns as a learning mechanism (Bandura, 1973). When established ways
of dealing with conflict are readily observable and children are encour-
aged to imitate them, behavior patterns can be learned without making

any assumptions about underlying psychodynamic processes. Direct in-

struction or modelling may often provide a sufficient basis for the con-
tinuationof certain behavior patterns.
The translationof dispositional tendencies into behavioral patterns is
fundamentallya social process; when there is social support for certain
types of actions they will be learned and maintained, when they are disap-
proved they become less common. From this standpoint, small differ-
ences in personality or social learning can be greatly magnified when
social support for different courses of action exists. Leaders mobilizing
groups for action often polarize them and emphasize differences that
were originally quite modest. Patternsof social support and interaction
become crucial in shapingperceptions on which subsequentmobilization
will be based. When social support for particular courses of action is
readily mobilized, then initial dispositional tendencies can have impor-
tant consequences for conflict behavior.
The third question is the theoretical relevance of the structuralvari-
ables employed in this study to the analysis of modern nations. Although
some of the specific measures employed sound relatively exotic to some
political scientists, the underlying concepts are ones with which political
analysts are already quite familiar. Socioeconomic complexity, political
centralization, political power concentrationare straightforwardand it is
easy to see their parallels in large nations. Similarly, the concept of cross-
cuttingties has been at the core of much political analysis in recent years.
One way in which anthropologistslook at residence and kinship rules or
at the organizationof fraternalinterestgroups is in terms of coalition for-
mation, alliances, and sources of integrationrooted in a society's social
and economic structure. Once again, the measurementof these concepts
at the national, community, or organizational levels is not likely to be
especially difficult.
The External Environment
Identifying both dispositional and structural sources of violent con-

flict clarifies why internal and external conflict have a variable relation-
ship to each other. When dispositional factors are especially important,
there is a consonance between the sources of internal and external con-
flict, whereas when structuralvariables are more important,the two will
be more unrelated, for the structural variables related to each form of
conflict are different. But when is each of these situations most likely?

We close with a few speculative comments on this question that we hope

apply equally well to nation-states as they do to the societies under study
here.
The analysis has focused on characteristics internal to society as ex-
plaining internal and external conflict. In part this is due to the natureof
our data, and it is striking how much variation in conflict behavior we
have been able to explain using these variables. At the same time several
importantstudies in internationalrelations suggest that the characteris-
tics of the external environment are crucial for understandingexternal
conflict (Waltz, 1959; Midlarsky, 1975; Zinnes, 1980). If this is the case
with the societies under study here, then perhaps part of the difference
between generalizing and differentiatingsocieties, and thatbetween soci-
eties high on external, ratherthan internal, conflict, lies in relationships
with outsiders, ratherthan internal societal characteristics, or the dispo-
sitional states of its members.
It may be that variation in the external environment explains why ex-
ternal and internalconflict are highly differentiated, and why structural,
ratherthan dispositional variables, explain this difference. Although our
data on the external environment of the societies in the sample are
sparse,7 we have coded at least one variablethat may be of some use here:
the frequency of contact between members of the society and outsiders.8
Adding this variable to the regression models produces several results
worth noting. First, the higher the level of contact with other societies,
the greater the level of external conflict and warfare. There is no effect,
however, of contact on internal violence, even though the two forms of
conflict are interrelated. Thus, although contact with outsiders is asso-
ciated with more fighting, it is not related to less internal violence as
might also have been expected by displacement theory. When external
conflict is the dependent variable, not only is the standardizedregression
coefficient for contact with outsiders statistically significant and rela-
tively robust, but three of the variables that are statistically significant in
the regression shown in the lower half of Table 1 (socioeconomic com-
plexity, cross-cutting ties in decentralized societies, and harsh socializa-
tion practices) are no longer significant when contact is included. In all
7. Although many ethnographers did not pay great attention to this question, the re-
ports used to code the societies in this sample did contain sufficient information so that
additional variables on the question of the level and nature of outside contacts could be
coded.
8. Each society was coded in terms of whether contact with persons from other soci-
eties (e.g. trade, warfare, travel, etc.) were frequent, occasional, rare, or nonexistent
(Ross, 1983: 181).

three cases the regression coefficients are smaller, although the signs are
still in the same direction (and there is almost no change in the standard
errors of beta).
When the frequency of contact with other societies is added to the re-
gression in Table 4, it emerges as the strongest predictor of the differ-
ences between societies low on internal as opposed to external conflict,
although in this case there are no changes in the statistical significance of
any of the other variables in the equation.9 But when frequency of exter-
nal contact is added to the regression in Table 3 distinguishing between
generalizing and differentiatingsocieties, it produces virtually no change
in the results, so that we can rule out the hypothesis that generalization is
simply a function of opportunity.Clearly the level of intersocietal contact
effects conflict patterns, but what might also be useful to have here would
be data on the characterof these contacts as well so we can better under-
stand the underlying dynamic here.
Part of the answer to the question of when internal and external vio-
lence will be independent, then, is that this depends on the extent to
which its sources are internal or external to a society. Internal sources
suggest the two are more related, whereas external sources increase their
independence. Although this answer is clear, it may be a bit pat. It does
not recognize that over time, external conditions will probably have im-
portanteffects on the internalorganizationof a society or on how internal
needs may manifest themselves externally. Ember and Ember (1971) and
Ember (1974) suggest, for example, that perhaps societies with high ex-
ternal warfaretend to become matrilocal, whereas internal warfarepro-
motes patrilocality. In our case, without temporal data we can only
speculate about the ways in which changes in socioeconomic complexity,
cross-cutting ties, contact with other societies, and external violence
might be related. But it does seem reasonable to suggest that changes in
internalconflict patternsand dispositions can arise as a result of external
forces. Finally, our results analyzing frequency of contact with other so-
cieties suggest bolder questions and the need for richer dataon the impact
of the external environment on conflict behavior. Our contact measure
should be viewed as a surrogatefor more complete measures, not a final
answer to our inquiry.
To what extent do these comments about the external environment
suggest a severe limitation of the application of these findings to modern
9. The magnitude of the standardizedregression coefficients for the other statistically
significant variables decreases by about 25 % in most cases.

nations? After all, don't they all fit into the category of high contact with
outsiders, therefore suggesting a relative unimportance of internal fac-
tors, as Midlarsky (1975) and others argue? We think not, for several
reasons. First, outside forces, we suggest, make a difference in separat-
ing the roots of internal and external violence, but our analysis does not
supportthe conclusion that either dispositional or structuralvariables are
unimportantto the dynamics of conflict even when outside contact is
high. Second, the model presentedhere, incorporatingboth dispositional
and structuralvariables, needs to be tested on a sample of nations before it
can be fully evaluated. Curiously few quantitativemodels of political vio-
lence have specifically incorporated both psychological and structural
variables in their dataanalysis. In some cases, such as Gurr (1968; 1970)
or Feierabend and Feierabend (1971), psychological conflict mecha-
nisms are identified, but objective social or economic indicatorsare used
to infer psychological states (Muller, 1980). Other models, such as Hibbs
(1973) or Rummel (1963), are purely structural, making no effort
to measure dispositions at the level of the data or infer them in their
analyses.
The theory of conflict and violence elaborated here seeks to explain
overall conflict levels in a society ratherthan any particularoutbreaks of
violence. Research that is clearly compatible with ours but that focuses
on this second question is the work on cognitive maps and operational
codes of key decision makers (George, 1969; Axelrod, 1976). Whereas
we have focused on the general causes of violence in a society, not the
more proximatereasons why it takes particularforms, this research looks
at particularways in which dispositions and structuresshape behaviors in
specific disputes. The ways in which other actors are viewed, inferences
concerning their motives, and routinized ways of responding to certain
adversaries or situations are all elements of the dispositional context our
general theory identifies as important. It suggests that the ways in which
individuals view disputes will be a function of perceptions having deep
roots in both social structuraland psychological functioning.
Identification of specific mechanisms and their relationship in con-
texts beyond those studied here is, of course, important. As a practical
matter, it would seem fruitful to first use this frameworkto analyze be-
havior in institutional settings such as schools, bureaucratic organiza-
tions, or corporations. Using both cross-national and intranational
variationin such contexts, one could evaluatethe degree to which conflict
behavior is a function of structuralconditions within the organization,
the broaderenvironment in which it operates, or the dispositional orien-

tations characteristicof key organizationalactors. The application of the

theory proposed here to national and internationalbehavior will have,
without a doubt, significant methodological problems, and will raise
theoretical issues of institutionalconstraintand homogeneity among de-
cision makers. Despite these potential problems, it offers the possibility
for theoretical linkage across levels, which we sorely need in the com-
parative study of political conflict.
APPENDIX 1
SampleSocieties
Internal External
Murdock Society Conflict Conflict
White Number Score Score
2 KUNG -3.0069 -3.7179
4 LOZI -.5901 -.5021
6 SUKU 1.5824 -1.4967
8 NYAKUSA 3.2710 .2632
11 KIKUYU .0089 -.4348
12 GANDA -3.0069 1.2067
13 MBUTI 3.6571 -3.7179
16 TIV 2.6209 -.208
18 FON -3.2359 .7254
20 MENDE .6416 .2441
22 BAMBARA -1.9880 .-689
23 TALLENSI 1.8080 -.0043
26 HAUSA -.8848 .6773
28 AZANDE .3311 1.2067
30 OTORO 4.3722 .2441
31 SHILLUK 3.8365 -.4348
34 MASAI 4.3722 1.2067
36 SOMALI 4.2617 1.2067
37 AMHARA 2.7946 1.2067
40 TEDA 5.8616 1.2067
42 RIFFIANS 5.0533 .7927
43 EGYPTIANS 3.7261 -.3173
46 RAWLA 4.2962 .7254
48 ALBANIANS 2.8747 1.2067
51 RURAL IRISH -1.9880 -.3173
52 LAPPS -2.3722 -2.7242
57 KURD 3.4959 1.2067
58 BASSERI -2.6146 .2121
60 GOND -4.1167 -1.8097
62 SANTAL -4-1121 -2.3412
(continued)

APPENDIX 1 Continued
Internal External
64 BURUSHO -4.5718 .3114
65 KAZAK .2040 1.2067
68 LEPCHA -4.5718 -3.7179
70 LAKHER 3.1646 1.2067
72 LAMET -3.2484 -2.7242
73 VIETNAMESE -2.3822 -.3173
77 SEMANG -4.5718 -3.2366
79 ADAMANESE 1.0123 .0465
82 NEGRI .7493 .2632
84 BALINESE -4.1121 -2.7242
85 IBAN 2.7434 1.2067
87 TORADJA -1.0498 .7254
90 TIWI 2.8747 -1.0318
92 OROKAIVA 3.5639 1.2067
94 KAPAUKU 3.5639 -1.8097
96 MANUS 1.6356 -.9161
98 TROBRIAND 1.4720 -2.7242
100 TIKOPIA -3.2359 -3.7179
102 FIJIANS 3.7261 .3114
104 MAORI 1.2217 1.2067
106 SAMOANS 2.9938 -.3173
108 MARSHALESE 1.0252 -1.8097
110 YAPESE 3.2710 -1.2483
112 IFUGAO 4.8318 -1.8097
116 KOREANS -1.7300 .4289
118 AINU 1.6579 .7927
119 GILYAK .1994 -2.7242
122 INGALIK -.9775 -1.4967
124 COPPER ESQ 1.0098 -2.7242
127 SAULTEAUX -2.2356 .7254
128 SLAVE .825 3 .7927
130 EYAK -1.3384 -.2692
132 BELACOOLA 2.1445 -.9161
134 YUROK .9157 -1.0154
136 YOKUTS -2.1307 -2.0763
138 KLAMATH 3.9171 .7254
140 GROS VENTRE -4.1121 -.5021
142 PAWNEE -3.2405 .7254
144 HURON -2.7808 .7254
147 COMANCHE .0480 .7254
148 CHIRICAHUA -4.1167 .2441
150 HAVASUPI -4.5718 -.9161
151 PAPAGO -4.5718 -.5840
(continued)

APPENDIX 1 Continued
Internal External
153 AZTEC --2.7101 1.2067

156 MISKITO -1 .8082 .6773
158 CUNA -1.5396 -.2692
159 GOAJIRO 3.4535 -1.9753
162 WARRAU -.9474 -1.4967
164 CARIB -2.5183 -.3173
166 MUNDURUCU -3.6571 1.2067
168 CAYAPA -4.5718 -3.2366
169 JIVARO 5.8616 1.2067
172 AYMARA .9142 .9583
174 NAMBICUARA .4766 -.4348
176 TIMBIRA -4.5718 1.2067
179 SHAVANTE 5.4065 1.2067
180 AWEIKOMA 2.8067 .7927
183 ABIPON 5.1045 1.2067
184 MAPUCHE 3.8365 1.2067
186 YAHGAN -1.6756 -2.7242
NOTE: For more details concerning the sampling procedures, coding, and reliability
see Ross (1983). The scale scores are the sum of the scores on the individual measures
(listed in Appendix 2) after they have been standardized and weighted by their
squared factor loadings. The raw data for the individual variables for each society are
published in Ross (1983). In cases where the data for a particular value cannot be
coded for a society, the sample mean is substituted.

APPENDIX2
Variables and Factor Loadings for Internal and
External Violence Measures
Factor
Variable Loading
Internal violence and conflict
1. The severity of conflict between different communities of the .94
same society (4 point measure)
2. The acceptability of violence when directed against members of .90
same society outside the local community (4 point measure)
3. Frequency of internal warfare (4 point measure) .81
4. The severity of conflict within the local community (4 point measure)
5. The extent to which physical force is used as a mechanism for dispute .67
settlement (3 point measure)
6. The acceptability of violence when directed against members of the .55
local community
7. Degree of compliance with community norms and decisions by .52
members of local communities (3 point measure)
External warfare and conflict
1. Frequency of external warfare (4 point scale) .86
2. Degree of hostility-not just warfare-expressed towards other .69
societies (4 point scale)
3. Acceptability of violence when directed towards persons in other .64
societies (4 point measure)
NOTE: Complete definitions and raw data for these measures are presented in Ross
(1983).
Appendix 3
MEASURES AND SOURCES FOR
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The data on the political variables are reported in Ross (1983), which also
contains information on sampling, coding procedures, reliability and scale con-
struction. Data on the economic, social structuraland child trainingvariables for
societies in the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (Murdock and White, 1969)
have been published in various issues of Ethnology and recently a good deal of
this material has been made available in Barry and Schlegel (1980). Below we
indicate the original publication for our sources. The measures for the indepen-
dent variables used in Tables 1-5 follow.

Ross / CROSS-CULTURAL
EVIDENCE 575
Strength of cross-cutting ties is a scale developed from factor analysis of 36

political variables for the societies in the sample as explained in the text and de-
tails of which are given in Ross (1983). This scale is derived from a summationof
the scores on each of the component variables that are first standardizedand then
weighted by its squaredfactor loading. The raw scores for each variable as well as
the scale scores are presented in Ross (1983). The variables used were (with their
factor loadings in parentheses): the extent to which individuals living in different
communities of the same society are linked together in politically relevant ways
(.64), the strength of "in group" or "we feelings" directed toward the wider
society-i.e., beyondthe local community (.62), the numberof different areas of
life in which community decision-making (either formal or informal) occurs
(.58), the strengthof "in group" or "we feeling" directed towardthe local com-
munity (.56), the extent to which kinship organizations linking different com-
munities are present and politically important (.53), the extent to which ritual
groups exist linking different communities are present and politically important
(.50), and the extent to which there is interventionin disputes as they develop and
to which community pressures work towardsettlement (.42).
Intercommunitymarriage is a five-point variable measuring the degree to
which marriage tends to be exogamous versus endogamous with respect to the
local community as presented in Murdock and Wilson (1972). To measure its
effects in decentralized societies a society's score on this variable was multiplied
by a dummy variable coded "1 " for all societies with no authoritybeyond that of
the local community, and "O" for societies where some authority is exercised
beyond the local community. This measure of political centralization is taken
from Tuden and Marshall (1972).
Matrilocality and patrilocality are coded from Murdock and Wilson (1972).
Societies are coded as patrilocal if Murdock and Wilson said they were patrilocal
or virilocal, otherwise patrilocality is absent; similarly, matrilocality is scored
as present if the society is matrilocal or uxorilocal, absent if it is not.
Intercommunitytrade is a seven-point measure of the extent to which a com-
munity in the society trades for foodstuffs (Murdock and Morrow, 1970).
Fraternal interest group strength is taken from Paige and Paige (1981). It is
based on the presence or absence of brideprice, patrilineality, and a trichoto-
mized measure of the size of effective kin-based political subunits. For 66 of the
societies their score is used. For the remaining 34 that are not in their sample
brideprice and patrilineality were coded from Murdock (1967: column 12, and
Murdock and Wilson, 1972), whereas the size of effective kin groups is esti-
mated using a recoded version of Murdock and Wilson's (1972) for those soci-
eties in which both are available. To measure its effects in decentralized societies
a society's score on this variable was multiplied by a dummy variable coded "1 "
for all societies with no authoritybeyond that of the local community and "0" for
societies in which some authority is exercised beyond the local community. This
measure of political centralization is taken from Tuden and Marshall (1972).

576 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
Polygyny is a three-point measure-monogamous, less than 20 %polygynous

marriage, and more than 20% polygynous derived from Murdock and Wilson
(1972) form of family variable.
Socioeconomic complexity is a scale made up of eight different measures that
were loaded on a single dimension when factor analyzed, and were standardized
and weighted as explained above: importance of agriculture as a con-
tribution to subsistence, importance of animal husbandry, low importance of
hunting, low importanceof gathering, the degree to which food is stored, the size
of the average community in the society, the degree of social stratification and
cultural complexity. The first five measures are from Murdock and Morrow
(1970), the size measure is from Murdock and Wilson (1972), and the stratifica-
tion and complexity measures are from Murdock and Provost (1973).
Political complexity is measured by a 13 variable scale called political power
concentration, based on factor analysis (Ross, 1983). The crucial variables are
the extent to which leaders act independently in a community, the presence or
absence of checks on political leaders, the degree of political role differentiation
in a society, the importanceof decision-making bodies, and the level of taxation.
Raw scores on the individual variables and scale are given in Ross (1983). For
more detail concerning sources of political complexity see Ross (1981).
Harsh socialization practices is a scale derived from a factor analysis of so-
cialization measures from Barry and Paxson (1971) and Barry, Josephson,
Lauer, and Marshall (1976, 1977), which were appropriateto measure either
harshness of socialization, affectionate socialization or protest masculinity. The
variables and their loadings on the harsh socialization dimension were: severity
of pain infliction (.69), extent to which corporal punishment is used (.63), the
degree to which children are not indulged (.57), the extent to which children are
scolded ( .51), importanceof caretakersother thanthe mother (.44), the degree to
which fortitude is stressed as a value (.37), and the degree to which aggressive-
ness is stressed as a value (.28).
Affectionate socialization practices is a second scale derived from the factor
analysis just cited. The variables loading on this dimension are the degree to
which trust is emphasized as a value during childhood (.74), the degree to which
honesty is stressed as a value during childhood (.67), the closeness of the father
in childhood (.65), the degree to which generosity is stressed as a value during
childhood (.53), the degree to which affection is expressed toward the child
(.49), and the extent to which children are valued by the society (.34).
Male gender identity conflict is measured following Whiting and others by the
length of abstinence from sexual intercourseby the mother after birth, described
as the cultural norm. The seven-point measure is from Barry and Paxson (1971).
Whiting also suggests that the natureof mother-infantsleeping arrangementscan
be used to measure these variables, but the Barry and Paxson (1971) measure of
sleeping arrangementsis not sufficiently precise.

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Internal and External Conflict and Violence: Cross-Cultural Evidence and a New Analysis

Author(s): Marc Howard Ross

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MARC HOWARD ROSS

Any new publication on an already well-researched topic mustjus-

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 29 No. 4, December 1985 547-579

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lation of those conditions under which internaland external violence are

My emphasis here is on the conditions under which internaland exter-

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because internallydivided societies cannot risk outside conflicts (LeVine

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show a positive association between internaland externalconflict, at least

Internal and External Violence

Elsewhere we have presented a multiple regression model of internal

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cluding warfare within and between communities of the same society,

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Furthermore, there is a tendency for polygyny to be low in high external

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nations have shown as well, teaching a citizenry to fight outside enemies

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made solely on psychological grounds. Structural factors are also in-

Generalizers Versus Differentiators

Another way to consider the interrelationshipof internaland external

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The stronger the cross-cutting ties linking groups and individuals

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Matrilocal societies are differentiators, whereas patrilocal ones are

High InternalVersusHigh ExternalViolence

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is highly correlatedwith the one we just used to distinguish between gen-

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This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 19:18:17 PM

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The analysis presentedhere seeks to cast a new light on the question of

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ternal conflict, we found that a numberof structuralfeatures were differ-

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Socialization as opposed to what? Which behaviors? How do we know?

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Don't Throwthe Baby Out

Does this Have Anything

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any assumptions about underlying psychodynamic processes. Direct in-

The External Environment

Identifying both dispositional and structural sources of violent con-

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We close with a few speculative comments on this question that we hope

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tations characteristicof key organizationalactors. The application of the

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153 AZTEC --2.7101 1.2067

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Strength of cross-cutting ties is a scale developed from factor analysis of 36

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