G.R. No.

141524 September 14, 2005 Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within
DOMINGO NEYPESvs. HON. COURT OF 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
APPEALS appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the
In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court
court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the
dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the
merits which, considering the evidence presented at the
action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly
trial, declares categorically what the rights and
received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3,
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or
1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18,
judgment that dismisses an action.
1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1,
1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of
motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration
July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, should be construed as the "final order," not the February
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since
fees on August 3, 1998. they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they We sustain petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1,
received the final order of the trial court denying their 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the
motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice final order contemplated in the Rules.
of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days
and they were well within the reglementary period for fromnotice of judgment or final order to appeal the
appeal. decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a
dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR
or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.
dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last
court, the order was the "final order" appealable under day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had
the Rules. It held further: only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners,
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural
however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to
right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory
a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order"
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving
requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious
the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit
fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, as liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where
amended, provides: technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were
not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final
periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently
any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days
applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
commission of a grave injustice.Our judicial system and
award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided,
the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy
however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for
balance between the strict enforcement of procedural
appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the
judgment appealed from. x x x
full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure cause.
states:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or
be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of even establish new rules for a more simplified and
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases.
record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court
days from the notice of judgment or final order. allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals.
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied) Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply
to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final It must be emphasized that the underlying reason for the
order or resolution. instant Petition is to allow the petitioner to take the
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice depositions of its witnesses, Mr. Ralph Bergen and any
of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted of the responsible officers of Peoplesoft Australia.
from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying
their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is
not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days
from notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in
the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal
may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment
or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which
we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of
Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period
from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of
cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March
3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days
becomes significant only when a partyopts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In
this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case
and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch
and to have judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his
notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15
days from receipt of the order (the "final order")
denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may
be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of
the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their
motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the
notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the
of 15 days, as already discussed. case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating
G.R. No. 168776 July 17, 2007
PHILIPPINE COMPUTER SOLUTIONS, INC. vs.
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ
It is not disputed that a Decision in the main case, SEC
Case No. 68524, has already been rendered. While the
Court of Appeals has yet to act on petitioner’s Petition
for Review, it is this Court’s view that the issue has
become moot and academic. An issue becomes moot and
academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of
no practical use or value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief which petitioners would be entitled to
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.
From a quick reference to the Decision of the trial court
in SEC Case No. 68524, it is readily apparent that the
trial court had already granted the prayer of petitioner in
its Complaint. Even more, during the hearings before the
trial court, Mr. Ralph Bergen had already personally
testified, hence, foregoing any need for taking his
deposition.
Furthermore, the Order dated 8 December 2003 of the
trial court denying petitioner’s motion to take deposition
is an interlocutory order. An order that does not finally
dispose of the case, and does not end the court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done
by the court, is interlocutory.24Interlocutory refers to
something between the commencement and the end of
the suit which decides some point or matter, but it is not
a final decision on the whole controversy.25
In Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals26 -
A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of
a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in
respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which,
on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are and which party is in the right; or a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground,
for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once
rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as
deciding the controversy or determining the rights and
liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more
remains to be done by the Court except to await the
parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of
the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or
the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to
cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
"final" or, to use the established and more distinctive
term, "final and executory."
the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates
that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
"interlocutory," e.g., an order denying a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion
for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing
amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications
for postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or
order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
"interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be
taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
Since a Decision has already been rendered by the trial
court in SEC Case No. 68524 on 27 December 2006,
then the Order of the same court dated 8 December 2003
denying petitioner’s motion to take deposition, being an
interlocutory order, should have been included and raised
in the petition for review filed by the petitioner before
the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 162692, August 26, 2015
NILO V. CHIPONGIAN vs.VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO
In the context of the final judgment rule, Section 1 of
Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders and
judgments in special proceedings to the final order or
judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the
remedy of appeal to other orders or dispositions that
completely determine a particular matter in the case,
to wit:
Rule 109. - Appeals in Special Proceedings
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be
taken. - An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court
of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased
person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such
person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim
against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim
against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee
or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the
party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed
from the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and
affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless
it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or
for reconsideration.
The dismissal of the petitioner's intervention
constituted "a final determination in the lower court
of the rights of the party appealing," that is, his right
in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister.
As such, it fell under paragraph (c) of Section 1, supra,
because it had the effect of disallowing his claim
against the estate of Vicente, as well as under
paragraph (e) of Section 1, supra, because it was a
final determination in the trial court of his
intervention. Conformably with either or both
paragraphs, which are boldly underscored above for
easier reference, the dismissal was the proper subject
of an appeal in due course by virtue of its nature of
completely disposing of his intervention.
The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final
order in special proceedings is by notice of appeal
and record on appeal. This is pursuant to Section 2(a),
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to
appeal a judgment or final order in special
proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment
or final order within which to perfect an appeal
because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal
but also a record on appeal that will require the
approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse
party, to wit:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall
be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of judgment or
final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus
cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed, (n) (bold emphasis
supplied)
For the petitioner, therefore, the period for perfecting
the appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from
notice of the final order dismissing the intervention.
The start of the period of 30 days happened on
September 18, 1998, the date when his counsel
received the decision dismissing his intervention.
However, the entire time from the filing of his Motion
for Reconsideration on October 2, 1998 until his
receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration
on March 18, 1999 should be deducted from the
reckoning of the period to perfect his appeal. He filed
the notice of appeal on March 19, 1999, and paid
the appellate court docket fees on March 31, 1999.40
Initially, the RTC denied due course to the notice of
appeal on the ground that it had been filed beyond
the reglementary period; hence, the petitioner filed
his Motion for Reconsideration against the order
denying due course.41 On July 5, 1999, the RTC issued
its order whereby it conceded that the petitioner had
timely filed the notice of appeal, but still denied the
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that he had
not perfected his appeal because of his failure to pay
the appellate court docket fees.42 Hence, he filed a
Motion to Set Aside Order, to which he appended the
copies of the official receipts of the payment of the G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
appellate court docket fees. Nonetheless, on August THELMA M. ARANAS vs.TERESITA V. MERCADO
13, 1999, the RTC denied the Motion to Set Aside
Order, and a copy of the order of denial was received The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted
by his counsel on August 27, 1999. the application for the writ of preliminary injunction,
was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should
A judgment or final order in special proceedings
not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for
is appealed by record on appeal. A judgment or
disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is
final order determining and terminating a particular
to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action,
part is usually appealable, because it completely
which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision
disposes of a particular matter in the proceeding,
on the merits of the action during the pendency of the
unless otherwise declared by the Rules of Court. The
appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily
ostensible reason for requiring a record on appeal
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a
instead of only a notice of appeal is the multipart
considerable length of time, and will compel the
nature of nearly all special proceedings, with each
adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one
part susceptible of being finally determined and
of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there
terminated independently of the other parts. An
are incidental questions raised by him and as there
appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that envisions
are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the
the elevation of the original records to the appellate
lower court. An interlocutory order may be the
court as to thereby obstruct the trial court in its
subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has
further proceedings regarding the other parts of the
been rendered, with the ground for appealing the
case. In contrast, the record on appeal enables the
order being included in the appeal of the judgment
trial court to continue with the rest of the case
itself.
because the original records remain with the trial
court even as it affords to the appellate court the full
opportunity to review and decide the appealed The remedy against an interlocutory order not
subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
matter.
action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, retains the order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction
original 30 days as the period for perfecting the or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari
appeal by record on appeal to take into consideration under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
the need for the trial court to approve the record on
appeal. Within that 30-day period a party aggrieved The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying
by a judgment or final order issued in special Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory
proceedings should perfect an appeal by filing both a and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her
notice of appeal and a record on appeal in the trial motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is
court, serving a copy of the notice of appeal and a because the inclusion of the properties in the
record on appeal upon the adverse party within the inventory was not yet a final determination of their
period; in addition, the appealing party shall pay ownership.
within the period for taking an appeal to the clerk of
court that rendered the appealed judgment or final On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct
order the full amount of the appellate court docket recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the
and other lawful fees. A violation of these assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in
requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of
by record on appeal, or the non-payment of the full Court,21 which also governs appeals in special
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final
fees to the clerk of the trial court may be a ground for orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that
the dismissal of the appeal. completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
Considering that the petitioner did not submit a appealable” may be the subject of an appeal in due
record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule course.
41, he did not perfect his appeal of the judgment
dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings
became final and immutable. He now has no one to as a practical recognition of the possibility that
blame but himself. The right to appeal, being material issues may be finally determined at various
statutory in nature, required strict compliance with stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109
the rules regulating the exercise of the right. As such, of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances
his perfection of his appeal within the prescribed in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in
period was mandatory and jurisdictional, and his special proceedings, viz:
failure to perfect the appeal within the prescribed Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be
time rendered the judgment final and beyond review taken. – An interested person may appeal in special
on appeal. proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court
of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
 where such order or judgment: motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a
(a) Allows or disallows a will; time when the petitioner had not even concluded
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased
person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such
the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the denial
person is entitled; of the motion did not resolve the merits of the case, as
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against something still had to be done to achieve this end.
the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on
behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee under the control of the court until the case is finally
or guardian; resolved on the merits.The court may therefore
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of modify or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds
the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a
shown at any time before final judgment.55In this
trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court
of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal light, the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution – which
shall be allowed from the appointment of a special merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as
administrator; and part of the evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 – could not
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and have attained finality (in the manner that a decision
affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless
or final order resolving the case on the merits does)
it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or
for reconsideration. despite the petitioner’s failure to move for its
reconsideration or to appeal.56
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.
interlocutory, did not come under any of the
instances in which multiple appeals are permitted. We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion
cannot be considered as a proscribed third (actually
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. second) motion for reconsideration of the
SANDIGANBAYAN Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As Section 5, Rule
The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayan’s 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the
1998 resolution. proscription against a second motion for
reconsideration is directed against "a judgment or
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line final order." Although a second motion for
between a final judgment or order and an reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be
interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition denied on the ground that it is a mere "rehash" of the
made.52 A judgment or order is considered final if the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the
order disposes of the action or proceeding court, it cannot be rejected on the ground that it is
completely, or terminates a particular stage of the forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited
same action; in such case, the remedy available to an motion.57
aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution,
however, merely resolves incidental matters and The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for
leaves something more to be done to resolve the certiorari.
merits of the case, the order is interlocutory53 and the While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory order,
aggrieved party’s remedy is a petition for certiorari as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly
under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that: conceded by the respondents, the claim that the
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of 1998 resolution should have been immediately
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not
to be done but to enforce by execution what has been grounded solely on the issuance of a disputed
determined by the court, an interlocutory order does interlocutory ruling. For a petition for certiorari to
58

not dispose of a case completely, but leaves prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
something more to be adjudicated upon. The term requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor
"final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
order which disposes of the case as to all the parties, ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved
reserving no further questions or directions for future party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari
determination. may issue notwithstanding the existence of an
available alternative remedy, if such remedy is
On the other hand, a court order is merely inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved
interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial party of the injurious effects of the order complained
proceedings yet to be had in connection with the of.59
controversy. It does not end the task of the court in
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case
their rights and liabilities as against each other. In No. 0009, the petitioner had not yet concluded the
this sense, it is basically provisional in its presentation of its evidence, much less made any
application.54 (emphasis supplied) formal offer of evidence. At this stage of the case, the
prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy of
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner certiorari to question the admission of the Bane
that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory. The deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 1st
motion, the plain remedy available to the petitioner
was to move for a reconsideration to assert and even
clarify its position on the admission of the Bane
deposition. The petitioner could introduce60 anew the
Bane deposition and include this as evidence in its
formal offer61 – as the petitioner presumably did in
Civil Case No. 0130.
G.R. No. 115104 October 12, 1998
MACAWIWILI GOLD MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILEX
MINING CORPORATION
Judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise
of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated to the
Court of Appeals in cases where the appellant raises
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
On the other hand, appeals from judgments of the
regional trial courts in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme
Court in cases where the appellant raises only
questions of law.
This procedure is now embodied in Rule 41, §2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which distinguishes the
different modes of appeal from judgments of regional
trial courts as follows:
Modes of appeal. —
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court to
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon
the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where the
law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner.
(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court
of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
shall be by petition for review in accordance with
Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only
questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal
shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
On the other hand, Rule 42 provides that appeals
from judgments of the regional trial courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction must be
brought to the Court of Appeals, whether the
appellant raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.
The rules on appeals from the judgments of the cause of action, even on the assumption that respondent does
regional trial courts in civil cases may thus be not have the right to expropriate, for the reason that an
summarized as follows: alternative statement in a pleading, if sufficient, is not vitiated by
(1) Original Jurisdiction — In all cases decided by
the regional trial court in the exercise of their
original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to:
(a) Court of Appeals — where the appellant raises
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law, by filing a mere notice of appeal.
(b) Supreme Court — where the appellant solely
raises questions of law, by filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(2) Appellate Jurisdiction
All appeals from judgments rendered by the regional
trial courts in the exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction, whether the appellant raises questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, shall
be by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.
The question is whether the issues raised in the
appeal of respondent Philex Mining are questions of
law or of fact.
[F]or a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. And the
distinction is well-known: There is a question
of law in a given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts; there is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.
The respondent's arguments may thus be
summarized as follows:
(1) Section 59, in relation to Section 53 of Presidential Decree
No. 463, expressly grants respondent the right to expropriate
mining claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by other
persons once the conditions justifying expropriation are present.
The power of eminent domain expressly granted under Sections
58 and 59 of P.D. No. 463 is not inferior to the possessory right
of other claimowners.
(2) There is nothing absurd in allowing a mining company to
expropriate land belonging to another mining company.
Pursuant to the ruling laid down in Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v.
Republic, 13 land covered by mining claims may be the subject of
expropriation. Moreover, a general grant of the power of
eminent domain only means that the court may inquire into the
necessity of the expropriation. 14
(3) Respondent could not be held guilty of forum-shopping or
subverting the Supreme Court's decision in Poe Mining v. Garcia.
Forum-shopping, which refers to filing the same or repetitious
suits, is not resorted to in the present case since respondent
seeks to expropriate petitioners' mining areas, not as operator of
the Poe mining claims, but as operator of the Nevada mining
claims.
(4) Respondent's expropriation of the land will not divide the
surface from the subsurface for the reason that respondent
seeks to expropriate all rights that petitioners, as well as the
Pigoro heirs, have over the 21.9 hectare area.
(5) The trial court erred in disregarding respondent's alternative
the insufficiency of the other alternative
statements.
The first four arguments advanced by respondent
Philex Mining raise the sole issue of whether it has,
under Presidential Decree No. 463, the right to
expropriate the 21.9 hectare mining areas where
petitioners' mining claims are located. On the other
hand, its final argument raises the issue of whether
the rules on the allegation of alternative causes of
action in one pleading under Rule 8, §1 of the Rules of
Court are applicable to special civil actions.These are
legal questions whose resolution does not require an
examination of the probative weight of the evidence
presented by the parties but a determination of what
the law is on the given state of facts. These issues
raise questions of law which should be the subject of
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed
directly with this Court. The Court of Appeals
committed a grave error in ruling otherwise.
G.R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009
JOANIE SURPOSA UY vs. JOSE NGO CHUA,
A party may directly appeal to this Court from a
decision or final order or resolution of the trial court
on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on
one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of
fact exists, on the other hand, when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the
controversy merely relates to the correct application
of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.15
The central issue in this case is whether the
Compromise Agreement entered into between
petitioner and respondent constitutes res judicata in
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still pending
before RTC-Branch 24.
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades
every well- regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon two grounds embodied in various
maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy
and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of
the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.16
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a
subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order;
(2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must
be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.17
It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-
CEB, previously before RTC-Branch 9, and Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-
Branch 24, were both actions for the issuance of a
decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner
against respondent. Hence, there is apparent identity
of parties, subject matter, and causes of action
between the two cases. However, the question arises
as to whether the other elements of res judicata exist
in this case.
The court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or
put an end to one already commenced.18 In Estate of
the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,19 the Court
pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect
of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise
agreement is a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other
contract, a compromise agreement must comply with
the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit:
(a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object
certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and
(c) cause of the obligation that is established. And,
like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise agreement must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy and public order.
Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or
public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in
and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no
legal effect at all.20
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls
attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which
states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall
be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and
respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and
approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21
February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
obviously intended to settle the question of
petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is
an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for
petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that
they are not the children of respondent, respondent
would pay petitioner and Allan ₱2,000,000.00 each.
Although unmentioned, it was a necessary
consequence of said Compromise Agreement that
petitioner also waived away her rights to future
support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of
respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement
dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and
respondent is covered by the prohibition under
Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that
the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be
no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.22
Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it
is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the into by the parties after the expiration of the
parties.23 redemption period. As can be clearly seen, the two
Being contrary to law and public policy, the cases and the appeal filed by the petitioner involved
different causes of action. Thus, the petitioner cannot
Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000
between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio be said to have engaged in forum-shopping.
and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It Neither can the petitioner be deemed to have waived
produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement its right to file this petition. Realizing that the
cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' remaining issue was a pure question of law, it
alleged performance (partial or full) of their withdrew its Notice of Appeal stating that it was
respective prestations.24 appealing the 28 January 2002 Order on both
questions of law and fact. Section 9 of Rule 41 of the
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by
Rules of Court provides that prior to the transmittal
approving the Compromise Agreement, in its Decision
of the original record, the court may allow
dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No.
withdrawal of the appeal.
8830-CEB, already made said contract valid and legal.
Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction Nothing in the Rules prevents a party from filing a
of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal. RTC- petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court after
Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give effect seasonably withdrawing the Notice of Appeal as long
to a Compromise Agreement that was contrary to law as it is done within the reglementary period and the
and public policy, even if said contract was executed issue involved is purely one of law. In this case it was
and submitted for approval by both parties. before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal
that the petitioner withdrew its Notice of Appeal to
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before
the Court of Appeals and filed with us a motion for
RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res judicata, since
extension of time to file a petition under Rule 45 of
RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its
the Rules of Court. And the petition was filed within
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
the extended period we granted, raising only one
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and
question of law.
respondent’s Compromise Agreement, which was
contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently, Nor is there a violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of
the Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special courts. Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for categorically provides that in all cases where only
having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without questions of law are raised, the appeal from a
jurisdiction, could not have attained finality or been decision or order of the Regional Trial Court shall be
considered a judgment on the merits. to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
G.R. No. 161882 July 8, 2005
BUKIDNON DOCTORS’ HOSPITAL, INC. vs. A question of law exists when the doubt or
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO, controversy concerns the correct application of law
or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the
Before filing on 4 March 2004 the petition in this case, issue does not call for an examination of the probative
the petitioner had filed two other cases, namely, (1) value of the evidence presented, the truth or
an Action for Specific Performance, Injunction, and falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact
Damages with the RTC of Malaybalay City, docketed exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
as Civil Case No. 3312-03 and (2) a Petition for truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
Corporate Rehabilitation with the RTC of Cagayan de calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly
Oro City, docketed therein as S.P. Case No. 2004-019. the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
However, these two cases involve causes of action relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as
different from the one at bar. In Civil Case No. 3312- well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
03, the petitioner sought the enforcement of the lease and the probability of the situation.15
contract between it and the respondent, with prayer As earlier stated, the only issue raised in this petition
for damages for the latter’s breach of its contractual is "whether [or] not the court a quo correctly ruled
obligation. In S.P. Case No. 2004-019, the petitioner that respondent, a former mortgagee-buyer, was still
prayed for rehabilitation pursuant to the Interim entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right as
Rules on Corporation Rehabilitation. provided under act 3135, as amended, despite a lease
Upon the other hand, in this case, the ex parte motion agreement between itself and the former mortgagor-
for a writ of possession was filed at the instance of the seller executed after respondent became the absolute
respondent. When the motion was granted, the owner of the foreclosed properties."
petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Court of This question is undoubtedly one of law. The
Appeals, which it later withdrew. Thereafter, it
existence of a lease agreement between the parties,
appealed to us via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which is a question of fact, ceased to be an issue in
questioning the propriety of the issuance of a writ of view of the admission thereof by both the petitioner
possession for the purpose of evicting the petitioner and the respondent.16 Thus, with only a question of
despite the lease agreement subsequently entered
law raised in this petition, direct resort to this Court reversal of the MTCC decision, petitioner directly
is proper. elevated the case to this Court on pure questions of
We shall now consider the issue of the propriety of law.
the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the A question of law arises when there is doubt as to
respondent. what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
The law and jurisprudence are clear that in is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, an order for a truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a questions
45

writ of possession issues as a matter of course, upon to be one of law, the same must not involve an
proper motion, after the expiration of the redemption examination of the probative value of the evidence
period without the mortgagor exercising the right of presented by the litigants or any of them. The
redemption, or even during the redemption period resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
provided a bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in law provides on the given set of circumstances.
46

case the foreclosure sale is shown to have been
conducted without complying with the requirements
of the law or without the debtor violating the
mortgage contract. The rationale for the ministerial
issuance of a writ of possession is to put the
foreclosure buyer in possession of the property sold
without delay, since the right to possession is founded
on ownership of the property.
However, in the instant case, a writ of possession was
not the correct remedy for the purpose of ousting the
petitioner from the subject premises. It must be noted
that possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right.21 It is acquired by the material
occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by
the fact that a thing or right is subject to the action of
one’s will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right.22 "By material
occupation of a thing," it is not necessary that the
person in possession should be the occupant of the
property; the occupancy can be held by another in his
name.23
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that after the
foreclosure of the property in question and the
issuance of new certificates of title in favor of the
respondent, the petitioner and the respondent
entered into a contract of lease of the subject
properties. This new contractual relation
presupposed that the petitioner recognized that
possession of the properties had been legally placed
in the hands of the respondent, and that the latter had
taken such possession but delivered it to the former
as lessee of the property. By paying the monthly
rentals, the petitioner also recognized the superior
right of the respondent to the possession of the
property as owner thereof. And by accepting the
monthly rentals, the respondent enjoyed the fruits of
its possession over the subject property.24 Clearly, the
respondent is in material possession of the subject
premises. Thus, the trial court’s issuance of a writ of
possession is not only superfluous, but improper
under the law.
G.R. No. 143331 October 5, 2007
FIVE STAR MARKETING CO., INC.vs. JAMES L. BOOC
The instant case arose from an ejectment case
commenced by the petitioner before the MTCC which
was later elevated to the RTC on appeal under Rule
40 of the Rules of Court. Aggrieved by the RTC's
In the present case, petitioner comes before this
Court raising a pure question of law. It impugns the
propriety of decision of the RTC which would remand
the ejectment case to the MTCC for the reception of
evidence and for further proceedings on the issue of
ownership of the subject property. Petitioner further
assails the finding of the RTC that the respondent was
denied due process when the MTCC decided on the
basis of the complaint alone for failure of the
respondent and his counsel to appear during the
preliminary conference. Otherwise stated, the issues
are: the effect of the non-appearance of defendant
and counsel during the preliminary conference of an
ejectment case and the propriety of remanding the
case for further proceedings.
Clearly, petitioner raises only questions of law which
require the interpretation and application of the rules
of procedure laid down by the Rules of Court.
However, considering that the assailed decision was
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction as it was brought before it from the
MTCC, petitioner should have elevated the case to the
CA under Rule 42 via the second mode of appeal,
instead of appealing directly before this Court under
Rule 45.
Petitioner, therefore, availed itself of the wrong or
inappropriate mode of appeal. On this score alone, the
petition could have been outrightly dismissed.49
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and in view of
the erroneous conclusion of the trial judge clearly
shown in the RTC decision, this Court shall proceed to
address the issues involving a well-settled question of
law.50
The MTCC was empowered to decide the case on the
basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner.
The record reveals that both the respondent and his
counsel failed to appear at the preliminary conference
scheduled on August 3, 1999. The only explanation
offered to justify their non-appearance was the
counsel's unpostponable personal engagement in
Manila, without specification as to the details thereof.
Assuming that the counsel's justification is
acceptable, the same should be applied only as an
explanation for the his non-appearance. However, no
explanation at all was offered with respect to the
respondent's failure to appear. At the very least, the
respondent should have attended the preliminary
conference notwithstanding the absence of his the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
counsel. Absent any clear justification for the party relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as
and counsel's non-appearance, the defiance of the well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
lawful order of the court as well as the well- and the probability of the situation.6
entrenched rule laid down by the rules of procedure The substantive issue posed for resolution in the
on the effect of non-appearance, cannot be allowed. present case pertains to the propriety of the issuance
To reiterate, respondent offered no explanation for of the writ of possession by the RTC. This, obviously,
his defiance of the rules on preliminary conference. is a question of law; consequently, direct resort to this
Neither did he exert effort to substantially comply by Court is proper.
appearing before the court even without his counsel. There is no question that the writ of possession
Thus, there is no reason to affirm the theory of the granted in this case was made by the RTC acting as a
RTC on the relaxation of the Rules. land registration court, after finality of its Decision
Furthermore, the RTC should have decided the case dated November 3, 1998 and the corresponding OCT
on the merits, as an appeal before it, and not prolong No. P-10053 was issued in the name of respondent.
the determination of the issues by remanding it to the As the soundness of the order granting the writ of
MTCC. It must be emphasized that in cases governed possession is a matter of judgment, the remedy is
by the Rules on Summary Procedure, no hearing is ordinary appeal by way of petition for review on
conducted; rather, the parties are required to submit certiorari. An error of judgment committed by a court
their respective position papers. On appeal to the in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the
RTC, the parties are required to submit their same as "grave abuse of discretion." Errors of
memoranda. The RTC should have decided the appeal judgment are correctible by appeal, while those of
on the basis of the records elevated by the MTCC, as jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari.7
well as the memoranda of the parties. To remand it is G.R. No. 154034 February 5, 2007
a superfluity and contrary to the summary nature of FIRST AQUA SUGAR TRADERS, INC. vs. BANK OF
the case. Finally, had the RTC decided the case in the THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
manner required, the result could only have been to
affirm the MTCC decision, since respondent did not The only issue before us is whether the notice of
contest it on the merits. appeal was filed on time.
G.R. No. 152827 February 6, 2007 The actual date of receipt of the notice of denial of the
GERARDO MENDOZA vs. SOLEDAD SALINAS motion for reconsideration dated January 30, 2001 is
a factual issue which the trial court and the Court of
On the procedural issue, it should be pointed out that Appeals have already ruled on. Accordingly, this
what petitioners filed with the Court is a petition for Court, not being a trier of facts15 and having no reason
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of to reverse the said finding, holds that the date of
Court of Court, and not a special civil action for receipt of the January 30, 2001 order was February 9,
certiorari under Rule 65. The principle of hierarchy of 2001.
courts does not find any application in this case.
Under Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, it is However, we disagree with the lower courts’ finding
provided that in all cases where only questions of law that the notice of appeal was filed late.
are raised, the appeal from a decision or order of the A party litigant may now file his notice of appeal
RTC shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for either within fifteen days from receipt of the original
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45, decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the
Section 1 of which provides: order denying the motion for reconsideration.17 Being
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A procedural in nature, Neypes is deemed to be
party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the time of its effectivity and is thus retroactive in
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other that sense and to that extent.18
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Petitioners’ notice of appeal filed on February 16,
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on 2001 was therefore well-within the fresh period of
certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of fifteen days from the date of their receipt of the
law which must be distinctly set forth. January 30, 2001 order on February 9, 2001.
A question of law exists when the doubt or G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010
controversy concerns the correct application of law ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO vs. ISMAEL VELOSO III
or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the
issue does not call for an examination of the probative Jurisprudence has settled the "fresh period rule,"
value of the evidence presented, the truth or according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC
falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15)
truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites days either from receipt of the original judgment of
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the
trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new was entered into between the parties. Since petitioner
trial or motion for reconsideration. was able to fulfill its obligation, the RTC ruled that it
In the case before us, respondent received a copy of was incumbent on respondent to pay for the services
rendered. The RTC did not give credence to
the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-
Branch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. respondent's claim that the elevator parts were never
Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days delivered and that the repairs were questionable,
thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a holding that such defense was a mere afterthought
Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The and was never raised by respondent against
RTC-Branch 227 denied respondent's Motion for petitioner at an earlier time.
Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, In reversing the RTC, the CA ruled that respondent
2003, which the respondent received on February 20, did not give its consent to the purchase of the spare
2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from parts allegedly installed in the defective elevators.
receipt of the order denying his Motion for Aside from the absence of consent, the CA also held
Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice that there was no perfected contract of sale because
of Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh period rule, there was no meeting of minds upon the price. On this
respondent was able to file his appeal well-within the note, the CA ruled that the Service Agreement did not
prescriptive period of 15 days, and the Court of give petitioner the unbridled license to purchase and
Appeals did not err in giving due course to said install any spare parts and demand, after the lapse of
appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610. a considerable length of time, payment of these prices
from respondent according to its own dictated price.
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME vs. NATIONAL LABOR The determination of whether there exists a
RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO perfected contract of sale is essentially a question
ARICAYOS of fact. It is already a well-settled rule that the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it
The Court is of the considered opinion that ever from the CA by virtue of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings
were eliminated, the legislative intendment was of fact of the CA are conclusive upon this Court. There
that the special civil action of certiorari was and are, however, recognized exceptions to the foregoing
still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of rule, namely:
decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal"
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
certiorari and the original action for certiorari are absurd, or impossible;
both modes of judicial review addressed to the (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
appellate courts. The important distinction between (4) when the judgment is based on a
them, however, and with which the Court is misapprehension of facts;
particularly concerned here is that the special civil (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
action of certiorari is within the concurrent original (6) when, in making its findings, the Court of Appeals
jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would the appellee;
not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on court;
Senate Bill No. 1495. (8) when the findings are conclusions without
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as
the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not
declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the
under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the record.17
hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the The present case falls under the 7th exception, as the
relief desired. RTC and the CA arrived at conflicting findings of fact.
G.R. No. 173881 December 1, 2010 G.R. No. 126731 July 11, 2002
HYATT ELEVATORS and ESCALATORS ESTEBAN YAU vs.THE MANILA BANKING
CORPORATION, vs. CATHEDRAL HEIGHTS CORPORATION
BUILDING COMPLEX ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Manilabank did not file a motion for reconsideration
The RTC held that based on the sales invoices of the Orders of RTC Cebu City, which directed Manila
presented by petitioner, a contract of sale of goods Golf to issue a certificate in Yau’s name, prior to
initiating its petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. implementation of the writ commences, the court
37085) in the CA. Thus, the petition before the must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
appellate court could have been dismissed outright for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power
since, as a rule, the CA, in the exercise of its original and authority to act in any manner against the
jurisdiction, will not take cognizance of a petition for defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not
certiorari under Rule 65, unless the lower court has bind the defendant.23
been given the opportunity to correct the error In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary
imputed to it. This Court has settled that as a general Attachment was issued on September 27, 1988 and
rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a implemented on October 28, 1988. However, the
condition sine qua non in order that certiorari shall alias summons was served only on January 26,
lie. However, there are settled exceptions to this 1989 or almost three months after the
Rule, one of which is where the assailed order is a implementation of the writ of attachment.
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction, which is evident in this case. The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of
Attachment on September 27 since a motion for its
The Notice of Garnishment of the Silverio share upon issuance can be filed "at the commencement of the
Manila Golf brought the property into the custodia action." However, on the day the writ was
legis of the court issuing the writ, that is, the RTC
implemented, the trial court should have, previously
Makati City Branch 64, beyond the interference of all or simultaneously with the implementation of the
other co-ordinate courts, such as the RTC of Cebu, writ, acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Yet, as
Branch 6. "The garnishment of property operates as was shown in the records of the case, the
an attachment and fastens upon the property a lien by summons was actually served on petitioner
which the property is brought under the jurisdiction several months after the writ had been
of the court issuing the writ. It is brought into implemented.
custodia legis, under the sole control of such court. A
court which has control of such property, exercises Private respondent, nevertheless, claims that the
exclusive jurisdiction over the same, retains all prior or contemporaneous service of summons
incidents relative to the conduct of such property. No contemplated in Section 5 of Rule 57 provides for
court, except one having supervisory control or exceptions. Among such exceptions are "where the
superior jurisdiction in the premises, has a right to summons could not be served personally or by
interfere with and change that possession".29 substituted service despite diligent efforts or where
the defendant is a resident temporarily absent
Thus, the doctrine of judicial stability or non- therefrom x x x." Private respondent asserts that
interference in the regular orders or judgments of a when she commenced this action, she tried to serve
co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, summons on petitioner but the latter could not be
serves as an insurmountable barrier to the located at her customary address in Kamuning,
competencia of the RTC Cebu City to entertain a Quezon City or at her new address in Guagua,
motion, much less issue an order, relative to the Pampanga.24 Furthermore, respondent claims that
Silverio share which is under the custodia legis of RTC petitioner was not even in Pampanga; rather, she was
Makati City, Branch 64, by virtue of a prior writ of in Guam purportedly on a business trip.
attachment.
Private respondent never showed that she effected
G.R. No. 125027 August 12, 2002 substituted service on petitioner after her personal
ANITA MANGILA vs. COURT OF APPEALS service failed. Likewise, if it were true that private
respondent could not ascertain the whereabouts of
A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the petitioner after a diligent inquiry, still she had some
complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the other recourse under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary
attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the The rules provide for certain remedies in cases where
commencement of the action or at any time personal service could not be effected on a party.
thereafter."21This phrase refers to the date of filing of Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that
the complaint which is the moment that marks "the whenever the defendant’s "whereabouts are
commencement of the action." The reference plainly unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
is to a time before summons is served on the inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
defendant, or even before summons issues. upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation x x x." Moreover, as private respondent
Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the also claims that petitioner was abroad at the time of
provisional remedy of attachment involves three the service of summons, this made petitioner a
stages: first, the court issues the order granting the resident who is temporarily out of the country. This is
application; second, the writ of attachment issues the exact situation contemplated in Section 16,26 Rule
pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for
the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it service of summons by publication.
is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant be first obtained. However, once the
In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons when the Garcias purchased the property in question,
belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed to it was already under a duly registered preliminary
have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the attachment. In other words, there was already notice
writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive to said purchasers (and the whole world) of the
process on petitioner without first obtaining impending acquisition by BSC, as the judgment
jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary writ of creditor, of a legal lien on the title of the Ng spouses
attachment must be served after or simultaneous as judgment debtors — in case BSC won its case in the
with the service of summons on the defendant Manila RTC.
whether by personal service, substituted service or The Garcias claim they acquired the subject property
by publication as warranted by the circumstances of by means of a deed of sale with assumption of
the case.27 The subsequent service of summons does mortgage dated June 29, 1998, meaning, they
not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction purchased the property ahead of the inscription of
over her person because the law does not allow for the levy on attachment thereon on July 27, 1998. But,
retroactivity of a belated service. even if consensual, not all contracts of sale became
G.R. No. 142013 October 15, 2002 automatically and immediately effective.15
BIÑAN STEEL CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF Apart therefrom, notwithstanding the approval of the
APPEALS
sale by mortgagee FEBTC (BPI), there was yet
another step the Garcias had to take and it was the
On August 15, 2001, a little too late, this Court issued registration of the sale from the Ngs to them. Insofar
the TRO sought by the Garcias . as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers
A year after the public auction, on August 6, 2002, the or conveys a person's interest in real property is the
Garcias, fearful of the impending consolidation of title registration of the deed.17
in favor of BSC, filed before this Court an urgent ex- Thus, when the Garcias bought the property on June
parte motion for the issuance of an order maintaining 29, 1998, it was, at that point, no more than a private
the status quo ante. They wanted to prevent the transaction between them and the Ngs. It needed to
consolidation of the title and possession by BSC until be registered before it could become binding on all
such time as the rights and interests of both sets of third parties, including BSC. It turned out that the
petitioners in the two cases before us shall have been Garcias registered it only on August 12, 1998, after
determined and finally resolved. FEBTC (now BPI) approved the sale. It was too late by
Acting on the said motion, on August 9, 2002, the then because, on July 27, 1998, the levy in favor of
Court resolved to grant the motion and directed the BSC, pursuant to the preliminary attachment ordered
parties to maintain the status quo as of August 6, by the Manila RTC, had already been annotated on the
2002. original title on file with the Registry of Deeds. This
registration of levy (or notice, in layman’s language)
It should be noted that, at the time of the attachment
now became binding on the whole world, including
of the property on July 27, 1998, the spouses Ng were
the Garcias. The rights which had already accrued in
still the registered owners of said property. It should
favor of BSC by virtue of the levy on attachment over
also be observed that the preliminary attachment in
the property were never adversely affected by the
favor of petitioner BSC was annotated and recorded
unregistered transfer from the spouses Ng to the
in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on July 27,
Garcias.
1998 in accordance with the provisions of the
Property Registration Decree (PD 1529). This We sympathize with the Garcias but, had they only
annotation produced all the effects which the law bothered to check first with the Register of Deeds of
gives to its registration or inscription.12 Quezon City before buying the property — as a
This Court has always held that attachment is a prudent buyer would have done — they would have
proceeding in rem. It is against the particular seen the warning about BSC’s superior rights over it.
property, enforceable against the whole world. The This alone should have been sufficient reason for
attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the them to back out of the deal.
attached property which ripens into a judgment It is doctrinal that a levy on attachment, duly
against the res when the order of sale is made. Such a registered, has preference over a prior unregistered
proceeding in effect means that the property attached sale and, even if the prior unregistered sale is
is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it subsequently registered before the sale on execution
to pay the owner’s debt. but after the levy is made, the validity of the execution
sale should be upheld because it retroacts to the date
In the instant case, the records reveal that the levy on
of levy. The priority enjoyed by the levy on
attachment covering the subject property was
attachment extends, with full force and effect, to the
annotated on TCT No. 11387 on July 27, 1998. The
buyer at the auction sale conducted by virtue of such
deed of sale executed on June 29, 1998 in favor of the
levy.18The sale between the spouses Ng and the
Garcias was approved by FEBTC only on August 12,
Garcias was undoubtedly a valid transaction between
1998 which was also the date when the sale was
them. However, in view of the prior levy on
registered. From the foregoing, it can be seen that,
attachment on the same property, the Garcias took
the property subject to the attachment. The Garcias, The question whether the attachment of the sixteen
in buying registered land, stood exactly in the shoes (16) buses was valid and in accordance with law,
of their vendors, the Ngs, and their title ipso facto however, has already been resolved with finality by
became subject to the incidents or results of the the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 08376. In its
pending litigation19 between the Ngs and BSC. July 31, 1987, decision, the Court of Appeals upheld
the legality of the writ of preliminary attachment SIHI
When the disputed property was consequently sold
obtained and ruled that the trial court judge acted
on execution to BSC, this auction sale retroacted to
with grave abuse of discretion in discharging the writ
the date of inscription of BSC's notice of attachment
of attachment despite the clear presence of a
on July 27, 1998. The earlier registration thus gave
determined scheme on the part of CBLI to dispose of
BSC superior and preferential rights over the
its property. Considering that the said Court of
attached property as against the Garcias22 who
Appeals decision has already attained finality on
registered their purchase of the property at a later
August 22, 1987, there exists no reason to resolve this
date. Notably, the Garcias were not purchasers for
question anew. Reasons of public policy, judicial
value in view of the fact that they acquired the
orderliness, economy and judicial time and the
property in payment of the loan earlier obtained from
interests of litigants as well as the peace and order of
them by the Spouses Ng.23
society, all require that stability be accorded the
All told, the purchaser of a property subject to an solemn and final judgments of courts or tribunals of
attachment legally and validly levied thereon is competent jurisdiction.
merely subrogated to the rights of the vendor and
G.R. No. 171124 February 13, 2008
acquires the property subject to the rights of the
ALEJANDRO NG WEE vs. MANUEL TANKIANSEE
attachment creditor. An attaching creditor who
registers the order of attachment and the sale by
In the case at bench, the basis of petitioner's
public auction of the property to him as the highest
application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
bidder acquires a superior title to the property as
attachment against the properties of respondent is
against a vendee who previously bought the same
Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which
property from the registered owner but who failed to
pertinently reads:
register his deed of sale.24
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may
Petitioners Garcias failed to show that BSC acted in
issue.-At the commencement of the action or at
bad faith which would have impelled this Court to
any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or
rule otherwise.
any proper party may have the property of the
The foregoing considerations show that the Garcias adverse party attached as security for the
are not entitled to the issuance of a writ of satisfaction of any judgment that may be
preliminary injunction from this Court. For the recovered in the following cases:
issuance of the writ to be proper, it must be shown
xxxx
that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is
material and substantial, that the right of the Garcias (d) In an action against a party who has been
is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent incurring the obligation upon which the action is
serious damage.25 Such requirements are all wanting brought, or in the performance thereof.
in the case at bar. Thus, in view of the clear and For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the
unmistakable absence of any legal basis for the applicant must sufficiently show the factual
issuance thereof, the same must be denied. circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent
G.R. No. 147950 December 11, 2003 intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC. vs. payment of the debt or failure to comply with his
STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. obligation. The applicant must then be able to
demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud
CBLI maintains that there was no basis for SIHI’s the creditor.
application for a writ of preliminary attachment. In the instant case, petitioner's October 12, 2000
According to CBLI, it committed no fraud in Affidavit34 is bereft of any factual statement that
contracting its obligation under the five promissory respondent committed a fraud. The affidavit narrated
notes because it was financially sound when it issued only the alleged fraudulent transaction between
the said notes on April 25, 1980. CBLI also asserts Wincorp and Virata and/or Power Merge, which, by
that at no time did it falsely represent to SIHI that it the way, explains why this Court, in G.R. No. 162928,
would be able to pay its obligations under the five affirmed the writ of attachment issued against the
promissory notes. According to CBLI, it was not guilty latter. As to the participation of respondent in the
of fraudulent concealment, removal, or disposal, or of
said transaction, the affidavit merely states that
fraudulent intent to conceal, remove, or dispose of its respondent, an officer and director of Wincorp,
properties to defraud its creditors; and that SIHI’s connived with the other defendants in the civil case to
bare allegations on this matter were insufficient for defraud petitioner of his money placements. No other
the preliminary attachment of CBLI’s properties.
factual averment or circumstance details how
respondent committed a fraud or how he connived
with the other defendants to commit a fraud in the
transaction sued upon. In other words, petitioner has
not shown any specific act or deed to support the
allegation that respondent is guilty of fraud.
The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ,35 must
contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed
to respondent was committed for the court to decide
whether or not to issue the writ.36 Absent any
statement of other factual circumstances to show that
respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation,
had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or
without any showing of how respondent committed
the alleged fraud, the general averment in the
affidavit that respondent is an officer and director of
Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other
defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to
support the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.37 Verily, the mere fact that respondent is
an officer and director of the company does not
necessarily give rise to the inference that he
committed a fraud or that he connived with the other
defendants to commit a fraud.
Let it be stressed that the provisional remedy of
preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous for it
exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance.41
The rules governing its issuance are, therefore,
strictly construed against the applicant,42 such that if
the requisites for its grant are not shown to be all
present, the court shall refrain from issuing it,
Considering, therefore, that, in this case, petitioner
has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show the
specific acts constitutive of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent, the trial court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of
preliminary attachment against the properties of
respondent.
G.R. No. 104875 November 13, 1992
FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Another mistaken notion entertained by petitioner
concerns the impropriety of issuing the writ of
attachment on August 11, 1989 when he "was not yet
a defendant in this case." This erroneous perception
seems to suggest that jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner, as defendant below, must initially attach
before the provisional remedy involved herein can be
requested by a plaintiff. A contrario, Chief Justice
Narvasa obliterated this unfounded assertion in
Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
(204 SCRA [1991]) whose dissertation on the subject
as related and applied to the present inquiry is quite
enlightening:
A preliminary attachment may be defined,
paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the
provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or
other proper party may, at the commencement of
the action or at any time thereafter, have the
property of the adverse party taken into the
custody of the court as security for the satisfaction
of any judgment that may be recovered. It is a
remedy which is purely statutory in respect of
which the law requires a strict construction of the
provisions granting it. Withal no principle,
statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance
by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.
Rule in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at
the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter," The phrase, "at the commencement of
the action," obviously refers to the date of the
filing of the complaint — which, as above pointed
out, is the date that marks "the commencement of
the action; and the reference plainly is to a time
before summons is served on the defendant, or
even before summons issues. What the rule is
saying quite clearly is that after an action is
properly commenced — by the filing of the
complaint and the payment of all requisite docket
and other fees — the plaintiff may apply for and
obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon
fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid
down by law, and that he may do so at any
time, either before or after service of
summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has
been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the
courts: for the plaintiff or other proper party to
incorporate the application for attachment in the
complaint or other appropriate pleading
(counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and
for the Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the
commencement application otherwise sufficient
in form and substance. (at pp. 347-350.)
Petitioner seeks to capitalize on the legal
repercussion that ipso facto took place when the
complaint against him was amended. He proffers the
idea that the extinction of a complaint via a
superseding one carries with it the cessation of the
ancilliary writ of preliminary attachment. We could
have agreed with petitioner along this line had he
expounded the adverse aftermath of an amended
complaint in his omnibus motion. But the four
corners of his motion in this respect filed on
September 5, 1990 are circumscribed by other salient
points set forth by Us relative to the propriety of the
assailed writ itself. This being so, petitioner's
eleventh hour effort in pressing a crucial factor for
exculpation must be rendered ineffective and barred
by the omnibus motion rule.
G.R. No. 147549 October 23, 2003
JESUS DELA ROSA vs. SANTIAGO CARLOS
There is no longer any issue on the lack of verification
and certification against forum shopping of the complaint
for forcible entry. The Court of Appeals itself stated in
its assailed Resolution that it was a mere "omission" by
Santiago and Teofila in their petition for review.
Santiago and Teofila failed to append to their petition for
review with the Court of Appeals the last page of the
complaint containing the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping.For the failure of Santiago and without the Spouses Dela Rosa physically possessing the
Teofila to attach to their petition the page of the Property.
complaint containing the verification and certification of Santiago and Teofila likewise challenged the validity of
non-forum shopping, the appellate court should have
the sale between their father Leonardo and the Spouses
faulted Santiago and Teofila and not the Spouses Dela Dela Rosa. The sale transpired on 1 September 1966,
Rosa. before Leonardo’s death. The Spouses Dela Rosa
Santiago and Teofila never raised as an issue the alleged registered on 6 October 1966 the Deed of Sale under Act
non-attachment to the complaint of affidavits of No. 3344 with the Registry of Deeds of Paombong,
witnesses, either in the MTC or in the RTC. In their Bulacan. If Santiago and Teofila truly believed that the
petition for review before the Court of Appeals, Santiago Deed of Sale is void, they should have filed an action to
and Teofila did not also raise this issue. The MTC and annul the same, but they did not. Santiago and Teofila
RTC apparently understood correctly that the verified questioned the validity of the Deed of Sale only when the
complaint of the Spouses Dela Rosa constitutes the Spouses Dela Rosa filed the forcible entry case.
affidavit of witnesses required under Rule 70. We rule However, Santiago and Teofila cannot properly
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the challenge the validity of the Deed of Sale in the
Spouses Dela Rosa failed to attach to their complaint the ejectment case because ejectment cases proceed
affidavits required in Sections 10 and 14 of Rule 70. independently of any claim of ownership. Santiago and
In a forcible entry case, the principal issue for resolution Teofila claim that the Deed of Sale was executed without
is mere physical or material possession (possession de the consent of Benita, Leonardo’s spouse. They also
facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) claim that the Deed of Sale was executed through fraud
nor ownership of the property involved. In the present and undue influence. However, these issues cannot
case, both parties claim prior possession of the Property. properly be addressed in the present action. These issues
The Spouses Dela Rosa claim that they have been in can only be resolved in a separate action specifically for
possession of the Property since 1966 upon the execution the annulment of the Deed of Sale. Resolution of these
of the deed of sale by Leonardo in their favor. On the issues, in turn, will determine whether the surviving heirs
other hand, Santiago and Teofila claim that they have of the Spouses Carlos are co-owners of the Property who
been continuously occupying the Property since birth and are likewise entitled to its possession. Co-ownership is
the Spouses Dela Rosa were never in possession of the only a necessary consequence of the heirs’ successional
Property. rights to the Property, if any.
While admitting that Santiago and Teofila used to reside G.R. No.147812. April 6, 2005
in the Property since birth, the Spouses Dela Rosa LEONARDO R. OCAMPO vs. LEONORA TIRONA
contend that Santiago and Teofila moved out when they
married in 1961 and 1959, respectively. According to the Unlawful Detainer Elements to be Proved
Spouses Dela Rosa, Santiago and his family live in
Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. The
Manila (at 3500-F Magsaysay Blvd., Sta. Mesa, Manila)
while Teofila occupies the lot adjacent to the Property elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful
bearing, however, the same address. Santiago and Teofila detainer cases are the fact of lease and expiration or
did not dispute these allegations by the Spouses Dela violation of its terms. To support their conclusion that
Rosa. there was an existing lease, the MTC and RTC found
that:
On the other hand, Santiago and Teofila admit that the
Spouses Dela Rosa visit the Property. Visiting the (1) Ocampo informed Tirona through a letter dated 1
Property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual March 1995 that he bought the subject land, upon
or physical possession. Even if the Spouses Dela Rosa which Tirona’s house stands, from the previous
were already residing in Manila, they could continue owner and lessor Rosauro Breton;
possessing the Property in Bulacan. The fact of their (2) Tirona’s continued occupancy of the subject land
residence in Manila, by itself, does not result in loss of signifies Tirona’s acceptance of Ocampo’s conditions
possession of the Property in Bulacan. The law does not of lease stated in the 1 March 1995 letter; and
require one in possession of a house to reside in the
house to maintain his possession. (3) In asserting her right to possess the subject land,
Tirona admitted that Ocampo is her lessor. In the 5
Santiago and Teofila likewise do not deny that the July 1995 letter, Tirona was referred to as "the
Spouses Dela Rosa renovated the house, furnished the hereinmentioned tenant of yours."27
same and constructed a perimeter fence around the
Property. Santiago and Teofila contend that these acts The following facts support the conclusion that there
did not include the right to possess physically the was a violation of the lease agreement:
Property.24 These acts of dominion are clear indications (1) Tirona, through Callejo Law Office, sent a letter
that the Spouses Dela Rosa were in possession of the dated 5 July 1995 which stated that Tirona will
Property. Santiago and Teofila failed to explain temporarily stop paying her monthly obligation until
convincingly how the Spouses Dela Rosa were able to the National Housing Authority has processed the
renovate, furnish the house and construct a perimeter pertinent papers regarding the amount due to
fence around the Property without physically possessing Ocampo in view of PD 1517;29
the Property. It is quite improbable to perform these acts
(2) As of August 1995, Tirona has not paid her rent to ownership. When the appellate court ruled that the
Ocampo corresponding to April to August 1995;30 case of unlawful detainer had to wait for the results of
and the partition proceedings, it effectively put ownership
as the main issue in the case. The issue of ownership
(3) In a letter dated 7 August 1995, Ocampo
opens a virtual Pandora’s Box for Tirona and her
demanded from Tirona unpaid rent payments.31
supposed intervenor, Maria Lourdes Breton-
In view of these facts, we hold that Tirona is estopped Mendiola.36
from denying her possession under a lease32 and that
there was a violation of the lease agreement. Thus, Interpleader
the MTC and RTC correctly ruled against Tirona. The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her
preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a
Ownership as an Issue
stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable
When Tirona filed her answer before the MTC, she diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court.
raised the issue of ownership and ascribed ownership Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a
of the subject lot to one Doña Lourdes Rodriguez suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of
Yaneza. Tirona later changed her strategy and filed an interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper
amended answer that ascribed ownership of the when the lessee does not know the person to whom
subject lot to Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. Tirona to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the
justified the amendment by stating that she did not property.
ask for the assistance of a lawyer for fear of not being
able to file her answer on time. This excuse is flimsy The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a
considering that Tirona first communicated to person who has property whether personal or real, in
Ocampo through Callejo Law Office. However, the his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or
MTC still allowed Tirona to amend her answer. Tirona partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims
stated that there was no violation of the lease an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed
agreement because she paid her rent to the real by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks
that the persons who claim the said property or who
owner, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.
consider themselves entitled to demand compliance
Contrary to Tirona’s position, the issue of ownership with the obligation, be required to litigate among
is not essential to an action for unlawful detainer. The themselves, in order to determine finally who is
fact of the lease and the expiration of its term are the entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is
only elements of the action. The defense of ownership afforded not to protect a person against a double
does not change the summary nature of the action. liability but to protect him against a double vexation
The affected party should raise the issue of ownership in respect of one liability. When the court orders that
in an appropriate action, because a certificate of title the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.33 in reality a new action and the former are styled
Although a wrongful possessor may at times be interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which
upheld by the courts, this is merely temporary and initiates the action is called a complaint of
solely for the maintenance of public order. The interpleader and not a cross-complaint.39
question of ownership is to be settled in the proper
Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject
court and in a proper action.34
land. All the elements required for an unlawful
In actions for forcible entry and [unlawful] detainer, detainer case to prosper are present. Ocampo notified
the main issue is possession de facto, independently Tirona that he purchased the subject land from
of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that Tirona’s lessor. Tirona’s continued occupation of the
either party may set forth in his pleadings, and an subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampo’s
appeal does not operate to change the nature of the terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to pay
original action. On appeal, in an ejectment case, it is rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.
within the discretion of the court to look into the
evidence supporting the assigned errors relating to Finally, legal interest at the annual rate of 6% is due
the alleged ownership of appellant insofar as said on the unpaid monthly rentals starting from 7 August
evidence would indicate or determine the nature of 1995 when Ocampo made an extrajudicial demand on
appellant’s possession of the controverted premises. Tirona for payment of the monthly rental.40 On
Said court should not however resolve the issue finality of our decision, annual interest at 12%, in lieu
raised by such assigned errors. The resolution of said of 6% annual interest, is due on the amounts the MTC
issues would effect an adjudication on ownership awarded until full payment.41
which is not sanctioned in the summary action for G.R. No. 127913 September 13, 2001
unlawful detainer.35 RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION vs.
Unlawful detainer being a summary proceeding, it METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION
was error for the appellate court to include the issue
of ownership. Had the appellate court limited its Section 1, Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court
2

ruling to the elements to be proved in a case of provides:

unlawful detainer, Ocampo need not even prove his
 Section 1. - Interpleader when proper. - Whenever the same subject matter are or may be made against
conflicting claims upon the same subject matter the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest
are or may be made against a person, who claims whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in
no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants."8
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed The decision in Civil Case No. 6202 resolved the
by the claimants, he may bring an action against conflicting claims insofar as payment of rentals was
the conflicting claimants to compel them to concerned.
interplead and litigate their several claims among Petitioner is correct in saying that it is not bound by
themselves. the decision in Civil Case No. 6202. It is not a party
It is undisputed that METROCAN filed the thereto. However, it could not compel METROCAN to
interpleader action because it was unsure which pursue Civil Case No. 4398-V-94. RCBC has other
between LEYCON and RCBC was entitled to receive avenues to prove its claim. Is not bereft of other legal
the payment of monthly rentals on the subject remedies. In fact, he issue of ownership can very well
property. LEYCON was claiming payment of the be threshed out in Civil Case No. 4037-V-93, the case
rentals as lessor of the property while RCBC was for Nullification of Extrajudicial foreclosure Sale and
making a demand by virtue of the consolidation of the Damages filed by LEYCON against RCBC.
title of the property in its name.
G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976
It is also undisputed that LEYCON, as lessor of the WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs. LEE
subject property filed an action for unlawful detainer E. WON alias RAMON LEE
against its lessee METROCAN. The issue in Civil Case The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the
No. 6202 is limited to the question of physical or Code of Civil Procedure, 2 is a remedy whereby a
material possession of the premises.3 The issue of person who has personal property in his possession,
ownership is immaterial therein4 and the outcome of or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
the case could not in any way affect conflicting claims claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks
of ownership, in this case between RCBC and that the persons who claim the said personal
LEYCON. This was made clear when the trial court, in property or who consider themselves entitled to
denying RCBC's "Motion for Inclusion x x x as an demand compliance with the obligation, be required
Indispensable Party" declared that "the final to litigate among themselves in order to determine
determination of the issue of physical possession over finally who is entitled to tone or the one thing. The
the subject premises between the plaintiff and the
remedy is afforded to protect a person not against
defendant shall not in any way affect RCBC's claims of double liability but against double vexation in respect
ownership over the said premises, since RCBC is of one liability. 3 The procedure under the Rules of
neither a co-lessor or co- lessee of the same, hence he Court 4 is the same as that under the Code of Civil
has no legal personality to join the parties herein withProcedure, 5 except that under the former the
respect to the issue of physical possession vis-a-vis remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the
the contract of lease between the parties."5 As aptly nature of the subject-matter of the controversy,
pointed by the MeTC, the issue in Civil Case No. 6202 whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is
is limited to the defendant LEYCON's breach of the proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is
provisions of the Contract of Lease Rentals.6 personal property or relates to the performance of an
Hence, the reason for the interpleader action ceased obligation.
when the MeTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. There is no question that the subject matter of the
6202 whereby the court directed METROCAN to pay present controversy, i.e., the membership fee
LEYCON "whatever rentals due on the subject certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit.
premises x x x." While RCBC, not being a party to Civil What is here disputed is the propriety and timeliness
Case No. 6202, could not be bound by the judgment of the remedy in the light of the facts and
therein, METROCAN is bound by the MeTC decision. circumstances obtaining.
When the decision in Civil Case No. 6202 became final
and executory, METROCAN has no other alternative A stakeholder 6 should use reasonable diligence to
left but to pay the rentals to LEYCON. Precisely hale the contending claimants to court. 7 He need not
because there was already a judicial fiat to await actual institution of independent suits against
METROCAN, there was no more reason to continue him before filing a bill of interpleader. 8 He should file
with Civil Case No. 4398-V-94. Thus, METROCAN an action of interpleader within a reasonable time
moved for the dismissal of the interpleader action not after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued
because it is no longer interested but because there is by either of the contending claimants. 9 Otherwise, he
no more need for it to pursue such cause of action. may be barred by laches 10 or undue delay. 11 But
where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the
It should be remembered that an action of environmental circumstances, the remedy is not
interpleader is afforded to protect a person not barred. 12
against double liability but against double vexation in
respect of one liability.7 It requires, as an Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence,
indespensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon in view of all the circumstances, such that it may
properly invoke the remedy of interpleader? We do anew against other adverse claimants, as that would
not think so. It was aware of the conflicting claims of in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.
the appellees with respect to the membership fee In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper
certificate 201 long before it filed the present
because the Corporation had already been made
interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the independently liable in civil case 26044 and,
lawful owner thereof. It was sued by Lee who also therefore, its present application for interpleader
claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final
did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had
the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself already established his rights to membership fee
therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and,
rendered against it and said judgment has already therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to
been executed. It is not therefore too late for it to establish his rights anew, and thereby increase
invoke the remedy of interpleader. instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possiblity
interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil
been rendered against him in favor of one of the case might eventually be taken away from him; and
contending claimants, 13 especially where he had because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to
notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition final judgment in the said case, its action of
of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.
judgment was entered. This must be so, because once G.R. No. L-19872 December 3, 1974
judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he EMILIANO B. RAMOSvs. GREGORIA T. RAMOS
becomes liable to the latter. 14
The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason In connection with the res judicata aspect of the case,
why it did not file an application for interpleader in it may be clarified that in the settlement of a
civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to decedent's estate it is not de rigueur (mandatory or
litigate between themselves their conflicting claims of necessary) for the heirs to sign a partition agreement.
ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment "It is the judicial decree of distribution, once final,
was rendered against it that the remedy of that vests title in the distributees" (Reyes vs.
interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too Barretto-Datu, L-17818, January 25,1967, 19 SCRA
late, because to he entitled to this remedy the 85, 91) which in this case was Judge Campbell's
applicant must be able to show that lie has not been decision (Exh. 4).
made independently liable to any of the claimants. A judgment in an intestate proceeding may be
And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee considered as a judgment in rem (Varela vs.
under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248, 267. See Sec. 49[a], Rule 39,
is clearly improper and unavailing. Rules of Court). There is a ruling that "if that decree of
Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of distribution was erroneous or not in conformity with
the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed law or the testament, the same should have been
to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had
that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader become final; its binding effect is like that of any other
suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of
case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it jurisdiction or fraud". A partition approved by the
offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to court in 1939 could no longer be contested in 1956
implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual on the ground of fraud. The action had already
situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prescribed. "The fact that one of the distributees was
prosper because it was filed much too late. a minor at the time the court issued the decree of
distribution does not imply that the court had no
To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court
jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution."
after the latter's successful establishment of his rights
(Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu, supra, citing Ramos vs.
in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate
Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 742). "A final order of distribution of
201, is to increase instead of to diminish the number
the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the
of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of
land of the estate in the distributes" (Syllabus, Santos
interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would
vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil.
lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This
895, 900).
cannot be done because having elected to take its
chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full Parenthetically, it may be noted that the filing of the
knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must instant case long after the death of Jose Ramos and
submit to the consequences of defeat. other persons involved in the intestate proceeding
Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be renders it difficult to determine with certitude
impleaded by his defeated adversary in an whether the plaintiffs had really been defrauded.
interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim G.R. No. 211356 September 29, 2014
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
MALAY, AKLAN justice may require. x x x
For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must
Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper
establish the concurrence of the following
remedy requisites, namely:
a. Declaratory relief no longer viable 1. The writ is directed against a tribunal,
Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
find merit in petitioner’s contention that the special judicial functions;
writ of certiorari, and not declaratory relief, is the 2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted
proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As provided under without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court: grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person excess of jurisdiction; and
interested under a deed, will, contract or other 3. There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and
written instrument, whose rights are affected by a adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or law.
any other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the The CA fell into a trap when it ruled that a mayor, an
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any officer from the executive department, exercises an
question of construction or validity arising, and for a executive function whenever he issues an Executive
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. x x x Order. This is tad too presumptive for it is the nature
(emphasis added) of the act to be performed, rather than of the office,
board, or body which performs it, that determines
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that whether or not a particular act is a discharge of
there has been no actual breach of the instruments judicial or quasijudicial functions. The first
involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the requirement for certiorari is satisfied if the officers
purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure act judicially in making their decision, whatever may
an authoritative statement of the rights and be their public character.
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or
contract for their guidance in the enforcement It is not essential that the challenged proceedings
thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense
issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may in which that word is used when applied to courts of
be entertained before the breach or violation of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi-judicial. To
the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A contrast, a party is said to be exercising a judicial
petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy function where he has the power to determine what
for ending controversies that have not reached the the law is and what legal rights of the parties are, and
state where another relief is immediately available; then undertakes to determine these questions and
and supplies the need for a form of action that will set adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, whereas
controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation quasi-judicial function is "a term which applies to the
of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative
of wrongs. officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement and official action and to exercise discretion of a
implementation. The closure and demolition of the judicial nature."
hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may
be issued by the trial court for carrying out the In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued
directives in the challenged EO 10. upon the respondent mayor’s finding that
Boracay West Cove’s construction, expansion, and
b. Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari operation of its hotel inMalay, Aklan is illegal.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Such a finding of illegality required the
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any respondent mayor’s exercise of quasijudicial
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi- functions, against which the special writ of
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its certiorari may lie. Apropos hereto is Our ruling in
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued:9
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate executive official nor is the matter of issuing
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. In
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and should be demolished, property rights are involved
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed
right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the G.R. No. 181303 September 17, 2009
city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers. CARMEN DANAO MALANA vs. BENIGNO TAPPA
Aside from the first requisite, We likewise hold that
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a
the third element, i.e., the unavailability of a plain,
person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or
speedy, or adequate remedy, is also present herein.
other written instrument, and whose rights are
While it may be argued that, under the LGC, Executive
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation
Orders issued by mayors are subject to review by
or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy
provincial governors,10 this cannot be considered as
includes the interpretation and determination of the
an adequate remedy given the exigencies of
validity of the written instrument and the judicial
petitioner’s predicament. In a litany of cases, we have
declaration of the parties’ rights or duties
held that it is inadequacy, not the mere absence of
thereunder.21
all other legal remedies and the danger of failure
of justice without the writ, that must usually The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is of Court, describes the general circumstances in
plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve which a person may file a petition for declaratory
the petitioner from the injurious effects of the relief, to wit:
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
appeal in order to have an order annulled and set or any other governmental regulation may, before
aside for being patently void for failure of the trial breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
court to comply with the Rules of Court. appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
Before applying this doctrine, it must first be borne in question of construction or validity arising, and for a
mind that respondents in this case have already taken declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
measures towards implementing EO 10. In fact, (Emphasis ours.)
substantial segments of the hotel have already been Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further
demolished pursuant to the mayor’s directive. It is provides in its second paragraph that:
then understandable why petitioner prayed for the
issuance of an injunctive writ––a provisional remedy An action for the reformation of an instrument, to
that would otherwise have been unavailable had he quiet title to real property or remove clouds
sought a reversal from the office of the provincial therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article
governor of Aklan. Evidently, petitioner correctly saw 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this
the urgent need for judicial intervention via Rule. (Emphasis ours.)
certiorari. The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Upon Our finding that a petition for certiorari under Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for
Rule 65 is the appropriate remedy, we will proceed to the reformation of an instrument, recognized under
resolve the core issues in view of the urgency of the Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action
reliefs prayed for in the petition. Respondents did not to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the
commit grave abuse of discretion Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership
required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale
Petitioner cannot justify his position by passing the with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are
blame onto the respondent mayor and the latter’s considered similar to declaratory relief because they
failure to act on his appeal for this does not, in any also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the
way, imply that petitioner can proceed with his
litigants, often without the need of execution to carry
infrastructure projects. On the contrary, this only the judgment into effect.
means that the decision of the zoning administrator
denying the application still stands and that To determine which court has jurisdiction over the
petitioner acquired no right to construct on the no actions identified in the second paragraph of Section
build zone. The illegality of the construction cannot 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must
be cured by merely tendering payment for the be read together with those of the Judiciary
necessary fees and permits since the LGU’s refusal Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
rests on valid grounds. It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Instead of taking the law into his own hands, Rules of Court does not categorically require that an
petitioner could have filed, as an alternative, a action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It
petition for mandamus to compel the respondent repeatedly uses the word "may" – that an action for
mayor to exercise discretion and resolve the quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on
controversy pending before his office. There is indeed petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring
an exception to the rule that matters involving to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring
judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court."
writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that
compel action in those matters, when refused.
the provision is merely permissive and indicates a demanded and respondents refused to vacate the
mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.23 subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary only subsequent to the latter’s express claim of
ownership over the subject property before the
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the
word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil petitioners’ title.
actions which involve title to or possession of real Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that
property where the assessed value does not exceed they had already been deprived of the possession
₱20,000.00, thus: of their property, the proper remedy for them is
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief.
Courts in Civil Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
Courts shall exercise:
possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a
xxxx suit that has for its object one’s recovery of
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions possession over the real property as owner.
which involve title to, possession of, real property, or Petitioners’ Complaint contained sufficient
any interest therein where the assessed value of the allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty over such an action would depend on the value of the
thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in property involved. Given that the subject property
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not herein is valued only at ₱410.00, then the MTC, not
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse
litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.) of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice,
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject petitioners’ Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack
property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is of jurisdiction.
only ₱410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners’ Complaint,
involving title to and possession of the said property acted in complete accord with law and jurisprudence,
is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the it cannot be said to have done so with grave abuse of
MTC, not the RTC. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of to have been committed in grave abuse of discretion
the instruments involved or of rights arising when the same was performed in a capricious or
thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an action for whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which hostility. No such circumstances exist herein as to
29

it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
practical remedy for ending controversies that have G.R. No. 175064 September 18, 2009
not reached the state where another relief is PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs.
immediately available; and supplies the need for a HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
form of action that will set controversies at rest
before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an Petition for Review v. Petition for Certiorari
invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.25
At the outset, the Court holds that the Court of
Where the law or contract has already been Appeals indeed committed grave abuse of discretion
contravened prior to the filing of an action for amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume erroneously and inexplicably resolving the Petition,
jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court which was initially filed by Camarines Sur before the
has no more jurisdiction over an action for Court, but later referred to the appellate court, as if
declaratory relief if its subject has already been the same were a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the of the Rules of Court. This mistake is evident in the
action.26 preliminary statement of the case, as found in the first
In the present case, petitioners’ Complaint for paragraph of the Decision dated 28 June 2004, where
quieting of title was filed after petitioners already the Court of Appeals stated that:
The petitioner Province of Camarines Sur (or actually filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45; the
Camarines Sur for brevity), represented by Gov. Luis Court of Appeals only mistook the same for a Petition
Villafuerte, asks through this Petition for Certiorari for Certiorari under Rule 65.
that the Decision of Branch 61 of the Regional Trial
Be that as it may, the Court still finds that the
Court stationed at Naga City x x x be reversed and set questions of law invoked by Camarines Sur must be
aside x x x.26 (Emphasis ours.) resolved against it.
For a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Declaratory Relief
Rules of Court to prosper, the following requisites
must be present: (1) the writ is directed against a Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any
tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or person interested in a deed, will, contract or other
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or written instrument, executive order or resolution, to
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction determine any question of construction or validity
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack arising from the instrument, executive order or
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the rights and duties thereunder.31 The only issue that
ordinary course of law.27 may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an
There is grave abuse of discretion "when there is a instrument or statute.32
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner (1) there must be a justiciable controversy between
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must persons whose interests are adverse; (2) the party
be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the controversy; and (3) the issue is ripe for judicial
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." determination.33
On the other hand, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court The Court rules that the City of Naga properly
pertains to a Petition for Review on Certiorari, resorted to the filing of an action for declaratory
whereby "a party desiring to appeal by certiorari relief.
from a judgment, final order or resolution of the x x x In the instant case, the controversy concerns the
the Regional Trial Court x x x, may file with the construction of the provisions of Republic Act No. 305
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on or the Charter of the City of Naga. Specifically, the City
certiorari. The petition may include an application for of Naga seeks an interpretation of Section 2, Article I
a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional of its Charter, as well as a declaration of the rights of
remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which the parties to this case thereunder.
must be distinctly set forth."
Clearly, the interests of the City of Naga and
A perusal of the petition referred to the Court of Camarines Sur in this case are adverse. The assertion
Appeals lays bare the fact that the same was by the City of Naga of a superior right to the
undoubtedly a Petition for Review on Certiorari administrative control and management of Plaza
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Not only does the Rizal, because said property of the public domain is
title of the Petition indicate it as such, but a close within its territorial jurisdiction, is clearly
reading of the issues and allegations set forth therein antagonistic to and inconsistent with the insistence of
also discloses that it involved pure questions of law. A Camarines Sur. The latter asserted in its Complaint
question of law arises when there is doubt as to what for Declaratory Relief and/or Quieting of Title that it
the law is on a certain state of facts. For a question to should maintain administrative control and
be one of law, the same must not involve an management of Plaza Rizal having continuously
examination of the probative value of the evidence possessed the same under a claim of ownership, even
presented by the litigants or any of them. The after the conversion of the Municipality of Naga into
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the an independent component city. The City of Naga
law provides on the given set of circumstances. The further asserted that as a result of the possession by
Court of Appeals, thus, could not fault Camarines Sur Camarines Sur, the City of Naga could not introduce
for failing to allege, much less prove, grave abuse of improvements on Plaza Rizal; its constituents were
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction denied adequate use of said property, since
on the part of the RTC when such is not required for a Camarines Sur required that the latter’s permission
Petition for Review on Certiorari. must first be sought for the use of the same; and it
Likewise, the doctrine that certiorari cannot be was still Camarines Sur that was able to continuously
resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of use Plaza Rizal for its own programs and projects. The
appeal applies only when a party actually files a City of Naga undoubtedly has a legal interest in the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of a controversy, given that Plaza Rizal is undisputedly
Petition for Review under Rule 45, since the latter within its territorial jurisdiction. Lastly, the issue is
remedy was already lost through the fault of the ripe for judicial determination in that, in view of the
petitioning party. In the instant case, Camarines Sur conflicting interests of the parties to this case,
litigation is inevitable, and there is no adequate relief and benefit of private respondents" (that is, allegedly
available in any other form or proceeding. for the private benefit of respondents) because even
before they were passed, respondent Mayor Cafe and
G.R. No. 144570 September 21, 2005
private respondents had already entered into lease
VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL vs. JOSE J. CAFE, et. al.
contracts for the construction and award of the
market stalls.29 Private respondents admitted they
Locus Standi and the Constitutionality Issue
deposited ₱40,000 each with the municipal treasurer,
We will first consider the second issue. The petition which amounts were made available to the
for declaratory relief challenged the constitutionality municipality during the construction of the stalls. The
of the subject resolutions. There is an unbending rule deposits, however, were needed to ensure the speedy
that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a completion of the stalls after the public market was
constitutional question unless the following gutted by a series of fires.30 Thus, the award of the
requisites are satisfied: (1) there must be an actual stalls was necessarily limited only to those who
case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2) the advanced their personal funds for their construction.
question before the Court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity Petitioner did not seasonably allege his interest in
of the act must have standing to do so; (4) the preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds or
the specific injury to him as a result of the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at
the earliest opportunity, and (5) the issue of enforcement of the questioned resolutions and
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the contracts. It was only in the "Remark to Comment" he
filed in this Court did he first assert that "he (was)
case.21
willing to engage in business and (was) interested to
Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal occupy a market stall."32 Such claim was obviously an
and substantial interest in a case such that he has afterthought.
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act being challenged. It calls for There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental
more than just a generalized grievance. The term importance, the following determinants formulated
"interest" means a material interest, an interest in by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the
incidental interest. Unless a person’s constitutional presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
rights are adversely affected by the statute or
respondent agency or instrumentality of the
ordinance, he has no legal standing.
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with
The CA held that petitioner had no standing to a more direct and specific interest in raising the
challenge the two resolutions/ordinances because he questions being raised.35
suffered no wrong under their terms. It also
concluded that "the issue (was) not the ordinances But, even if we disregard petitioner’s lack of legal
themselves but the award of the market stalls to the standing, this petition must still fail. The subject
private respondents on the strength of the contracts resolutions/ordinances appropriated a total of
individually executed by them with Mayor Cafe." ₱2,280,000 for the construction of the public market
Consequently, it ruled that petitioner, who was not a stalls. Petitioner alleges that these ordinances were
party to the lease contracts, had no standing to file discriminatory because, even prior to their
the petition for declaratory relief and seek judicial enactment, a decision had already been made to
award the market stalls to the private respondents
interpretation of the agreements.
who deposited ₱40,000 each and who were either
We do not agree. Petitioner brought the petition in his friends or relatives of the public respondents.
capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Petitioner asserts that "there (was) no publication or
Davao del Norte23 and not in his personal capacity. He invitation to the public that this contract (was)
was questioning the official acts of the public available to all who (were) interested to own a stall
respondents in passing the ordinances and entering and (were) willing to deposit ₱40,000." Respondents,
into the lease contracts with private respondents. A however, counter that the "public respondents’ act of
taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to entering into this agreement was authorized by the
challenge its validity. Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo per Resolution No. 180
Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove dated October 10, 1988" and that "all the people
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal interested were invited to participate in investing
expenditure of money raised by taxation. The their savings."
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State We note that the foregoing was a disputed fact which
for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act the courts below did not resolve because the case was
constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The dismissed on the basis of petitioner’s lack of legal
resolutions being assailed were appropriations standing. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to prove the
ordinances. Petitioner alleged that these ordinances subject ordinances and agreements to be
were "passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment discriminatory. Considering that he was asking this
Court to nullify the acts of the local political
department of Panabo, Davao del Norte, he should
have clearly established that such ordinances
operated unfairly against those who were not notified
and who were thus not given the opportunity to make
their deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation that the
public was not notified did not suffice. Furthermore,
there was the time-honored presumption of
regularity of official duty, absent any showing to the
contrary.
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts
of the political departments are valid, absent a clear
and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt
is to sustain. This presumption is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the
measure had first been carefully studied by the
legislative and executive departments and found to be
in accord with the Constitution before it was finally
enacted and approved.40
G.R. No. 144101 September 16, 2005
ANTONIO P. TAMBUNTING, JR. and COMMERCIAL
HOUSE OF FINANCE, INC. vs. SPOUSES EMILIO
SUMABAT and ESPERANZA BAELLO
On March 16, 1979, respondents filed an action for
declaratory relief with the CFI of Caloocan City,
Branch 33, seeking a declaration of the extent of their
actual indebtedness. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
C-7496. Nonetheless, the petition must fail.
Petitioners claim that the trial court erred when it
affirmed the validity of the consignation. They insist
that the CFI was barred from taking cognizance of the
action for declaratory relief since, petitioners being
already in default in their loan amortizations, there
existed a violation of the mortgage deed even before
the institution of the action. Hence, the CFI could not
have rendered a valid judgment in Civil Case No. C-
7496 and the consignation made pursuant to a void
judgment was likewise void. Respondents also fault
the trial court for holding that their right to foreclose
the property had already prescribed.
True, the trial court erred when it ruled that the 1981
CFI decision in Civil Case No. C-7496 was already final
and executory.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a
person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order, regulation or
ordinance before breach or violation thereof.1 The
purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties
under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance
in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach.2 It may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the
statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers.3 Where
the law or contract has already been contravened
prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief,
the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the
action.4 In other words, a court has no more
jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its
subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has
already been infringed or transgressed before the
institution of the action. Under such circumstances,
inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in
favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more
for the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment
or final order.
Here, an infraction of the mortgage terms had already
taken place before the filing of Civil Case No. C-7496.
Thus, the CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took
cognizance of the case in 1979. And in the absence of
jurisdiction, its decision was void and without legal
effect. As this Court held in Arevalo v. Benedicto:5
Furthermore, the want of jurisdiction by a court over
the subject-matter renders its judgment void and a
mere nullity, and considering that a void judgment is
in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are
divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which
neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all
acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void,
and considering further, that the decision, for want of
jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in
contemplation of law, and, hence, can never become
executory, it follows that such a void judgment cannot
constitute a bar to another case by reason of res
judicata.
Article 1142 of the Civil Code is clear. A mortgage
action prescribes after ten years.
An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage
should be enforced within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues.6 Otherwise, it will be barred
by prescription and the mortgage creditor will lose
his rights under the mortgage.
Here, petitioners’ right of action accrued in May 1977
when respondents defaulted in their obligation to pay
their loan amortizations. It was from that time that
the ten-year period to enforce the right under the
mortgage started to run. The period was interrupted
when respondents filed Civil Case No. C-6329
sometime after May 1977 and the CFI restrained the
intended foreclosure of the property. However, the
period commenced to run again on November 9, 1977
when the case was dismissed.
The respondents’ institution of Civil Case No. C-7496
in the CFI on March 16, 1979 did not interrupt the
running of the ten-year prescriptive period because,
as discussed above, the court lacked jurisdiction over
the action for declaratory relief. All proceedings
therein were without legal effect. Thus, petitioners
could have enforced their right under the mortgage,
including its foreclosure, only until November 7,
1987, the tenth year from the dismissal of Civil Case
No. C-6329. Thereafter, their right to do so was
already barred by prescription.
The foreclosure held on February 8, 1995 was
therefore some seven years too late. The same thing
can be said about the public auction held on March
27, 1995, the consolidation of title in CHFI’s favor and
the issuance of TCT No. 310191 in its name. They
were all void and did not exist in the eyes of the law.
G.R. No. L-60403 August 3, 1983
ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS vs. THE
HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR and
EMPLOYMENT
At the outset, the petitioners are faced with a
procedural barrier. The petition is one for declaratory
relief, an action not embraced within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Remotigue v.
Osmena,, Jr., 21 SCRA 837; Rural Bank of Olongapo v.
Commission of Land Registration, 102 SCRA 794; De la
Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294). There is no statutory or
jurisprudential basis for the petitioners' statement
that the Supreme Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over declaratory relief suits where only
questions of law are involved. Jurisdiction is
conferred by law. The petitioners have not pointed to
any provision of the Constitution or statute which
sustains their sweeping assertion. On this ground
alone, the petition could have been dismissed
outright.
Following similar action taken in Nacionalista Party v. before the Supreme Court. A petition for declaratory
Angelo Bautista (85 Phil. 101) and Aquino v. relief is not among the petitions within the original
Commission on Elections (62 SCRA 275) we have, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only
however, decided to treat the petition as one for
mandamus. The petition has far reaching implications Thus, the present petition should be dismissed on this
and raises questions that should be resolved.
The issue raised in this petition, however, is more
basic and fundamental than a mere ascertainment of
intent or a construction of statutory provisions. It is
concerned with a revisiting of the traditional
classification of government employment into
governmental functions and proprietary functions
and of the many ramifications that this dichotomous
treatment presents in the handling of concerted
activities, collective bargaining, and strikes by
government employees to wrest concessions in
compensation, fringe benefits, hiring and firing, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
The workers in the respondent institutions have not
directly petitioned the heads of their respective
offices nor their representatives in the Batasang
Pambansa. They have acted through a labor
federation and its affiliated unions. In other words,
the workers and employees of these state firms,
college, and university are taking collective action
through a labor federation which uses the bargaining
power of organized labor to secure increased
compensation for its members.
Under the present state of the law and pursuant to
the express language of the Constitution, this resort to
concerted activity with the ever present threat of a
strike can no longer be allowed.
The general rule in the past and up to the present is
that "the terms and conditions of employment in the
Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section
11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended
and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
amended). Since the terms and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector to secure
concessions from their employers. It is the legislature
and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the
terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars,
rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements.
G.R. No. 91500 October 18, 1990
ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC. vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
The petition seeks a declaration of the
unconstitutionality and/or nullity of Presidential
Decree No. 576-A. As such, it must be treated as one
seeking declaratory relief. Such an action should be
brought before the Regional Trial Court and not
questions of law are involved.
score.
Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy
involving the law sought to be annulled. Petitioner
does not allege that it has filed an application for a
license to operate a radio or television station in
excess of the authorized number and that the same is
being denied or refused on the basis of the
restrictions under Presidential Decree No. 576-A.
Petitioner does not also allege that it had been
penalized or is being penalized for a violation under
said Decree. There is, likewise, no allegation that any
of the petitioner's stations had been confiscated or
shut down pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 576-A.
Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being
raised in the context of a specific case or controversy
wherein the petitioner has asserted his rights. All that
petitioner seeks is the nullification of Presidential
Decree No. 576-A and the reinstatement of its rights
under Republic Act No. 3001.
Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial
power is "the right to determine actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants."
The allegation of petitioner that its petition should be
treated as a petition for prohibition does not place
petitioner in any better position. The petition cannot
be considered as one for prohibition as it does not
seek to prohibit further proceedings being conducted
by any tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising judicial or ministerial functions. Petitioner the actual occupants of certain portions of the Maysilo
does not claim that it has a pending application for a Estate.
broadcast license which is about to be denied under Be that as it may, the second requisite in an action for
Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Apparently, what
quieting of title requires that the deed, claim,
petitioner seeks to prohibit is the possible denial of encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
an application it may make to operate radio or cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
television stations on the basis of the restrictions or inoperative despite its primafacie appearance of
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, validity or legal efficacy.
the petition is premature.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud
Petitioner prays for reinstatement of its rights under from being cast upon title to real property or any
its original franchise. Reinstatement is an affirmative interest therein.
remedy and cannot be secured through a writ of
prohibition which is essentially a preventive and not Thus, the cloud on title consists of: (1) any
a corrective remedy. It cannot correct an act that is a instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
fait accompli. proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective;
(3) but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
G.R. No. 167391 June 8, 2011 voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be
PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted. The
CORPORATION vs. MAXIMO BONIFACIO fourth element is not present in the case at bar.
In order that an action for quieting of title may While it is true that TCT No. C-314537 in the name of
prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff Eleuteria Rivera is an instrument that appeared to be
or complainant has a legal or equitable title or valid but was subsequently shown to be invalid, it
interest in the real property subject of the action; and does not cover the same parcels of land that are
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding described in petitioner’s titles. Foremost, Rivera’s
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown title embraces a land measuring 14,391.54 square
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its meters while petitioner’s lands has an aggregate area
primafacie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.40 of only 8,694 square meters. On the one hand, it may
be argued that petitioner’s land could be subsumed
As regards the first requisite, we find that petitioner within Rivera’s 14,391.54-square meter property. Yet,
was able to establish its title over the real properties a comparison of the technical descriptions of the
subject of this action. Petitioner submitted in parties’ titles negates an overlapping of their
evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale41 by which it boundaries.
acquired the subject property from N. Dela Merced
and Sons, Inc., as well as copies of OCT No. 994 dated Such disparity in location is more vividly illustrated in
May 3, 1917 and all the derivative titles leading to the the Plan prepared by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief of
issuance of TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923 in the Geodetic Surveys Division, showing the relative
petitioner’s name. positions of Lots 23 and 23-A. As it appears on the
Plan, the land covered by respondents’ TCT No. C-
The Death Certificate of Eleuteria Rivera reveals that 314537 lies far west of petitioner’s lands under TCT
she was 96 years old when she died on February 22, Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923. Strictly speaking,
1997. That means that she must have been born in therefore, the existence of TCT No. C-314537 is not
1901. That makes Rivera two years older than her prejudicial to petitioner’s titles insofar as it pertains
alleged grandmother Maria de la Concepcion Vidal to a different land.
who was born in 1903. Hence, it was physically
impossible for Eleuteria Rivera to be an heir of Maria Significantly, an action to quiet title is characterized
de la Concepcion Vidal. as a proceeding quasi in rem.56 In an action quasi in
rem, an individual is named a defendant and the
Moreover, the Partition Plan of the Maysilo Estate purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests to
shows that Lot 23-A was awarded, not to Maria de la the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions
Concepcion Vidal, but to Isabel Tuason, Esperanza quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or
Tuason, Trinidad Jurado, Juan O’ Farrell and Angel O’ liability of a particular property but which are
Farrell.53 What Vidal received as her share were Lot 6 intended to operate on these questions only as
and portions of Lots 10 and 17, all subject to the between the particular parties to the proceedings and
usufructuary right of her mother Mercedes Delgado. not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all
This was not at all disputed by respondents. possible claimants. The judgment therein is binding
On the other hand, Vedasto Galino, who was the only upon the parties who joined in the action.57
holder of TCT No. 8004 registered on July 24, 1923 Yet, petitioner was well aware that the lots
and to whom petitioner traces its titles, was among encompassed by its titles are not the same as that
the successful petitioners in Civil Case No. 391 covered by respondents’ title. In its complaint, Phil-
entitled Rosario Negrao, et al. v. Concepcion Vidal, et Ville alleges:
al., who sought the issuance of bills of sale in favor of
27.4. That Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo Estate, as has nevertheless successfully established its
described in said TCT No. C-314537 of the late ownership over the subject properties and the
Eleuteria Rivera when plotted using its tie line to validity of its titles which entitles it to declaratory
MBM No. 1, Caloocan Cadastre is outside Lot 23-A of relief.
the Maysilo Estate. This must be so because Lot 23 is G.R. No. 143797 May 4, 2006
not [a] portion of Lot 23-A, Maysilo Estate….58 CARLITO L. MONTES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
This brings petitioner’s action within the purview of
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court on Declaratory Relief. The pivotal issue here is whether Montes is entitled
Section 1 of Rule 63 provides: to the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining the
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.-Any person DOST Secretary from enforcing the suspension order.
interested under a deed, will, contract or other Montes’ petition for certiorari prayed, among others,
written instrument, whose rights are affected by a that the appellate court issue an order "restraining
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or the Honorable Secretary, Department of Science and
any other governmental regulation may, before Technology from implementing the Order dated 02
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the March 2000."27 Montes’ motion for reconsideration
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any likewise prayed that "(t)he implementation of the
question of construction or validity arising, and for suspension for one year from the service without pay
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. of the herein petitioner be restrained (subject of the
assailed OMB Decision and Order). . ."28 In the present
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to
petition, Montes prays that "(a)n order be issued to
quiet title to real property or remove clouds
restrain the Honorable Secretary, DOST from
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article
implementing the Suspension Order on the herein
1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this
petitioner."29
Rule. (Emphasis supplied).
Clearly, the relief sought from the appellate court is
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that
the same as the relief prayed for in the present
there has been no actual breach of the instruments
petition—that is, that an order be issued restraining
involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the
the DOST Secretary from implementing the
purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure
Ombudsman’s Order. In filing the instant petition
an authoritative statement of the rights and
without awaiting the resolution of his pending motion
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or
before the appellate court, Montes asked for
contract for their guidance in the enforcement
simultaneous remedies in two different fora. This act
thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle
is censurable and serves as a ground for the dismissal
issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may
of the instant case with prejudice.
be entertained before the breach or violation of the
statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition Moreover, we find that Montes failed to adequately
for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for show that there is no appeal or any other plain,
ending controversies that have not reached the state speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
where another relief is immediately available; and of law to warrant the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
supplies the need for a form of action that will set For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he
controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be
of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or
of wrongs. person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial;
In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has
quieting of title after it was served a notice to vacate acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
but before it could be dispossessed of the subject grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal
properties. Notably, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
SP No. 43034, had earlier set aside the Order which the ordinary course of law.30
granted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria Rivera A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if
and the Writ of Possession issued pursuant thereto. it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
And although petitioner’s complaint is captioned as injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or
Quieting of Title and Damages, all that petitioner resolution of the lower court or agency.31
prayed for, is for the court to uphold the validity of its
titles as against that of respondents’. This is When the DOST issued the assailed suspension order
on 28 June 2000, Montes’ motion for reconsideration
consistent with the nature of the relief in an action for
declaratory relief where the judgment in the case can was still pending before the appellate court. Montes
be carried into effect without requiring the parties to thus had the remedy of filing a petition for
pay damages or to perform any act.59 prohibition before the appellate court as an incident
of the petition for certiorari and motion for
Thus, while petitioner was not able to demonstrate reconsideration he had previously filed therewith.
that respondents’ TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Had Montes brought the instant petition before the
Eleuteria Rivera constitutes a cloud over its title, it Court of Appeals, the same could, and would, have
been consolidated with his petition for certiorari, the suspension order which impelled him to abandon
thereby bringing under the competence of the said his motion for reconsideration also rendered the
court all matters relative to the action, including the instant petition academic.
incidents thereof.
As the present petition is one for prohibition which is
Evidently too, Montes disregarded the doctrine of a preventive remedy, worthy of note is the fact, as
judicial hierarchy which we enjoin litigants and manifested by the petitioner himself, that the
lawyers to strictly observe as a judicial policy. For this suspension order has already been implemented on
reason, the instant petition should be dismissed. As 17 July 2000.35 The act sought to be enjoined having
we ruled in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,32to wit: taken place already, there is nothing more to restrain.
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must G.R. No. 162571 June 15, 2005
so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the ARNEL L. AGUSTIN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter
and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in child and denies the genuineness and authenticity of
the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the the child’s birth certificate which he purportedly
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised signed as the father. He also claims that the order and
only where absolutely necessary or where serious resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court
and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that of Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to support to a petition for recognition, which is
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or supposedly proscribed by law. According to
before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no
agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are right to ask for support and must first establish his
not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the filiation in a separate suit under Article 28317 in
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the relation to Article 26518 of the Civil Code and Section
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional 1, Rule 10519 of the Rules of Court.
Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the The petitioner’s contentions are without merit.
specific action for the writ’s procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the The assailed resolution and order did not convert the
policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers action for support into one for recognition but merely
must strictly observe.33 allowed the respondents to prove their cause of
action against petitioner who had been denying the
The Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of authenticity of the documentary evidence of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution
habeas corpus and injunction is not exclusive. It is and order effectively integrated an action to compel
shared by this Court with the Regional Trial Courts recognition with an action for support, such was valid
and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of and in accordance with jurisprudence.
jurisdiction however should not be taken to mean
that the parties have an absolute, unrestrained Although petitioner contends that the complaint filed
freedom of choice of the court to which they will file by herein private respondent merely alleges that the
their application or petition. There is an ordained minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the
sequence of recourse to courts vested with deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from
concurrent jurisdiction, beginning from the lowest, on the allegations therein the same may be considered as
to the next highest, and ultimately to the highest. This one to compel recognition. Further, that the two
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, causes of action, one to compel recognition and
and is likewise determinative of the proper forum for the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in
petitions for extraordinary writs. A direct invocation one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in
these writs should be allowed only when there are Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we
special and important reasons therefore, clearly and said:
specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent The question whether a person in the position of the
inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex
attention which are better devoted to those matters action to compel recognition as a natural child and at
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent the the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character
further clogging of the Court’s docket.34 of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must
be answered in the affirmative, provided always that
In this regard, the Court notes that Montes implicitly the conditions justifying the joinder of the two
confirmed that he committed forum shopping by distinct causes of action are present in the particular
stating that he had to file the instant petition before case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity
this Court in view of the denial of his motion for requiring that the action to compel
reconsideration before the appellate court. Montes acknowledgment should have been instituted and
failed to consider that the same implementation of prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the
action in which that same plaintiff seeks or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
here applied different from that generally applicable remedy in the ordinary course of law."
in other cases. x x x In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or
explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse
some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The
we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction
must be considered well settled, that a natural in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any
child having a right to compel acknowledgment, error made would have only been an error in
but who has not been in fact legally judgment. As we have discussed, however, the
acknowledged, may maintain partition decision of the respondent court, being firmly
proceedings for the division of the inheritance anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.
against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the
G.R. No. 184045 January 22, 2014
estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J.
In neither of these situations has it been thought MARQUEZvs. SPOUSES CARLITO ALINDOG AND
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree CARMEN ALINDOG
compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is
that in partition suits and distribution proceedings PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
the other persons who might take by inheritance are
before the court; and the declaration of heirship is Records show that sometime in June 1998, petitioner
appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring Anita J. Marquez extended a loan in the amount of
supplied) ₱500,000.00 to a certain Benjamin Gutierrez. As
security therefor, Gutierrez executed a Deed of Real
Although the instant case deals with support rather Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land located in
than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale Tagaytay City with an area of 660 square meters,
for integrating them remains the same. Whether or more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends
(TCT) No. T-134437 (subject property), registered
completely on the determination of filiation. A under the name of Benjamin A. Gutierrez, married to
separate action will only result in a multiplicity of Liwanag Camerin (Sps. Gutiererez). The mortgage
suits, given how intimately related the main issues in was duly annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No.
both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration T-13443, which Sps. Marquez had verified as clean
of filiation is entirely appropriate to these prior to the mortgage.8
proceedings.
Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it obligation, Anita sought the extra-judicial foreclosure
relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in of the subject property. At the public auction sale held
its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert on January 19, 2000, Anita emerged as the highest
test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained bidder for the amount of ₱1,171,000.00.9 Upon
through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and Gutierrez’s failure to redeem the same property
which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant within the prescribed period therefor, title was
and reliable since it is reasonably based on consolidated under TCT No. T-4193910 on November
scientifically valid principles of human genetics and 5, 2001 (in the name of Anita J. Marquez, married to
molecular biology. Nicasio C. Marquez) which, however, bore an
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the annotation of adverse claim dated March 2, 2000 in
right to privacy does not bar all incursions into the names of respondents-spouses Carlito and
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle Carmen Alindog (Sps. Alindog). Said annotation was
scientific and technological advancements that copied from an earlier annotation on TCT No. T-
enhance public service and the common good... 13443 made only after the subject property’s
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by mortgage to Sps. Marquez.
proper safeguards that enhance public service and Subsequently, or on March 21, 2000, Sps. Alindog
the common good. filed a civil case for annulment of real estate mortgage
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of and certificate of sale with prayer for damages
discretion on the part of the public respondent for against Sps. Marquez and a certain Agripina Gonzales
upholding the orders of the trial court which both (Gonzales) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and ordered TG-1966 (annulment case). In their complaint,12 Sps.
him to submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 Alindog alleged that they purchased13 the subject
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of property from Gutierrez way back in September
certiorari is only available "when any tribunal, board 1989, but were unable to secure a certificate of title in
their names because Gonzales – to whom they have registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of
entrusted said task – had deceived them in that they property with Torrens title; and upon the filing of
were assured that the said certificate was already such motion and the approval of the corresponding
being processed when such was not the case.14 bond, the law also in express terms directs the court
Eventually, they found out that the property had to issue the order for a writ of possession. Under the
already been mortgaged to Sps. Marquez, and that legal provisions above copied, the order for a writ of
when they tried to contact Gonzales for an possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing
explanation, she could no longer be found. Separately, of the proper motion and the approval of the
Sps. Alindog averred that when the mortgage was corresponding bond. No discretion is left to the court.
executed in favor of Sps. Marquez, Gutierrez was And any question regarding the regularity and
already dead.15 validity of the sale (and the consequent cancellation
of the writ) is left to be determined in a subsequent
In their defense,16 Sps. Marquez disputed Sps.
proceeding as outlined in section 8. Such question is
Alindog’s ownership over the subject property,
not to be raised as a justification for opposing the
arguing that the purported sale in the latter’s favor
issuance of the writ of possession, since, under the
was never registered and therefore, not binding upon
Act, the proceeding for this is ex parte.
them. Further, they insisted that their certificate of
title, TCT No. T-41939, was already indefeasible, and Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers
cannot be attacked collaterally. to a situation wherein the purchaser seeks possession
Meanwhile, on March 16, 2005, Anita filed an ex-parte of the foreclosed property during the 12-month
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession (ex- period for redemption. Upon the purchaser’s filing of
parte petition) before the RTC claiming that the same the ex parte petition and posting of the appropriate
is ministerial on the court’s part following the bond, the RTC shall, as a matter of course, order the
consolidation of her and her husband’s title over the issuance of the writ of possession in the purchaser’s
subject property. Impleaded in said petition are Sps. favor.
Gutierrez, including all persons claiming rights under The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in
them. favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure
sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33,
ISSUE
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules) pertinently
Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave provides that the possession of the mortgaged
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-
issued the injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually
Marquez from taking possession of the subject holding the property by adverse title or right. In the
property. recent case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc.
The Court’s Ruling v. Centeno,46 citing the case of China Banking Corp.,
the Court illumined that "the phrase ‘a third party
The petition is meritorious. who is actually holding the property adversely to the
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an judgment obligor’ contemplates a situation in which a
extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the third party holds the property by adverse title or
possession of the property and can demand that he be right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or
placed in possession of the same either during (with usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and
bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the usufructuary possess the property in their own right,
redemption period therefor. To this end, the Court, in and they are not merely the successor or transferee of
China Banking Corp. v. Sps. Lozada41 (China Banking the right of possession of another co-owner or the
Corp.), citing several cases on the matter, explained owner of the property. Notably, the property should
that a writ of possession duly applied for by said not only be possessed by a third party, but also held
purchaser should issue as a matter of course, and by the third party adversely to the judgment obligor."
thus, merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the part In other words, the third person must therefore claim
of the court, viz.: a right superior to that of the original mortgagor.
The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of
estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135, as possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, who had already
amended. The purchaser at the public auction sale of consolidated their title over the extra-judicially
an extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in nature.
possession thereof in accordance with Section 7 of The general rule as herein stated – and not the
Act No. 3135, as amended exception found under Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules – should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their
The Court expounded on the application of the
claim over the subject property on their purported
foregoing provision in De Gracia v. San Jose, thus:
purchase of the same from its previous owner, i.e.,
As may be seen, the law expressly authorizes the Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the original
purchaser to petition for a writ of possession during mortgagor). Accordingly, it cannot be seriously
the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion doubted that Sps. Alindog are only the latter’s (Sps.
under oath for that purpose in the corresponding
Gutierrez) successors-in-interest who do not have a one who has a clear legal right to the performance of
right superior to them. the act to be compelled.
That said, the RTC therefore gravely abused its
discretion when it issued the injunctive writ which
enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the
subject property. To be sure, grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.49 Here, while the RTC had initially
issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, it
defied existing jurisprudence when it effectively
rescinded the said writ by subsequently granting Sps.
Alindog's prayer for injunctive relief. The RTC's
finding anent the initial evidence adduced by Sps.
Alindog constitutes improper basis to justify the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in their
favor since, in the first place, it had no authority to
exercise any discretion in this respect. Jurisprudence
is clear on the matter: without the exception under
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules availing, the issuance
of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of an
extra-judicially foreclosed property - such as Sps.
Marquez in this case - should come as a matter of
course, and, in such regard, constitutes only a
ministerial duty on the part of the court. Besides, it
was improper for the RTC to have issued a writ of
preliminary injunction since the act sought to be
enjoined, i.e., the implementation of the writ of
possession, had already been accomplished in the
interim and thus, rendered the matter moot. Case law
instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts
sought to be enjoined had already become fait
accompli (meaning, an accomplished or
consummated act). Hence, since the consummation of
the act sought to be restrained had rendered Sps.
Alindog's injunction petition moot, the issuance of the
said injunctive writ was altogether improper.
All told, by acting averse to well-settled
jurisprudential rules and resultantly depriving Sps.
Marquez of their right of possession over the subject
property, the Court therefore concludes that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in this case. In effect, the
CA's contrary ruling thereto is hereby reversed and
set aside, which consequentially leads to the
nullification of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC in favor of Sps. Alindog, and the
reinstatement of the writ of possession issued by the
same court in favor of Sps. Marquez. It must, however,
be noted that these pronouncements are without
prejudice to any separate action which Sps. Alindog
may file in order to recover ownership of the subject
property.
G.R. No. 160932 January 14, 2013
SPECIAL PEOPLE INC. FOUNDATION vs. NESTOR M. Mandamus
CANDA petitioner
The peremptory writ of mandamus is an We dismiss the present recourse because the
extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme petitioner failed to exhaust the available
necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is administrative remedies, and because it failed to
powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to
The petition for review is denied for its lack of merit.
1.
Petitioner’s appeal is improper under Rule 45,
Rules of Court
This appeal by certiorari is being taken under Rule
45, Rules of Court, whose Section 1 expressly requires
that the petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth. Yet, the petitioner
hereby raises a question of fact whose resolution is
decisive in this appeal. That issue of fact concerns
whether or not the petitioner established that its
project was not located in an environmentally critical
area. For this reason, the Court is constrained to deny
due course to the petition for review.
It is a settled rule, indeed, that in the exercise of our
power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re-examination of
the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial of the case. The Court relies on the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals or of the trial
court, and accepts such findings as conclusive and
binding unless any of the following exceptions
obtains, namely:
(a) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
(c) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
or the trial court went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(h) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent;
(j) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; and
(k) when the Court of Appeals or the trial court
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.15 However, none
of the aforementioned exceptions applies herein.
2.
was an improper remedy for
show that it was legally entitled to demand the Moreover, the petitioner states in its pleadings that it
performance of the act by the respondents. had a pending appeal with the DENR Secretary.
It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks However, the records reveal that the subject of the
appeal of the petitioner was an undated resolution of
the intervention of a court of law upon an
administrative concern should first avail himself of all the DENR Regional Director, Region VII, denying its
the remedies afforded by administrative processes. application for the CNC, not the decision of RD
24

The issues that an administrative agency is Lipayon. Nonetheless, even assuming that the
authorized to decide should not be summarily taken pending appeal with the DENR Secretary had related
away from it and submitted to a court of law without to RD Lipayon’s decision, the petitioner should still
first giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of have waited for the DENR Secretary to resolve the
the issues upon due deliberation.16 The court of law appeal in line with the principle of exhaustion of
must allow the administrative agency to carry out its administrative remedies. Its failure to do so rendered
functions and discharge its responsibilities within the its resort to mandamus in the RTC premature. The
specialized areas of its competence.17 This rests on omission is fatal, because mandamus is a remedy only
the theory that the administrative authority is in a when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 25
better position to resolve questions addressed to its
particular expertise, and that errors committed by Another reason for denying due course to this review
subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by is that the petitioner did not establish that the grant
their superiors if given a chance to do so.18 of its application for the CNC was a purely ministerial
The records show that the petitioner failed to exhaust in nature on the part of RD Lipayon. Hence,
the available administrative remedies. At the time RD mandamus was not a proper remedy.
Lipayon denied the petitioner’s application for the The CNC is a certification issued by the EMB certifying
CNC, Administrative Order No. 42 dated November 2, that a project is not covered by the Environmental
200219 had just vested the authority to grant or deny Impact Statement System (EIS System) and that the
applications for the ECC in the Director and Regional project proponent is not required to secure an
Directors of the EMB. Notwithstanding the lack of a ECC.26The EIS System was established by Presidential
specific implementing guideline to what office the Decree (P.D.) No. 1586 pursuant to Section 4 of P.D.
ruling of the EMB Regional Director was to be No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) that
appealed, the petitioner could have been easily required all entities to submit an EIS for projects that
guided in that regard by the Administrative Code of would have a significant effect on the environment.
1987, which provides that the Director of a line The foregoing considerations indicate that the grant
bureau, such as the EMB,20 shall have supervision and or denial of an application for ECC/CNC is not an act
control over all division and other units, including that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that
regional offices, under the bureau.21 Verily, involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by
supervision and control include the power to "review, the EMB Director or Regional Director, who must
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of determine whether the project or project area is
subordinate officials or units."22 Accordingly, the classified as critical to the environment based on the
petitioner should have appealed the EMB Regional documents to be submitted by the applicant.
Director’s decision to the EMB Director, who
exercised supervision and control over the former.The petitioner maintains that RD Lipayon already
exercised his discretion in its case when he made his
It is relevant to mention that the DENR later finding that the application substantially complied
promulgated Administrative Order No. 2003-3023 in with the procedural requirements for review. As such,
order to define where appeals should be taken, he was then obliged to issue the CNC once the
providing as follows: petitioner had submitted the required certifications.
Section 6. Appeal The petitioner errs on two grounds.
Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his
ECC/CNC applications may, within 15 days from discretion with regard to the CNC application when
receipt of such decision, file an appeal on the he made his finding. It is clear that his finding
following grounds: referred to the "procedural requirements for review"
a. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the only. He had still to decide on the substantive aspect
deciding authority, or of the application, that is, whether the project and the
project area were considered critical to the
b. Serious errors in the review findings.
environment. In fact, this was the reason why RD
The DENR may adopt alternative conflict/dispute Lipayon required the petitioner to submit
resolution procedures as a means to settle grievances certifications from the various government agencies
between proponents and aggrieved parties to avert concerned. Surely, the required certifications were
unnecessary legal action. Frivolous appeals shall not not mere formalities, because they would serve as the
be countenanced. bases for his decision on whether to grant or deny the
application.
Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the and ordinary modes of proceeding and forms of
petitioner satisfactorily complied with the remedy are powerless to afford redress to a party
requirement to submit the needed certifications. For aggrieved, and where without its aid there would be a
one, it submitted no certification to the effect that the failure of justice.37
project site was not within a critical slope. Also, the The writ of mandamus has also retained an important
PHIVOLCS’s certification showed that the project site feature that sets it apart from the other remedial
had experienced an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, writs, i.e., that it is used merely to compel action and
a fact that sufficed to place the site in the category of to coerce the performance of a pre-existing duty.38 In
"areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural fact, a doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence
calamities." Clearly, the petitioner failed to establish is that mandamus will issue only when the petitioner
that it had the legal right to be issued the CNC applied has a clear legal right to the performance of the act
for, warranting the denial of its application. sought to be compelled and the respondent has an
The writ of mandamus is of very ancient and obscure imperative duty to perform the same.39 The petitioner
origin. It is believed that the writ was originally part bears the burden to show that there is such a clear
of the class of writs or mandates issued by the English legal right to the performance of the act, and a
sovereign to direct his subjects to perform a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the
particular act or duty.28 The earliest writs were in the respondent to perform the act.40
form of letters missive, and were mere personal A key principle to be observed in dealing with
commands. The command was a law in itself, from petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary
which there was no appeal. The writ of mandamus remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that
was not only declaratory of a duty under an existing are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are
law, but was a law in itself that imposed the duty, the discretionary.41 A purely ministerial act or duty is one
performance of which it commanded.29 The King was that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
considered as the fountain and source of justice, and facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
when the law did not afford a remedy by the regular mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
forms of proceedings, the prerogative powers of the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or
sovereign were invoked in aid of the ordinary powers
impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial
of the courts.30 only when its discharge requires neither the exercise
A judicial writ of mandamus, issued in the King’s of official discretion or judgment.42
name out of the court of King’s Bench that had a
The petitioner's disregard of the foregoing
general supervisory power over all inferior fundamental requisites for mandamus rendered its
jurisdictions and officers, gradually supplanted the petition in the RTC untenable and devoid of merit.
old personal command of the sovereign.31 The court
of King’s Bench, acting as the general guardian of G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
public rights and in the exercise of its authority to SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R.
grant the writ, rendered the writ of mandamus the DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M.
suppletory means of substantial justice in every case GONZALES
where there was no other specific legal remedy for a
legal right, and ensured that all official duties were The petition for certiorari, prohibition and
fulfilled whenever the subject-matter was properly mandamus, being bereft of substance and merit, is
within its control.32 Early on, the writ of mandamus dismissed.
was particularly used to compel public authorities to Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the
return the petitioners to public offices from which hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court
they had been unlawfully removed.33 with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
Mandamus was, therefore, originally a purely mandamus without tendering therein any special,
prerogative writ emanating from the King himself, important or compelling reason to justify the direct
superintending the police and preserving the peace filing of the petition.
within the realm.34 It was allowed only in cases Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the
affecting the sovereign, or the interest of the public at Court is not the only judicial forum from which to
large.35 The writ of mandamus grew out of the seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances.
necessity to compel the inferior courts to exercise As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court
judicial and ministerial powers invested in them by of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings
restraining their excesses, preventing their the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
negligence and restraining their denial of justice.36 prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of
Over time, the writ of mandamus has been stripped of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance
its highly prerogative features and has been of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section
assimilated to the nature of an ordinary remedy. 4 of Rule 65.
Nonetheless, the writ has remained to be an Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’
extraordinary remedy in the sense that it is only direct resort to the Court was permissible, the
issued in extraordinary cases and where the usual petition must still be dismissed.
The writ of certiorari is available only when any and regulations issued by, as well as other actions
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi- taken by the Secretary of Justice.
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its G.R. No. 146754 March 21, 2012
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
SPOUSES JESSE CACHOPERO and BEMA
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there CACHOPERO vs. RACHEL CELESTIAL
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.7 The spouses Cachopero are insisting that the Writ of
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, Execution had been properly implemented as they
therefore, the following requisites must concur, had already vacated Celestial’s lot, which according to
namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, them, was the subject matter of the Ejectment case
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial against them. They argue that to eject them also from
functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have the subject land, which they applied for in the DENR,
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with and which was put in issue in Special Civil Case No.
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess 070, and then G.R. No. 142595 before this Court,
of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any would be going beyond what was agreed upon by the
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary parties.
course of law.9 The burden of proof lies on petitioners
Celestial on the other hand, asseverates that it was
to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued clear not only from the Sheriff’s own return, but also
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave from the ocular inspection conducted by the RTC, that
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of the old house, which was the subject matter of the
jurisdiction. compromise agreement, was only partially
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the demolished.
requisites. To start with, they merely alleged that the We affirm the Court of Appeals.
Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of
his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that A petition for mandamus, under Rule 65 of the 1997
the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal,
Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his neglects the performance of an act which the law
questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
cases involving the Legacy Group. The function such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
involved was purely executive or administrative. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the other time to be specified by the court, to do the act
findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of required to be done to protect the rights of the
probable cause in any case. petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the respondent.
authority of the Secretary of Justice to assume
jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation The writ of mandamus is aimed to compel a
of crimes and the prosecution of offenders is fully respondent, who failed to execute his/her legal duty,
sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of or unlawfully excluded another from the enjoyment
Justice exercises control and supervision over all the of an entitled right or office, to perform the act
regional, provincial, and city prosecutors of the needed to be done in order to protect the rights of the
country; has broad discretion in the discharge of the petitioner.31 Simply put, "mandamus is employed to
DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ and its compel the performance, when refused, of a
adjunct offices and agencies by promulgating rules ministerial, as opposed to a discretionary, duty."32
and regulations to carry out their objectives, policies In Tay v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court elucidated on
and functions. when a writ of mandamus may issue, to wit:
Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice In order that a writ of mandamus may issue, it is
acts beyond the bounds of his authority, or essential that the person petitioning for the same has
arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any a clear legal right to the thing demanded and that it is
person or entity who may feel to be thereby the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the
aggrieved or adversely affected should have no right act required. It neither confers powers nor imposes
to call for the invalidation or nullification of the rules duties and is never issued in doubtful cases. It is
simply a command to exercise a power already However, Celestial’s intention has nothing to do with
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.34 the validity of the compromise agreement, which the
In addition, mandamus applies as a remedy when the spouses Cachopero freely signed, and on which the
MTC based its judgment.
petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law and is not
doubtful.35 This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that
In the case at bar, Celestial’s petition for mandamus is Special Civil Case No. 070, which became G.R. No.
anchored on her rights emanating from the 142595 when it was elevated to this Court, has
Compromise Agreement she executed with the nothing to do with the case before us. The spouses
Cachopero anchor their right on the MSA that they
spouses Cachopero.
filed with the DENR over the subject land, whereas
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise this case concerns the compromise agreement they
as follows: executed with Celestial.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by Although Celestial’s petition in G.R. No. 142595 was
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or denied, and the Court of Appeals’ ruling ordering the
put an end to one already commenced. DENR to process the spouses Cachopero’s MSA over
Article 2037 of the Civil Code provides for the effects the subject lot was affirmed, what is involved herein
of a compromise agreement, to wit: is the transfer of the old house from the subject land,
and not the subject land itself. However, the spouses
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and Cachopero have not shown this Court that their MSA
authority of res judicata; but there shall be no had indeed been approved.
execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise. Unless the spouses Cachopero can show this Court
that there is a supervening event, which occurred
In Philippine National Oil Company-Energy after the judgment of the MTC, and which brought
Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) v. Abella, this about a material change in their situation vis-à-vis
Court pronounced: that of Celestial, the latter has the right to have the
Prevailing case law provides that "a compromise once compromise agreement executed, according to its
approved by final orders of the court has the force of terms.
res judicata between the parties and should not be
disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery.
Hence, ‘a decision on a compromise agreement is final
and executory.’ Such agreement has the force of law
and is conclusive on the parties. It transcends its
identity as a mere contract binding only upon the
parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is
subject to execution in accordance with the Rules.
Judges therefore have the ministerial and mandatory
duty to implement and enforce it." Hence,
compromise agreements duly approved by the courts
are considered the decisions in the particular cases
they involve.39
The terms of the compromise agreement involved
herein are clear and unequivocal. The spouses
Cachopero agreed to vacate Celestial’s lot and
transfer the old house to the land at the back of
Celestial’s lot. While it has been shown that the
spouses Cachopero had already removed part of the
old house, Jesse Cachopero himself admitted, during
the ocular inspection done by the RTC, that part of the
old house beyond Celestial’s lot were not demolished
nor removed.
It is clear from the records and the facts of this case
that the real reason Celestial wanted to eject the
spouses Cachopero from the subject land is to reclaim
the use of such land for herself. This can be gleaned
from the fact that in their compromise agreement, she
was willing to shoulder the expenses of transferring
the old house to the area at the back of her own lot.
This fact runs counter to her claim that she was
ejecting her brother and his wife from the old house
due to its dilapidated and uninhabitable condition.