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VOL. 143, AUGUST 19, 1986 499

Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy

*
No. L-53703. August 19, 1986.

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City)
and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.

Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Marriage; Nullity

of marriage; Proof that first marriage was vitiated by force, not
necessary in an action for a declaration of nullity of marriage filed
by the second husband; Reason.—There is no need for petitioner to
prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage
will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been
made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage
to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

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* SECOND DIVISION.

500

500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Introducing evidence about

existing prior marriage, not necessary as the first marriage though
void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact; Woman’s
marriage to second husband void; Case at bar.—There is likewise
no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage
of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then
such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a

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judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law.

PETITION to review the orders of the Juvenile and

Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
     Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office
for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the

erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel
(plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his
marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro
Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for
short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia’s
previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the
ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our
Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while
admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage
claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the
first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly
forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that
ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the
status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force
exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void
or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the
pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an
opportunity to present evidence—
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VOL. 143, AUGUST 19, 1986 501

Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force

exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the
marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

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Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of

evidence because the existence of force exerted on both
parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the
following Orders of the respondent Judge—

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the

parties were compelled to submit the case for
resolution based on “agreed facts;” and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner’s
motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated by force committed against both
parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will
not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is dear that when she married respondent
she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80,
Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about
the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still 1 needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman
at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner
and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for

________________

1 Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315.

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Valisno vs. Plan

lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

     Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Gutierrez,

Jr., JJ., concur.
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Petition dismissed, orders affirmed.

Note.—The conclusion that the second marriage is the

better one that deserves the law’s recognition and
protection over the first is a dangerous proposition. It
legalizes a continuing polygamy by permitting a spouse to
just drop at pleasure her consort for another in as many
jurisdiction as would grant divorce on the excuse that the
new marriage is better than the previous one; and, instead
of fitting the concept of marriage as a social institution, the
proposition altogether does away with the social aspects of
marriage in favor of its being a matter of private contract
and personal adventure. (Tenchavez vs. Escaho, 17 SCRA
674.)

——o0o——

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