LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ASSO.

OF LDB EMPLOYEES and

GARCIA
G.R. No. 120319
October 6, 1995

FACTS:
From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the
following issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and the MOA on
promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position
Papers. Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s
Position Paper ; LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite
a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23,
1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.

Without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision

disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the CBA
provision nor the MOA on promotion.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision
of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

ISSUE:
WON a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the CA and not the SC

HELD:
The Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.
YES. The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such
arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter. The “(d)ecision,
awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed
to the Commission …” Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the
decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an
appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.

Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more
often than not, elevated to the SC itself on a petition for certiorari, in effect
equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the CA. In the view of the
Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise that
the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final
at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators
determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect
as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this
Court ruled that “a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity.” Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary
arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-
judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions
are not appealable to the latter.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the
Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of RTC s and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary

arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or
commission, still both he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of
a “quasi-judicial instrumentality.”

An “instrumentality” is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms

governmental “agency” or “instrumentality” are synonymous in the sense that
either of them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain
government act or function is performed. The word “instrumentality,” with
respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function. An individual
person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the
settling of an estate, in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a
bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in bankruptcy of
a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a

governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor
Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term
“instrumentality” in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions
and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the
exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as
contemplated therein.

It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also

provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the
present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the
appealability of its decisions to the CA under the foregoing rationalization, and
this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A
fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators
should likewise be appealable to the CA, in line with the procedure outlined in
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial
agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No.
876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special
proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none
be specified, the RTC for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or
is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction.
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that
of the RTC. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision,
the CA must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC. As a matter
of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of
this nature for proper disposition.
NOTES:
1. In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an
impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and
arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept the
decision of the arbitrator as final and binding. Arbitration may be classified, on
the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.
Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are
compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to
accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. 1The
essence of arbitration remains since a resolution of a dispute is arrived at by
resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the
parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally appointed by
the government.
Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the
parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective
agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and binding
resolution. 2Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with by both
parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an
arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by both parties but to comply with the same.
After all, they are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of
settlement for that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a
mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case. Above all,
they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator’s decision.
2. Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original
jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over
(1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and
(2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise
jurisdiction over other labor disputes.
On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has
jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases:
. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar
days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without
extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may
file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.

Iron and Steel Authority v. CA

[65 SCAD 261]

FACTS:
P.D. 272 was issued creating Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA"). National
Government embarked on a program which is the construction of NSC which is an
integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the
President of the Philippines withdrawing from sale or settlement tract of public
land and reserving that land for the use and occupancy of NSC. Since certain
portions of the public land subject matter of Proclamation No. 2239 were
occupied by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC").
LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to
reach an agreement within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of LOI No.
1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No.
272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings. The negotiations failed thus,
Petitioner commenced eminent domain proceedings against MCFC in RTC. While
the trial was ongoing, the statutory existence of ISA expired. The trial court
dismissed the case which was anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court
that “only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties
in civil case.”

ISSUE:
Whether the President has the power to exercise the power of eminent domain.
HELD:
In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as
an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant
to its authority under P.D. No. 272. In addition to his general supervisory
authority, the President of the Philippines shall have such other specific powers
and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law. The Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 currently in force has substantially reproduced the
foregoing provision in the following terms:

"Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. — The President shall determine when it is
necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of
the National Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems
the action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper court."
(Italics supplied) In the present case, the President, exercising the power duly
delegated under both the1917 and 1987

Revised Administrative Codes in effect made a determination that it was

necessary and advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf
of the Government of the Republic and accordingly directed the Solicitor General
to proceed with the suit.

Malaga vs. Penachos (Digest)

Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.
GR No. 86995 03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS:
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28,
1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction
of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day
for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988,
and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3
o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE

Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-
qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2,
1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All
three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents
were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC
against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them
resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to
the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their
documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the
defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their
complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC
from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a
motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited
from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They
also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic
as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be
constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling
within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of
PD 1818?
RULING:
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special
charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional
policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and
the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government

instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries
development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect
the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its
accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly
authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the
president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even
the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to
public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out
of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that
the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in
the General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the

prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the
transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the
award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
Eugenio vs. CSC, 243 SCRA 196 (1995)

FACTS:
Eugenio, the Deputy Director of Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, applied for
a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. But before she got the
rank, the CSC passed Resolution No. 93-459, reorganizing itself and changing the
CES Board (CESB) to Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service
Commission (OCES).

ISSUE:
W/N CSC usurped legislative function of Congress by abolishing the CESB and
transferring its budget to OCES

HELD:
CESB was created by PD 1. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as CESB was
created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. While CSC has the
power to reorganize under Sec. 17, Chap. 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V. of the
Administrative Code of 1987, this must be read with sec. 16, which enumerates
the offices under the control of the CSC. CESB is not one of such offices.

CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached

to CSC. This essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made
to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government
agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.”
De La Llana v Alba
GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982

FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition,
seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129
which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs,
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the
inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a
suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision
of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and
judges as provided for under the Constitution.

RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and
justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of
their offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the

office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is
in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
LIANGA BAY LOGGING, CO., INC., vs.HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE
G.R. No. L-30637
July 16, 1987

Facts:
The parties are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are

adjacent to each other.Since the concessions of petitioner and responde

nt are adjacent to each other, they have a commonboundary. Reports of

encroachment by both parties on each other’s concessions triggered a survey to

establish the common boundary of the respective concession areas and was
held that the claim of AgoTimber Corporation runs counter to the intentions of
the Office granting the Timber License Agreement toLianga Bay Logging. Ago
Timber appealed to Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and set
aside the appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled in favor
of Ago. Lianga Bay Logging,elevated the case to office of President and ruling
of Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed. On
Motion for Reconsideration, decision was reversed and reinstated decision of Dire
ctor of Forestry. A civil action was
instituted by Ago Timber to determine the correct boundary line of license
timber areas. TRO was set inplace. Lianga brought the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue:
WON respondent court has jurisdiction over the administrative case

Held:
Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respond
ent Ago, asking forthe determination anew of the correct boundary line of it
s licensed timber area, for the same issue had
already been determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Office of the President, administrative officials under whose
jurisdictions the matter properly
belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of
Forestry, the jurisdiction
SOLID HOMES v. TERESITA PAYAWAL,
GR No. 84811, 1989-08-29

Facts:

On August 31, 1982 Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes Inc.,
before the Regional Trial Court alleging that they contracted to sell her
subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975.Subsequently Solid Homes Inc.
executed a deed of sale but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate title
despite of repeated demands by Payawal because defendant had mortgaged
the property in bad faith to a financing company. Thereafter, Solid Homes Inc
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
this being rested in the National Housing Authority under PD no. 597. The motion
was denied, hence, the petition to reverse said decision of the Court of Appeals in
sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court was submitted by Solid
Homes Inc. to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over cases involving claims, refund
and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman?

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the applicable law is PD No. 957. The National
Housing Authority has the jurisdiction.

As amended by PD No 1344 entitled “Empowering the National Housing Authority

to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under Presidential
Decree No 957” Section 1 provides, in the exercise of its function to regulate the
real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in PD No
957 that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature:
a) unsound real estate business practices,
 b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot
owners or condo unit buyers against project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or
salesman and,
c) cases involving specific performance of contractual statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman. The challenged decision of the respondent
court was reversed and the decision of RTC is Set Aside without prejudice to the
filing of the appropriate complaint before the HLURB.

Matienzo v Abellera
162 SCRA 1 (1998)

FACTS
Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators in Metro Manila.
The respondents, however, admit to operate colorum or kabit
taxis, thus, they applied for legalization of their unauthorized excess taxis citing
PD 101. Respondent Board set such applications for hearing and granted
provisional authority to operate. Petitioners argue that the Board cannot do
this as the six month period in the Transitory Provision has lapsed and has
become functus officio.

ISSUES:
W/N the board can grant such permits.

RULING
YES. The power vested by PD 101 to BOT was “to grant special permits of
limited term for the operation of public utility motor vehicles as may, in the
judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine
operators into legitimate and responsible operators.” Such power remains even
after the six months prescribed in the law as such period merely provides for the
withdrawal of the State’s waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators.
Notice and hearing are not required for the grant of such temporary authority
because of its provisional nature and that the primary application shall be given a
full hearing. To determine whether a Board or Commission has power, it should
be (1) liberally construed in light of its purpose for which is was created and ;
(2) that incidentally necessary to a full implementation of legislative intent as
being germane to the law. Thus, the BOR shall, from time to time, re-study the
public need for public utilities in any area in the Phils for the purpose of re-
evaluating the policies.

Chung Ka Bio v IAC

163 SCRA 534, 545-546 (1988)

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. was incorporated for a term of 25 years.
The members of its board of directors executed a deed of assignment of all of the
accounts receivables, properties, obligations and liabilities of the old PBM in favor
of Chung Siong Pek in his capacity as treasurer of the new PBM, then in the
process of reincorporation. The new PMB was issued a certificate of incorporation
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Chung Ka Bio and the other
petitioners herein, all stockholders of the old PBM, filed with the SEC a petition
for liquidation of both the old PBM and the new PBM. The allegation was that the
former had become legally non-existent for failure to extend its corporate life and
that the latter had likewise beenipso facto dissolved for non-use of the charter
and continuous failure to operate within 2 years from incorporation.

Issue:
WON, The new corporation has not substantially complied with the two-year
requirement of Section 22 of the new Corporation Code on non-user because its
stockholders never adopted a set of by-laws.

Held:
No. Non-filing of the by-laws will not result in automatic dissolution of the
corporation. Under Section 6(i) of PD 902-A, the SEC is empowered to “suspend or
revoked, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of
registration of a corporation” on the ground inter alia of “failure to file by-laws
within the required period.” It is clear from this provision that there must first of
all be a hearing to determine the existence of the ground, and secondly, assuming
such finding, the penalty is not necessarily revocation but may be only suspension
of the charter. In fact, under the rules and regulations of the SEC, failure to file
the by-laws on time may be penalized merely with the imposition of an
administrative fine without affecting the corporate existence of the erring firm.

GSIS vs CSC
02 SCRA 799 (1991)

Facts :
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6)employees as
being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found to be
connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. Five of
these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board
found the dismissals to be illegal because affected without formal charges having
been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the
remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary proceedings. The GSIS
appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution, the Commission ruled
that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal. GSIS appealed to the SC and
affirmed the decision of the CSC with a modification that it eliminated the
payment of back salaries until the outcome of the investigation and
reinstatement of only 3 employees since the other two had died. The heirs of the
deceased sought execution of the order from the CSC which was granted. GSIS
opposed and came to the SC on certiorari contending that the CSC does not have
any power to execute its resolution or judgment.

Issue :
WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or judgment.

Ratio :
The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested by the Constitution
and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also
with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. The Civil
Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting, approving and
putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative disciplinary and
protest cases, pursuant to the authority granted by the constitutional and
statutory provisions. The provisions are analogous and entirely consistent with
the duty or responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies
and resolutions adopted by the Commission. In light of all the foregoing
constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the
Civil Service Commission the power or authority to enforce or order execution of
its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been
exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to
decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has
been decided is carried out.

Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to

hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the
grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the
law otherwise provides.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of
disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending,
against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of
the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it makes
exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition precedent to payment
of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a useless
exercise.