Strong States, Weak States: The Role of the State in Revolution

Author(s): Evenly B. Davidheiser

Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Jul., 1992), pp. 463-475
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
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 Strong States, Weak States
The Role of the State in Revolution

Evenly B. Davidheiser

Perhapsone of the most misunderstoodrelationshipsin the study of political developmentis

that between the strengthof the state and revolution. Both logic and a substantialbody of
theory indicate that revolutionshould emerge only where old states are too weak to prevent
it. If revolutionhas brokenthroughold structures,the state must have been weak.' Such an
assertion, however, borderson the tautologicaland tells us very little about the relationship
between state strength and revolution. If one assesses state strength independently of
revolution, the picture looks very different. Observation leads to the counterintuitive
conclusion that strong states--not weak ones--are most likely to be associated with
revolution.
Here I argue that strong states tend to destabilize sociopolitical life by transformingit.
Simultaneously,the strong state's high level of autonomyfrom society inhibits its ability to
respondto social forces. The situationreaches crisis when severe economic pressuresarise.
This crisis acts as a trigger for revolution. My argumentrests on the twin contentions that
transformationis destabilizingand that the state-societyrelationshipis critical in influencing
how the destabilizationis handled.
Existing work on the relationshipbetween state and revolutionhas been dissatisfying for
two reasons. First, scholarshave failed to define clearly the state as an actor. Second, there
is no consensus on how to measurethe strengthof the state. In the first section of this paper
I will addressthese twin problems,arguingthat in defining the state as actorit is most useful
to focus on the structureswhich comprise the state. I offer three criteriafor evaluating the
strengthof the state:depth of penetrationof society by the state, breadthof penetration,and
state autonomy, or penetrationof the state by society. I will illustrate that, when state
strength is properly measured, strong states--not weak ones-are most likely to be
associated with revolution. This argumentwill be empiricallybuttressedby three European
countries which represent three very different experiences with the state and revolution:
Russia, Germany,and Sweden. In all three cases, rapideconomic transformationfollowed
by severe economic pressures presented conditions conducive to major sociopolitical
change. The first two cases witnessed revolutionon the left and right, respectively. In both
countries mobilizational dictatorshipsemerged from a set of conditions of development
which were characterizedby the presence of a strong state. Sweden is offered as a
counterpoint,a case where, despite severe pressureson the population, revolutionfailed to
materialize.

Assessing the Strength of the State

To evaluate the role of the state in revolutionwe need clear definitions of what constitutes
the state and how to measurestate strength.Though inclusion of the state as a critical actor

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ComparativePolitics July 1992

in the process of revolutionhas a long tradition,agreementon its role has not emerged. Prior
to the behavioralrevolution scholars emphasized mistaken policies, corruptofficials, and
palace intriguesin the ancien regime as key sources of revolution. Though the strengthof
the state was not a theoretical concern for these scholars, the association between weak
states and revolutionis implicit in their work. Such studies more or less ignored the "view
from below" and became the target of sociological studies in the 1960s and 1970s. James
Davies, T. RobertGurr, and ChalmersJohnson introducedexplanationswhich droppedthe
state from analysis and instead focused on sources of populardiscontentand motivationfor
revolution.2
Yet anotherround in the debate over whether to emphasize the view from below or the
view from above was inauguratedby Theda Skocpol with States and Social Revolutions.
Correctingfor approacheswhich consideredsocial forces alone, Skocpol attemptedto merge
elite and mass explanationsof revolution. She concludedthat revolutionoccurs where states
break down and peasant unrest breaks through. Skocpol did not provide a well-defined
means for gauging state strengthbut based her findings on the ability of coercive institutions
(the police and military)to control society and on the assumptionof state autonomy. Thus,
she excluded both the impact of institutionswhich intervenemore broadly (for example, in
the economy) and-the impact which society may exert on the state. Without these her
argumentbecame almost tautological:revolution is the collapse of the old state; it occurs
where the state is weak and collapses.3
A very different image emerges if one broadensthe range of institutionsconsideredand
focuses on the "relative" autonomyof the state.4 Replacing the notion of "the state" with
state structuresallows differentiationacross policy institutions,"while adoptingthe notion of
relative autonomyallows for the penetrationof the state by societal interests.Thus, the state
regains what Michael Mann has indicatedis a key function:its role as an arena for conflict
between societal interests.6This approachallows inclusion of more or less effective and
more or less representativelegislatures.
Broadeningattention to include economic institutionsand the relative autonomy of the
state results in conclusions diametricallyopposed to Skocpol's. We find that states which
penetrateand transformsociety but which allow little penetrationby societal interests are
more likely to fall to revolution. From this perspective strong states are more likely to be
associated with revolution. These divergent conclusions raise a series of conceptually
difficult problems. How is one to measure state strength?Should the state be treated as a
single unit with an associated level of autonomy or as composed of many different units,
each with its own distinct level of autonomy?The latterseems to make more sense from an
empiricalviewpoint, but it raises yet anotherdilemma. Should one measurethe autonomyof
the state's componentparts vis-bL-vissociety or vis-A-visone another?
Clearly, a well-developed measure of state strengthis required. I propose evaluation of
the strengthof the state accordingto threecriteria:the depth of societal penetrationby policy
institutions;the breadthof societal penetrationby policy institutions;and the penetration,or
permeability,of the state by society. Table 1 presents the extreme cases of state strength
based on these criteria. Societal penetrationis a conventional issue in studies of political
development.7 The key to gauging state strength here is evaluating the state's ability to
implementpolicies which transformsociety. Depth of penetrationrefers to the magnitudeof
transformation at the state's behest. Breadth of penetration refers to the scope of

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 Evelyn B. Davidheiser

Table 1 Strengthof the State

Strong State Weak State

Depthof Penetration High Low

Breadthof Penetration High Low

Permeability Low High

transformation,both functional(aspects of society transformed)and physical (for example,

geographical).
Understandingthe extent of penetrationis insufficient, however. We must also consider
which institutionsare responsible for penetrationand why. For example, one would expect
a different pattern of politics to emerge where the military is primarily responsible for
extending the power of the center into the periphery than where an economic minister
performsthis task. Similarly, battles between institutionsover which one will performthe
transformativerole may either weaken or strengthenthe degree of penetration.One must
consider variations in the capacity of contending policy institutions vis-a-vis both other
institutionsand societal actors. Finally, the penetrationof the state by society, or the state's
permeability,provides a measureof the openness of policy institutionsto societal interests.
It is anotherway of talking about state autonomy. Hence states with low permeabilityare
strong, while those with high permeabilityare weak.
Of course, between the extremes of a consistently strong state and a consistently weak
state a variety of mixes is possible. While social revolution is most likely where the state is
strong and least likely where the state is weak, mixed cases should experience some sort of
upheaval but, perhaps, stop short of social revolution. The three cases discussed here
represent the two extremes-Russia and Sweden, respectively--and one intermediate
case-Germany. Each was exposed to rapid economic change, but each reacted very
differently. I turn now to a reevaluationof the role of the state in revolutionby reassessing
state strengthin each of these cases.

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ComparativePolitics July 1992

Russia, 1880-1917

From the 1880s until the 1917 revolution the Russian economy underwent rapid
transformationfrom a backward agrarian economy to one with significant sectors of
large-scale, technologically advanced industry. By all accounts, this transformation
occurred only because of a high level of state intervention in the economy. Significant
policies were adoptedto provide direct subsidies to industryand to limit taxes. At least as
significant was the foreign economic policy which erected protective tariffs and actively
recruitedforeign capital to bolster investmentin industry.As Russian peasants flooded the
cities seeking work in the new factories, the state offered industrialistsprotection from
rising labor unrest. By the start of World War I, the progress which had been made in
three short decades was tremendous. In 1880 the overall index of industrial production
stood at only 18 percent of that of 1913. Between 1873 and 1914 the productionof iron
and steel increasedby 574 percent and that of oil by 250 percent.8These figures support
the conclusion that the Russian state was indeed strong when strength is measured in
terms of depth of penetration.
While the issue of breadthof penetrationgives a more mixed result, there is also ample
reason here to stress the strengthsratherthan weaknesses of the Russian state. It is easy to
emphasize the isolation of Russian industry from the rest of the economy as Russia
continuedto be a primarilypeasantsociety. Yet in reality the state's industrializationpolicy
had a wide-reachingimpact throughoutthe country and its economy. In geographic terms
penetrationwas indeed very limited. Industrializationwas confined to those regions in and
aroundestablishedcities--especially Moscow and St. Petersburg,but also Vladimir, Kiev,
and Odessa. In addition, importantindustrialcenters sprangup close to mineralresources.
The Donbass coal and Baku petroluemindustriesare fine examples.
Though on the whole the country remained primarily rural and agricultural, even
agriculturewas profoundly influenced by the transformativepolicies of the state aimed at
promoting industrialization.The steady export of grain requiredto finance the inflow of
foreign capital exposed agricultureto the pressures of fluctuating world markets, thereby
adding new uncertaintiesto the age-old problems of weather and soil. Prices were now
influenced by events outside the country's borders. Peasant migration in search of urban
employment made an increasing number of rural households subject to industrial
fluctuations.9Thus, one can argue that state penetrationof the economy was indeed broad
and wide-ranging.
Perhapseven more critical was the breadthof the state's penetrationof culturalnorms.
When Russian policymakers moved toward industrialization,they were essentially siding
with the westernizersin their perennialstruggle against the Slavophiles. While the former
considered Russia essentially a Europeancountry, albeit a backwardone, the latter were
convinced thatRussia was unique, with its own destiny to fulfill. Rapid industrializationand
the concomitantexposure to foreign capital brought with it western mores. The entry of
peasantsinto modernfactories profoundlyaffected the lives of those involved, and because
many of these individuals maintained their links to their ancestral villages, the cultural
impact was felt in ruralRussia as well. In this sense, the breadthof penetrationwas indeed
significant, underscoringthe strengthof the Russian state.
If penetrationindicates a strong state, perhapswe can find the sources of collapse in the

466
 Evelyn B. Davidheiser

politics surroundingthe implementationof the transformativepolicy. In the Russian case a

significant struggle was taking place between the ministryof finance and the ministryof the
interior. While the former pressed for rapid industrializationin an effort to improve the
country's tax base, the latter feared the destabilizing effects of transformationand hence
advocatedthe continued dominanceof agriculture.
In institutionalterms, industrializationhad to wait for the ministryof finance to acquire
the capacity to implement industrial policies. In 1862 a unified budget under finance
marked substantial advances in the ministry's power. During subsequent decades
increasing control over state banks, taxation, and transportationall contributed to
finance's capacity.'0 Interioralso attemptedto develop instrumentswhich would enable it
to control the population. For example, in the face of rising labor unrest the ministry
experimentedwith "police socialism." Labor was organized by an agent of the ministry,
Sergei Zubatov, to protest against capital and in favor of the monarch. As in most cases
of industrial policy, however, interior's interests ran against those of finance, and the
latter won. Zubatov's experiment was terminated." Thus, interior was prevented from
achieving the same level of penetrationin controlling society that finance had achieved in
transformingsociety.
This is not to suggest that even a strong Russian state was autonomousfrom society. I
have argued elsewhere that these two institutions also had critical ties to key societal
interests--finance to industry,interiorto agriculture.'2The relationshipof these institutions
to client groups within society was both influenced by the strength of client groups and
influenced institutional strength. As economic change contributedto the decline of the
landed aristocracy, relations with interior were strained, and the institution's strength
declined. As the independent power of industrial groups grew, their relationship with
finance was bolstered and the strength of the institution grew. Autonomy from societal
interests is a less importantconsiderationthan is the ability to implement transformative
policies.
Despite these links to societal interests, society's penetrationof the state remainedlow.
Workersand peasants had no access to the state, and interiorwas even able to withstand
pressuresfor change demandedby agriculturalforces. Though reformsin 1905 introduceda
legislature (the Duma), the tsar remained "autocrat of all the Russias." The executive
apparatuswas quite successful in whittling away the Duma's powers until the institution
proved meaningless. In short, the permeabilityof the state was quite low.
The divergence in institutionalstrengthundoubtedlyplayed a role in the final collapse of
the ancien regime. The strengthof the state in transformingsociety throughthe ministryof
finance was so greatthat it simultaneouslydestabilizedsociety. Meanwhile, the capacity for
control under interiorfailed to grow. Finally, channels for respondingto societal demands
were absent. World War I undoubtedlyprecipitatedthe economic crisis which triggered
revolution in 1917, but even without the war economic conditions were rapidly pushing
events in this direction.
The working class, the creationof the industrializingstate, was mobilized and supported
the Bolsheviks' revolution. After 1917 new political institutionswere constructedand social
relations were dramaticallyaltered. Old elites were completely removed from the political
process. A social revolution had occurred, redefining the relationship between societal

467
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interests and between the state and society. Tsarist autocracy was replaced by a
mobilizationaldictatorship.

Germany, 1871-1933

Like Russia, Germanyalso developed a strong state during the period of industrialization.
Also like Russia, Germanywitnessed the rise of a mobilizationaldictatorship,with National
Socialism winning widespread popular support. There are, of course, some notable
differences between the German and Russian cases, the most dramatic of which is the
outcome--dictatorshipon the left in Russia and on the right in Germany.Unlike Russia, the
evolution of the state in Germanywas conditioned first by the struggle for unification and
then by a rupture in regimes when Imperial Germany, responsible for much of
industrialization,was replaced by Weimar Germany, the springboardfor mobilizational
dictatorship.
Unlike Russia, Germanyfaced the problem of industrializationsimultaneouslywith the
problem of territorialunification. The German Zollverein, or customs union, had been
formed in 1834 to remove barriersto trade between the various German principalitiesand
states. In 1866, a large area of the Zoliverein united into a politically cohesive unit, the
North German Federation, dominated--though not controlled-by Prussia. The southern
Germanprincipalitiesand statesjoined by the beginning of the next decade, and finally war
with France and the acquisitionof Alsace and Lorrainein 1871 completed unification.'3
The process of unification naturallyhad significant implications for the strengthof the
new German state. Three institutions were critical players in Russia's unification of the
country: the Hohenzollernmonarchy, the military, and the chancellery (under Bismarck).
These institutions remained dominant in the new Reich, but their new power was also
restrictedby the empire's federal structure.Imperial offices were limited to the military,
foreign service, foreign trade, and post offices. All other administrativeauthority was
reservedfor the memberstates. There was some variationin administrativeunits across the
states. Dependingon local needs a state might or might not have institutionsconcernedwith
the development of industries. For the most part, however, states and municipalities had
institutions controlling or working with banking, railroads, and other infrastructural
industries.Variationtended to be most pronouncedin more complex forms of intervention.
In short, the picture of strengthof the Germanstate was mixed. Clearly, the institutions
which dominated the empire had been strong enough to unite it. However, the federal
structureof the state limited the executive's powers. This mix was reflected in the depth and
breadthof state penetrationof society in the area of economic policy.
Alexander Gerschenkronirrefutablyestablished the presence of the German state in the
country's industrialization,emphasizing its role in banking, railroadbuilding, and various
infrastructuralindustries,but what does not emerge clearly from Gerschenkron'sdiscussion
is the degree to which this interventionrested in the hands of the Germanstates ratherthan
the Reich.'" Gustav Stolper's classic economic history of Germanyis much cleareron this
point. For example, by 1877 the railroadsystem in Germanywas nationalized,but railroads
were owned and operated by the individual states, preventing the creation of a unified
nationwide system. Similar, there was significant state ownership in the mining and iron

468
 Evelyn B. Davidheiser

industriesas well as public utilities, but in all cases ownership was by member states or
municipalitiesand not the Reich.'6
For Gerschenkron,of course, the most importantinstitutionsin Germanindustrialization
were the banks. Here the picture of state strength is somewhat clearer. While the federal
states retained the right to issue money, by 1875 the Reichsbank in Berlin had clearly
emerged as the country's dominant bank. Though the Reichsbank issued privately held
stock, stockholders had no authorityin its operation. All officers were appointed by the
Kaiser and were responsibleto the crown."7
Accordingto GordonCraig, the Reich opposed all notions of popularsovereigntyand the
role of the legislaturereflected this. Initiationof legislation was reserved for the executive,
and defeat of the chancellor's legislation could result in the dissolutionof parliamentand the
calling of new elections. Apparentlythe most importantfunctions of the Reichstag were to
symbolize popularparticipationand Germannational unity.'16
From this perspective it is somewhat difficult to gauge the depth and breadth of
penetrationof society by the state. The extent of state interventionin the economy would
indicate the penetrationwas deep, but its control by federal states ratherthan the Reich
raises limits on the breadthof central penetration.
On the issue of the permeabilityof the state, the record is less ambiguous. Though there
was a nationallegislature, its powers were weak in comparisonwith the Reich's chancellor.
Indeed, Bismarck seldom found himself constrainedby parliamentaryobjections. Member
states might or might not have parliaments(most did), but the franchise and legislative
powers differed dramaticallyamong them.
In 1918, the collapse of the monarchyand the adoptionof the Weimarconstitutionin the
context of the existing state presence in the economy had importantimplications for the
strength of the state. The new constitution undoubtedly weakened the executive branch
while strengtheningthe legislative, but this did not foster a decline in the state's presence in
the economy. More important,the Weimarconstitutionradicallyalteredthe federal structure
of the country, dramaticallyincreasing the power of the central government vis-a-vis the
states.'9 Ironically, in this narrow sense one might describe the Weimar constitution as
furtheringGermanunification.20
Not surprisingly,state interventionin the economy actuallyrose duringthe Weimaryears.
A unified state-owned railroad system was finally achieved. The Reichsbankbecame the
sole bank of issue, a true central bank. As Germanyconfrontedthe severe economic crises
of inflation and then depression, the bank became an important tool of intervention.
Building on the practices of "war socialism" which had prevailedduringWorld War I and
demands for socialization which emerged from the 1918 revolution, mixed companies
combining governmentand privateownershipbecame increasinglywidespread.Emergency
powers reserved for the executive were used extensively by the government of Heinrich
BrUiningafter the Great Depression hit. Deflationarymeasures were implementedwithout
the support of parliament.2' Together, these actions furthered German unification and
facilitatedthe emergence of the Nazi dictatorship.
Balancingthis growth in penetration,however, was an increase in permeability.From this
perspectiveone would hesitate to describe the Germanstate of the Weimaryears as stronger
than its prewarcounterpart.The augmentedpowers of parliamentlimited executive strength.
Simultaneously,the expanded franchiseand growing polarizationof party politics severely

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constrainedparliament'sability to govern. Nevertheless, the Weimar state held significant

powers not available to its federal predecessor. These were clearly reflected in state
interventionin the economy.
This pronouncedpresence in the economy meant that the state would find itself open to
attack as economic conditions worsened. According to Stolper, "masses who wanted the
jobs had been trainedby Marxist and anti-Marxistleaders alike to look to the Government
for whateverthey asked of life.""2When the state could no longer deliver, newly mobilized
mass actors offered their support to those who promised delivery, and a new state was
erected on the foundationsof the old.
The ThirdReich emergedfrom a periodof severe economic crisis and social upheavaljust
as Soviet Russia had. Also like Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany constructed a new set of
political institutions. However, the Third Reich did not proceed as far in transforming
society as Soviet Russia did. In Germany, old elites were left in place, marking a
fundamentaldifference between these two cases.

Sweden, 1870-1932

Sweden providesa criticalcounterpointto both the Russianand Germancases. While Russia

was the site of revolutionon the left and Germanywas the site of revolution on the right,
Sweden was able to avoid upheaval and violence altogether. MarquisChilds capturedthe
Swedish case nicely in the title of his 1936 book, Sweden: The Middle Way.23Democracy in
Sweden was not only preserved but in many respects even intensified during this period.
This occurreddespite the rapid industrializationwhich was underway,transformingsociety
in ways similar to those observed in Russia and Germany.In the 1930s depression resulted
not in mobilizationaldictatorshipbut in the democratic "cow trade" between the Agrarian
Party and the Social Democrats.24What appearscritically different in the Swedish case is
the strength of the state. State institutions played only a minor role in the process of
industrialization.State interventionin society was not very great measuredby either depth or
breadth of penetration. Indeed, Sweden presents a case in which state power actually
declined over the periodof rapidindustrialization,regainingstrengthonly duringthe 1930s.
The permeabilityof the state, however, was quite high. Parliamentappearsto have been the
dominantinstitutionduring the period of transformation.
In the first portionof the nineteenthcentury,priorto industrialization,state interventionin
the economy had been moderately high. A mercantilist policy, developing exports and
regulating important industries, had ensured the state's presence in the economy. For
example, the iron and timber industries,considered vital to the country's well-being, were
strictly regulated. Production quotas, licenses, and other interventionist measures were
employed to keep prices high and prolong the availability of scarce natural resources.
Similarly, concern over potentiallabor unresteven in the eighteenthcenturyfostered a wide
arrayof laws regulatingthe movement and employment of landless labor.25However, the
level of intervention was very slight when compared to state intervention in Russia or
Germany,where the goal was to facilitate the developmentof new industries.
The breadthand depth of state penetrationpresentedby Swedish mercantilistpolicy were
significantly offset by other aspects of political life which seriously weakened the state.

470
 Evelyn B. Davidheiser

Early tension between the crown and nobility pushed the former into alliance with the
peasantry,which acquiredsignificantlandholdingsfrom the crown and became an important
counterbalanceto noble power.26While noble power was checked by a strong peasantry,the
nobility nevertheless represented an important limit on the power of the monarch.
Parliament,the Riksdag, was establishedquite early in Sweden (1435) and maintainedthe
right to determine royal succession when in doubt. This occurred frequently during the
period 1718-1771, and parliamentreacted by installing what was hoped would be weak
monarchs, usually women or foreigners.27
Parliamentthus emergedearly as an importantcounterweightto the crown, but parliament
did not emerge as a stronginstitutionin its own rightthe way the Russianministryof finance
or the Germanchancellerydid. Divisions within parliamentpreventedthis. At its origin the
Riksdag was composed of four chambers representing Sweden's four estates: nobility,
clergy, townsmen, and peasantry. While the nobles dominated, their struggle with the
monarchpressedthe latterto seek alliance partnerselsewhere, giving at least some influence
to the other chambers.28
Nor could cabinet governmentemerge as a strong alternativeto a fragmentedparliament.
In 1866, the Riksdag became a bicamerallegislature with upper and lower houses holding
relativelyequal powers and with the cabinet responsibleto both houses. Because each house
representeda dramaticallydifferent segment of Swedish society, the two tended to be
irreconcilablydivided on most major issues. As a result, the cabinet was paralyzed, and a
strong ministerialgovernmentfailed to emerge.
What is perhaps most striking about the Swedish case, however, is the trend in the
strengthof the state over time. As industrializationprogressedafter about 1870, the state
actually became weaker. The state policy associated with the promotion of industry in
Sweden was much more similar to the one followed by Britainthan to those of Russia and
Germany:the state was a facilitatorof industrializationratherthan an industiralizerin its
own right. Legislative barriersto free enterprisewere removed one by one, and industry
grew. Laws restrictinginternaltradewere removed in 1864. Similarly, as timberbecame an
increasingly important export, state production quotas which limited quantities were
removed. Similar steps were also taken in the iron industry.Meanwhile, regulationson the
free movement of labor were removed, and the old guild system was dismantled. Rather
than state intervention,Sweden relied on export-ledgrowth, much as Britainhad after mid
century.29In short, Swedish economic policy after 1870 looked very much like that of
England in the first half of the nineteenthcentury.
In only two areasdid Swedish industrializationpolicy vary distinctly from that of Britain
and reflect the country's status as a late industrializer.First, the state took an active role in
railroadbuilding, financing the constructionand operationof main lines. Yet the state left
the constructionand operation of branch lines to private enterprise. Second, tariffs were
periodically a component of Swedish industrializationpolicy, and their fluctuation nicely
illustratesthe permeabilityof the Swedish state.30By all accounts, tariffbattles were among
the most contentious in the late nineteenth century parliament and elections.3' The
importanceof export-led growth to industrializationensured a large voice for free trade,
while the continued existence of less competitive grain and iron producers meant that
protectionismwould also have its proponents.Fluctuatingtariff policy tended to reflect the
rise and fall of the political fortunesof these contendinggroups.

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Despite the relatively low level of state involvement in the economy, Swedish
industrializationproceededrapidly. In 1870, 72.4 percentof the populationwas engaged in
"agricultureand subsidiary occupations," in contrast to 14.6 percent in "manufacturing
handicraftsand mining." By 1910 the balance had changed dramatically:48.8 percent in
agricultureand 32 percent in industry.32One might be tempted to argue that the critical
difference between Sweden on the one hand and Germany and Russia on the other was a
lack of military pressures, which eliminated the need for state intervention.This may be
true, but what is critical is that, even without a strong state, industrializationoccurredquite
rapidly in Sweden. And what is notable about the Swedish case is that it occurredwithout
the social instabilityseen elsewhere.33It would appearthatthe weaknessof the state actually
contributedto this outcome. A low level of state interventionin industrializationmeant that
the process of state building was divorced from the process of industrialization.Though
industrializationwas rapid, the unsettlingsocioeconomic changes were not accompaniedby
the even more destabilizingeffects of state building.
Simultaneously,the permeabilityof the state was guaranteedby an active and influential
parliament. During the period of economic transformation,permeability increased as the
franchisewas expanded. This guaranteedthat the institutionwould have to react to societal
demands. When severe economic crisis struckin the early 1930s, the state proved flexible
enough to manage the growing pressures.
The 1932 election, held at the peak of Sweden's economic crisis, resulted in a strong
showing for industriallabor's Socialist Party and the peasants' AgrarianParty. The result
was the famed "cow trade" in which labor accepted price supports for agricultural
commodities (that is, higher food prices), while agricultureaccepted higher urban wages
(thatis, higherprices for manufactures).34 The weakness of the state preventedeitherpartner
from using the state for the interestsof one economic groupexclusively. Simultaneously,the
permeabilityof the state forced a response to societal interests. Democracy prevailed as
Sweden took the "middle way."

Conclusions

Our discussion of the Russian, German, and Swedish cases results in a conclusion
diametricallyopposed to the conventionalwisdom. Strong states are more likely than weak
states to result in evolution. Strength of policy institutions is indeed a critical variable
explaining revolution when measured according to the state's depth and breadth of
penetrationof society and the permeabilityof the state.
The most complete transformationtook place in Russia, where the depth and breadthof
penetrationof society by policy institutionswas greatest but where penetrationof state by
society was weakest. Here the Bolshevik revolution resulted in both political and social
transformation--a true "social" revolution. In Germany, a mixed record on depth and
breadthof penetrationas well as permeabilityof the state was associated with a mixed
record on the degree to which upheaval transformedthe country. Clearly, vast political
transformation took place with the advent of the Nazi Third Reich, but social
transformation,though present, was less sweeping than in the Russian case. Finally, in
Sweden policy institutionsachieved only a low level of penetrationof society and social

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 Evelyn B. Davidheiser

Table2 Strengthof the StateandOutcomesin Russia,Germany,andSweden

Russia Germany Sweden

Imperial Weimar

Depth High High High I Low

Breadth High Low

IHigh ]Low

Permeability I Low Med-Low Med-High High

Outcome Social Revolution No

Revolution on the right Revolution

upheavalfailed to materialize.More critically,the legislatureprovidedinstitutionalaccess to

society which allowed for peaceful reformratherthan violent upheaval. Instead of socialist
or nationalsocialist revolution, Sweden passed througha period of reformwhich resultedin
social democracy (see Table 2).
Our findings suggest that penetrationby policy institutionsis critical in understandingthe
mass politics which result in revolution. I have arguedthat a strong state is more likely to
contributeto revolution than a weak one. Undoubtedly,the breakdownof coercive ability
allows revolution to "breakthrough," as Skocpol contends. Clearly, we would agree with
Skocpol's assessment of the strength of coercive institutions at the time of the Russian
revolution. However, a weak state may also be conducive to reformist rather than
revolutionarychange, as the Swedish case suggests.
I have not claimed that strongstates cause revolution.What the state does with its strength
and how it manages the crises which triggerrevolutionboth play a criticalrole. My findings
simply cast doubt on the conventionalwisdom's associationof weak states with revolution.
Additionally,they suggest that one should carefullydefine which state structuresare partof
the equationof revolutionarychange. Focus on economic institutions,for example, indicates
that strong states which undertakerapid economic transformationof the country may be
setting themselves up for revolution.Neitherrapidchange nor a strongstate alone, however,
would present sufficient conditions for revolution. Only by careful definition can one avoid
the tautology of arguing that weak states result in revolution.

NOTES
1. Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927); Robert
Hunter, Revolution: Why, How, When? (New York: Harper, 1940); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions
(New York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1979); PitrimSorokin, 'Fluctuationsof InternalDisturbances,"in George A.

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Kelly and Clifford Brown, eds., Struggles in the State: Sources and Patterns of WorldRevolution(New York: John
Wiley, 1970).
2. See James C. Davies, "Towarda Theory of Revolution." AmericanSociological Review, 27 (1962), 5-18, T.
RobertGurr, WhyMen Rebel (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1970); ChalmersJohnson, RevolutionaryChange
(Boston: Little Brown, 1966). For an earlier generationthat focuses on the ancien regime and revolutionaryprocess,
see Crane Brinton, The Anatomyof Revolution(New York: W. W. Norton, 1938); George S. Petee, The Process of
Revolution(New York: Harper, 1938).
3. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p. 29.
4. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in CurrentResearch," in Peter Evans,
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), pp. 7-8.
5. Perhapsthe best example of this is the collection of articles in Peter Katzenstein,ed.. Between Power and Plenty
(Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1979).
6. Michael Mann, "The AutonomousPower of the State: Its Origins, Mechanismsand Results," in John Hall, ed.,
States in History (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 109-36.
7. See especially Joseph LaPalombara,"Penetration:A Crisis of GovernmentalCapacity,"LeonardBinder, "Crisis
of Political Development," and Sidney Verba, "Sequencesand Development," all in Crises and Sequences in Political
Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971): Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968): CharlesTilly, ed., The Formationof National States in Western
Europe (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1975).
8. The index of overall industrialproductionis from Brian Mitchell, European Historical Statistics (New York:
Facts on File), pp. 376-77. Data on sectoral productionis from P. A. Khromov, EkonomicheskoeRazvitie Rossii v
XIX-XX vekakh(Moscow: Gosudarstvennoeizdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury.1950), pp. 457, 459.
9. Victoria Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow,
1900-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 45-46, 55-56; Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian
Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 12-15: Leopold Haimson, "The Problem of Social
Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917," Slavic Review, 23 (December 1964), 619-42, and 24 (March 1965), 1-21:
Robert E. Johnson, Peasant and Proletarian: The WorkingClass of Moscow in the Late Nineteenth Century(New
Brunswick:Rutgers University Press, 1979), pp. 12-13, 31-33.
10. N. P. Eroshkin,Ocherkiistorii gosudarstvennikhuchrezhdeniidorevoliutsionnoiRossii (Moscow: Gosudarstven-
noe uchebnopedagogicheskoeizdatel'stvo, 1960), pp. 310-17: I. F. Gindin, Gosudarstr'enniibank i ekonomicheskaia
politika tsarskogo pravitel'st'a (1861-1892 gody) (Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1960), pp. 153-58: A. P. Pogrebinski.
Ocherkiistoriifinansov dorevoliutsionnoiRossi (Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1954), pp. 55, 59: L. E. Shepelev, Tsarizmi
burzhuaziiavo vtoroi polovine xix veka (Leningrad:Nauka, 1981), pp. 210-13: G. L. Yaney, The Systematizationof
Russian Government(Urbana:University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 364-65.
11. S. Ainzaft, Zubatovshchinai Gaponovshchina(Moscow: 1925): V. Ya. Laverychev, Tsarizmi rabochii vopros
v Rossii (1861-1917 gg) (Moscow: Mysl', 1972): Dmitry Pospielovsky, Russian Police Trade Unionism (London:
London School of Economics, 1971); JeremiahSchneiderman,Sergei Zubatov and RevolutionaryMarxism (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1970).
12. Evelyn B. Davidheiser, "The World Economy and the Rise of MobilizationalDictatorship:Russia's Transition,
1870-1917" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1990).
13. Gordon A. Craig, Germany, 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 1-37.
14. Craig, Germany pp. 38-60; Gustav Stolper, The German Economy, 1870-1940 (New York: Reynal &
Hitchcock, 1940), pp. 26-31.
15. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1962). For other descriptions of German industrialization, see Knut Borchardt, "Germany,
1700-1914," in Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Emergence of Industrial Societies: The Fontana Economic History of
Europe, Part 1, Vol. 4 (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976), p. 76-160; Willibald Gutsche, Monopole, Staat und
Expansionvor 1914 (Berlin:Akademie Verlag, 1986): R. H. Tilly, "CapitalFormationin Germanyin the Nineteenth
Century," in the CambridgeEconomic History of Europe, Vol. 7, Part 1 (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,
1978), pp. 382-441; Alan Milward and S. B. Saul, The Development of the Economies of Continental Europe.
1850-1914 (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1977); and Clive Trebilcock, The Industrializationof the
ContinentalPowers (New York: Longman, 1981).
16. Stolper, GermanEconomy, pp. 28, 75-77.

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17. Ibid.. pp. 76-77.

18. Craig, Germany. pp. 45-46. See also the discussion in James J. Sheehan, "Conflict and Cohesion among
GermanElites in the NineteenthCentury,"in James J. Sheehan, ed., Imperial Germany(New York: FranklinWatts,
1976), pp. 62-92.
19. Craig stresses the mixed balance of powers between the center and states in Weimar Germany. See Craig,
Germany, p. 419. Stolper places more emphasis on growing centralization. See Stolper. German Economy, pp.
198-219.
20. Of course I would not want to push this point. Obviously, on the issue of unificationincreasedcentralizationwas
offset by the loss of imperialterritory.
21. Stolper, German Economy, pp. 198-99: Harold James, Weltwnirtschaftskrise 1924-1936 (Stuttgart:Deutsche
Verlag, 1986).
22. Stolper, GermanEconomy. p. 20.
23. MarquisW. Childs, Sweden: The Middle Way (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936).
24. Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 131.
25. Forexample, individualswho failed to find suitablework were requiredto become servants.G. A. Montgomery,
The Rise of Modern Industryin Sweden (London:P. S. King & Son, 1939), p. 63.
26. Montgomery.p. 1.
27. Dankwert A. Rustow The Politics of Compromise:A Study of Parties and Cabinet Governmentin Sweden
(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1955). pp. 10-11.
28. Ibid.
29. Montgomery.
30. Droppedin the early 1870s, tariffs were resumedin the 1880s as agriculturesufferedincreasinglyfrom declining
commodity prices. Tariffs were lowered again in 1880 as export industriesclamored for their reduction but were
restoredto high levels in the 1890s. Ibid., pp. 145-58.
31. Ibid., pp. 145-58; Rustow, pp. 35-37.
32. Montgomery.p. 141. For other discussions of Swedish industrialization,see K. G. Hildebrand. "Labourand
Capital in the ScandinavianCountries in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in The Cambridge Economic
History of Europe. Vol. 7, Part 1 (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1978). pp. 590-628; LennartJorberg,
"The Nordic Countries, 1850-1914," in Carlo M. Cipolla. ed., The Emergence of Industrial Societies, Part 2
(London:Fontana, 1973), p. 375-485.
33. This finding would seem to weaken the argumentthat rapid economic transformationis inherentlyassociated
with political instability. See MancurOlson, "RapidGrowth as a Destabilizing Force." Journal of Economic History
(1963). 529-52.
34. See the discussion in Gourevitch, pp. 131-35.

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