Bálcãs ocidentais

Disputa por influência

União Europeia e Estados Unidos

The EU has developed a policy to support the gradual integration of the Western
Balkan countries with the Union. On 1 July 2013, Croatia became the first of the seven
countries to join, and Montenegro, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Commented [P1]: A entrada da Sérvia e de Kosovo na UE está
diretamente ligada às tratativas de paz entre os dois
Albania are official candidates. Accession negotiations and chapters have been opened with
Commented [P2]: Ao mudarem de novo para Macedônia do
Montenegro and Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidate Norte, os gregos pararam de vetar o acesso grego à OTAN e à UE
countries. Slovenia is a member state since 2004.

The EU’s enlargement policy aims to unite European countries in a common political
and economic project. Guided by the Union’s values and subject to strict conditions,
enlargement has proved to be one of the most successful tools in promoting political,
economic and societal reforms, and in consolidating peace, stability and democracy across the
continent. Enlargement policy also enhances the EU’s presence on the global stage.

Any European state may apply to become a member of the Union if it respects the
common values of the Member States and is committed to their promotion (Article 49 TEU).
The Copenhagen criteria, established by the European Council in 1993 in Copenhagen, are
essential in any candidate or potential candidate country’s EU integration process. They
include:

 The stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities;
 A functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the EU;
 The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including by adhering to the aims
of political, economic and monetary union, and adopting the common rules, standards
and policies that make up the body of EU law (the acquis communautaire).
 In December 2006 the European Council agreed on a ‘renewed consensus on
enlargement’, based on ‘consolidation, conditionality and communication’ and on the
EU’s capacity to integrate new members.

Turkey's candidacy to join the EU has been a matter of major significance and considerable Commented [P3]: Não é bálcãs ocidental, mas tá no meio do
alargamento da UE.
controversy since it was granted in 1999. Turkey is the thirteenth largest economy in the
world, it has the second largest military force of NATO and is a key regional power. In 2006,
Carl Bildt, Swedish foreign minister, stated that "[The accession of Turkey] would give the EU a
decisive role for stability in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which is
clearly in the strategic interest of Europe."

However, others, such as former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, maintain an opposition to Turkey's membership. Opponents argue that Turkey
does not respect the key principles that are expected in a liberal democracy, such as the
freedom of expression. Turkey's large population would also alter the balance of power in the
representative European institutions. Upon joining the EU, Turkey's 70 million inhabitants
would bestow it the second largest number of MEPs in the European Parliament. Demographic
projections indicate that Turkey would surpass Germany in the number of seats by 2020.
Turkey also does not recognize one EU state, Cyprus, over the Cyprus dispute and the Cypriot
government blocks some chapters of Turkey's talks.

Turkey's relations with the EU have seriously deteriorated in the aftermath of the 2016
Turkish coup d'état attempt and subsequent purges. On 24 November 2016 the European
Parliament approved a non-binding resolution calling for the "temporary freeze of the ongoing
accession negotiations with Turkey" over human rights and rule of law concerns.

Russia

The strategic goal of Russia’s policy in the Balkans is preserving positions in its own
civilizational area, which has historically included the South Slavic space. The tactical ones
include creating a comfortable environment for Russian companies (primarily from the energy
sphere) and counterbalancing NATO’s influence in the region. In the long run, the tactical goal
could be a full-scale inclusion or even initiating a multilateral solution of the “Balkan issue” by
organizing an international conference.

Serbia has maintained close links with traditional Slavic ally Russia even as the country
formally seeks European Union membership. Belgrade has refused to join Western sanctions
against Russia over Ukraine and has promised it will stay out of NATO. Despite strong Russian
opposition, Montenegro joined NATO in 2017 while Macedonia has settled its name dispute
with Greece in order to join the Western military alliance.

By drawing on its pan-Slavic ties with some of the Balkan countries, Russia has tried to
legitimize its presence and raise its influence in the region. Although it has never left the
region, its foreign policy strategies towards the Balkan countries have altered over time.
Currently, Russia has tried to play a role in the important developments of the Balkan politics
such as in the latest regional tensions surrounding Serbia and Kosovo.

Russian influence in the Western Balkans cannot be understood without analyzing the
function of the international system, relations among the great powers, their balance of
power, and the historical background of the region. Since the 1990s, ethnic conflicts which
ended up with the military interventions in the Western Balkans have played an important role
in the reformulation of the international system orders. The break-up of the Soviet Union and
the end of the Cold War brought about an emergence of the US as a hegemonic power. The
US-led NATO military interventions in the Balkans (both in Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo but
especially in Kosovo) then contributed to the solidification of the USA position, further
undermining Russia’s attempt to position itself as a great power.

NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo has brought a new paradigm in the

international arena by framing Western support and legitimacy of the intervention as
‘humanitarian.’ This portrayal was not uncontested, however, and triggered a debate
regarding the international law and order. In the opposition to the Western position, Russia
has supported Serbia in the international arena by condemning the intervention in Kosovo as
unjust and against the international law. Russia has thus used Kosovo’s case as a strategic
opportunity to reassert its role in the international system.

Furthermore, the military intervention in Kosovo has served as a tipping point for
Russian foreign strategy since Russia started to use it as a precedent and a legitimization of its
own military interventions elsewhere, as seen in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The annexation of Crimea and instability in Ukraine show a further conversation of

Russia’s foreign policy into a more aggressive and revisionist, as Moscow openly started to
oppose the Western norms and principles accepted as international values. Fighting against
Western dominance in general and USA hegemony in particular, positions Russia as an
economic and military alternative for the Western Balkan countries. Yet, instead of having a
clear strategy towards the Western Balkans, Russia rather concentrates on strategic profits
from the political mistakes committed in the region by the Western powers and their general
lack of attention given to the Balkans.

Although the Western Balkan countries are in the process of the EU integration, they
still face obstacles of ethnic tensions, corruption, unstable social conditions and economic
stagnation. These vulnerabilities are exploited by the great powers to spread their influence in
the Balkans. Although the EU has played a significant role in the democratization process of
the countries, the Union’s own issues such as migration, and or Brexit, have enabled Russia to
play a more active role and enhance its economic, cultural and military relations with these
countries.

In this regard, Serbia is Russia’s biggest cultural and military ally in the region. Russia
has also become Serbia’s major supporter in opposing Kosovo’s statehood in the international
arena. The two countries have mutually benefited from their cooperation, Russia proving its
international power through its influence in Serbia, and Serbia using it for its own political
benefits, and as bait to the EU, i.e. threatening the EU to go under Russian political umbrella,
and most importantly to bring Russian influence in the region.

In the recent meeting between Vučić and Putin in Moscow where they discussed how
to push forward the dialogue with Kosovo, Vučić was interested in presenting the support for
Russia in the process. Even though the specifics of the meeting were not shared with the
public – the message that also Putin wanted to give through the meeting was clear – West
should count with Russia, when it comes to the important political developments in the region.

Last but not least, there is a final stage of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia
currently taking place. If successfully finalized, it would enable Serbia to speed up its EU
membership process and secure financial benefit as an EU country whereas for Kosovo it
would open the UN membership door. Possession of a veto in the UN Security Council makes
Russia a crucial player in the process and also enables it to prevent Kosovo’s membership in
the UN and its full international recognition.
 Macedônia do Norte

The use of the name "Macedonia" was disputed between the Southeast European
countries of Greece and North Macedonia. The dispute arose from the ambiguity in
nomenclature between North Macedonia, then known as the Republic of Macedonia, the
adjacent Greek region of Macedonia and the ancient Greek kingdom of Macedon. Citing
historical and irredentist concerns, Greece opposed the use of the name "Macedonia" without
a geographical qualifier such as "Northern Macedonia" for use "by all ... and for all purposes".
As millions of ethnic Greeks identify themselves as Macedonians, unrelated to Slavs, Greece
further objected to the use of the term "Macedonian" for the neighboring country's largest
ethnic group and language. North Macedonia was accused by Greece of appropriating symbols
and figures that are historically considered part of Greek culture such as the Vergina Sun and
Alexander the Great, and of promoting the irredentist concept of a United Macedonia, which
involves territorial claims on Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia.

On 12 June 2018, an agreement was reached between Greek prime minister Alexis Commented [P4]: Prespa agreement
Tsipras and his Macedonian counterpart Zoran Zaev, whereby the name "Republic of North
Macedonia" would be adopted. A referendum was held in Macedonia on 30 September 2018,
with voters overwhelmingly affirming support for EU and NATO membership by accepting the
agreement, albeit with 37% voter turnout. After the agreement was ratified by both sides, it
entered into force from 12 February 2019. Also in February, NATO states have signed an
agreement with Macedonia, clearing the way for the Balkan nation to become the military
alliance's 30th member.

Questão Kosovar

Belgrade–Pristina dialogue is a series of EU-facilitated talks between the governments

of Serbia and Kosovo and mediated by the European Union. Serbia claims Kosovo as its
southern province under United Nations administration, and rejects its independence. Kosovo
considers Serbia as a neighboring state. The negotiations began in March 2011, three years
after Kosovo declared independence. They are the first negotiations between the two entities
since Kosovo declared independence in February 2008.

Belgrade’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence has become an obstacle to

Serbia’s accession negotiations with the European Union. The Serbian political establishment
has found itself in a difficult spot: it needs to secure EU membership, but that is only possible if
it signs an agreement with Pristina recognizing the legitimacy of the Kosovo state. At the same
time, the potential agreement also needs to be acceptable to nationalist audiences at home
that are adamantly against losing Kosovo. The only possibility Belgrade sees to achieve both
goals is the potential partition of Kosovo that would allow Serbia to annex its northern
municipalities and thus justify granting some kind of acknowledgement to the Kosovo state
before domestic constituencies.

However, the unilateral partition of Kosovo is clearly unacceptable to Pristina, which

led to Kosovo’s President Hashim Thaçi proposing “corrections of borders” that would
reportedly involve a land swap between the two countries: exchanging Serb-populated
territories in northern Kosovo for the Albanian-majority Preševo Valley in Serbia. Thaçi stated,
after talks in Geneva in October 2018, that an agreement on a lasting peace between the two
countries, including the demarcation of 400 kilometers (250 miles) of border, would open the
way to prosperity and closer ties to the EU, as well as full international recognition for Kosovo.
He saw a small window of opportunity to make the deal happen.

The proposed deal has invoked mixed reactions from international players and in the
Balkans. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, who has been brokering the
negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, embraced a potential solution involving land
swaps as long as they abide by international law and avoid attempts to create ethnically
homogeneous states. US President Donald Trump has promised to receive the presidents of
Serbia and Kosovo in the White House “to celebrate what would be a historic accord”.

But many European politicians and Balkan leaders caution against partition in the
region, as it could set a precedent to be used elsewhere. Whether successful or not, partition
in pursuit of ethnic homogenization of any state in the Balkans could trigger demands for
secession, annexation, or border changes in several potential flash points, including the Serb
Republic (Republika Srpska) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, western Macedonia, and the Muslim-
majority Sandžak region divided between Montenegro and Serbia. Furthermore, such a
precedent can be used by Moscow in regions further east, where Russia has annexed
territories or supported regional separatism. Judging by its previous attempts to use the
secession of Kosovo for its own political purposes, Russia could exploit another Balkan
precedent for its ambitions in Crimea, Georgia, Moldova and elsewhere. Russia’s official
position on a potential land swap between Serbia and Kosovo is that it would support a
satisfactory, mutually acceptable decision, if Belgrade and Pristina reach it.

Talks to repair ties between the Balkan states, who fought a 1998-1999 war that ended
after a NATO-led bombing campaign against Serb forces, shuddered to a halt last year when
Kosovo imposed a 100 percent levy on its neighbor’s imports. It was a reaction to Serbia
blocking its bid to join the global policing organization Interpol -- part of a campaign to deny
recognition of Kosovo in international bodies also backed by Russia and China. Serbia says it is
ready to resume dialogue with Kosovo over the normalization of ties only after Pristina lifts
import tariffs on Serbian goods