ELECTION LAW

III CASE 7 - IV CASES 1 AND 2 DIGEST

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES

CASE #7 CODILLA vs. De Venecia

GR 150605 December 10, 2002

DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the Comelec to disqualify candidates is limited to the grounds
enumerated in Sec 68, BP 881. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of the Comelec
jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature, and the power of Comelec over such
cases in confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offense for the
purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the courts of justice.

FACTS:

Petitioner Codilla and Respondent Ma. Victoria Locsin were candidates for the position of Representatives
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte on the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, Codilla was Mayor of
Ormoc City while Locsin was sitting Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. May 8, 2001,
Josephine de la Cruz filed with Comelec a Petition for Disqualification against Codilla for indirectly
soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte in violation of Sec 678,
Omnibus Election Code. Codilla allegedly used equipments and vehicles owned by the Ormoc City
Government to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the 2 towns to induce, them to vote for
him. The case was assigned to Comele’s 2nd Division, who remanded the case to the Regional Election
Director for investigation.

At the time of the elections on May 14, the Regional Election Director has yet to hear the disqualification
case. Consequently, Codilla was included in the list of candidates, was voted for, and won in the initial
results. Locsin filed a “Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation” of Codilla with Comelec 2nd
Division, alleging the evidence on record is very strong and unless rebutted remains. Codilla’s
proclamation was suspened by ExParte Order of Comelec 2nd Division. As a result, Codilla was not
proclaimed as winner even though the final election results showed that he garnered more votes as
against Locsin. Codilla filed an Answer alleging that he has not received the summons together with the
copy of the petition and that the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of Brgy. roads of the Matag-ob
and Kananga were undertaken without his authority as City Mayor. Later, Codilla filed a Motion to Lift
Order of Suspension of his proclamation and requested the setting of a hearing on his motion. He
submitted his Memorandum in support of his Motion assailing the suspension of his proclamation on the
grounds that: a) he was not afforded due process, b) the order has no legal and factual basis, c)
evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent for the purpose of suspending proclamation. But the motion
was not resolved.

Comelec 2nd Division promulgated a Resolution which found him guilty of indirect solicitation of votes
and order his disqualification. It directed the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes. By virtue of the Resolution, the votes cast for Codilla, totalling 71, 350 were
declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. As a result, Locsin was proclaimed as the
duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte and took her oath of office.

Codilla seasonable filed with Comelec En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Proclamation of Locsin who garnered the 2d highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin
filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because
of the proclamation of Locsin and that any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin
can only be taken cognizance of by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case
should be filed and heard in the first instance by a Division of the Commission and not directly by the
Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of Locsin was valid because she received the highest
number of valid votes cast, the votes of Codilla being stray.

1
ELECTION LAW
III CASE 7 - IV CASES 1 AND 2 DIGEST

Comelec reversed the Resolution of the 2nd Division and declared the proclamation of Locsin as null and
void. Locsin questioned the procedure and manner by which the decision was issued, and relied on the
opinion that Comelec has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of Locsin after she has taken oath and
assumed office since HRET is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the
House. She further declared that she will openly defy and disobey Comelec En Banc resolution ordering
her to vacate the position. Despite this, Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as
the duly-elected Representative and took his oath of office.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the proclamation of Respondent Locsin by Comelec Second Division is valid - Nawp.

(2) WON said proclamation divested Comelec En Banc of jurisdiction to review its validity - Nawp.

HELD:

1. Nawp.

First, Petitioner Codilla was denied due process during the entire proceeding leading to the proclamation
of Respondent Locsin. Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the
service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation. Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning candidate's guilt is strong. In
the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific finding that evidence of
petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the
"seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification. We hold that absent any finding that
the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its
power when it suspended his proclamation.

Second, Comelec 2nd Division did not give ample opportunity to Petitioner to adduce evidence in
support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification. No hearing was conducted in gross violation
of Sec 6, RA 6646 which specifically enjoins Comelec to “continue with the trial or hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest.

Third, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not based on
substantial evidence. It merely relied of the affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for
disqualification. Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence
coming from the petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged.
Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:

"Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is declared
by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or
other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
official functions, xxx shall be disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding office" The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these
allegations. To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses against the
petitioner, particularly section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:

"Section 261. Prohibited Acts - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

1. Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of
value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or make or offers
to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person,
association, corporation, entity or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general, to vote
for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for
the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.

2
ELECTION LAW
III CASE 7 - IV CASES 1 AND 2 DIGEST

(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the
government for an election campaign.- Any person who uses under any guise whatsoever directly or
indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the government
or by its political subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or controlled corporations, or by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any partisan political activity x x x."

However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in
section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction.97 They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before
the regular courts of justice, viz:

"Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code,
and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint
within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or
with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. Section 268.
Jurisdiction.- The RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceeding for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure
to vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision
of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."The COMELEC Second Division grievously
erred when it decided the disqualification case based on section 261 (a) and (o), and not on
section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Fourth, exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent Locsin was
done with undue haste. The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of
the petitioner, and the proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the
opportunity to challenge the same

Fifth, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and respondent cannot be
validly proclaimed on that basis. As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void
for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that
the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division to order the
immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent
as having garnered the next highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer,
cannot be proclaimed. More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled
doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.102 In every election, the people's choice is the
paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority
speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election
for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place

2. Nawp.

First, the validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration
seasonably filed by the petitioner. Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en
banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division.
The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely
filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for
the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte.

3
ELECTION LAW
III CASE 7 - IV CASES 1 AND 2 DIGEST

Second, it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the
instant case. The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet
been resolved by the COMELEC en banc. To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent
Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the
petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

POST ELECTION DISPUTE

CASE #1 JAVIER vs. COMELEC

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

DOCTRINE: The COMELEC en banc and not a mere division must hear and resolve a pre-proclamation
controversy for Batasan members.—We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole
judge of all contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to
hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those
arising before the proclamation of the winners.

All election contests for the Batasan must be decided by the COMELEC en banc.—The questioned
Decision of the Second Division of the COMELEC, dated July 23, 1984, proclaiming private respondent,
Arturo F. Pacificador, as the duly elected Assemblyman of the province of Antique, should be set aside for
the legal reason that all election contests, without any distinction as to cases or con under the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution.

Facts:

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the
May 1984 elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came
to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s
men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true
to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent’s proclamation, the
petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His
complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of
the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void
because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the
Constitution.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of
canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning
candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to
immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the
Commission. On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set
aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the
petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision
now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of
the province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul the said decision on the
basis that it should have been decided by COMELEC en banc.

4
ELECTION LAW
III CASE 7 - IV CASES 1 AND 2 DIGEST

The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold
blood and in broad daylight. And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of the
1987 Constitution.

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot and academic.

Issues:

1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the petitioner being dead and the
respondent missing. - NAWP

2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to promulgate its decision
of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election? - NAWP

Held:

1. NAWP.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the
petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a
convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be
resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important
purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect
condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the
government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not
always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled
and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the
dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we
act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and
as a restraint upon the future.

2. NAWP.

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of
the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and
decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard
and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety
days from the date of their submission for decision.

We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and
city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from
beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of
the winners.

5
ELECTION LAW
III CASE 7 - IV CASES 1 AND 2 DIGEST

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving
members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the
most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the
Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late
already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many
unscrupulous candidates, which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of
the real winners in the election. The respondent’s theory would make this gambit possible for the pre-
proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in
division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission
en banc.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that
have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of
the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

POST ELECTION DISPUTE

CASE #2 ROBLES vs. HRET

G.R. No. 86647 February 5, 1990

DOCTRINE: The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts,
without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its
jurisdiction over the case. It is an established doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the
authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is
granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.

FACTS:

Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of
Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections.
Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987. Rep. Virgilio Robles elected to 1st
District of Caloocan. Respondent Romeo Santos then filed an election contest with HRET
(electoral fraud & irregularities) & called for re-counting / re-appreciation of votes. Respondent
Santos, filed Motion to Withdraw Contest but later filed Urgent Motion to Recall/Disregard his
Previous Motion. First Motion not acted upon by HRET, second Motion granted. Petitioner Robles
claimed that the first motion divested HRET of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not HRET acted without jurisdiction. - NAWP

HELD:

It is petitioner's main contention in this petition that when private respondent Santos filed the Motion to
Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988,
respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered
the revision of the unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any
action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the

6
ELECTION LAW
III CASE 7 - IV CASES 1 AND 2 DIGEST

case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case
is terminated (Jimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1). We agree with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal when it held: “We cannot agree with Protestee’s
contention that Protestant’s ‘Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts’ effectively withdrew the
precincts referred to therein from the protest even before the Tribunal has acted thereon. Certainly, the
Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only
when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction
already acquired. “We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or
deny Protestant’s Motion to Withdraw, if only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see
to it that the will of the electorate is ascertained. “Since Protestant’s ‘Motion to Withdraw Protest on the
Unrevised Precincts’ had not been acted upon by this Tribunal before it was recalled by the Protestant, it
did not have the effect of removing the precincts covered thereby from the protest. If these precincts
were not withdrawn from the protest, then the granting of Protestant’s ‘Urgent Motion to Recall and
Disregard Withdrawal of Protest’ did not amount to allowing the refiling of protest beyond the
reglementary period.” Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all
questions pertaining to the cause are orders withinits jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be,
they cannot be corrected by certiorari (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56614, July 28, 1987, 152
SCRA 378; Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna, G.R. No. 61404, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 564). This
rule more appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has
time and again been upheld by Us in many cases.

The allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due process when respondent tribunal rendered a
partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the HRET rules and found that Santos made a recovery of
267 votes after the revision of the first twenty-five per cent of the contested precincts has likewise, no
basis. The partial determination was arrived at only by a simple addition of the votes adjudicated to each
party in the revision of which both parties were properly represented.

It would not be amiss to state at this point that "an election protest is impressed with public interest in
the sense that the public is interested in knowing what happened in the elections" (Dimaporo v. Estipona,
supra.), for this reason, private interests must yield to what is for the common good.

the instant petition is DISMISSED.