Accounting, Organizations andsociety, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 329-350, 1985. 0361-3682185 S3.00+.

00
Printed in Great Britain @ 1985 Pergamon Press Ltd.

THE USE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION BY TRADE UNION NEGOTIATORS IN

PLANT LEVEL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING*

DAVID L. OWEN
Department ofAccounting and Business Finance, University of Manchester, UK

and

ANTHONY J. LLOYD
Member of Parliament forStretford (formerly Department of Business and Administration,
University of Salford L?K)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to undertake a critical review of recently completed empirical work, carried out
under the auspices of the SSRC, on the use of information in individual company and plant level bargaining.
The authors also attempt to develop a strategy for further investigation of this important topic which high-
lights the importance of variations in the nature of the domestic organisation in relation to the potential
importance and usefulness of financial information for union negotiators,

Traditionally, union negotiators have tended to
concentrate on factors such as rises in the cost of
living, changes in productivity and compar-
ability with other groups of workers rather than
a particular company’s ability to pay when
negotiating pay rises. At best it would appear
that statistics on ability to pay have been refer-
red to by unions as a “permissive” rather than
“determining” factor in wage claims (Foley &
Maunders, 1977). However it can be argued that
in the current economic climate, union
negotiators’ concern with avoiding any redun-
dancies arising from pay settlements reached
( Daniel, 198 1) will encourage a consideration of
ability to pay as an increasingly important factor
to be borne in mind when pursuing claims.
Hence there should be a demand from unions for
increased provision of financial information on
the part of employers, particularly in the private
sector of the economy.
There is indeed at the national level some evi-
dence of such a process taking place. Not only do
we have examples of “shopping lists” of informa-
tion requirements being issued through the TUC
(e.g. TX-Labour Party Liaison Committee,
1982) but also individual unions such as the
General and Municipal Workers Union (GMWU)
have begun to seek, as a matter of policy, to sec-
ure information agreements with companies,
and have published advice for their shop stew-

l The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of participants in Accounting seminars at the Universities of
Birmingham and Leeds, and at the AUTA Northern Accounting Group Conference at the University of Manchester (April
1982 ) on earlier drafts of this paper. Acknowledgement is also due to Anthony Hopwood for extensive commentary on an
earlier draft of the paper.

329
330 DAVID L. OWEN and ANTHONY J. LLOYD
ards on what types of information it is most use-
ful to ask for (GMWU, 1978). Other unions, not-
ably the Transport and General Workers Union
(TGWU) began some years ago to adopt the
practice of using detailed financial arguments in
pursuing certain “prestige” national wage claims
(e.g. TGWU, 1971, 1977).
A number of writers have commented most
favourably on such trends. For example, Palmer
( 1977, p.55) writing of the United States experi-
ence, which has had a profound effect on legisla-
tive developments in the United Kingdom,
suggests that, “The increased infusion of
accounting data into the negotiations process
should smooth the operation, raise the level of
bargaining and improve the union/management
relationship”, whilst Hawkins ( 1979, p.20) com-
ments that “. . increased disclosure is likely to
have a tangible effect on the level of profes-
sionalism with which collective bargaining is
conducted on both sides of the table”. Indeed
there appears to be a great deal of political con-
sensus, as evidenced by provisions contained
within the Industrial Relations Act 1971,
Employment Protection Act 1975 and Employ-
ment Act 1982, that information disclosure has
an important role to play in promoting more
informed and rational bargaining.
Much interest in recent years has focussed
upon the extent to which the above evidence of
apparent changes in union attitudes at national
level towards recognising the potential impor-
tance of a financial information input into the
collective bargaining process, is reflected in
individual company and plant level bargaining.
This interest itself reflects an appreciation of the
importance of the plant as a level of pay settle-
ment. For example a study by Daniel (1976)
which surveyed 254 plants, each employing
over 200 people drawn from the whole range of
manufacturing industry, indicated that the plant
represented, by a considerable margin, the most
important level of bargaining over pay, particu-
larly in engineering and metalworking.
Early evidence produced by researchers
suggested that ability to pay information was
being increasingly accepted by union
negotiators at domestic level as possessing
potential usefulness, which however tended to
outweigh the existing use made of such data.
Daniel (1976) for example found that, whereas
the ability of employers to pay, as measured by
trends in product demand, labour intensity, cash
flow and the changing size of the workforce,
appeared to have little infhtence over the wage
increase agreed, financial circumstances it&t-
enced management priorities and hence the
degree of difficulty associated with the negotia-
tions. Furthermore, inability of the firm to pay
was cited more frequently than any other argu-
ment put forward by management as being one
that union negotiators felt to be persuasive. It is
therefore somewhat surprising that Daniel
found considerable evidence of management
being disinclined to provide trade union officers
with information on the financial side of the bus-
iness! A further study worthy of note is that of
Cooper & Essex (1977) on the role of shop
stewards. Surveying a sample of 230 stewards in
the Greater Manchester area who were mem-
bers of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering
Workers (AUEW), Cooper & Essex asked them
to rank the important justifying factors used in
pursuing a pay claim. They found that profits
made by the firm ranked third in order of impor-
tance, behind the cost of living and comparision
with others in the same workplace. This marked
a major departure from a ranking published in
the 1968 Government Social Survey where pro-
fits of the firm appeared in ninth place. Cooper
& Essex concluded that, “Perhaps during the
period between the two surveys shop stewards
have come to regard accounting profits as a good
predictor of a firms willingness to pay a wage
claim” (p.2 14).
Perhaps a word of caution is necessary when
interpreting the results of the Cooper & Essex
study, the authors themselves emphasising that
their conclusions must be regarded as tentative
in view of the forced choice questionnaire
employed imposing a particular image of reality
on respondents and the relatively poor (24.8% )
response rate achieved. This need for caution is
reinforced when one considers the fmdings of
recent studies of the use made of company infor-
mation by trade unions in collective bargaining
 THE USE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION BY TRADE UNION NEGOTIATORS 331

at the domestic level conducted under a Social
Science Research Council (SSRC) initiative. ’
Jackson-Cox et al. (1984) for instance, found
that, “In general, managements’ provision of
such information to trades union represent-
atives was initiated in response to pressures
arising out of constraints imposed by the envi-
ronment in which firms operated, rather than in
response to trade union pressures or requests”.
Mitchell et al. (1980, p.55) could find, “no evi-
dence to suggest that management had been
under pressure from their work forces to dis-
close information. Trade union leadership . .
had, in general merely been permissive”, whilst
Reeves & McGovern ( 198 1) could find little evi-
dence of financial information being used by the
union side in wage bargaining.
The SSRC studies are particularly noteworthy
in that not only have the researchers sought to
ground their observations in a generally richer
institutional context than was the case with
earlier studies (Cooper & Essex, 1977; Foley &
Maunders, 1977) but also they have not per-
petuated the error of identifying collective bar-
gaining solely with wage bargaining. Thus they
see acquisition of company information on the
part of union negotiators being useful for pur-
poses extending far beyond a mere estimation of
ability to pay. For example, such information
may be used in order to arrive at an understand-
ing of the rationale underlying management
decisions, obtaining advance warning of issues
or decisions, particularly those having repercus-
sions on job prospects which may need to be
negotiated, and furthermore in enabling them to
question the validity of certain decisions or
propose alternative courses of action. In other
words they see an important role for information
acquisition in extending collective bargaining
beyond the traditional areas of concern, i.e.
terms and conditions of employment. Whereas
we would not take issue with the SSRC resear-
chers wider definition of collective bargaining
we would take issue with their tendency to
unquestioningly accept the potential impor-
tance of corporate financial information* to
union negotiators in this context, and con-
sequent failure to consider fully possible expla-
nations for the low rates of utilisation of such
information by union negotiators highlighted in
the studies. A further major reservation we have
concerning the studies is that, despite the richer
institutional context, we feel the possible impor-
tance of variations in the nature of the domestic
organisation in relation to the potential impor-
tance and usefulness of financial information for
the union negotiator is not fully explored.
Indeed we observe a tendency for the studies to
assume the existence of a universal “identikit”
union representative despite the deficiencies of
such a viewpoint highlighted in recent industrial
relations literature (Marchington & Armstrong,
1981).
Our purpose in this paper is therefore to
undertake a critical review of the SSRC studies
and, further, to develop a strategy for future
investigations in this still largely uncharted area
of research. We commence with a brief review
of three of the studies3 in which we seek to high-
light the major points they raise, which we have

’ Four studies were conducted, the research teams being as follows: J. Jackson-Cox, J. McQueeney and J. E. M. Thirkel
(University of Kent at Canterbury). H. Levie and R. E. Moore (Ruskin College, Oxford). F. Mitchell, H. I. Sams and P. J, White
(University of Edinburgh). T. K Reeves and T. McGovern (Anghan Regional Management Centre). For detailed references
see Bibliography.
’ It should be pointed out that the SSRC researchers focussed their attention on the acquisition and use of company informa-
tion in general rather than corporate financial information in particular. However it is apparent that much of their analysis
does indeed concern “financiaI” information, in terms of information which could further the construction of a particular
economic reality. Thus we feel justified in restricting our attention to corporate financial information defined in a similar
wide manner so as to include, for example, information relating to investment decisions, production planning and associated
manpower requirements, marketing and pricing policy.
’ The project carried out by Mitchell et al. whilst suggesting an extremely minor role for financial information disclosure in
the conduct of industrial relations looks at disclosure techniques primarily in the context of provision of information to all
employees rather than union negotiators specitically. The results presented are thus not as relevant to the theme of this par-
ticular paper as those from the other projects.
332 DAVID L. OWEN and ANTHONY J. LLOYD
attempted to utilise in our development of a
strategy for further investigation.
THE SSRC SPONSORED STUDIES
Moore, Gold & Levie (1979); Moore & Levie
(1981)
Moore and his colleagues at the Ruskin Col-
lege Trade Union Research Unit conduct their
studies very much within a trade union institu-
tional context, the trade unions involved having
approached the research team for help. Thus
their work at least exhibits the merit that value
judgements are certainly made explicit (Cooper
& Sherer, 1981) The dominant theme under-
pinning their analysis is that the effective use of
company information can, without doubt, aid
the union official in pursuing the interests of the
membership.
Before turning to the later study it would be
useful to summarise briefly the main points of
the earlier pilot study (Moore et al., 1979).
Essentially Moore et al. adopt a “user” approach,
advising officials to
look to the use of information, not to the acquisition
of more, when considering how to gain more intluence
within the enterprise. In particular information is a
means to an end; it makes sense only within its context;
it must be used within a strategy; and a wedge of the
union or unions has to cooperate together to ensure its
effectiveness (p.34).
In practice a number of constraints have to be
overcome before trade unionists can use infor-
mation effectively. Such constraints fall into two
categories, firstly management constraints -
managerial attitudes, the organisation of indust-
rial relations, company structure, and secondly
union constraints - union servicing, union pol-
icy, union structure (including shop steward
organisation). In overcoming these constraints
union officials are urged to develop forward
thinking, entailing the selection of objectives,
4 The case studies were concerned with the following issues: an anti merger campaign (Odharns); the introduction of a new
participation scheme (British Leyland); action taken to prevent a closure (British Steel, Ebbw Vale); and union re-organisa-
tion so as to cope better with company bargaining structures (Lucas).
the ordering of priorities and the choosing of
strategies or means to achieve them. Only by
developing forward thinking may trade
unionists avoid the trap of being “sucked into
management”. In particular it is necessary for
union officials to get to know and understand the
company information system as well as
strengthening the union organisation in the
company by developing a suitable structure,
enabling a clear picture of all the activities and
ramitications of the company to be obtained.
The latter point is of course particularly impor-
tant in that it is easy for shop stewards to develop
a parochial approach to plant bargaining
whereas many issues facing them, such as invest-
ment strategy, are not cot&ted to a particular
plant and may be best tackled by the adoption of
a multi piant bargaining approach.
It should be pointed out that the case studies
utilised by Moore et al. to illustrate their argu-
ments are all concerned with a major industrial
change which either took place or was
threatened.* As they indeed admit, it is easier to
develop a strategy to counter a one-off crisis that
it is to use information on a continuing basis.
Nevertheless we feel that the constraints model
developed does provide useful lessons for union
negotiators in using information on a regular
basis both in order to assess a company’s ability
to pay a wage increase and in attempting to
extend collective bargaining.
Moore & Levie’s ( 1981) project investigates
further the context of disclosure and trade union
use of company information. A further set of con-
straints is added to their original model, con-
straints created by the nature of the industry.
Within this category the size and spread of
employers, the nature of employment, employ
ment traditions and relations between unions
are specified as important factors. A case study
centred on the construction industry, focussing
on the problems encountered by the Union of
Construction Allied Trades and Technicians
(UCA’IT) in gathering information about its
 THE USE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION BY TRADE UNION NEGOTL4TORS
members earnings in order to consolidate the
wages structure in the industry, is utilised to
illustrate these particular constraints. Important
factors drawn to attention here are the fact that
construction industry national agreements
cover a small number of major employers and an
enormous number of small employers exhibit-
ing vast differences in management information
systems used, the operation of the “lump”
together with high rates of labour turnover,
“Victorian” employment traditions and poor
relations between the major unions involved in
the industry (UCATT and the TGWU).
The original constraints model, whilst
accepted as a useful diagnostic tool in a particu-
lar industrial and company setting at a particular
point in time, is criticised in this later study on
the grounds that it is static, whereas disclosure
and use of information are dynamic factors.
Therefore Moore et al. go on to identify crucial
dynamic factors that can change disclosure and
use of information dramatically. The factors
identified are management style and strategy,
the state of the economy, i.e. companies are
more generally inclined to disclose information
when things are going badly, and, most impor-
tantly, the ambitiousness of union demands.
The basic thesis adopted is that as union
demands become more ambitious in the context
of developing collective bargaining the union
moves along the “information scale”. Starting at
the bottom of the scale, with an acceptance of
company information as it comes, the union
moves through points such as asking for addi-
tional information, seeking access to the man-
agement information system and changing the
system towards the ultimate point of developing
its own trade union information system. The
level of democracy in the union is considered to
be the yardstick of its ability to improve its use of
company information. Whereas formal democ-
racy can be said to exist in all unions, the
relationship between union officials and the
membership ultimately resting on a voting
nexus, decision making within the union in
many cases has become an autocratic one way
process. Moore et al.. in their use of the term
democracy are referring to the need for active as
333
opposed to merely formal democratic proce-
dures. This requires,
a’ much higher level of involvement of the members
and their representatives. It means a bargaining structure
that is present at every level of the company.It impliesa
high level of co-operation, or at least discussion between
and within unions. It means creating a new role for Full-
Time Officers who no longer have to solve members
problems, but who enable them to solve their problems
themselves. It means an active education and research
programme that changes as collective bargaining
develops. It means a flexible organisation that is capable
of re-organising itself as the needs and problems of the
members change (p.20).
Although, as in the earlier study, Moore &
Levie do not look specifically at the problem of
using company information on a regular basis,
for example in negotiating wage claims, they do
raise the suggestion that Information Agree-
ments are a useful way to incorporate informa-
tion rights in collective bargaining. Rejecting a
shopping list approach they stress the need for,
a procedural agreement specifying the conditions of
informationto be disclosed(timing level of details,relia-
bility, format etc.) for whom it will be disclosed, how
often and who is responsible for disclosure. Specifying
the substance of the information to be disclosed should
be a function of collective bargaining itself(p. 11).
As is pointed out, empirical research on the
negotiation and use of such an agreement would
require a longitudinal research study to be car-
ried out. indeed it is a possible criticism of many
studies carried out in the area of trade union use
of information in collective bargaining that they
are essentially short term and static in nature
(e.g. Reeves & McGovern, 1981; Mitchell et al.,
1980).
Jackson-Cox, McQueeney & Tbirkell(I984)
Jackson-Cox et al. see the provision of com-
pany information as being, “particularly impor-
tant in the development of ‘intelligence’ for the
identification of new issues relating to the com-
pany and changes in management strategy
which may give rise to issues which are not yet
fully developed or disclosed” (p.264). Thus
their approach differs somewhat from that of
334 DAVID L OWEN and ANTHONY J. LLOYD
Moore et al. (1979, 1981) who argued that
union representatives should formulate objec-
tives and strategies for using information before
taking steps to acquire it, in other words adopt-
ing a decision making approach. Some support
for Jackson-Cox et d’s position is provided by
Gospel ( 1978) who pointed out that the deci-
sion oriented approach is not a one way process
whereby development of priorities leads to the
identification and use of information, but is in
fact a two way process.
For information itselfprovides a source of standards and
criteria which can generate objectives. In other words,
disclosure can activate objectives by changing percep
tions of such things as pay discrepancies, job security
prospects, managerial efficiency etc. In this way, the
acquisition of information can lead to a stronger motiva-
tion for further disclosure of information (p.24).
Jackson-Cox et al. however point out that
there are certain constraints to be overcome by
the union side in. identifying and indeed
legitimising issues within a particular bargaining
field. For identification of an issue only comes
about through the application of criteria and
standards demonstrating its structural rele-
vance, furthermore for such an issue to be recog-
nised as legitimate bilaterally agreed standards
must apply. The major problem here of course is
that there are no external institutional standards
relating to the provision of financial information,
such as there are in the field of health and safety
at work concerning for example the appoint-
ment of both management safety officers and
trade union safety representatives as well as the
establishment of safety committees.
A further major constraint may be provided by
domestic trade union institutions, particularly
where there is segmented trade union represen-
tation and the shop steward’s source of criteria
and standards is derived internally from the
membership. In such a situation the shop stew-
ards approach towards the acquisition and use
of company information may well be con-
strained by the limited expectations and stand-
ards of the membership. Jackson-Cox et al. place
great emphasis on the development of work-
place institutions, represented by position hol-
ders such as conveners or senior stewards
whose time will be principally devoted to union
duties, and forums such as joint shop stewards
committees, in order to overcome segmenta-
tion, establish common criteria and standards in
relation to particular issues and possibly secure
membership consent to external trade union
standards. Indeed they conclude horn the seven-
teen situational studies carried out that,
Only if. uses of information are accompanied by the
development and recognition of institutions, leading to
changes in union expectations, will trade unions be able
to challenge management’s prerogative to make many
unllateral decisions. In the meantime, the role of com-
pany information as inputs to trade union decision mod-
els will continue to be extremely limited (p.269).
As well as highlighting the crucial importance
of membership attitudes on shop steward
approaches to information use, certain other
observations made by Jackson-Cox et al. relating
to the possible importance of variations in the
nature of the domestic organisation are also
worthy of note. For example, some evidence is
produced, albeit limited, of the approach
adopted by full time officials to the disclosure
issue. In one case (Company F) the full time offi-
cial, who played a major role in the annual wage
negotiations, tried to initiate, unsuccessfully as it
turned out, a process of formal disclosure to the
district office of the union rather than linking it
to specific workplace or company issues. A simi-
lar process was observed in two other cases
where full time officials encouraged generalised
disclosure requests by shop stewards but again
didn’t relate such requests to specitlc issues or
use them to develop the domestic institutions.
Given this evidence of a restricted approach to
disclosure by full time officials it is perhaps sur-
prising that Jackson-Cox et al. place such a high
degree of emphasis on the need for shop stew-
ards in developing their perceptual field to have
access and commitment to external union stan-
dards and to mobilise external resources. Whilst
recognising the need for suitable company wide
steward organisations it could be argued that the
factory consciousness exhibited by the Ford
shop stewards (Beynon, 1973) may promote
 THE USE OF FINANCIAL INFOR!MATION BY TRADE UNION NEGOTIATORS
more efficient information usage than the
involvement of the external union would
achieve.
Evidence is also produced of ditIerences in
approach to the disclosure issue adopted by
white collar and blue collar union officials.
In some instances white collar union representatives
showed more interest in the acquisition of information
than their manual counterparts, but, with two excep-
tions, conditions for the establishment of institutional
mechanisms for the sharing of this expertise with manual
representatives were lacking (p.263).
In general it would appear that the manual
union representatives were unwilling to co-
operate with representatives from white collar
supervisory unions, or unable to do so due to
unfavourable membership attitudes, despite the
specialist expertise the latter could contribute
to the handling of information. It may well be
that as many white collar unionists are used to
dealing with financial information in their daily
work, thus making the obtaining and interpreta-
tion of such information relatively easy, they will
view its use in the drawing up of annual wage
claims more favourably than their blue collar
counterparts. Indeed it is interesting to note in
this context that Jackson-Cox et al. point to one
example (Company C) of a white collar union
senior representative initiating a claim for dis-
closure as a mechanism to attract membership.
A major difficulty in promoting information
usage in domestic bargaining is provided by
shop steward mistrust of management. Jackson-
Cox et al. state the problem succinctly,
The willingness of management to provide information
in order to encourage wage restraint tended to re-inforce
the belief amongst many stewards that they were better
off without company information, and made them suspi-
cious of all information received directly, or indirectly,
from management; and hence their desire to check
against information from other sources (p.266).
This would appear to reinforce the argument
of Moore et al. that it is vital for unions to seek
access to the management information system
and ultimately aim to develop their own infor-
335
approach to information disclosure (Gospel,
1978).
Reeves G McGovern (1981)
Reeves & McGovern present ten case studies
of information disclosure ordered in such a way
to show that,
as two key conditions namely shop stewards having
the interest or skill to utilise company information in bar-
gaining, and management providing a negotiating or par-
ticipative structure in which they could do so, become
increasingly more favourable to the use of company
information by shop stewards, its use nevertheless
remains fairly limited (p.52).
However, it would be pertinent to point out at
this stage that a careful scrutiny of the case
studies presented indicates that the conclusion
drawn tends to overstate the degree of manage-
ment “openness” in terms of information pro-
vided. For example, in no less than eight of the
studies mention is specifically made of manage-
ment not disclosing information, on matters
ranging from pricing policy and unit costs to the
contents of a consultants’ report on manning
levels, or of management not providing informa-
tion in a suitably disaggregated form. Further-
more, in one particular plant (Case 8) where a
participative scheme had been set up, the vehi-
cle for participation being a joint management-
union committee, it is noted that, “certain
figures, however, were not revealed. One was
the profit made by the plant . . In line with this
withholding of the profit figure, the plants
period accounts were also not shown to JC rep-
resentatives” (p.37). Yet Reeves & McGovern
consider this as an example of existing condi-
tions being very favourable to the use of com-
pany information by shop stewards! Indeed, the
case studies presented (Cases 7-9) in which par-
ticipative schemes were in operation provided
examples only of joint consultation rather than
joint decision making.
Despite our reservations in respect of the
conclusions drawn by Reeves & McGovern they
do present a number of illuminating observa-
tions which are worthy of mention. In particular
the problem of lack of membership support con-
336 DAVID L. OWEN and ANTHONY J. LLOYD

straining stewards in their use of company infor-
mation, referred to by Jackson-Cox et al. is
mentioned in six of the case studies. The prob-
lem for the shop steward is concisely stated ‘I. .
bargaining over budgets, however theoretically
desirable, was believed to be something that
management would not acceed to lightly, whilst
their members would not be prepared to sup-
port them in what it was believed they would see
as a remote and irrelevant exercise” (Case 5,
p.24). Furthermore, in the only example
encountered of company information playing a
part in wage bargaining, shop stewards in this
case accepting management’s assessment of abil-
ity to pay, the settlement provoked a very hostile
reaction from the membership despite job losses
being avoided (Case 3). In another case the exis-
tence of an explicit management policy on
employee communications, introduced in
response to criticisms from the workforce of the
way they were kept informed on company mat-
ters, did not result in any pressure being applied
on shop stewards by their constituents to use
financial information in wage bargaining (Case
6). Finally, shop stewards were unable to
mobilise membership support when they
attempted to employ financial arguments to
counter the management proposal to close Dun-
lop’s tyre factory at Speke on Merseyside (Case
10).
Reeves & McGovern concur with Jackson Cox
et al.3 viewpoint that shop steward mistrust of
management presents a major dil3iculty in pro-
moting information usage in domestic bargain-
ing. The effect of past experiences, leading to a
general mistrust of management on the part of
shop stewards, is cited as a contributory factor to
a lack of union interest in information disclosure
in four of the studies. A number of other factors
cited by Reeves & McGovern as inhibiting shop
stewards in using information, such as lack of
expertise in handling financial data, lack of
opportunity to obtain and use information at the
right level or lack of a strategy also seem to pro-
vide corroborative evidence of the validity of
Moore et al.‘s constraints model. A further con-
straint worthy of note is also mentioned which
obviously affects the union side’s ability to use
financial information, that of lack of expertise
caused by a high turnover of shop stewards
(Case 8).
Some evidence of company information pos-
sessing a potential usefulness for shop stewards,
in view of their interest in acquiring “intelli-
gence” about a company in order to make some
assessment of job security, is provided, being
specifically referred to in five of the case studies.
For example in Case 2 they write, “The main
issues that concerned the union representatives,
and indeed virtually the only purpose they had
clearly in mind when seeking company informa-
tion, was whether anything was happening that
could affect the job prospects of their members”
(p. 11). Similar evidence of a greater union
interest in using financial information in respect
of decisions concerning security of employment
is also provided by Sherer et al. ( 1981). How-
ever Reeves & McGovern take the analysis a
stage further by using a specific case study (Case
10) to indicate the circumstances in which
union representatives will abandon their tradi-
tional stance of merely reacting to managerial
initiatives in favour of using information in order
to positively extend collective bargaining. In
this particular case however, the Dunlop Case
study, the plan drawn up by the manual shop
stewards in order to oppose management’s plan
to close the factory came too late to have any
effec?. This is hardly surprising, for, as Jackson-
Cox et al. indicated, union representatives are at
a major disadvantage in dealing with non-
routine issues, of which redundancy questions

’ This case study also provides interesting evidence of the possible different approaches to use of information by different
unions. The managers belonging to the Association of Scientilic Technical and Managerial StaBs (ASTMS) drew up their own
plan to avert closure which entailed a large reduction in the manual workforce. Not surprisingly thii was totally unacceptable
to the manual unions looking, “too much like the kind of plan any management team might draw up in order to enforce redun-
dancies and reduce unit costs” (p.49).
 THE USE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION BY TRADE UNION NEGOTIATORS
are a prime example, as they only become
involved after management has taken the vital
initial decisions.
THE SSRC SPONSORED STUDIES: A CRITIQUE
The role offinancial information in collective
bargaining
The studies outlined above all tend to unques-
tioningly accept the potential importance of cor-
porate financial information to trade union
negotiators. Jackson-Cox et al. see a role for such
information in developing the perceptual field of
shop stewards, Reeves & McGovern appear to
see financial information acquisition and use as
being particularly useful in developing opposi-
tion to closure and redundancy threats whilst
Moore & Levie regard the acquisition of further
information as being an essential first step in
extending the scope of collective bargaining.
The latter study is indeed the only one to seri-
ously begin to develop a critical perspective
towards information flowing from management
information systems. Whereas Moore & Levies
emphasis on the union side increasing their use
of management accounting information echoes
earlier conclusions reached by Cuthbert &
Whitaker ( 1977) they go further in stressing the
need for seeking access to the management
information system, so that data may be reformu-
lated to take alternative criteria than those
adopted by management into account for deci-
sion making purposes.’ As an illustration of the
restrictive assumptions and value judgements
underpinning management information systems
they utilise an example of union trustees of a staff
pension fund being unable to obtain financial
information on potential investments which did
not rely on “city” assumptions about what rep-
resented a good investment rather than includ-
ing social dimensions. Another form of bias in
the traditional information system is of course
provided by its concentration on profitability
“Jaclson-Cox et al also stress the need for the union side to develop alternative criteria in the use of financial information
but don’t articulate their argument as fully as Moore & Levie.
337
and cost minimisation rather than, for example,
job protection or social costs and benefits aris-
ing from production. Nevertheless despite their
undoubted awareness of such political and
social bias Moore and Levies overriding theme
is that unions need more information not less.
For corporate financial information to play a
major role in the bargaining process there must
obviously be a large measure of specific and
shared calculative rationality inherent in union-
management negotiations. In their acceptance
of the potential importance of financial informa-
tion we must assume that the SSRC researchers
also accept the existence of such a rational
underpinning to negotiations. Other writers in
the field seem to have adopted the same view-
point. For example Maunders ( 1981) has
suggested that where the union is regarded as
acting as the labour market agent of employees
the economic arguments for disclosure are vir-
tually identical to such arguments relating to
shareholders, i.e. to facilitate the efficient alloca-
tion of resources. In the latter case the purpose
of disclosure is to facilitate the efficient allo-
cation of capital, in the former, labour. Further
support for this rational view of the negotiating
process is provided by Pope & Peel ( 198 1) who
present a model of union decision-making which
relies on expectations being formed “rationally”
and based on the “optimal” use of information.
This assumption of specific and shared ration-
ality has however come under recent attack, not-
ably from Ogden & Bougen ( 1985) who argue
that the bargaining process cannot usefully be
modelled as a rational economic procedure con-
cerned with efficient resource allocation. As
well as pointing to the underlying antagonistic
basis of capital-labour relations they also ques-
tion whether many conventional management
decision making processes within the organisa-
tion are themselves the product of applied
economic rationality. For example, they draw
our attention particularly to studies highlighting
the anarchic tendencies of decision processes
338 DAVID L OWEN and ANTHONY J. LLOYD
(Cohen et al., 1972) and decision-making pro-
cesses under conditions of uncertainty concem-
ing the objectives and cause-effect relationships
of decision-making (Thompson & Tuden, 1959).
In the latter situation Burchell et al. (1980)
point to the lack of scope for accounting systems
to operate as “answer machines” in the context
of purely computational decision-making and
argue that instead they are used as “ammunition
machines”, to promote the positions of particu-
lar interested parties, in situations of high uncer-
tainty over objectives, and as “rationalisation
machines”, legitimizing and justifying actions
that have already been decided upon, when
there is a high degree of uncertainty over cause
and effect relationships. Thus in the environ-
ment of uncertainty characterising the collec-
tive bargaining context accounting information
can function as an ideological mechanism for
propogating and re-inforcing managerial values
and purposes (Ogden & Bougen, 1985) rather
than as an objective and neutral input into the
bargaining process. This may be particularly
apparent in the limited range of arguments,
focussing on potential profitability, that workers
are able to employ in relation to their employers
in the case of plant closure and redundancy situ-
ations (Batstone, 1980). Such a role for account-
ing information may of course provide an
acceptable “rule of the game” for groups such as
shareholders and creditors but cannot be
acceptable to the union side when used in an
industrial relations context (Bougen & Ogden,
1981).
The assumption of specific and shared ration-
ality based on economic considerations, and the
consequent acceptance of the importance of
formal information flowing from the manage-
ment information system in the collective bar-
gaining situation, may indeed be further ques-
tioned. For example, one may cite the preva-
lence of informal planning and assessment prac-
tices in organisations (Earl & Hopwood, 1980)
and the consequent incompleteness of formal
rationality and routinisation leading to the
development of powerful informal management
networks for the formulation of plans and prop-
osals, networks from which workers and their
representatives are excluded (Batstone, 1980).
Due to their apparently limited conception of
the roles played by financial information and
consequent unquestioning acceptance of the
potential importance of such information in the
bargaining process, the SSRC researchers fail to
fully articulate possible explanations for the low
rates of utilisation of corporate financial infor-
mation by union negotiators found in the studies
undertaken. However in view of continued legis-
lative interest in the disclosure issue, exhibited
for example in Section 1 of the Employment Act
1982, a consideration of such explanations
seems merited. It is to this issue we now turn.
Union objectives
Certain researchers have looked at the provi-
sion of information for collective bargaining
purposes in the context of the development of
decision models for union representatives
(Climo, 1976; Cooper & Essex, 1977) entailing
initially a specificiation being made of union
objectives. However the search for universal
objectives could prove ti-uitless. For example,
the objectives of a traditional craft union may
well differ considerably from those of a manage-
rial white collar union, the former being largely
concerned with the protection of long standing
status and differentials, whilst the latter may
actively seek changes giving them greater par-
ticipation in decision making.
Furthermore, such generalised objectives as
are specified may not indicate an increased role
for corporate financial information in collective
bargaining. For, as Cooper & Essex ( 1977) point
out, it is unlikely that union objectives can be
considered purely in terms of economic factors,
a more fundamental interest may indeed centre
on contesting managerial control (Ogden &
Bougen, 1985). Such an interest can only be pur-
sued by seeking to change the whole nature of
organisational arrangements, i.e. the rules and
procedures by which the organisation operates
together with the system of values, goals and
priorities which permeate them (Batstone,
1980). There appears little scope for using cor-
porate financial information in this context for
very little can be achieved at individual organisa-
 THE USE OF FINANCIAL INFORhIATlON BY TRADE UNION NEGOTIATORS
tional levels. Activity at a higher level is required
as such objectives are most profitability pursued
by attempting to change the economic, social
and political status quo, i.e. in seeking changes in
the balance of power between classes in society
(Cooper & Essex, !977). Scargill ( 1978, p.4)
puts the point most forcibly,
You can make all the plans that you want in society as far
as your individual organisation is concerned, and both
the multinational and national capitalist organisations
will crush you with their iron heel. It is a nonsense, it
is a fallacy, to believe for one moment that we can live in
a capitalist society and attempt to work with it.
In so far as unions do pursue economic objec-
tives their aim here may well be to achieve a
“fair” settlement for all their members, regard-
less of the particular circumstances of the com-
pany they work for. As Lindop ( 1979) points out,
people tend to judge incomes on the basis of
other people carrying out similar jobs, this being
the basis on which fairness is determined. Thus
he forsees a move away from plant bargaining
towards larger bargaining units when economic
circumstances worsen, as such agreements pro-
vide a “safety net” for workers in plants
adversely affected, who may depend on the sec-
urity of national or company wide structures and
the mutual support of fellow trade unionists.
Daniel ( 198 1) indeed suggests that in seeking
social justice unions would prefer to restrain the
earnings of members in favourable cir-
cumstances rather than depress the relative pay
of members in less favourable situations. Further
evidence of the importance of the comparability
factor for union negotiators is provided by
Brown & Sisson (1975) and Blackaby (1978)
who points to the union negotiator’s concern
with ensuring that the group he or she repre-
sents does not fall behind but gets at least the
“going rate”. The other major concern of union
negotiators - to obtain increases for their mem-
bers at least equal to the rise in the cost of living,
may also reflect union concern with social jus-
tice. Such a concern with social justice suggests
a very limited role for corporate financial data,
produced by management information systems
operating under profit maximisation and cost
339
minimisation constraints, in the union
negotiators decision model.
It should also be pointed out that pay settle-
ments in individual plants or companies have a
macro, as well as micro, economic impact.
Hence government incomes policies are de-
signed to hold down wage increases without
regard, in general, to particular company cir-
cumstances. Even in the absence of incomes
policies, Galbraith ( 1967) argues that unions
play a significant role in economic planning by
standardising wage costs between different
industrial firms and ensuring that changes in
wages will occur at approximately the same
time, thus greatly facilitating price maintenance
and control. A major drawback to many of the
models developed of union decision making
which place a high degree of emphasis on the
use of corporate financial information lies in
their concentration on micro-economic factors
and consequent underestimation of the impact
of macro economic and wider social factors on
union objectives.
The potential for integrative bargaining
Perhaps the strongest argument for a financial
information input into the collective bargaining
process is that a move towards integrative bar-
gaining, which functions to find common or
complementary interests and to solve problems
confronting both parties to the negotiations, will
thereby be encouraged (Foley & Maunders,
1977). Such a view owes much to the pluralist
school of industrial relations which, whilst
accepting conflict as being inherent in industrial
societies, assumes that accommodation will be
achieved between conflicting interest groups
based on compromise (Fox, 1966). Whereas
some empirical support for the existence of
integrative bargaining is provided by Morley &
Stephenson ( 1977) other writers such as Dob-
son ( 1982) have questioned the degree of
pluralism in industrial relations pointing out that
many managements adopt a unitarist approach,
particularly in the realms of investment deci-
sions, production methods and business policy
generally. Blackburn (1973, p.180) puts the
point more strongly, “To imagine that the per-
340 DAVID L. OWEN and ANTHONY J. LLOYD
sormel manager, production manager or super-
visor has any choice other than to extract
surplus value as efficiently as possible from his
labour force is quite absurd. That is to say they
seek to raise the value of what the worker
produces as much as possible above the cost of
hiring him”. Thus it would appear possible to
question the potential for integrative bargaining
in many negotiating situations, particularly if
one sees the interests of capital and labour as
being diametrically opposed (Ogden & Bougen,
1985) or the union-management relationship as
basically adversarial in nature (Craft, 1981).
Hence considerable doubts can be raised over
the potential role of information disclosure in
promoting integrative bargaining.
The capacity of union negotiators to use
financial arguments
Wilders ( 1979) points to the lack of belief on
the part of employees in many companies in a
direct relationship between profit and pay.
Given this situation one may question the extent
to which union negotiators are motivated to use
financial arguments if their success in bargaining
is to be judged on comparability grounds by a
membership which perceives no causal link bet-
ween high pay settlements and redundancies.
Furthermore, even if a particular negotiator was
to accept the existence of a relationship bet-
ween pay and profits, considerable doubts may
be raised as to how well equipped are most
negotiators at domestic level to employ financial
arguments. Such an approach to bargaining
requires well developed union research and
training facilities for use by shop stewards and
full time local officials (Radice, 1971). However,
available evidence indicates that most research
departments are small and overworked (Marsh
& Rosewell, 1976) and trade union education
services are overstretched and under financed
(Cuthbert & Whitaker, 1977). Thus evidence
provided by Lyall (1975) and Mitchell et al.
(1980) pointing to a very low level of com-
prehension of financial information by shop ste-
wards should cause us little surprise, although it
should perhaps give rise to some concern given
the major role played by shop stewards, particu-
larly of manual unions, in plant level bargaining
(Daniel, 1976). Even though these latter studies
may be criticised on the grounds that they
ascribed a purely “answer machine” role to
accounting systems and tested the respondents
accordingly, nevertheless it would appear
necessary for union negotiators to understand
the operation of present accounting systems if
they are to appreciate their limitations, particu-
larly their role as an ideological mechanism, and
develop suitable alternative systems and criteria.
For negotiators who are ill equipped to utilise
financial arguments effectively, due to lack of
understanding or poor union organisation, Gos-
pel ( 1978, p.26) sounds a warning note arguing
that in these circumstances, “greater disclosure
would be likely to prove at least ineffective and
at worst harmful, since it would serve to
strengthen the position of management and
reduce the independence of union representa-
tives”.
Information as a power resource
The proposition that information is a power
resource has attracted much support in the field
of industrial relations and probably explains the
reluctance of some managers to lend their sup-
port to the principle of increased financial infor-
mation disclosure. However, it should be
realised that the mere possession of information
does little to change the balance of power in
union-management relations. As Pettigrew
(1972, p.189) stresses, “Power resources must
not only by possessed by an actor, they must be
cont?viled by him . . . Control, may not be
enough, there is also the issue of the skillful use
of resources”. Furthermore he argues that, “The
final decision outcome will evolve out of the
process of power mobilisation attempted by
each party in support of its demand” (p.202). In
the context of Pettigrew’s analysis one could
point out that:
( 1) Management controls the communication
process thus giving them a wide discretion
over what to disclose, or not to disclose.
(2) Management possession of the means of
production enables them to command
 THE USE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION BY TRADE UNION NEGOTlATORS 341

decision making procedures (Burkitt, adopt a more critical perspective towards the
1981).’ role of financial information in collective bar-
gaining, rather than to completely deny its
(3) There would appear to be a large difference
potential importance to the union negotiator.
in the degree of expert power in the use of
Certainly the TUC see information provision as
information operating in favour of manage-
providing the potential basis for a degree of de
ment and against the shop steward.
facto union control over aspects of a company’s
(4) The potential for union negotiators to activities (TUC, 1974) and, looking at the ques-
mob&se membership support based on tion from a d*erent perspective Craft ( 198 1)
detailed financial arguments, as opposed to fears that increased disclosure of information
comparability or cost of living claims, may lead to the union side questioning the
would appear to be limited given the lack of appropriateness of management allocation deci-
perceived relationship between pay and sions, seeking to focus negotiation on the budget
profits referred to earlier. process and challenging management on the use
of particular accounting and Bnancial practices.
Thus there is a real danger that the mere pos-
However we would argue that the potential
session of information by the union side without
importance and usefulness of financial informa-
any corresponding power to influence decision-
tion to the union negotiator not only depends
making, due to their exclusion from the key
upon how successful the union side is in
management policy making networks (Batstone,
developing alternative criteria to those used by
1980) will merely lead to them being “sucked
management for assessing organisational perfor-
into management”. Indeed management may
mance (Ogden & Bougen, 1985) but is also con-
adopt a policy of information disclosure in order
tingent upon the different objectives of, and
to increase employee identification with the
roles played by, the individual negotiators con-
company and hence lessen their identification
cerned.
with the union (Jackson-Cox et al., 1984).
Cooper & Essex ( 1977) put forward the view
As a final illustration of the contention that
that, “In assessing the information that will be
possession of information does not necessarily
relevant to employee representatives we must
lead to an increase in power we would cite the
specify the particular representatives involved”
argument of Smith & Manley ( 1973) that disclo-
(p.203). However, they fail to develop their
sure can do little to help groups of workers with
arguments sufficiently in that they only consider
little effective industrial strength to back up
the role of the full-time official in the context of
negotiating demands or groups with few
national wage negotiations, and, whilst suggest-
resources. Disclosure in, effect means more
ing that shop stewards in different unions, and
power to the powerful.
even the same union in different locations, may
perform dilTerent roles, omit to discuss this par-
ticular point further. Unfortunately, a similar fail-
ing is apparent in the SSRC sponsored studies.
THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIATIONS IN THE Whereas the situational studies themselves do
NATURE OF THE DOMESTIC ORGANISATION: succeed in highlighting important variations in
A STRATEGY FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION the nature of the domestic organisation, the con-
clusions the researchers draw seem to point to a
Our intention in the preceding section was to mistaken belief in the existence of a universal
highlight the need for future researchers to “identikit” union representative, at least so far as

In particular empirical research has highlighted managerial control of strategic decision making, the union side being
restricted to a reactive stance enabling them to merely impede implementation of decisions with no power to initiate and
influence decision topics (Wilson ef al.. 1982).
342 DAVID L. OWEN and ANTHONY J. LLOYD
the potential role of financial information in the
bargaining situation is concerned.
Moore & Levie, for example, whilst recognis-
ing union structure as a particular constraint on
the effective use of information, nevertheless see
the ambitiousness of union demands as being a
universal change agent, notwithstanding the
structural differences both between different
unions and within the same union in different
locations. Whereas they suggest that trade union
ambitions and trade union democracy are two
dynamic variables that a union more or less con-
trols itself, and can greatly enhance its use of
information, we would argue that changes in
these variables hinge on the roles played by indi-
vidual union officials and their relationship to
their constituent members. Also Jackson-Cox et
al. whilst highlighting the potential impact of a
number of variations in the nature of the domes-
tic organisation, such as the importance of differ-
ing membership attitudes, the roles played by
full-time officials and different approaches
towards information used by white and blue col-
lar representatives respectively, still see the
major role for company information as being to
develop generally the perceptual .fieId of an
apparently homogeneous shop steward user
group. Finally, whereas Reeves & McGovern
point to a considerable variation in the degree of
interest on the part of shop stewards in making
use of the company information that was pro-
vided, they fail to develop a suitable analytical
framework within which such variations may be
related to differences in roles and objectives of
particular stewards.
We would strongly contend that further inves-
tigations in this field must pay far more explicit
attention to the possible importance of varia-
tions in the nature of the domestic organisation
(Batstone et al., 1977). We therefore tentatively
present the following analytical framework
which may provide a strategy to guide future
researchers.
Possible differences in approach to the use of
financial information by full-time union
officials and shop s&war&
Much attention has recently focused on the
major role played by shop stewards in plant level
collective bargaining (e.g. Daniel, 1976). The
increasing importance of the shop steward in
workplace industrial relations is highlighted by
Brown’s ( 1981) estimation that the number of
full-time stewards in manufacturing industry
quadrupled in the decade 19661976, and that
this rapid rate of growth continued at least dur-
ing the following two years. Multi-unionism
within the plant and the size of the workforce are
suggested as being the major factors stimulating
the development of steward organisations. How-
ever, whilst accepting the importance of the
above rate of growth in numbers of stewards,
and associated organisational developments
such as the emergence of joint shop stewards
committees, the continuing role of the full-time
official in providing a link between the work-
place organisation and the outside union move-
ment should not be under-estimated. Such a link
is important in that it gives domestic bargainers
the strength they need to match the employers
economic power (Jenkins and Sherman, 1977).
Indeed, the full-time official can play a major part
in collective bargaining, for example being cal-
led into the negotiations when a “failure to
agree” is registered between management and
plant level union representatives. The role of the
full-time official in wage negotiations appears to
be particularly important in white collar unions
(Batstone et al., 1977) and, potentially, blue col-
lar unions in smaller workplaces, where the full-
time official is clearly a major resource for ste-
wards (Winch, 1980). Furthermore, there has
been recent speculation that the recently
diminished power of the shop steward in a time
of recession and high unemployment may lead
to demands on the part of trade unionists for
new union coalitions and a more centralised dis-
cipline (Brown & Sisson, 1983). The latter
development would undoubtedly increase the
influence of the full-time official on collective
bargaining and tend to erode that of the shop ste-
ward, even at plant level.
It is important to note that full-time officials
may have attitudes and objectives very different
horn those of shop stewards. A full-time official
has no link with a particular company and may
 THE USE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION BY TRADE UNION NEGOTlATORS
therefore be far more concerned with average
earnings levels in his or her particular area than
fighting to achieve higher settlements for groups
of workers in more profitable companies. Thus
detailed financial data relating to a particular
company may be of little relevance to the full-
time official and, in any case, due to the shortage
of full-time officers in most British trade unions
(Clegg, 1979), the workload undertaken, in
terms of the number of companies dealt with,
must limit the amount of time available for
spending on one particular set of negotiations.
Furthermore, whereas the services of the
union’s research department may be called upon
in the case of certain “prestige” wage claims,
such facilities are unlikely to be available for
plant level negotiations. By contrast, as Pedler
(1973) indicates, shop stewards, although
essential to the union and hardly less so to man-
agement, are mainly responsible to their mem-
bers. Thus, although stewards often place great
emphasis upon the importance of the larger
union as the embodiment of union principles
and as a basis for their self identity (Batstone et
al., 1977) they may still exhibit a high degree of
factory consciousness (Beynon, 1973) and
hence pay far more attention to the financial cir-
cumstances of their particular company in carry-
ing out wage negotiations than would the full-
time official.
Although the steward’s exclusion from key
management coalitions (Batstone, 1980) may
act as a constraint on the acquisition and effec-
tive use of sensitive information, this effect may
be countered somewhat by the possibility of
informal acquisition and access to informal net-
work sources. As Partridge (1978) points out,
management itself is not a unitary phenomenon
and different parts of management have different
perspectives about their organisations. Hence
management-Workgroup bargaining does not
take place along one link, rather it is a multiplex
relationship with rival management coalitions
and stewards bargaining informally amongst
themselves. Informal contact between senior
stewards and individual managers may thus pro-
vide a useful means of information acquisition
for the steward, with management possibly wil-
343
ling to exchange strategic planning information
in order to gain an insight into likely union reac-
tions to planned courses of action. In pursuing
such a strategy management may deal solely
with a small number of “key” stewards (Terry,
1982) thereby fostering strong leadership ten-
dencies in the stewards so recognised (Batstone
et al., 1977) a point we shall return to later.
Of course in the bargaining situation stewards
have a need for information over and above that
offered by management (Partridge, 1978) and
do indeed gain informal access to information
through a network of sources and contacts
which frequently bemuse the personnel man-
ager. For example, information may be obtained
from the work process itself, in which case
the steward’s knowledge of the information
gathering process may encourage a critical
appreciation and questioning of data supplied by
management, or alternatively, from the steward
and union network. Empirical studies by Cooper
& Essex ( 1977) and Sherer et al. ( 1981) have
highlighted the importance of the latter source
of information to the steward. Nevertheless it
should be stressed that, despite such oppor-
tunities to gain informal access to, presumably
less biassed, information being exploited by
shop stewards, there is little evidence of ste-
wards being able to use the information
obtained in order to contest managerial control
over strategic decision making (Wilson et al.,
1982).
Whilst Batstone et al. (1977) point to an
important process of accommodation and
mutual interdependence between full-time offI
cials and the shop steward network, reflecting
their broad consensus upon goals and a recogni-
tion of each other’s power, certain areas of
mutual suspicion and potential conflict exist.
Hemingway ( 1978) highlights this point in con-
sidering everyday union government as, “a pro-
cess of bargaining at all levels of trade union
organisation”, and, in the context of our particu-
lar argument, Foley & Maunders ( 1977) indicate
that one reason why the official union structure
is anxious to be the prime focus for information
disclosure is that direct disclosure to stewards
confers recognition, status and authority which
344 DAVID L. OWEN and ANTHONYJ.
may one day constitute a challenge to existing
structures. The different viewpoints of full-time
officials and shop stewards are further evi-
denced by their respective attitudes towards
shop steward training. The prime interest of the
former group appears to be that of focusing
training on the affairs of the union, in order to
cement loyalty to and involvement with the
union, whereas stewards themselves wish to
acquire skills in handlingworkplace problems so
as to represent their members more effectively
(Lover, 1976).
Whereas we have, in discussing the possible
differences in attitudes, and roles played by,
shop stewards and full-time officials, suggested
that shop stewards may, due to their factory con-
sciousness and access to informal information
sources, adopt a more positive approach to the
use of corporate financial information it is as
well to note that an alternative viewpoint
appears tenable. Thus Mills ( 1978) suggests that
only by strengthening central union authority
over the membership will unions be enabled to
play a role in strategic planning, a role which, as
we have already noted, is at present denied
to them (Wilson et al., 1982). Furthermore,
according to Mills, union amalgamations will
assist the development of such a role as the
resulting larger unions will be stronger in terms
of negotiating power and ability to finance the
necessary research and other supporting ser-
vices.
Whichever viewpoint one accepts there does
appear to exist sutEcient grounds for hypothesis-
ing that the approaches of the shop steward and
the full-time official to the question of informa-
tion acquisition and use will be very different,
and that future researchers would do well to
bear this in mind. Furthermore care should be
taken not to underestimate the actual and poten-
tial role of the full-time official in collective bar-
gaining, particularly in view of the possible areas
of conflict with shop stewards.
Possible differences in approach to the use of
financial information by white collar and
blue collar union representatives
Clegg ( 1979) points to an exceptionally rapid
LLOYD
increase in union density amongst white collar
employees in manufacturing in recent years.
Given the contrast in work situations and possi-
bly in orientations to work and the union
(Batstone et al., 1977) white collar union rep-
resentatives may well adopt a different approach
to the bargaining situation than do their blue
collar counterparts, in particular their attitudes
towards the use of financial information may dif-
fer considerably. Before considering this point
further two additional factors relating to white
collar bargaining should be borne in mind.
Firstly full-time officials tend to play a more
prominent role in collective bargaining than
appears to be the case in manual unions (Clegg,
1979). For example, Batstone et al. suggest that
stewards on the stti side tend to defer to full-
time officials and are more generally inclined
to accept their leadership in terms of ideas and
contributions. However there is a growing ten-
dency in certain industries, notably engineering,
for stewards to play a more central role in the
negotiating process, due to the greater preva-
lence of decentralised bargaining at establish-
ment level. Therefore we shah confine our atten-
tion to the role of the shop steward, although
earlier remarks concerning the possible differ-
ence in objectives and attitudes of full-time offi-
cials may be of particular relevance in the con-
text of white collar bargaining and should be
borne in mind.
Secondly, white collar bargaining in manufac-
turing industry is often extremely fragmented
(Clegg, 1979) with each main union bargaining
separately with management. Such fragmen-
tation contrasts with the unified approach
adopted by the manual unions, which tend to
bargain as a unit at plant level, and must have
considerable repercussions on the degree of
“power” at the disposal of the union negotiator
involved. Furthermore, given the differences in
membership characteristics between white col-
lar unions, some representing mainly super-
visors and middle managers, whilst others draw
the bulk of their membership from lower grade
clerical workers, their approaches to bargaining
may differ considerably. Whereas we shall con-
sider white collar unions as a unit, as distinct
 THE USE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION BY TRADE UNION NEGOTlATORS
from blue collar unions, the possibility of differ-
ences in values and objectives between different
unions should be realised and indeed serves to
highlight the necessity to pay due regard to the
individual nature of the organisation concerned
when conducting empirical investigations.
Attention was drawn earlier to the important
effect of membership attitudes on shop steward
approaches to information use (Jackson-Cox et
al., Reeves & McGovern). Interestingly there is
some evidence of profound ditferences in work-
place attitudes on the part of white collar and
blue collar workers. For instance Foley & Maun-
ders ( 1977) point out that traditionally the loy-
alty of white collar workers was assumed to be
direct to the company and Batstone et al. find
evidence indicating less of a commitment to
what may generally be defined as trade unionism
amongst staff workers than on the shop floor.
Mercer & Weir (1972) suggest that the white
collar worker’s involvement in trade unionism is
based on instrumental considerations, relating
to the possible efficacy of trade unions in obtain-
ing tangible benefits for their members, as much
as on ideological considerations. Also Mercer &
Weir point to an overall belief on the part of
white collar workers that unions should main-
tain effective consultation with management at
all levels which seems to evidence a functional
and consultative view of the ordering of intra-
organisational relationships.
The closer identification of the white collar
worker with the company and associated instru-
mental approach to trade unionism appears to
suggest a potentially more important role for
financial arguments in white collar collective
bargaining, particularly in the context of
mobilising membership support, than in blue
collar bargaining. This process may be encour-
aged by the suggested tendency of white collar
workers to attach greater importance and cre-
dence to financial information than their blue
collar counterparts, due to greater exposure to
such information in the daily work situation.
However, whether this potential role is realised
depends to a large extent on the objectives,
attitudes and roles played by the individual shop
steward involved in the negotiations.
345
A study by Nicholson et al. ( 1980) indicates
that only a minority of white collar stewards
share the critical stance on union matters of a
majority of their members and that they are in
fact attitudinally closer to blue collar stewards
than they are to their own members. Batstone et
aI. also found some evidence of white collar ste-
wards espousing a conflict image of industry,
although the strength of this observation is tem-
pered somewhat by an observed greater degree
of ambivalence over the nature of relationships
in industry, a less certain commitment to “union
principles” and a more ready espousal of a belief
in industrial harmony and individualism than
was expressed by blue collar stewards. Certainly
Batstone et al. found enough white collar
stewards placing emphasis on the role of the ste-
ward in “ensuring harmony with management”
to suggest that corporate financial information
could be of potential usefulness to them in the
negotiating situation. However, it is questiona-
ble whether many white collar stewards have
the necessary resources under their control so
as to be able to pressure management into dis-
closing information, and to enable them to use
that information effectively.
Batstone et al. point out that the union plays a
more central role in the lives of shop floor work-
ers, due to the greater degree of control exerted
over the everyday work situation and, via closed
shop agreements, on recruitment, than of the
white collar staff. The nature of shop floor work
is such as to promote collective behaviour, thus
shop floor workers take their problems to their
stewards, whereas the individualistic nature of
tasks performed, and of the reward structure,
leads staff workers to approach management
individually. Thus the status of the steward is
reduced in the eyes of both membership and
management, and with it the power of the union.
On the shop floor due to the greater collective
power of the workforce and stronger union
organisation, management faces greater uncer-
tainty which it seeks to reduce by the establish-
ment of strong bargaining relationships with
stewards, based on mutual trust. Therefore blue
collar stewards tend to have more contact with
managers, particularly senior managers, and it
346 DAVID L OWEN and ANTHONY J. LLOYD

would appear are thus in a far stronger position
to push management into disclosing information
than are their white collar counterparts.
There are indeed a number of other factors
contributing to the relatively weak position of
white collar stewards in the context of pressing
management to disclose information. In particu-
lar, white collar steward organisations tend to be
less closely knit than blue collar organisations,
with shop steward committees and conveners
playing a far less dominant role, thus making it
more dihicult to mobilise membership support
across the plant (Batstone et aZ.>. There is also
evidence to suggest that white collar stewards
are less experienced both in terms of handling
negotiations and strikes (Nicholson et al.,
1980). Finally, due to diEerences in membership
expectations, white collar stewards find it more
difficult to adopt a leadership role, being far
more likely to act as delegates of the member-
ship (Batstone et al.) which again must lessen
their status in the eye of management.
The above analysis suggests that whereas the
membership of white collar unions may view
favourably any moves made by their represen-
tatives towards using financial arguments in col-
lective bargaining, the representatives them-
selves may find great dficulties in employing
such arguments due to the weakness of the
union organisation. The fragmentation of white
collar bargaining and lack of co-operation with
blue collar unions together with the generally
more dominant role of the full time official also
appear to represent major constraints on the
effective use of information by white collar ste-
wards. These issues again seem important
enough to merit the attention of future resear-
chers in the field.
Possible differences between individual shop
stewards in their approach to the use of
financial information
Whereas we have suggested that, due to their
generally more powerful union organisation,
shop floor stewards are in a stronger position to
push management into disclosing information it
should also be pointed out that the membership
are less likely to support such a course of action
than are the white collar membership. There-
fore, much will depend on the extent to which
the blue collar steward is able to adopt a leader-
ship role, as opposed to acting merely as a dele-
gate for membership aspirations. Batstone et al.
consider leaders as being those stewards who, in
acting as representatives, strive to implement
union principles, and distinguish them from
“populists” who, in acting as delegates, do not
adopt union principles.’ Willman (1980) takes
Batstone et al. to task for their linking of the con-
cept of leadership with the pursuit of union prin-
ciples. He points out that stewards in manage-
ment sponsored organisations may well adopt a
leadership role in promoting policies which
assist the rationalisation of personnel administ-
ration, as opposed to policies which seek to
exert worker intluence on the effort bargain
such as may be adopted by leader stewards in
independent organisations. For the purposes of
our discussion we intend to follow Willman and
divorce the concept of leadership from the pur-
suit of union principles, which are in any case
never satisfactorily defined by Batstone et al.
Batstone et al. point out that strong bargaining
relationships, in terms of the exchange of confi-
dential information and mutual support, are
more likely to develop between management
and leader stewards than between management

a Batstone et al. consider two other leadership styles; “nascent leaders” who though committed to union principles fail to gain
the support of other stewards or the shop Boor, and “cowboys”, who play a representative role in promoting the short term
interests of their members and do not adhere to union principles. Both these styles are less prevalent than the “leaders” and
“populists”, the stewards concerned tending to either change their style of leadership or be removed from office. Later
research by Marchington & Armstrong ( 1983) suggests that Batstone ef al’s summary dismissal of these latter styles is prema-
ture. For the sake of clarity of exposition we shall adhere to the Batstone et al. analysis whilst bringing to the reader’s attention
the possibility of other leadership styles persisting in the long term. Certainly Marchington & Armstrong’s contribution to the
debate is worthy of the attention of future researchers in this field.
 THE USE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION BY TRADE UNION NEGOTIATORS
and populists. The potential for a financial input
into the negotiations therefore appears to be
much greater where leader stewards are
involved, particularly in view of Morley &
Stephenson’s ( 1977) argument that, “Delegates
have to champion a group position and, if they
capitulate, must convince their parties that they
have good reason for doing so. Leaders, on the
other hand, presumably do not face such severe
problems of intra-organisational bargaining and
are more likely to be persuaded to move by
other negotiators” (p.37). However, it should be
stressed that even leader stewards need to
mobilise membership opinion to enable them to
operate effectively. As Batstone et al. point out,
rejection of steward recommendations is a
major check upon steward behaviour for such an
outcome reduces the credibility and status of
the union in the eyes of both membership and
management. Pedler (1973) also stresses the
importance and power of the membership in
considering leadership to be a group property
which is situationally specific. “On some issues
where the representative has access to the
necessary information, a ‘leader’ role tends to be
adopted. On other issues, where the matter in
question is central to the norms of the group, a
vote is taken and the representative is simply a
‘mouthpiece”’ (p.56). Broad (1983) concurs
with this viewpoint and argues that, “an elastic-
ity of shop steward leadership characterises
workplace interactions where the Workgroup
itself imposes sanctions on stewards who over-
stretch their power or stray from the group
norm” (p.61). This may particularly occur
where a tightly knit leading steward group fails
to develop adequate communications with the
membership (Schuller & Robertson, 1983). Also
of course a shop steward must retain the support
of the membership to stay in office. It would
seem that the steward has anything but security
of tenure, being not only subject to annual re-
election but also, as many stewards claim, facing
removal from office at any time if sufficient feel-
ing exists in their constituencies (Pedler, 1973).
Thus a steward elected by only a small majority
is in a particularly delicate position and may find
it extremely dficult to adopt a leadership role
347
(Batstone et al.).
From the above analysis it can be seen that
even for a “leader” steward to successfully press
management into disclosing information, mem-
bership support must be mobilised, which, given
the traditionally reactive role of blue collar
stewards, may be particularly difficult. Three
further factors which may inhibit the shop ste-
ward in using any financial information acquired
are also worthy of note. Firstly, in many indus-
tries there tends to be a high turnover of shop
stewards leading to a shortage of suitably experi-
enced stewards. For example, of the stewards
studied by Batstone et al. only 12 per cent of
populists had been in office for more than five
years, and 30 per cent of leaders. Furthermore,
whereas leaders appear to have greater stability
in office than populists in many cases the service
had not been continuous. Secondly, lack of
resources, particularly in the form of full time
conveners and suitable shop steward organisa-
tions, can pose a major problem. This is felt in
acute form in smaller workplace organisations
and, as Winch ( 1980) points out, may indicate a
potentially more important role for the full time
official, particularly in view of the higher rates of
shop steward turnover in such organisations.
Finally, as the studies by Jackson-Cox et al. and
Reeves & McGovern showed, in certain cases,
shop steward mistrust of management, due to
past negotiating experiences, may have very
much soured stewards attitudes towards the use
of financial information.
CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH
Our purpose in this paper has been to under-
take a critical review of recent research into the
use of company information by trade union
negotiators in collective bargaining at the
domestic level, and to tentatively outline a
strategy for further investigations in this im-
portant, but still largely unexplored, area of
research.
We have had two major criticisms to make of
the research projects conducted under the SSRC
348 DAVID L. OWEN and ANTHONY J. LLOYD

initiative. Firstly, we discern a tendency for the
researchers to accept without question the
potential importance of financial information to
the union negotiator, and hence a failure to
explore fully possible explanations for the low
rates of utilisation of such information by union
negotiators highlighted in the studies. We have
therefore attempted to begin to remedy this
deficiency. Secondly, despite the generally
richer institutional context within which the
researchers concerned have sought to ground
their observations, as compared to many earlier
studies in this field, there is still evidence of an
implicit assumption being made of the existence
of a universal indent&it union repesentative.
Perhaps this is not surprising as such an assump-
tion appears to have underpinned much of the
recent theoretical literature in the area (e.g.
Climo, 1976; Cooper & Essex, 1977; Pope &
Peel, 1981) where there has been an over-
reliance on the normative approach in an
attempt to specify a universal decision model for
the domestic trade union representative. How
ever, as Foley & Maunders ( 1977) indicate, “The
normative, model building approach can only be
useful if, ultimately, its assumptions about user
behaviour and objectives correspond with real
world conditions - something which requires
‘positive’ confhmation” (p. 188).
Our major contention is that future research
in the area should pay far more explicit attention
to the possible importance of variations in the
nature of the domestic organisation and in par-
ticular to the differing objectives, and roles
played by, the individual union negotiators con-
cerned. We have tentatively suggested an initial
analytical framework within which future
research may be conducted involving a consid-
eration of possible different approaches to finan-
cial information use by full-time officials and
shop stewards, white and blue collar union rep-
resentatives, and “leader” as compared to “dele-
gate” stewards. Of course such a hanrework is
probably over simplified and will need refining
further in the course of future investigations.
One such refinement may involve a considera-
tion of the impact of institutional arrangements,
in terms of the general pattern of bargaining pre-
vailing, on the potential for corporate financial
Information input into the negotiating process.
For example it may well be the case that where
is more potential for using information of a “cor-
porate” nature the more centrahsed bargaining
is within the company concerned. In view of the
recent re-emergence of the disclosure issue as a
subject of heated debate, largely due to develop-
ments within the European Economic Commun-
ity, we feel that the urgent need for such investi-
gations to be undertaken is self evident.

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