CAPIO, KRISTIA C.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

SECTION 4 – FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

 NEAR V. MINNESOTA, 283 US 697 (1931)

1. When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no
court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.

2. The primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.

3. The security of community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and
the overthrow by force of orderly government.

 NATIONAL PRESS CLUB V. COMELEC (1992)

 OSMENA V. COMELEC (1998)
 ADIONG V. COMELEC (1992)

COMELEC resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers in mobile units like cars
and other moving vehicles.

 IN RE: JURADO (1995)

False reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from sanction by the
cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free
speech has never countenanced the publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and
unmitigated dissemination of patent lies.

 AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. V. CAPULONG (1988)

The right to be let alone is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion to a person’s privacy has
long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information
sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of public
character. The interest sought to be protected by the right to privacy is the right to be free from
unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an
individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.

 REYES V. BAGATSING (1983)

 PITA VS COURT OF APPEALS (1989)

ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

 PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO (1948)

The right to freedom of speech and to peaceably assemble, and petition the government for
redress of grievances are fundamental personal rights of the people guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. City or town mayors are not conferred the power to refuse
CAPIO, KRISTIA C.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

to grant the permit, but only the discretion in issuing the permit to determine or specify the
streets or public places where the parade may pass or the meeting may be held.

 J.B.L. REYES V. BAGATSING (1983)

Rules on assembly in public places

1. The applicant should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the
time when the assembly will take place.

2. The application should be filed ahead of time to enable the public official concerned to
apprise whether there are valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant, but in another
public place. The grant or refusal should be based on the application of the Clear and Present
Danger Test.

3. If the public authority is of the view that there is an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.

4. The decision of the public authority, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to the
applicants at the earliest opportunity so that they may, if they so desire, have recourse to the
proper judicial authority.

 MALABANAN VS RAMENTO (1989)

 NON V. DAMES (1990)
 PBMEO V. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS, CO. (1973)

Human rights have a primacy over property rights. The rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
civil institutions.

SECTION 5 – FREEDOM OF RELIGION

 BOARD OF EDUCATION V.ALLEN, 392 U.S. 236

Book lending program for students in parochial schools. – benefit to parents and students.

 AGLIPAY V. RUIZ (1937)

Postage stamps depicting Philippines as the venue of a significant religious event – benefit to
the religious sect involved was merely incidental as the promotion of Philippines as a tourist
destination was the primary objective.

 GARCES V. ESTENZO (1981)

Government sponsorship of town fiestas, some purely religious traditions have now been
considered as having acquired secular character.
CAPIO, KRISTIA C.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II