SECTION 4 – FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY
AND PETITION election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
NEAR V. MINNESOTA, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
(a) When a nation is at war, many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that
no court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right
(b) Actual obstruction to the government’s recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports
or the number and location of troops
(c) Obscene publications
(d) Incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by
force of orderly government
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. NO. 102653. MARCH 5, 1992.
PONENTE: FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
In the three (3) consolidated Petitions before us, the common
question raised by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section
11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646.
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass
media which are prevented from selling or donating space and
time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are
candidates for office (one for national and the other for
provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and
taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of
curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional
guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners
maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts
to censorship, because it selects and singles out for
suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only
publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election period of
1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of
media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of
public information and public opinion relevant to election issues.
Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the
freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of
media-based campaign or political propaganda except those
appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on
Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring
about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and issues in the election
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information
and opinion.
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987:
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition
to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful;
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station,
other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media
to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for
campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission
as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall
 take a leave of absence from his work as such during the
campaign period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 is valid/
constitutional.
RULING:
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of
Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of
expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution)
has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX(C) (4) which may
be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific
limited period — i.e., “during the election period.” It is difficult to
overemphasize the special importance of the rights of freedom
of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in
particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the
electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify
those who shall have governance over them. Thus, it is
frequently said that these rights are accorded a preferred status
in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free
speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are
not the only important and relevant values even in the most
democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of
opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to
the level of financial resources that one may have at one’s
disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state
policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the
Constitution is the egalitarian demand that “the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”
The essential question is whether or not the assailed legisla-tive
or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of
the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election
period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute
unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom
of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not
gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or
regulation of media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech
and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves.
The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable
connection with the constitutional objective set out in
Article IX(C)(4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and
television time that the resources of the financially affluent
candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the
core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates
with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty
pockets that Article IX(C)(4) of the Constitution and Section 11
(b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which
Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be
expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal
time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry
about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
(In relation to PRIOR RESTRAINT, the concept is found in the
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cruz)
But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it
constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination of ideas. In
a word, it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of
the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may
speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less
than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment
should he be so rash as to disobey. In his “Appeal for the
Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,” Milton deplored the impossibility
of finding a man base enough to accept the office of censor and
at the same time good enough to perform its duties. Yet a
pretender to that meddler is in our midst today, smugly
brandishing the threat of this miserable law.
One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of
censorship, as where private mail is screened during wartime to
prevent deliberate or unwitting disclosure of sensitive or
classified matters that might prejudice the national security or
where, to take a famous example, a person is prohibited from
shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater. But these exceptions
merely make and bolster the rule that there should be no prior
restraint upon a person’s right to express his ideas on any
subject of public interest. The rule applies whether the
censorship be in the form of outright prohibition, as in the cases
before us, or in more subtle forms like the imposition of a tax
upon periodicals exceeding a prescribed maximum number of
copies per issue or allowing the circulation of books only if they
are judged to be fit for minors, thus reducing the reading tastes
of adults to the level of juvenile morality.
I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam
Books v. Sullivan that “any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its validity.” That presumption has not
been refuted in the cases sub judice. On the contrary, the
challenged provision appears quite clearly to be invalid on its
face because of its undisguised attempt at censorship. The
feeble effort to justify it in the name of social justice and clean
elections cannot prevail over the self-evident fact that what we
have here is an illegal intent to suppress free speech by denying
access to the mass media as the most convenient instruments
for the molding of public opinion. And it does not matter that the
use of these facilities may involve financial transactions, for the
element of the commercial does not remove them from the
protection of the Constitution.
OSMENA V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 132231, MARCH 31, 1998
PONENTE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
ADIONG VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 103956, MARCH 31, 1992
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the
posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner Blo Umpar
Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections
now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits
the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars
and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is
violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the
petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print
political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of
politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this
prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other
moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the
electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992
elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22,
1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice
from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to
the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may
prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places,
public or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that it fixes.
RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC's
prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places
whether public or private except in designated areas provided
for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds.
First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution
(Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial
enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.
Second — the questioned prohibition premised on the statute
and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth.
Third — the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and
a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as
regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26
and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of
the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers
on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount
interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any
financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal
significance.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and
other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial
government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened
by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished
citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear
and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently
clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided
must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or
a writing instrument to be stilled.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places whether public or private except in the
authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO
A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC. April 6, 1995.
PONENTE: NARVASA, C.J.
DOCTRINE:
False reports about a public official or other person are not
shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech
enshrined in the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of
free speech has never countenanced the publication of
falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated
dissemination of patent lies.
FACTS:
Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general
circulation, the “Manila Standard.” He describes himself as a
columnist, who “incidentally happens to be a lawyer,”, had been
writing about alleged improperties and irregularities in the
judiciary over several months (from about October, 1992 to
March, 1993). Other journalists had also been making reports or
comments on the same subject. At the same time, anonymous
communications were being extensively circulated, by hand and
through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the
courts. And all these were being repeatedly and insistently
adverted to by certain sectors of society. Events Directly Giving
Rise to the Proceeding at Bar.
The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision
promulgated by this Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-called
“controversial case” of “Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),” G.R.
No, 94374. In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the
vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority.
In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374, the “Philippine
Daily Inquirer” and one or two other newspapers published, on
January 28, 1993, a report of the purported affidavit of a Mr.
David Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. This
gentleman, it appears, had been commissioned by one of the
parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),
to examine and analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in
relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of one of
the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain if the
decision had been written, in whole or in part, by the latter.
Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the Gutierrez decision
“looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDT’s counsel,”
Thus, he speaks of the “Magnificent Seven,” by merely referring
to undisclosed regional trial court judges in Makati; the
“Magnificent Seven” in the Supreme Court, as some
undesignated justices who supposedly vote as one; the “Dirty
Dozen,” as unidentified trial judges in Makati and three other
cities. He adverts to an anonymous group of justices and judges
for whom a bank allegedly hosted a party; and six unnamed
justices of this Court who reportedly spent a prepaid vacation in
Hong Kong with their families.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order “Creating an
Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports of Corruption in the
Judiciary,” to investigate the said reports of corruption in the
judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the public
utility, denying the allegations in Jurado’s column. The Supreme
Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with
in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be
docketed and acted upon as an official Court proceeding for the
determination of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado
are true.
HELD:
Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were done,
demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual
accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and
reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt
of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the
administration of justice and the judges engaged in that
function. By doing them, he has placed himself beyond the
circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live
by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who strive at all times to
maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.
Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the
fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that
the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public
official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false
statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard
of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the
proper exercise of any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.:
“ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” The
provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of
“abuse of rights,” “one of the most dominant principles which
must be deemed always implied in any system of law.”
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth
of the statements when publishing statements which are clearly
defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily
subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more
stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than
are commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless,
persons who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary
cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to
private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to discourage
all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect
from becoming judges. The public interest involved in freedom
of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that
matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private
honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the
other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between
these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm
which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish
statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or
other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining
the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not
require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or
publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of
private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory
statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth
thereof.
AYER PRODUCTION PTY LTD. V HON.IGNACIO M.
CAPULONG AND JUAN PONCE ENRILE
G.R. No. 82380. April 29, 1988.
PONENTE: FELICIANO, J.
DOCTRINE:
The production and filming by petitioners of the projected
motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the
circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion
upon private respondent's "right of privacy."
The right to be let alone is not an absolute right. A limited
intrusion to a person’s privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the
information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute matters of public character.
The interest sought to be protected by the right to privacy
is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the
wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of
an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate
public concern.
Intrusion has to be based upon a nonjudicial government
official’s assessment that public safety and order demands
such intrusion, limited to the provisions of law. To hold
otherwise would be to opt for a government of men, and
not of laws.
FACTS:
Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer
Productions), 1 envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for
commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release,
the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with
local movie producer Lope V. Juban who suggested th they
consult with the appropriate government agencies and also with
General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who
had played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed.
The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution"
was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and
Classification Board as wel as the other government agencies
consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of
the intended film production.
On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile replied that
"[he] would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation,
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of
any member of his family in any cinema or television production,
film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation"
and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing,
showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no
reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should
not be made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to
any matter purely personal to them.
It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the
name of private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie
script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
picture.
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not the Freedom of Speech/ Expression
includes freedom to film and produce motion pictures.
b. Whether or not the Right to Privacy of Respondent Enrile
is violated by the Motion Picture of “Four Day
Revolution”.
HELD:

a. Yes. Freedom of Speech includes the freedom to film
and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion
pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television.
Along with press, radio and television, motion pictures
constitute a principal medium of mass communication for
information, education and entertainment. This freedom
of Speech is available in our country both to locally-
owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies.
b. No. The projected motion picture “The Four Day
Revolution” does not constitute an unlawful intrusion
upon private respondent’s right of privacy. Whether the
"balancing of interests test" or the clear and present
danger test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions,
the Court believes that a different conclusion must here
be reached: The production and filming by petitioners of
the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution"
does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an
unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of
privacy."
JOSE B.L. REYES vs. RAMON BAGATSING
G.R. No. L-65366. November 9, 1983.
PONENTE: FERNANDO, C.J.
DOCTRINE:
There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel
aspects of litigation, the judgment must be confined within
the limits of previous decisions. The law declared on past
occasions is, on the whole, a safe guide, so it has been
here. Hence, as noted, on the afternoon of the hearing,
October 25, 1983, this Court issued the minute resolution
granting the mandatory injunction allowing the proposed
march and rally scheduled for the next day. That
conclusion was inevitable ill the absence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive, evil to a legitimate public
interest. There was no justification then to deny the
exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and
peaceable assembly. These rights are assured by our
Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The participants to such assembly, composed
primarily of those in attendance at the International
Conference for General Disbarment, World Peace and the
Removal of All Foreign Military Bases would start from the
Luneta. Proceeding through Roxas Boulevard to the gates
of the United States Embassy located at the same street. To
repeat, it is settled law that as to public places, especially
so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor
is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the
permit, whether an individual or a group.
FACTS:
Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a
peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00
in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the
United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of
public property, a short program would be held. The march
would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such
conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a
petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session
of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in
the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free
speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken
by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request
was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence
reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to
infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large
number of people are expected to attend. Respondent
suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the
Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of
the participants themselves and the general public may be
sured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory
injunction was granted on the ground that there was no showing
of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice
Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No.
7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within
a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or
chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the freedom of expression and the right to
peaceably assemble violated.
HELD:
Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable
assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free
speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to
public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is
freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the
applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There
can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as
the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial
Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the public places has from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens. With regard to the ordinance, there was no
showing that there was violation and even if it could be shown
that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that
respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his
denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.
PITA VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 80806. OCTOBER 5, 1989.
PONENTE: SARMIENTO, J.
FACTS:
In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the
Manila Police, seized and confiscated from dealers along Manila
sidewalks, magazines believed to be obscene. These were later
burned. One of the publications was Pinoy Playboy published
by Leo Pita.
He filed an injunction case against the mayor of Manila to enjoin
him from confiscating more copies of his magazine and claimed
that this was a violation of freedom of speech. The court
ordered him to show cause. He then filed an Urgent Motion for
issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate
seizure.
Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and
burning of obscene reading materials but admitted that these
were surrendered by the stall owners and the establishments
were not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera,
filed no answer.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the
case for hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce
evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy
Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or
burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or not".
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order
appealed from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary
injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that
freedom of the press is not without restraint.
In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:
1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without
any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's
magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they
are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the
trial court and, in effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss
the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what
was submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of
petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.
HELD:
In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been
on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and
present danger" that would warrant State interference and
action. But the burden to show this lies with the authorities.
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or
conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and
present danger."
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving
the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that
the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State
to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that
must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify
State action to stop the speech.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have
shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had
been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a
lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and
seizure, by way of a search warrant.
ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO
L-18000. JAN 27, 1948
PONENTE: FERIA, J.
DOCTRINE:
The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances, are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic countries.
But it a casettled principle growing out of the nature of
well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights
is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, not injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and
other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police
power" which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order
or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign
police power is exercised by the government through its
legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating
those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may
be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns,
municipalities, and cities authorizing their legislative
bodies, called municipal and city councils to enact
ordinances for the purpose.
FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner
Cipriano Primicias, manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties,
against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to
compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public
meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner
requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”.
However, the respondent refused to issue such permit because
he found “that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing
upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions,
especially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and
high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public
order.”
Respondent based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of
1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a
riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any
unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119,
free use of Public Place.
HELD:
Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and to
peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these
rights are not absolute. They can be regulated under the state’s
police power – that they should not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the
community or society. The Court holds that there can be 2
interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila
is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant
permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade,
or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of
Manila; and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to
be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and public places by
others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize
the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction
since the first construction is tantamount to authorizing the
Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic
system of government no such unlimited power may be validly
granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in
cases of national emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to
be issued is for the use of public places and not for the
assembly itself.
The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be
struck down. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of
speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
JOSE B.L. REYES vs. RAMON BAGATSING
G.R. No. L-65366. November 9, 1983.
PONENTE: FERNANDO, C.J.
DOCTRINE:
Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet
peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of
public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost
deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as the case with freedom of
expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent.
MALABANAN vs. RAMENTO
G.R. No. L-62270. May 21, 1984.
FERNANDO, CJ.
DOCTRINE:
Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and
free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the
rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and
communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in
gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to
borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des
Moines Community School District, "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate." While, therefore, the authority of
educational institutions over the conduct of students must
be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of
constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level there is
persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion:
"The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to
accommodate students during prescribed hours for the
purpose of certain types of activities. Among those
activities is personal intercommunication among the
students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process
of attending school; it is also an important part of the
educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not
embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during
the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he
does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing]
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school' and without colliding with the
rights of others. ... But conduct by the student, in class or
out of it, which for any reason — whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior — materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."
FACTS:
The failure to accord respect to the constitutional rights of
freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech is the
grievance alleged by petitioners, students of the Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation, in this certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus proceeding.
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
respondent University. They sought and were granted by tile
school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to
12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along
with other students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court
(VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball
court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such
gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language
their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the
same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and
continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their
permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to
language severely critical of the University authorities and using
megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance
of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees,
within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise
created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they
should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then
on September 9, 1982, they were formed through a
memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for
their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front
of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged
by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
a petition for mandamus with damages against private
respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and
Sports. On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director
of the National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of the
charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private
Schools more specifically their holding of an illegal assembly
which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted
resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The
penalty was suspension for one academic year.
HELD:
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are
guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily,
their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or
involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous
restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing
of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state,
has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and
scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or
utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly
could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the
name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the
assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be
sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power
to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting
such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of
the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work
of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be
violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
ARIEL NON VS. HON. SANCHO DANES II
G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990.
CORTES, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc.
were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic
year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass
actions against the school in the preceding semester. The
subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the
pleadings.
The trial court dismissed the petition referring to the ruling in
Alcuaz vs. PSBA stating, that being a mere privilege and not a
legal right for a student to be enrolled or re-enrolled, respondent
Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for
re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the
school.
The respondents, in justifying their action, stated that 8 of the
petitioners have incurred failing grades. In response, the
petitioners stated that: (a) three of them were graduating. (b)
Their academic deficiencies do not warrant non-readmission. (c)
The improper conduct attributed to them was during the
exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly. (d) There was no due investigation that could serve
as basis for disciplinary action. (e) Respondent school is their
choice institution near their places of residence, which they can
afford to pay for tertiary education.
HELD:
The contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering
the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the
grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions. The authority for schools to refuse
enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which
has a term of one semester, has already expired, cannot be
justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the admission and
enrollment of students as a major component of the academic
freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning.
The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic
standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate against
students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and
assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to
equal protection.
Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to
afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they
seek to pursue.
However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline
or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits
his contractual right; and the court should not review the
discretion of university authorities. Excluding students because
of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against
them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not
only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of
the basic tenets of fair play.
Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some cannot be
considered marked academic deficiency. Neither can the
academic deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of
the school due to an insufficiency of information. Herein, the
students could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings
in connection with the mass actions, but the penalty that could
have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense
committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements
of procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph
145, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools).
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of
administrative sanctions have become moot and academic.
Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-
enrollment and who have been effectively excluded from
respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been
more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they
might have committed when they led and participated in the
mass actions that, according to respondents, resulted in the
disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary
proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only
further aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and
the officials of respondent school which necessarily resulted
from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of Appeals and
before the trial court.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO.
G.R. No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.
PONENTE: MAKASIAR, J.
DOCTRINE:
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as
they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our
civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions."
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a
law which restricts or impairs property rights.
FACTS:
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a
mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts
(from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively);
and that they informed the respondent Company of their
proposed demonstration.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine
Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the
PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in
fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to
freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for
petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it
would interrupt the normal course of their business which may
result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat
of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they
pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated
their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to
participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not
absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed
for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers
of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their
motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the
CBA?
HELD:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well
as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to
survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity
and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute
when directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we
shall be governed.”
GREGORIO AGLIPAY vs. JUAN RUIZ
G.R. No. L-45459. March 13, 1937.
PONENTE: LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this
court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director
of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of
Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the
Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what
he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq.,
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the
President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having
sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for
printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as
border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red,
violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations
are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were
actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this
day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to
be prevented by the petitioner herein.
HELD:

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is
not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as
it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the
Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish
a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and
develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general
welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice,
liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance
upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view.
What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does
not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public
money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the
issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director
of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.
On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of
Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint that the only purpose in issuing and
selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourists to this country."
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel
for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of
church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection
a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the
scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be
taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is
done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the
belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a
particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious
reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the
attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that
there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act
No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to
misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to
assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in
issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case
of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the
exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the
step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the
court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.
ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO
G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.
DOCTRINE:
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint,
San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or the
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the
highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the
image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church
when the mass was celebrated.
Not every governmental activity which involves the
expenditure of public funds and which has some religious
tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding
separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of
Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer
was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by
means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay
assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No.
6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish church during
the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor
as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however,
petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña, refused
to return custody of the image to the council on the pretext that
it was the property of the church because church funds were
used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a
replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond.
Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed an
action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the
subject image contending that when they were adopted, the
barangay council was not duly constituted because the
chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to
participate; and that they contravened the constitutional
provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of religion
and the use of public money to favor any sect or church.
ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for
purchase of saint's image with private funds in connection with
barangay fiesta, constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela,
Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration"
every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente
Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the
construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds
for which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and
cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any
religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for
the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was
purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The
construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The
wooden image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San
Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion
or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of
the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the
image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when
the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or
illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio,
then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot
be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio
fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained
tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony
and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. CITY OF MANILA
GR NO. L-9637 | APRIL 30, 1957
PONENTE: FELIX, J.
DOCTRINE:
Nor could dissemination of religious information be
conditioned upon the approval of an official or manager
even if the town were owned by a corporation as held in the
case of Marsh vs. State of Alabama (326 U.S. 501), or by the
United States itself as held in the case of Tucker vs. Texas
(326 U.S. 517). In the former case the Supreme Court
expressed the opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the
press and religion occupies a preferred position as against
the constitutional right of property owners.
"When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of
property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of
press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of
the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. . . . In
our view the circumstance that the property rights to the
premises where the deprivation of property here involved,
took place, were held by others than the public, is not
sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their
fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint
by the application of a State statute." (Tañada and
Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th
ed., p. 304-306).
FACTS:
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit,
religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing
business in the Philippines, with its principal office in Manila.
They distribute and sell bibles throughout the country. The City
Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it
violated Ordinance No. 3000 and 2529 as it was conducting
business of general merchandise since November 1945, without
the necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal license and
required them to secure the permit and license within three days
together with compromise in the sum of P5,821.45. To avoid the
closure of their business, they paid under protest. They filed a
complaint and prayed that the ordinance be declared illegal and
unconstitutional as it infringes religious freedom.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila are
constitutional and valid.
RULING:
1. Yes, they are constitutional. The ordinances do not
deprive defendant of his constitutional right of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing
and carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit
to claim as part of his religious system. It seems clear,
therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered
unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff society.
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner has a television program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo” aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13
every Sunday. The program presents and propagates
petitioner’s religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times
in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted
to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116,
119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as “X” or not
for public viewing on the ground that they “offend and constitute
an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by
law.”
On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the
President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which
allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary
Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez
reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to
the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional
guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that
the episode poses any clear and present danger.
Petitioner also filed a civil case. Petitioner alleged that the
respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its
TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series
Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board
invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201
of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the
literal translation of the Bible and says that the (Catholic)
veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because it
was not in the Bible. The board contended that it outrages
Catholic and Protestant beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Was the Iglesia ni Cristo program constitutionally protected as a
form of religious exercise and expression? – YES.
RATIO:
Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption
of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to
overthrow this presumption. Respondent failed to do this. So-
called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly
suppresses petitioner’s freedom of speech and interferes with
its right to free exercise of religion. “Attack” is different from
“offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may
disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but
that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however,
unclean they may be.
Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to
favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another
religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to
preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics;
the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the
State from leaning towards any religion.
The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is
best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It
is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the
tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of
the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but
only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil.
It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to
the case at bar because the issue involves the content of
speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly,
unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be
measured, and the causal connection between the speech and
the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination
of the question as to whether or not such vilification,
exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the
boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial
function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body
such as a Board of Censors.” A system of prior restraint may
only be validly administered by judges and not left to
administrative agencies.
German v. Barangan
G.R. No. L-68828 March 27, 1985
Escolin, J.
FACTS:
In the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of
about 50 businessmen, students and office employees
converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the purpose of
hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the
Malacañang grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow
T-shirts, they started to march down with raised clenched fists
and shouts of anti-government invectives. The marchers were
barred by respondent Major Lariosa, upon orders of his
superiors and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from
proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was
located within the Malacañang security area. Despite plea, they
were not allowed in the church.
Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street
was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At the hearing of
this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that
they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or
persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They
maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to
perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-
government demonstration at a place close to the very
residence and offices of the President of the Republic.
HELD:
In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained
of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only
in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the
same into action.
Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the use of
J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom and reasonableness of which
have already been discussed, is allowed under the
fundamental law, the same having been established in the
interest of national security.
ROEL EBRALINAG vs THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT
G.R. No. 95770. March 1, 1993.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same issue
whether school children who are members or a religious sect
known as Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school
(both public and private), for refusing, on account of their
religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which
includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national
anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled
from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An
Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8
(Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All
Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing
these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their
teachings. They contend that to compel transcends
constitutional limits and invades protection against official
control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the
precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the
Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we
are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag
is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any
religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses
cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony.
They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover,
exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and
demoralize the rest of the school population which by far
constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief
guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean
exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by
competent authority.
ISSUE:
Whether school children who are members or a religious sect
known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school
(both public and private), for refusing, on account of their
religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which
includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national
anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.
HELD:
The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the
school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority
and the amplest protection among human rights, for it
involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within
the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom
is the existence of grave and present danger to public
safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to
prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in “external acts”
or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the
flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do
not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their
expulsion.
SANTIAGO A. FONACIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-5917. January 28, 1955.
FACTS:
Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI),
represented by its supreme bishop Gerardo Bayaca, against
Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his
administration of all the temporal properties and to recover the
same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme bishop of
IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme
Bishop. Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as
Supreme Bishop and his legal successor was Juan Jamias. He
claims that the there was an accounting of his administration
and was turned over to bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los
Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their faith and formally
joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church of America. CFI
rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the
sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier
to render an accounting of his administration CA affirmed the
decision of the CFI.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the
legitimate supreme bishop of IFI.
Held:
Supreme Court affirmed CA’s decision. The legitimate Supreme
Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De los Reyes, Jr. The Supreme Court
affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes as the
Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws to finally dispose
of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368
declared that the rule in property controversies within
religious congregations strictly independent of any other
superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine
Independent Church) is that the rules for resolving such
controversies should be those of any voluntary
association. If the congregation adopts the majority rule
then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to
duly constituted authorities within the congregation, then
that should be followed.
FORTUNATO R. PAMIL vs. HONORABLE TELERON
G.R. No. L-34854. November 20, 1978.
The novel question raised in this certiorari proceeding concerns
the eligibility of an ecclesiastic to an elective municipal position.
Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971,
elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque,
Bohol. 1 Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo
warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the
office, for his disqualification 2 based on this Administrative
Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed
to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service,
persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or
national funds, or contractors for public works of the
municipality." 3 The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge
sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal
mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly
repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then
elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention that
there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and
effect. Thus was the specific question raised.
It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle
of the applicable construction of the provision on what
laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in
this case were to be heeded. The challenged Administrative
Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible
ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its
face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by
the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a
religious test. Torcaso v. Watkins 18 an American Supreme
Court decision has persuasive weight. What was there
involved was the validity of a provision in the Maryland
Constitution prescribing that "no religious test ought ever
to be required as a disqualification for any office or profit or
trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the
existence of God ..." Such a constitutional requirement was
assailed as contrary to the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution by an appointee to the office of notary
public in Maryland, who was refused a commission as he
would not declare a belief in God. He failed in the Maryland
Court of Appeals but prevailed in the United States
Supreme Court, which reversed the state court decision. It
could not have been otherwise. As emphatically declared
by Justice Black: "this Maryland religious test for public
office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of
belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced
against him."
The analogy appears to be obvious. In that case, it was lack
of belief in God that was a disqualification. Here being an
ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith
suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an
incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision
relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional
mandate. It is not a valid argument against this conclusion
to assert that under the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916,
there was such a prohibition against a religious test, and
yet such a ban on holding a municipal position had not
been nullified. It suffices to answer that no question was
raised as to its validity. In Vilar v. Paraiso, 20 decided under
the 1935 Constitution, it was assumed that there was no
conflict with the fundamental law.
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211. September 15, 1989.
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three
year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines.
The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the
respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the
petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
HELD:
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is
not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right
to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally
distinct right under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to
freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. The
Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)]
separately from the "right to leave any country, including
his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)]
and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his
own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such
laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public
order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country"
of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It
would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations
to the right to return to one's country in the same context
as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to
travel.
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR. VS THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-62100. May 30, 1986.
As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the
appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration
thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the
proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in
their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to
leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with
contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have
been committed by the appellate court in allowing
Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself
that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 94284. April 8, 1991.
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing
of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an
Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a
hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground
that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary
Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment
and scheduled hearings.
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail
but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear
before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest
have been issued. Those orders and processes would be
rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to
leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial
confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal
case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a
valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be
dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in
any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It
is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should
run their course and proceed to finality without undue
delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all
times to Court Orders and processes.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. VASQUEZ
G.R. Nos. 99289-90. January 27, 1993.
We elucidate that such policy includes the matter of
petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the
trial or lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein
should apply for permission to leave the country from the
very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best
position to pass upon such applications and to impose the
appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant
with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or
implications thereof.
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-72119. May 29, 1987.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters
of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every
door to any and all information. Under the Constitution,
access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain
types of information from public scrutiny, such as those
affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23,
1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32,
1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in every
case, the availability of access to a particular public record
must be circumscribed by the nature of the information
sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves
public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold
question is, therefore, whether or not the information
sought is of public interest or public concern.
RICARDO VALMONTE vs FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR
G.R. No. 74930. February 13, 1989.
CORTES, J.
The right to information is an essential premise of a
meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not
to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of
and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right
to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional
policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public
service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in government.
MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO vs. MANUEL L.
MORATO
G.R. No. 92541. November 13, 1991.
FACTS:
At issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official
records as guaranteed by the constitution.
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be
allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting
slips accomplished by the individual board members after a
review of the movies and television productions. It is on the
basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified
accordingly.
Acting on the said request, the records officer informed
petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from
respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain
access to the records sought to be examined.
The decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips
accomplished by the members concerned are acts made
pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither
personal nor private in nature but rather public in
character. They are, therefore, public records access to
which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the
exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the
discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged
with the custody of the official records sought to be
examined. The constitutional recognition of the citizen's
right of access to official records cannot be made
dependent upon the consent of the members of the board
concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered
nugatory.

LEO ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999.
PUNO, J.

The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development shall,
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.