(34) WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC.
v CA and ORTIGAS &
COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP G.R. No. 91797 August 28, 1991
BIDIN, J.
Petition for review
FACTS
On August 27, 1974, R Widora filed LRC Case No. Q-336 before the respondent (trial)
court an application for registration of title of a parcel of land as shown in Plan No. LRC
(SWO)-l5352. Widora alleged that the parcel of land is covered by Titulo de Propriedad
Numero 4136, dated April 25, 1894, issued in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban. Later, on June 14, 1978, Widora filed an amended application for registration of
the said parcel of land. It alleged that the parcel of land is situated at Malitlit-Uoogong,
Quezon City, with an area of 156 hectares, more or less, described in Plan No. LRC
(SWO)-15352; and that the applicant acquired said property from the heirs of Don Mariano
San Pedro on December 12, 1954. The amended application prayed that said parcel of land
be ordered registered in the name of Widora.
On August 25, 1978, respondent Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership
over 12 to 14 hectares of Lot 8 (LRC) SWO-15352, and praying for a decree of registration
over said portions of Lot 8.
On October 24, 1978, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging, among
others, that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case, the land being applied for
having been already registered under the Torrens System and in the name of Ortigas under
TCT 77652 and TCT 77653.
On April 20, 1979, the respondent (trial) court issued an order directing the applicant to
prove its contention that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 are not proper derivatives of the
original certificates of titles from which they were purportedly issued, and setting the case
for hearing on June 28, 1979, at 8:30 a.m.
On June 27, 1979, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for reconsideration of said order of
April 20, 1979, alleging that a Torrens title becomes indefeasible after a year and that the
same becomes conclusive upon the entire world; that the Land Registration Commission
itself has advised the court that the 156 hectare property sought to be registered is covered
by valid and subsisting titles in the name of Ortigas; that Courts of First Instance and the
appellate courts in previous cases had sustained the Ortigas titles over the land in question.
On October 3, 1979, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Ortigas was denied by the
respondent (trial) court, but the latter set the motion to dismiss for hearing on October 18
and 19, 1979 at 8:30 a.m., for the purpose of enabling the applicant to prove its contention
that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 are not proper derivatives of the original certificates of
title from which they were purportedly issued.
The parties presented their testimonial and documentary evidence before the respondent
(trial) court in support of their respective positions.
On March 30, 1988, the respondent (trial) court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner
Ortigas, holding, among others, that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their face show that
they were derived from OCT 337, 19, 336, 334, pursuant to Decree 1425; that if there was
error in the correct number of OCT on said titles, no step or measure to rectify the same
was taken; that Decree No. 1425 shows that it covers a total area of only 17 hectares, more
or less, located in Sta. Ana, Manila, which was four kilometers away from the land subject
of the application for registration which covers an area of 156 hectares, more or less,
described in Plan No. LRC (SWO)-15352 situated at Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City; that
the contention of Ortigas that Decree No. 1425 covers an area in Manila and also a part of
Rizal is not credible, for if this were true then the area of said Rizal portion should appear
on the face of said decree of registration, which is not the case; that TCT 77652 and TCT
77653 were not derived from any decree of registration, and that the said TCTs being null
and void, cannot be used as basis to contest the right of the applicant to apply for
registration over the subject land. The order of March 30, 1988, in its dispositive portion
stated:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Motion dated October 4, 1978 and
Motion to Dismiss, dated, October 23, 1978 filed by oppositor Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership are both DENIED for lack of merit; while this Court's order of
September 15, 1978 directing the City Assessor of Quezon City to issue a separate tax
declaration corresponding to the 12 or 14 hectares which is an undivided portion of the
land applied for registration and now belonging to the said Dolores V. Molina; further,
authorizing the City Treasurer of Quezon City to accept the corresponding realty taxes due
thereon; and further the said Dolores V. Molina is allowed to intervene in these
proceedings, is hereby affirmed; likewise, the City Treasurer is directed to accept the
whole of the taxes due on the property subject of the instant petition from applicants
Widows & Orphans Association, Inc., as prayed for in its Manifestation with Motion
subject to the right of the oppositor Dolores V. Molina as contained in this Court's order of
September 15, 1978."
On April 26, 1988, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for reconsider consideration of the said
order of March 30, 1988, taking exception to the ruling that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653
are null and void, and alleging, among others, that respondent (trial) court had no
jurisdiction to hear an application for registration of a previously registered land; that the
parcels of land applied for are covered by TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 in the name of
Ortigas; that the parcels of land covered by TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 are within the
parcel of land covered by OCT 351; and that OCT 351 is a copy of Decree No. 1425 issued
on April 26, 1905. The motion for reconsideration prayed the respondent court to
reconsider its order of March 30, 1988 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the
application for registration, the parcels of land subject thereof being already covered by
Torrens Certificates of Title.
On May 19, 1989, the respondent (trial) court issued an order, denying the motion for
reconsideration of Ortigas, and setting the hearing on the merits on July 26, 1989, ... for the
"eventual presentation of the parties' respective evidence respecting their alleged ownership
of the property subject of this petition." (Rollo, pp. 24-26)
Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before respondent court praying for the annulment of the March 30, 1988 and
May 19, 1989 orders of the trial court. It also prayed that the trial court be ordered to
dismiss the land registration case.
On November 27, 1989, respondent court rendered the decision sought to be reviewed, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus of petitioner Ortigas
& Company Limited Partnership is GRANTED. The orders of March 30, 1988 and May 19,
1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, in LRC Case No. Q-336, are
REVERSED and ANNULLED, and said LRC Case No. Q-336 is DISMISSED. The
injunction issued by the Court, per Resolution of August 8, 1989, is made permanent.
(Rollo, p. 35)
Based on the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas at the hearing of its
application for preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court from proceeding with the
hearing of LRC Case No. Q-336, respondent court held that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653,
albeit reflecting their origins as OCT Nos. 337, 19, 336 and 334, are actually derivatives of
OCT No. 351, the latter having been issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that since OCT
351 is allegedly a copy of Decree 1425, the mere fact that the original copy of Decree
1425, or a certified copy thereof, can no longer be located or produced, does not mean that
Decree 1425 covering the lots embraced in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 was not issued.
Concluding, respondent court said:
It may be that TCT 77652 and 77653 do not show on their face (sic) that they were derived
from OCT 351. But the fact remains, as shown above, that the parcel of land covered by
OCT 351 embraced the parcels of land, Lots 7 and 8, of TCT 77652 and 77653. There was,
therefore a mistake in the entries in TCT 77652 and 77653 when the same referred to
OCTs 337, 19, 336, 337 (sic) and 334, as their source, for the correct OCT insofar as Lots
7 and 8 are concerned, should be OCT 351. (Rollo, p. 27)
In this petition, petitioner WIDORA avers that the respondent Court of Appeals has
decided questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of this Court
because:
I notice (Michael and Co. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 [1915]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 73
THE COURT OF APPEALS INSISTED IN UPHOLDING THE EXISTENCE OR
VALIDITY OF TCTs 77652 and 77653 DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A SUPPORTING
DECREE OF REGISTRATION.
II
THE QUESTIONED DECISION UTILIZED SECONDARY EVIDENCE DESPITE THE
EXISTENCE AND AVAILABILITY OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ENJOIN THE
TRIAL ON THE MERITS OF LRC NO. Q-336 SINCE JURISDICTION RESIDES WITH
THE RTC ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT.
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In essence, it is the contention of petitioner that respondent court's grounds and reasoning
in support of its findings that respondent Ortigas is the registered owner of the disputed
property are baseless in law and fact. Petitioner argues that respondent court erred in
sustaining the validity of TCTs Nos. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting
decree of registration and instead utilized secondary evidence, OCT 351 which is
supposedly a copy of Decree 1425. Petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 is itself existing
and available at the Register of Deeds of Manila and on its face shows that it covers a
parcel of land with an area of only 17 hectares in Sta. Ana, Manila while the parcel of land
applied for contains an area of 156 hectares, located at Malitlit-Uoogong Quezon City, four
(4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana, Manila and is certified by the Bureau of Lands and the
Bureau of Forestry as alienable and disposable.
Respondent Ortigas claims that respondent court committed no error in rectifying the
mistake in the entries in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 as regards their sources and/or origins
arguing that the correction was justified by the fact that the plan of OCT 351 coincides
with the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653; that OCT 351 was issued
pursuant to Decree 1425 and that OCT 351 is a copy of the Decree itself.
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We find the petition impressed with merit.
Undoubtedly, the evidence (i.e., plan submitted by respondent Ortigas, testimony of its
surveyor and OCT 351) adduced by private respondent to prove the contents of Decree
1425 and admitted by respondent court is merely secondary and should not have been
admitted in the first place.
Before secondary evidence may be admitted, there must be 1) proof of the execution of the
original writing and 2) that it has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court or
that it is in the possession of the adverse party who has failed to produce it after reasonable
SCRA 146 [1976]). Private respondent has not shown compliance with the above requisites
which would justify the admission of the secondary evidence used and erroneously relied
upon by respondent court.
Furthermore, the unilateral action of respondent court in substituting its own findings
regarding the extent of the coverage of the land included in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653,
ostensibly to correct the error in, and conform with, the technical description found in OCT
351 based on the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas cannot be
sustained. That function is properly lodged with the office of the trial court sitting as a land
registration court and only after a full-dress investigation of the matter on the merits. It is
before the land registration court that private respondent must adduce the proof that the
disputed parcels of land is legally registered in its favor.
In Dioquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court (179 SCRA 163 [1989]), this Court held that
"(w)hile it is true that the Court of Appeals is vested with the 'power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve
factual issues raised ..." (Sec. 9 [3], BP 129), there was not even a request for evidentiary
hearing filed in this case. The Court of Appeals therefore should not have admitted said
evidence without giving the adverse party opportunity to present counter evidence, if any.
Besides, "evidence necessary in regards to factual issues raised in cases falling within the
Appellate Court's original and appellate jurisdiction contemplates incidental facts which
were not touched upon, or fully heard by the trial or respondent Court. The law could not
have intended that the Appellate Court would hold an original and full trial of a main
factual issue in a case, which properly pertains to trial courts" (citing Lingner & Fisher
GMBH v. IAC, 125 SCRA 522 [1983]). In the case at bar, it appears that the parties have
yet to fully present their respective evidence in support of their claims before the trial
court. As a matter of fact, the trial court had set the case for hearing on the merits in its
order dated May 19, 1989. What is more, the case involves a vast tract of land consisting of
156 hectares, separately situated in two outlaying localities (i.e., Quezon City and Sta. Ana,
Manila.) The resolution of this controversy calls for a full-blown trial on the merits if only
to afford the contending parties their respective days in court. Further, a ground for
dismissal based on disputed facts, as in this case is not proper in a motion to dismiss
(Spouses Jayme and Solidarios v. Alampay, 62 SCRA 131 [1975]).
In the case at bar, respondent Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered
by its TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots applied for by petitioner.
On the other hand, petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at
Sta. Ana, Manila while the lot applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by the
Bureau of Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an area of 156 hectares located in
Quezon City four (4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana, Manila. Hence, the necessity of a
trial on the merits to ascertain the disputed facts, i.e., whether the lot applied for is covered
by Decree No. 1425 or is alienable and disposable. Under Act 496, it is the decree of
registration issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the basis for the
subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that
quiets the title to and binds the land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240
[1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering the parcel of
land applied for, then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not
quiet the title to nor bind the land and is null and void.
Besides, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and, unless it
constitutes clearly a grave abuse of discretion or was issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction, the error, if any, should be corrected by appeal in due time, after trial and
judgment on the merits and not by the extraordinary writ of prohibition (Moreno v.
Macadaeg, 7 SCRA 700 [1963]; National Investment and Development Corporation v.
Aquino, 163 SCRA 53 [1988]).
Furthermore, on grounds of pre-maturity, interlocutory orders cannot be decided by the
appellate courts until the lower court shall have decided the merit of the case. Thus, in
Villegas v. Fernando (27 SCRA 1119 [1969]), this Court held:
This first assigned error (assailing the personality of the appellees to ask for a review of
the decision and decree in the registration case) is actually directed at an earlier order
dated 26 April 1961 denying appellants heirs' motion to dismiss the petitions for review
filed by the present appellees. And inasmuch as said order of 26 April 1961 is
interlocutory, there being as yet no trial and decision on the merits of the petition for
review, it is premature to raise said assigned error in appellants heirs' instant appeal. We
shall rule thereon only when the proper time comes, i. e., after the lower court shall have
settled not only the still unresolved status and rights of the parties, particularly those of
petitioners (sic) for review, now appellees herein, almost all of whom are claiming that
they are not mere homestead or free patent applicants but patent or title holders, but also
whether the original decision should be maintained or not. For the court below, after
receiving and hearing the parties, may still conclude in favor of appellants herein.
(Emphasis supplied)
But not only that. Respondent court committed a procedural lapse in correcting the alleged
error in the questioned TCT. A certificate of title cannot be altered, amended or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law (Sec. 48, PD 1529; Natalia Realty
Corp. v. Vallez, 173 SCRA 534 [1989]; Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915]). Also, no
correction of certificate of title shall be made except by order of the court in a petition filed
for the purpose and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was
entered (Sec. 112, Act 496; now Sec. 108, PD 1529). While the law fixes no prescriptive
period therefor, the court, however, is not authorized to alter or correct the certificate of
title if it would mean the reopening of the decree of registration beyond the period allowed
by law (Rodriguez, v. Tirona, 68 Phil. 264 [1939]).
Respondent Ortigas, on the other hand, argues that this Court has already recognized the
fact that the parcel of land under TCT No. 227758 from which TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653
were issued, are covered by, among others, Decree 1425 issued in GLRO Record No. 917
(Rollo, p. 94).
The argument is without merit True this Court declared in Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership v. Ruiz (148 SCRA 326 [1987]) that "petitioner is the duly registered owner of
the land * (then) in dispute as evidenced by OCT Nos. 13, 33, 334, and 337 by virtue of
Decrees Nos. 240, 1942 and 1925 issued in GLRO Record Nos. 699, 875 and 917 ..."
Nowhere in said decision, however, is a pronouncement that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and the orders of
were issued from TCT No. 227758. On the contrary, it is not disputed by the parties that the trial court in LRC Case No. Q336 entitled, "In Re-Application for Registration of Title,
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 themselves show that they were derived from OCT No. 337, WIDOWS and ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, Inc., Applicant, ORTIGAS & COMPANY
19, 336 and 334 and not from OCT 351 or TCT 227758. If indeed, the real origin thereof is LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and DOLORES V. MOLINA, Oppositors", dated March 30,
OCT No. 351, what respondent Ortigas should have done was to file a petition for the 1988 and May 19, 1989 are hereby REINSTATED insofar as the denial of oppositor
correction of the TCTs in question as stated earlier. Ortigas' motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration, respectively, are concerned and
the case remanded to the trial court for trial and adjudication on the merits.
While it may be true, as respondent Ortigas argues, that a land registration court has no
jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is nevertheless
true that the aforesaid rule only applies where there exists no serious controversy as to the
certificate's authenticity visa vis the land covered therein. In the case at bar, the claimed
origin of the questioned TCTs evidently appear to be different from what is stated therein.
It does not appear indubitable that the disputed parcels of land are properly reflected in the
TCTs relied upon by private respondent. Off-hand, and as the parties admit, the TCTs do
not show that they are actually derivatives of OCT 351. Such being the case, the rule relied
upon cannot therefore apply. One who relies on a document evidencing his title to the
property must prove not only the genuineness thereof but also the identity of the land
therein referred to (CF. Lasam v. Director of Lands, 65 Phil. 637 [1938]). In the case at bar,
private respondent's TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 trace their origins from OCT Nos. 337,
19, 336 and 334 and not from OCT 351 as it is now claimed by respondent Ortigas.

The trial court cannot be faulted for not having granted respondent Ortigas' motion to
dismiss simply because the TCTs relied upon by the latter do not accurately reflect their
supposed origin. Thus, in Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. 769 [1926]) this
Court held that the "simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System,
does not make the possessor the true owner of all the property described therein. If a person
obtains a title, under the Torrens System, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, he does not, by virtue of said
certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included (citing Legarda and
Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915])." TMs pronouncement was reiterated by the Court
in Caragay-Layno v. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 718 [1984]; Coronel v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (155 SCRA 270 [1987]; Goloy v. Court of Appeals (173 SCRA 26 [1989];
and Miranda v. Court of Appeals (177 SCRA 303 [1989]). As it is in this case, a certificate
of title cannot be considered conclusive evidence of ownership where the certificate itself
is faulty as to its purported origin.

Further, the fact that respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss was denied does not mean that
it could no longer participate in the resolution of the case and factual determination of the
parties' allegations. As correctly stated by the trial court, "(i)t is to be stressed, however,
that the denial of oppositor Ortigas' instant motion for reconsideration does not necessarily
mean that it is deprived of any participation in the instant petition. For as already stated,
what follows after its denial is the eventual presentation of all the parties' respective
evidence respecting their alleged ownership of the property subject of this petition." (Rollo,
p. 65)