ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORP VS GENERAL FIRE AND LIFE ASSURANCE CORPFACTS: Aboitiz Shipping is the

owner of M/V P. Aboitiz, a vessel w/c sank on a voyage from Hongkong to the Philippines. Thissinking of
the vessel gave rise to the filing of several suits for recovery of the lost cargo either by the shippers their
successors-in-interest, or the cargo insurers like General Accident (GAFLAC).Board of Marine Inquiry
(BMI), on its initial investigation found that such sinking was due to

force majeure

and that subjectvessel, at the time of the sinking was seaworthy. The trial court rules against the carrier
on the ground that the loss didnot occur as a result of

force majeure

. This was affirmed by the CA and ordered the immediate execution of the full judgment
award.However, other cases have resulted in the finding that vessel was seaworthy at the time of the
sinking, and that suchsinking was due to

force majeure

.Due to these different rulings, Aboitiz seeks a pronouncement as to the applicability of the doctrine of
limited liability on the totality of the claims vis a vis the losses brought about by the sinking of the vessel
M/V P. ABOITIZ, as based on the real and hypothecary nature of maritime law. Aboitiz argued that the
Limited Liability Rule warrants immediate stay of execution of judgment to prevent impairment of other
creditors' shares.

ISSUE: Whether the Limited Liability Rule arising out of the real and hypothecary nature of maritime law
should apply in this and related cases.

RULING: The SC ruled in the affirmative.

The real and hypothecary nature of maritime law simply means that the liability of the carrier in
connection with losses related to maritime contracts is confined to the vessel, which is hypothecated for
such obligations or which stands as the guaranty for their settlement. It has its origin by reason of the
conditions and risks attending maritime trade in its earliest years when such trade was replete with
innumerable and unknown hazards since vessels had to go through largely uncharted waters to ply their
trade. It was designed to offset such adverse conditions and to encourage people and entities to venture
into maritime commerce despite the risks and the prohibitive cost of shipbuilding. Thus, the liability of
the vessel owner and agent arising from the operation of such vessel were confined to the vessel itself,
its equipment, freight, and insurance, if any, which limitation served to induce capitalists into effectively
wagering their resources against the consideration of the large profits attainable in the trade. The
Limited Liability Rule in the Philippines is taken up in Book III of the Code of Commerce, particularly in
Articles 587,590, and 837, hereunder quoted in toto:

Art. 587. The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for the indemnities in favor of third persons which
mayarise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which he loaded on the vessel; but he
mayexempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her equipment and the freight it may
have earned during the voyage.

Art. 590. The co-owners of a vessel shall be civilly liable in the proportion of their interests in the
common fund for the results of the acts of the captain referred to in Art. 587.

Each co-owner may exempt himself from this liability by the abandonment, before a notary, of the part
of the vessel belonging to him.

Art. 837. The civil liability incurred by ship owners in the case prescribed in this section (on collisions),

shall be understood as limited to the value of the vessel with all its appurtenances and freightage served
during the voyage. The only time the Limited Liability Rule does not apply is when there is an actual
finding of negligence on the part of the vessel owner or agent.

ISSUE 2: Whether there is a finding of such negligence on the part of the owner in this case.RULING 2:
The SC ruled in the negative.

In its Decision, the trial court merely held that:

. . . Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that the vessel M/V "Aboitiz" and its cargo were
not lost due to fortuitous event or force majeure

People v Echavez, 95 SCRA 663 (1980)

Facts: Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed separate informations against sixteen people for squatting which
waspunishable under PD No. 772. FIve of the informations were raffled to Judge Vicente Echavez, Jr.
TheJudge dismissed the five informations before the accused could be arraigned. One of the
Judge'sgrounds for the dismissal was that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply
to thecultivation of a grazing land. The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered.

Issues: Whether PD No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands.

Ruling/Held: No. The court ruled that PD No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its
preambleshows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
illegalconstructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of
involvespasture lands in rural areas.

Parayno vs Jovellanos
G.R. No. 148408
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Police power

Facts:
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some
residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure
or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer,
Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation.
Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of
location of petitioner’s gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing
gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law.
According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning
Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel
Elementary School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called
as witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June
1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses
closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire;
3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time
especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow
of traffic.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she
filed a case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec
44 of the mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence
this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent
municipality was an invalid exercise of the latter’s police powers

HELD:
The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not
under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : “That the business of the petitioner [was] one
of a gasoline filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a
service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code;”
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party
making them. hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by
the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that “gasoline service station” under Section
44 necessarily included “gasoline filling station” under Section 21. Indeed, the activities
undertaken in a “gas service station” did not automatically embrace those in a “gas filling
station.”
As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police
powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner’s gasoline station. While it had, under RA
7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of
its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution
No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters
from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to
measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether
there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent
municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioner’s business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent
municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement
of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station
is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it
cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people
of Calasiao, we again note: “Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being
hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station
Commander.. recommended “to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of
PP 1185.” It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is “in the heart of
the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao.” Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate
the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning
Ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby
directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it
seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.

CENTRAL CAPIZ VS. RAMIREZ

FACTS
The respondent, Ana Ramirez, contracted with the petitioner, Central Capiz, to supply the latter
with sugar cane. The said contract was to be converted into a right in rem, recorded in the
Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the
same. However, the respondent refused to continue with her contract obligations in the view that
it violates Act No. 2874, “An Act To Amend And Compile the Laws Relating to Lands Of
The Public Domain, And For Other Purposes.” Both parties concede that the land involved is a
private agricultural land and raises the question whether such land is within the scope of Act No.
2874.

ISSUE
Whether or not the private agricultural land of the respondent is within the scope of Act No.
2874.

HELD
No, The purpose of the Legislature in enacting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to
lands of public domain, and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are
not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. The little of the Act is indicative of such
legislative intent. The phrase “and for other purposes” contained in the title of the Act must be
discarded and treated as non-existent, without force and effect, as it violates the single subject
requirement.

SUMULONG vs. COMELEC Case Digest

SUMULONG vs. COMELEC
73 P.R. 288, 1942

Facts: Under the authority of Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, Comelec adopted a
resolution providing for the appointment of election inspectors to be proposed by the political parties
and persons named therein. Petitioner, Juan Sumulong, President of the political party Pagkakaisa
ng Bayan, claims the exclusive right to propose the appointment of such inspectors. He contends
that the resolution of the Comelec, by giving the so-called rebel candidate or free-zone faction of the
Nationalista Party the right to propose one election inspector for each of the precincts in each of the
53 legislative districts, contravenes Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act No. 657. He argues that
under that section the Nationalista Party has the right to propose one, and only one inspector for
each precinct, and that the resolution has the effect of giving that party two inspectors in each and
every precinct within those legislative districts. Petitioner maintains that the discretion given by
Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 to the Comelec in the Choice of election inspectors is not
absolute, but limited by the provision of the Act that the majority party shall have the right to propose
only one inspector.

Issue: Whether or not the Comelec, in giving the so-called rebel candidates and free-zone factions
of the Nationalista Party the right to propose election inspectors, has acted within the limits of the
discretion granted to it by law.

Held: The present case is not an appropriate case for review by the Supreme Court. The Comelec is
a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of
government. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created – free, orderly, and honest
elections. The Supreme Court may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are
clearly illegal / constitute grave abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. The Comelec
because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived
from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position
to decide complex political questions. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission,
as ordained in the Constitution requires that the power of the Supreme Court to review the acts of
that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.

Cordero v. Cabatunado

Manuel Cordero was the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit (TCU) of the Agricultural
Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of
indigent tenant Vicente Salazar who filed a case against landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana in
order to reinstate and reliquidate past harvests. Sta. Romana filed a motion to disqualify
Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of Republic Act No. 1199 or The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that representation
by counsel of tenants who cannot afford to pay should be done by the public defenders of
the Department of Labor.
Judge Jose Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero appealed. During
pendency of the appeal Republic Act No. 2263, AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS
OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
was passed. This law, particularly Sections 19 and 20 thereof, amended the previous law
and now allows trial lawyers from the TCU to represent indigent tenants and it is also the
basis of the creation of the Tenancy Mediation Division. Cordero filed a Manifestation
averring that by virtue of the amendment the issue has now become moot and academic.
Cabatuando countered that the provisions were not embraced in the title of the amending
law nor in the amended law hence void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill and
whether or not to allow trial lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent tenants
should be allowed.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is
satisfied if all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed
in the title of the bill.The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in
the instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. To declare
sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in effect upset the transfer of the duty of
representing indigent tenants from the public defenders of the Department of Labor to the
trial attorneys in the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the
Department of Justice. In other words, a declaration of nullity of these provisions of RA
2263 would do harm to, and would be nugatory of, the intention of Congress to consolidate
the function of enforcing our tenancy laws in the Department of Justice.

Lidasan v. COMELEC
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled
“An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was
passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included
in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of
Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to
establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed
a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did
not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory
several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another
province – Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate
that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill”?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is
not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full
impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away
from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept
the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that
even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the
prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of RA 4790.

Tio v. Videogram Regulatoy Board

In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There
was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie
industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being
acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to
be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the
LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the
following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not
germane to the subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body,
because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government
agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive
enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar,
the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with,
nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked
to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek
assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the
very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a
“fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the
direction and control of the [VRB].”