Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Financial Fraud
by Zuraidah Mohd-Sanusi and Yusarina Mat-Isa
Adapted from Amat, Perramon, and Gowthorpe (2007) and Healy and Wahlen (1999).
Dishonest management has lucrative options in its choice of accounting methods for the recording of
inventory amounts and asset depreciation. This flexibility, legitimate use of which is allowed by GAAP,
offers opportunities to exaggerate or minimize company profits. Managers may also attempt to manipulate
earnings where judgment or estimation of certain accounts is needed in the financial reporting. Determining
the amount of certain expenses—for example, provision for doubtful debt and impairment of securities
—can involve high levels of ambiguity. Companies may artificially recognize profits before they are
realized, or they may try to book leased assets into the balance sheet. Another method is through the
structuring of transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead stakeholders about the underlying
economic performance of the company, or to influence the outcomes of contracts that depend on reported
accounting numbers. This is especially true when some off-balance sheet items, such as commitments and
contingencies, are exploited to project a better financial position. Timing is another area that managers can
manipulate to show a better than actual financial position, an example being the deferment of recognition of
R&D costs.
Some companies may apply several techniques in making their accounting figures appear to be in good
shape. Parmalat, one of Italy’s largest industrial empires, concealed billions of euros of debt through fictitious
sales by its shell companies, as highlighted in Figure 2.
No. Item
Revenue checklist
1 Does the company have a right of return policy?
2 Has there been any change in revenue recognition
policy?
3 Was the revenue of the company recognized before
the product/service was available?
4 Does the company have the physical capacity to
generate the reported revenue?
Assets checklist
5 Has the company changed its credit policy?
6 Have payment terms been extended?
7 Has the company changed its inventory method?
8 Has the company reclassified its properties, plants,
and equipment (PPE)?
Amortization policies checklist
9 Has the company extended the amortization and
depreciation period for capitalized costs?
10 Is there an example of a prior-year write-down of
assets that became value-impaired?
11 Is there any reason to believe that normal operating
expenses are converted to reserves?
Revenue is the most common item to be manipulated by management as there are too many alternative
ways to recognize it, whether through legal or illegal techniques (Albrecht et al., 2009). The two most
common practices are premature recognition of revenue and overstatement of revenue. The former involves
recognizing revenue from legitimate sales in a prior period, while the latter entails the recording of more
revenue than is actually realized. These two practices—which in some cases may be hard to distinguish—
can be used to show a greater earnings capacity than is actually the case.
Similarly, assets are often overvalued in an attempt to bolster the company’s financial position and net worth.
Besides such overvaluation of assets, which is usually perpetrated by management, misappropriation of
assets is one of the most common frauds committed against a company, and this is usually done by internal
staff. As assets have a close link with revenue, there can be a strong motivation to creatively alter asset
figures in the balance sheet.
Amortization is the deduction of capital expenses over a specific period of time, usually the life of the asset.
This means that amortization is related in one way or another to the assets and revenue of a company.
One of the most common techniques used by companies to improve the financial figures is to extend the
amortization period. When the amortization period is extended, expense recognition is postponed to a later
period, which results in a boost to the current earnings.
Company T
Company T, founded in 1996, is a leading custom air cargo carrier offering a full range of services for
express shipping with an average annual turnover of MYR 700 million. In May 2007 the company’s shares
saw a massive sell-down following the announcement of findings from a special audit conducted pursuant to
the alleged unreliability, discovered by the company’s newly appointed auditor, of its consolidated results for
the financial year ending December 31, 2006. The special audit found that the company’s revenue for 2005
and 2006 had been overstated by more than MYR 500 million through recognition of revenue that had yet to
crystallize.
The overstatement of revenue for the financial year ending December 31, 2005, involved the recording
of invoices issued for purported services to 19 companies totalling MYR 197 million. In the financial year
ending December 31, 2006, the same modus operandi had been applied, resulting in the false recording
of 20 invoices totalling MYR 333 million. This misreporting represented overstatements of 36% and
30%, respectively, of the company’s consolidated revenues for the years ending 2005 and 2006 and
changed what would otherwise have been pretax losses into pretax profits. A further audit extended back
to the financial year ending December 31, 2004, showed a similar modus operandi that resulted in an
overstatement of revenue by approximately MYR 95 million. However, the findings for that financial year
could not be fully substantiated as the documentation needed for further testing had not been completed.
This saga led the SCM to charge three executives of Company T, including its founder, with misreporting of
financial information.
This case shows that creative accounting practices can extend back many years before they are detected.
Many questions have arisen as to why the previous auditor failed to bring the issue to light during the
normal course of auditing the financial statements for the years ending 2005 and 2006. Provided that the
audits were conducted with due care and consideration and all relevant audit procedures were undertaken,
the auditor should have discovered frauds of that magnitude. Nevertheless, this did not happen and
stakeholders had to wait for the newly appointed auditor to spot that something was wrong with the
company’s financial statements.
Some creative accounting practices may represent a fine line between manipulative finessing and fraud that
would be difficult to distinguish. As the case of Company T illustrates, premature recognition of income from
purported sales that involve significant amounts is too obvious an indicator to go unnoticed for several years.
It is very perplexing to ponder on the possibility that the auditor was not able to spot even a trace of such
indications of malpractice. Sometimes more palpable creative accounting practices are employed, but still
auditors fail to detect them, as is shown by the next case.
Company M
Company M used to be the largest manufacturer of optical data storage media in South East Asia.
Founded in 1994, the company’s ability to cater to its clients’ specific needs and its reputation as a reliable
manufacturer garnered it a prominent base of global clients. Nevertheless, in 2007 things took a different
turn for the company. About a year before that, in June 2006, the company had talked about a “sterling
fourth quarter” for its financial year ending April 2006. However, in April 2007 the company announced that
two of its major subsidiaries had defaulted on maturing trade facilities.
A preliminary investigation report highlighted “substantial irregularities” in the subsidiaries’ financial
statements, including fictitious trade creditors and debtors, undisclosed related party transactions, and a
deposit payment of MYR 211 million for production lines that appeared to be fictitious. The investigation also
Summary
There are many methods that management can use to cover up poor financial performance or to boost the
company’s earnings. These practices may be both within and beyond the boundaries of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP). The methods include switching between different accounting methods;
exploiting subjective estimations of certain financial numbers; the creation of artificial transactions; the
complexity of business transactions and corporate structure; and the manipulation of income recognition
More Info
Books:
• Albrecht, W. Steve, Conan C. Albrecht, Chad O. Albrecht, and Mark Zimbelman. Fraud Examination.
3rd ed. Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2009.
• Coffee, John C., Jr. Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
• Mulford, Charles W., and Eugene E. Comiskey. The Financial Numbers Game: Detecting Creative
Accounting Practices. Hoboken: NJ: Wiley, 2002.
Articles:
• Amat, Oriol, Jordi Perramon, and Catherine Gowthorpe. “Manipulation of earnings reports in
Spain: Some evidence.” Journal of Applied Accounting Research 8:3 (2007): 93–115. Online at:
dx.doi.org/10.1108/96754260880001055
• Beatty, Anne, and Joseph Weber. “The effects of debt contracting on voluntary accounting method
changes.” Accounting Review 78:1 (January 2003): 119–142. Online at: dx.doi.org/10.2308/
accr.2003.78.1.119
• Cerullo, Michel J., and M Virginia Cerullo. “Using neural network software as a forensic accounting
tool.” Information Systems Control Journal 2 (2006). Online at: tinyurl.com/8xkvufc
• Healy, Paul. M., and James. M. Wahlen. “A review of earnings management literature and its
implications for standard setting.” Accounting Horizons 13:4 (December 1999): 365–383. Online at:
dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch.1999.13.4.365
• Kothari, S. P., Andrew J. Leone, and Charles. E. Wasley. “Performance matched discretionary
accrual measures.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 39:1 (February 2005): 163–197. Online at:
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.11.002
Reports:
• Beasley, Mark S., Joseph V. Carcello, Dana R. Hermanson, and Terry L. Neal. “Fraudulent financial
reporting: 1987–1997: An analysis of US public companies.” Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
of the Treadway Commission (COSO), 1999. Online at: tinyurl.com/7l4ogtf
Websites:
• Bursa Malaysia Berhad: www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm
• International Federation of Accountants (IFAC): www.ifac.org
See Also
Best Practice
• Fraud: Minimizing the Impact on Corporate Image
Viewpoints
• Freezing Out Fraud
Checklists
• Internal Auditing for Fraud Detection and Prevention