1. REPUBLIC VS. JUDGE HERNANDEZ, RTC PASIG 2.
2. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
G.R. No. 117209 | 1996-02-09
Subject: It is the change of the adoptee's surname which is the natural consequence
of a grant of adoption; Change of first name can only be accomplished through a
special proceeding under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court; Permissive joinder of actions;
A petition for change of name cannot be joined to a petition for adoption (governed
by a separate set of rules); Change of (first) name, granted only under certain grounds;
Change of (first) name not proper in this case— baptismal name, when at variance
with that entered in the civil register, is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real
name
Facts:
The spouses Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade filed a petition to
adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for
adoption. In the very same petition, respondent spouses prayed for the change of the
first name of Kevin Earl to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was
baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his
adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at
respondents' residence.
The Republic opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption, arguing that these petitions should be conducted and pursued
as two separate proceedings.
The trial court granted both petitions (adoption and change of name) of the spouses.
In this petition, the only issues are (1) WON the court a quo erred in granting the prayer
for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee
embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) WON there was lawful ground for the
change of name.
Held:
It is the change of the adoptee's surname (not the first name) which is the natural
consequence of a grant of adoption
1. Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates the legal effects of adoption. The law allows
the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter,
upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's surname
to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a
grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact,
even if not prayed for by petitioner.
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of
an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised
solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot
properly be granted.
Change of first name can only be accomplished through a special proceeding under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
3. The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the
adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine
the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing
the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial
change in one's official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial
order.
4. The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein, If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing
and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly
determined.
5. A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with
all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction
for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by
itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any
other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special
proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.
Permissive joinder of actions
6. By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the
uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more
than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of
action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same
complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join
several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration,
complaint or petition.
7. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not
mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes
of action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules
be joined.
8. While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section
5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint
conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or
are of the same nature and character.
A petition for change of name cannot be joined to a petition for adoption (governed
by a separate set of rules)
9. While it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for
adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation
between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less
do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant
their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of
conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
10. A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each
action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. These two
proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon
to evaluate the proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate
the adoptee properly. On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family
relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the propriety and
reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name.
Change of (first) name, granted only under certain grounds
11. The name of an individual has two parts: The given or proper name and the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname
or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the
child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
12. By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil register.
The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in
the eyes of the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil
register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no
person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory
restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification.
13. By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally
is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For
purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code
and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is
the true or official name recorded in the civil register. A petition for change of name
being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with
all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure
therein renders the proceedings a nullity.
14. A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound
discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a
change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.
15. Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient
to warrant a change of name:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
Change of (first) name not proper in this case— baptismal name, when at variance
with that entered in the civil register, is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real
name
16. A petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by
another name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied
inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. Baptism is not a condition
sine qua non to a change of name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been
using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable
cause to legally authorize a change of name. A name given to a person in the church
records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community - when at variance
with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real
name.
17. In the instant petition, the only grounds offered to justify the change of name
prayed for was that the adopted child had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping
with the religious faith of the respondent spouses and that it was the name by which
he had been called and known by his family, relatives and friends from the time he
came to live with private respondents. None of the justified grounds for a change of
name has been alleged or established by private respondents. To repeat, the change
of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the
adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name.
2. LANDINGIN VS. REPUBLIC (2006)
G.R. No. 164948 | 2006-06-27
Subject:
Adoption Statutes are Liberally Construed for the Benefit of the Child; Persons Whose
Written Consent are Needed to the Adoption; Purpose for the Indispensable
Requirement of Consent and Notice to the Natural Parents; The Petitioner Should Have
Adduced the Written Consent of the Legal Guardian; Abandonment Should Evince a
Settled Purpose to Forego all Parental Duties; When Amelia Left for Italy, She Did Not
Intend to Abandon her Children; The Affidavit of Consent of Petitioner’s Presented are
Inadmissible as Evidence; The Financial Capacity of the Prospective Parents Should be
Carefully Evaluated
Facts:
Petitioner Diwata Landingin was an American citizen of Filipino parentage. She filed a
petition for the adoption of 3 minors, who were all the natural children of Manuel
Ramos, Diwata’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her
brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother because Amelia,
their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and had 2 children by her second
marriage and no longer communicated from the time she left up to the institution of
the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being
supported by the petitioner. Her children abroad gave their written consent for their
adoption.
A Social Worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development submitted a
Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia had been consulted
with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children,
she voluntarily consented.
Petitioner failed to present the social worker as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption. Despite such, the
trial court granted the petition. When the Republic appealed before the Court of
Appeals, the appellate court reversed the assailed decision.
Held:
Adoption Statutes are Liberally Construed for the Benefit of the Child
1. It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be
of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection
of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples
or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
2. Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Persons Whose Written Consent are Needed to the Adoption
3. The written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: (a) The
adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over; (b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if
known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal
custody of the child; (c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of
age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (d) The illegitimate sons/daughters,
ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latter's
souse, if any; (e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
Purpose for the Indispensable Requirement of Consent and Notice to the Natural
Parents
4. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers,
and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner
of the proposed adoption.
5. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated
and re-established in adoptive parents.
The Petitioner Should Have Adduced the Written Consent of the Legal Guardian
6. When Landingin filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already
in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice.
7. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian.
Abandonment Should Evince a Settled Purpose to Forego all Parental Duties
8. Abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is
a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties.
9. The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love
and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial
affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect,
abandons the child.
10. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is
not such an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
When Amelia Left for Italy, She Did Not Intend to Abandon her Children
11. When Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave
the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or
relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her mother-in-law.
12. The adoption of the minors will have the effect of severing all legal ties between
the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be
vested on the adopter.
13. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be
the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his/her children.
The Affidavit of Consent of Petitioner’s Presented are Inadmissible as Evidence
14. Petitioner failed to offer in evidence the DSWD Report and of the Joint Affidavit of
Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise,
failed to prove.
15. the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country, it needs
to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, which was not done by the petitioner.
16. As the alleged written consent of petitioner's legitimate children did not comply
with the law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document
whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting
of the makers.
17. No further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent
of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
The Financial Capacity of the Prospective Parents Should be Carefully Evaluated
18. Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows
that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated
and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-
be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.
19. Given the facts of the case, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the United
States. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age.
3. IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF HERMOGENES DIANGKINAY
G.R. No. L-29850 | 1972-06-30
Facts:
On October 18, 1967, petitioner-respondent filed a verified petition for change of
name in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III. The City
Fiscal of San Pablo opposes the petition for change of name of the petitioner
Hermogenes Diangkinay, in view of the fact that the same is not justified and the
registered name as appears in the Registry of Birth of Hermogenes Diangkinay should
remain as such; and that his records like school records and his baptismal certificate
should be the ones corrected to conform to his registered name.
On the date scheduled for the hearing, evidence was presented by respondent in
support hereof.
The evidence disclose that petitioner-respondent was born in Barrio Sta. Filomena, City
of San Pablo on December 19, 1936, his parents being Basilio Diangkinay and Cristina
Deangkinay; that he was registered in the Registry of Birth of the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Pablo City under the name of Hermogenes Diangkinay; that since
his boyhood, he had consistently used the name Rolando Deangkinay because he
believed that was his true name; that in Sta. Filomena Elementary School where he
finished his elementary education, in the Laguna College where he completed his
secondary course and in the National University where he graduated with the degree
of Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, he had used and had been known
by the name of Rolando Deangkinay; in all his official actuations and social dealings,
he had, likewise, used the name Rolando Deangkinay; and when he took his residence
certificates and when he entered into marital union with his wife Aurora Federizo on
December 23, 1962, he also used Rolando Deangkinay as his name.
The lower court granted the petition. City Fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
City Fiscal contented that this Christian name (ROLANDO DEANGKINAY) did not
appear in the title of the petition. The failure in the heading of the petition to include
petitioner's Christian or the name which he is actually known is fundamental and such
failure is non-compliance with the strict requirements of publication, hence, fatally
defective and the court has no JURISDICTION to hear the case.
Issue:
Whether or not failure in the heading of the petition to include petitioner's Christian or
the name which he is actually known is non-compliance with the strict requirements of
publication.
Held:
To the facts at hand. Records show that Rolando Deangkinay, the name sought to be
adopted, neither appears in the title of the petition nor in the title or caption of the
notices published in the newspapers. Having failed to comply with this requirement,
the lower court acquired no jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition.
We have stressed that petitions for change of name being proceedings in rem, strict
compliance with the requirements of publication is essential, for it is by such means
that the court acquires jurisdiction.
In Ma Chik Kin v. Republic, We held that failure to include the true name of the party
whose name is sought to be changed, in the title of the petition and of the notices
published in connection therewith, precludes the court from obtaining jurisdiction to
entertain the same. We now hold that failure to include the name sought to be
adopted in the title of the petition, and consequently in the notices published in the
newspapers, is a substantial jurisdictional infirmity. For, as We explained in Yu v.
Republic:
"To be sure, there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to
objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not
because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the
existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed in the public mind."
4. SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC (2007)
G.R. No. 174689 | 2007-10-22
Subject:
Petition for a change of name and sex; Sex reassignment surgery; Administrative
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry (Clerical or Typographical Error); Sexual Status
Determined At Birth; Statutory Construction (Words In A Statute Understood In Their
Ordinary and Well Known Meaning); Equity; Judicial Legislation
Facts:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex
in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila.
He alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks
and acts as a female." His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" included
undergoing psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. In 2001, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
Being engaged to be married to his American fiance, petitioner sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that the petition was filed,
not for an unlawful motive, but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex
The Republic, thru the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which set aside
the trial court decision. The CA ruled that there is no law allowing the change of either
name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through
surgery.
Petitioner claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and
Republic Act No. 9048.
Held:
Note: Article 376 (change of name or surname) and Article 412 (change or correction
of entry in the civil register) of the Civil Code has been amended by RA 9048 (Clerical
Error Law).
Note: With the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 10172, errors involving the
day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person can be subject to
administrative correction.
Petition for Change of Name
1. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without
a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
Administrative Nature of Proceedings for Change of First Name
2. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, jurisdiction over applications for change of
first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage
of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
3. Hence, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's
first name was not within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have
been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It
was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048.
4. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
Grounds for Petition for Change of Name
5. Section 4 of RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name or
nickname may be allowed:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion.
6. Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one's legal
capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment.
7. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this
case, petitioner failed to show any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.
Administrative Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry (Clerical or Typographical Error)
8. RA 9048 provides that the correction or change of entries in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from
the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Change of Entry on Sex is Not a Clerical or Typographical Error
9. Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines a clerical or typographical error as “a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.”
10. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
11. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from"
while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained
no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex,
were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Sexual Status is Determined at Birth
12. Under the Civil Register Law (Act 3753), a birth certificate is a historical record of
the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error, is immutable.
Statutory Construction (words in a statute understood in their ordinary and well-known
meaning)
13. When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. Thus, the words "male"
and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone
sex reassignment.
14. Furthermore, words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-
known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context
compels to the contrary. Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term
"sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a
post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Cannot Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity
15. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. First, marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It
will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment
(a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which
apply particularly to women. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if the petition were to be granted.
Judicial Legislation
16. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed
solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
17. Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "no judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is
not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to
apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it is
for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment.
5. REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN (2008)
G.R. No. 166676 | 2008-09-12
Subject: Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in
the civil register; the diversity of nature and how an individual deals with what nature
has handed out warrant the change of sex and name; A change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion
Facts:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before
the RTC. She alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary
male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her
gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer
to Jeff.
Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, UP- PGH issued a medical
certificate stating that Cagandahan’s condition is known as CAH. He explained that
genetically Cagandahan is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs – female and
male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that Cagandahan’s uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period.
He further testified that Cagandahan’s condition is permanent and recommended the
change of gender.
The RTC granted Cagandahan’s petition. Thus, the OSG seeks reversal of the said
ruling.
The OSG contended that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance
with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section
3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, Cagandahan’s petition before the court a quo did
not implead the local civil registrar. It also argued that Cagandahan’s petition failed
to state that Cagandahan is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition
was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under
Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Lastly, it contended that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and Cagandahan’s claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.
Held:
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register
1. Art. 412 and Article 376 of the Civil Code were amended by Republic Act No. 9048
in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, R.A. No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.
2. There is substantial compliance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court when
Cagandahan furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
3. Under R.A. No. 9048 , a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
4. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code. The
acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth.
The diversity of nature and how an individual deals with what nature has handed out
warrant the change of sex and name
5. Cagandahan undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
“inappropriate” appearance of male characteristics. A person, like Cagandahan, with
this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. CAH is one of many
conditions that involve intersex anatomy.
6. Ultimately, where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual having reached the
age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Cagandahan here thinks of
himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification
at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like Cagandahan,
is fixed.
7. Cagandahan here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural
steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already
ordered his life to that of a male. Cagandahan could have undergone treatment and
taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold
of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due
course in Cagandahan’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
8. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on Cagandahan
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider Cagandahan as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female.
A change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion
9. As for Cagandahan’s change of name under Rule 103, it has held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of
Cagandahan’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine
name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that Cagandahan’s
change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, there is a merit in
Cagandahan’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
6. REPUBLIC VS. KHO (2007)
G.R. No. 170340 | 2007-06-29
Subject: Substantial changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding;
The publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to
implead an indispensable party
Facts:
Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of
Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City
to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in
behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in
their birth certificates
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the
citizenship of his mother to “Filipino” instead of “Chinese,” as well as the deletion of the
word “married” opposite the phrase “Date of marriage of parents” because his
parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco, were allegedly not legally married. The same
request to delete the “married” status of their parents from their respective birth
certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the date of
his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the
date appearing in their marriage certificate.
Carlito et al. also prayed that his second name of “John” be deleted from his record
of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage
certificate be corrected from “John Kho” to “Juan Kho” and “Filipino” to “Chinese,”
respectively.
The city civil registrar stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed
corrections in the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no objections
to the other amendments.
The trial court granted the petition. The CA denied Republic of the Philippine’s appeal
and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which outlines the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry, was observed in the case.
Held:
Substantial changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding
1. For the change involving the nationality of Carlito’s mother as reflected in his birth
certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the
citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring. Further, the
deletion of the entry that Carlito’s and his siblings’ parents were “married” alters their
filiation from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” with significant implications on their
successional and other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an
adversary proceeding.
2. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who
may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other
mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far
reaching. (See Labayo-Rowe v. Republic)
3. Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108 (See Republic v. Valencia).
4. The obvious effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative
correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in
entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in
the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings. (See Republic v. Benemerito).
5. When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the
entries of the civil register is satisfied.
The publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to
implead an indispensable party
6. The publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure
to implead an indispensable party. The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to
bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section
3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. Verily, a petition for correction is an action in
rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition
binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that
the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication
of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court
with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. (See Barco v. Court of Appeals)
7. In this case, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or Kho’s parents
should have been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. Also, during the hearing,
the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any
objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the
proceeding. Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of
the proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth certificates, especially
since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence
she shared with Carlito and the children.
8. With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate of
marriage shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not on April 27,
1989. Since the minors were illegitimate at birth, the correction would bring about no
change at all in the nature of their filiation.
9. The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito’s and his siblings’
birth certificates of the entry “Married” opposite the date of marriage of their parents,
moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph
(Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had
been living together as common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted
marriage legally.
10. A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to the
Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of marriage between Juan Kho
andEpifania. Under the circumstances, the deletion of the word “Married” opposite
the “date of marriage of parents” is warranted.
11. With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name from “Carlito
John” to “Carlito,” the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls under letter
“o” of Section 2 of Rule 108. Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103
(which governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of
the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
12. Carlito’s official transcript of record from the Urious College in Butuan City,
certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, and voter registration record
satisfactorily show that he has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus
likely to arise from the dropping of the second name.
13. The correction of the mother’s citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in
Carlito’s birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross
examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to question her
citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction prayed for, does not in any way
change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.
14. The birth certificates of Carlito’s siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania
as “Filipino.” To disallow the correction in Carlito’s birth record of his mother’s citizenship
would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings who are
unquestionably born of the same mother and father.
15. Outside the ambit of substantial corrections is the correction of the name of
Carlito’s wife from “Maribel” to “Marivel.” The mistake is clearly clerical or
typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the
understanding considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of
Carlito and his wife is “Marivel.”
7. BRAZA VS. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY (2009)
G.R. No. 181174 | 2009-12-04
Subject: In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation; Substantial
or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed; Validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party
Facts:
Ma. Cristina Torres and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. were married and they bore Paolo Josef
and Janelle Ann and Gian Carlo.
Pablo died. Lucille Titular began introducing her minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza as her
and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina obtained Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. She then filed a petition to correct
the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. Contending that
Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille
and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting
marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, she prayed for (1) the correction of the
entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father
and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon,
Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit
Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of
nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose,
the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
The trial court dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special
proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court
under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of
Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected
to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial
action. Thus, they filed the present petition for review.
Held:
In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation
1. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis
Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry
may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally
be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings,
in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed
2. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an
error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless
change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of
the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed
only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.
Validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party
3. Ma. Christina and her children’s cause of action is actually to seek the declaration
of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s
legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code,
respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided
in said Code.
4. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
8. EMPERATRIZ LABAYO-ROWE VS. REPUBLIC
250 Phil. 300
Facts:
Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the
birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the Civil
Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her name appearing in
the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz;
and her civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as
“married” on “1953 Bulan” are erroneous because she was not married to Vicente
Miclat who was the one who furnished the data in said birth certificate.
Finding merit in the petition, the presiding judge issued an order dated January 25, 1971
direcating the local civil registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries
and to change the name of the mother appearing as Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz
Labayo. The court also directed the civil registrar to correct the name of the mother
appearing as Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status
from "married" to "single" and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No
marriage."
In its appeal, the Republic questions the propriety of the lower court's order to correct
the civil status and the date and place of marriage of the petitioner below as
appearing in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat.
Issue:
Whether or not correction of entries in the civil registry involving the correct spelling of
the surname as well as the civil status of the mother at the time of the birth of her child
may be made under a summary procedure thus making the order of the CFI proper?
Held: No.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that "(n)o entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without judicial order." It has been held that the corrections
contemplated in Article 412 include only corrections of mistakes that are clerical in
nature. In Go vs. Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Malabon, this Court ruled that the
clerical errors which might be corrected through judicial sanction under the said article
should be those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of names
clearly misspelled, occupation of parents, errors that are visible to the eye or obvious
to the understanding, errors made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying or
writing.
If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to
the eye or obvious to the understanding,[14] the court may, under a summary
procedure, issue an order for the correction of the mistake.[15] However, as repeatedly
construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as
well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings[16] depending upon the nature of the issues
involved.[17] This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure
contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature which does not cover cases involving
controversial issues.[18]
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in
character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature
of the issues in controversy,[19] and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations
of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.[20]
The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books making up the
civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie evidence of the
facts therein contained.[21] If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the
door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might
be detrimental and far reaching.[22]For these reasons, the law has placed the
necessary safeguards to forestall such an eventuality so that even on matters which
call for a correction of clerical mistakes, the intervention of the courts was found
necessary.
As earlier noted, the petition for correction of entries in the civil registry which is now
before Us on appeal by the Republic does not only involve the correction of petitioner
Labayo's name and surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" in the birth
certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her status from
"married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing the
status of her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." The change of
petitioner's name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere
innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate. The Republic,
however, is appealing the part of the questioned order which directed as well the
change of the petitioner's status from "married" to "not married" and Victoria Miclat's
filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate."
In David vs. Republic,[23] this Court held that where the petition for correction of entries
in the civil registry, if granted, will have the effect of changing not only the civil status
of the petitioner but as well as her child's filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," the
same cannot be granted except in an adversary proceeding. The matter should be
threshed out in an appropriate action as the corrections involve substantial alterations,
and not mere clerical errors.[24] An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the
indispensable parties should be made parties to the case as required under Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the
only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is
required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the
Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made
respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as
well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would
be adversely affected thereby.[25] All other persons who may be affected by the
change should be notified or represented.[26] The truth is best ascertained under an
adversary system of justice.[27]
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired
if her status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would
be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an
illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of
the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof
was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule
108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution,[28] which directs that such rules "shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights."
If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections
of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the
proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an
unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive
rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.
9. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANTOR
GR No. 184621; December 10 2013
Facts:
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about
by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry
would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the
respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the
respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard
anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance,
the respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of
presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had
a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired
from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors
and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a
point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these
earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition
in court.

Issue:
W/N the petition for the declaration of presumptive death should be granted
Held:
NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code
which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that
the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death
can be granted.
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged
"earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’
directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred
from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’
directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search
for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for
him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her
husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of
the authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the
nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions,
we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing,
to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the
police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends,
who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she
allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present
spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s
whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries
were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim
that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving
that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from
her friends and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the
view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on
uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct
a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded
belief that her husband was already dead.
10. DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, VS. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN
G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014,
Facts:
Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against
Joy, her former common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011, he
visited Joy’s condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived at his office, he
noticed his digital camera missing.
On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered
from the digital camera showing him and another woman. He denied the video and
demanded the return of the camera, but she refused. The had an altercation where
Neri allegedly slammed
Joy’s head against a wall and then walked away.
Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of
Republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the said
video. The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of
the other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ
of habeas data.
After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ and
directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital camera, as well as
the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days from receipt.
In her return, Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera and
reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the cases she filed against Neri.
Neri’s petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the
evidence in the cases she filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering,
collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Neri.
The RTC granted Neri’s petition and ordered the turn-over of the video to Neri and
enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It disregarded Joy’s defense that she is not
engaged in the collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of
reproducing the same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated Neri’s right
to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of the video
and not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
W/N the filing of the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data was proper
Held:
NO. A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule),
was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances.
It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as “the right
to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands
as
“a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ,
Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently
alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other.
Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence
showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not
issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked
in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful. In this case, the Court finds
that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or
security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video.
While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears
would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or
contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on
the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy
right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so
much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition
dismissible, as in this case. In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations,
the petition would equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence
presented.
As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-
serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate
that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating
Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even
lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in
order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin
Ilagan’s reputation.
Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she
reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the
criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the
insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence,
the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data
petition.
11. GAMBOA VS CHAN
G.R. No. 193636, 07-24-2012
Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zeñarosa
Commission which was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups in
the country in view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future.
Upon conclusion of its investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to
the office of the President. Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police Ilocos Norte conducted
surveillance operation against her and her aides and classified her as PAG coddler.
Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded in the Report’s
enumeration of individual maintaining PAGs.
Gamboa’s association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of
media, publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was
violated, Gamboa filed a petition before the RTC for the issuance of writ of habeas
data to destroy the unverified reports from the PNP data base and restrain PNP from
forwarding baseless reports against her. The RTC ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in
the report violates her right to privacy. However, the RTC dismissed Gamboa’s petition
for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish the source of the
information.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the forwarding of information or intelligence report by the PNP to the
Commission was an unlawful act that violated petitioner’s right to privacy
2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper
Held:
Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the
Commission is NOT an intrusion of petitioner’s right to privacy.
It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim which is to investigate
the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions
accorded to the Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on
individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their
activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa. This court holds that
Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the report listing
her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP contrary to the ruling of the trial court,
however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Commission was not unlawful
act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP
was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the
body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these
notorious group. Moreover, the Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize
the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to
request assistance from the latter. Thus, the Petition for writ of habeas data is NOT
PROPER.
12. PEDRO S. AGCAOILI VS REPRESENTATIVE RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS
GR No. 232395, Jul 03, 2018
Facts:
On March 14, 2017, House Resolution No. 882 was introduced by respondents Rodolfo
Fariñas, et. al., directing the Committee on Good Government and Public
Accountability (House Committee) to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation,
pertaining to the use by the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte of its shares from
the excise taxes on locally manufactured virginia-type cigarettes for a purpose other
than that provided for by R.A. No. 7171. The Resolution stated that the following
purchases by the provincial government of vehicles in three separate transactions from
the years 2011 to 2012 in the aggregate amount of P66,450,000.00 were in violation of
R.A. No. 7171 as well as of R.A. No. 9184 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445.
Petitioners allege that at the hearing of May 29, 2017, they were subjected to threats
and intimidation. According to petitioners, they were asked "leading and misleading
questions" and that regardless of their answers, the same were similarly treated as
evasive. Once they cannot recall or failed to answer, they were cited in contempt and
ordered detained.
The next day, or on May 30, 2017, petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondent House Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General Detabali (Detabali) before
the CA.
On June 2, 2017, the CA in its Resolution issued a writ of Habeas Corpus ordering
Detabali to produce the bodies of the petitioners before the court. A motion to dissolve
the writ of Habeas Corpus was also filed on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction
over the petition.
On July 13, 2017 and while the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before the CA,
petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos filed the instant Omnibus Petition.
During the congressional hearing on July 25, 2017 and while the present Omnibus
Petition is pending final resolution by the Court, respondent House Committee lifted the
contempt order and ordered the release of petitioners. Consequently, petitioners were
released on the same date.

On August 31, 2017, the CA issued a Resolution in the Habeas Corpus Petition
considering the case as closed and terminated on the ground of mootness.
Petitioners insist that the Habeas Corpus Petition then pending before the CA can be
transferred to the Court on the strength of the latter's power to promulgate rules
concerning the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts and its authority to
exercise jurisdiction over all courts as provided under Sections 1 and 5(5), Article VIII of
the Constitution
In any case, respondents argue that petitioners cannot compel the Court to assume
jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition pending before the CA as assumption of
jurisdiction is conferred by law.
Petitioners contend that their rights to liberty and personal security were violated as
they have been detained, while co-petitioner Marcos is continuously being threatened
of arrest.
In opposition, respondents maintain that the writ of Amparo and writ of Habeas
Corpus are two separate remedies which are incompatible and therefore cannot co-
exist in a single petition. Further, respondents argue that the issuance of a writ
of Amparo is limited only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
which are not extant in the instant case.
Issues:
(a) W/N the instant Omnibus Petition which seeks the release of petitioners from
detention was rendered moot by their subsequent release from detention
(b) W/N the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction over the Habeas
Corpus Petition then pending before the CA
(c) W/N the instant Omnibus Petition sufficiently states a cause of action for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo
Held:
(a) The release of persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
was filed renders the petition for the issuance thereof moot and academic.
The writ of Habeas Corpus or the "great writ of liberty" was devised as a "speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom." The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."
In Pestaño v. Corvista,[68] it was pronounced that where the subject person had
already been released from the custody complained of, the petition for habeas
corpus then still pending was considered already moot and academic and should be
dismissed. This pronouncement was carried on in Olaguer v. Military Commission No.
34, where the Court reiterated that the release of the persons in whose behalf the
application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the petition for the
issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic.[70] Thus, with the subsequent
release of all the petitioners from detention, their petition for habeas corpushas been
rendered moot. The rule is that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial
rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved and thus, will
not determine a moot question as the resolution thereof will be of no practical value.
Far compelling than the question of mootness is that the element of illegal deprivation
of freedom of movement or illegal restraint is jurisdictional in petitions for habeas
corpus. Consequently, in the absence of confinement and custody, the courts lack the
power to act on the petition for habeas corpus and the issuance of a writ thereof must
be refused.
(b) The Supreme Court's administrative supervision over lower courts does not equate
to the power to usurp jurisdiction already acquired by lower courts
The Supreme Court, the CA and the RTC enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over petitions
for habeas corpus. As the Habeas Corpus Petition was filed by petitioners with the CA,
the latter has acquired jurisdiction over said petition to the exclusion of all others,
including this Court. This must be so considering the basic postulate that jurisdiction
once acquired by a court is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until
the case is terminated. A departure from this established rule is to run the risk of having
conflicting decisions from courts of concurrent jurisdiction and would unwittingly
promote judicial interference and instability.
Rule 102 in fact supports this interpretation. Observe that under Section 6, Rule 102, the
return of the writ of Habeas Corpus may be heard by a court apart from that which
issued the writ.] In such case, the lower court to which the writ is made returnable by
the issuing court shall proceed to decide the petition for habeas corpus. In Medina v.
Gen. Yan and Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc., the Court held that by virtue of such
designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the
merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]" Indeed, when a court acquires jurisdiction
over the petition for habeas corpus, even if merely designated to hear the return of
the writ, such court has the power and the authority to carry the petition to its
conclusion.
Petitioners are without unbridled freedom to choose which between this Court and the
CA should decide the habeas corpus petition. Mere concurrency of jurisdiction does
not afford the parties absolute freedom to choose the court to which the petition shall
be filed. After all, the hierarchy of courts "also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs."
Further, there appears to be no basis either in fact or in law for the Court to assume or
wrest jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition filed with the CA.
(c) The filing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo before this Court while
the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA was still pending is improper
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to
separately and directly intervene through the writ of Amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz,
et al. v. Hon. Judge Del Rosario, et al., thus:
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with
the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment,
we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of
Amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life,
liberty or security — the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect
— is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance
of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or
on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the
writ with a separately filed criminal case.(Italics in the original)
Thus, while there is no procedural and legal obstacle to the joining of a petition
for habeas corpus and a petition for Amparo, the peculiarity of the then pendency of
the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA renders the direct resort to this Court for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo inappropriate.
In Lozada, Jr., et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., the Court reiterates that
the privilege of the writ of Amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of
whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee
or a private individual.
Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily admit that the instant Omnibus
Petition does not cover extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats
thereof. Thus, on this ground alone, their petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo is
dismissible.
Despite this, petitioners insist that their rights to liberty and security were violated
because of their unlawful detention. On the other hand, co-petitioner Marcos seeks
the protective writ of Amparo on the ground that her right to liberty and security are
being threatened by the conduct of the legislative inquiry on House Resolution No.
882. But even these claims of actual and threatened violations of the right to liberty
and security fail to impress.
Even more telling is the rule that the writ of Amparo cannot be issued in cases where
the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing.
In this case, the alleged unlawful restraint on petitioners' liberty has effectively ceased
upon their subsequent release from detention. On the other hand, the apprehension
of co-petitioner Marcos that she will be detained is, at best, merely speculative. In
other words, co-petitioner Marcos has failed to show any clear threat to her right to
liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
Here, it appears that petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos even attended and
participated in the subsequent hearings on House Resolution No. 882 without any
untoward incident. Petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos thus failed to establish that
their attendance at and participation in the legislative inquiry as resource persons
have seriously violated their right to liberty and security, for which no other legal
recourse or remedy is available. Perforce, the petition for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo must be dismissed.
13. FRANCIS SAEZ VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 183533; 09-25-2012
Facts:
On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary
protection order, inspection of place and production of documents. In the petition,
he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed. He likewise prayed for the military
to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for
his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government records
connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). During the hearings,
the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always
being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel"
pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner’s store.
Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, "Joel" approached and informed
him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel"
inquired if the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA
justices during the hearing if the petitioner had gone home to Calapan after having
filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt.
Osio who was always at the pier. The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to present
sufficient evidence to substantiate his petition for habeas data and writ of amparo.
The CA likewise dropped as respondent, for Pres. GMA on the ground of her immunity
from suit. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not resort to petition for writs of amparo and habeas data was proper
Held:
The Supreme Court still finds that the CA did not commit a reversible error in declaring
that no substantial evidence exist to compel the grant of the reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner. The Court took a second look on the evidence on record and finds no
reason to reconsider the denial of the issuance of the writs prayed for.
In the hearing before the CA, it was claimed that "Joel" once inquired from the
petitioner if the latter was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such claim cannot
establish with certainty that the petitioner was being monitored.
The petitioner and the respondents have conflicting claims about what transpired
thereafter. The petitioner insisted that he was brought against his will and was asked to
stay by the respondents in places under the latter's control. The respondents, on the
other hand, averred that it was the petitioner who voluntarily offered his service to be
a military asset, but was rejected as the former still doubted his motives and affiliations.
Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that
questions of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the Court is not bound by the factual findings
made by the appellate court which rendered the judgment in a petition for the
issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Be that as it may, in the instant case,
the Court agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof
imposed upon him by the rules to establish his claims.
It cannot be overemphasized that Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ
of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly include in their coverage even threatened
violations against a person's right to life, liberty or security. Further, threat and
intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity
- nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from
threat".
It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must find rational basis on the
surrounding circumstances of the case. In this case, the petition was mainly anchored
on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of his inclusion in
the military's order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on him,
and the intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While as
stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs
of amparo and habeas data, in the petitioner's case, the restraints and threats
allegedly made allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent
and credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous grounds.
Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner's mobility was never curtailed.
From the time he was allegedly brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time he
sought the assistance of KARAPATANST, there was no restraint upon the petitioner to
go home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro on several instances. And while he may
have been wary of Pvt. Osio's presence at the pier, there was no claim by the petitioner
that he was threatened or prevented by Pvt. Osio from boarding any vehicle that may
transport him back home. The petitioner also admitted that he had a mobile phone;
hence, he had unhampered access to communication and can readily seek
assistance from non-governmental organizations and even government agencies.
The petitioner also harps on the alleged "monitoring" activities being conducted by a
certain "Joel", e.g., the latter's alleged act of following him, pretending to
peddle pandesal and asking him about his personal circumstances. Such allegation
by the petitioner, however, is, at best, a conclusion on his part, a mere impression that
the petitioner had, based on his personal assessment of the circumstances. The
petitioner even admitted in his testimony before the CA that when he had a
conversation with "Joel" sometime in July 2007, the latter merely asked him whether he
was still connected with ANAKPAWIS, but he was not threatened "with anything"
and no other incident occurred between them since then. There is clearly nothing on
record which shows that "Joel" committed overt acts that will unequivocally lead to
the conclusion arrived at by the petitioner, especially since the alleged acts
committed by "Joel" are susceptible of different interpretations.
Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his
claims, the reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded
to amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a claimant is dispensed with
the onus of proving his case. "Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence
demands some adequate evidence."
14. LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO VS. COMMISSIONER JAIME H. MORENTE
G.R. No. 230324 | 2017-09-19
Facts:
Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) is a holder of Philippine Passport. Parker was charged for
deportation for being an undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien, in
violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. It was alleged that Danielle
Nopuente was a fugitive from justice in the United States of America with an
outstanding arrest warrant issued against her. Subsequently, a Summary Deportation
Order (SDO) was issued against Danielle Nopuente, also known as Isabelita
Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker, upon verification that she arrived in the Philippines
under the Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of a period of one year. Parker
was not in the list of approved applications of the DFA for dual citizenship and her
American Passport had been revoked by the United States Department of State. Thus,
she was considered an undocumented, undesirable, and overstaying alien, in violation
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
Pursuant to the SDO issued by the Bureau of Immigration, Parker was arrested in
Tagaytay City on the premise that Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker are one
and the same person. She was then taken to the Immigration Detention Facility in
Bicutan, Taguig City. She is still currently detained in the Immigration Detention Facility
as the deportation was not carried out due to the fact that Parker is charged with
falsification and use of falsified documents before Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao
City.
Parker filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before RTC of Pasig City. The Bureau of
Immigration was able to produce the body of Parker before the RTC. The Bureau of
Immigration then alleged that as the SDO had become final and executory, it served
as the legal authority to detain Parker. The Bureau of Immigration also argued that
Parker cannot be released or deported without the final disposition of her pending
criminal case in Davao City.
The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that the detention of Parker was legal. Parker
then appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the RTC and
found that Parker failed to prove that she was a Filipino citizen to warrant judicial
intervention through habeas corpus.
On 23 March 2017, Callo filed this petition for a writ of amparo with prayer to issue
Interim Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention. Callo
argues that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus, there is no reason for her
to be detained by the Bureau of Immigration.
Issue:
Whether or not Parker is entitled to the writ of amparo?
Held:
No. The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to
violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more
specifically, to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.
On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined by the Court as the
arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the
State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
Further, elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA No. 9851
were clearly laid down by this Court:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or apolitical organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.
It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case.
There is also no threat of such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a
detention carried out by the State through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and
fourth elements are not present. There is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
freedom or refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo
admits, Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of
Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration also does not deny this. In fact, the Bureau of
Immigration had produce the body of Parker before the RTC in the proceedings for
the writ of habeas corpus previously initiated by Parker herself. There is no intention to
remove Parker from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. As the
Bureau of Immigration explained, Parker has a pending criminal case against her in
Davao City, which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting her from the
country.
15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CAYANAN AND PASCUA
GR No. 181796; July 11, 2017

Facts:
On July 9, 2007, Pablo Cayanan, a used car dealer, and Ronaldo F. Perez, a fixer, were
forcibly taken by a group of armed men led by SPO2 Rolando Pascua. Perez was later
released but Cayanan has not been seen nor heard from since then.
A petition for habeas corpus was filed in behalf of Cayanan but later converted to
amparo proceedings. Perez executed a sworn affidavit describing the abduction but
later recanted his statement. SPO2 Pascua submitted a counter-affidavit in which he
denied the allegations and claimed that he was also abducted in the same incident
by unknown men.
The RTC issued the writ of amparo, ordering the CIDG Director to conduct further
investigations and for SPO2 Pascua to appear before the proper forum. The CIDG
however appeals the RTC’s judgment, arguing that the applicant for the writ failed to
prove by substantial evidence the involvement of CIDG in the disappearance of
Cayanan because Perez recanted his affidavit; that the CIDG is only required to
exercise ordinary diligence and that it has already discharged its duty under the Rules
when it submitted its return with certifications that CIDG was not detaining Cayanan.
Lastly, the CIDG contends that the issuance of the writ violated Pascua’s right to
presumption of innocence.
Issues:
1. Whether there is substantial evidence to justify the issuance of the writ;
2. Whether only ordinary diligence is required from the CIDG;
3. Whether the CIDG complied with the requirements of the Rules on the
submission of return.
4. Whether the issuance of the writ violated Pascua’s right to be presumed
innocent
Held:
1. Yes, substantial evidence existed.
In amparo petitions, the Court allows for flexibility in considering the evidence
presented, including hearsay evidence which may be admitted as the circumstances
of the case may require for the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty, and
security.
The recantation has no evidentiary value for being general and bereft of details of
what really happened if the abduction did not occur. Other witnesses also identified
Pascua as the person leading the abductors.
2. No, extraordinary diligence is required from the CIDG. The State and its agencies,
not just public officials and employees, are covered by the Rule and may be
impleaded.
3. No, the CIDG did not comply with Section 9 on the required contents of the return
of the Rule.
“In its return, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by its operating
divisions to the effect that Pablo was not being detained by any of them. Said
certifications were severely inadequate. It is almost needless to characterize the
certifications as non-compliant with the requirement for a detailed return. As such, the
certifications amounted to a general denial on the part of the CIDG. The quoted rule
requires the verified written return of the CIDG to be accompanied by supporting
affidavits. Such affidavits, which could be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG and
other agencies like the NBI and probably the Land Transportation Office (L TO) to
collaborate in the investigation of the abduction of Pablo, would have specified and
described the efforts expended in the search for Pablo, if such search was really
conducted, and would have reported the progress of the investigation of the definite
leads given in the Perez’s sinumpaang salaysay on the abduction itself.
The allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo among its various
operating divisions similarly constituted a general denial because the CIDG did not
thereby indicate who had conducted the search, and how thoroughly the allegedly
continuous searches had been conducted. The CIDG pointed out in its return that the
CIDG had undertaken an administrative investigation against Pascua, and submitted
in that regard the certification on the pre-charge evaluation and investigation of
Pascua. The CIDG asserts that its investigation of the disappearance of Pablo was
conducted in tandem with that of the NBI; that it had also formed its own investigating
team to conduct a “thorough investigation” of the abduction of Pablo; and that it had
meanwhile verified the vehicle used in the abduction from the LT0. Under the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the investigations
conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable the RTC to
judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo’s whereabouts had
been sincere and adequate. The return by the CIDG was non-compliant in that regard.
To be noted at this juncture is that the CIDG should have exerted greater effort at
complying with both the letter and spirit of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in light of
Perez’s sinumpaang salaysay having fully placed the responsibility for the abduction
and disappearance of Pablo right at the very doorsteps of the CIDG in Camp Crame.
It is disheartening for us to see the CIDG’s investigation having been limited to Pascua
despite the circumstances justifying a broader inquiry. There was also no affirmative
showing of any investigation of the area of the abduction itself despite Regina having
presented witnesses from the area. Indeed, the CIDG did not seem to have itself
investigated Perez on the abduction.”
4. No, presumption of innocence of the respondent is not an issue in amparo
proceedings
“The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar to
those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the respondents
is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor
to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats
to life, liberty or security.”
16. TAPUZ VS DEL ROSARIO
GR No 182484; 17 June 2008
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari against the issuance of the writ of amparo and habeas
data filed by Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, et al.(Petitioners), against the presiding judge
(Respondent, “R “for short) who issued said writs (Judge Elmo Del Rosario, RTC of Kalibo,
Br. 5).
Private Respondents Sps. Sanson (Gregorio and Ma. Lourdes) filed with the MCTC of
Aklan a complaint for forcible entry with damages with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of prelim mandatory injunction against petitioners. Said court, rendered judgment
in favor of Private Respondents. Petitioners, appealed said judgment to RTC.
The case was appealed with RTC Br. 6 of Kalibo. On appeal, Private Respondents filed
a motion for the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. After
complying with all the requirements for the issuance of said writ, Respondent issued the
same. Petitioner moved to reconsider the issuance of said writ, while the Private
Respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition which petitioner also
opposed. Respondent denied the opposition against the motion for demolition and
the same issued a writ of demolition.
Petitioners thereafter filed with the CA a petition for review of the Permanent
Mandatory Injunction and the Order of Demolition. After that, Petitioners also filed
herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with prayers for the issuance of the writs of
habeas data and amparo.
Petitioners to support the issuance of said writs alleged factual positions contrary and
opposed to the MCTCs findings and legal reasons. (Note: Contrary to MCTCs findings,
actually, said court found the factual situation in the contrary to Petitioners’s
contention. Petitioners contends that they had prior possession of the subject real
property; and Private Respondents intrude and took away their possession of the same
by force and violence).
Issue:
Whether Petitioners have a basis for the issuance of the prayed writs to his favor?
Held:
The petitions herein for the issuance of the writs of habeas data and amparo are fatally
defective both as to its substance and form.
WRIT OF AMPARO
Such writ, as held by the Court in this case: “ the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective
remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations
of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds.”
The alleged acts of violence made by PR against P were disproved at the proceedings
with the MCTC – through a full-blown trial.
Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the
petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-
related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress
and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more
in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of amparo.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material
allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the
right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right
to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated,
any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has
already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of
the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has
not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is
nothing more than the fishing expedition that this Court – in the course of drafting the
Rule on habeas data – had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas
data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data is fully in order.
17. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ
GR NO. 191805; November 15, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan
(Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under
the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.
Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he
refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for
the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection
Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties.
The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the
CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case
during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
Issues:
1. Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of
presidential immunity from suit
2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and
habeas data cases.
3. Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held
responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
4. Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former
President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction.
Held:
1. No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil
or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only
go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced
disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy
immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts
should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when
it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that
presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (The
term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right,
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself
from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context
of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez.
2. Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to
the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict." Although originally used for
ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also
found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. This development in
the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the
application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not
criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise
find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to
determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address
the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures
to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of
command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in
order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively
implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the
amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors
it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such
identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation
by the appropriate government agency.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the
doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain
responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
3. Yes.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as
superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine.
4. No. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis
of the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No.
191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should have known
that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on
members of the NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting
these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military
men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy
allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we
do not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each
and every count of forcible disappearance. Aside from Rodriguez’s general
averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility
or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to
show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty
or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.
18. VIVARES VS. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
G.R. No. 202666; September 29, 2014
Facts:
Julia and Julienne , both minors, were, during the period material, graduating high
school students at STC. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits
for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several
others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile. Escudero, a
computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that
some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up,
dressed only in brassieres. Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through
one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol),
STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an
investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a
manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in
question, reported, as required, to the office Sr. Purisima, STC’s high school principal
and. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and informed their
parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012. A week before graduation,
or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for
Injunction and Damages before the RTC and command the respondent not to
implement the said sanction which the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion
for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement
exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained
unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Data, Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the
writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file
their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5)
working days from service of the writ. In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s
directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the following grounds for
the denial of the petition. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
habeas data. Hence the petition.
Issues: own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to
viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that
1.) Whether a writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu? it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either
2.) Whether the Respondents violated the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large. Considering that the default
of the minors involved in this case. setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’
Held: children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they
cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. That the
1.) NO, The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission contention. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The provision, when taken in its friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless
proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former.
protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook
individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.”
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data. To
“engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavor. To
“engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that
the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or
entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of
regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal
Endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will
not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity. To agree with the argument
of the petitioners, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small
group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage,
and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an instrument designed
to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the
information and communications technology––a right which a great majority of the
users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.

2.) No, the respondents failed to established that the uploading or showing the photos
to Tigol constitute a violation of their privacy. the showing of the said photo to Tigol
disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them.
Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only
to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other
students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their