G.R. No. 91486.
January 19, 2001 Partial Decision was not published in a newspaper or periodical of general
ALBERTO G. PINLAC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petition: Petition for Certiorari.
The instant case springs from a contentious and protracted dispute
over a sizeable piece of real property situated in what is now known as
Old Balara, Sitio Veterans, Barrio Payatas and Silangan, all of Quezon
City. There are numerous claimants, titled and untitled alike, each
either pressing to own a piece of it, or striving to protect ones right as a
titled owner.
Facts:
Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their dependents and successors-
in-interest. They filed a class suit primarily for Quieting of Title before the RTC
of Quezon City, claiming that they have acquired the forest land with 502
hectares through prescription and that they have filed applications for land
titling in their respective names with the appropriate government agency.
While petitioners claim that the land in dispute was part of the public domain,
they named as respondents several persons and corporations who are titled
owners of subdivided parcels of land within the subject property. One of those
so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision
(hereinafter, Vil-Ma). Since personal service of summons could not be effected
on Vil-Ma and some of the other named respondents, petitioners moved for
leave of court to serve summons by publication which was granted. Accordingly,
the summons was published in the Metropolitan Newsweek, a periodical edited
and published in the City of Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan.
Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings,
while the others, including Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and were thus declared in
default. Consequently, petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte
against the defaulted respondents. The court rendered a Partial Decision in
favor of petitioners. Court declared petitioners as absolute owners of the
aforesaid lots by virtue of extra-ordinary prescription, with the exception of the
lands covered by the respective transfer certificate of title belonging to the non-
defaulted respondents.
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus was brought before the Court of Appeals by the titled owners of the
subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. They assailed the default judgment was null and
void on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, for the reasons
that they were never made parties, nor were their lots described in the
complaint, published summons, and Partial Decision. Named defendant was
VIL-MA, a totally separate and independent entity which had already ceased to
exist way back in January of 1976. Moreover, the summons, as well as the
circulation. Thus, the defective service of summons to said defendant did not
place the individual lot owners under the trial court’s jurisdiction, nor are they
bound by the adverse judgment.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition and annulling
the Partial Decision in Civil Case based on its finding that the trial courts lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of respondents.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition
for certiorari.
Issue: whether or not RTC has acquired jurisdiction over respondent Vil-ma
Maloles subdivision by the publication of the summons and so the partial
decision was legal, valid and proper.
Ruling: We find no merit in the instant petition.
We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the Partial Decision is null
and void insofar as private respondents are concerned since the latter were not
duly served summons or notified of the proceedings against them. The
summons and the Partial Decision were published in a local newspaper edited
and published in Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan. However, the Court of
Appeals found the publication in said newspaper, namely the Metropolitan
Newsweek, to be invalid because the said periodical is not considered a
newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City where the subject property is
located, as required by Presidential Decree No. 1079, Section 1.
Petitioners, however, contend that the service of summons by publication was
legal and in accordance with the requirements of Rule 14, Section 14 of the
Rules of Court. The service by publication was done pursuant to the orders of
the trial court.
While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the
approval of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal defect that the Metropolitan
Newsweek is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City. The Rules
strictly require that publication must be in a newspaper of general circulation
and in such places and for such time as the court may order. The court orders
relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time that
the summons was to be published. In the absence of such specification,
publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements of the
rules. The incomplete directive of the court a quo coupled with the defective
publication of the summons rendered the service by publication ineffective. The
modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to strictly comply
with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication is a
fatal defect in the service of summons. It cannot be overemphasized that the
statutory requirements of service of summons, whether personally, by
substituted service, or by publication, must be followed strictly, faithfully and
fully, and any mode of service other than that prescribed by the statute is
considered ineffective.
Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly complied with the
rules, the service of summons would still be ineffective insofar as private
respondents are concerned. At the time the complaint for Quieting of Title was
filed on November 2, 1983, Vilma Maloles Subdivision no longer existed as a
juridical entity. Vilma Maloles Subdivision, a partnership, was dissolved more
than six (6) years earlier, it could no longer be sued having lost its juridical
personality.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596 is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit.
G.R. No. 204796, February 04, 2015
REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. DIAMOND
DRAGON REALTY AND MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent.
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land and the one-storey building erected at
the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Araneta Avenue, Quezon City. Reicon and
respondent Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc. (Diamond) entered
into a Contract of Lease, whereby Reicon leased the subject property to
Diamond for a period of 20 years, from January 15, 1991 to January 15, 2011. In
turn, Diamond sublet portions of the subject property to Jollibee Foods
Corporation and Maybunga U.K. Enterprises (Maybunga), represented by its
proprietor, Andrew D. Palangdao (Andrew).
Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals due, and the checks it had issued by
way of payments were all dishonored upon presentment. This prompted Reicon
to demand the payment of the accrued rentals and terminate the contract.
Thereafter, it entered into separate contracts with Jollibee and Maybunga over
the portions of the subject property they respectively occupy.
Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Reicon,
Jollibee, Maybunga, Andrew, alleging that the contract did not provide for its
unilateral termination by either of the parties. As such, Diamond prayed that the
unilateral termination of contract effected by Reicon, as well as the separate
contracts of lease it entered into with Jollibee and Maybunga, be declared
invalid and illegal. Further, it sought the award of unpaid rentals from Jollibee
and Maybunga, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
By way of special appearance, Reicon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person, considering that the summons
was not served upon its president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel, as required by the Rules of
Court, but upon a certain Fernando Noyvo, a houseboy/gardener, at a residence
located at Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, which is not the principal office of
Reicon.
Opposing Reicon’s motion to dismiss, Diamond argued that, even assuming that
summons was not properly served upon Reicon, improper service is not a
ground to dismiss its complaint.
RTC denied Reicon’s motion to dismiss, ratiocinating that improper service of
summons is not among the grounds enumerated under Section 1, Rule 16 of the
Rules allowing for the dismissal of a complaint. Reicon moved for
reconsideration which was, however, denied.
Aggrieved, Reicon elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion upon Presiding Judge of the RTC in not
dismissing Diamond’s complaint. In a Resolution, the CA required Reicon to
show cause as to why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for its
failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Diamond. It appears that the
CA’s earlier Resolution addressed to Diamond was returned to it, with the
notation “RTS-Moved Out.”
In its Compliance, Reicon stated that Diamond has not submitted any paper or
pleading notifying the RTC of any change in its address. As such, Reicon
maintained that the service of its petition to Diamond’s address as above-
indicated should be deemed effective. In the alternative, it proffered that
Diamond may be served through its counsel of record at the latter’s office
address.
Diamond filed a manifestation, under a special appearance, averring that
Reicon’s petition for certiorari must be dismissed outright for its failure to serve
a copy thereof on its counsel of record. It cited the rule that when a party is
represented by counsel, notice of proceedings must be served upon said counsel
to constitute valid service.
The CA dismissed Reicon’s certiorari petition based on the following grounds:
(a) non-compliance with the requirements of proof of service of the petition on
Diamond and (b) non-compliance with the rule on service upon a party through
counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules.
Reicon’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: whether or not Reicon’s certiorari petition before the CA was properly
served upon the person of Diamond.
Ruling: The petition is meritorious.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules, which covers cases originally filed before
the CA, provide as follows:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance
with requirements. – The petition shall contain the full names
and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a
concise statement of the matters involved, the factual
background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the
relief prayed for.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired.
– The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution
indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary
submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
A punctilious review of the records, particularly of the certiorari petition filed
by Reicon before the CA, shows that it contains the registry numbers
corresponding to the registry receipts as well as the affidavit of service and/or
filing of the person who filed and served the petition via registered mail on
behalf of Reicon. These imply that a copy of Reicon’s certiorari petition had been
served to the RTC as well as to Diamond through its address at “Suite 305 AIC
Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road, Ortigas Center,
Pasig City, in compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules on proof of
service as well as with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 46 above-quoted.
On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as
its business address in its complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of
evidence to show that it had since changed its address or had moved out. Hence,
Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in serving a copy of
its certiorari petition to Diamond in light of the requirement under Sections 3
and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as above-cited, which merely entails service of the
petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel.
The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by
nature, an original and independent action, and, therefore not considered as
part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition,
as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for
respondent has been made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not apply.
Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Reicon’s certiorari petition outright
for non-compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules as well as the rule on
service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The
service of said pleading upon the person of the respondent, and not upon
his counsel, is what the rule properly requires, as in this case.
On a related note, the Court further observes that jurisdiction over the
person of Diamond had already been acquired by the CA through its
voluntary appearance by virtue of the Manifestation dated May 5, 2011, filed
by its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, who, as the records would show, had
consistently represented Diamond before the proceedings in the court a quo
and even before this Court. To restate, Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules provides:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. —
The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution
indicating its initial action on the petition or by his
voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the CA’s resolution indicating its initial action on the petition, i.e.,
the Resolution dated January 5, 2011 requiring Diamond to comment, was
returned with the notation “RTS-Moved Out,” the alternative mode of
Diamond’s voluntary appearance was enough for the CA to acquire jurisdiction
over its person.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
 of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion
seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for
resolution.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated May 21, 2012
and November 21, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the CA is DIRECTED to REINSTATE the petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 116845 under the parameters discussed
in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169135, June 18, 2010
JOSE DELOS REYES, Petitioner, v. JOSEPHINE ANNE B. RAMNANI, Respondent.
Petition: This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
The trial court rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 24858 in favor of respondent
Josephine Anne B. Ramnani. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court.
Then, Branch Sheriff Pedro T. Alarcon conducted a public bidding and auction sale over
the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 480537 (subject
property) during which respondent was the highest bidder. Consequently, a certificate
of sale was executed in her favor on even date. A writ of possession was issued by the
trial court. Subsequently, the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No.
480537.
Respondent filed a motion (subject motion) for the issuance of an order directing the
sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale in her favor. Petitioner opposed on the twin
grounds that the subject motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing and that
the trial courts’ decision can no longer be executed as it is barred by prescription.
The trial court granted respondent’s the motion on the ground that the prescription for
the issuance of a writ of execution is not applicable in this case.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Petitioner
thereafter sought review via certiorari before the CA.
The CA denied the petition. The CA noted that the subject motion is a non-litigious
motion, hence, the three-day notice rule does not apply. Further, it agreed with the trial
court that the issuance of the final certificate of sale is not barred by prescription, laches
or estoppel.
Issue: Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the fatally defective motion.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
Petitioner contends that the motion filed by respondent to compel the sheriff to execute
the final certificate of sale is fatally defective because it does not contain a notice of
hearing.
Respondent’s Arguments:
Respondent contends that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion and that
petitioner was not denied due process because he was given an opportunity to be heard
by the trial court.
Ruling: The petition lacks merit. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final
certificate of sale as a matter of right.
The CA correctly ruled that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion. While, as a
general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4, Rule 15
of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions or motions
which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party. As already discussed, respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate
of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. Hence, the
subject motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. At any rate, the trial court
gave petitioner an opportunity to oppose the subject motion as in fact he filed a
Comment/ Opposition on March 1, 2004 before the trial court. Petitioner cannot,
therefore, validly claim that he was denied his day in court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 13, 2005 Decision and August
3, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87972 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010
FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR., Petitioner, v. MANILA SOUTHCOAST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
Petition: petition for review
Facts:
Petitioner Fausto R. Preysler, Jr. filed with the MTC of Batangas a complaint for
forcible entry against respondent Manila Southcoast Development Corporation.
The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate the
disputed land. Respondent appealed to the RTC of Nasugbu, Batangas. The RTC,
in its Decision dated 22 January 2004, reversed the MTC decision and dismissed
petitioner’s complaint.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was set for
hearing on 26 February 2004. Petitioner sent a copy of the Motion for
Reconsideration to respondents counsel by registered mail on 23 February
2004. During the 26 February 2004 scheduled hearing of the motion, the RTC
judge reset the hearing to 2 April 2004. Meanwhile, it was only on 3 March
2004, or 6 days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, that
respondent’s counsel received a copy of petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
The rescheduled hearing on 2 April 2004 was again reset on 7 May 2004 and
was further reset to 6 August 2004. After the hearing, respondent filed its
Motion to Dismiss, claiming that non-compliance with the three-day notice rule
did not toll the running of the period of appeal, which rendered the decision
final.
The RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for failure to appeal
within the 15 days reglementary period and declaring the 22 January 2004
Decision as final and executory. The RTC ruled that petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was fatally flawed for failure to observe the three-day notice
rule. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration which was
dismissed by the RTC. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The CA held that the three-day
notice rule under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is
mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro
forma. As found by the RTC, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 12
February 2004 was received by respondent only on 3 March 2004, or six days
after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals held that all violations of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 which render
the purpose of the notice of hearing of the motion nugatory are deemed fatal.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether petitioner had violated the three-day notice rule
Ruling: We find the petition meritorious.
In upholding the RTC Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the
Court of Appeals relied mainly on petitioners alleged violation of the notice
requirements under Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which
read:
SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions
which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner
as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3)
days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice.
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing
shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify
the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than
ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. No written
motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of service thereof.
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the
procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of
procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court
of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the
Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice.
In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the
three-day notice rule. However, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that
although respondent received petitioners Motion for Reconsideration six days
after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, the said hearing was reset
three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August
2004, or more than five months after respondent received a copy of petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly,
respondent had more than sufficient time to oppose petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did oppose the motion when it filed
its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. In view of the circumstances of this
case, we find that there was substantial compliance with procedural due
process. Instead of dismissing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
based merely on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have
resolved the motion based on the merits.
Furthermore, the RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioners Omnibus Motion
for allegedly failing to comply with the three-day notice requirement. The RTC
found that the notice of hearing of petitioners Omnibus Motion which was set to
be heard on 12 November 2004 was received by respondent on 9 November
2004. The RTC held that the service of the notice of hearing was one day short
of the prescribed minimum three days notice.
We disagree. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that [e]very written motion required
to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
hearing on shorter notice. Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least three
days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the
petitioners Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to
comply with the notice requirement, respondent should have received the
notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November 2004, which is 9
November 2004. Clearly, respondents receipt on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday)
of the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12
November 2004 (Friday), was within the required minimum three-days notice.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 22
November 2005 and the Resolution dated 3 March 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 89621. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Nasugbu, Batangas to resolve petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
and Omnibus Motion on the merits.
G.R. No. 116693 July 5, 1996
PURITA DE LA PEÑA, JUDGE VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, RTC-Br. 2, Balanga,
Bataan, petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO R. DE LA PEÑA, BENJAMIN P. BRIONES, SPOUSES JULIA DE LA PEÑA
and JOSE ALBERTO, GODOFREDO, VIRGINIA and MARIA, all surnamed DE
LA PEÑA, and the COURT OF APPEALS-Fourth Division, respondents.
Facts:
A Complaint was filed against petitioner in the RTC of Balanga, Bataan, seeking
(a) the annulment of the deed of sale and deed of extrajudicial partition
executed between Fortunata de la Peña and Purita de la Peña, (b) the partition
of the estates of Fortunata de la Peña and Gavina de la Peña, and (c) the award
in their favor of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs of the suit.
Petitioner Purita de la Peña filed her Answer with Counterclaim. Subsequently,
the parties entered into partial compromise agreements where they agreed to
settle their respective claims. Judge Vivencio S. Baclig dismissed the complaints
for annulment of the deeds of sale and extrajudicial partition, partition of the
estates of Gavina and Fortunata de la Peña, and the counterclaim of Purita de la
Peña for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement.2
Respondents herein as plaintiffs before the trial court received copy of the
aforesaid decision on 2 July 1993. On 15 July 1993, plaintiffs filed their Motion for
Reconsideration which is now being assailed as pro forma since it did not
contain a notice of hearing.
Judge Baclig denied the motion for reconsideration as he found no cogent and
compelling reason to warrant the reversal or modification of the decision
sought to be reconsidered. Consequently, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal
and/or Extension of Time to File Appeal. On the other hand, petitioner herein as
defendant in the court below filed a Motion for Execution contending that the
motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiffs did not toll the running of the
prescriptive period as it failed to contain a notice of hearing hence pro forma.
Judge Baclig issued another Order 5 denying the motion for extension to file an
appeal and ruled that plaintiffs' period to appeal had already lapsed as it was
not tolled by the motion for reconsideration earlier filed, the latter being pro
forma for lack of a notice of hearing. As regards defendant's motion for
execution, the court a quo found no necessity to issue a writ considering its
earlier ruling dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and defendant's counterclaim.
The Court of Appeals held null and void the order of the trial court declaring
private respondents' motion for reconsideration pro forma.
Petitioner moved to reconsider. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and reiterated its ruling that the motion for
reconsideration was not a mere scrap of paper so that the notice of appeal was
timely filed; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: whether motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs suspend the
running of the prescriptive period

Ruling: No.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that the motion for reconsideration filed
by the plaintiffs did not contain any notice of hearing. It was therefore pro
forma, hence it did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. The copy
of the decision was received on 2 July 1993. Consequently, respondents had
until 17 July 1993 within which to file their notice of appeal. Since they filed
their Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal on 20
August 1993 or 49 days after receipt of the decision, the appeal was clearly filed
out of time. On that date the decision of the court a quo already attained finality
34 days earlier, hence, could no longer be reviewed much less modified on
appeal. The filing of the Notice of Appeal and/or Extension of Time to File Appeal
was a futile exercise. There was no longer any period to appeal nor a decision
that could still be appealed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The

questioned Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 25 May 1994 and 29 July
1994 are SET ASIDE and the assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court
declaring the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent as pro
forma is REINSTATED. Consequently, the judgment dismissing the complaint as
well as the counterclaim has acquired FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.