XLVI.
RULE 41: APPEAL FROM THE RTCs The issue raised by petitioner before the appellate court
JULIETA PANOLINO vs. JOSEPHINE L. TAJALA
G.R. No. 183616 June 29, 2010
Facts:
The DENR Regional Executive Director Jim O. Sampulna (RD
Sampulna), denied for lack merit the application of Julieta
Panolino (petitioner), which was opposed by herein respondent
Josephine L. Tajala, for a free patent over a parcel of land
located in Sultan Kudarat, and directed petitioner to vacate the
contested property and remove at her expense whatever
improvements she may have introduced thereon.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on June 27, 2007, of
which she filed a motion for reconsideration on July 11, 2007.
Her motion was denied on September 6, 2007, copy of which
she received on September 12, 2007.
On September 19, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal bef
ore the Office of RD Sampulna, stating that she was appealing
the decision and order to the Office of the DENR Secretary. By
Order of October 16, 2007, RD Sampulna denied the notice of
appeal, holding that it was filed beyond the reglementary
period. The RD explained that petitioner should have filed her
appeal on September 13, 2007 as she had only one day left of
the 15-day reglementary period for the purpose, pursuant to
DENR Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990 which
provides that if a motion for reconsideration of the
decision/order of the Regional Office is filed and such motion
for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right
to perfect his
appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned
from receipt of the resolution of denial.The administrative
order also provides that “The Rules of Court shall apply when
not inconsistent with the provisions hereof.”
Invoking the rule enunciated by this Court in the 2005 case
of Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., petitioner argued in
her motion for reconsideration of RD Sampulnas October 16,
2007 Order that she still had a fresh period of fifteen days from
her receipt on September 12, 2007 of copy of the Order
denying her motion for reconsideration. However, her motion
was denied.
Petitioner elevated the matter via certiorari before the CA
which, by Resolution, dismissed it on the ground that petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, she having
bypassed the Office of the DENR Secretary and the Office of
the President before resorting to judicial action.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that her petition
for certiorari raised a purely legal issue. The appellate court,
holding that the issue raised is clearly a question of fact,
denied petitioners motion. Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the fresh period rule laid down
in Neypes applies to petitioner’s case
Ruling: NO.
is one of law because it can be resolved by merely
determining what the law is under the undisputed facts. The
appellate court’s ruling that such issue raises a question of fact
which entails an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties is thus erroneous.
As reflected in the decision in Neypes, the fresh period rule
shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules
cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Petitioners present case is administrative in nature
involving an appeal from the decision or order of the DENR
regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed
governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of
1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the
motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect
his appeal during the remainder of the period of appeal,
reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial; whereas if the
decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day
period to perfect his appeal.
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, as clarified
in Neypes, being inconsistent with Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 87, Series of 1990, it may not apply to the case of
petitioner whose motion for reconsideration was denied.
WHEREFORE, the assailed issuances of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED, not on the ground advanced therein but on the
ground reflected in the foregoing discussion. No costs.
EMELINDA V. ABEDES vs.CA, RELIA QUIZON ARCIGA and
SHERIFF RONBERTO B. VALINO
G.R. No. 174373 October 15, 2007
Petition: Special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court
Facts:
Respondent Relia Quizon Arciga filed an action before the RTC
of Pasig City against Wilfredo P. Abedes (Wilfredo), husband of
herein petitioner, seeking support for her daughter, Dannielle
Ann Arciga (Danielle Ann). A Decision was therein rendered,
declaring Wilfredo the natural father of Danielle Ann. Wilfredo
was similarly ordered by the RTC to support Danielle Ann.
Since no appeal was interposed by the parties, the judgment
became final and executory. Unfortunately, the Sheriffs Return
showed that no personal property of Wilfredo could be levied
upon to satisfy the judgment. The Writ of Execution was returned
unsatisfied. Later, a property covered by TCT No. 292139 was
discovered to be allegedly registered in the name of Wilfredo.
Thus, the Sheriff caused the registration of a Notice of Levy on
Execution on TCT No. 292139, with the Office of the Registry of
Deeds. Upon notice of the same, petitioner filed a Notice of Third
Party Claim with the RTC of Pasig. Petitioner alleged that the
property covered by TCT No. 292139 belongs exclusively to her.
Therefore, it may not be utilized to satisfy the judgment rendered
against her husband Wilfredo.
Notwithstanding the adverse claim, a Notice of
Sheriffs Sale was made announcing the sale to the public and
to the highest bidder of all the rights, claims, and shares of
Wilfredo in the property covered by TCT No. 292139. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order and
Damages before the RTC of Tarlac City
After due hearing, the RTC of Tarlac City issued a
TRO. Meanwhile, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint of petitioner. However, the RTC of Tarlac
City dismissed the motion for want of merit.
In their Answer, respondents Relia Quizon Arciga and Sheriff
Ronberto B. Valino principally contended that the property
subject of the levy is presumed conjugal property; and as such,
liable for the judgment against Wilfredo.
In view of this development, petitioner filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. The RTC of Tarlac City issued the assailed
Order ruling that the property covered by TCT No. 292139 is
petitioner’s paraphernal property. As her exclusive property, it
may not be made liable for the obligations of Wilfredo. Hence,
the RTC enjoined respondent Sheriff from conducting the public
sale of the property covered by TCT No.
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing order
was denied by the RTC, prompting respondents to file an appeal
with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals issued a Decision, reversing and setting
aside the appealed Order and Resolution of the RTC of Tarlac
City.
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals said that the Family Code
provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property
relations between petitioner and Wilfredo, notwithstanding the
fact that their marriage was celebrated prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code. Following the foregoing line of ratiocination,
the Court of Appeals held that the property covered by TCT No.
292139 may be levied upon in execution for the support of
Danielle Ann. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The
CA denied the motion. Hence, the Petition before us filed under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether the petitioner used the appropriate mode of
appeal
Ruling: No.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. However, the proper remedy of petitioner
from the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for
review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
Parenthetically, it must be emphasized that under Rule 56, Sec.
5(f) of the Rules of Court, which governs the procedure in the
Supreme Court, a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, as in
this case, merits an outright dismissal. Patently, the petition
must fail.
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court elaborates on the
modes of appeal:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where
the law or these Rules so require. In such
cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where
only questions of law are raised or involved,
the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is taken to the
Court of Appeals on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is
brought to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal,
provided for by Rule 45, is elevated to the Supreme Court only
on questions of law.
In the case at bar, respondents utilized the first mode of
appeal. Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC of
Tarlac City on 18 August 2004, giving notice that they were
appealing its Order and Resolution, dated 9 June 2004 and 3
August 2004, respectively, to the Court of Appeals. Indeed,
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states that an appeal
to the Court of Appeals shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. The question now arises
whether respondents raised questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law before the Court of Appeals. A review
of the records reveals that respondents, in their appeal with the
Court of Appeals, raised mixed questions of fact and law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioner.
GABRIEL LAZARO and the heirs of FLORENCIA PINEDA
and EVA VIERNES vs. CA and Spouses JOSE and ANITA
ALESNA
G.R. No. 137761. April 6, 2000
Failure to pay docket and other lawful fees within the
prescribed period is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal.
This rule cannot be suspended by the mere invocation of "the
interest of substantial justice." Procedural rules may be relaxed
only in exceptionally meritorious cases.
Petition: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
Facts:
Before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Spouses Jose
and Anita Alesna, private respondents herein, filed a civil
action for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages (with
prayer for preliminary injunction) against Petitioners Gabriel
Lazaro and the heirs of Florencia Pineda and Eva Viernes.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioners. Thereafter, the private respondents filed a Notice of
Appeal before the trial court.
The CA dismissed the appeal for failure of herein private
respondents to pay the required docket fees within the
prescribed period. Thereafter, it issued its first assailed
Resolution granting their Motion for Reconsideration and
reinstating the appeal.
Subsequently, the petitioners also filed their own Motion for
Reconsideration assailing the said Resolution. As earlier
stated, the CA denied their Motion. Hence, this Petition.
Issue: Whether the failure to pay docket and other lawful fees
within the prescribed period is a ground for the dismissal of an
appeal.
Ruling: Yes.
The Petition is meritorious.
The Rules of Court, as amended, specifically provides that
appellate court docket and other lawful fees should be paid
within the period for taking an appeal. Hence, Section 4 of Rule
41 reads:
"Section 4. Appellate court docket and other
lawful fees. -- Within the period for taking an
appeal,[9] the appellant shall pay to the clerk
of the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from, the full amount of
the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together
with the original record or the record on
appeal."
Contrary to the submission of private respondents that the
aforecited rule is merely directory, the payment of the docket
and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both
mandatory and jurisdictional. Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court provides: "Failure of the appellant to pay the
docket and other fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule 41" is a
ground for the dismissal of the appeal. Indeed, it has been held
that failure of the appellant to conform with the rules on appeal
renders the judgment final and executory. Verily, the right to
appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that
right must comply with the statute or the rule.[
In the present case, the private respondents failed to pay the
required docket fees within the reglementary period. In fact, the
Court notes that they paid the fees only after the CA had
dismissed the appeal, or six months after the filing of the
Notice of Appeal. Clearly, existing jurisprudence and the Rules
mandate that the appeal should be dismissed.
We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of
substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Indeed, in no
uncertain terms, the Court held that the said rules may be
relaxed only in "exceptionally meritorious cases." In this case,
the CA and the private respondents failed to show that this
case is one such exception.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals' assailed Resolutions, dated July 31, 1998 and
December 28, 1998, are SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (Branch
27) in Civil Case No.4058 is
declared FINAL and EXECUTORY. No pronouncement as to
costs.
REPUBLIC vs. CA, HON. MADRONA and APOLINARIA
MALINAO JOMOC
G.R. No. 163604. May 6, 2005
Facts:
In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee
Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, RTC, granted the petition and
accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his
petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead. The
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to
appeal the trial courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal.
The trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and
served as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a special
proceeding, disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts
order of disapproval having been denied, it filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the CA, contending that the declaration of
presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or
separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
The Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on
procedural and substantive grounds stating that the petition is
not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its petition a certified
true copy of the assailed Order. However, despite the
procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the
substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for
declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the
nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is
30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of
appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its
appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the
period to appeal is 15 days from notice or decision or final
order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a
notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether a record on appeal shall be required in order
to perfect an appeal
Ruling: Yes.
This Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a
special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The instant
petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of
Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of
the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129
and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on
Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving
petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court
of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and
other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition
before the appellate court. Petitioners failure to attach to his
petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial courts order
denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its
Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the
issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court
should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case
be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the
foregoing discussion.
MAJOR ROMEO G. ELEPANTE vs.HON. MADAYAG and
MAJ. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, Commanding General,
National Capital Region Defense Command
G.R. No. 93559 April 26, 1991
Petition: This is a petition for certiorari
Facts:
Major Romeo Elepante filed a petition for habeas corpus with
this Court. The Court resolved to issue a writ returnable to the
Executive Judge of the RTC, Makati, Metro Manila. Also this
Court directed the latter to hear and decide the case.
In the hearing, Romeo Elepante testified that he is a Major in
the Philippine Navy (Marines) and the Executive Officer of the
Metropolitan Citizens Military Training Command; that on April
15, 1990, a platoon of armed soldiers led by Captain Doctor
brought him to the NCR Defense Command where he was
detained; that there was no warrant for his arrest; that he was
confined as prisoner at Fort Bonifacio; that no formal charges
have been filed against him. The trial court rendered a decision
dismissing for lack of merit the petition for habeas corpus. The
trial court opined that Major Elepante was arrested because of
his involvement in several coup attempts.
Major Elepante filed this petition for review on certiorari,
alleging inter alia, that there is no criminal complaint filed
against him so that his continued detention is a violation of the
Constitution. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its
comment. In his comment the Solicitor General pointed out that
counsel for petitioner received on May 29, 1990, a copy of the
trial court's decision dated May 24, 1990, so that when he filed
this petition on June 11, 1990, the assailed decision had
attained finality. Citing Rule 41, Section 18 of the Revised
Rules of Court, appeal in habeas corpus should be filed within
forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s appeal in habeas corpus was
timely filed
Ruling: No.
Section 18 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, explicitly
provides, viz:
Sec. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken.
— An appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be
perfected by filing with the clerk of the court or the
judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice of such judgment, a statement
that the person making it appeals therefrom.
As interpreted in the case of Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz (109
Phil. 379 [1960]), which also involved a habeas corpuscase,
this Court ruled that the requirement under Section 18 of Rule
41 of the Old Rules of Court which provides that an appeal
in habeas corpus should be perfected within twenty-four (24)
hours (now forty-eight hours under Rule 41, Section 18 of the
Revised Rules of Court), is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional. Hence, this Court has no other alternative but to
dismiss the appeal filed out of time.
In computing the forty-eight (48) hour period of appeal, this
Court in Kabigting v. Director of Prisons (6 SCRA 281 [1962]),
ruled that the date on which the decision was promulgated
and/or served is not counted and the period starts to run the
following day unless the same by a Sunday or legal holiday in
which case the period of appeal is to be considered from the
succeeding day. To perfect an appeal, a notice of appeal is
required to be filed with the Clerk of Court or Judge who
rendered the judgment (Rule 41, Section 18, Revised Rules of
Court).
In the case at bar, counsel for petitioner received on May 29,
1990 a copy of the trial court's decision dated May 24, 1990
(Rollo, p. 8). Clearly when he filed the instant petition on June
11, 1990, thirteen (13) days had lapsed, so it was filed outside
the forty-eight (48) hour reglementary period. This being so,
the decision sought to be reviewed is already final so that this
Court following the Saulo ruling, has no alternative but to
dismiss the instant petition.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for the decision sought to be reviewed is already
final and (b) General Rodolfo Biazon or his successor is
directed to take appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
L. RULE 45: APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT
HEIRS OF PACIANO YABAO, Represented by REMEDIOS
CHAN vs. PAZ LENTEJAS VAN DER KOLK
G.R. No. 207266 June 25, 2014
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
The case traces its roots to the complaint for ownership and
possession filed by the Heirs of the late Paciano Yabao (Heirs
of Yabao), represented by Remedios Chan, before the MTCC
of Calbayog City (MTCC),against Paz Lentejas Van der Kolk
(Van der Kolk).
Van der Kolk filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. She
contended that the predecessors-in-interest of the Heirs of
Yabao had executed a joint affidavit, wherein they renounced
their hereditary rights over the subject lot and declared that
Faustina Yabao, mother of Van der Kolk, as its true owner.
The MTCC issued a Resolution denying the motion to dismiss
and holding that there was proper service of summons.
Subsequently, the MTCC rendered its Decision, declaring Van
der Kolk in default giving the reason that her non-filing of an
answer within the fresh 10-day period
Aggrieved, Van der Kolk appealed the MTCC decision before
the RTC, Branch 32, Calbayog City. Counsel for Van der Kolk
received the notice of the RTC Clerk of Court requiring her to
file a memorandum on appeal within 15 days from such
receipt. The RTC issued the Order dismissing the appeal for
failure of Van de Kolk to file the memorandum on appeal within
the period mandated by the Rules of Court. It added that the
right to appeal is a statutory privilege and one who seeks to
avail the same must comply with the requirements of the
statute or rules. Van der Kolk’s motion for reconsideration of
the above order was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
Unfazed, Van der Kolk filed a petition for review under Rule 42
before the CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision granting
the not raised petition “on grounds not raised herein but
disclosed by the records." It stated that the MTCC erred in
granting the reliefs prayed for by the Heirs of Yabao because
they were not warranted by their complaint.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the Heirs of Yabao was
denied by the CA in its Resolution. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the appellate court can render a decision
based on the grounds not raised or assigned as errors
Ruling: Yes.
The Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds not
raised or assigned as errors in several instances. In the case
of Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village
Lessee Homeowners Association, Incorporated,24the Court
enumerated such instances. Thus:
For instance, the Court has allowed the consideration of other
grounds not raised or assigned as errors specifically in the
following instances: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical
errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is
necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution
of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically
assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and
are matters of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower
court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
closely related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination
of a question properly assigned is dependent.
In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the observation,
analysis and conclusion of the CA. The several errors
committed by the MTCC, which when taken collectively, justify
the reversal of its December 4, 2006 Decision.
The Court agrees with the CA that the MTCC erred when it
granted the reliefs prayed by the Heirs of Yabao because the
same were not warranted by the allegations in the complaint.
In the case at bench, the respondents, as plaintiffs in the
MTCC, merely alleged that they are the heirs of Paciano
Yabao without presenting any proof why they are the latter’s
heirs and in what degree or capacity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
K & G MINING CORPORATION vs. ACOJE MINING
COMPANY, INCORPORATED AND ZAMBALES CHROMITE
MINING COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
G.R. No. 188364, February 11, 2015
Petition: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court
Facts:
Petitioner KGMC and respondents Acoje Mining Company
Incorporated (AMCI) and Zambales Chromite Mining Company
Incorporated (ZCMCI) are mining corporations. ZCMCI
acquired the 60 mining and thereafter filed its application for
patent and availment of rights and privileges over the mining
claims which was approved by the Bureau of Mines.

ZCMCI entered into an operating agreement with AMCI over
the former’s 60 mining claims. Thereafter, a certain Dominador
Ilagan registered with the DENR his mining claims and
assigned the same to KGMC.
The Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) informed ZCMCI
that its application for mining lease should be converted into a
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) in accordance
with E.O. No. 279.
KGMC filed its letter of intent to avail for itself an MPSA before
the MGB of Region III over its mining claims. Three months
thereafter, ZCMCI submitted documents in support of an
MPSA application. The technical committee submitted its
Memorandum recommending that ZCMCI be allowed to apply
for an MPSA.
The DENR Secretary issued Department Administrative Order
No. 82, series of 1990 (DAO 1990-82), providing the
procedural guidelines on the award of MPSA through
negotiation. ZCMCI, AMCI and the government, represented
by the DENR Secretary, executed an MPSA covering ZCMCI’s
60 mining claims with an approximate area of 540 ha. The
MPSA was approved by the Office of the President (OP).
Claiming that the issuance and approval of the above MPSA
was highly irregular, KGMC filed a letter/protest with the OP.
KGMC claimed that the area covered by the subject MPSA is
not available since 540 ha thereof is in conflict with KGMC’s
Prospecting Permit Application covering a total area of 486
ha. KGMC claimed to have been denied of due process
because no publication of ZCMCI and AMCI’s MPSA was ever
made thus depriving it an opportunity to file an adverse claim.
KGMC sought the disapproval of the subject MPSA and its
remand to the concerned DENR Regional Office so that its
protest and adverse claim can be resolved. On the other hand,
ZCMCI wrote to the DENR Secretary stating that the MPSA
has already become final and executory upon its approval by
the President.
KGMC’s letter-protest was eventually forwarded to the DENR
Panel of Arbitrators. The Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB ruled
in favor of KGMC. They found that ZCMCI’s failure to file its
MPSA proposal with the MGB-DENR made the approval of its
MPSA highly irregular.
On appeal, however, the MAB reversed the ruling of the Panel
of Arbitrators of the MGB. According to the MAB, Article 3,
paragraph 3.5(b) of DAO 1989-57 did not expressly prohibit the
direct filing of an MPSA proposal before the MGB Central
Office. Aggrieved, KGMC moved for reconsideration but its
motion was denied in the MAB Resolution.
KGMC filed before the CA a Petition for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Certiorari. However, the CA denied extension
for the reason that decisions of the MAB are appealable via a
petition for review under Rule 43 and not by way of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Even assuming that certiorari is
an available remedy, the reglementary period for its filing has
already prescribed.
KGMC thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to
Admit Petition. The CA denied reconsideration. Hence, the
present recourse.
Issue: Whether herein petitioner failed to timely file an appeal
Ruling: Yes.
KGMC faults its previous counsel in failing to timely file the
correct mode of appeal from the MAB resolutions and submits
that it should be excused from the repercussions of his ensuing
omissions as they amounted to gross negligence.
“It is settled rule that the mistake of a counsel binds the client.”
While there is a recognized exception to the rule that is - where
the lawyer’s negligence was so gross that it results in the grave
injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law51 - it is
inapplicable to the present case.
First, a counsel’s failure to perfect an appeal within the
reglementary period is simple negligence. It is not one as
gross, palpable, and reckless as to deprive a party of its day in
court.
Second, in cases where the counsel’s negligence consisted of
his failure to timely file an appeal, any alleged deprivation of
due process is negated by the fact that the client had the
opportunity to be heard or was actually heard in the lower
tribunal. This was the ruling in Building Care
Corporation/Leopard Security & Investigation Agency v.
Macaraeg53 where the Court found no deprivation of due
process because the client was able to fully present and argue
her case before the Labor Arbiter (LA). She was accorded the
opportunity to be heard and thus her failure to appeal the LA’s
decision cannot be deemed as a deprivation of her right to due
process.
KGMC was not deprived of due process. So long as a party is
given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her
interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial
of due process. Records show that the case took its regular
course in lower tribunals. KGMC had the opportunity to be
heard, was so heard and actively participated, in the
proceedings before the Panel of Arbitrators and the MAB.
Moreover, it is an established doctrine that the perfection of an
appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements
is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated March 16, 2009 and
June 5, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
107700 are AFFIRMED.
L1. RULE 46: ORIGINAL CASES
LEOPOLDO V. MENDOZA v. CA and MERCHANDISING
INSPECTION COMPANY, LTD.
G.R. No. 148505, February 20, 2007
Petition: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
Facts:
Petitioner, alleged in his petition that he was employed as a
checker by the Overseas Merchandising Inspection Company
Ltd., private respondent. However, for a period of time,
respondent company did not give him any work assignment due
to his union activities. Thus, he filed with the Arbitration Branch,
NLRC, a complaint for constructive dismissal and non-payment
of backwages.

For its part, respondent company denied the allegations in the
complaint, claiming that petitioner showed disinterest in his work
and stopped reporting to the office. Nonetheless, he received
his salary and bonus.
Labor Arbiter Facundo Leda promulgated a Decision dismissing
the charge for unfair labor practice but finding that
petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Respondent company then interposed an appeal to the
NLRC. In its Decision, the NLRC set aside the judgment of the
Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
NLRC.
Thereupon, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari.
The appellate court promulgated its Resolution dismissing the
petition for petitioners failure to pay the docket and other legal
fees.
In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner alleged that when he
filed the petition through registered mail, he enclosed P1,030.00
in cash as docket fee. He thus prayed that he be allowed to pay
once more the docketing fee so required. The Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed his petition for his failure to pay the
required docket fees.
Ruling: No.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Sec. 3. Contents and filing of
petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements. The petition shall contain the
full names and actual addresses of all the
petitioners and respondents, a concise
statement of the matters involved, the factual
background of the case, and the grounds
relied upon for the relief prayed for.
xxx
The petitioner shall pay the
corresponding docket and other lawful
fees to the clerk of court and deposit the
amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of
the filing of the petition.
The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the
petition. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case unless the docket fees are paid. It is clear that non-
compliance with any of the requirements stated above warrants
the dismissal of a petition.
While the Rules of Court must be faithfully followed, however,
they may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to
relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with his failure
to comply with the prescribed procedures. In the instant case,
however, petitioner has not shown any reason which justifies
relaxation of the Rules.
It bears stressing that procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
prejudiced a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed. Not one of these
exceptions is present here.
Moreover, petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy. What he
should have filed with this Court is a petition for review on
certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, not a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the same Rules.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 4266
(UDK) are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
DR. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, in her official capacity as
MEDICAL CENTER CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL CHILDREN'S
HOSPITAL vs.CA and DR. ALEJANDRO S. DE LA FUENTE.
G.R. No. 101428 August 5, 1992
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a
special civil action of mandamus against a public officer, to
take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be
recovered from the defendant officer, is the chief issue raised
in the certiorari action at bar. Also put the issue is whether or
not the Solicitor General may represent the defendant public
officer in the mandamus suit, in so far as the claim for
damages is concerned, in light of the Court's rulings in Urbano
, et al. v. Chavez, et al., and Co v. Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, et al. 1
Facts:
In 1987, a reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry
of Health commenced. At the time of the reorganization, Dr.
Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of the Clinics of the
National Children's Hospital. Dr. de la Fuente received notice
from the Department of Health that he would be re-appointed
"Medical Specialist II." Considering this is to be a demotion, Dr.
de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization
Board. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to
the Civil Service Commission.
Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided by the Civil Service
Commission in a Resolution wherein it was declared that the
demotion/transfer of de la Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to
Medical Specialists II is illegal.
De la Fuente thereupon sent letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the
Medical Center Chief of National Children's Hospital, however,
no one in the DOH Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr.
de la Fuente.
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-
Gozon, Dr. de la Fuente repaired to the CSC and asked it to
enforce its judgment. He was however "told to file in court a
petition for mandamus because of the belief that the
Commission had no coercive powers — unlike a court — to
enforce its final decisions/resolutions.
So he instituted in the Court of Appeals an action of
"mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to
compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget
Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and
executory resolution of the CSC.
The CA required the respondents to answer. However, no
answer was filed. About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed
with the same Court a "Supplemental/Amended Petition". The
second petition described as one for "quo warranto" aside from
"mandamus". The Appellate Court promulgated its judgment
and ordered that respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-
Gozon, to comply with the resolution. But de la Fuente's prayer
for damages was denied by the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the petitions (for mandamus) are not the vehicle
nor is the Court the forum for claim of damages.
It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the
judgment. He insisted that the Appellate Court had
competence to award damages in a mandamus action.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution, resolving de
la Fuente's motion for reconsideration, the Court ordered
setting a date for reception of evidence on de la Fuente’s claim
for damages. It based its judgment on Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which allows the award of damages in a
mandamus petition.
In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the CA, the
Solicitor General's Office had instituted the special civil action
of certiorari at bar. It contends that the CA is not legally
competent to take cognizance of and decide the question of
damages in a mandamus suit.
Issue: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction, in a special civil
action of mandamus against a public officer, to take
cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered
from the defendant officer
Ruling: Yes.
The Solicitor General's Office correctly identifies Section 9, B.P.
129 as the legal provision specifying the original and appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General's
Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit and
specific statement regarding "actions for moral and exemplary
damages," and finding none, concluded that the Court of
Appeals had not been granted competence to assume
cognizance of claims for such damages. The conclusion is
incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no
reference whatever to claims "for moral and exemplary
damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all;
yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and
decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of
damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases
falling within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's
theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural
one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for
damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages
arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of
a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the
matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of
action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.
NARCISO ZAPANTA, EDILBERTO CAPULONG AND
CLARITA CAPULONG vs.CO KING KI
G.R. No. 191694 December 3, 2014
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Facts:
Respondent Co King Ki (respondent), filed a Complaint for
Ejectment against petitioners, Ernesto, Marciano and one
Lawrence Smith (defendants) before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). Respondent alleged that he is
the owner of a parcel of land located at Lubao, Pampanga.
The defendants filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim, averring, among others, that they are qualified
farmer beneficiaries of the subject property and that
respondent was no longer the owner thereof as same was
already foreclosed by the Philippine Veterans Bank.
The Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) rendered
a Decision in favor of respondent, declaring defendants as
illegal occupants and not tenants of the subject property, and
directing them to vacate the same. Defendants filed their
Motion for Reconsideration which the RARAD denied.
Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal. The PARAD denied the
notice of appeal filed by defendants for having been filed out of
time.
Defendants sought reconsideration of the September 18, 2008
Order while respondent moved for the execution of the
Decision. The PARAD denied the defendants’ Motion for
Reconsideration and granted respondent’s Motion for
Execution.
Aggrieved, petitioners, together with Ernesto and Marciano,
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA issued a
Resolution, dismissing the petition for certiorari because
petitioners failed to append a clearly legible duplicate
original/certified true copy of the assailed PARAD Order in
violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. The CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for
certiorari on the basis of a strict application of Section 3,
Rule46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Ruling: No.
Petitioners appeal for the liberal construction of the rules
because they will suffer insurmountably if the case would be
dismissed based on a technicality. We deny the petition.
While it is true that when an appeal is filed, the approval of a
notice of appeal is a ministerial duty of the court or tribunal
which rendered the decision, it is required, however, that said
appeal must have been filed on time.24 It bears reiterating that
appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory
privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must
comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting
an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such
requirements are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly
discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a
losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the decision.

Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a

noble purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the guise of
liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities.
They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party.
Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive
rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where
suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the
correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well
served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the
procedural rules.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The assailed

Resolutions dated November 20, 2009 and March 22, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106882 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.