LXV.

RULE 65
c. Mandamus

UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE,

G.R. No. 176831 January 15, 2010

QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel his mother (the petitioner) to produce his father’s will.
Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the will. RTC ruled in favour of petitioner. CA ruled otherwise and
ordered the production of the will. SC ruled that petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy because there
lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

FACTS:

Alleging that his father passed away and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy
Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages before the RTC of
Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be
instituted. In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original
holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts.

The RTC heard the case. Petitioner contends that respondent did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus. RTC ruled in favour of petitioner.

Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of
merit. However, upon Motion for Reconsideration, CA granted the motion and ordered the production of the
will. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her
possession the holographic will.

Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied
this motion.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for mandamus is the proper remedy

RULING: NO.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to
whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to
enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right
involved is mandated by the Constitution.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do
or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will
mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists,
although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court,
officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board,
or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have
a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act
required.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved herethe
production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of
mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he
seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him
from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject
will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of.

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et al., vs. LTFRB and DOTC, respondents.

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner sought for the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding respondents to require PUVs to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Solicitor General explains that the writ of mandamus is not
the correct remedy. SC ruled that the writ of mandamus sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus is
unavailing because mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a
duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG.

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents to require public
utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

Petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and
related environmental hazards. Meantime, the Court granted petitioners' motion to implead the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.

In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, explains that the writ of mandamus
is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or
person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers to
implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, Lastly,
petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.

ISSUE: Whether writ of mandamus is the proper remedy

RULING: NO.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against
any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty;
(2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or
person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available
only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates
the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has
been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979

QUICK SUMMARY:

Petitioner filed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to recognize that the obligation
of labourers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the
employees' wages and salaries. The lower court dismissed the petition ruling that there is nothing in the law
which provides for such first priority credit. SC ruled that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus
that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded. In the present case, petitioner was
unable to show a clear legal right. Hence, Mandamus does not lie.

FACTS:

In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner seeks a reversal of such decision relying
on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the RA No. 2023, wherein it is stated, as petitioner
had interpreted, that the loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll
collection from the respondent's employees' wages and salaries.

To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, stated that there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act
2023 which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first
priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries. The mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023
is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn
this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit union's
credit into a first priority credit.

ISSUE: Whether a writ of mandamus should be issued

RULING: NO.

This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it would
appear that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.

Mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on which he
would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have
prevented him from instituting a suit of this character. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well
defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed.
The latest reported case, Province. of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, this court speaking through
Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has also been held that it is essential to the
issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and
it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases.

STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE AGENCY vs. PUERTO PRINCESA CITY
G.R. No. 181792 April 21, 2014

QUICK SUMMARY:
A decision was rendered in favour of herein petitioners for the payment of just compensation by the
respondents. However, respondents failed to pay hence petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC. RTC
dismissed petitioner’s motion on the ground that government funds could not be subjected to execution and
levy. Aggrieved, petitioners wrote a letter to COA, however the latter reasoned that it no longer have
jurisdiction over the matter as the case was already in the execution stage. Petitioner filed a petition for
Mandamus before the SC. The SC ruled that COA erred in not acting on the claim and that it still retained its
jurisdiction to adjudicate the money claim. Further, SC ruled that petitioners should have filed a petition for
certiorari with the SC. Hence, petition for mandamus is not proper because the COA's refusal to act did not leave
the petitioners without any remedy at all.

FACTS:

Petitioners were the owners of 2 parcels of land which were used and developed as a road by the City of
Puerto Princesa. In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an action for Payment of Just Compensation
against respondents before the RTC. RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. Pursuant thereto,
respondents made an initial payment of petitioners’ claim. Eventually, respondents failed to fulfil their
obligation so petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC for the collection of unpaid just compensation.

Subsequently, petitioners filed 2 motions both asking the RTC to order the Land Bank of the Philippines to
deliver the garnished account of respondents and/or to order respondents to appropriate funds for the
payment of the money judgment rendered against them and in favor of petitioners. RTC denied both motions
on the ground that government funds could not be subjected to execution and levy unless there was a
corresponding appropriation law or ordinance.

Petitioners wrote a letter to the Commission On Audit (COA) requesting that it order respondents to pay
petitioners the amount adjudged in the decision of the RTC. COA informed petitioners that it could not act
upon his request to order respondents to because it had no jurisdiction over the matter as the case was
already in the execution stage. Undaunted, petitioners filed similar complaints against respondents before the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, Office of the Undersecretary of the DILG praying that respondents pay the
subject money judgment and that they be suspended from office for their refusal to comply with the money
judgment. Hence, this Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the remedy of mandamus is proper to compel respondents to comply with the decision of the
RTC

RULING: NO.

The Court cannot blame petitioners for resorting to the remedy of mandamus because they have done
everything in the books to satisfy their just and demandable claim. They went to the courts, the COA, the
Ombudsman, and the DILG. They resorted to the remedy of mandamus because in at least three (3) cases, the
Court sanctioned the remedy in cases of final judgments rendered against a local government unit (LGU).
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a
municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered
against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval
of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor

Clearly, mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a money judgment is rendered in its favor
and against a municipality or city, as in this case. It has been held, however, that a resort to the remedy of
mandamus is improper if the standard modes of procedure and forms of remedy are still available and
capable of affording relief.

Regarding final money judgment against the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, the legal
remedy is to seek relief with the COA. Considering that a writ of execution was already issued by RTC-Br. 223,
the remedy of petitioners is to follow up their claim with the COA. Petitioners rightfully did so, but the COA
erred in not acting on the claim.

It is clear that the COA has the authority and power to settle "all debts and claims of any sort due from or
owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities." This authority and
power can still be exercised by the COA even if a court’s decision in a case has already become final and
executory. In other words, the COA still retains its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even after the
issuance of a writ of execution.

Considering that the COA still retained its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate money claim, petitioners should
have filed a petition for certiorari with this Court pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's
refusal to act did not leave the petitioners without any remedy at all.

JOSEPH OMAR O. ANDAYA v. RURAL BANK OF CABADBARAN, INC., DEMOSTHENES P. ORAIZ and
RICARDO D. GONZALEZ
G.R. No. 188769, August 03, 2016

QUICK SUMMARY:
This case concerns the dismissal of an action for mandamus that sought to compel respondents to register the
transfer of shares of stock and issue the corresponding stock certificates in favor of petitioner. The
Cabadbaran City RTC ruled that petitioner Andaya was not entitled to the remedy of mandamus, since the
transfer of the subject shares of stock had not yet been recorded in the corporation's stock and transfer book,
and the registered owner had not given him a special power of attorney to make the transfer. Andaya has
filed a Rule 45 petition directly before SC, insisting that he has a cause of action to institute the suit. SC ruled
that petitioner has been able to establish that he is a bona fide transferee of the shares of stock and therefore
has legal standing to initiate an action for mandamus.

FACTS:

Andaya bought from Chute shares of stock in the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran. Chute duly endorsed and
delivered the certificates of stock to Andaya and, subsequently, requested the bank to register the transfer
and issue new stock certificates in favor of the latter. A few days later, the bank wrote Chute to inform her
that he could not register the transfer. Andaya also separately communicated with the bank reiterating
Chute's request for the issuance of new stock certificates in petitioner's favor.

The bank denied the request of Andaya. It reasoned that he had a conflict of interest, as he was then president
and chief executive officer of a competitor bank. Respondent bank concluded that the purchase of shares was
not in good faith. Consequently, Andaya instituted an action for mandamus and damages against the Rural
Bank of Cabadbaran. Petitioner sought to compel them to record the transfer in the bank's stock and transfer
book and to issue new certificates of stock in his name.

The RTC issued a Decision dismissing the complaint. The trial court ruled that Andaya had no standing to
compel the bank to register the transfer and issue stock certificates in his name. Consequently, Andaya
directly filed with this Court a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari assailing the RTC Decision on pure
questions of law.

ISSUE: Whether a writ of mandamus should issue in favour of petitioner

RULING:

It is already settled jurisprudence that the registration of a transfer of shares of stock is a ministerial duty on
the part of the corporation. Aggrieved parties may then resort to the remedy of mandamus to compel
corporations that wrongfully or unjustifiably refuse to record the transfer or to issue new certificates of stock.
This remedy is available even upon the instance of a bona fide transferee who is able to establish a clear legal
right to the registration of the transfer. We also rule that Andaya has been able to establish that he is a bona
fide transferee of the shares of stock of Chute.

In contrast, at the crux of this petition are the registration of the transfer and the issuance of the
corresponding stock certificates. Requiring petitioner to register the transaction before he could institute a
mandamus suit in supposed abidance by the ruling in Ponce was a palpable error. It led to an absurd,
circuitous situation in which Andaya was prevented from causing the registration of the transfer, ironically
because the shares had not been registered.

Accordingly, a writ of mandamus to enforce a ministerial act may issue only when petitioner is able to
establish the presence of the following: (1) right clearly founded in law and is not doubtful; (2) a legal duty to
perform the act; (3) unlawful neglect in performing the duty enjoined by law; (4) the ministerial nature of the
act to be performed; and (5) the absence of other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.31chanrobleslaw

After finding that petitioner has legal standing to initiate an action for mandamus, the Court now reinstates
the action he filed and remands the case to the RTC to resolve the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus.

d. Motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite; exceptions

ELSIE S. CAUSING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D. BIRON, SR.

G.R. No. 199139 September 9, 2014

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner was relocated by private respondent Mayor Biron from her office as the Local Civil Registrar to the
Office of the Mayor. Petitioner filed the complaint claiming that the order issued by Mayor Biron was illegal.
The Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of
probable cause. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and recommendation of PES. Aggrieved, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. SC ruled that motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and since petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration, her petition for certiorari was
dismissed.

FACTS:
Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued a
Memorandum which relocated her from her office as the Local Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor

In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron, Causing filed the complaint-affidavit in the Office of the
Regional Election Director, claiming that the order issued by Mayor Biron being made within the election
period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of a COMELEC Resolution.
In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to
closely supervise the performance of her functions after complaints regarding her negative behavior had
been received and that she was not demoted to a lower position that diminished her salary and other
benefits.

The Provincial Election Supervisor (PES), recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of
probable cause to charge Mayor Biron with the violation. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and
recommendation of PES observing that Mayor Biron did not strip Causing of her functions as the Municipal
Civil Registrar. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether the petition for certiorari should be dismissed because of the petitioner’s failure to file a
motion for reconsideration in the COMELEC

RULING: YES.

Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration before filing the petition for certiorari.

The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an
aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
filing of the motion for reconsideration before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the
public respondent the opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.

The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the
requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the
petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where the petitioner was deprived of due process, and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the foregoing exceptions was applicable herein.
Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in election offense
cases.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION vs.

SPOUSES ROGELIO LAZO and DOLORES LAZO
G.R. No. 195594 September 29, 2014

QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondents sought for the payment of just compensation from the petitioner. When respondents’ demands
were not acted upon, they decided to file a complaint against petitioner. The trial court granted respondents’
complaint and issued an ex parte 72-hour TRO, the court also granted respondents’ application for preliminary
injunction. Without moving for a reconsideration, petitioner directly filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged Orders of the trial court. The appellate court ruled
that petition for certiorari suffers from fatal defect since it was filed without seeking first the reconsideration
of the trial court. SC ruled jurisprudence has laid down exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is
proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for reconsideration and this case falls within the exceptions.

FACTS:
Respondents are the owners of Monte Vista Homes. They voluntarily sold to the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) a portion of Monte Vista for the construction of an open irrigation canal that is part of
the Banaoang Pump Irrigation Project (BPIP). Subsequently, respondents found out through a Geohazard
Assessment Report (GAR), that the ground shaking and channel bank erosion are possible hazards that could
affect the NIA irrigation canal traversing Monte Vista.

Sangguniang Bayan of Bantay, Ilocos Sur adopted the recommendations contained in the GAR. Respondent
Rogelio Lazo brought to NIA’s attention payment of just compensation for the entire buffer zone.

When respondents’ demands were not acted upon, they decided to file a complaint for just compensation
with damages against NIA. Prior to the filing of an Answer, respondents filed an Amended Complaint with
application for a TRO and preliminary injunction. The trial court issued an ex parte 72-hour TRO and granted
respondents’ application for preliminary injunction.

Without moving for a reconsideration, petitioner directly filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA
dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged Orders of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that
petition for certiorari suffers from fatal defect since it was filed without seeking first the reconsideration of
the trial court. It was said that petitioner omitted to show sufficient justification that there was no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

ISSUE: Whether the facts of this case justified petitioner’s immediate resort to the court of appeals without
filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed orders of the trial court.

RULING: YES.

A petition for certiorari may be given due course notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration was
filed in the trial court. Although the direct filing of petitions for certiorari with the CA is discouraged when
litigants may still resort to remedies with the trial court, the acceptance of and the grant of due course to a
petition for certiorari is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the court because the technical
provisions of the Rules may be relaxed or suspended if it will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice.

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for
certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed
to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. However, the rule is not absolute
and jurisprudence has laid down the following exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper
notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for reconsideration:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parteor in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and,
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
We cannot but agree with petitioner that this case falls within instances (a), (b), (c), (d), and (i) above-
mentioned. Also, the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as those already raised and
passed upon in the lower court; hence, filing a motion for reconsideration would be useless and serve no
practical purpose. There is likewise an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government.

The CA and this Court unquestionably have full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume
jurisdiction of special civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition. We deem it proper to
adopt an open-minded approach in the present case.

LXVI. RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO

ERNESTO CAMPOS and FLORENCIO OROC vs. ESTEBAN DEGAMO and FELINO PALARCA
G.R. No. L-18315 September 29, 1962

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioners questioned respondent’s assumption to office and prayed that a writ quo warranto be issued
ousting and excluding respondents from the office and that they (petitioners) be declared entitled to said
offices. The lower court ruled that quo warranto cannot prosper because it fails to state a cause of action. The
SC ruled that petitioners are not the proper parties to institute the present action.

FACTS:
Petitioners were elected and proclaimed councilor No. 1 and councilor No. 2, respectively, of the municipality
of Carmen, Agusan; while respondents Esteban Degamo and Felino Palarca were proclaimed Mayor and Vice
Mayor, respectively, of the said municipality, notwithstanding that there was no valid canvass for the offices
of Mayor and Vice Mayor effected and the respondents could not legally occupy the said positions.

Petitioner made verbal demands upon respondents to stop forming the duties and functions of said offices,
but respondents denied and refused. Petitioners, therefore, prayed a that a writ quo warranto be issued
ousting and excluding respondents from the office of mayor and vice-mayor of Carmen, respectively and that
they be declared entitled to said offices and placed forthwith possession thereof.

Respondents answered that they were duly elected by the people and validly proclaimed by the said Board.
Respondents claimed that petitioners had no legal personality or authority to file the present case. The lower
court ruled that quo warranto cannot prosper because it fails to state a cause of action.

Petitioners appealed directly to the Supreme Court on purely questions of law.

ISSUE: Whether the quo warranto action of herein petitioners will prosper

RULING: NO.

On the assumption that the present action is presented as an ordinary quo warranto case (Rule 68, Rules of
Court), same cannot also prosper. Section 7, Rule 68, provides:

What complaint for usurpation to set forth, and who may be made parties. - When the action is against a
person for usurping an office or franchise, the complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to
be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the defendant is unlawfully in
possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the office or franchise may be made parties, and
their respective rights to such office or franchise determined, in the same action.
Malimit and Acain who claimed to be entitled to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, are not
parties herein. The complaint must likewise allege that plaintiffs were duly elected to such positions. Where
the office in question is an elective one, the complaint must show that the plaintiff was duly elected thereto
(Luna vs. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 401; Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil. 18). Petitioners-appellants Campos and Oroc, having
been candidates and elected for the office of councilors and not for the office of mayor and vice-mayor, they
are not the proper parties to institute the present action.

The appeal is dismissed and the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-
appellants.

ABRAHAM C. SISON vs. HON. PANGRAMUYEN, Commissioner of Civil Service, et al.,

G. R. No. L-40295 July 31, 1978

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and quo warranto for the annulment of the actions of respondents.
Petitioner contends that based on the rule of next-in-rank, he, instead of respondent Maliwanag, should have
been appointed to the position of City Assessor. SC ruled that the most fatal drawback of petitioner's cause is
that he came to the courts out of time. Petition herein was filed more than 1 year after the pretended right of
petitioner to hold the office in question arose. This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial
remedy in his favour.

FACTS:

Petition denominated as for certiorari and quo warranto and seeking the annulment of the actions of
respondents in affirming such attestation of private respondent Eureka F. Maliwanag's appointment as
Assistant City Assessor and further asking that respondent Commissioner be mandated to appoint petitioner
as such Assistant City Assessor and that private respondent Maliwanag be declared as unlawfully usurping
said position under a void and illegal appointment.

In sum, petitioner would want the Court to hold that since he was Chief Deputy Assessor exercising
immediate administrative control and supervision over respondent the appointment of aforementioned is
illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank. Petitioner maintains that upon the
promotion of the Assistant City Assessor to the position of City Assessor, he, petitioner, instead of respondent
Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s petition for certiorari and quo warranto may be granted

RULING: NO.

We are loathe to substitute Our own judgment for that of the Commissioner of Civil Service who is primarily
charged with the administration of the Civil Service Law and rules and regulations, absent, as in this case,
convincing showing of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.

Withal, the most fatal drawback of petitioner's cause is that he came to the courts out of time. As already
stated, the appointment in controversy was made on November 23, 1973 and respondent. On the other hand,
the petition herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one year after the pretended right of
petitioner to hold the office in question arose. This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial
remedy in his favour.

Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section 16 of Rule 66 invoked by private respondent refers to
actions of quo warranto and since his petition is also for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable.
Such contention is not correct. As earlier noted in this decision, the allegations supporting petitioner's cause
or causes of action boil down to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to
which she has been appointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor.
Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a nullification of her appointment,
which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto.
Besides, even if it could be also viewed as mandamus, it is already settled that his latter remedy prescribes
also after one year.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON, et al., vs. HON. MENDEZ, SR., et al.
G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC against the officials of the Municipality of San
Andres. On the basis that EO No. 353 which created the Municipality of San Andres is a nullity because it
amounted to a usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature, petitioner now contends that the officials
of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of
their respective offices. The lower court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action. The case was
elevated to SC. SC ruled that petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been
seasonably brought. SC added that a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision must be timely raised.

FACTS:
President Garcia, issued, EO No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon. By virtue of EO No.
174, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially
recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality.

The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC in Gumaca, Quezon, against the
officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 and
prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain
from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. Petitioning municipality contended that
EO No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of
the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of their
respective offices that righfully belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.

In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring that, considering the petition to
be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that
prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General.

The lower court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to
the State. The same court denied petitioner municipality's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari."

ISSUE: Whether the petition for quo warranto may be given due course

RULING: NO.

The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any
person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." When the inquiry is
focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the
Philippines . . . ." Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and
upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an
individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he
claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another."

While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of
the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of the
Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity. At any rate, in the interest
of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of the Municipality of San Andres, the Court shall delve into
the merits of the petition.

While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 may have converted the
Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo
warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right
to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act
7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive
Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was
only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to
challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the
Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local
government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of
another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not
indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a
political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, vs. MARIA
LOURDES P.A. SERENO
G.R. No. 237428 June 19, 2018

QUICK SUMMARY:

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court contending that the Court is without
jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto. SC ruled that a quo warranto proceeding is
the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment. SC further ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution that says that impeachable officers are
immuned, exempted, or excluded from quo warranto proceedings when the very issue to be determined
therein is the status of an officer as such. SC denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

Respondent claims denial of due process because her case was allegedly not heard by an impartial tribunal.
She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo
warranto.

By way of Comment, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), seeks a denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration for being proforma. In any case, the OSG
argues that respondent's motion lacks merit as there was no denial of due process and that quo warranto is
the appropriate remedy to oust an ineligible impeachable officer. The OSG maintains that the petition is not
time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the State and that the peculiar
circumstances of the instant case preclude the strict application of the prescriptive period.

Carefully weighing the arguments advanced by both parties, this Court finds no reason to reverse its earlier
Decision.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court is has jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto.

RULING: YES.

The Court reaffirms its authority to decide the instant quo warranto action. This authority is expressly
conferred on the Supreme Court by the Constitution under Section 5, Article VIII which states that:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)

Section 5 of Article VIII does not limit the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction only to certain public officials or
that excludes impeachable officials therefrom.

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public office
and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire into a public officer's eligibility or
the validity of his appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding involves a
judicial determination of the right to the use or exercise of the office.

The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers also finds basis in paragraph 7, Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution which designates it as the sole judge of the qualifications of the President and
Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. With this authority, the remedy of quo warranto was
provided in the rules of the Court sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).

This Court has the constitutional mandate to exercise jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions. And
as Estrada and the PET Rules show, impeachable officers are not immune to quo warranto actions. Thus, a
refusal by the Court to take cognizance of this case would not only be a breach of its duty under the
Constitution, it would also accord respondent an exemption not given to other impeachable officers.

Quo warranto, not impeachment, is the constitutional remedy prescribed to adjudicate and resolve questions
relating to qualifications, eligibility and entitlement to public office. Those who chose to ignore this fact are
Constitutionally blind. There is nothing in Our Constitution that says that impeachable officers are immuned,
exempted, or excluded from quo warranto proceedings when the very issue to be determined therein is the
status of an officer as such. No amount of public indignation can rewrite or deface the Constitution.

LXVII. RULE 67: EXPROPRIATION

THE CITY OF MANILA vs. THE ARELLANO LAW COLLEGES, INC.,

G.R. No. L-2929 February 28, 1950

QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner seeks to expropriate the land of respondent for the purpose of subdivision and resale. The lower
court dismissed the action on the ground that RA No. 267empowers cities to purchase but not to expropriate
lands. SC ruled that the necessity for the condemnation has not been shown. Any good that would accrue to
the public from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in comparison with the
preparation of a young men and young women for useful citizenship.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 267 provides that cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans from the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Philippine National Bank for the purpose of purchasing or
expropriating homesites within their respective territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents
of the said cities and municipalities.

The court below ruled that Republic Act No. 267empowers cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for
the purpose of subdivision and resale, and so dismissed the present action, which seeks to expropriate
several parcels of land situated on Legarda Street, City of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether a necessity exists to justify the expropriation of the parcels of land

RULING: NO.

We are inclined to believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase lands for
homesites. The word "expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of only meaning. But this
power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions. The National Government may
not confer its instrumentalities authority which itself may not exercise. A stream cannot run higher than its
source.

To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a
necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes.

Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary. Does not mean
an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the
public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent
with such benefits. But measured even by this standard, and forgetting for a moment the private character of
the intended use, necessity for the condemnation has not been shown.

On the other hand, the defendant not only has invested a considerable amount for its property but had the
plans for construction ready and would have completed the project a long time ago had it not been stopped
by the city authorities. And again, while a handful of people stand to profits by the expropriation, the
development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000 students would be sacrificed. Any good
that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in
comparison with the preparation of a young men and young women for useful citizenship and for service to
the government and the community, a task which the government alone is not in a position to undertake. The
Mayor of the City of Manila himself confessed that he believes the plaintiff is entitled to keep this land.

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY vs. HON. DULAY and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987

QUICK SUMMARY:

Petitioner filed with the CFI of Cebu a complaint for expropriation against the private respondent. The
respondent judge issued the order of condemnation and also appointed commissioners to ascertain the just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. Petitioner objected on the ground that P.D. No.
1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation
through commissioners. SC ruled that the provisions of P.D. No. 1533 on just compensation are unconstitutional
and void. The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle in determining just compensation
but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded.

FACTS:

The President issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated
in the City of Lapu-Lapu for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner. The proclamation
included parcels of land owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. Upon failure of the
parties to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property, the petitioner filed with the then CFI of
Cebu, a complaint for expropriation against the private respondent. The respondent judge issued the order of
condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be
condemned, upon the payment of just compensation. The respondent judge also issued a second order
appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation for the properties sought to
be expropriated.

Petitioner objected to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to
8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners. The trial
court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration

Petitioner flied this present petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order,
enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.

ISSUE: Whether Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed by P.D. No. 1533
insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned

RULING: NO.

We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional and void
and accordingly dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court
technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared
either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D.
1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the
power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this
effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose. This time, we answer in the affirmative.

We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only
serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute
the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners
pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to
undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place.
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 135042. September 23, 1999D E C I S I O N

QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondent filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against petitioner. NPC deposited at the Philippine National
Bank and thereafter, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession. Before counsel for the petitioner received any
order from the trial court directing the implementation of the Writ of Possession, NPC occupied the disputed
property. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA contending that the issuance of the Writ of
Possession is highly irregular because there was no hearing on the correct amount of just compensation for the
taking of the disputed property. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. SC ruled that there is no
prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate possession of the land involved in expropriation
proceedings may be taken. And even with the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the Writ of
Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional compensation is deposited.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land which the National Power Corporation (NPC) is seeking to
expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project. NPC filed a Complaint for
Eminent Domain against petitioner. Instead of filing an Answer, petitioner countered with a Motion to Dismiss.
Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession. NPC
deposited at the Philippine National Bank. The trial court denied the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Without awaiting the outcome of the Motion for Reconsideration,
NPC filed a Motion to Implement the Writ of Possession. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession. Before
counsel for the petitioner received any order from the trial court directing the implementation of the Writ of
Possession, NPC occupied the disputed property.
In a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner assailed the Writ. The CA upheld the trial court on the
ground that the issuance of the Writ of Possession was proper in view of NPCs compliance with Section 2, Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, by depositing with the Philippine National Bank an amount equivalent
to the assessed value of the disputed property. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Writ of Possession was validly issued, considering that the trial court had not
conducted any hearing on the amount to be deposited
RULING: YES.
Petitioner objects to the issuance of the Writ of Possession for being highly irregular, arbitrary and despotic,
because the Motion to Dismiss was yet to be resolved. It stresses that there was no hearing on the correct
amount of just compensation for the taking of the disputed property, as required in Panes v. Visayas State
College of Agriculture. We cannot uphold this contention.
There is no prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate possession of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt
adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owners. However, the requirements for authorizing
immediate entry in expropriation proceedings have changed.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure revised Section 2 of Rule 67 and clearly reverted to the San Diego,
Daet and Haguisan rulings. Section 2 now reads:

SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. Upon
the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the
plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property
involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to
the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to
the orders of the court. xxxx
 After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith
place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof
to the court with service of copies to the parties. [Underscoring ours.]

In the present case, although the Complaint for expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997, the Motion for the
Issuance of the Writ of Possession was filed on July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of the Writ is covered by the
1997 Rules. As earlier stated, procedural rules are given immediate effect and are applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time they are passed; new court rules apply to proceedings that take place after the
date of their effectivity. Therefore, Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the prevailing and
governing law in this case.
With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once the
provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial court did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the NPCs Motion for the issuance of the Writ, despite the
absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit.

SPOUSES MARIAN B. LINTAG and ANGELO T. ARRASTIA vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 158609 July 27, 2007

QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondent filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain against petitioners in order to acquire an easement of a right
of way over a portion of the said property. After the deposit of the initial assessed value of the subject property,
the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession. When RA No. 8974 was approved, petitioners filed a
Motion asking the RTC to direct the NPC to comply with the said law. RTC granted the same. CA declared that
RA No. 8974 cannot be applied retroactively since the subject property had already been obtained by NPC. SC
ruled that to effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners
the final just compensation.

FACTS:

Petitioners are the registered owners of a property located at Barangay Bibincahan, Sorsogon. Respondent
filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain against petitioners in order to acquire an easement of a right of way over
a portion of the said property. Respondent averred that such acquisition was necessary and urgent for the
construction and maintenance of a Power Transmission Project.

After the deposit of the initial assessed value of the subject property, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Possession. However, RA No. 8974 was approved. Subsequently, petitioners filed a Motion asking the RTC to
direct the NPC to comply with RA No. 8974. In the said motion, petitioners asseverated that pursuant to Sec. 4
of RA No. 8974, they are entitled to 100% of the value of the subject property based on the current relevant
zonal valuation made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

The RTC issued an Order directing the NPC to comply with RA No. 8974. The court held that RA No. 8974 is
procedural in nature, and, thus, may be given retroactive effect.

NPC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, NPC went to the CA via Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. CA declared that RA No. 8974 cannot be applied
retroactively since an initial deposit had already been made and possession of the subject property had already
been obtained by NPC. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the writ of possession effectuates the transfer of ownership of the property
expropriated
RULING: NO.

Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved
in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners x x x.

It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The
process is not complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of
possession in this case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer
of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just compensation.

We observe that petitioners are not questioning the authority of the NPC to exercise the power of eminent
domain nor the propriety of its exercise. While the constitutional restraint of public use has been overcome,
the imperative just compensation is still wanting. Thus, petitioners now appeal for the prompt payment of just
compensation. Indeed, just compensation is not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered just.

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN vs. PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, et al.

G.R. No. 194578 February 13, 2013

QUICK SUMMARY:
Before the Court is a petition for Contempt filed by petitioner against respondents for disseminating the
details of the disbarment complaint against him. SC ruled that petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty.
Quinsayas, the other respondents had a hand in the dissemination and publication of the disbarment
complaint against him. Hence, only Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas if found guilty of indirect contempt.

FACTS:

A convoy of 7 vehicles carrying the relatives of then Maguindanao vice-mayor Mangudadatu, as well as
lawyers and journalists, was on their way to the COMELEC office to file Mangudadatu’s Certificate of
Candidacy when they were accosted by a group of about 100 armed men and were taken hostage. The
hostages were systematically killed and their bodies and vehicles were dumped in mass graves and covered
with the use of a backhoe. Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder were filed and raffled to RTC of Quezon
City. Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., the principal accused in the murder cases.

Respondents filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner before the Supreme Court which is still pending.
Petitioner alleged the respondents actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint against him
in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.

In their Comments, respondents alleged that petitioner failed to prove that they actively participated in
disseminating details of the disbarment complaint against him. They alleged that while they were the ones
who filed the disbarment complaint against petitioner, it does not follow that they were also the ones who
caused the publication of the complaint. They alleged that petitioner did not provide the name of any
particular person, dates, days or places to show the alleged confederation in the dissemination of the
disbarment complaint.

ISSUE: Whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings, warranting a
finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.

RULING:

First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal contempt. In People v. Godoy, this
Court made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court
in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in
whose behalf the violated order is made.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against
organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue
between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the
proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of
private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the
court.

The records of this case showed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner had been
published and was the subject of a televised broadcast by respondent media groups and personalities.

The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech." As a general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in
nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing of a
disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public concern considering that it arose from the
Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his
involvement and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations
in the disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao Massacre case.

The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by itself, is not sufficient to
absolve the media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality rule. However, since petitioner is a
public figure or has become a public figure because he is representing a matter of public concern, and because
the event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public concern, the
media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news. It would have been different
if the disbarment case against petitioner was about a private matter as the media would then be bound to
respect the confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.

Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty. Quinsayas, the other respondents had a hand in the
dissemination and publication of the disbarment complaint against him. It would appear that only Atty.
Quinsayas was responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment complaint. Atty. Quinsayas is
bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant in the disbarment case against
petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the
confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, Atty.
Quinsayas disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner to members of the media
which act constitutes contempt of court.
WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect contempt for distributing copies of
the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun to members of the media.