XLI. RULE 39: SECS. 1 – 14
" A copy of such final order or judgment shall be served personally or
G.R. No. 93756 March 22, 1991
ANDRES DY and GLORIA DY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE ZEUS G. ABROGAR,
HONORABLE FELICIDAD NAVARRIO-QUIAMBAO, SHERIFF ERNESTO ADAN,
CLERK OF COURT CARLOS N. AGUILLON, JR., and RAMON V.
ROXAS, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment of petitioners from his
property in the MTC of Makati. The inferior court rendered a decision in favour
of the plaintiff (herein respondent) and against the defendants ordering the latter
to vacate the premises and pay the rentals.
An appeal therefrom was interposed by petitioners to the RTC. The trial court
rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the MTC. An ex-parte motion
for immediate execution of judgment was filed by the private respondent in the
inferior court and it was granted on the same day. On the following day,
respondent sheriff, ejected petitioners from the premises by throwing out all
their belongings into the street and turning over possession of the premises to
private respondent.
Petitioners filed an urgent ex- parte motion to quash and/or recall writ of
execution and nullify all proceedings had therein on the ground they have not
been served a copy of the decision of the trial court. The motion was denied by
the inferior court on the same day.
On March 6, 1990, petitioners received a copy of the decision of the trial court.
On the following day, petitioners filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction alleging
that they have not been furnished a copy of the decision of the trial court when
its immediate execution was effected. The appellate court dismissed the petition
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the judgment or order of the regional trial court be immediately
executed even before a copy thereof was served on the losing party?
Ruling: No.
Under Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that "(e)xecution
shall issue only upon a judgment or order that finally disposes of the action or
proceeding.
by registered mail on the parties.
There must be proof of service.
By the same token, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the execution
pending appeal of a judgment or order may be granted upon motion of the
prevailing party, upon good reasons, with notice to the adverse party. Of course,
such judgment or order may not be considered to be pending appeal unless notice
of such judgment or order had been served on the losing party. Thus, its execution
pending appeal cannot be authorized without previous notice to the losing party
of such judgment or order.
Applying these rules in a suppletory manner to cases falling under the Rules on
Summary Procedure, it is clear that a judgment or order of a Regional Trial Court
which disposes of the action or proceeding must be served on the losing
party before the same may be considered immediately executory. While an ex-
parte motion for issuance of a writ of execution thereof may be filed in the proper
court, such motion must be supported by a proof of service of the judgment or
order on the losing party.
Consequently, the Court finds and so holds that in a civil case which was decided
under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the immediate execution of the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court may not be effected unless prior notice of the
judgment or order had been served on the losing party and proof of such service
accompanies the motion for execution of the judgment. This will enable the losing
party to take any appropriate steps to protect his interests when warranted. The
losing party is entitled to such notice as an essential requirement of due process;
otherwise, the entire proceedings leading to the execution of the judgment may
be nullified and set aside.
While the petitioners' cause in this case is meritorious, unfortunately they failed
to interpose an appeal from the questioned judgment of the Regional Trial Court
within the reglementary period after notice thereof on March 6, 1990. They
explained it is a futile exercise as they have already been actually dispossessed of
the property subject of litigation.
Needless to say, the petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals cannot
take the place of appeal. What petitioners should have done, besides filing this
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is to
interpose an appeal within the reglementary period. As it is now, the judgment
had lapsed into finality and no further relief can now be afforded the petitioners
under the circumstances.
The judgment of the appellate court must thus be upheld on this account.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
G.R. No. 179104 February 29, 2008
ANASTACIO TUBALLA HEIRS, namely: JULIANA TUBALLA, AGUSTIN
TUBALLA, and HERMAN TUBALLA, petitioners, vs.
RAUL CABRERA, ET AL., respondent
Petition: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Facts:
Anastacio Tuballa filed a Complaint against Cabrera Enterprises for Recovery of
Possession of a parcel of sugar land. Tuballa is the registered owner of Lot No.
5697. Sometime in 1982, the men employed by Cabrera Enterprises intruded into
the subject land without Tuballa’s consent. The laborers of Cabrera Enterprises
did not heed Tuballas protestation and admonition, prompting him to make
several attempts to accost the manager of Cabrera Enterprises but to no avail, as
the manager either was always out of office or refused to meet Tuballa.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering Cabrera Enterprises Incorporated to
vacate, pay damages and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Aggrieved, Cabrera
Enterprises interposed its timely appeal before the CA. The appellate court
affirmed the decision of RTC.
The CA issued an Entry of Judgment, stating that its Decision has become final
and executory. Subsequently, Tuballa filed a Manifestation before the RTC,
pointing out that there was a typographical error in the dispositive portion of the
RTC Decision, which indicated Lot No. 6597 instead of Lot No. 5697, and that the
CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
The RTC issued an Order stating that the decision sought to be executed is not
the decision of the RTC but rather of the CA. Hence, any correction or clarification
of the decision of the Court of Appeals must be addressed to the said court.
Tuballa was thus compelled to file a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under
Rule 65 before the CA, which, dismissed the same due to a number of procedural
omissions and deficiencies. The appellate court also denied Tuballa’s motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition filed by the children and heirs of Tuballa.
Issue: Whether a final judgments may be modified for the correction of clerical
errors
Ruling: Yes.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made
by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land.
The only exceptions to the rule that final judgments may no longer be modified
in any respect are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.
Under OCT No. FV-16880, the technical description of the land refers to Lot
No. 5697, Pls-659-D and not Lot No. 6597. The RTC committed a typographical
error in its Decision when it ordered Cabrera Enterprises to vacate Lot No. 6597,
Pls-659-D and turn over the possession of the same to Tuballa. And, in accordance
with the first exception to modification of final judgment mentioned earlier, this
Court hereby modifies the clerical error in the Decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 30, 1994 of the RTC is
hereby MODIFIED by changing Lot No. 6597 to Lot No. 5697 in the first
paragraph thereof.
A.C. No. 11095 January 31, 2017
EUFEMIA A. CAMINO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RYAN REY L. PASAGUI, Respondent.
Petition:
Before the Court is a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution filed by
Complainant Eufemia A. Camino, relative to the Court's Per Curiam Decision.
Facts:
In a Disbarment Complaint filed by complainant against respondent Atty. Ryan
Rey L. Pasagui (Atty. Pasagui) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CED), complainant alleged, that respondent
violated their agreement for the latter to facilitate and secure a loan in order to
finance the payment of necessary expenses to transfer the title of a certain
property under her name. She claimed that respondent obtained a loan in her
name and that of her husband, using their property as collateral, but Atty. Pasagui
arrogated the proceeds thereof to himself.
In a Per Curiam Decision, the Court, ruling in favor of the complainant, found that
respondent was guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct for converting
the money of his client to his own personal use without her consent. Thus, the
Court affirmed the findings and conclusions of the IBP Board of Governors, but
modified the recommended penalty and instead imposed the penalty to
Disbarment.
In the present Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, complainant now prays
for the issuance of a Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the said judgment.
Issue: Whether the Writ of Execution prayed for should be granted
Ruling: Yes.
Generally, once a judgment or order becomes final and executory, the judgment
obligee may file a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in the court of
origin as provided for under Rule 39, Sec. 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Likewise, a judgment or final order may also be executed pending appeal as
provided for in Rule 39, Sec. 2.
Corollarily, judgments declared to be immediately executory, as in the present
case, are enforceable after their rendition. Similar to judgments or orders that
become final and executory, the execution of the decision in the case at bar is
already a matter of right. The judgment obligee may, therefore, file a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution in the court of origin as provided for under
Rule 39, Sec. 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In this particular case, however, the case did not originate from the lower courts,
but instead is an original action for disbarment filed by the complainant against
Atty. Pasagui, accusing the latter of Estafa through Abuse of Confidence.
Consequently, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court should issue the Writ of Execution prayed for. But, in
as much as this Court does not have a sheriff of its own to execute its own decision
and considering that the complainant resides in Tacloban City, the Ex-
Officio Sheriff of Tacloban City is directed to execute the money judgment
against the respondent in accordance with Rule 39, Section 9 of the Rules of
Court. Likewise, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Tacloban City is ordered to enforce the
Court's directive for respondent to return all the pertinent documents in his
possession to the complainant pursuant to Section 11of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT complainant's
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution by DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court to issue the Writ of Execution prayed for.
G.R. Nos. 135180-81; 135425-26. August 16, 2000
Heirs of the Late Justice JOSE B. L. REYES represented by ADORACION D.
REYES and Heirs of EDMUNDO A. REYES, namely, MA. TERESA P. REYES and
CARLOS P. REYES, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND METRO MANILA BUILDERS, INC., respondents.
Petition: The cases before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari to nullify the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
Brothers Justice Jose Benedicto Luna Reyes (also known as Justice J. B. L. Reyes)
and Dr. Edmundo A. Reyes were co-owners of a parcel of land located at Taft
Avenue. The brothers entered into a lease contract with Metro Manila Builders,
Inc. (MMB, Inc.). However, later, petitioners found out that respondent MMB, Inc.
had sub-leased the property to third parties. Consequently, petitioners served on
respondent MMB, Inc. a notice terminating the lease contract and demanding that
they vacate and surrender the premises subject of the lease to petitioners. Failing
to do so, petitioners filed with the MTC of Pasay City, a complaint for unlawful
detainer based on breach of the contract of lease.
Respondent MMB, Inc. filed its answer to the complaint. MMB, Inc. did not deny
the violations imputed to it but questioned the absence of a judicial rescission of
the contract of lease.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. Subsequently,
petitioners filed with the MTC of Pasay City a motion for execution of the
judgment of eviction. On the other hand, respondent appealed the decision to the
RTC of Pasay City, Branch 113 but such appeal was dismissed. In its appeal to the
RTC, respondent MMB, Inc. never raised the issue of jurisdiction. Hence, on a later
date, respondent MMB, Inc. filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the MTC of Pasay City, granted the motion for execution that
petitioners filed and issued the corresponding writ of execution. However, the CA
issued a temporary restraining order against the execution of the ejectment
judgment.
Even before the appellate court could rule on the injunctive relief, respondent
MMB, Inc. withdrew its appeal. Simultaneously with the withdrawal of the first
CA case, private respondent also filed a petition for annulment of the ejectment
decision before the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 231 (RTC 231) on the ground that
the MTC had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Petitioners filed with the
RTC a motion to dismiss which was denied.
Respondent MMB, Inc. then filed with the Court of Appeals a series of petitions
and motions urging the Court of Appeals to issue injunctive relief. In addition to
this, respondent MMB, Inc. also filed with the Court of Appeals an urgent motion
for the issuance of another TRO to enjoin the MTC-Branch 45, Pasay City from
enforcing the writ of execution.
Respondent MMB, Inc. filed with the Court of Appeals another case seeking to set
aside the order of the RTC Pasay, Branch 231. The Court of Appeals consolidated
the second and third CA cases. The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
setting aside the decisions rendered by the MTC of Pasay City. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review of the decision of
the CA. The CA, however, despite the pending petition with this Court issued a
writ of Execution Pending Appeal on its own Decision. The CA designated a
special sheriff to enforce the writ, and on the same day, he evicted petitioners
from the premises and restored possession in favour of private respondent.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari to
nullify the resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals has authority to issue immediate execution
pending appeal of its own decision
Ruling: No.
It was bad enough that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the lease contract
must be judicially rescinded before respondent MMB, Inc. may be evicted from
the premises. It was worse that the Court of Appeals immediately enforced its
decision pending appeal restoring respondent in possession of the leased
premises and worst, appointed a special sheriff to carry out the writ of
execution. In the first place, we emphatically rule that the Court of Appeals
has no authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own
decision. Discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section 2 (a), 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, is allowed pending appeal of a judgment or final
order of the trial court, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after
due hearing. A judgment of the Court of Appeals cannot be executed pending
appeal. Once final and executory, the judgment must be remanded to the lower
court, where a motion for its execution may be filed only after its entry. In other
words, before its finality, the judgment cannot be executed. There can be no
discretionary execution of a decision of the Court of Appeals. In the second place,
even in discretionary executions, the same must be firmly founded upon good
reasons. The court must state in a special order the "good reasons" justifying the
issuance of the writ. The good reasons allowing execution pending appeal must
constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the
injuries or damages to the adverse party if the decision is reversed. Jurisprudence
teaches us what are "good reasons" that justify a premature execution of
judgment, such as "deterioration of commodities subject of litigation" and "the
deteriorating condition of the vessel, M/V 'Valiant' . . . left to rot at the pier and
without a crew to guard it".
In this case, the good reasons given by the Court of Appeals to support the
discretionary execution of its decision are (1) that respondent would be deprived
of income from its business endeavors; (2) that "it is of public knowledge" that
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are clogged with cases and it may
take some time before the decision in the case may attain its finality; and (3) that
petitioners acted with bad faith and malice. None of the cited reasons is "good"
enough. According to jurisprudence, respondent's precarious financial condition
is not a compelling circumstance warranting immediate execution.
By the mere fact of the filing of the petition, the finality of the Court of Appeals'
decision was stayed, and there could be no entry of judgment therein, and, hence,
no premature execution could be had. The Court of Appeals adopted its
resolution granting execution pending appeal on September 18, 1998, after the
petition for review was already filed in the Supreme Court. [81] It thereby
encroached on the hallowed grounds of the Supreme Court. Worst of all,
the Court of Appeals has no authority to appoint a special sheriff. It
appointed an employee of the mailing section, who was not even bonded as
required by law.
WHEREFORE, the Court declares VOID the resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals and REINSTATES
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 231, dated March 23,
1998, and order dated April 14, 1998, in Civil Case 98-0366.
G.R. No. 210218, August 17, 2016
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF ANTONINA
RABIE, REPRESENTED BY ABRAHAM R. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
Petition: petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation against respondents Heirs of
Antonina Rabie (respondents) for the acquisition of a residential lot located in
Laguna to be used as access road for the Caliraya Hydro Electric Power Plant
Project of the NAPOCOR. The case was raffled to RTC of Laguna (trial court).
Respondents filed a Verified Answer and prayed for a just compensation. In
addition, respondents sought payment for NAPOCOR's alleged unauthorized
entry and use of the property from 1940 to date. After NAPOCOR deposited with
the Land Bank of the Philippines, it filed a Motion to Issue Order of Expropriation
and a Motion for Annotation/Registration of Partial Payment. The trial court
granted the motions.
Subsequently, the trial court also issued an Order directing the expropriation in
favor of the NAPOCOR upon payment of the FMV of the property. However, the
court also ruled that defendants' claim that said property was occupied by
plaintiff since 1940 is unrebutted, hence, reasonable rentals were awarded to
defendants.
NAPOCOR filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. However, the trial
court denied the motion in an Order dated 30 April 2013 which was received by
NAPOCOR on 23 May 2013 and by respondents on 15 May 2013.
On 22 May 2013, respondents filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. While
on 6 June 2013, NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal.
The trial court gave due course to NAPOCOR's Notice of Appeal and directed the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. The trial court also
granted respondents' Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.
The trial court's Officer-in-Charge issued a Writ of Execution. Sheriff Claveria
issued a Notice addressed to the President of NAPOCOR demanding payment of
yearly rentals plus 12% interest from 1940 up to the present until fully paid
within ten days from receipt thereof. Aggrieved, NAPOCOR filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The CA
dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition
Issues: (1) whether the trial court still had jurisdiction when it ruled on the
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal; (2) whether there exists good reasons for
the execution of the trial court's decision pending appeal
Ruling:
Trial court had jurisdiction to resolve motion for discretionary execution
Execution pending appeal, also called discretionary execution under Section
2(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is allowed upon good reasons to be stated in
a special order after due hearing. Section 2(a), Rule 39 provides:
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. -
(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. - On
motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in
the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in
possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the
case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in
its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before
the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution
pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order after due hearing.
In this case, the motion for execution pending appeal was filed by respondents
seven days after their receipt of the trial court's order denying the motions for
reconsideration filed by both parties. Clearly, respondents filed the motion for
execution pending appeal before the lapse of the period to file an appeal, which
is fifteen days from notice of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
Therefore, the trial court still had jurisdiction when respondents filed their
motion for execution pending appeal.
Further, prior to transmittal of the records of the case, the trial court does not
lose jurisdiction over the case and in fact, may issue an order for execution
pending appeal. In this case, the trial court issued its Order granting the motion
for execution pending appeal on 11 July 2013. That Order expressly stated that
the trial court was still in possession of the original record of the case at the
time. In fact, the records were transmitted to the Court of Appeals on 19 July
2013. In other words, the trial court issued the Order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal before the transmittal of the records to the Court of
Appeals. Hence, contrary to NAPOCOR's contention, the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the trial court still had jurisdiction when the motion for
execution pending appeal was filed and when the trial court resolved such
motion.
Discretionary execution does not apply to eminent domain proceedings
The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal
under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply to eminent domain proceedings.
As early as 1919 in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, the Court held:
When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally take the form of
an order merely requiring the payment of the award as a condition precedent to
the transfer of the title, as a personal judgment against the Government could
not be realized upon execution.
In Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, no less than the eminent Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee explained the rationale behind the doctrine that
government funds and properties cannot be seized under a writ of execution,
thus:
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Non-existence of good reasons for the execution pending appeal

The trial court also committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to specify
and discuss any good reason required for granting execution pending appeal.
The prevailing doctrine as provided for in Section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure is that discretionary execution is permissible only
when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality
or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period to appeal. Good
reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution lest
judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party after the lapse of time be
unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have
apparently no cause but to delay. Such reasons must constitute superior
circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Were it otherwise,
execution pending appeal may well become a tool of oppression and inequity
instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice.
The execution of judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general
rule and must, therefore, be strictly construed. So, too, it is not to be
availed of and applied routinely, but only in extraordinary circumstances.
This rule is strictly construed against the movant, for courts look with
disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquired a
final character. In the same vein, the Court has held that such execution is
"usually not favored because it affects the rights of the parties which are
yet to be ascertained on appeal."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 28 November 2013 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131335 is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
XLIII. RULE 39: SECS. 15 – 30
G.R. No. 137675 December 5, 2000
NOVERNIA P. NAGUIT, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSLER U. PADUA and NORBERTO B.
MAGSAJO, respondents.
Facts:
In a decision rendered on 15 October 1991, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 133, found Rolando Naguit liable for violation of BP 22, and
ordered him to indemnify private respondent Osler U. Padua. A writ of execution
was issued by said court and pursuant thereto, respondent Sheriff Norberto B.
Magsajo levied upon a condominium unit. Consequently, the property was sold
at a public auction in favor of private respondent, as the highest bidder. The
certificate of sale was issued in the name of private respondent
Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati against private respondent
Padua and respondent Sheriff Magsajo for the annulment of sale and for damages,
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in order to
enjoin the final conveyance of title over the condominium unit to private
respondent. Petitioner claimed that the debt contracted by her husband did not
redound to the benefit of the family, nor was it made with her consent, and
therefore, should not be charged to the conjugal partnership of gains or to her
exclusive property; that the condominium unit levied upon and sold to private
respondent is her exclusive property, not the judgment obligor's; and that
consequently, the levy and sale of the condominium unit are void.
RTC of Makati denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction, explaining that if plaintiff believes that there were irregularities in the
auction sale of the property subject of this case which is claimed to be owned by
the petitioner, the problems should have been threshed out before the RTC
Makati, Branch 133, which court authorized the levy on execution of judgment of
property of plaintiff in this case. Besides, the petitioner should have elevated the
matter to the higher tribunal, and seek proper injunctive relief, and not to refer
to this Court which does not exercise an appellate authority over the court that
issued the aforesaid writ of execution.
The trial court issued an order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
and dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's decision to dismiss the case. In its decision promulgated
on 18 November 1998, the appellate court explained that since petitioner is the
spouse of the judgment debtor she cannot be considered a stranger to the case.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether petitioner is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ
of execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent
action
Ruling: Yes.
In the case at bar, petitioner filed an independent action for the annulment of the
certificate of sale issued in favor of private respondent, contending that the
property levied upon and sold to private respondent by virtue of the writ of
execution issued in Criminal Case No. 90-2645 was her exclusive property, not
that of the judgment obligor. Pursuant to our ruling in Sy v. Discaya, petitioner is
deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is
therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of
ownership over the subject property.
Contrary to the stand taken by the trial court, the filing of such an independent
action cannot be considered an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of a co-equal
and coordinate court. The court issuing the writ of execution may enforce its
authority only over properties of the judgment debtor; thus, the sheriff acts
properly only when he subjects to execution property undeniably belonging to
the judgment debtor. If the sheriff levies upon the assets of a third person in
which the judgment debtor has no interest, then he is acting beyond the limits of
his authority and is amenable to control and correction by a court of competent
jurisdiction in a separate and independent action. This is in consonance with the
well-established principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger. Execution of a judgment can only be issued against a party
to the action, and not against one who has not yet had his day in court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 18 November 1998 and 9 February 1999,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. This case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
G.R. No. L-55076 September 21, 1987
MATILDE S. PALICTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE O. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch III, and MARCELO SOTTO, Administrator, respondents.
Petition: This is a petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
A sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the
respondent judge in the case of Pilar Teves, et al. vs Marcelo Sotto, Administrator,
for the satisfaction of judgment in the amount of P725,270.00.
Certain properties belonging to the late Don Filemon Sotto and administered by
respondent Marcelo Sotto were levied upon. Some of the properties were
awarded to Pilar Teves. The residential house situated on a government lot at
Lahug, Cebu City, was awarded to lone bidder Asuncion Villarante.
Within the period for redemption, petitioner Matilde S. Palicte, as one of the heirs
of the late Don Filemon Sotto, redeemed from purchaser Pilar Teves, 4 lots.
A deed of redemption was issued for these lots. Subsequently, petitioner Palicte
filed a motion with respondent Judge Ramolete for the transfer to her name of
the titles to the 4 parcels of land covered by the deed of redemption.
This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case entitled "Pilar Teves, et al.
vs Marcelo Sotto, administrator" on the ground that movant, Palicte, is not one of
those authorized to redeem under the provisions of the Rules of Court.
The lower court held that although Palicte is one of the declared heirs, she does
not qualify as a successor-in-interest who may redeem the real properties sold.
It ruled that the deed of redemption is null and void. The motion of Palicte was
denied.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Palicte may validly exercise the right of
redemption under Sec. 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling: Yes.
Sec. 29 of Rule 39 provides:
SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold. — Real property sold as
provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold
separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by
the following persons:
(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole or
any part of the property;
(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage on
the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the judgment
under which the property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed
a redemptioner.
Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by
the judgment debtor or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the
property. Does Matilde Palicte fall within the term "successor-in-interest"? In the
case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Filemon Sotto whose
estate was levied upon on execution to satisfy the money judgment against it. She
is one of the declared heirs in Special Proceeding No. 2706-R. As a legitimate heir,
she qualifies as a successor-in- interest.
The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of the administrator
as the judgment debtor and as the only "successor-in-interest." The estate of the
deceased is the judgment debtor and the heirs who will eventually acquire that
estate should not be prohibited from doing their share in its preservation.
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the properties, her motion to
transfer the titles of the four (4) parcels of land covered by the Deed of
Redemption from registration in the name of Filemon Sotto to her name cannot
prosper at this time. Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount to a
distribution of the estate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court's orders
declaring the deed of redemption null and void and denying the motion to
transfer title over the redeemed properties to Matilda Palicte are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, subject to the right of the other heirs to join in the redemption as
stated above.
[G.R. No. 78556. April 25, 1991.]
ALFARO FORTUNADO, EDITH FORTUNADO, NESTOR FORTUNADO and
RAMON A. GONZALES, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, BASILISA
CAMPANO, as City Sheriff of Iligan City, REGISTER OF DEEDS, Iligan City,
ANGEL L. BAUTISTA and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Respondents.
Petition: The petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 denying
mandamus to compel the sheriff to execute a final deed of sale in their favor.
Facts:
RTC of Quezon City 2 rendered judgment in Civil Case entitled "Alfaro
Fortunado v. Angel Bautista," ordering the defendant to pay damages to the
plaintiff. Pursuant to the said judgment, respondent Basilisa Campano, City
Sheriff, levied upon two parcels of land registered in the name of Bautista. The
latter lot had already been purchased by respondent National Steel Corporation,
but had not yet been registered in its name.
After due notice, these lots were sold at public auction to the petitioners as the
only bidder. They were issued a certificate of sale which was registered on April
25, 1984.
Subsequently, NSC filed with the trial court an urgent motion to redeem both
lots. This was opposed by the petitioners on the ground that the movant did not
have the personality to intervene.
As the motion remained unresolved and the period of redemption would expire
on April 18, 1985, NSC issued to the sheriff PNB Check which was sufficient to
cover the full redemption price for both lots.The sheriff acknowledged receipt of
the check as redemption money for the two parcels and issued a certificate of
redemption in favor of NSC and Bautista.
Bautista wrote the sheriff that he would no longer effect the redemption
because there was nothing to redeem, the auction sale being null and void.
The sheriff wired the petitioners’ counsel, notifying him of the deposit of the
PNB check. The said counsel told the sheriff that he was rejecting the check
because it was not legal tender and was not intended for payment but merely
for deposit.
Petitioner requested the sheriff to issue a final deed of sale over the two lots and
deliver the same to them on the ground that no valid redemption had been
effected within the 12-month period from the registration of the sale. When the
request was not granted, the petitioners filed with the respondent court a
petition for mandamus. The respondent court denied mandamus but granted
injunction to restrain the registration of the certificate of redemption in favor of
NSC and Bautista.
Aggrieved, the petitioners moved for partial reconsideration. While their
motion was pending, NSC filed a Manifestation informing the respondent court
that the certificate of redemption had already been registered and TCT No. T-
27154 had been issued in its favor.
The respondent court denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this appeal by certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not redemption had been validly effected by the private
respondents.
Ruling: Yes.
Although the private respondents in the case at bar did not file a redemption
case against petitioners, it should not be noted that private respondents NSC
filed an Urgent Motion for Redemption dated February 11, 1985, and Bautista
filed an Urgent Motion (To Deposit Redemption Money with Quezon City Clerk
of Court) dated March 27, 1985. The motions were well within the redemption
period.
In the United States, it has also been held and recognized that a payment by
check or draft or bank bills or currency which is not legal tender is effective if
the officer accepts such payment. If in good faith the redemptioner pays, and the
officer receives before the expiration of the time of redemption, an ordinary
banker’s check, the payment is regarded as sufficient.
We find nothing wrong with Bautista’s letter of March 21, 1985, where he made
his redemption of the lot covered by TCT No. T-7625 subject to the reservation
that "the same shall not be taken to mean my acknowledgment of the validity of
the aforesaid writ of execution and sale . . . nor . . . as waiver on my part of any of
the legal rights and remedies available to me under the circumstances." Had he
not done so, estoppel might have operated against him. As we held in Cometa v.
IAC, 15 "redemption is an implied admission of the regularity of the sale and
would stop the petitioner from later impugning its validity on that ground." In
questioning the writ of execution and sale and at the same time redeeming his
property, Bautista was exercising alternative reliefs.
In Javellana, it was contended that the position of Luis Mirasol as a litigant in the
prior appeal was inconsistent with his position as litigant in the redemption
case and that he was estopped from now claiming as redemptioner the property
which he had earlier claimed as owner. The Court held:
We are unable to see any force in the suggestions; as the positions occupied by
this litigant are based upon alternative rather than upon opposed pretension.
No one can question the right of a litigant to claim property as owner and to
seek in the same proceeding alternative relief founded upon some secondary
right. The right of redemption, for instance, is always considered compatible
with ownership, and one who fails to obtain relief in the sense of absolute
owner may successfully assert the other right. That which a litigant may do in
any one case can of course be done in two different proceedings.
We are not, by this decision, sanctioning the use of a check for the payment of
obligations over the objection of the creditor. What we are saying is that a check
may be used for the exercise of the right of redemption, the same being a right
and not an obligation. The tender of a check is sufficient to compel redemption
but is not in itself a payment that relieves the redemptioner from his liability to
pay the redemption price. In other words, while we hold that the private
respondents properly exercised their right or redemption, they remain liable of
course, for the payment of the redemption price.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with the modification that
the redemption made by Angel L. Bautista was also unconditional like that of
the National Steel Corporation. Accordingly, the petition is DENIED, with costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED
G.R. Nos. L-50405-06 August 5, 1981
VICENTA P. TOLENTINO and JOSE TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, CONSUELO B. DE
LA CRUZ, et al., respondents.
Petition: A petition for review by certiorari
Facts:
Ceferino de la Cruz died leaving as his only heirs his widow, Consuelo de la Cruz,
and their children (hereinafter referred to as the De la Cruzes). At the time of his
demise, Ceferino left a parcel of land (homestead land). In a deed of sale executed
by the De la Cruzes, the homestead land was sold to the spouses Jose Tolentino
and Vicenta Tolentino (hereinafter referred to as the Tolentinos). The Tolentinos
took immediate possession of the homestead land and caused the issuance of
T.C.T. No. T-11135 in their names.
The Tolentinos constituted a first mortgage over the homestead land, together
with two other parcels of land covered in favor of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, (BPI) Davao Branch. Another mortgage was constituted over the said
properties in 1964 in favor of Philippine Banking Corporation. The Tolentinos
failed to pay their mortgage indebtedness to the BPI upon maturity in the judicial
foreclosure sale that followed, conducted by the City Sheriff of Davao, BPI was the
sole and highest bidder. The Sheriff's Certificate of Sale in favor of BPI was
registered only on April 2, 1969 in the Registry of Deeds of Davao.
Meanwhile, the De la Cruzes filed an action with the CFI of Davao against the
Tolentinos for the repurchase of the homestead land, on the ground that they had
tried to repurchase said land extrajudicially for several times already but that the
Tolentinos would not heed their request, thus constraining the De la Cruzes to
file a court action for the repurchase thereof.
The Tolentinos filed a Motion to Dismiss the repurchase case on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action, but said motion was denied by the lower
court.
Upon a manifestation filed by the De la Cruzes, the lower court issued an Order
declaring the Tolentinos as "having no standing" in the proceedings therein, to
which the latter filed a motion for its reconsideration. This motion, as well as their
second Motion for Reconsideration, was denied by the lower court.
Subsequently, the lower court rendered a decision allowing the De la Cruzes to
repurchase the homestead land. Upon payment by the De la Cruzes of the amount
representing the repurchase price to the BPI, the latter executed a deed of
conveyance over the homestead land. On motion, the lower court issued a writ of
possession in favor of the De la Cruzes.
The Tolentinos filed a Motion to Quash the writ of possession alleging as principal
grounds therefor the absence of service on their counsel of a copy of the writ of
possession, as well as the decision of the lower court declaring the De la Cruzes
entitled to repurchase the homestead land. The lower court denied the Motion to
Quash. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the lower court.
Aggrieved, the Tolentinos filed before the respondent CA a petition for certiorari.
This petition was denied by the respondent court. In the meantime, petitioner
Vicente Tolentino went to BPI Davao Branch, offering to redeem the homestead
property for P16,000 covered by a check. Upon being informed that she can no
longer redeem the same for the reason that it was already conveyed to the De la
Cruzes, Vicente left the office of the manager. Vicente later on consigned with the
Office of the City Sheriff of Davao a crossed PNB check drawn against the PNB
Kidapawan Branch, allegedly for the redemption of the 3 lots, including the
homestead land. The following day, however, upon advice of their counsel,
Vicente issued a stop-payment order against the said crossed check purportedly
to protect her rights and to prevent BPI cashing said check without returning all
the properties which BPI had foreclosed and purchased.
Simultaneously with the consignation of the crossed check with the City Sheriff
of Davao, the Tolentinos filed a complaint (redemption case) against BPI, with
the Davao CFI for the redemption of their properties, which were foreclosed by
and sold to BPI. BPI seasonably filed an answer with counterclaim for exemplary
damages in the sum of P5,000 and attorney's fees in the sum of P4,000 plus costs.
The trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint of the Tolentinos.
From that decision, both the Tolentinos and BPI appealed to the respondent
Court of Appeals,
In a consolidated decision, the respondent Court of Appeals held, among others,
that consignation by crossed check does not satisfy the requirements set forth in
Article 1249 of the New Civil Code governing the payment of debts in money.
The Tolentinos filed a Motion for Reconsideration in CA. This Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the respondent court for lack of merit. Hence, the
instant petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the tender of payment and consignation made by the
Tolentinos before the City Sheriff of Davao were valid
Ruling: Yes.
When the action to redeem was filed, a simultaneous deposit of the redemption
money was tendered to the Sheriff and under the last sentence of Section 31, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, it is expressly provided that the tender of the redemption
money may be made to the Sheriff who made the sale. And the redemption is not
rendered invalid by the fact that the said officer accepted a check for the amount
necessary to make the redemption instead of requiring payment in money. It goes
without saying that if he had seen fit to do so, the officer could have required
payment to be made in lawful money, and he undoubtedly, in accepting a check,
placed himself in a position where he could be liable to the purchaser at the public
auction if any damage had been suffered by the latter as a result of the medium
in which payment was made. But this cannot affect the validity of the payment.
The check as a medium of payment in commercial transactions is too firmly
established by usage to permit of any doubt upon this point at the present
day. No importance may thus be attached to the circumstance that a stop-
payment order was issued against said check the day following the deposit, for
the same will not militate against the right of the Tolentinos to redeem, in the
same manner that a withdrawal of the redemption money being deposited cannot
be deemed to have forfeited the right to redeem, such redemption being optional
and not compulsory.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the appealed consolidated
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby MODIFIED and
judgment is hereby rendered authorizing the petitioners to redeem the
properties subject matter hereof, other than the homestead land, within thirty
(30) days from entry of judgment, and ordering private respondent BPI to
execute a deed of absolute conveyance thereof in favor of the petitioners upon
payment by the latter of the purchase price thereof, with 1% per month interest
thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of
any taxes or assessments which BPI may have paid thereon after purchase, if any.
In all other respects, the aforesaid consolidated decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs at this
instance.
G.R. No. 152343 January 18, 2008
MA. FE BACOS, petitioner,
vs.
DOMINGO ARCEGA, respondent.
Petition: Petition for Review on Certiorari
Facts:
Domingo Arcega, respondent, filed with the Labor Arbiter in Quezon City a
complaint for illegal dismissal
against Viabel International Garments, Inc. (Viabel) and/or Marlon Viado. The
Labor Arbiter Daisy G. Cauton-Barcelona rendered a Decision in favor of
respondent.
Due to the failure of Viabel and/or Marlon Viado to appeal to the NLRC, the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision became final and executory. Upon respondent’s motion, a writ
of execution was issued. The sheriff of the NLRC levied 28 sewing machines
belonging to Viabel and/or Marlon Viado and scheduled their sale at a public
auction.
Maria Fe Bacos, petitioner, filed with the NLRC a notice of third party claim,
alleging that the levied machines were previously sold to her by Marlon Viado.
The respondent filed an opposition to petitioner’s third- party claim contending
that it is frivolous and spurious.
The Labor Arbiter Barcelona dismissed the third-party claim on the ground that
the Deed of Absolute Sale appears to be spurious. On appeal by petitioner, the
NLRC dismissed the same. In another Resolution, the NLRC denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA rendered its
Decision dismissing the petition, holding that herein petitioner had not
succeeded in substantiating her claim that the levied properties were sold to her.
Forthwith, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
appellate court. Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner contends inter alia that the CA erred in dismissing the petition,
claiming that Section 16, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, merely
requires the third-party claimant to submit an affidavit of his title to the
property. The Rule does not require that her title of ownership be produced.
Issue: Whether the circumstances supporting the third-party claimant’s
ownership or possession of the levied properties must be specified.
Ruling: Yes.
The petition lacks merit.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
provides:
SEC. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. If the
property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment
obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title
thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such
right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and
a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound
to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the
officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party
claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In
case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by
the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the
taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond
unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the filing of the bond.
Corollarily, Sections 2 and 3, Rule VI of the NLRC Manual of Instructions for
Sheriffs provide:
Section 2. Proceedings. If property levied upon be claimed by any person
other than the losing party or his agent, such person shall make an
affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
grounds of such right or title and shall file the same with the sheriff and
copies thereof served upon the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing
the writ and upon the prevailing party. Upon receipt of the third-party
claim, all proceedings with respect to the execution of the property
subject of the third-party claim shall automatically be suspended
and the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ shall conduct a
hearing with due notice to all parties concerned and resolve the validity
of the claim within ten (10) working days from receipt thereof and his
decision is appealable to the Commission within ten (10) working days
from notice,
and the Commission shall likewise resolve the appeal within the same
period.
Section 3. Resolution of the Third-Party Claim, Effect. In the event the
third party claim is declared to be valid, the sheriff shall immediately
release the property to the third party claimant, his agent or
representative and the levy on execution shall immediately be lifted or
discharged. However, should the third party claim be found to be
without factual or legal basis, the sheriff must proceed with the
execution of the property levied upon as if no third party claim has been
filed.
It is thus clear that a third-party claim must be supported by an affidavit stating
the claimant’s title to, or right to possession of the property, and the grounds
therefor. In other words, a mere affidavit will not suffice. The circumstances
supporting the third-party claimant’s ownership or possession of the levied
properties must be specified.
Here, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that the Deed of Absolute Sale
involving the sewing machines between petitioner and Marlon Viado is
spurious.Likewise, the Court of Appeals found that no copy of the said document
is on file with the Clerk of Court. The appellate court aptly held that the absence
of such document is itself a badge of fraud and simulation that could make any
court suspicious and wary of imputing any legitimacy and validity to the same,
and actually militates against its use as basis for petitioners claim.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64177. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.