REG. I.D.

: 1702679

Self- constitution in the ethics of Plato and Kant

 Introduction

Over the years, there has been a debate about sources of motivation for enacting an

action. Some philosophers like Kant and Plato used the constitutional model and categorical

imperative to explain an action and why it is self-constitution. This paper is a summary and a

critical review of the constitutional model and why it is better than Hume’s combat model,

what an action is and how it pertains to an agent, Plato’s account of the constitutional model

and Kant’s account of the categorical imperative.

Constitutional model

In the constitutional model passion and reason are assigned different functional and

structural roles in the soul. Passion and reason are responsible for generating a motive towards

an action. The human soul is equated to a constitution of a city- state. The constitutional model

defines what an action is and makes presumptions on what makes an action right or wrong. An

action is not just bald behavior or bodily movements. An action is brought into being by the

persons who conceive it. An action is formulated by specific attributes an individual possess1.

Different people form has different motives for implementing an action. Their motives are

either from reason or from passion. According to the constitutional model, an action is indeed

one’s own if it unifies him wholly the way a constitution unites a city- state. Good actions are

actions that give a person voluntary integrality when generating a motive2. On the other hand,

1
Christine M. 2009, Self-Constitution: Action, Identity, and Integrity, Oxford:

OxfordUniversity Press (especially “Autonomy and Efficacy”) Van Hooft, Stan, 2001.

‘Judgment, Decision, and Integrity,’ Philosophical Explorations, 4: 135–149.

2
Christine M Korsgaard,. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1996.
 3

bad actions are implemented when something inside a person threatens his voluntary

integrality. Basically, an action is self-constitution.

Hume has a completely different view of passion and reason in his combat model.

According to Hume, a rational person has to regulate his actions according to logic. He states

that if any other principle like passion challenges logic, an individual ought to oppose or subdue

it. He argues that motives formed on reason are valid and consistent, but motives built from

passion are blind, inconsistent and deceitful3. This model does not hold up especially from a

third person’s conscious. In some cases, an individual’s actions are usually a result of one

motive overriding the other. For example, the urge to satisfy one’s passion may be stronger

than the reason not to. In this case, the difference between passion and reason is the same as

the difference between one passion and another. If one follows Hume’s line of thought, then

he will come to a conclusion that actions are no different than biological process or reflexes

which is wrong. An action is so much more than that, and the constitutional model proves it.

Action

An action is a deed of doing something to achieve an objective. According to Plato the

type of action conceived is what sets aside an unjust person from a just person. An action is

governed by free will. Free will is determined by what part of the soul is superior which in

most cases the reason is. An action is an agent’s final choice on his identity to reason or passion.

According to Plato and Kant action is self-constitution. A good action establishes and maintains

voluntary unity of the human soul, and a wrong action makes it impossible for the soul to act

as a unified agent. All the three parts, reason, appetite, and spirit work as a unit. The principle

3
Hume David , A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd Edition, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge

and P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), Book II, Part III, Section III, p. 413.
of justice is used to implement good, or just actions and deliberative action by its nature

imposes unity on free will.

Plato’s account of the constitutional model

Plato uses the constitutional model to define the meaning of justice. He equates the

constitution of the soul to the city state’s constitution. He identifies the main elements of a city

which are rulers who constitute the law, the auxiliaries who execute and implement the law

and the common folk like farmers and merchants who provide for the city’s needs. The rulers

make the law according to what is best for the city as a whole. Each one of these elements in

the city performs their duties and do not meddle in each other’s responsibilities. The same

concept applies to the constitution of the soul. According to Plato, a soul has three parts reason,

appetites, and spirit. These parts work in the same way as the city- state elements. Reason

compares to the rulers, and it provides guidance for the good of the whole person, spirit

correlates with the auxiliaries where it enacts actions of reason and appetites which resemble

the common folk, and their work is to provide whatever needs are desired. A soul usually works

as a unit, appetites makes a proposal regarding a certain issue, reason decides whether to act

on it or not, and the spirit carries reason’s decision out. According to Plato when the main

elements in a city- state perform their duties, they ultimately end up working as a unit. The

constitution possesses a regularizing force which ensures that the three parties work as a single

consolidated agent4. The constitution is one of the deliberative procedures that ensure that

4
Christine M Korsgaard. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1996.
 3

there is justice in the city and allows the city to act a single unified unit. Justice is what makes

a person function as a single unit and injustice is what make it impossible.

Kant’s account of the categorical imperative

Kant’s categorical imperative is also known as the law of free will. The idea of freedom

is common in rational beings. Free will is a self- governing process that allows human beings

to make their own decisions. According to Kant free will is autonomous because a person has

the ability to decide whether or not to implement a certain action. With free will comes

inclinations or incentives to do things. A person gets to implement an action according to what

he is most inclined to5. His motive will be based on reason and what will be the outcome of the

action if implemented. For example, if a certain item is appealing, the inclination is to purchase

this particular item which is termed as a proposal. Free will determines whether or not to buy

this particular item based on reason. Free will does not follow any laws apart from the laws

that a person formulates themselves. Kant’s categorical imperative is based on the

constitutional model because inclination presents a proposal, reason decides whether to act on

it or not. The decisions made take the form of a legislative act.6

Conclusion

The combat model has many flaws as explained in the text above. It does not give an

accurate picture of the human souls and is biased to reason. It does not account for other

elements that have functional roles in the soul like the constitutional model. The constitutional

model can be viewed as the formal standards for deliberative action. Humans have an

5
Matherne Samantha. Kant and the Art of Schematism. Kantian Review .2014 19 (2):181-

2015
6
Arruda, Caroline T., 2016, “Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement”,

Philosophia, 44(4): 1165– 1165–1183. doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9744-5.

obligation to choose actions justly as per the categorical imperative. All good and bad actions

are selected using the same process, the decision made after the process is what is differentiates

a good action from a bad one.

 3

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