Professional Documents
Culture Documents
GP 24-20
Applicability Group
Date 30 December 2005
GP 24-20
BP GROUP
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES
30 December 2005 GP 24-20
Guidance on Practice for Fire and Explosion Hazard Management of Offshore Facilities
Foreword
This is the first issue of Engineering Technical Practice (ETP) GP 24-20. This GP is a development of
RP 24-2, which has been divided into a series of GPs and GISs of which this GP is part. Related GPs
and GISs are:
BP
GP 24-10 Fire Protection - Onshore
GP 24-03 Concept Selection for Inherently Safer Design
GP 24-21 Onshore and Offshore Fire Hazard Analysis.
GP 24-22 Onshore/Offshore Gas Explosion Hazard Analysis.
GP 24-23 Offshore - Active Fire Protection.
GP 24-24 Offshore - Passive Fire Protection.
GIS 24-233 Fire Water Pumps and System Design.
GIS 24-071 Fine Water Spray Active Fire Protection.
GIS 24-072 Carbon Dioxide Extinguishment Systems
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Table of Contents
Page
Foreword ........................................................................................................................................ 2
1. Scope .................................................................................................................................... 6
2. Normative references............................................................................................................. 6
3. Terms and definitions............................................................................................................. 7
4. Symbols and abbreviations .................................................................................................... 8
5. General.................................................................................................................................. 9
5.1. FEHM Policy ............................................................................................................... 9
5.2. Responsibility and Timing ......................................................................................... 10
6. Fire and explosion hazard management (FEHM)................................................................. 10
6.1. Overview................................................................................................................... 10
6.2. Hazard categories..................................................................................................... 11
6.3. FEHM process .......................................................................................................... 12
6.4. FEHM and CVP ........................................................................................................ 12
7. CVP appraise....................................................................................................................... 13
8. CVP select........................................................................................................................... 13
8.1. General..................................................................................................................... 13
8.2. Hazard identification ................................................................................................. 13
8.3. Hazard evaluation ..................................................................................................... 15
8.4. Hazard conflicts ........................................................................................................ 15
8.5. Catastrophic hazards ................................................................................................ 15
8.6. Final evaluation......................................................................................................... 15
9. CVP define .......................................................................................................................... 15
9.1. Hazard identification during Define stage.................................................................. 15
9.2. Process and layout optimisation................................................................................ 16
9.3. Hazard analysis ........................................................................................................ 16
9.4. Assignment of hazard category................................................................................. 20
9.5. Hazard management strategy ................................................................................... 21
9.6. SCDM selection ........................................................................................................ 23
9.7. SCDM performance standards.................................................................................. 24
10. CVP execute........................................................................................................................ 26
10.1. General..................................................................................................................... 26
10.2. Final risk assessment ............................................................................................... 27
10.3. Documentation.......................................................................................................... 27
11. CVP operate ........................................................................................................................ 30
A.1. SCDM tables........................................................................................................................ 31
A.2. Table descriptions................................................................................................................ 31
A.2.1. General..................................................................................................................... 31
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List of Tables
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List of Figures
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1. Scope
2. Normative references
The following normative documents contain requirements that, through reference in this text,
constitute requirements of this technical practice. For dated references, subsequent amendments to, or
revisions of, any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on this
technical practice are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of
the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative
document referred to applies.
BP
GP 24-03 Concept Selection for Inherently Safer Design
GP 24-10 Fire Protection - Onshore
GP 24-21 Onshore and Offshore Fire Hazard Analysis.
GP 24-22 Onshore/Offshore Gas Explosion Hazard Analysis.
GP 24-23 Offshore - Active Fire Protection.
GP 24-24 Offshore - Passive Fire Protection.
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For the purposes of this GP, the following terms and definitions apply:
Catastrophic hazard
Hazard of severity such that preservation of lives of personnel on facility cannot be demonstrated and
design is such that effects cannot be mitigated to allow controlled evacuation.
Controllable hazard
Hazard that has potential for local damage, harm to personnel, and local escalation but does not have
potential to endanger entire facility or endanger personnel sheltering at muster points or refuges.
Evacuation hazard
Hazard that after a defined period of time may have potential to endanger lives of personnel on facility
through progressive escalation or through eventual impairment of muster areas and evacuation
systems.
Fuel
Any flammable gas or liquid.
Hazard category
Hazards are defined in three categories:
a. Controllable.
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b. Evacuation.
c. Catastrophic.
a. Involving death or serious injury to persons on facility or working at facility. This usually
involves more than one death or serious injury. This does not include occupational hazards
managed through operations management system for facility.
b. Resulting, directly or indirectly, in significant environmental impact.
c. Resulting in major damage to structure of facility or plant, with significant loss of
production capacity.
d. Likely to damage BP reputation.
Muster area
Predefined area for temporary refuge where personnel can safely assemble to assess hazard, take roll
call, and prepare to evacuate facility.
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TR Temporary refuge.
5. General
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2. Major accident risk, process, control, and layout discipline personnel: FEHM enables
them to optimise their designs such that they minimise frequency and consequence of
fire and explosion hazards.
3. Hazard analysts: FEHM enables them to identify and quantify fire and explosion
hazards in a form that can be used by engineers and operators.
4. Process safety and fire protection engineers: FEHM enables them to design active and
passive protection systems applicable to identified fire and explosion hazards.
5. Operators: FEHM enables them to ensure that design and application of fire and
explosion hazard management strategies and systems comply with and support
operations and maintenance philosophy, ensure personnel safety, and protect the
environment.
6.1. Overview
6.1.1. Philosophy
a. FEHM shall demonstrate that fire and explosion risks have been identified, understood,
and systems and processes are in place to effectively manage these risks.
b. FEHM shall demonstrate that risks to personnel on facility comply with BP reporting
criteria identified in GP 48-50 and/or comply with project risk criteria.
c. FEHM shall comply with any client/operator risk criteria or national risk criteria.
d. FEHM should be agreed upon by future operator of facility to ensure that operator:
1. Knows purpose and capability of all SCDMs (safety critical design measures).
2. Can operate SCDMs properly.
3. Has adequate maintenance schemes in place.
4. Has included these maintenance schemes into operating procedures.
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6.2.1. General
a. In implementation of FEHM, the project or operational team shall identify hazards and
then determine what hazard category the identified hazard shall be placed. Hazard
categories determine how each hazard will be managed.
b. Fire and explosion hazards shall be sorted into three hazard categories:
1. Controllable.
2. Evacuate.
3. Catastrophic.
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d. Evacuation hazards shall be managed such that integrity of escape routes, muster areas,
and evacuation equipment is maintained for a defined time period, during which it can be
demonstrated that controlled evacuation from the facility can be performed.
e. Frequency of evacuation hazards shall be actively managed over and above that required
for controllable hazards.
f. The project team shall design facilities such that frequency of evacuation is at lowest
reasonably practical level, particularly if it is inherently hazardous to evacuate due to
weather conditions and location.
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7. CVP appraise
a. The project development team shall identify risks from fires and explosions and costs of
mitigation measures.
b. The project development team shall conduct a preliminary major accident risk assessment
as outlined in GP 48-50.
c. Assessment process outlined in GP 24-03 should be used in this stage
d. FEHM process shall identify primary risk drivers associated with:
1. Well fluid properties: pressure, temperatures, toxicity, corrosivity.
2. Drilling and well service requirements: number of wells, workover requirements.
3. Storage and export requirements and limitations.
4. Limitations on choice of concept (e.g., deep water).
5. Particular processing requirements.
6. Simultaneous operations of future drilling and production of hydrocarbons
e. FEHM process should consider manageability of major hazards. Particular attention should
be paid to major hazards that may expose large numbers of personnel or processes and
equipment that require frequent hazardous intervention.
f. Potential costs, design requirements, and limitations on choice of concept or operations
arising from major accident hazards should be considered in overall commercial and
technical appraisal of development, as outlined in GP 24-03.
8. CVP select
8.1. General
An initial FEHM evaluation shall be conducted.
Select stage requires development of a number of radically different concepts and
selection of best option as described in GP 24-03.
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9. CVP define
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d. Hazard identification should ensure all hazards have been identified and are considered in
hazard analysis. HAZID process is described in detail in BP HAZID information.
Special note should be made if fires may be preceded by confined explosion.
9.3.1. General
a. Progressively deeper understanding of hazard causes, consequences, and potential for
escalation should be developed during CVP define stage.
Hazard understanding provides core information on which to base hazard
management decisions and designs that flow from them. It is not a retroactive
exercise to be performed on completed design.
b. The project team shall define which hazard analysis studies are required to understand fire
and explosion hazards.
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• Process simulation model to accurately calculate release rates versus time for
larger number of hole sizes. This can examine effects of optimised isolation,
different depressurisation rates, and effects of delayed operation.
• Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models to quantify flammable gas cloud
sizes and concentrations.
• CFD models to quantify explosion overpressures from a range of scenarios.
• CFD models to quantify severity of external flaming from confined modules.
• CFD models to quantify density and toxicity of smoke around escape routes,
muster areas, and evacuation equipment.
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• Mass flow rate of flammable release over time, taking into account gas detection
and response times for ESD (emergency shutdown) and blowdown.
• Calculation of flammable cloud development in area concerned with
determining maximum gas cloud volume, buildup time, steady state
concentration, and decay time.
• Most likely ignition sources or assessment of worst case ignition location.
b. EHA should be conducted for cloud size ranges predicted for defined scenarios to
determine range of overpressure and drag loads produced in relation to cloud size.
c. EHA at this stage should correspond to level 2 assessment as defined in GP 24-22.
d. EHA shall identify:
1. Ventilation rates for each area (module) based on various wind speeds and directions.
2. Options for ventilation improvement (grating, plating, walls).
3. Gas cloud sizes using gas accumulation analysis based on project supplied scenarios.
4. Gas cloud size for various leak rates (e.g., 2 kg/s, 5 kg/s, 10 kg/s, 20 kg/s, 40 kg/s, 60
kg/s).
5. Gas cloud size versus wind speed (e.g., 2 m/s, 6 m/s, 10 m/s).
6. Gas cloud size versus wind direction (e.g., east, west, north, south).
7. Effect of design options (e.g., walls, grating, plating, forced ventilation).
8. Effect of leak location and direction.
9. Effect of gas detection reliability (coverage and redundancy) on gas cloud buildup
rate.
10. Effect of blowdown and isolation on buildup rate and decay rate.
11. Explosion effects for each area.
12. Explosion overpressure load and impulse versus cloud size, duration, and variation
with time for both SLB (strength level blast) and DLB (ductile level blast).
13. Structural response to imposed loads for both SLB and DLB.
14. Drag loads for piping and large vessels.
15. Effect of ignition location.
16. Effect of gas cloud location and shape.
17. Effect of changes in design of control or mitigation options (e.g., walls, grating).
18. Structural loads for main structure, walls, decks, equipment, and piping supports.
19. Identification of items of plant and equipment that are vulnerable to explosion load
and failure that could lead to critical escalation.
20. Options for controlling and mitigating explosion hazards.
21. Definition of safety critical design elements for control and mitigation.
e. EHA should be performed with close cooperation between explosion analysts and project
team (management and structural, layout, piping, and safety engineers), as options for
design changes need to be discussed and assessed quickly for rejection or implementation.
f. EHA shall be updated as design progresses and strategies to manage hazards have been
selected and defined.
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9.4.1. General
a. FEHM process shall assign each identified hazard to one of three hazard categories:
1. Controllable.
2. Evacuate.
3. Catastrophic.
b. Assignment of hazards to these categories should be based on potential for and timing of
damage and escalation from FHA and EHA.
Core of FEHM process is determination of hazard category. This defines how
hazard is managed, defines what hazard management strategies and SCDMs are
needed, and sets performance requirements of SCDMs.
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3. Hazard zone is very large and creates so much disruption that personnel are divided
and unable to muster in one place, accurate head count cannot be achieved, or each
group cannot evacuate in safe controlled manner.
4. Hazard escalates so rapidly that muster areas and evacuation equipment become
overwhelmed before controlled evacuation can be achieved.
Hazards may include continuous releases from reservoir arising from drilling, well
service, or completion failure. Hazards may result from large liquid processing
inventories where smoke and flaming effects of very large fires create prolonged
exposure of plant and muster areas. Hazards may also be associated with
hydrocarbon releases concurrent with SCDM failure, such as failure of ESD to
close.
Projects should avoid classifying riser releases outboard of topsides SDV (shutdown
valve) as evacuation hazards, particularly on fixed single jacket facilities. Resultant
fires could be catastrophic and should be classified as such. Fitment of subsea
isolation valves might reduce duration and immediate effects of these failures, but
they can still result in multiple fatalities.
9.5.1. General
a. Management strategy and mitigation methods shall be selected for each fire and explosion
hazard.
b. Strategy selected shall be appropriate for the hazard category to which the hazard has been
assigned.
c. Five basic hazard management strategies should be applied sequentially until adequate
defence in depth is provided. The five basic strategies are, in descending order of
preference:
1. Eliminate.
2. Prevent.
3. Detect and control.
4. Mitigate.
5. Emergency response (including muster and evacuation).
d. Hazard management strategy should include comprehensive suite of prevention measures
and measures to detect, control, mitigate, and potentially evacuate.
e. Particular strategy should be selected early in the design phase while it is still possible to
optimise design, minimize hazards, and take credit for these features before committing
expenditure on extensive protection.
f. Default set of strategies and SCDMs for a large integrated facility are described in Annex
A.
g. Selection of SCDM to implement these strategies and performance required of those
SCDMs is defined in 9.6 and 9.7.
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9.6.1. General
a. FEHM process shall define role of SCDMs in managing impact of hazards.
b. FEHM shall clearly define performance and required survivability such that effective
SCDMs may be specified.
c. Specification of SCDMs shall follow processes described in appropriate ETPs.
d. SCDM selected to implement hazard management strategy shall comply with the IMFS.
e. Default set of strategies and SCDMs for large integrated facility are in Annex A.
f. SCDM selection should emphasise effectiveness and minimise potential for failure,
particularly through human error.
g. SCDM should include protective systems referred to in element 5 of the IMFS.
h. SCDM choice should also minimise maintenance with the reduced associated exposure of
personnel (i.e., fewer tasks in which to make mistakes and fewer people exposed).
i. SCDM should be classified in descending order of preference:
1. Passive
2. Active.
3. Procedural (i.e., operational controls).
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9.7.1. General
a. Performance standards shall be set for all SCDMs, including competencies and procedures
required to implement hazard management strategy.
Performance standard is a statement, expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms,
of performance requirement of SCDMs, item of equipment, person, or procedure
used as basis for managing hazard through lifecycle of facility.
b. Performance standards shall be endorsed by future operators and shall be documented for
delivery to future operations group.
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9.7.2. Role
Exact role that SCDM provides shall be defined before performance standard is set. Role shall
be defined with respect to particular hazards.
For example, role of a depressurisation system may not simply be to meet a
particular depressurisation rate in code. It could be prevention of vessel rupture in
high pressure condensate fire or reduction of duration of gas fire such that it does
not cause equipment failure.
9.7.3. Functionality
a. Minimum performance necessary to fulfil role shall be defined.
b. During operation of SCDM, failure to achieve minimum performance shall require
immediate repair or replacement or shall be considered a change and therefore initiate
management of change systems.
Codes and standards often provide or infer default standards and the means to
achieve them. If these are the start point, code suitability should be verified against
specific hazard requirements to confirm effectiveness.
Typical examples of functional performance for engineered SCDM are:
• Sensitivity and response time of gas detectors.
• Fire rating of passive fire protection: J30, H60, etc.
• Application rate of firewater to keep specified vessel temperature.
• Maximum blockage of ventilation or venting spaces.
For example, functional performance standard of fire pump may be defined by
response time, run time, and flow and pressure curve that can meet different and
multiple demands of each major accident hazard scenarios in which water is critical
to mitigation.
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c. Safety factor shall be applied if there is uncertainty about accuracy of results of hazard
analysis.
d. Safety factor shall be applied if performance of SCDM may reduce over time due to
mechanical deterioration, corrosion, or environmental degradation.
Research has shown that intensity of process hydrocarbon fire and explosions may
be greater than that used as basis of international codes and standards. Products
may have been developed and certified against these hazards of lesser intensity.
Appropriateness of any default design code shall be confirmed. If there are no
internationally recognised codes and system design is based upon interpretation of
research, an appropriate design safety factor shall be applied above minimum
successful test results.
9.7.5. Survivability
a. SCDMs required to operate or maintain integrity during or after an event shall have
sufficient strength, protection, or redundancy to comply with performance standards for
specified period after initial event. This should be defined by standards for survivability
and expressed in terms of severity of event that it should survive.
For example, flammable gas detection system does not need to survive fire or
explosion, as it has already fulfilled its role in incipient stages of the event.
Separator and connected piping and instruments may have to maintain integrity if
exposed to 500 mbar explosion overpressure, and ESD valve actuator and power
supplies may have to be fail safe and protected from jet fire until it has closed.
b. Survivability of critical SCDM shall be demonstrated in emergency system survivability
study.
10.1. General
a. SCDMs required to implement FEHM strategy shall be designed such that minimum
performance can be achieved throughout working life of facility.
b. Purchase specification should include allowance for performance deterioration.
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10.3. Documentation
10.3.1. General
a. There shall be adequate communication and documentation between each stage of project
to next and to operators such that hazard management decisions are understood and
recorded. This should be performed through fire and explosion hazard register (FEHR) and
supporting documentation.
The BP IMFS specifically requires that hazard register shall be developed which
provides clear links from identified hazards to measures, SCDM, processes and
procedures to manage/mitigate risks.
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b. FEHR should be progressively developed to reflect changes in design and level of detail as
design progresses.
FEHR is core document for FEHM in the design of facility and future operation and
should be accepted by future operator. FEHR should cross reference hazards to
decisions to implement strategies and SCDM needed to implement strategies.
c. FEHR should demonstrate that safety goals and risk criteria have been met. This should
include demonstration that:
1. Overall process to identify, understand, and manage hazards is complete.
2. BP risk reporting criteria have been met.
3. National regulations are satisfied.
4. IMFS is fully honoured.
Rigorous proactive approach to management of hazards that has been followed and
documented provides over 90% of demonstration, as process itself should deliver
design that is safe and practical. Project HSSE review process described in
GP 48-01 should provide some of this assurance.
d. If there is major threat to life, environment, or BP reputation, it may be necessary to have
independent verification by BP risk management specialists that risks are in compliance
with corporate risk reporting criteria.
10.3.3.1. General
For each identified hazard and groups of generic hazards, the following information shall be
required:
a. Description and quantification of hazard, including cause and routes to escalation.
Summary is acceptable if linked by reference to supporting documentation.
b. Category of hazard (controllable, evacuate, or catastrophic).
c. Strategy to manage hazard.
d. List of engineered prevention, control, and mitigation SCDM.
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10.3.3.3. Timing
a. FEHR shall be prepared during CVP execute and completed before CVP operate.
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10.3.3.4. Review
a. FEHR shall be support document to any safety case requirements and shall be completed
in time for submission, if necessary.
b. If drilling and well completion operations commence prior to production, the FEHR
sections related to these operations shall be completed.
c. FEHR shall be regularly reviewed and shall be updated as required during management of
change process.
a. Information on hazards and strategies for hazard management, the FEHR developed during
the CVP execute stage, shall be provided to future operators of facility.
b. SCDM shall be operated so as to achieve intent and performance for lifetime of the
facility.
c. Safety critical procedures shall be developed with arrangements for provision of competent
personnel for commissioning and operation.
d. Inspection, testing, and maintenance program shall be developed to verify that SCDM
meet required performance, both at commissioning and during operation.
e. Rigorous management of change process shall be followed for all changes that could
undermine achievement of FEHM goals, introduce new hazards, exacerbate existing
hazards, or impact management of hazards.
f. Commissioning and operations shall provide personnel, practices, procedures, and levels of
competence required to meet intent of FEHM such that goals may be achieved for lifetime
of the facility.
SCDMs must also operate within any limitations determined during development.
These limitations should have been developed in agreement with future operator.
SCDMs must be tested, inspected, maintained, and operated to achieve required
performance.
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Annex A
(Normative)
Minimum default hazard management strategies and safety critical
design measures (SCDM) tables for large integrated facilities
a. This Annex is a set of tables of minimum default hazard management strategies and
SCDMs (safety critical design measures) for permanently manned integrated fixed
platforms and FPSOs (floating production, storage, and offloading units).
b. These facilities can pose the greatest risk to personnel from fire and explosion due to
higher personnel numbers, continuous exposure through work in hazardous areas, living
and sleeping nearby, and from high level of process scale and work complexity requiring
permanent personnel occupancy.
c. These tables principally provide standards for life safety but also provide some asset
protection.
d. These minimum default standards are guidance only.
e. These minimum default standards may be relaxed for facilities having inherently lower
risk. Such facilities may have separate personnel accommodations, non-resident operation,
or normally unattended status.
f. SCDM should be based on analysis of hazards and major accident risk reduction process to
determine identified exposure and consequences and which, therefore, require protection.
g. If default minimum standards are used, then retroactive fire analysis should confirm that
provision, performance, and extent of protection is adequate. Retroactive analysis may also
reduce default provisions.
A.2.1. General
A.2.2 through A.2.9 describe each element of SCDM tables.
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There is specific differentiation between high pressure and low pressure oil fires.
This arises from differences in design requirements and effectiveness of systems with
high pressure releases. The difference originates from type and release pressure of
liquid at time the escalation could realistically occur. Default for this failure time
needs to be determined by the project team. If plant operates at these pressures or
has depressurised below these values within the escalation time, it may be
considered as low pressure.
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A.3.1. Wellbays
Notes:
1. Low pressure wells with low gas content create fires that should be easily suppressed by moderate rate
deluge. Deluge performs three functions: cool plant, suppress combustion, and limit hydrocarbon
vaporisation. Simultaneous protection is not normally required in adjacent areas.
2. Structures and walls should be passively protected even if deluge is provided. Structures and walls
should be designed to withstand infrequent events, such as flow line failure without well isolation or
failure of swab valve joint during wire lining and continuous well release.
3. Structures and walls are unlikely to be deformed by explosion. If analysis shows that deformation is
possible, specification of barriers should require fire rating to be maintained over expected deformation
range.
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Table A.2 - Wellbay with high pressure gas lifted oil production
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Notes:
1. Isolated gas inventories normally should not have sufficient inventory to cause escalation unless there
are large quantities of condensate, in which case refer to row above regarding high pressure gas. ESD is
normally all that is needed. In extraordinary cases, depressurisation can be added. Deluge is not effective
preventing local escalation and will have limited effect on suppressing external flaming.
2. Deluge is not provided because it is ineffective against gas jets and there is low chance of escalation
from frequent events if ESD is effective.
3. Passive protection should protect against infrequent events such as continuous well releases or release of
gas lift annulus contents. Passive protection should prevent passage of heat, flame, and smoke into other
areas, limiting negative effects and allowing controlled evacuation. General area deluge coverage to
suppress external effects of oil fires and allow response measures to regain well control may also be
needed for these events, particularly for centre bay drilling.
4. Structure and walls could be deformed by explosion. If analysis shows that deformation is possible,
specification of barriers should require fire rating to be maintained over expected deformation range.
5. Failure or slow operation of isolation or blowdown could lead to extended release and large gas cloud
development. This possibility should be tested.
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Notes:
1. Fires resulting from oil processing in roofed areas create high heat fluxes within module, smoke
generation due to poor ventilation, and potential of external flaming at sides of module, with major
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Table A.5 - High pressure oil and condensate separation in roofed modules
Notes:
1. High pressure separation in roofed modules is major hazard on fixed platforms that may lead to severe
external flaming and potential of escalation to other oil inventories and structural collapse. High
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pressure separation may be located at the same level or below refuge and safety systems, and ventilation
restrictions will increase smoke toxicity. All Rank 1 systems shall be effectively combined to allow
these hazards to be controlled. As there is a significant explosion risk, multiple releases and system
failure is significant possibility; therefore, evacuation case should rely only on passive systems.
2. For severe explosion, high overpressure load on decks and equipment could lead to the structure
supporting equipment being deformed. This could cause displacement of pipes and equipment leading to
widespread loss of containment. Structural response to SLB and DLB should be examined and suitable
strength built into key structure.
3. This area might be affected by fires from other areas, primarily infrequent events. In these cases, there
should be sufficient firewater capacity to protect the source and this area. As these events should be in
the infrequent category, it will be permissible to assume that all fire pumps will be available.
4. Failure or slow operation of isolation or blowdown could lead to extended release and large gas cloud
development. This possibility should be tested.
5. With high pressure oil and condensate separation, either plant can be depressurised such that release
pressures are classified as low before escalation can occur (find guidance on definition of high pressure)
or else fires can be treated as high pressure using default systems in this row. Limiting external flaming
is essential to keep fire severity in frequent or controllable category.
6. Depressurisation plays key role in managing high pressure liquids hazards. Design should achieve three
roles listed. Reduction of liquid release pressure will reduce fire size and enable deluge to be effective.
Without depressurisation, size and intensity of fires may be on the limit of controllability, particularly
for large high pressure inventories. Without it, there may be prolonged external flaming from modules,
which may require evacuation. Combination of deluge and depressurisation should limit external
flaming and extent to which fire maintains vessel pressure. This may need to be confirmed by
calculation.
7. Vessel rupture is more likely with condensate than oil due to fluid boiling properties. It could increase
severity of an event to that which requires evacuation (i.e., from frequent or controllable event to an
infrequent/evacuation case). Depressurisation of both fire source and exposed vessel should usually be
sufficient to prevent rupture but this should be verified by calculation. If this is not practical, additional
specific deluge may be applied. Passive vessel protection is not desirable because of corrosion
underneath, inspection restrictions, and difficulties in reinstatement during operation.
8. Structural passive protection should use epoxy intumescent systems. It is only required if structures in
the area support tall structures, large liquid inventories, or heavy loads, such as drilling rigs where their
collapse couple leads to critical escalation. If structural failure in the area could also lead to overall loss
if integrity of the whole topsides structure, it should be protected unless analysis shows that there is
adequate redundancy elsewhere.
9. Firewalls should be provided to separate process areas from safe areas, such as utilities, safety systems,
muster, and accommodation areas. Fire and explosion analyses should be used to determine need for
walls and ceilings to separate process and wellbays. There are conflicting requirements: free ventilation
to disperse flammable gas, explosion venting, limitation of size and spread of gas clouds, and prevention
of fire spread and escalation to other areas. Presence and location of walls should be guided by GP 24-
20. Walls, if provided, should meet default requirements herein, with fire exposure from both sides if
necessary. These should be effective even if active systems fail to operate (i.e., for infrequent/evacuation
events).
10. Structure and walls could be deformed by explosion. If analysis shows that deformation is possible, then
specification of barriers should require fire rating to be maintained over expected deformation range.
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Notes:
1. These vessels should have low probability of rupture and should not be passively protected.
2. Lack of roof and location of this processing on top deck significantly reduces fire intensity and its
overall impact on facility. Processing should be located either at same level as accommodation, refuge,
muster, and lifeboats or above it. Combustion will carry flames and smoke over these areas, and free
ventilation will not increase smoke toxicity.
3. Fire and explosion impact may arise through events underneath module or hazards located in adjacent
modules.
4. Open aspect and free ventilation means that a flammable cloud is unlikely to develop unless there is
very little wind. Even if an explosion occurs, venting will be upwards into open space and only low
overpressure generated.
5. Control of liquid spills and ability to handle deluge capacity, as well as oil, is critical. So long as oil is
contained, fire size and location are manageable. Failure to limit its spread can allow sea fires alongside
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FPSOs and cascading oil fires on other facilities. Both situations can bring fire closer to personnel,
hindering evacuation, or cause escalation and loss of safety systems.
6. It may be impractical to apply water into combustion zone and onto hydrocarbon pools to suppress
combustion and limit vaporisation. Therefore, it is preferable to allow fire to burn out. As it is on an
open deck, fire plume should rise safely above platform or FPSO without serious flame or smoke impact
onto refuge and lifeboats. Foam may put out fire in conjunction with containment and depressurisation,
but success cannot be guaranteed. It may be worth considering for very large inventories (~ 100 tonne).
General notes:
a. With infrequent events, evacuation would depend on limitation of further escalation and containment of
liquids. It should not be necessary to install firewalls on top deck. It is impractical to build them high
enough to limit fire impact, and they will simply reduce ventilation, hinder escape, and increase chance
of explosion.
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Table A.7 - High pressure oil and condensate separation on open decks
Notes:
1. Lack of roof and location of this processing on top deck significantly reduces fire intensity and its
overall impact on facility. Processing should be located either at same level as accommodation, refuge,
muster, and lifeboats or above it. Combustion will carry flames and smoke over these areas, and free
ventilation will not increase smoke toxicity.
2. As with lower pressure fires, control of spills is critical, but in this case, liquid dropout from release is
less likely in first few minutes.
3. Fire and explosion impact may arise through events underneath module or hazards located in adjacent
modules.
4. Vessel rupture is more likely with condensate than oil due to the fluid boiling properties. It could
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increase severity of an event to that which requires evacuation (i.e., from a frequent or controllable
event to infrequent/evacuation case). Depressurisation of both fire source and exposed vessel should
usually be sufficient to prevent rupture but should be verified by calculation. If not practical, additional
specific deluge may be applied. Passive vessel protection is not desirable because of corrosion
underneath, inspection restrictions, and difficulties in reinstatement during operation.
5. It may be impractical to apply water into combustion zone and onto hydrocarbon pools to effectively
suppress combustion and limit vaporisation. Therefore, it is preferable to allow fire to burn out. As it is
on an open deck, fire plume should rise safely above platform or FPSO without serious flame or smoke
impact onto the refuge and lifeboats.
6. Higher rate high velocity deluge is needed to be effective against high pressure impinging spray fires
and to be effective in high winds in open areas. If depressurisation can reduce source to low pressures
before failure times, then low pressure fire application rates may be used.
General notes:
a. High pressure release can easily direct fire such that it completely engulfs adjacent modules. This may
have to be classified as a frequent event if fire size cannot be reduced before likely failure times. In these
cases, fire pump capacity should be based on this scenario, with a reserve pump in support.
b. Gas fires cannot be controlled by deluge, but combination of ESD, depressurisation of source, and
exposed plant should be sufficient to prevent escalation. Fire analysis should predict fires based on
combined loss of gas through depressurisation and accidental release. It may be necessary to optimise
depressurisation rates to prevent escalation.
c. With infrequent events, evacuation would depend on limitation of further escalation and containment of
liquids. It should not be necessary to install firewalls on top deck. It is impractical to build them high
enough to limit fire impact, and they will simply reduce ventilation, hinder escape, and increase chance
of explosion.
d. Open aspect and free ventilation means that flammable cloud is unlikely to develop unless there is very
little wind. Even if explosion occurs, venting will be upwards into open space and only low overpressure
generated.
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Table A.8 - Gas drying, purification, gas liquids recovery on top decks and roofed modules
Notes:
1. Gas and gas liquids inventories will normally be from 1 tonne to 2 tonne, and this will not normally
sustain fire at a size that can cause escalation beyond source inventories. Main risks are flash fires and
explosions, particularly in roofed modules. These hazards associated with NGL liquids are particularly
severe. Gas/vapour spread and explosion effects may extend into adjacent modules leading to multiple
releases involving both source plant and adjacent processing.
2. Fire and explosion impact may arise through events underneath module or hazards located in adjacent
modules.
3. Hazards in roofed modules are more severe with poorer gas dispersion and confinement of fire around
the plant, hence default to automatic depressurisation rather than manual.
4. Larger liquid inventories might also need to be depressurised to reduce damaging fire sizes.
5. Plant, if exposed to damaging fire loads from other fire sources, should be depressurised to prevent
vessel rupture.
6. Failure or slow operation of isolation or blowdown could lead to extended release and large gas cloud
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Notes:
1. Severe explosion may originate in same module but from other equipment (e.g., gas lines). These
considerations may dominate design of deck structure, fire and blast barriers, and equipment supports.
2. Failure or slow operation of isolation or blowdown could lead to extended release and large gas cloud
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Notes:
1. On top decks, effects are controllable unless oil is allowed to spread into other areas, creating larger fires
and endangering safety systems, muster points, and causing further escalation. Oil carryover to sea
should be prevented as effects and location can be unpredictable. It may be better to contain oil in source
area and allow it to burn out under controlled conditions.
2. ESD of pumps will make step change in size of fires and in most cases will change them from intense
spray to pool or low pressure release. These fires are much more controllable both by deluge and
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drainage systems. Without isolation of pressure source, size of fires may lead to evacuation.
3. Failure or slow operation of isolation or blowdown could lead to extended release and large gas cloud
development. This possibility should be tested.
4. Fire and explosion impact may arise through events underneath module (e.g., under process deck on
FPSO) or hazards located in adjacent modules.
5. Deluge should control and probably extinguish pool fires. With higher vapour pressures and spray fires
(see Table A.7), deluge should also provide degree of suppression but extinguishment is not assured.
6. Protection specified here does not consider specific risks associated with pump drivers. Deluge should
be sufficient to deal with hazards originating from open diesel or gas engines, but turbines should be
fitted with their own protection as specified elsewhere.
General notes:
a. Oil pumping is significant risk, with possibility of frequent failures of joints, seals, and regular
intervention for maintenance.
b. Identification of oil leaks is critical. Low vapour pressure oil will be unlikely to give off significant
amounts of vapour that could be picked up by gas detection system. Good ventilation on top deck will
make this situation worse. May be necessary to monitor pumping conditions and drains systems, and use
manual observation for detection.
c. With infrequent events, evacuation would depend upon limitation of further escalation and containment
of liquids. It should not be necessary to install firewalls on top deck. It is impractical to build them high
enough to limit fire impact, and they will simply reduce ventilation, hinder escape, and increase chance
of explosion.
d. Severe explosion may be caused by large gas release from other equipment (e.g., gas lines, risers). These
considerations may dominate design of deck structure and equipment supports.
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Notes:
1. Open aspect and free ventilation in open areas means that flammable cloud is unlikely to develop unless
there is very little wind. Even if explosion occurs, venting will be upwards into open space and only low
overpressure generated.
2. In general, automatic ESD is only control system needed to limit the danger potential of gas compressor
fires. If there is a very large inventory, this is likely to be associated with very large throughputs, large
knockout vessels, or direct feed from separators. In these cases, additional segregation of inventories
should be considered.
3. Automatic depressurisation of compressors should only be considered after consultation with
compressor Vendor and BP rotating machinery experts. Automatic depressurisation can cause seal
damage, and it is rare that compressors need depressurisation to prevent escalation.
4. Fire and blast walls should not be needed to prevent escalation, rather to prevent gas releases spreading
into other areas and to contain explosion and flash fire effects. Default has been specified as J15,
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although plain steel blast wall should be sufficient and unlikely to fail in gas fire, providing nothing
critical is mounted on or located against the safe side.
5. Failure or slow operation of isolation or blowdown could lead to extended release and large gas cloud
development. Fire could also be prolonged. This possibility should be tested.
6. Fire and explosion impact may arise through events underneath module or hazards located in adjacent
modules.
7. For severe explosion, high overpressure load on decks and equipment could lead to structure supporting
equipment being deformed. This could cause displacement of pipes and equipment leading to
widespread loss of containment. Structural response to SLB and DLB should be examined and suitable
strength built into key structure.
General notes:
a. Deluge systems should not be installed over compressors. They are ineffective against gas jet fires, and
escalation arising from secondary release of their inventory in fire is usually of little consequence.
Applying saltwater deluge to compressors is likely to cause rapid cooling of hot surfaces and corrosion.
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Table A.12 - Flare knockout drums on top decks and roofed modules
Notes:
1. Should flare header or venting systems in enclosed space rupture during blowdown, then severe
explosion with high overpressure load on decks and equipment could lead to structure supporting
equipment being deformed. This could cause displacement of pipes and equipment leading to
widespread loss of containment. Structural response to SLB and DLB should be examined and suitable
strength built into key structure. Failure of flare header or knockout drums is likely to be caused by
explosion or fire from another event. Addition of blowdown products may not be significant in ongoing
context of initiating event. This should be examined.
2. Passive protection of flare header supports is recommended throughout hydrocarbon processing areas of
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platform. It is impractical to protect headers themselves. This should be achieved by closer spacing of
pipe supports and cooling effects of depressurising gas.
3. It is critical that flare system maintain its integrity, even during infrequent events. Passive protection is
default for these scenarios both to withstand credible external effects and failure of flare system itself.
This should be augmented with deluge onto vessels. Passive protection for these vessels is not
recommended because of difficulties of removal, inspection, and corrosion underneath system.
General notes:
a. Damage to flare system causes both loss of that safety system and potential redirection of whole gas
inventory on facility into one area. Event may be controllable if system is located on top deck but is
likely to have severe impact on fixed platform if flare is located lower in process area. May cause
structural failure and be much more likely to escalate to other inventories.
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Table A.13 - Export/import systems and risers on fixed and floating facilities
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Passive protection of top of riser, 2 Ensure ESD valve operation, sealing, and J30, H60, and designed to
ESD valves, actuators, their power joint integrity. withstand SLB and DLB
supplies, and riser structural Prevent catastrophic failure of pig events. (see Notes)
supports. (5) launcher system including door assembly.
Epoxy intumescent protection of 2 Prevent structural failure leading to riser J60 extending 5 m below
structures supporting heavy loads impact and release. lowest inboard processing.
that may collapse onto riser of
ESD.
Subsea or secondary off 2 Limit duration of riser fire such that Same performance as riser
installation isolation valves. (2) evacuation is not required. isolation.
2
Specific deluge of inboard oil 3 Prevent further release of oil that may 20 l/min/m .
export/import piping underneath then endanger the risers.
main platform decks.
Notes:
1. Fire hazards from import/export facilities must be controlled effectively if riser failure is to be
prevented. Effective isolation of risers and process is all that is required for gas fires. Oil facilities also
require deluge suppression of oil fires around pig launcher/receiver facilities.
2. Riser ESD valves shall be able to close under accident conditions. This means that actuators may need to
be protected from fire and blast for a short period (up to 3 min) from jet fire and blast.
3. Fire on the sea is a possibility that should be considered. Bunding and drainage for process facilities in
event of large release of oil may discharge collected oil to sea, but these facilities should be designed to
extinguish fire before discharge to sea. Fire on the sea may prevent evacuation and lead to catastrophic
event.
4. Oil inventories should not be sufficient to cause prolonged external flaming from roofed module. If
such, general area deluge over pigging facilities may need to be extended over entire module.
5. If possible, platform should be arranged such that passive protection of riser ESD valves and risers is not
required. This will require relocation of all instruments and joints other than those on ESD valves to
another location. If there are multiple risers, leakage from ESD joints onto another riser may increase
need for passive protection.
General notes:
a. Explosion effects on risers and ESD valves are typically confined to drag loads.
b. Fire and explosion events arising from risers can have most significant impact of all hazards, and release
may rise through or travel underneath other modules.
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Epoxy intumescent fire protection 2 Support swivel, deluge, and critical safety
of support structure for swivel and systems.
deluge. Prevent structural collapse onto riser ESD
valves.
Notes:
1. For explosion events, turret assembly is an enclosed area, particularly if weather or wind reduction
screens are included. Given potential for high gas release rates from risers, large cloud can develop
quickly and ignition will lead to high overpressure on decks and high drag loading on systems and
equipment.
2. Prevention of riser failure and assurance of their topsides ESD operability and survivability is critical.
Arrangement of turret will determine whether valves should be individually protected or enclosed within
larger protected space.
3. Operability of turret bearings after an incident is critical so that FPSO may weathervane. If it cannot,
whole mooring and riser system may be at risk when weather changes. This may also apply to
operability of swivel if it cannot be disconnected from either hub or manifolds.
4. It should be possible to limit duration and severity of credible riser events such that further escalation
does not occur and evacuation is not required. This will also need intense deluge to achieve this,
particularly if accommodation is located in bow just forward of turret. It will be necessary to design
deluge such that it can withstand effects of “frequent” explosions and to support it directly from swivel
support and access structure.
5. To achieve suppression, very intense deluge will be required, totally filling area with medium to large
droplets. This should be performed using peripheral deluge supported on structure rather than running
piping within turret. It should be arranged such that water is both injected into air being induced into fire
at deck level and injected into combustion zone at higher levels. This will also provide coverage of
vulnerable equipment.
6. Minimum standard of 20 l/min/m2 has been specified. This should be increased such that full capacity of
firewater system can be applied to turret and immediate process plant. Systems should be sized such that
no single system has demand greater than minimum performance of any fire pump.
7. Purpose of liquids spill containment is to prevent oil spread into process areas and top deck. If design of
turret can contain these liquids and allow deluge water to pass through into sea, this arrangement should
be used.
General notes:
a. Monitors do not provide effective suppression of turret fires and will put operators at risk during
operation. They should not be used for primary protection.
b. Infrequent incidents may cause radiation onto large process vessels, such as slug catchers, requiring
operation of their deluge. Total installed firewater capacity may be used for simultaneous operation of
turret and adjacent process deluge systems.
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Notes:
1. Hazardous drains tanks and vessels will be located at lowest practical point relative to process plant and
may be at same level or lower than muster, accommodation, fire pumps, and evacuation systems. Under
normal circumstances, leaks and fires in drains may be frequent but small. They should not have
inventory or fire size to cause escalation or overwhelm platform such that evacuation is required.
General notes:
a. For gas production facilities, amount of liquids in process plant are considered to be such that, even
under process upset conditions, insufficient inventory would be fed to drains system to have potential for
major escalation. This should be confirmed by examination of process. If this is case and platform has
firewater infrastructure, default requirements for oil processing platform should be applied.
b. There are circumstances if major inventories may be drained down or isolation failure causes large
continuous feed to system from process plant. These events could give rise to events of scale such that
all consequences could be realised. Compact fixed platforms with processing and utilities on several
levels will be most vulnerable with possibility of flames spreading under platform towards safe areas.
Firewalls would be required to prevent this fire spread and deluge suppressing combustion if required.
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2
General area deluge over shale 1 Cool derrick, drilling equipment, and BOP. 20 l/min/m over shakers
shaker area (oil and condensate and radius of 3 m.
fields only).
Top deck monitors (only on 2 Assist disposal of oil and suppress 4 of 3600 l/min capacity.
platforms with existing firewater combustion of oil seepage not the drill
infrastructure of sufficient capacity). floor.
(2)
2
Drill floor deluge (only on oil and 2 Cool wireline coiled tubing BOP. 20 l/min/m .
condensate fields). (2)
Impact deck monitors (oil and 2 2 of 3600 l/min capacity.
condensate production platforms
only).
Notes:
1. Reservoir, type of drilling, and well service activity will determine type of event and impact on
platform. Passive protection should be used to protect drill crews attempting to run well kill equipment
and to shield personnel during evacuation from infrequent events, such as uncontrolled well releases.
2. For active systems, deluge and monitors should be used to control lesser events on oil reservoirs.
Monitors may also be used to delay structural failure of derrick during larger events, such as blowouts.
Active systems should be of large capacity and use as much of platform firewater capacity as possible.
Active systems should be located as far from drilling facilities as possible to allow wider coverage and
safe operation by the fire crews.
General notes:
a. If possible, live firewater connections to derrick that might be vulnerable to damage in fire, either
directly or through loss of support, should be avoided.
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General notes:
a. Most methanol fires are associated with shallow spills and can be extinguished with dilution. It should
not be necessary to add foam to deluge.
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Bibliography
BP
[1] GP 48-01 Project HSSE Review.
[5] API RP 14G Recommended Practice for Fire Prevention and Control on Open Type Offshore
Production Platforms.
[6] API RP 14J Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore Production Facilities.
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