G.R. No.

L-6019 March 25, 1911

JUAN N. ARAGON, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, oppositor-
appellant.

Facts:
The Court of Land Registration adjudicated title to a parcel of land in Manila in favor of
the appellees and ordered it to be registered.
The Government of the Philippine Islands, however, through its agents contended that
the land is part of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether the parcel of land is part of the public domain
Ruling:
The ruling of the lower court was sustained. The right of possession and ownership of
the applicants was established as provided under Article 446 of the Civil Code: law library
Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed
therein, he must be protected or possession must be restored to him by the means established
in the laws of procedure.
The owners of the property may lose possession on their property as provided under
Article 460 of the Civil Code:
ART. 460. The possessor may lose his possession -
1. By the abandonment of the thing.
2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration.
3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming unmarketable.
4. By the possession of another, even against the will of the former possessor, if the new
possession has lasted more than one year.
Since the owners of the land have never abandoned it, and that its location and actual
condition is not totally destroyed so as to have become a part of the playa (shore) of the Bay of
Manila, it is proper for the land to be registered.
G.R. No. 80294-95 September 21, 1988
CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO AND JUAN VALDEZ, respondents.
Facts:
The VICAR filed an application for registration of title with the Court of First Instance of
Baguio Benguet on 1962 over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 at Poblacion Central, La Trinidad, Benguet. On
1963 the Heirs of Juan Valdez and Egmidio Octaviano filed their Opposition on Lots Nos. 2 and
3. The land registration court confirmed the registrable title of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano appealed the decision to
CA. The CA reversed the decision of the land registration court and dismissed the VICAR's
application as to Lots 2 and 3.
VICAR filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC on the decision of the CA. The
SC denied the petition.
The Heirs of Octaviano filed a Motion For Execution of Judgment with the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and was denied because the decision of the CA did not grant the Heirs of
Octaviano any affirmative relief.
The Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed a civil case for recovery of possession of Lot 3;
and the Heirs of Juan Valdez likewise filed for the recovery of possession of Lot 2. The CA ruled
in favor of the heirs of Valdez and Octaviano.
Issue:
Whether VICAR is entitled to the ownership of Lots 2 and 3 and that the application of
the principle res judicata is erroneous.
Ruling:
The petition is denied.
Petitioner was in possession as borrower in commodatum up to 1951, when it
repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes. When
petitioner applied for registration of Lots 2 and 3 in 1962, it had been in possession in concept of
owner only for eleven years. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession for ten years,
but always with just title. Extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires 30 years.
The Court sees no error in CA’s ruling that said findings are res judicata between the
parties. They can no longer be altered by presentation of evidence because those issues were
resolved with finality a long time ago. To ignore the principle of res judicata would be to open
the door to endless litigations by continuous determination of issues without end.
Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed by
petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the
return of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they became bailors
in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter
of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The
bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner
came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of petitioner Vicar
by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription
because of the absence of just title.
G.R. No. 80298 April 26, 1990

EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner,

vs.
THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and
style of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts:
Tomas de la Peña represented himself as Professor Jose Cruz, dean of De la Salle
College and ordered 406 books from EDCA. He issued a check covering the purchase. He then
sold 120 books to Santos. Without clearing his first order, he placed another order with EDCA
which prompted EDCA to investigate. They found that De la Pena is not employed in De la
Salle, has no account with Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment
check and that he sold 120 books to Santos.
With the help of the police, EDCA forcedly seized the books from the store of Santos.
Santos sued for the recovery of the books. The lower court and CA ruled in favor of Santos.
Issue: Whether the EDCA has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued
by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
Ruling:
No, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of its property. The first sentence of Article 559
provides that "the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title,"

Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.

If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price paid therefor.

Additionally, ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of
the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect as provided under the Civil Code:

Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.

From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions
of the law governing the form of contracts.

Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.

Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser
until he has fully paid the price.
 Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to
criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted,
delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer
it to another.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books
which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid
for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by
the private respondents to the books.
G.R. No. L-20264 January 30, 1971

CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA and ANASTACIO GARCIA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA D. GUEVARA and JUAN B.
GUEVARA, respondents.

Facts:
Guevara saw her stolen ring being worn by De Garcia so she asked where De Garcia
bought it, De Garcia told her that she bought the ring from a comadre. Guevara asked to try the
ring and it fit her finger. After 2 or 3 days, Guevara asked De Garcia to have the ring checked by
Mr. Rebullidawho concluded that it was the very ring that Guevara bought from him in 1947. The
ring was returned to De Garcia and she refused to return it despite a written request and writ of
seizure, claiming that the ring was lost.
Guevara lost in the lower court and elevated the matter to the CA. The CA reversed the
lower court’s judgment.
Issue: Whether the possession of De Garcia of the movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title.
Ruling:
No, De Garcia did not acquire ownership of the ring. There is no merit to De Garcia’s
contention that her possession in good faith is equivalent to title.
Article 559 of the Civil Code reads: "The possession of movable property acquired in
good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the
possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor." Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond
ring in question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found
in possession of the same. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in
good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price.
Honorable Justice Jose B. L. Reyes in Sotto vs. Enage: `Article 559 in fact assumes that
possessor is as yet not the owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor has come to
acquire indefeasible title by, let us say, adverse possession for the necessary period, no proof
of loss or illegal deprivation could avail the former owner of the chattel. He would no longer be
entitled to recover it under any condition.' "
G.R. No. L-30817 September 29, 1972

DOMINADOR DIZON, doing business under the firm name "Pawnshop of

DominadorDizon", petitioner,
vs.
LOURDES G. SUNTAY, respondent.

Facts:
Suntay and Clarita R. Sison entered into a transaction wherein Suntay’sring was
delivered to Clarita R. Sison for sale on commission. Three days later, unknown to Suntay, the
ring was pledged by Melia Sison, niece of the husband of Clarita R. Sison, in connivance with
the latter, with Dizon’s pawnshop. After some time, Suntay demanded Sison to return her ring.
When she learned that her ring was pawned, she filed an estafa case against Sison and wrote
to a letter to Dizon to return her ring. When Dizon refused, Suntay filed a case with the lower
court which issued the writ of replevin and rendered a judgement that Suntay had the right of
possession of the ring. Dizon brought the case to the CA where the CA affirmed the lower
court’s judgement.
Issue:Whether the possession of Dizon of the movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title.
Ruling:
No, Dizon has no right of possession of the ring. In De Gracia v. Court of Appeals.Thus:
"The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: 'The possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost
any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its
return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.'
There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco. Thus: 'Suffice it to say in
this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith by
another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle
that were one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law
imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be
committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new
Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle and a statutory provision,
the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction."
The principle of estoppel cannot be invoked in the case.Neither the promptings of equity
nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice come to Dizon’s rescue. He is engaged in a
business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest itself to ascertain whether or not
an individual who is offering a jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do so. If no such care be
taken, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit, he should be the last to
complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized.