Special Lecture Notes in Political Law: By: Dean Ed Vincent S. Albano Bar Review Director

Special Lecture Notes in
POLITICAL LAW
By:
DEAN ED VINCENT S. ALBANO
Bar Review Director
IMMUNITY OF STATE
Immunity from suit is not absolute; basis.
There was an action to recover a property which the DOTC encroached upon when it constructed its
telephone exchange lines. DOTC invoked immunity of the State as it was merely performing its
mandate and in taking said property without formal expropriation proceedings, it took the property
in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The owners contended that it cannot exercise such
power to perpetrate injustice against its citizens. Is the State’s argument correct? Explain.
Ans.: No. The State may not be sued without its consent. This fundamental doctrine stems from the principle
that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends
(Republic v. Villasor, 153 Phil. 356, 60 [1973] and United States of America v. Hon. Guinto, 261 Phil. 777, 791
[1990] both citing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 [1907]).
This generally accepted principle of law has been explicitly expressed in both the 1973 and the present
Constitutions.
But as the principle itself implies, the doctrine of state immunity is not absolute. The State may waive
its cloak of immunity and the waiver may be made expressly or by implication.
The Constitution identifies the limitations to the awesome and near limitless powers of the State.
Chief among these limitations are the principles that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law and that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation (Art. III, Sec. 1 and 9, CONSTITUTION). These limitations are enshrined in no less than the Bill
of Rights that guarantees the citizen protection from abuse by the State.
Consequently, our laws require that the State’s power of eminent domain shall be exercised through
expropriation proceedings in court. Whenever private property is taken for public use, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to initiate expropriation proceedings. By necessary
implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a waiver of State immunity.
If the DOTC had correctly followed the regular procedure upon discovering that it had encroached on
the respondents’ property, it would have initiated expropriation proceedings instead of insisting on its
immunity from suit. The petitioners would not have had to resort to filing its complaint for reconveyance. As
this Court said in Ministerio:
It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what
the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more
so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be
maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for
public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court.
There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked (DOTC v. Sps. Abecina, G.R. No. 206484, June 29, 2016, Brion, J).
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
UNCLOS
Under Sec. 31 of the UNCLOS, a flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage
to the Coastal State resulting from non-compliance with the rules and regulations of the coastal State
regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea. But the USA has not
ratified the UNCLOS. Can the US then be bound by it? Explain.
Ans.: Yes. Although the US has not yet ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long standing policy the US
considers itself bound by customary international rules on the traditional uses of the ocean as codified in the
UNCLOS.
The international law of the sea is a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of
the sea, the exploration of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch
of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans. The
UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay,
Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 and became into force on November 16, 1994.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum)
and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum) (Bertrand Theodor L. Santos, “Untangling a
Tangled Net of Confusion: Reconciling the Philippine Fishery Poaching Law and the UNCLOS” World Bulletin,
Vol. 18: 83-116 (July-December 2002), p. 96). The freedom to use the world’s marine waters is one of the
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oldest customary principles of international law (Anne Bardin, “Coastal State’s Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Vessels” 14 Pace Int’l. Rev. 27, 28 (2002)). The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying
degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous
zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction
over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises
sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air
space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil (Fr. Arigo, et al. v. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510,
September 16, 2014).
What are some conditions inorder that warships may enjoy sovereign immunity? Explain.
Ans.: In the case of warships, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
(1) If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request
for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to
leave the territorial sea immediately (Sec. 30).
(2) The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to
the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or
with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law (Sec.
31).
(3) With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31,
nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other
government ships operated for non-commercial purposes (Sec. 32).
A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine
resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship
is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US? Explain.
Ans.: Non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines
as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. It is expected that the US would bear
“international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely
affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner,
which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk
from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters.
Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to
comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the
marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis,
directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with
this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into
account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although
the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the
latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the
laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any
other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31 (Fr. Arigo, et al. v. Swift, et
al., G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014).
Petitioners argued that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they
invoked federal statutes in the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their
immunity to any action. Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US
respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance. Is the contention correct? Why?
Ans.: No. The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting
the Philippines to promote “common security interests” between the US and the Philippines in the region. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the
United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. The invocation of US federal tort
laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving
US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement (Fr.
Arigo, et al. v. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014).
Waiver-Only on criminal jurisdiction.
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What is the extent of the waiver of immunity of State under the VFA? Explain.
Ans.: As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.
A ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US
personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and
beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to
determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant
damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that
deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law (Fr. Abrigo,
et al. v. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014).
UNCLOS III and Ra 9522 not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of internal waters.
The fact of sovereignty does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle
of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the
competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea
lanes passage are now pending in Congress.
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate
to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s
limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary
international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent
passage and sea lanes passage, does not place them in lesser footing vis-a-vis continental coastal States which
are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through
international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by
their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands
separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to
the rights of other States under UNCLOS III (Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita,
et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011, En Banc [Carpio]).
The demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of
UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will course
reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis
maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants
new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical
miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to
this one beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent
areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and out national interest.
(Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011,
En Banc [Carpio]).
During the pendency of the murder case against Pemberton, petitioners filed a Motion to Compel the
AFP to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail which was denied. They advanced
that Philippine authorities ought to “have primary jurisdiction over respondent Pemberton’s person
while he is being tried in a Philippine Court,” in accordance with Article V, paragraph [3][b] of the
Visiting Forces Agreement.
They argued that even though the Visiting Forces Agreement gives the United States the “sole
discretion” to decide whether to surrender custody of an accused American military personnel to the
Philippine authorities, “the rule is that . . . the Court still has control over any proceeding involving a
jurisdictional matter brought before it, even if it may well involve the country’s relations with another
foreign power.

Pemberton contended that under VFA, the custody over him rightfully remains with the USA
authorities citing Sec. 6 of the VFA which provides that the “custody of any United States personnel
over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States
military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense, until completion of all
judicial proceedings.” Is the contention of petitioners correct? Why?
Ans.: No. Article 2, paragraph (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
The Philippines, as a State Party, is obligated to comply with its obligations under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. To do otherwise would be to ignore completely the nature of the
obligation contemplated by the provision in an attempt to justify their failure to comply with a domestic
procedural rule aimed to protect a human right in a proceeding, albeit that of the adverse party.
The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State Party to establish a system of
accessible and effective remedies through judicial and administrative mechanisms. The trial of Pemberton,
indicates that there is a legal system of redress for violated rights. The petitioners chose to act on their own,
in total disregard of the mechanism for criminal proceedings established by this court, should not be
tolerated under the guise of a claim to justice. This is especially in light of petitioners’ decision to furnish the
accused in the case a copy of her Motion only during the hearing. Upholding human rights pertaining to
access to justice cannot be eschewed to rectify an important procedural deficiency that was not difficult to
comply with. Human rights are not a monopoly of petitioners. The accused also enjoys the protection of these
rights (Laude, et al. v. Hon. Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde, et al., G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015, Leonen, J).
The Right to Life of the Unborn from Conception
The Philippine national population program has always been grounded on two cornerstone
principles: “principle of no-abortion” and the “principle of non-coercion.” These principles are not
merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection which
expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Does Life Begin?

Life begins at fertilization.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable
because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen
because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception
is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of
when life begins.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word “conception” which, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
The Constitution provides that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum.
The Constitution does not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. Contraceptives
that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible. (James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014, En
Banc [Mendoza])
The Right to Health and to a Balanced and

Healthful Ecology in Accord with the Rhythm and Harmony of Nature
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), et al., G.R. No. 209271, December 8, 2015, En Banc (Villarama, Jr.)
The Precautionary Principle

The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing the normative idea that
governments are obligated to “foresee and forestall” harm to the environment. In the following decades, the
precautionary principle has served as the normative guideline for policymaking by many national
governments. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the outcome of the 1992 United

Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, defines the rights of the people
to be involved in the development of their economies, and the responsibilities of human beings to safeguard
the common environment. It states that the long term economic progress is only ensured if it is linked with
the protection of the environment. For the first time, the precautionary approach was codified under
Principle 15, which reads:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
Principle 15 codified for the first time at the global level the precautionary approach, which indicates
that lack of scientific certainty is no reason to postpone action to avoid potentially serious or irreversible
harm to the environment. It has been incorporated in various international legal instruments. The Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, finalized and adopted in Montreal on January
29, 2000, establishes an international regime primarily aimed at regulating trade in GMOs intended for
release into the environment, in accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development. X x x
The precautionary principle applies when the following conditions are met:
1. There exist considerable scientific uncertainties;
2. There exist scenarios (or models) of possible harm that are scientifically reasonable (that is
based on some scientifically plausible reasoning);
3. Uncertainties cannot be reduced in the short term without at the same time increasing
ignorance of other relevant factors by higher levels of abstraction and idealization;
4. The potential harm is sufficiently serious or even irreversible for present or future
generations or otherwise morally unacceptable;
5. There is a need to act now, since effective counteraction later will be made significantly more
difficult or costly at any later time.
The Rules (of Procedure for Environmental Cases) likewise incorporated the principle in Part V, Rule
20, which states:
Sec. 1. Applicability. – When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal
link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary
principle in resolving the case before it.
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the
benefit of the doubt.
SEC. 2. Standards for application. – In applying the precautionary principle, the following
factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present
or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the
environmental rights of those affected.
Basic function of the precautionary principle.

Under this Rule, the precautionary principle finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence in
cases before the courts. The precautionary principle bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in
factual findings cannot be achieved. By applying the precautionary principle, the court may construe a set of
facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction, with the goal of preserving and protecting the
environment. This may be further evinced from the second paragraph where bias is created in favor of the
constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In effect, the precautionary principle
shifts the burden of evidence of harm away from those likely to suffer harm and onto those desiring to change
the status quo. An application of the precautionary principle to the rules on evidence will enable courts to
tackle future environmental problems before ironclad scientific consensus emerges.
For purposes of evidence, the precautionary principle should be treated as a principle of last resort,
where application of the regular Rules of Evidence would cause in an inequitable result for the environmental
plaintiff – (a) settings in which the risks of harm are uncertain; (b) settings in which harm might be
irreversible and what is lost is irreplaceable; and (c) settings in which the harm that might result would be
serious. When these features – uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, and the possibility of
serious harm – coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is strongest. When in doubt, cases must be
resolved in favor of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Parenthetically, judicial
adjudication is one of the strongest fora in which the precautionary principle may find applicability.
(International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
[Philippines], et al., GR No. 209271, December 8, 2015, En Banc [Villarama])
Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Bt talong Field Trials in the Philippines
Assessing the evidence on record, as well as the current state of GMO research worldwide, the Court
finds all the three conditions present in this case – uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm and the
possibility of serious harm.

Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF (National Biosafety
Framework) in the crucial stages of risk assessment and public consultation, including the determination of
the applicability of the EIS (Environmental Impact Statement) requirements to GMO field testing, are
compelling reasons for the application of the precautionary principle. There exists a preponderance of
evidence that the release of GMOs into the environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the
field trial sites, and eventually the health of our people once the Bt eggplant are consumed as food. Adopting
the precautionary approach, the Court rules that the principles of the NBF need to be operationalized first by
the coordinated actions of the concerned departments and agencies before allowing the release into the
environment of genetically modified eggplant. The more prudent course is to immediately enjoin the Bt
talong field trials and approval for its propagation or commercialization until the said government offices
shall have performed their respective mandates to implement the NBF.
We have found the experience of India in the Bt brinjal field trials – for which an indefinite
moratorium was recommended by a Supreme Court-appointed committee till the government fixes
regulatory and safety aspects – as relevant because majority of Filipino farmers are also small-scale farmers.
Further, the precautionary approach entailed inputs from all stakeholders, including the marginalized
farmers, not just the scientific community. This proceeds from the realization that acceptance of uncertainty
is not only a scientific issue, but is related to public policy and involves an ethical dimension. For scientific
research alone will not resolve all the problems, but participation of different stakeholders from scientists to
industry, NGOs, farmers and the public will provide a needed variety of perspective foci, and knowledge.
(International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), et al., GR No. 209271, December 8, 2015, En Banc [Villarama])
The Precautionary Principle

The principle of precaution originated as a social planning principle in Germany. In the 1980’s, the
Federal Republic of Germany used the Vorsogeprinzip (“foresight principle”) to justify the implementation of
vigorous policies to tackle acid rain, global warming and pollution of the North Sea. It has since emerged
from a need to protect humans and the environment from increasingly unpredictable, uncertain, and
unquantifiable but possibly catastrophic risks such as those associated with Genetically Modified Organisms
and climate change. The oft-cited Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
(1992 Rio Agenda) first embodied this principle.
In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific certainty
in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect. In such an event, the courts
may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and
protecting the environment.
When Precautionary Principle applies; local application.

It is notable that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of three
elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations
where the threat is relatively certain, or that the causal link between an action and environmental damage
can be established, or the probability of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not precautionary
measures, may be taken. Neither will the precautionary principle apply if there is no indication of a threat of
environmental harm, or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible.
In Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., (G.R. No.
189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin]), it was argued that the Ordinance enacted by the City of
Davao prohibiting aerial spraying of pesticides is justified since it will protect the health of residents and the
environment against the risks posed by aerial drift of chemicals applying the precautionary principle. The
Court did not find the presence of the elements for this principle to apply, thus, it held:
We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with, there has been no
scientific study. Although the precautionary principle allows lack of full scientific certainty
in establishing a connection between the serious or irreversible harm and the human
activity, its application is still premised on empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a
necessary basis for effective policy choices under the precautionary principle.
Precaution is a risk management principle invoked after scientific inquiry takes
place. This scientific stage is often considered synonymous with risk assessment. As such,
resort to the principle shall not be based on anxiety or emotion, but from a rational decision
rule, based on ethics. As much as possible, a complete and objective scientific evaluation of
the risk to the environment or health should be conducted and made available to decision-
makers for them to choose the most appropriate course of action. Furthermore, the positive
and negative effects of an activity are also important in the application of the principle. The
potential harm resulting from certain activities should always be judged in view of the
potential benefits they offer, while the positive and negative effects of potential
precautionary measures should be considered.
The only study conducted to validate the effects of aerial spraying appears to be the
Summary Report on the Assessment and Fact-Finding Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying
in Banana Plantations. Yet, the fact-finding team that generated the report was not a

scientific study that could justify the resort to the precautionary principle. In fact, the
Sangguniang Bayan ignored the findings and conclusions of the fact-finding team x x x.
We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against aerial
spraying if little or nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying
may bring to the health of the residents within and near the plantations and to the integrity
and balance of the environment. It is dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of aerial
spraying would be adverse even in the absence of evidence. Accordingly, for lack of scientific
data supporting a ban on aerial spraying, Ordinance No. 0309-07 should be struck down for
being unreasonable.
BILL OF RIGHTS
Due Process
Investigator cannot be the prosecutor at the same time.
The PCGG conducted an investigation and gathered evidence against the accused, then filed the
complaint for violation of RA 3019 alleging that he had illegally acted as a nominee/dummy of former
Pres. Marcos in acquiring shares of stock in various corporations. The PCGG found probable cause to
file the information after conducting preliminary investigation of the charges. Can it conduct the
preliminary investigation? Explain.
Ans.: No. The PCGG cannot gather evidence against a respondent, file a criminal complaint, and then conduct a
preliminary investigation of the case without contravening the basic tenets of due process. The due process
violation was compounded by the fact that the PCGG had filed a civil complaint against the same respondent
alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts.
In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who conducted the criminal
investigation, gathered the evidence and thereafter filed the complaint for the
purpose of preliminary investigation cannot be allowed to conduct the preliminary
investigation of his own complaint. It is to say the least arbitrary and unjust. It is in
such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the same time." Having
gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be
expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own
complaint, this time as a public prosecutor (People v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., G.R. Nos.
160864 & 160897, November 16, 2016, Sereno, J).
Ex-parte application and inquiry of AMLC of bank deposit not violative of substantive due process.
The petitioner authorized an associate to inquire on the veracity of a report that the AMLC asked the
CA to allow it to peep into the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations and a law office where a
family member was once a partner. He was authorized to secure copies of relevant document like the
petition and order issued if any. Presiding Justice Andres Reyes answered and said that the petition is
strictly confidential. The newspapers reported later on that the CA issued a resolution granting ex-
parte the application of AMLC to examine the bank accounts of SPCMB. Petitioner filed directly with
the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that the Anti-Money Laundering Act is
unconstitutional as it allows the examination of a bank account without any notice to the affected
party, hence, it violates the right to due process and the right to privacy. Rule on the contentions.
Explain.
Ans.: The contention that there is violation of the right to due process is not correct. Section 11 of the AMLA
providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does
not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage. It is the
preliminary and actual seizure of the bank deposits or investments in question which brings these within
reach of the judicial process, specifically a determination that the seizure violated due process (Republic of
the Phils. v. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc., et al., 566 Phil. 94, 106-107 [2008]). In fact, in
Eugenio it was said that:
“A bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical
seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the
examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank
financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or
financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular
details such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets
subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be
physically seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the possession of the
bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the account holder alone as that
would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.”
At the stage in which the petition was filed, the inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by
the AMLC still does not contemplate any form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property (Subido,
Pagente, Certeza, Mendoza & Binay Law Offices v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 216914, December 6, 2016, Perez, J).

SPCMB contended that the CA's denial of its request to be furnished copies of AMLC's ex-parte
application for a bank inquiry order and all subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and
issued in relation thereto, constitutes grave abuse of discretion where the purported blanket
authority under Section 11: (1) partakes of a general warrant intended to aid a mere fishing
expedition; (2) violates the attorney-client privilege; (3) is not preceded by predicate crime charging
SPCMB of a money laundering offense; and ( 4) is a form of political harassment [of SPCMB' s]
clientele.
In short, the contention is that such inquiry intrudes into the privacy of the owner of the
account. Rule on the contention. Explain.
Ans.: The contention is not correct.
While an ex-parte proceeding authorizing the government to inspect certain bank accounts or
investments without notice to the depositor would have significant implications on the right to privacy still
does not preclude such a bank inquiry order to be allowed by specific legislation as an exception to the
general rule of absolute confidentiality of bank deposits.
Section 11 of the AMLA was subjected to heightened scrutiny by the Court and found nothing
arbitrary in the allowance and authorization to AMLC to undertake an inquiry into certain bank accounts or
deposits. It provides safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state
policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts:
(1) The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application for bank
inquiry order;
(2) The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a finding of
probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity under Section
3(i) or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA;
(3) A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court
order ex-parte for the principal account which court order ex-parte for related accounts is
separately based on probable cause that such related account is materially linked to the principal
account inquired into; and
(4) The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related accounts
shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution.
The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank account are not
undertaken whimsically and solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the
requirement of demonstration by the AMLC, and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the
limits of such governmental action (Subido, etc. v. CA, G.R. No. 216914, December 6, 2016, Perez, J.).
Give the concept of probable cause under the AMLA. Explain.

ANS: The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order differs from the pr.obable cause required
for the institution of a criminal action.
The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order refers to "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful
activity and/or money laundering offence is about to be, is being or has been committed and that the account
or any monetary instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to
said unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense."
In resolving the issue of whether probable cause exits, the CA's statutorily-guided determination's
focus is not on the probable commissions of an unlawful activity (or money laundering) that the office of the
Ombudsman has already determined to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets, or other monetary
instruments sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal activities enumerated under R.A.
9160, as amended. Otherwise stated, probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation between an
unlawful activity and the property or monetary instrument which is the focal point of Section 10 of RA No.
9160, as amended. xxx (Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al., v. Republic, 705 Phil. 477, 501-502 [2013]; Subido, etc. v. CA, G.R.
No. 216914, December 6, 2016, Perez, J.).
Is there a remedy of SPCMB? Explain.

Ans.: Yes. SPCMB, as the owner of the bank account which may be the subject of inquiry of the AMLC, ought to
have a legal remedy to question the validity and propriety of such an order by the appellate court under
Section 11 of the AMLA even if subsequent to the issuance of a freeze order. SPCMB should be allowed to
question the government intrusion. Plainly, by implication, SPCMB can demonstrate the absence of probable
cause, i.e. that it is not a related account nor are its accounts materially linked to the principal account being
investigated (Subido, etc. v. CA, G.R. No. 216914, December 6, 2016, Perez, J.).
Due process and police power.
An Ordinance enacted by the City of Davao prohibiting aerial spraying in all agricultural entities in
that City and requiring affected parties to shift to other modes of pesticide application within a three-
month period under pain of penalty was declared unconstitutional as it violates due process for being
oppressive. Is the ruling correct? Why?
Ans.: Yes. The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application within three
months considering the vast area of the affected plantations and the corresponding resources required
therefor.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the plantations.
As such, the completion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the
respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-
month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would
definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers &
Exporters Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc (Bersamin)).”
Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guarantee of equal protection
secures every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the State’s duly constituted
authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs impartially and not to
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental
objective.
Equal protection neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the territory
in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals determined
according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. In other words, a valid
classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class. (Mosqueda, et al. v.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc
[Bersamin])
The Three (3) Levels of Scrutiny to Determine the Propriety of the Classification under the Equal
Protection Clause
The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the Government for its
conduct is gauged by using the means-end test. This test requires analysis of: (1) the interests of the public
that generally requires its exercise, as distinguished from those of a particular class; and (2) the means
employed that are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three levels of
scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.
The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis test) demands
that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in
cases involving economics or social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class.
When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under
intermediate or heightened review. Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate
scrutiny. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest
and be substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and
must not depend on broad generalizations.
The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The
Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest, and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino
Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc
[Bersamin])
Application of Rational basis test; violative of equal protection clause.

Applying the rational basis test, the ordinance of Davao City prohibiting aerial spraying in all
agricultural entities therein as the practice produces pesticide drift causing inconvenience and harm to the
residents and degrades the environment, violates the equal protection clause, hence, should be declared
unconstitutional.
REASON: The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the
conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom
spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health
risks to the community and to the environment. A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the
harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve. In the process, the ordinance suffers from being
“underinclusive” because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same
mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A classification that is drastically underinclusive with
respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly
serves the intended purpose of the law (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., et al., (G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin]).

Effect of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness.
Aside from its being underinclusive, the ordinance also tends to be “overinclusive” because its
impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the legislative
purpose. Its implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of individuals than those
included in the intended class based on the purpose of the law.
The imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to
be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. The respondents admit that
they aerially treat their plantations not only with pesticides but also vitamins and other substances. The
imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides and regardless of the
agricultural activity being performed becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relation to the
purported inconvenience, discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the ordinance seeks to
address. The burden now will become more onerous to various entities, including the respondents and even
others with no connection whatsoever to the intended purpose of the ordinance.”
Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are the only ideal venues for
the investment of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying. It effectively denies the affected
individuals the technology aimed at efficient and cost-effective operations and cultivation not only of banana
but of other crops as well. The prohibition against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the operations of the
banana plantations that depend on aerial technology to arrest the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and
other menaces that threaten their production and harvest. X x x the effect of the ban will not be limited to
Davao City in view of the significant contribution of banana export trading to the country’s economy.
The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and unreasonable in light of the
existence and availability of more permissible and practical alternatives that will not overburden the
respondents and those dependent on their operations as well as those who stand to be affected by the
ordinance (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., (G.R. No. 189185,
August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin]).
Non-Impairment of Contracts
Cost-recovery mechanics imposed by ERC does not violate the non-impairment clause; exercise of police
power.
NEECO is a rural electric cooperative directed by the ERC to refund over-recoveries charged to their
consumers on account of the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) clause under RA 7832 which has
been the subject of a case decided by the Supreme Court. RA 7832 imposed a cap on the amount of
system loss that may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their consumers.
Before the Supreme Court, it argued that the cap imposed on the recoverable rate of system
loss is arbitrary and constitutes a violation of the non-impairment clause and that the computation
used by ERC in arriving at the cap to be imposed is unconstitutional since it is equivalent to unlawful
taking of property. Is the contention correct? Why?
Ans.: No. The regulation of rates imposed to public utilities such as electricity distributors is an exercise of the
State’s police power.
When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected by public interest, it ceases to be
juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. As the state agency charged with the regulation of
electric cooperatives, ERC is mandated to protect public interest by directing NEECO to refund over-charges it
made to its consumers. Moreover, the computation made by the ERC to determine the cap was a mechanism
purely for cost-recovery and should not be income-generating.
Nor can the cost-recovery mechanism imposed be deemed an impairment of the contracts entered
into by NEECO prior to the enactment of RA 7832 since all private contracts must yield to the superior and
legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare (Nueva Ecija Electric Coop., Inc (NEECOI) v.
ERC, G.R. No. 180642, February 3, 2016).
SEARCH WARRANT
Evidence discovered during surveillance; witness had personal knowledge.
In this case, there was letter-complaint to the NBI-Ilocos Office asking surveillance, investigation,
apprehension and prosecution of Nena Ang for alleged illegal trading of LPG products and
underfilling, selling of underfilled LPG products. Surveillance was conducted, then, a test-buy was
conducted which turned out to be true, hence, they applied for a search warrant which was later on
quashed on the ground that there was no probable cause to issue the same. The CA affirmed the ruling
of the lower court that the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
requires that the facts surrounding the basis for the application must be within the personal
knowledge of the applicant or his witnesses. If this does not obtain, the finding of probable cause of a
judge may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed
since “the judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory
provisions.”
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in ruling that the witnesses had no personal
knowledge of the facts thus, there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants and

Ans.: The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable
cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. x x x (Del Castillo v. People, 680 Phil. 447 [2012]).
On the claim of lack of personal knowledge, the facts discovered during surveillance conducted on
the basis of information and evidence provided by petitioners – constitute personal knowledge which could
form the basis for the issuance of a search warrant (Petron LPG Dealers Assn. & Total Gaz LPG Dealers Assn. v.
Nena Ang, et al., G.R. No. 199371, February 3, 2016, Del Castillo, J).
Is a routine baggage inspection at the port by port authorities is valid even without warrant? Explain.
Ans.: Yes. Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search
warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so
literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different from that
imposed on state agents or authorized government authorities.
But the Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons
and vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in
this case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered agents
of government. The actions of port personnel during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-
related function.
Searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of
x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.
The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into
airports or ports of travel.
Search conducted by the port authorities are reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and
ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a
warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions
obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against the accused (Erwin Libo-
on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016).
Confession before the media.
Is confession before the media admissible in evidence? Explain.

Ans.: Yes. Extrajudicial confession given to the media in an interview is admissible in evidence. This is
especially so if there was no indication of the presence of police officers who could have possibly exerted
undue pressure or influence.
Reiterating People v. Andan, 336 Phil. 91 [1997], it was held that a confession made before news
reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from the police authorities, is sufficient to sustain a
conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused:
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any
undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters
when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of
the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force
appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they
asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not
once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them.
He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its
reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and
other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news
reporters.
Appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to
the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need
of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that
government has the duty to protect.
Extrajudicial confession while at a detention cell; effect.
In a case, accused-appellant claimed that the atmosphere in the jail when he was interviewed was
"tense and intimidating" and was similar to that which prevails in a custodial investigation. He
contended that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible. Is the contention correct? Why?
Ans.: No. The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made while inside a detention cell does not by itself
render such confession inadmissible. In People v. Domantay, 366 Phil. 459 [1999], where the accused was also
interviewed while inside a jail cell, the Court held that such circumstance alone does not taint the
extrajudicial confession of the accused, especially since the same was given freely and spontaneously.

While there were indeed some police officers around because about two to three meters from the jail
were the police station and the radio room there is no evidence that the presence of the police officers
exerted any undue pressure or influence on accused-appellant and coerced him into giving his confession.
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was
conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to the killing out of
fear (People v. Dacanay, G.R. No. 216064, November 7, 2016; citing People v. Jerez, 349 Phil. 319, 327 [1998]).
Roadside questioning of a motorist.
The traffic enforcer PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza flagged down petitioner Rodel Luz for driving a
motorcycle without a helmet. Alteza invited Luz to come inside their sub-station located near the area.
While issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, Alteza was alerted by Luz’s uneasy
movement and thus asked him to put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket. Consequently, it was
revealed that Luz was in possession of prohibited drugs. Can the roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop be considered a formal arrest? Why?
Ans.: No. At the time that he was waiting for the police to write his citation ticket, petitioner Rodel Luz could
not be said to have been “under arrest.” There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him,
deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which
Luz was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact xx x PO3 Altea himself
testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was the Luz had been flagged down “almost
in front” of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was
no intention to take Luz into custody (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012).
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by Luz, the failure to
wear crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of
arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may
be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an
intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the
former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to
issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation. (Luz v. People, G.R. No.
197788, 29 February 2012, 2nd Div. [Sereno]).
The right to privacy

The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a
facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. But the Court
acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to privacy exists
independently of its identification with liberty, it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.
In “In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon” the
relevance of these zones to the right to privacy was explained, thus:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any
form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary
legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by
civilized men,” but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy”
and “everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence.
In assessing the challenge that the Senate has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether
that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. (Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v.
The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014, En Banc [Abad]).
The four (4) aspects of press freedom

Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized
four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from
punishment subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of circulation.
(Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, En Banc [Puno, CJ]).
Facial challenge of law.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional
as applied to him or her. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties
and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute “on its face,” not
merely” as applied for” so that the overbreadth law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The fact that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the

concern with the “chilling” deterrent effect of the overbreadth statute on third parties not courageous enough
to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbreadth law’s “very existence may cause other not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” An overbreadth ruling is designed to
remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither
the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not
free speech. It is true that the agreements and course of conduct were in most instances brought about
through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because that conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out
by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional guarantees of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws
against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious
to society (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al., (G.R. No.
178552, 178890, 179157, & 179461, 5 October 2010, En Banc [Carpio-Morales]).
Overbreadth doctrine vis-a-vis Section 4[a][3] of Republic Act No. 10175 (The Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012
Section 4[a][3] provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data
and systems;
xxx
(3) Data Interference – The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion
or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data
message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4[a][3] suffers from overbreadth in that, while itseeks to discourage
data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the
area of protected freedoms. But Section 4[a][3] does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes
what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of wilfully destroying without right the things that belong to
others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no
connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and
private documents.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect
or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the
boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such
kind of fear is to render the State powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. Here, the
chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4[a][3] clearly describes the evil that it seeks
to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no
set of circumstances will Section 4[a][3] be valid. Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden. (Jose Jesus M.
Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014, En Banc [Abad]).
Void for vagueness rule when applicable to penal statutes.

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the
void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As
Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, “we must view
these statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal
statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to mount “facial” challenges to penal statutes
not involving free speech.”
In an “as applied” challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise
any constitutional ground – absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards,
overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a
violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on
the violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing. (Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No.
203335, Feb. 11, 2014, En Banc [Abad]).

The clear and present danger test.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) x x x applied for a permit to rally at Mendiola Bridge.
However, then Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza issued a permit to rally at Plaza Miranda instead. The
CA upheld the modification of the venue in IBP’s rally permit as not constituting grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Mayor. Is the ruling correct? Why?
Ans.: No. Section 6(c) of the Public Assembly Act (BP 880) provides that “If the mayor is of the view that there
is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he
shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.”
In modifying the permit outright, Atienza gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately
inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at
modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present test which x x x is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issue permit adverts to an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official x x x is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a
realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant
circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place
– is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. It smacks of whim and caprice for Atienza to
impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error
for the appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory
provision, not to have modified the permit “in terms of satisfactory to the applicant.” (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Hon. Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, 24 February 2010, 1 st Div. [Carpio-
Morales]).
Commercial speech vis-a-vis Section 4[c][3] of Republic Act No. 10175 (The Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012)
Section 4[c][3] penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as
“spam.”
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as
“spam.” The term “spam” surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who
repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a “spam.”
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, pointed out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service
providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with the owner’s peaceful
enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending
out spams enters the recipient’s domain without prior permission. The OSG contended that commercial
speech enjoys less protection in law. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: No. But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the
“efficiency of computers.” Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been
receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have
interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail
ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is
not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating
the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression. (Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014).
Freedom of Expression vis-a-vis obscenity/pornography and Republic Act 10175 (The Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012)
Among the offense punishable under R.A. No. 10175 (The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012) is
cybersex (Section 49[c][1]) which is defined by law as “the wilful engagement, maintenance, control, or
operation, directly or indirectly, of any lasciviousness exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the
aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.”
Petitioners claimed that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. They
expressed that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults,
which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would not be regarded as crimes when done “for
favor” in cyberspace. In common usage, the term “favor” includes “gracious kindness,” “a special privilege or
right granted or conceded,” or “a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously.” This meaning given
to the term “favor” embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement
agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.
These deliberations in Congress show a lack of intent to penalize a “private showing x x x between
and among two private persons x x x although that may be a form of obscenity to some. The understanding of
those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of “engaging in a business” is necessary to
constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and

pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by
webcam.
The subject of Section 4[c][1] – lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity – is not novel.
Article 201 of the RPC punishes “obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows.” The Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes those who “maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or
pornography.” The law defines prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of
person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other
consideration.
The case of Nograles v. People shows the extent to which the State can regulate materials that serve
no other purpose than satisfy the market for violence, lust, or pornography. The Court weighed the property
rights of individuals against the public welfare. Private property, if containing pornographic materials may be
forfeited and destroyed. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by
some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the
exploitation of women.
In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the bounds
of obscenity. The Court will not declare Section 4[c][1] unconstitutional where is stands a construction that
makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or
indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as
Congress has intended. (Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335,
Feb. 11, 2014, En Banc [Abad]).
Facial Challenge
James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., (GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014, En Banc
[Mendoza])
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but
also all other rights in the First Amendment (See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 [1987]). These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges
to strictly penal statutes (Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phil. 357 [2008]; Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265 [2004]; Estradfa v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 [2001]), it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights (Resolution, Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 594 Phil. 305, 316 [2008]). The
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated
by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to
determine if the RH (Reproductive Health) Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as
a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people (Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No,.
203335, Feb. 11, 2014).
Freedom of Religion
In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court regarding the use of the basement of
the Quezon City, Hall of Justice for religious worship, it was contended that the act violated the
constitutional prohibition of public money or property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination
or any other system of religion. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: No. Section 29[2], Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, “No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to
the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.”
The word “apply” means “to use or employ for a particular purpose” (Black’s Law Dictionary (Fifth
Ed.), p. 91) "Appropriate" means "to prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or to designate or
destine a fund or property for a distinct use, or for the payment of a particular demand" (Black’s Law
Dictionary (Fifth Ed.), p. 93).

The aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use of public property for religious
purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available
indiscriminately to the public in general." Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession even
as it is available for a civic parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it
may also be used for a political assemblage (In Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at
the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, Mendoza, J).
What does the phrase “directly or indirectly” refer to? Explain.

Ans.: The phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of appropriation of public money or property,
not as to whether a particular act involves a direct or a mere incidental benefit to any church. Otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have placed it before "use, benefit or support" to describe the same. Even
the exception to the same provision bolsters this interpretation. The exception contemplates a situation
wherein public funds are paid to a priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary because
they rendered service in the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium. That a priest belongs to a particular church and the latter may have benefited from the money
he received is of no moment, for the purpose of the payment of public funds is merely to compensate the
priest for services rendered and for which other persons, who will perform the same services will also be
compensated in the same manner (In Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of
Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, Mendoza, J).
What would be the effect if the holding of religious rituals within the halls of justice would be
prohibited? Explain.
Ans.: To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of justice would set a dangerous precedent and
commence a domino effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent neutrality/accommodation, would be
the norm. Thus, the establishment of Shari'a courts, the National Commission for Muslim Filipinos, and the
exception of Muslims from the provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would all be rendered
nugatory because of strict separation. The exception of members of Iglesia ni Cristo from joining a union or
the non-compulsion recognized in favor of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses from doing certain gestures
during the flag ceremony, will all go down the drain simply because we insist on strict separation (In Re:
Letter of Tony Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No.
10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, Mendoza, J).
Right to Information
Requisites before right to information may be compelled.

Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of mandamus.
Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public interest. And,
secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether or not a particular information
is of public concern or public interest. Both terms cover a wide-range of issues that the public may want to be
familiar with either because the issues have a direct effect on them or because the issues "naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citizen." As such, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or
public concern is left to the proper determination of the courts on a case to case basis.
The Philippine petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of plastic and other related
materials, and provides essential input requirements for the agricultural and industrial sectors of the country.
Thus, the position of the petrochemical industry as an essential contributor to the overall growth of our
country's economy easily makes the information sought a matter of public concern or interest.
The second requisite is that the information requested must not be excluded by law from the
constitutional guarantee. The constitutional guarantee of the people's right to information does not cover
national security matters and intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal
matters. Equally excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence,
closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court has ruled that the right to
information does not extend to matters acknowledged as "privileged information under the separation of
powers," which include "Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door
Cabinet meetings." Likewise exempted from the right to information are "information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused (Sereno, et al. v. Committee on Trade & Related
Matters (CTRM) of the NEDA, G.R. No. 175210, February 1, 2016)."
Re: Request for copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) and Personal Data
Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the
Judiciary (A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012, En Banc [Mendoza])
The right to information goes hand in hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure
and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in government
decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. The importance of the said right was
pragmatically explicated that the incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the
public of the nation’s problems nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to

information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law (citing
Valmonte v. Belmonte).
Thus, while “public concern” like “public interest” eludes exact definition and has been said to
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen, the Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article IX, has
classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a
“duty to disclose” sprang from the “right to know.” Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command
while the latter is a permission. Hence, there is a duty on the part of members of the government to disclose
their SALNs to the public in the manner provided by law.
There are valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some
individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and their publication. However,
custodians of public documents must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the
persons seeking to access to the records. The moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on
others is the requestor’s responsibility and lookout. While public manner in which records may be inspected,
examined or copied by interested parties, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit
access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public trust.
When does the right to counsel commence? Explain.

Ans.: The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion that would
lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation,
i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the accused (People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 691, 718; People v.
Pepino, et al., G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016).
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a
suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation (People v. Pavillare, 386 Phil. 126, 136 [2000]). As
a rule, a police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during
custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police lineup (People
v. Pepino, et al., G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016; People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012, 678
SCRA 332).
Spontaneous and voluntary statements to the police admitting the commission of crime not covered by
the concept of “under investigation.”
The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to
"custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask
questions on the suspect' s participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission (People v. Pasudag,
409 Phil. 560, 570 (2001)). As expounded in People v. Marra, G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994, 236 SCRA
565, 573:
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into
custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
Accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when he admitted, without assistance of
counsel, to the police that he stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so
spontaneously and voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It
may be true that the officer asked accused-appellant who killed his father, but he only did so in response to
accused-appellant's initial declaration that his father was already dead. At that point, the police still had no
idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the suspect in his father's
killing. Accused-appellant was also merely standing before the police in front of the Police Station and was
not yet in police custody (People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015).
Speedy Disposition of Cases
Vexations delay results in dismissal of a case.
From the time the Affidavit of COA Auditors and the COA Audit Report were turned over to the
Ombudsman for review and scrutiny for at least 8 years before the Ombudsman ordered the conduct
of the investigation, it took 16 years before the Ombudsman found probable cause. Was there delay
and a violation of the right to speedy disposition of the cases? Explain.
Ans.: Yes. The speedy disposition of cases covers not only the period within which the preliminary
investigation was conducted, but also all stages to which the accused is subjected, even including fact-finding
investigations conducted prior to the preliminary investigation proper. In Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr., G.R. No.
126814, March 2, 2000, it was said:

Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid
constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of
justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to “a speedy disposition of their case”;
includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords
broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is
more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the
period after the submission of the case. The present constitutional provision applies to civil,
criminal and administrative cases (Commodore Lamberto Torres v. SB, et al., G.R. No.
221562-69, October 5, 2016, Velasco, J).
Purpose of rule on speedy disposition of cases.
State the basic purpose/s of the guarantee of speedy disposition of cases. Explain.
Ans.: The right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch
in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary
objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation
and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.
The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to
stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-
judicial tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with
the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice.
Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and
by various legislations inutile.
All told, the criminal complaints were correctly dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay of fifteen
(15) years amounting to a transgression of the right to a speedy disposition of cases and therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion (Commodore Lamberto Torres v. SB, et al., G.R. No.
221562-69, October 5, 2016, Velasco, J).
Limitation on the right to travel
Office of Administrative Services – Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Ignacio B. Macarine, A.M.
No. MTJ-10-1770, 18 July 2012
The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not
absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided
that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided
by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of
administrative supervision over lower courts.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be
complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To “restrict” is to
restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to “regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule. To
ensure management of court docket and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No.
49-2003 requires a judgment who wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of
absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a certification from the Statistics Division,
Court Management Office of the OCA. The said certification shall state the condition of his docket based on his
Certificate of Service for the month immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has decided
and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant to Section
15[1] and [2], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, for travelling abroad without having been officially allowed by the Court, Judge Macarine is
guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
The Right to Bail
Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Div.), G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015, En Banc (Bersamin)
A close reading of the ruling of the SC in this case allowing former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to post
bail although he was charged of plunder, a non-bailable offense, was because of the Olalia ruling.
In this case, former Senator Enrile was shown not to be a flight risk or a danger to the community
(his voluntary surrender to the authorities and his record of respect for court processes in earlier cases), and
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances (his advanced age, fragile state of health
and medical predicament that will require the services of doctors of his choice) that will justify the grant of
bail to him. After all, the main purpose of bail is to assure the presence of an accused during the trial of the
case as required by the court.
In granting the petition for bail, the SC took cognizance that the principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. It was also
mindful of the Philippine’s responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but

also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
Health reason in granting bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail.
Bail for the provisional liberty to the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious
to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling hid health and life would not
serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented.
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of
his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will
guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the
accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail x x x
that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.
The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his
personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well
as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
The Right against Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder
What is a bill of attainder? Is P.D. 1866 a bill of attainder?

People v. Ferrer, defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals
or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of
certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack
of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the
determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential. P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the
elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the
measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the decree does is
to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying
circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the power of the court to
determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of
illegal possession of firearms has been committed and that the qualifying circumstances attached to it has
been established also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents require. (Misolas
v. Panga, 181 SCRA 648, 659-660, Jan. 30, 1990)
What is an ex post facto law? Is R.A. No. 8249 an ex post facto law?
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is
a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the
Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e., one which prescribes rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired
under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has
already been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but
statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of
appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of
procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It
does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did not
alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.
At any rate, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused’s right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review
questions of law. On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of
review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome. (Panfilo M. Lacson v.
The Executive Secretary, et. al., G.R. No. 128096, Jan. 20, 1999)
R.A. No. 7483 (An Act defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and providing
penalties for violations thereof)
Accused Antonio Lauga was charged with and convicted of the crime of rape of his daughter. During
the proceedings in the trial court, the prosecution presented as witnesses, the victim, the victim’s brother,
and one Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay.

Is Lauga’s extra-judicial confession to a bantay bayan admissible as evidence? Explain.
Ans.: No. People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article
III, Section 12[1] and [3] of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbour of the private complainant. The
Supreme Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanod’s, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular
instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III,
Section 12[1] and [3], of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the
barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only
one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed by x xx [the] Constitution should have already been
observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was
made in response to the ‘interrogation’ made by the latter – admittedly conducted without
first informing accused-appellant for her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence
of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x
x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.
National Patrimony/Regalian Doctrine
Regalian doctrine once again explained.
Congress converted Bataan Community Colleges and Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts & Trades
under RA 8562 into Bataan Polytechnic State College (BPSC). Under the law, all parcels of land
belonging to the government occupied by the schools were declared properties of BPSC. Cong. Garcia
wrote Governor Roman requesting the transfer of the properties to the College, but it was refused. It
was contended by the Governor that such properties belong to the Province of Bataan, not the State.
They are patrimonial properties of the province, hence, they cannot be taken without due process and
without just compensation. A petition for mandamus was filed which was granted. The CA affirmed
the decision on appeal. Is the decision correct? Explain.
ANS: Yes. The State’s ownership of and control over all lands and resources of the public domain are beyond
dispute. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “all lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x.” In Section 1, Article XIII of
the Amended 1935 Constitution, it was also provided that “all agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State x x x.”
Under this well-entrenched and time-honored Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain are
under the absolute control and ownership of the State (Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan v. Cong. Garcia,
et al., G.R. No. 174964, October 5, 2016, Reyes, J).
Local government property devoted to governmental purposes, such as local administration, public
education, and public health, as may be provided under special laws, is classified as public.
In The Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al., 131 Phil. 446 [1968], the Province
of Zamboanga del Norte sought to declare unconstitutional R.A. No. 3039, which ordered the transfer of
properties belonging to the Province of Zamboanga located within the territory of the City of Zamboanga to
the said City, for depriving the province of property without due process and just compensation. In said case,
the Court classified properties of local governments as either (a) properties for public use, or (b) patrimonial
properties, and held that the capacity in which the property is held by a local government is dependent on the
use to which it is intended and for which it is devoted. If the property is owned by the municipal corporation
in its public and governmental capacity, it is public and Congress has absolute control over it; but if the
property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
control, in which case, the municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation. In upholding the validity of R.A. No. 3039, the Court noted that it affected "lots used as capitol
site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites - a total of
24 lots - since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are
subject to the absolute control of Congress (Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan v. Cong. Garcia, et al., G.R. No.
174964, October 5, 2016, Reyes, J)."
In Province of Zamboanga del Norte, properties for the free and indiscriminate use of everyone are
classified under the Civil Code norm as for public use, while all other properties are patrimonial in nature. In
contrast, under the Municipal Corporations Law norm, to be considered public property, it is 'enough that a
property is held and devoted to a governmental purpose, such as local administration, public education, and
public health. The classification of properties in the municipalities, other than those for public use, as
patrimonial under Article 424 of the Civil Code, is "without prejudice to the provisions of special laws,"
holding that the principles obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special
laws."
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, 605 Phil. 244 [2009], the Court reiterated
that Article 420(2) of the Civil Code makes clear that properties "which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth," are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable

or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion when it is "intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth (Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan v. Cong. Garcia, et al., G.R. No.
174964, October 5, 2016, Reyes, J)."
Requisites before one may acquire property of public dominion.
Before a person can acquire land of public dominion, what requirements must be complied with?
Explain.
ANS: In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 605 Phil. 244 [2009], Bersamin, J, it was said that possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code will not
convert it to patrimonial or private property. There must be an express declaration that the property is no
longer intended
for public service or the development of national wealth. In the absence thereof, the property remains to be
alienable and disposable and may not be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
There must be an official declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public use, public service, or for the development of national wealth before it can be acquired by
prescription; that a mere declaration by government officials that a land of the public domain is already
alienable and disposable would not suffice for purposes of registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
The period of acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the time that the State officially declares
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development
of national wealth (Rep. v. Cortez, G.R. No. 186639, February 5, 2015, 715 SCRA 417; Rep. v. Rizalvo, Jr.,659
Phil. 578 [2011]; Rep. v. Heirs of Estacio, G.R. No. 208350, November 14, 2016, Peralta, J) .
Aliens cannot own land in the Philippines.
May an alien own land in the Philippines? Explain.

Ans.: No. Much as the Court sympathized with the plight of a mother who adopted an infant son, only to have
her ungrateful ward eject her from her property during her twilight years, the Court did not grant her prayer.
She acquired the subject parcels of land in violation of the constitutional prohibition against aliens owning
real property in the Philippines. Axiomatically, the properties in question cannot be legally reconveyed to one
who had no right to own them in the first place. However, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for
reversion or escheat of the land to the State. In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto
by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution, both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have
committed the constitutional violation. Being in pari delicto, the courts will not afford protection to either
party.
Under the Constitution then in force, aliens may not acquire residential lands: “One of the
fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the constitution x x x is ‘that lands, minerals,
forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should,
therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their prosperity.” The
prohibition against aliens owning lands in the Philippines is subject only to limited constitutional exceptions,
and not even an implied trust can be permitted on equity considerations (Ang v. The Estate of Sy So, G.R. No.
1822252, August 3, 2016).
What is the meaning of the term “capital” of a public utility company in the Constitution and explain.
This question arose again because despite the finality of the Gamboa decision a petition was filed
seeking to apply the 60-40 Filipino ownership requirement to each class of shares of a public utility
corporation, whether common, preferred non-voting, preferred voting or other class of shares.
Explain.
ANS: The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock comprising both common and nonvoting preferred shares.
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to
preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the
election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right to
participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the
election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors (Heirs of Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Sec. Teves; Jose
Roy III v. Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, et al., G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016, Caguioa, J).
Reason for the foregoing definition of “capital.”

The Court adopted the foregoing definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution in furtherance of "the intent and letter of the Constitution that the 'State shall develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos' [because a] broad definition
unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the
public utility." The provision is an express recognition of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities
both in the national economy and for national security. The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is
to prevent aliens from assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest. The
foregoing interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands

of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities; and, as revealed in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, "capital" refers to the voting stock or controlling interest of a corporation
(Gamboa v. Teves, 668 Phil. 1 [2011]; Jose Roy III v. Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, et al., G.R. Nos. 207246,
November 22, 2016, Caguioa, J).
In this regard, it would be apropos to state that since Filipinos own at least 60% of the outstanding
shares of stock entitled to vote directors, which is what the Constitution precisely requires, then the Filipino
stockholders control the corporation, i.e., they dictate corporate actions and decisions, and they have all the
rights of ownership including, but not limited to, offering certain preferred shares that may have greater
economic interest to foreign investors - as the need for capital for corporate pursuits (such as expansion),
may be good for the corporation that they own. Surely, these "true owners" will not allow any dilution of their
ownership and control if such move will not be beneficial to them.
As owners of the corporation, the economic benefits will necessarily accrue to them. There is thus no
logical reason why Filipino shareholders will allow foreigners to have greater economic benefits than them. It
is illogical to speculate that they will create shares which have features that will give greater economic
interests or benefits than they are holding and not benefit from such offering, or that they will allow
foreigners to profit more than them from their own corporation - unless they are dummies. But,
Commonwealth Act No. 108, the Anti-Dummy Law, is NOT in issue in these petitions. Notably, even if the
shares of a particular public utility were owned 100% Filipino, that does not discount the possibility of a
dummy situation from arising. Hence, even if the 60-40 ownership in favor of Filipinos rule is applied
separately to each class of shares of a public utility corporation, as the petitioners insist, the rule can easily be
side-stepped by a dummy relationship. In other words, even applying the 60-40 Filipino foreign ownership
rule to each class of shares will not assure the lofty purpose enunciated by petitioners.
What tests shall determine whether a corporation is a Philippine national? Explain.

ANS: Both the Voting Control Test and the Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to determine whether a
corporation is a "Philippine national (Heirs of Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Teves, 696 Phil. 276
[2012])" and that a "Philippine national," as defined in the FIA and all its predecessor statutes, is "a Filipino
citizen, or a domestic corporation "at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to
vote," is owned by Filipino citizens. A domestic corporation is a "Philippine national" only if at least 60% of its
voting stock is owned by Filipino citizens." The term "capital" refers to controlling interest of a corporation
and the framers of the Constitution intended public utilities to be majority Filipino-owned and controlled.
CITIZENSHIP
Foundling born in the Philippines, a natural-born citizen.
Sen. Grace Poe is admittedly a foundling. Is she a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?
Ans.: Yes, as a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. During the deliberations in the 1935 Constitutional convention, there was an attempt to
amend the proposed provisions on citizenship to include foundlings in the concept of natural-born citizens
but it was not carried out because there was any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage
are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. In fact some
delegates were able to convince their colleagues that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings a
Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized. In the words of Chief Justice Fernando, “the
constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. In fact, there is nothing in the 1935, 1973, 1987
Constitution for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who
wish to deny the use of the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the Constitution
really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization (Mary Grace
Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016, Perez, J).
Other provisions of Philippine law that would support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first
place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have
jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, 117 Phil. 976 [1963], a child left by an
unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. The Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no
court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case
and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well
as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction
over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this
theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the
Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the
Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country

Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016, Perez, J).
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a
foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. Is the contention correct?
The SC said:
Ans.: This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In
the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this
instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities (Sec. 5, RA No.
8552). Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the
citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother
under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
Under the provisions of Section 5 of the RA No. 8552 it shall be the duty of the Department or the
child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological
parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of
legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016, Perez, J).
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that
natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth."
The ruling is not correct. R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative
to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born
citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the
Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already
rejected in Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A
person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."
Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, it was pointed
out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and
naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and
(2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized
Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either
be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and
the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz
was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives (G.R. No. 217126-27,
10 November 2015; Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos.
221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016, Perez, J).
Effect of migration to the USA and how did she reacquire her original domicile.
When she immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. An
intention to remain there; and 3. An intention to abandon the old domicile (Fernandez v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 623 Phil. 628, 660 (2009) citing Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil. 354, 370-
372 (2009) further citing Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC, 430 Phil. 754, 768-770 (2002) further further citing
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960, 14 September 1993, 226 SCRA408, 415). To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual (Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798, 819 [1999]; Mary Grace Natividad S.
Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016).
Naturalization; concept; effects.
Edison So v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007, 3 rd Div., (Callejo, Sr.)

Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen (RECORD, SENATE 11 th CONGRESS [June 4-5, 2001]). It
likewise addresses the concerns of degree holder who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot
practice their profession, thus promoting “brain gain” for the Philippines (Id.).
R.A. No. 9139 may be availed of only by native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their
lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate, the
intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine
citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in
nature. x x x. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine
citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. (Edison So v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170603,
January 29, 2007, 3rd Div. [Callejo, Sr.]).
Republic Act No. 9225 (The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003)
Section 5[2] of The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. x x x.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
When a person is considered a member of Congress.
A petition was filed to cancel the COC of Reyes as candidate for the position of Representative of the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque alleging material misrepresentation. The petition was
granted but she filed a motion for reconsideration. During the pendency of the MR, the elections were
held on May 13, 2013 and on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution. But despite
such affirmation the PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed Reyes as the winner. Velasco filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the COMELE assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes, that
it is void. It was initially denied but it was reconsidered by the COMELEC and declared that the
proclamation of Reyes was void. Reyes, however took her oath as elected representative, hence,
Velasco filed a petition for mandamus to compel Belmonte to allow him to assume office. Reyes,
however, contended that since she has taken her oath already, the HRET has the power to decide the
issue, hence, the mandamus case is not the proper remedy. Is the contention of Reyes correct?
Explain.
Ans.: No. HRET has no jurisdiction to try the said case. Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET that has
jurisdiction over her. To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (i) a valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of
office.
Reyes was not yet considered a Member of the House of Representatives. The most crucial time is
when Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her non-eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque - for without a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the election
and much less as a duly proclaimed winner. That particular decision of the COMELEC was promulgated even
before Reyes's proclamation.
Hence, the Petition for Mandamus was granted. Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap were
ordered to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of
the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco and entering the latter's name in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives (Velasco v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016).
May the HRET resolve the issue of fraud, terrorism? Explain.

Ans.: Yes. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution clearly spells out HRET's jurisdiction, to wit:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds or irregularities.
It aims to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and,
therefore, entitled to hold the office.
The power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power granted to the COMELEC to declare
failure of elections. The Constitution no less, grants the HRET with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election
contests involving the members of the House of Representatives, which necessarily includes those which
raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or other irregularities committed before, during or after the elections.

The HRET has jurisdiction to determine whether there was terrorism in the contested precincts. In
the event that the HRET would conclude that terrorism indeed existed in the said precincts, then it could
annul the election results in the said precincts to the extent of deducting the votes received by Daza and
Abayon in order to remain faithful to its constitutional mandate to determine who among the candidates
received the majority of the valid votes cast (Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 222236, May 3, 2016, Mendoza, J).
HRET has sole power to decide on the issue of qualifications of members of Congress including Party-
List.
The party-list group Ating Koop was proclaimed as a winner in the 2010 elections with Lico as its
representative in the House of Representatives. There was a term-sharing agreement among the
nominees. He was, however expelled by the party due to malversation, graft and corruption aside
from the fact that he refused to honor the term-sharing agreement. In a petition before the COMELEC,
it was prayed that he be ordered to vacate his office and the COMELEC upheld the expulsion, hence,
Lico questioned the decision contending that it is the HRET that has jurisdiction. Is the contention
correct? Explain.
Ans.: Yes. The HRET has exclusive jurisdiction.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve
questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET
acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of
the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in
the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case.
There is no legal basis of the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of Lico from Ating
Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings
already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list
group sought to be represented (Atty. Isidro Lico, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 205505, September 29,
2015, Sereno, J).
The Power of Appropriation

Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the
requirement that appropriations bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option of
the Senate to propose or concur with amendments. While the budgetary process commences from the
proposal submitted by the President to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting an
appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the nation, based on its own judgment, wisdom and purposes. Like
any other piece of legislation, the appropriation act may then be susceptible to objection from the branch
tasked to implement it, by way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter, budget execution comes under the domain of
the Executive branch which deals with the operational aspects of the cycle including the allocation and release
of funds earmarked for various projects. Simply put, from the regulation of fund releases, the implementation
of payment schedules and up to the actual spending of the funds specified in the law, the Executive takes the
wheel. “The DBM (Department of Budget and Management) lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of
the fund. The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs
which may be funded from the PDAF (Priority Development Assistance Fund). The list submitted by the
Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews
and determines whether such list of projects submitted is consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set
by the Executive.” This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and
therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
In Philconsa, the Court upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress to propose and
identify priority projects because this was merely recommendatory in nature and it also recognized that
individual Members of Congress far more than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to
be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.
(Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No.
164987, April 24, 2012, En Banc [Mendoza]).
Concept of the Pork Barrel System.

The Court has defined the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that
govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are
utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum,
discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees,
are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment
measures and/or practices. x x x and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. x x x the Court
shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

(Belgica, et al. v. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 208566, 710 SCRA 1, 50-51, November 19,
2013, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe].
The “Pork Barrel” System Declared Unconstitutional: Reasons

The Court rendered this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our
history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view
of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to
wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the
system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the
power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific
projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the
President the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by
giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called
to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it has authorized
legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of
capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again, insofar as it has
conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only
to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of “priority
infrastructure development projects,” it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
(Belgica, et al. v. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 208566, 710 SCRA 1, 50-51, November 19,
2013, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe].
Under the Constitution, no money shall be paid out of the National Treasury without appropriation, is
the rule absolute? Explain.
Ans.: No. In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the
budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for
the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of
the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are
authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from the
savings in other items of their respective appropriations (Nazareth v. Villar, et al., G.R. No. 188635, January
29, 2013).
Are there limitations to the authority to transfer funds? Explain.

Ans.: Yes. The authority granted to the President is subject to two essential requisites in order that a transfer
of appropriation from the agency’s savings would be validly effected. The first requires that there must be
savings from the authorized appropriation of the agency. The second demands that there must be an existing
item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which the savings would be
transferred for augmentation purposes only (Nazareth v. Villar, et al., supra).
Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution,
must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations of their respective
offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices. (Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R.
No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Executive power; vested in the President.
One of the State duties is to protect its citizens, represented by the President. State the Constitutional
provision on such duty.
Ans.: The 1987 Constitution has “vested the executive power in the President of the Republic of the
Philippines” (Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1). While the vastness of the executive power that has been
consolidated in the person of the President cannot be expressed fully in one provision, the Constitution has
stated the prime duty of the government, of which the President is the head:
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or
civil service (Sec. 4, Article II, Constitution).

The duty to protect the State and its people must be carried out earnestly and effectively throughout
the whole territory of the Philippines in accordance with the Constitutional provision on national territory.
Hence, the President of the Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of the
Philippine archipelago (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.,G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016).
How does the President carry out such important duty? Explain.
Ans.: To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped with authority over the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), which is the protector of the people and the state. The AFP's role is to secure the
sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. In addition, the Executive is
Constitutionally empowered to maintain peace and order; protect life, liberty, and property; and promote the
general welfare (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3). In recognition of these powers, Congress has specified that the
President must oversee, ensure, and reinforce our defensive capabilities against external and internal threats
(see Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 18 in relation to Art. II, Secs. 3, 4 & 7; Executive Order No. 292 [Administrative
Code of 1987], Book IV [Executive Branch], Title VIII [National Defense], Secs. l, 15, 26 & 33 [hereinafter
Administrative Code of 1987]) and, in the same vein, ensure that the country is adequately prepared for all
national and local emergencies arising from natural and man-made disasters (Administrative Code of 1987,
Book IV [Executive Branch], Title XII [Local Government], Sec. 3[5]; Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et
al., supra).
Is the power absolute? Explain.

Ans.: No. This power is limited by the Constitution itself, because the President may call out the AFP to
prevent or suppress instances of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, (Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 18) but
not suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a period exceeding 60 days, or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law exceeding that same span. In the exercise of these powers, the
President is also duty-bound to submit a report to Congress, in person or in writing, within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and Congress may
in turn revoke the proclamation or suspension. The same provision provides for the Supreme Court's review
of the factual basis for the proclamation or suspension, as well as the promulgation of the decision within 30
days from filing (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra).
The power and duty to conduct foreign relations; its nature; reason for the rule.
Under the Constitution, who is the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations? Explain.
Ans.: The President carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations (See
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1 in relation to Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV [Executive Branch], Title I
Foreign Affairs), Secs. 3[1] and 20; Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino, 580 Phil. 422 [2008]; Pimentel v.
Office of the Executive Secretary, 501 Phil. 303 (2005); People's Movement for Press Freedom v. Manglapus,
G.R. No. 84642, 13 September 1988 (unreported) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 [1936]); Joaquin Bernas, Foreign Relations in Constitutional Law, 101 (1995); Irene R. Cortes, The
Philippine Presidency: A Study of Executive Power 187 [1966]; Vicente G. Sinco, Philippine Political Law:
Principles and Concepts 297 [10th ed., 1954]). Since every state has the capacity to interact with and engage
in relations with other sovereign states (See 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,
Art. 1, 165 LNTS 19; James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 61 [2"d ed. 2007]), it is but
logical that every state must vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those other sovereign
states (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra).
State the nature of the conduct of foreign relations. Explain.

Ans.: The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death
significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of
government which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness. x x
x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about
foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over
the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential
role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in
the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent
standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state
relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally
undesirable consequences (Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, 633 Phil. 538, 570 [2010] [quoting the Dissenting
Opinion of then Assoc. Justice Reynato S. Puno in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 379 Phil. 165, 233-234
[2004]; Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016).
What could be the justifications why the conduct of foreign relations is vested in the President?
Explain.
Ans.: The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death
significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of
government which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness. x x
x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about
foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over

the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential
role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in
the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent
standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state
relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally
undesirable consequences (Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, 633 Phil. 538, 570 [2010] [quoting the Dissenting
Opinion of then Assoc. Justice Reynato S. Puno in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 379 Phil. 165, 233-234
[2004]; Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra).
What is the role of the Senate in relation to the power of the President as the sole organ in
international relations? Explain.
Ans.: The power to defend the State and to act as its representative in the international sphere inheres in the
person of the President. This power, however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever
instrument the Chief Executive so desires. The Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international
agreements the President enters into, as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution, obtain
the approval of two-thirds of its members (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra)
EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain
"Agreed Locations" in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that
to do so was no longer necessary. Accordingly, in June 2014, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the
U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes confirming the completion of all necessary internal requirements
for the agreement to enter into force in the two countries (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra)
What are distinguishing feature of executive agreements? Explain.

Ans.: One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not
affected by a lack of Senate concurrence (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, supra). This
distinctive feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea Trading ( 1961 ), viz:
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-
thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without
the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.
xx xx
[T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity
of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest
days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as
commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and
copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
That notion was carried over to the present Constitution. The Constitutional
Commission members ultimately decided that the term "international agreements" as
contemplated in Section 21, Article VII, does not include executive agreements, and that a
proviso is no longer needed (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra)
Power of control of the President; extent.
President Duterte decided to allow former President Marcos to be interred at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. Petitions were filed alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the President for reasons that Marcos is not qualified to be interred at the
LMB on the ground that he was dishonorably discharged when he was ousted from power by the 1986
February Revolution. They likewise alleged that he committed offenses involving moral turpitude for
his gross human rights violations, massive graft and corruption and dubious military records. By
going into exile, he deliberately evaded liability for his actions.
It was further contended that in 1992 the government represented by Sec. Alunan and the
Marcos family entered into an agreement that the body of President Marcos would be interred in
Batac, Ilocos Norte. Hence, the contention that he should not be buried at the LMB. Rule on the
contentions. Explain.
ANS: The contentions are not correct.
This is so because of the power of control.
The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is empowered
to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the supervision and control of the DND. The
DND, in turn, is under the Office of the President.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing
provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited,
much less withdrawn, by the legislature (See National Electrification Administration v. COA, 427 Phil. 464,
485 [2002]). This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former
President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the
incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his
predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed
wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate (Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Ernesto Enriquez, et al.,
G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016).

Power of appointment of Justices at SB; clustering of nominees is not constitutional.
The Judicial & Bar Council submitted several lists of nominees for possible appointees to the
vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. The nominees were clustered into several lists like for example 17 th,
18th, 19th, 20th, 21st with five (5) nominees for each cluster. President Aquino appointed Justices to the
vacant positions, but did not pick the appointees from the clusters concerned but appointed justices
from one cluster to another position. Petitioners who were listed in the cluster for the 17 th Justice
questioned the appointments. They contended that the President could only choose one nominee
from each of the six separate shortlists for each specific vacancy and no other and the appointment
made in deviation of this procedure is a violation of the Constitution. Is the contention correct?
Explain.
ANS: No. The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to
appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the
vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated
by the JBC, the appointment is valid. President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of
nominees into the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary
from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice.
The JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters, one for every vacancy, could influence the
appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate of recommending qualified nominees to the
President. Clustering impinges upon the President's power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances
for appointment of the qualified nominees, because (1) the President's option for every vacancy is limited to
the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the President has appointed from one cluster, then he
is proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. The said
limitations are utterly without legal basis and in contravention of the President's appointing power (Hon.
Philip Aguinaldo, et al. v. Aquino, et al., G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
Acting Solicitor General Alberto C. Agra was appointed acting Secretary of Justice. He was designated
as Acting Solicitor General. Is the designation valid? Explain.
Ans.: The designation is void, hence, unconstitutional. Sec. 13, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. Likewise, Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B of the
Constitution provides:
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII,. Hence, Agra could not validly
hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the
Constitution has not otherwise so provided (Funa v. Acting Sec. of Justice Alberto N. Agra, et al., G.R. No.
191644, February 19, 2013).
He contended that he was merely designated in an acting capacity, hence, the rule is inapplicable. Is
the contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: No. It is of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13, plainly
indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the
Government or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. To hold an
office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office (Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No.
184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308). Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, the Constitution
makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, is to prevent the
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable
floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive
Department and of limitations on the President’s power of appointment in the guise of temporary
designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of
government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations” (Funa v. Acting
Sec. of Justice Alberto N. Agra, et al., G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013).
Why cannot the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice be considered ex officio while acting
a Solicitor General? Explain.
ANS: It is because of the fact that the functions of the two (2) offices are different.

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ is mandated to “provide the government with a
principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes,
prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system; implement the laws on the admission
and stay of aliens, citizenship, land titling system, and settlement of land problems involving small
landowners and members of indigenous cultural minorities; and provide free legal services to indigent
members of the society.”
On the other hand, the Administrative Code of 1987 confers upon the Office of the Solicitor General
the following powers and functions, to wit:
The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.
The foregoing provisions of the applicable laws show that one position was not derived from the
other. Indeed, the powers and functions of the OSG are neither required by the primary functions nor
included by the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent unit
of the latter, as, in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous
(Section 34, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987). With the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9417, the Solicitor General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of the Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals (Funa v. Acting Sec. of Justice Agra, et al., supra).
Interpretation of the term “savings” is not a legislative function but a judicial function.
Is the interpretation of “savings” as a concept a legislative determination? Explain.

Ans.: No. It is a judicial function because the power of judicial review is vested exclusively in the Court. This is
especially so that the petitions primarily alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive which
demand the exercise by the Court of its power of judicial review as mandated by the Constitution (Araullo, et
al. v. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209287, & companion cases, February 3, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Strict interpretation of “savings.”
Why is there a need to strictly interpret the concept of “savings?” Explain.

Ans.: Yes. The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an exception
to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose.
Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against expanding
the scope of the power to augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and
other budget implementers within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent
them from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the purse. Hence, regardless of the perceived beneficial
purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the
national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as
the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the
relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article
VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within the
parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through
legal methods (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209287, & companion cases, February 3, 2015,
Bersamin, J, citing Brillantes, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 269,
307).
Under Sec. 38 of the Administrative Code, the President can suspend or stop further expenditure of
funds allotted for any agency. State the meaning and effect of such power. Explain.
ANS: When the President suspends or stops expenditure of funds, savings are not automatically generated
until it has been established that such funds or appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance,
and that the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been completed,
discontinued or abandoned (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209287, & companion cases, February
3, 2015, Bersamin, J).
The rule is that, if there are unexpended balances of appropriations or savings, they are reverted to
the General Fund. Is this rule applicable to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, Commission
on Human Rights and the Office of the Ombudsman? Explain.
ANS: No, because they enjoy fiscal autonomy.
The Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the
power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates
authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as
may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control, otherwise, autonomy given by the
Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated
for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers
upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. x x x (Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524,
April 15, 1992, 208 SCRA 133; Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209287, & companion cases, February
3, 2015, Bersamin, J).
The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA.
The respondents posited that the Court has erroneously invalidated all the DAP-funded projects by
overlooking the difference between an item and an allotment class, and by concluding that they do not
have appropriation cover; and that such error may induce Congress and the Executive (through the
DBM) to ensure that all items should have at least P1 funding in order to allow augmentation by the
President.
They contended that there is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create allotment
classes within an item. What is required is for Congress to create items to comply with the line-item
veto of the President.
Rule on the contention.
ANS: The contention is meritorious.
Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the object of
augmentation by the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and the
heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, it was said
that an item that is the distinct and several part of the appropriation bill, in line with the item veto power of
the President, must contain “specific appropriations of money” and not be only general provisions, thus:
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there
exists a proper “item” which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of
appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of
the appropriation or of the bill.” In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine
Islands, the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in
itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of
law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the
President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain “specific
appropriations of money” and not only “general provisions” which provide for parameters of
appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular
amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a “line-item.” This treatment
not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a “specific appropriation of
money” but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the
foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence
Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would
then be considered as “line-item” appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto.
Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into
component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must
be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a
proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation
may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice
considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in
which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the
President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would
equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the
rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed.
The item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a
program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no
specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should
be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power
over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense category belongs to.
Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385, it was clarified that
there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to
which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in
the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred

thereto for augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the
GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding
to unforeseeable contingencies.
Nonetheless, this modified interpretation did not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found
in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings (Araullo, et al. v.
Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209287, & companion cases, February 3, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Was the Pardon granted to former President Estrada an Absolute Pardon?

Ans.: Yes. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public office. The wording of the pardon extended
to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonardo-De Castro])
The 1987 Constitution specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that
the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive
clemency.
It is apparent that the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be: (1)
impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming
from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to
delimit the pardoning power of the President.
The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with
by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of
Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution when they finally rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the
pardoning power of the President in the form of “offenses involving graft and corruption” that would be
enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of a law. (Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonardo-De Castro])
Principal and accessory penalties included in the pardon.

The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code
cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to
pardon persons convicted of violating penal laws.
Xxx
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law is unwarranted, especially so if it will
defeat or unduly restrict the power of the President to grant executive clemency.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
LOCUS STANDI
Taxpayer has locus standi to question illegal expenditures of public funds.
Despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of some portions of the RH Law, especially the
abortifacients, the respondents unjustly caused the allocation of public funds to purchase the same. It
was contended that they have no locus standi to file the suit. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: The petitioners have the legal standing to sue, Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, xxx may be
accorded standing to sue, provided that xxx for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional xxx for concerned citizens, there must be a showing
that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early (Alliance for the Family
Foundation, Phils. Inc (ALFI), et al. v. Hon. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016, Mendoza, J).
Considering that the Court in Imbong already declared that the issues of contraception and
reproductive health in relation to the right to life of the unborn child were indeed of transcendental
importance, and considering also that the petitioners averred that the respondents unjustly caused the
allocation of public funds for the purchase of alleged abortifacients which would deprive the unborn of its the
right to life, the petitioners have locus standi to file the petitions.
In the same vein, the SC in Sergio R. Osmeña v. Department of Transportation and Communications
Secretary Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, et al., G.R. No. 211737, January 13, 2016, said that when suing as a citizen,
the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which
he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
or act complained of. When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and
has an interest in the execution of the laws (Alliance for the Family Foundation, Phils. Inc (ALFI), et al. v. Hon.
Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016, Mendoza, J).
Judicial power once again expounded.
State the concept of the power of judicial review. Explain.

Ans.: The power of judicial review specially refers to both the authority and the duty of the Court to
determine whether a branch or an instrumentality of government has acted beyond the scope of the latter's
constitutional powers (See: Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, 17 July 2012, 676 SCRA 579;
Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013, 693 SCRA 574;
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, 658 Phil. 322 (2011); Francisco v. House of
Representatives, supra; Demetria v. Alba, 232 Phil. 222 [1987]). As articulated in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, the power of judicial review involves the power to resolve cases in which the questions concern
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, the Court
exhaustively discussed this "moderating power" as part of the system of checks and balances under the
Constitution. In our fundamental law, the role of the Court is to determine whether a branch of government
has adhered to the specific restrictions and limitations of the latter's power:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that
the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No.
212426, February 12, 2016).
How did the 1987 Constitution strengthened the power of judicial review or the moderating power?
Explain.
Ans.: The power of judicial review has since been strengthened in the 1987 Constitution. The scope of that
power has been extended to the determination of whether in matters traditionally considered to be within
the sphere of appreciation of another branch of government, an exercise of discretion has been attended with
grave abuse (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice; Francisco v. House of
Representatives, supra note 94; Tanada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 [1997]; Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083,
30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 809-810 (citing Llamas v. Orbos, 279 Phil. 920 [1991]; Bengzon v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, 20 November 1991, 203 SCRA 767; Gonzales v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636,
19 November 1990, 191 SCRA 452; Coseteng v. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, 12 July 1990, 187 SCRA 377; Daza v.
Singson, 259 Phil. 980 [1989]). The expansion of this power has made the political question doctrine "no
longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review” (Oposa v. Factoran, supra; Saguisag, et al. v.
Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426, February 12, 2016).
How is the moderating power exercised? Explain.

Ans.: This moderating power must be exercised carefully and only if it cannot be completely avoided. The
Constitution is so incisively designed that it identifies the spheres of expertise within which the different
branches of government shall function and the questions of policy that they shall resolve (Morfe v. Mutuc, 130
Phil. 415, 442 [1968]). Since the power of judicial review involves the delicate exercise of examining the
validity or constitutionality of an act of a coequal branch of government, the Court must continually exercise
restraint to avoid the risk of supplanting the wisdom of the constitutionally appointed actor with that of its
own (See: Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra note 93; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960);
and Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra; Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra).
The Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a Legislative or Executive Act

A legislative or executive act that is declared void for being unconstitutional cannot give rise to any
right or obligation. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, G.R. No. 187485,
October 8, 2013 cited in Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No.,
209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])
The Operative Fact Doctrine

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always
be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It
provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use
must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an
unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only
to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met
the stringent conditions that will permit its application. (Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon
C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])

Operative Fact Doctrine Applied in the DAP (Disbursement Acceleration Program) Case
The doctrine of operative fact is applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its
application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its
related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.
The implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance
the PAPs that were not covered in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to
augment items pertaining to other departments of the Government in clear violation of the Constitution. To
declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation
constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the
Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive
as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo everything
that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously burdensome for
the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the
implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the
country. To count the positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like public infrastructure,
could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply
the doctrine of operative fact to the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy results by
destruction, and would result in most undesirable wastefulness. (Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v.
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])
The Doctrine of Operative Fact Extends as well to a Void or Unconstitutional Executive Act
The term executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those
that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation (G.R. No. 187485, October 8,
2013), the Court likewise declared that “for the operative act doctrine to apply, there must be a ‘legislative or
executive measure,’ meaning a law or executive issuance.” Thus, the Court opined there that the operative
fact doctrine did not apply to a mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related
issuances were executive acts. The DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative practice
especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing various memoranda and circulars.
(Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1, July
1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])
The Presumption of Good Faith Stands in the DAP Case despite the Obiter Pronouncement
The Court has neither thrown out the presumption of good faith nor imputed bad faith to the authors,
proponents and implementers of the DAP. The contrary is true, because the Court has still presumed their
good faith by pointing out that “the doctrine of operative fact x x x cannot apply to the authors, proponents
and implementers of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper
tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.” X x x
Relevantly the authors, proponents and implementers of the DAP, being public officers, further enjoy
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions. This presumption is necessary because
they are clothed with some part of the sovereignty of the State, and because they act in the interest of the
public as required by law. However, the presumption may be disputed.
At any rate, the Court has agreed during its deliberations to extend to the proponents and the
implementers of the DAP the benefit of the doctrine of operative fact. This is because they had nothing to do
at all with the adoption of the invalid acts and practices. (Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015, En Banc [Bersamin], Resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration)
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court (Section 5[5], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from
Payment of Legal Fees, The Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic
Act No. 8291, which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot
operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress.
Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts.
In said case, the Court ruled that:
“The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a
legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291
necessarily fails.

Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of
legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the
Court’s independence – fiscal autonomy, Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority
of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under
Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special
allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF
expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to “guarantee the independence of the
Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.” Legal fees therefore do not only
constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential
element of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees
granted by Congress to governments-owned or controlled corporations and local government
units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is
constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its
independence. (GSIS v. Heirs of Fernando F. Caballero, G.R. No. 158090, 623 SCRA 5, 14-15,
Oct. 4, 2010, 2nd Div. [Peralta])
OMBUDSMAN
Independence of the Ombudsman does not insulate it from judicial power.
In a case, the Ombudsman contended that under Sec. 14, R.A. 6770, courts are prohibited from
extending provisional injunctive reliefs to delay an investigation being conducted by it. Is the
contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: No. The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman
from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained
to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman’s notion that it can be
exempt from an incident of judicial power – that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive
suspension order – clearly strays from the concept’s rationale of insulating the office from political
harassment or pressure (Conchita Carpio-Morales v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015,
Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Judicial power not exercised in vacuum. Explain the principle.

Ans.: Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court’s exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired
over a particular case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly
promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is
exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523 [1911], the Court elucidated that “[t]he
power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given
cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner
in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in
conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter.”
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction; reasons.
What body has the power to determine whether the scheme of selling a condtel units is tantamount to
an investment contract and/or sale of securities? Explain.
Ans.: The SEC has jurisdiction as the resolution of the issue requires the expertise and technical knowledge of
the SEC being the government agency which is tasked to enforce and implement the provisions of the
Securities Code and its implementing rule s and regulations. The regular courts have no jurisdiction in view of
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies (SEC v. DIH Dev. Corp., et al., G.R. No. 210316,
November 28, 2016, Peralta, J).
In the same manner Section 10-3 of the 2006 Rules of Procedure of the SEC states:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself
of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be made by given the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction,
then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal
reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of
comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case (Maglalang v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 723 Phil. 546, 556-557 [2013]).

Exhaustion of administrative remedies; exception.
The petitioner was appointed as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer II (PAROII) of the DAR in
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. His appointment was temporary as he had no Career
Service Executive Eligibility. His request was based on decision of the RTC in a case concerning the
status of a division superintendent whose petition for mandamus has been granted by the RTC. It was
denied, hence, he filed a special civil action for mandamus before the RTC. In dismissing the petition
on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Is the dismissal correct? Explain.
Ans.: Yes. Before parties are allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that they must
have availed themselves of all the means of administrative processes afforded to them. Where the enabling
statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or
reconsideration, the courts - for reasons of law, comity, and convenience - will not entertain a case unless the
available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. Petitioner admits that while
administrative remedies were available to him, he had invoked an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. On the contrary, the dismissal of the petition for mandamus was warranted by the
doctrine because the issue raised by petitioner is not a purely legal question (Sps. Gonzales v. Marmaine
Realty Corp., G.R. No. 214241, January 13, 2016; Mohammad v. Grace Delgado-Saqueton, G.R. No. 193584, July
12, 2016, Bersamin, J).
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT
Corporate Powers of Local Governments

Ordinance to be valid as exercise of police power must pass both formal and substantive tests.
Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007 was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City and
signed by Mayor Rodrigo Duterte imposing a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural
practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc (PBGEA) and two of its
members challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. They alleged that the ordinance
exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause; and
amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law.
The RTC declared the ordinance valid and constitutional but this was reversed by the CA.
Before the SC the basic question that was raised was whether Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid
exercise of police power and thus constitutional. Is the Ordinance constitutional? Why?
Ans.: No. To be considered as a valid police power, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged test: the formal
(i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local government unit, and whether
it is passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent
merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as
well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section 53 and Section 54 of The Local
Government Code. These provisions require the ordinance to be passed by the majority of the members of the
sanggunian concerned, and presented to the mayor for approval. The question in the substantive test is
whether the Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds
for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power.
It did not pass the substantive test because of the due process and equal protection clause. It was
even ruled to be ultra vires (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Assn., Inc., G.R. No.
189185 & 189305, August 16, 2016, Bersamin, J).
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in order to promote the
general welfare. Such legislative powers spring from the delegation thereof by Congress through either the
Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare Clause in Section 16 of the Local Government
Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the local government unit to effectively accomplish and carry
out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain local autonomy. X x x.
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general legislative power
and the police power proper. General legislative power refers to the power delegated by Congress to the local
legislative body, or the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the case of Davao City, to enable the local legislative body
to enact ordnances and make regulations. This power is limited in that the enacted ordinances must not be
repugnant to law, and the power must be exercised to effectuate and discharge the powers and duties legally
conferred to the local legislative body. The police power, on the other hand, authorizes the local government
unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the local government unit and its constituents, and for the protection of
their property.
Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the local government unit with the
authority to enact ordinances aimed at promoting the general welfare x x x.
In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology, the local
government unit takes its cue from Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Following
the provisions of the Local Government Code and the Constitution, the acts of the local government unit
designed to ensure the health and lives of its constituents and to promote a balanced and healthful ecology

are well within the corporate powers vested in the local government unit. X x x. (Wilfredo Mosqueda, et al.
v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc
[Bersamin])
Requisites of a Valid Ordinance

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation,
it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it
must not be unreasonable. (Wilfredo Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association,
et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin])
Ordinance No. 0309-07 of Davao City Prohibiting Aerial Spraying in That City Declared Ultra Vires
The function of pesticides control, regulation and development is within the jurisdiction of the FPA
(Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority) under Presidential Decree No. 1144. The FPA was established in
recognition of the need for a technically oriented government entity that will protect the public from the risks
inherent in the use of pesticides. To perform its mandate, it was given under Section 6 of Presidential Decree
No. 1144 the following powers and functions with respect to pesticides and other agricultural chemicals x x x.
Evidently, the FPA was responsible for ensuring the compatibility between the usage and the
application of pesticides in agricultural activities and the demands for human health and environmental
safety. This responsibility includes not only the identification of safe and unsafe pesticides, but also the
prescription of the safe modes of application in keeping with the standard of good agricultural practices.
On the other hand, the enumerated devolved functions to the local government units do not include
the regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals. X x x
In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to do so, the City of
Davao performed an ultra vires act. As a local government unit, the City of Davao could act only as an agent of
Congress, and its every act should always conform to and reflect the will of its principal x x x.
For sure, every local government unit only derives its legislative authority from Congress. In no
instance can the local government unit rise above its source of authority. As such, its ordinance cannot run
against or contravene existing laws, precisely because its authority is only by virtue of the valid delegation
from Congress.
Moreover, Ordinance No. 0309-07 proposes to prohibit an activity already covered by the
jurisdiction of the FPA, which has issued its own regulations under its Memorandum Circular x x x.
Devoid of the specific delegation to its legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded its delegated
authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 must be struck down also for being
an ultra vires act on the part of the Sangguning Bayan of Davao City.
The ruling herein does not seek to deprive the LGUs their right to regulate activities within their
jurisdiction. They are empowered under Section 16 of the Local Government Code to promote the general
welfare of the people through regulatory, not prohibitive, ordinances that conform with the policy directions
of the National Government. Ordinance No. 0309-07 failed to pass this test as it contravenes the specific
regulatory policy on aerial spraying in banana plantations on a nationwide scale of the National Government,
through the FPA (Wilfredo Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, et al., G.R.
No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc (Bersamin)).
Requisites for a Proper Exercise by Local Governments of Police Power

In the State’s exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government. A local government unit is
considered to have properly exercised its police power only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1)
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to
be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution, the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the
Government’s action. This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not
arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the
ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably
necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordnances must
survive a due process challenge. (Wilfredo Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association,
et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin])
Requisites for the creation of a province

Section 7, Chapter 2 paragraph (c) of the Local Government Code (LGC), provides that the land area
must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a local government unit
independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and
sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Therefore, there are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous; and (2)
the land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of

its populace. A sufficient land area in the creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as
provided by Section 461 of LGC.
Hence, the requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2,000
square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land area under paragraph (a)[i] of Section 461
and Section 7[c] of LGC.
However, paragraph [b] of Section 461 provides two instances of exemption from the requirement of
territorial contiguity, to wit, “the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
Nowhere in paragraph [b] is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a province is
composed of two or more islands, or when the territory of a province is separated by a chartered city or
cities, such province need not comply with the land area requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometres or
the requirement in paragraph (a)[i] of Section 461 of LGC.
Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions where
none is provided from considerations of convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose; neither
may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated, nor construe its provisions by taking into account
questions of expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as to relax non-compliance
therewith. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, but
only for application (Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050,
12 May 2010, En Banc [Peralta]).
What is the reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a
permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian?
Under Section 45[b] only the nominee of the political party under which the Sanggunian member
concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy
in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the
same political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy x x x.”
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent
vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the
election.
With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice-
Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who should belong to the
political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s representation in the Sanggunian would be
diminished. To argue that the vacancy created was that formerly held by Rolando Lalas, a LAKAS-NUCD-
Kampi member, would result in the increase of that party’s representation in the Sanggunian at the expense
of the REFORMA-LM. This interpretation is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law and thus violative of a
fundamental rule in statutory construction which is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of
the law. As earlier pointed out, the reason behind par. [b], Section 44 of the Local Government Code is the
maintenance of party representation in the Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the electorate.
The “last vacancy” in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the member of
formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the causes already
enumerated. The term “last vacancy” is thus used in Sec. 45[b] to differentiate it from the other vacancy
previously created. The term by no means refers to the vacancy in the No. 8 position which occurred with the
elevation of Rolando Lalas to the seventh position in the Sanggunian. Such construction will result in
absurdity. (Navarro v. Court of Appeals, 335 SCRA 672, Mar. 28, 2001, 1 st Div. [Kapunan]).
What body has jurisdiction over boundary disputes between barangays? Explain.
Ans.: The RTC has no jurisdiction to settle a boundary dispute involving barangays in the same city or
municipality. Said dispute shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang
bayan concerned. If there is failure of amicable settlement, the dispute shall be formally tried by the
sanggunian concerned and shall decide the same within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to. Further, the decision of the sanggunian may be appealed to the RTC having jurisdiction over the
area in dispute, within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court (Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo
City v. Antipolo City, SB, et al., G.R. No. 187349, August 17, 2016).
Vice-Governor counted in computing the quorum and not counted in the determination of the required
votes to uphold a matter in the SP; role is merely to break a tie.
Sangguniang Panglungsod of the Province of Antique was composed of 14 members, including the
Vice-Governor and 3 ex-officio members. A resolution was passed reorganizing the committee
membership with a vote of 7 in favor and 6 against. Consequently, the majority floor leader was
replaced. At the time of the voting, all the 14 members were present, hence, the contention was that,
the resolution was not passed as the majority is half of 14 plus 1, thus, it should be 8.
May the Vice-Governor as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be counted in
the determination of number constitutes the majority? Explain.
Ans.: In La Carlota City, Negros Occidental, et al. v. Atty. Rojo, G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012, the Court
interpreted a provision pertaining to the composition of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, viz.:
Section 457. Composition (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, the legislative body of
the city, shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian
members, the president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the

panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives,
as members.
R.A. 7160 clearly states the composition of that the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Black's
Law Dictionary defines "composed of”' as "formed of' or "consisting of." As the presiding
officer, the vice-mayor can vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding officer votes when
it matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in the votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor, as
presiding officer, is a "member" of the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is
mandated under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a tie. To construe otherwise would
create an anomalous and absurd situation where the presiding officer who votes to break a
tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a "member" of the Sanggunian.
It can, thus, be concluded that the Vice Governor forms part of the composition of the SP as its
Presiding Officer, and should be counted in the determination of the existence of a quorum. However, the
nature of the position of the Presiding Officer as a component of the SP is distinct from the other members
comprising the said body (J. Tobias M. Javier, et al. v. Rhodora Cadiao, et al., G.R. No. 185369, August 3, 2016).
No need for VG’s vote; no tie to break.

In the instant petition, when the Resolution was deliberated upon, all the ten (10) regular and three
(3) ex-officio members, plus the Presiding Officer, were present. Seven members voted for, while six voted
against the Resolution. There was no tie to break as the majority vote had already been obtained. To
hold that the Presiding Officer should be counted in determining the required number of votes necessary to
uphold a matter before the SP shall be counterproductive. It would admit deadlocks as ordinary incidents in
the conduct of business of the SP, which in effect incapacitates the said body from addressing every issue laid
before it. In the process, the SP's responsiveness, effectivity and accountability towards the affairs of the body
politic would be diminished.
Verily, the Vice Governor, as the SP's Presiding Officer, should be counted for purposes of
ascertaining the existence of a quorum, but not in the determination of the required number of votes
necessary to uphold a matter before the SP.
Condonation doctrine abandoned.
An incumbent Mayor was charged with irregularities in the performance of his duties during his first
term. He was re-elected. He contended that due to his re-election, there was condonation of such acts.
Is his contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: No. There is no basis in the Constitution and the law to adopt the condonation doctrine. While the SC
ruled in Pascual in favor of Governor Pascual using the condonation doctrine, that due to his re-election, he
cannot be made liable for acts committed in a previous term, resorting to American jurisprudence, there was
however, a basis for US jurisprudence while in the Philippines, there is none.
There is no truth in Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their
right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the
process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction,
there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any
legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If
condonation of an elective official’s administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction,
then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time
of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or
statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the
electorate’s will has been abdicated (Conchita Carpio-Morales v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10,
2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Preventive suspension and suspension as penalty distinguished.
Give the distinctions between preventive suspension and suspension as a penalty.

Ans.: By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In
Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio, 503 Phil. 886 [2005], the Court explained the distinction, stating that
its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital
in the prosecution of the case against him:
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in
an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the
accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established
and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal,
then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty (Section 24 of Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292; Conchita Morales v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015,
Perlas-Bernabe, J).

En pessant, neither may the concept of crediting, criminal law, preventive imprisonment in the
service of a convict’s term of imprisonment (Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code) be applied to preventive
suspension during investigation in administrative law in the service of a respondent’s final penalty of
suspension. For not only are they distinct in the objective or purpose, or in their nature as preventive
imprisonment involves restriction of personal liberties which is not the case with preventive suspension; the
respective laws covering them are explicit (Reyes v. Delim, 368 SCRA 323, 333 [2001]; Yabut v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 233SCRA 310, 316-317 [1994]; Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 689, 694 [1992]).
The Ombudsman has Administrative Disciplinary Authority over all Public Officers and Employees
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (Sec.
21, R.A. No. 6770)
In the exercise of its Administrative Jurisdiction, the Ombudsman may impose Preventive Suspension
The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not
more than six (6) month, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman
is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided (Sec. 24, R.A. No. 6770; Conchita Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals (6th Div.), G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015 (Perlas-Bernabe)).
Three (3) Term Limit.

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Section 8, Article X, 1987 Constitution).
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the
right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC and Capco, Jr., G.R. No. 133495,
Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157).
The two conditions for the application of the disqualification provision are: (1) that the local official
concerned has been elected three consecutive times for the same position; and (2) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms. Absent one or both of these conditions, the disqualification may not yet apply.
(Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC and Capco, Jr., G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, En Banc [Mendoza]).
ELECTION
Dual citizen is disqualified from running for public office.
Arnado is a natual-born citizen of the Philippines. He became a naturalized American citizen, but
reacquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation. Thereafter, he continued to use his American
passport. He filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor and gained 84% of the votes and proclaimed
as the winner. There was, however, a petition to disqualify him and/or cancel his certificate of
candidacy filed after he filed his COC contending that he remained an American citizen because he
continued to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation. It was granted by the
COMELEC ruling that he failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship,
and that while he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation, the same was deemed withdrawn or recalled
when he travelled abroad using his American passport as held in Maquiling v. COMELEC. Is the
decision of the Comelec correct? Explain.
Ans.: Yes. Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn
when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on
October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second
requirement. While Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.
The reason for Arnado’s disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections – being a
candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines – still subsisted when he
filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012 (Arnado v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 210164, August
18, 2015, Del Castillo, J; Agustin v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).

State the two (2) remedies to prevent candidate from running. Explain.
Ans.: There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an
electoral race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course to or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy. In Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 182369,
December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782, the Court has differentiated the two remedies thuswise:
[A] petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or
68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said
certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person
whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states:

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election
(Agustin v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Nature of petition under Sec. 78; similar to a quo warranto proceeding.
What is the basis of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a COC? Explain.
Ans.: The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on
a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to
the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC,
following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has
already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC
since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact
that a “Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after
proclamation of the winning candidate (Agustin v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015,
Bersamin, J; see also Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 1823689, December
19, 2008, 574 SCRA 782).
False representation attempts to mislead, misinform electorates.
What is the nature of the false representation in the CoC? Explain.

Ans.: The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform,
or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” Given the purpose of the requirement, it
must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for
public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous
mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception
on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run;
if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws
(See also Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra note 29, at 792; Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 455; (Agustin v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105,
November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).).
Conviction for libel; candidate is disqualified.
A person who was convicted of the crime of libel may he run for public office? In fact, he was elected.
Did he commit material misrepresentation? Explain.
Ans.: Yes, because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code)
which shall be removed after the expiration of five years from his service of sentence.
Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the expiration of a period of five years
from his service of sentence. In Teves v. Comelec, 604 Phil. 717 [2009], the five-year period of disqualification
would end only on 25 May 2010 or five years from 24 May 2005, the day petitioner paid the fine he was
sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. In this case, since he served his sentence when he paid the fine on
17 February 2011, the five-year period shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, he is disqualified to become
a Member of the House of Representatives until then (Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado v. HRET, et al., G.R. No.
219603, January 26, 2016, Carpio, J).

Fugitive from justice.
A petition to disqualify a candidate for mayor was filed on the ground that he is a fugitive from justice.
The Comelec disqualified him on the basis of the fact that he was missed at the hospital when the
warrant for his arrest was being served. No other evidence was presented to show that he tried to
hide from the authorities or that he avoided being arrested and prosecuted. Is the ruling of the
Comelec correct? Why?
ANS: No. Based on settled jurisprudence, the term “’fugutive from justice’ includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution”
(Marquez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 313 Phil. 417, 423 [1995]; Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections).
In Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections, 528 Phil. 624 [1996], the Court held that:
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an
intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of
an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction (Labao, Jr. v.
Comelec, et al., G.R. Nos. 212615; 212989, July 19, 2016, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
Second placer cannot be proclaimed as winner.
In a case, the candidate was disqualified, he being a fugitive from justice may the second placer be
declared the winner? Explain.
Ans.: No. In such case, the COC is void from the beginning. It does not matter that the disqualification case was
finally decided before or after the election. He was never a candidate, hence, there was no second placer. The
candidate garnering the second highest number of votes can be proclaimed as the winner.
In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 601 [2012], it was held:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner
if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where
the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently
had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took effect, or a legal impediment that
took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void
ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a
candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and
should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections.
If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the
election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all
votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is
void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of
the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for
the same position (Diambrang v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 201809, October 11, 2016, Carpio,
J).
Residence qualification of a candidate.

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside
in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement
since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that
domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may
be taken for granted that Jalosjos effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he
migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years.
Australia became Jalosjos’ domicile by operation of law and by choice.
On the other hand, when Jalosjos came to the Philippines to live with his brother in Zamboanga
Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. Jalosjos left Australia,
gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, Jalosjos
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in
his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his
acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there.
And he was since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate
the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere. Indeed, a candidate is not

required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To
insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.
What matters is that Jalosjos has proven two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of
making it his domicile (Rommel Apolinario Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, Apr. 24, 2012).
EMINENT DOMAIN
State the nature of power of eminent domain. Explain.

Ans.: In Republic, et al. v. Limbonhari & Sons, G.R. No. 217956, November 16, 2016, Peralta, J, the SC was
confronted with the issue as to whether title to a property which the State took under the power of eminent
domain was transferred since there was no payment of just compensation.
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The nature and scope of such
power has been comprehensively described as follows: (Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v.
Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila, 503 Phil. 845 [2005])
x x x It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the
primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare.
Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the
necessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of
civilized countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication
grant the power to the government, but limit the power which would, otherwise, be without
limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides that "private property shall not he taken for public
use without just compensation." Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses
act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power (Heirs
of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 384 Phil. 676, 687-688 [2000]).
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents,
is necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law.
Consequently, when the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will
be given against the agency asserting the power. The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor
of the owner and against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised
is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9 that “private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.” The provision is the most important protection of property rights
in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The
constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to
give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes away a person’s property to
benefit society, the society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is “to bar the Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.” (City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005; cited in Mosqueda, et
al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En
Banc [Bersamin])
The Two (2) Types of “Taking” under the Power of Eminent Domain
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property. (City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R.
No. 118127, April 12, 2005)
In Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al. (G.R. No.
189185, August 16, 2016), it was argued that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone in all agricultural
entities under Section 6 of an ordinance of Davao City prohibiting aerial spraying unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners in that City of the beneficial use of their property amounting to taking without just
compensation. The Supreme Court did not agree. Citing City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. (G.R. No. 118127, April 12,
2005), it clarified that taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial
use of its property. According to the Court:
The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of
aerial spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance requires the
planting of diversified trees within the identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed
and deemed as confiscatoy requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be
entitled to compensation if the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or
productive uses of the land. The respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely
deprived of their landholdings because they can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the
areas to be identified as the buffer zones.

POLICE POWER
Ordinance No. 1664 authorizes the immobilization of illegally parked motor vehicles by clamping the
tires. A petition to declare it void alleging that the ordinance is violative of the right to due process. Is
the contention correct? Explain.
Ans.: No. As to substantive due process, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with
the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy. Considering that traffic
congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic centers of the
country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the general
welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose.
With regard to procedural process the clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles was within the exceptions
dispensing with notice and hearing. The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was
necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance,
notice and hearing would be superfluous (Valentino L. Legaspi V. City Of Cebu, Et Al./Bienvenido P. Jaban, Sr.,
Et Al. V. Court Of Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. 159110/G.R. No. 159692. December 10, 2013).
SOCIAL JUSTICE
Social justice is for the deserving.

The duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such
an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side.
By the same token, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, Pedro L. Yap, et al., 319 Phil.
246 [1995], the Supreme Court ruled:
Social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether he be a
millionaire or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called
upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they
are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served,
for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law (Heirs of Pacifico Gonzales v.
Juanito De Leon, et al., G.R. No. 210428, December 7, 2016 citing Gelos v. Court of Appeals,
248 Phil. 114 [1992]).s
Suffice it to say, the taking of the subject property by blatantly ignoring the facts and the law that are
clearly not supportive of the cause of the respondents would be tantamount to an oppressive and unlawful
act of the state against petitioners.
Good Luck to ALL

2017 Bar Candidates
We Are Praying For Your SUCCESS.
ABRC Family

Special Lecture Notes in Political Law: By: Dean Ed Vincent S. Albano Bar Review Director

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Special Lecture Notes in

Immunity from suit is not absolute; basis.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Waiver-Only on criminal jurisdiction.

2 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

3 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

The Right to Life of the Unborn from Conception

When Does Life Begin?

The Right to Health and to a Balanced and

The Precautionary Principle

4 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

Basic function of the precautionary principle.

5 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

The Precautionary Principle

When Precautionary Principle applies; local application.

6 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

Investigator cannot be the prosecutor at the same time.

7 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

Give the concept of probable cause under the AMLA. Explain.

Is there a remedy of SPCMB? Explain.

Due process and police power.

8 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

Equal Protection Clause

Application of Rational basis test; violative of equal protection clause.

9 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

Evidence discovered during surveillance; witness had personal knowledge.

10 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

Confession before the media.

Is confession before the media admissible in evidence? Explain.

Extrajudicial confession while at a detention cell; effect.

11 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

Roadside questioning of a motorist.

The right to privacy

The four (4) aspects of press freedom

Facial challenge of law.

12 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

Void for vagueness rule when applicable to penal statutes.

13 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

14 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

15 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

What does the phrase “directly or indirectly” refer to? Explain.

Requisites before right to information may be compelled.

16 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

When does the right to counsel commence? Explain.

Speedy Disposition of Cases

Vexations delay results in dismissal of a case.

17 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

Purpose of rule on speedy disposition of cases.

Limitation on the right to travel

The Right to Bail

18 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

Health reason in granting bail.

The Right against Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder

What is a bill of attainder? Is P.D. 1866 a bill of attainder?

19 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

National Patrimony/Regalian Doctrine

Regalian doctrine once again explained.

20 |ABRC2017.Special Lecture Notes in Political Law (CLEANED-1)/EVSA/crys

Requisites before one may acquire property of public dominion.

Aliens cannot own land in the Philippines.

May an alien own land in the Philippines? Explain.

Reason for the foregoing definition of “capital.”