1. HOLY SEE V.

ROSARIO

Facts: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines
by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque
registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his
rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parti es has the
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A
to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the
three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity
from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.

The trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign
immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner
invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

Issue: Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

Ruling:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador,
the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the
universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or
absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the
newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for
gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction
can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila.

The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of
the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation
and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This
treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner
did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost
impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot,
and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and
Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause
through diplomatic channels.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first
task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall
first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young,
Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905,
919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

2. SALVACION V. CENTRAL BANK

Facts: On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years
old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was
able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after
policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The
policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.)
COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-
30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.

Basically, Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen
Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to
escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting
to almost P1,000,000.00.

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that
Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action
for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

Issue: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

Held: The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required
to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as
would satisfy the judgment.

If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency
deposit could be more important than his child's rights to said award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages from this
alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the
questioned provisions.

It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country's economy was in a shambles; when
foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present
times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of
law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to
anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

5
It has thus been said that — But I also know, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As
that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions
change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. . . We might as well require a
man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous
ancestors.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus: The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national
to obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a purpose which does
not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the alien. More specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection
against attachment, garnishment or other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960
applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain
the deposit in the bank for long.

The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely
passing through.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil
Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:

Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
 Central Bank Circular No. 960
was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426:

Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the publication of such rules and regulations in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank
promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules and regulations at the time the deposit was made
shall govern.

The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act NO. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, thus:

Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and
considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such
foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or
administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency deposits shall be
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her
parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and
even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those

entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law
failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit
System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However,
the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given
incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his
deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.

Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result
especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.”

It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli
for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.

Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of
the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a
transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.

We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.

3. BARRETTO V. GONZALES

FACTS: Plaintiff and defendants are citizens of Phil, resident of Manila and married in the Phil. They voluntarily separated and not lived
as husband and wife. They have 4 children, who are 11, 10, 8 and 6 years of age. They agreed to allow the husband for the wife’s
support and their children, 500 pesos monthly and to be increased during illness and necessity, and the title of properties be put in her
name. After the agreement, husband left the Philippines and resided to Reno, Nevada and secured an absolute divorce on the ground
of desertion, which was approved in November 1927. During that time, he married a Filipina and has three children as a result of that
marriage. Defendant reduced the amount he agreed for the support and has not made payments fixed in the divorce decree.

When he went back to Philippines, the wife brought an action before CFI Manila requesting that the court confirm and ratify the decree
of divorce issued by the state of Nevada. And that section 9 of Act No. 2710, which reads as follows:
The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds
of matrimony until one year thereafter.

The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard to the spouse who, having legitimate children, has not
delivered to each of them or to the guardian appointed by the court, within said period of one year, the equivalent of what would have
been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of property.

be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their
children. It is also prayed that the community existing between plaintiff and defendant be declared dissolved and the defendant be
ordered to render an accounting and to deliver to the plaintiff her share of the community property, that the defendant be ordered to pay
the plaintiff alimony at the rate of five hundred pesos (P500) per month,

A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor children, and they appear as intervenors and join their mother in these proceedings.
CFI rendered judgment against the defendant.

Issue: w/n the decree of divorce could be enforced in the Philippines (no)

Held: the SC said that the action of the husband was clearly to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to
secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the matrimonial
domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the
husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of
that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. While the decisions of this court heretofore in
refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of
matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these Islands. Article
9 thereof reads as follows:

The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity or persons, are binding upon Spaniards even
though they reside in a foreign country.

And article 11, the last part of which reads:

. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to promote public order and good morals,
shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign
country.

It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this
jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. The lower
court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the securing of the divorce, the contracting of another marriage and the bringing
into the world of innocent children brings about such a condition that the court must grant relief. The hardships of the existing divorce
laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation what the personal
views of the writer on the subject of divorce may be. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal.

Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the citizens
of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner which our Government believes is contrary to public order and
good morals. Holding the above views it becomes unnecessary to discuss the serious constitutional question presented by appellant in
his first assignment of error.

4. DE LEON V. CA

Facts:

 Oct. 18, 1969 – private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock
before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan Rizal
 Aug. 28, 1971 – Susana L. De Leon were born from this union
 • Oct. 1972 – de facto separation between the spouses
occurred due to irreconcilable marital differences; Sylvia left the conjugal home
 March 1973 – Sylvia went to the US and obtained American citizenship
 Nov. 29, 1973 – Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, a petition for dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente;
also filed claims for support and distribution of properties/ but since Jose Vicente was a Philippine resident and did not have
any assets in the US, Sylvia held the divorce proceedings in abeyance and concentrated her efforts to obtain property
 settlements with Jose Vicente
 March 16, 1977 – Sylvia entered into a Letter-Agreement with private respondent Macaria De Leon (her mother-in-law)
 March 30, 1977 - Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the CFI of Rizal a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of
their conjugal partnership
 Trial court: declared that the conjugal partnership of the spouses is DISSOLVED
 March 17, 1980 – Sylvia moved for the execution of the Order of the trial court; Vicente moved for MR

 April 20, 1980 – Macaria filed with the trial court a motion for leave to intervene, alleging that she is the owner of the
properties involved in the case; assailed the validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement which had for its purpose, the
termination of the marital relations of the spouses
 CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC


Issue: Whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid - NO

Held: The only basis by which Sylvia may lay claim to the properties which are the subject matter of the Letter-Agreement, is the Letter-
Agreement itself. The third paragraph of the Letter-Agreement reads: In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of
relations between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon:

Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of property relations with her
husband. Indeed, Sylvia and Jose Vicente subsequently filed a joint petition for judicial approval of the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership, sanctioned by Article 191 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration was
the termination of marital relationship.

RTC said that the cause or consideration for the intervenor Macaria De Leon in having executed the Letter-Agreement was the
termination of the marital relationship between her son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco de Leon.

Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the contract is void and inexistent from the beginning.

Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: Those whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;

xxx xxx xxx

(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.

But marriage is NOT a mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulations...

From the foregoing provisions of the Civil Code, the court believes that Macaria De Leon’s undertaking that the termination of marital
relationship is not only conratry to law but also to Filipino morals and public policy. As such, any agreement or obligations based on
such unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public policy should be deemed null and void.

Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil Case contemplates properties belonging to the spouses and not those belonging to a third
party, who, in the case at bar., is Macaria. In the petition for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made to appear that the
said properties are conjugal in nature. However, Macaria was able to prove that she owns the questioned properties. Neither Sylvia nor
Jose Vicente adduced any contrary evidence.

Even granting that the consideration of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of property relations, the Court said that:

Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:

(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;

(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and wife;

Besides, the Letter-Agreement shows on its face that it was prepared by Sylvia, and in this regard, the ambiguity in a contract is to be
taken contra proferentem, i.e., construed against the party who caused the ambiguity and could have also avoided it by the exercise of
a little more care. Thus, Article 1377 of the Civil Code provides: "The interpretation of obscure words of stipulations in a
contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity”

Article 1335 of the Civil Code provides:

xxx xxx xxx

There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent
and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give
his consent.

To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.

A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent.

In order that intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the
intimidation must be the determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be
unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance
which all men can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded
fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury.

In this case, the claim of Macaria that Sylvia threatened her to bring Jose Vicente to court for support, to scandalize their family by
baseless suits and that Sylvia would pardon Jose Vicente for possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage subject to the transfer of
certain properties to her, is obviously not the intimidation referred to by law. With respect to mistake as a vice of consent, neither is
Macaria's alleged mistake in having signed the Letter-Agreement because of her belief that Sylvia will thereby eliminate inheritance
rights from her and Jose Vicente, the mistake referred to in Article 1331 of the Civil Code. It does not appear that the condition that
Sylvia "will eliminate her inheritance rights" principally moved Macaria to enter into the contract. Rather, such condition was but an
incident of the consideration thereof which, is the termination of marital relations.

Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto rule, is the proper law to be applied. It provides:

When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be repudiated by one of the parties before
the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has been caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may,
if the public interest wig thus be subserved, allow the party repudiating the contract to recover the money or property.

Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to the pari delicto rule in this
case is to put a premium to the circumvention of the laws, positive relief should be granted to Macaria. Justice would be served by
allowing her to be placed in the position in which she was before the transaction was entered into.

Petition is DENIED. CA’s decision is AFFIRMED.

5. HIX V. FLUEMER

FACTS: E. Randolph Hix was born in the year 1866 in Union, South Carolina, where he lived with his parents until the age of 15. They
then removed to Rye, Westchester County, New York. A few years later, he was sent to the University of Lehigh, and to the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, leaving the latter before graduating, to accept employment with the Edison Company where he
worked for about three years. After resigning from his position he opened an office and engaged in private work as consulting engineer
and contractor until the year 1895, when he removed to Wheeling, West Virginia, to engage in the general engineering business as a
member of the firm of Hogg & Hix, surveyors.

After fifteen years of residence in Wheeling, he took an examination and received an appointment as coal expert for the Philippine
Government, arriving at Manila some time during the year 1910. While E. Randolph Hix was living in Manila in 1912, he met the
appellant and married her in Shanghai, China, on or about June 24, 1913, returning to Manila where they established their domicile. A
son was born of this union in Boston, Massachusetts, on July 1, 1915, named Preston Randolph Hix, while she was in the United
States where she had gone on the month of May of the same year to visit her family and the mother and sister of her husband. The
appellant returned to Manila in November, 1916, and continued to live with the deceased as husband and wife.

On March 16, 1919, the appellant left for Canada, where she remained with their child until February, 1921, when she returned to
Manila in a very precarious condition of health and was given medical treatment in the St. Paul's Hospital at the expense of her
husband. After she regained her health, she lived apart from her husband by mutual consent.

On December 7, 1922, the appellant instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against her husband, E. Randolph Hix,
for the purpose of compelling him to provide adequate support for herself and her son, Preston Randolf Hix.

The trial court adjudicated the case in her favor and ordered the defendant E. Randolph Hix to pay her the sum of P500 in advance on
or before the 5th day of each month for the maintenance of herself and her son.

In the month of May, 1925, that is, one year after his arrival at Elkins, West Virginia, the deceased filed a complaint for a divorce with
the Circuit Court of Randolph County, West Virginia, alleging, among other things, that he was a citizen of the United States of America,
and of the State of West Virginia, and had been for more than one year prior to the date of the institution of the suit, an actual bona fide
citizen and resident of Randolph County, West Virginia; that Annie cousins Hix was a resident of the City of Peking, China; that on
December 1, 1921, his wife had abandoned and deserted him, taking up a separate residence and declining to live or have anything to
do with him; that he, Hix, freely, voluntarily, and adequately supported his wife and child, paying her the sum of $175 per month; that he
intended to reside permanently in the United States, and that it was with such intention that he had returned to West Virginia; that he
and his wife had been living apart for three years, and that she had rejected his offer of reconciliation. As the appellant was not a
resident of the State of West Virginia, she was summoned upon the complaint for divorce by publication, and not having entered an
appearance in the case, either personally or by counsel within the term fixed, the Circuit Court of Randolph County, West Virginia,
rendered judgment against her in 1925 declaring her marriage with the plaintiff dissolved. Having procured the divorce, E. Randolph Hix
returned to Manila in 1927, where he continued to live and engaged in business up to the time of his death in the year 1929.

ISSUE: whether the Circuit Court of Randolph County in West Virginia acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for
divorce filed by E .Randolph Hix and to render a valid and binding judgment against the petitioner and appellant, Annie Cousins Hix.

HELD: The pertinent part of section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

SEC. 306. Effect of Judgment. — The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special proceeding before a court or judge of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of any State or Territory of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
or order, may be as follows:

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person, the judgment or order in
conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person: . . . .

These provisions show that in order that a judgment of a court or judge of any state of the American Union with respect to the personal
or legal condition of a particular person may be conclusive and constitute res judicata, it is essential that the court have jurisdiction, and
such jurisdiction is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Section 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 312. How Judicial Record May be Impeached. — Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of a want of jurisdiction in
the court or judicial officer, of collusion between the parties, or of fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings.

One of the conditions for the validity of a decree of absolute divorce is that the court granting it has acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter, and to this end the plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith, and for the length of time fixed by the law, in
the state in which it was granted. E. Randolph Hix was domiciled in the City of Manila where he lived apart from his wife and
child, by mutual consent, and here he had his business. He removed to the State of West Virginia leaving his aforesaid wife
and child and his business behind, for the purpose of obtaining an absolute divorce, which he did in 1925, returning in the
year 1927 to reside in the City of Manila, and continuing his business.

Although the opponent and appellee attempted to show that E. Randolph Hix went to West Virginia with the intention of residing there
permanently, as allege in the complaint for divorce, such an intention was contradicted by the fact that before leaving the City of Manila,
he did not liquidate his business but placed it under the management of said opponent, and once having obtained his divorce, he
returned to the City of Manila to take up his residence and to continue his aforesaid business, and that his purpose in going to West
Virginia was to obtain a divorce.

By the fact that E. Randolph Hix was a citizen of the United States and of the State of West Virginia, since it is not the citizenship of the
plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal residence within the State where he applies for a divorce. That
E. Randolph Hix himself believed he had relinquished his former legal residence in West Virginia, of which he was a citizen, upon
establishing his marriage domicile in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, is shown by the fact that he had to reestablish his residence
in said State for the length of time fixed by the law in order to be able to file his complaint for a divorce.

Since E. Randolph Hix was not a bona fide resident of the State of West Virginia, the divorce decree he obtained from the Circuit Court
of Randolph County, is null and void, said court having failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.

But even if his residence had been taken up in good faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit,
the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila,
and no new domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not having entered an appearance
in the case, either personally or by counsel, did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over her person.

The divorce decree issued by the Circuit Court of Randolph County, West Virginia, may also be impeached by evidence of fraud,
according to section 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure, quoted above.

E. Randolph Hix alleged in his complaint for a divorce filed with the aforementioned court, that on December 1, 1921 his wife had
abandoned and deserted him, living separately and declining to live or have anything to do with him; that she was a resident of the City
of Peking, China; and that he freely and voluntarily provided adequately for her and their son, paying her $175 per month. These
allegations, being false, tended to deceive and did in fact deceive the aforesaid Circuit Court of Randolph County in West Virginia into
granting the decree of divorce applied for, because, had he alleged in his complaint that his wife lived apart from him by mutual
consent, as was a fact, said court would not have granted the divorce, since in the case of Bacon vs. Bacon (68 W. Va., 747; 70 S. E.,
762), the Supreme Court of West Virginia laid down the doctrine that separation by mutual consent does not constitute desertion or
abandonment before the law.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the residence acquired in a state of the American Union by a
husband, who, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, abandons the country wherein are his matrimonial domicile and his wife, who is
living apart from him by mutual consent, and then returns to said matrimonial domicile after obtaining a divorce, continues residing,
therein and engaging in business, is not bona fide residence, and does not confer jurisdiction upon the court even if he alleges in the
complaint for divorce that he intends to reside permanently in said state; (2) that the summons by publication in a complaint for divorce,
filed in a state by the husband who has gone to said state, abandoning his matrimonial domicile where his wife continues to reside,
does not confer jurisdiction upon the court over the person of said wife when she has not entered an appearance in the case, and the
decree issued by said court dissolving the marriage is not binding upon her; and (3) that a decree of divorce issued by a court of any
state or territory of the American Union, or of a foreign country, may be impeached in another case for lack of jurisdiction in said court
over the subject matter, or over the person of the defendant, or for fraud in obtaining it on the part of the person procuring it.

6. ADPONG V. CHEONG SENG GEE

Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga. He left property worth nearly 100K. The estate of the deceased
was claimed by the 2 following parties:

1. Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by the marriage of Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895,
and 


2. Mora Adong, who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, according to the ceremonies
prescribed by the book on marriage of the Koran, w/ her daughters Payang and Rosalia 


The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the CFI. The trial judge Abeto reached the conclusion that the
proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine
Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. As to the allegations of Adong the conclusion was
that the marriage between Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it
could not be held to be a lawful marriage; so, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the
judge was for there to be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee,
Payang, and Rosalia. Both parties appealed.

Issues:
 1. W/N the marriage contracted in China, and proven mainly by an alleged matrimonial letter, is valid in the Philippines – NO
because there is no proof as to produce a conviction as to the existence of the Chinese marriage 


2. W/N the marriage performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion is valid - YES 


Held:

1. Validity of the Chinese Marriage
 Cheong Seng Gee claimed that Cheong Boo was married in Amoy, China to Tan Dit in 1985.
Witnesses (one was Cheong Boo’s brother) were presented who testified to having been present at the marriage ceremony. There was
also introduced in evidence a document in Chinese which says that the father of Tan Dit accepted the offer of marriage of Cheong Boo
and that such document serves as the proof of the acceptance. Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for more than 1 year,
during this time Cheong Seng Gee was born. Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippines and had a concubine Mora by whom he
had 2 children. In 1910, Cheong Seng Gee went to the Philippines who, as appears from documents presented, was permitted to land
in the country as the son of Cheong Boo. Cheong Boo never returned to China and seems never to have corresponded with his
Chinese wife or to have had any further relations w/ her.

The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing between the Cheong Boo and son Cheong Sen g
Gee but do not establish the marriage between the deceased and Seng Gee’s mother. Sec. IV of Marriage Law (General Order No. 68)
provides that "All marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to
prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of Amoy, China
concerning marriage were in 1895. There is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the
existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage.

2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage
 Adong claimed that a marriage ceremony took place in Basilan according to the rites of
Mohammedan religion. This is established by the Iman who solemnized the marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, such as Adong’s
father and the chief of the rancheria. The groom complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250
in goods. From then day until the death of Cheong Boo, they cohabited as husband and wife. They had 5 children, 2 are living at the
rd
time of this case. In his relations w/ 3 persons, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several
private and public documents. Thus, when different legal documents were executed, including decrees of registration, Cheong Boo
stated that he was married to Adong and he gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.

3 sections of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) must be taken into consideration. Sec. IX provides "No marriage heretofore
solemnized before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any
informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that
they have been lawfully married." Marriage in this jurisdiction is both a civil contract and a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of contrary evidence, to be in fact married. Sec. IX is in the
nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. The courts can properly incline the scales of
their decisions in favor of the solution which will more effectively promote the public policy. Here the consequences entailed in holding
that the marriage of the Adong and the deceased, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void, would be
far reaching in disastrous result because there are at least 150K Moros who have been married according to local custom. The court
has the power either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of the children born of these unions bastards or to
make them legitimate. The court held that the evidence produced a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan marriage
and regarded the provisions of Sec. IX as validating marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion. Thus, the
Mohammedan marriage is valid, giving to the widow and the 2 legitimate children the rights accruing to them under the law.

Also, Sec. V provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a judge of any court inferior to the SC, justice of the peace, or priest
or minister of the Gospel of any denomination . . ." "Priest" and "minister of the Gospel" means all clergymen of every denomination and
faith. A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister of the Gospel," and Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of the
Marriage Law.

Lastly, Sec. VI provides that "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence
of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." The 2 essentials of a valid marriage are
capacity and consent. The latter element may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or repute. In
this instance, there is no question of capacity nor consent. While it is true that during the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the
priest were addressed more to the elders than to the participants, it is likewise true that Cheong Boo and Adong did in fact take each
other to be husband and wife and did thereafter live together as husband and wife.
7. RAMIREZ V. GMUR

Facts: Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a native of Switzerland but a resident of the Philippines, died in Iloilo City on Junne 29, 1913,
leaving valuable asset which he disposed by will. His will was offered for probate in the CFI of Iloilo, which allowed it. Werthmuller’s
widow, Doña Ana M. Ramirez, was named as executrix. Everything was given to the widow, as the will provided, except for a piece of
real property in the City of Thun, Switzerland, which was devised to Werthmuller’s brothers and sisters.

Werthmuller seemed to have ignored in making his will that he had heirs from his natural daughter, Leona Castro.

Leona Castro was the daughter of Felisa Castro and an unknown father. There was an annotation on the margin of the original
baptismal entry of Leona Castro that a public document (an “escritura”) states that she was recognized by Samuel Bischoff on June 22,
1877. This annotation was authenticated by the signature of Father Ferrero, whose deposition was taken in this case. Father Ferrero
testified that the word “escritura” in this entry means a public document; and he says that such document was exhibited to him when the
marginal note was added to the baptismal record and supplied the basis of the annotation in the entry.

Samuel Bischoff tacitly recognized Leona Castro as his daughter and treated her as such. Leona Castro was later married to
Frederick von Kauffman, a British subject, born in HK and lived in Iloilo City. Leona Castro and von Kauffman had 3 children (Elene,
Federico and Ernesto). Leona Castro was then brought to Thun, Switzerland to recuperate her health. Years later, Leona Castro
informed von Kauffman that she does not want to stay married with the latter.

Von Kauffman later obtained a divorce decree in Paris, France. It showed that Leona Castro lived in Paris, though there is no evidence
showing that she acquired permanent domicile in Paris.

The estrangement of von Kauffman and Leona Castro was because Leona Castro was attracted to Dr. Ernest Emil Mory, the physician
in charge of the sanitarium in Switzerland where Leona Castro was brought. Dr. Mory and Leona Castro was later married in
London, England. It appears that Dr. Mory was already married to a certain Helena Wolpman, but had divorced her.

nd
Before Dr. Mory and Leona Castro got married, they begot a daughter named Leontina Elizabeth in Thun, Switzerland. A 2 daughter,
rd
Carmen Maria, was born in Berne, Switzerland, and a 3 daughter, Esther. On October 6, 1910, Leona Castro died.

Now, the 2 sets of children are claiming from the estate of Samuel Werthmuller. Otto Gmur is the guardian of the 3 Mory daughters.
Frederick von Kauffman appeared as guardian for his own children.

Ana Ramirez insists, as against the Mory daughters, that the Leona Castro had never been recognized by Samuel Werthmuller
at all.

As to the Mory daughters, Leontina Elizabeth is considered an illegitimate daughter which was legitimated by the subsequent marriage
of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro. Carmen Maria and Esther Renate, on the other hand, are to considered legitimate offspring of Leona
Castro since the latter’s marriage to von Kauffman was already divorced when they were born and Leona was already married to Dr.
Mory.

The von Kauffman children insists that the divorce decree was wholly invalid; that the Mory daughters are the offspring of an
adulterous relationship; and that the von Kauffman daughters alone should be entitled to participate in the division of the estate.

Issue: Whether or not the Mory daughters and the von Kauffman children are entitled to participate in the division of the
estate of Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller.

Held: The SC held that the von Kauffman children are entitled to participate in the inheritance as legitimate children of Leona
Castro and Frederick von Kauffman. Leona Castro’s relationship to Samuel Werthmuller was ruled as follows:

It is satisfactorily shown that Leona Castro was a recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff. The memorandum made by Father
Ferrero as to the recognition of Leona Castro was found satisfactory, despite the fact that the original was not presented after diligent
search and secondary evidence as well as Fr. Ferrero’s deposition was presented.

It will be observed that the recognition of Leona Castro as the daughter of Samuel Bischoff occurred prior to the date when the Civil
Code was put in force in these Islands; and consequently her rights as derived from the recognition must be determined under the law
as it then existed, that is, under Law 11 of Toro, which afterwards became Law 1, title 5, book 10, of the Novisima Recopilacion. Under
that law recognition could be established by proof of acts on the part of the parent unequivocally recognizing the status of his offspring.
In other words at tacit recognition was sufficient. Under article 131 of the present Civil Code, the acknowledgment of a natural child
must be made in the record of birth, by will, or in other public instrument. We are of the opinion that the recognition of Leona Castro is
sufficiently shown whether the case be judged by the one provision or the other.

But it is contended by counsel for Doña Ana Ramirez that only children born of persons free to marry may possess the status of
recognized natural children, and there is no evidence to show that Felisa Catro was either a single woman or widow at the time of the
conception or birth of Leona. In the absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that she was single or a widow.

From the fact that Leona Castro was an acknowledged natural daughter of her father, it follows that had she survived him she would
have been his forced heir, he having died after the Civil Code took effect; and as such forced heir she would have been entitled to one-
third of the inheritance.

To determine the rights of the Mory daughters, the SC had to look into the validity of the divorce decree obtained by von
Kauffman in Paris. If the decree is valid, then the marriage of Mory and Leona Castro is valid and the Mory daughters are
entitled to participate in the division of the estate. Otherwise, the Mory daughters would have no such right.

As to the Mory daughters, the SC held that the divorce decree relied upon cannot be recognized as valid in the courts of the
Philippines. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a marriage contracted in the
Philippines by a person domiciled here, such marriage being indissoluble under the laws then prevailing in this country.

The evidence shows conclusively that Frederick von Kauffman at all times since earliest youth has been, and is now, domiciled in the
city of Iloilo in the Philippine Islands; that he there married Leona Castro, who was a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and that Iloilo was
their matrimonial domicile; that his departure from iloilo for the purpose of taking his wife to Switzerland was limited to that purpose
alone, without any intent to establish a domicile elsewhere; and finally that he went to Paris in 1904, for the sole purpose of getting a
divorce, without any intention of establishing a permanent residence in that city. The evidence shows that the decree was entered
against the defendant in default, for failure to answer, and there is nothing to show that she had acquired, or had attempted to acquire,
a permanent domicile in the City of Paris. It is evident of course that the presence of both the spouses in that city was due merely to the
mutual desire to procure a divorce from each other.

It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to
which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their
matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. The voluntary appearance
of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction.

It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the judicial
forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose
of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
courts of that State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State of his
own domicile.

As the divorce granted by the French court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Doctor Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in
London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in
Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the Mory children to participate in the estate of Samuel
Bischoff must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated, and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants," as used in article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be
interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations.

Even if the claims of the children were made after the probate, the same are not divested by the decree admitting the will to probate
since such decree is only conclusive as to the due execution of the will and not its intrinsic validity.

8. VANDEVER V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

The issue presented for our determination in this Industrial Commission special action is whether petitioner established the existence of
a valid Colorado common-law marriage so as to be entitled to widow's death benefits under our workers' compensation laws. We hold
that there is substantial evidence supporting the decision of the administrative law judge and affirm the award.
I. FACTS
On October 29, 1983, Ronald L. Vandever was shot and killed while performing his duties as an employee of respondent Phoenix
Newspapers. Petitioner Cynthia K. Vandever's claim for compensation as decedent's widow was denied by the Industrial Commission.
Petitioner filed a timely request for hearing protesting the denial of her claim. A formal hearing was held and her claim was again denied
in a decision dated November 16, 1984. The decision denying benefits was affirmed pursuant to a request for review and petitioner filed
this special action.
The following facts regarding the relationship of petitioner and the decedent are *375 drawn from the record and the uncontroverted
testimony given at the administrative hearing. In 1976, decedent began working for respondent Phoenix Newspapers in Ajo, Arizona.
Petitioner moved to Arizona in 1973 and obtained a divorce from a former spouse in March, 1976. She was introduced to the decedent
in April and immediately thereafter, the couple began living together in the Phoenix area. The couple recited marriage vows to each
other during the course of a friend's wedding ceremony the following month, but failed to obtain a license or otherwise comply with the
formalities of a valid marriage contracted within the state as set forth in A.R.S. § 25-111.[1] Thereafter, petitioner used the name of
Vandever, gave birth to two children, and continued to cohabit with the decedent.
In August, 1978, petitioner and the decedent traveled to Colorado for three weeks with their seven-month old daughter Melissa in order
to attend the wedding of the decedent's nephew, Stephen Houser. Petitioner testified that she and the decedent were introduced as Mr.
and Mrs. Vandever and as husband and wife to several people at the rehearsal dinner, wedding and reception. Her testimony was
corroborated by Stephen Houser, who testified that he and his relatives introduced petitioner and the decedent as Ron and Cindy
Vandever. Houser further confirmed that his wedding album was signed "Ronald, Cindy and Melissa Vandever" and that an article
regarding his wedding, published in a local newspaper, listed "Mr. & Mrs. Ronald Vandever and Melissa of Ajo, Arizona" as guests in
attendance. Houser testified that he never really knew whether the petitioner and decedent were legally married and did not press the
issue.
After the wedding, petitioner and decedent stayed in the Houser apartment for three weeks while the newlyweds were on their
honeymoon. Petitioner testified that during their stay decedent unsuccessfully sought employment in the Grand Junction area. Finally,
petitioner testified that at some point during the three-week vacation the couple heard a radio broadcast on the subject of Colorado
common-law marriage and concluded that they were in fact married under the laws of that state.
In January of 1979, decedent resigned from his Ajo, Arizona position with respondent Phoenix Newspapers. The couple returned to
Colorado for two weeks where decedent again unsuccessfully attempted to obtain employment in the Grand Junction area. Decedent
and petitioner traveled on to New Mexico for a month and a half, and finally settled in Wyoming for thirteen months. In mid-1980,
decedent accepted a position offered by the respondent Phoenix Newspapers in Casa Grande, and the couple returned to Arizona
where they resided until the decedent's untimely death in 1983.
II. ANALYSIS
In a workers' compensation proceeding, the burden is on the claimant to establish all of the elements of her claim. Russell v. Industrial
Comm'n, 104 Ariz. 548, 456 P.2d 918 (1969); Gamez v. Industrial Comm'n, 114 Ariz. 179, 559 P.2d 1094(App. 1976). The concept of
marriage under the workers' compensation statutes is not special, but follows the ordinary domestic relations law of this
state. Gamez. Therefore, in order to qualify as a widow under A.R.S. § 23-1046, petitioner had the burden of establishing that she and
decedent were validly married under Arizona law. Id. Petitioner does not argue that a marriage was validly contracted within this state in
accordance with the statutory requirements set forth in A.R.S. § 25-111. Rather, it is her position that a common-law *376 marriage was
validly contracted in Colorado. Although a common-law marriage cannot validly be contracted within this state, we will recognize a
common-law marriage if validly contracted under the laws of another jurisdiction. In Re Estate of Trigg, 102 Ariz. 140, 426 P.2d
637 (1967); Grant v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 427, 555 P.2d 895 (1976). Recognition of such marriages is authorized by A.R.S. §
25-112(A), which provides that "[m]arriages valid by the laws of the place where contracted are valid in this state."
The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of the word "contracted." It is the respondents' position that a common-law marriage is
"contracted" in the state where the relationship has its origin and is consummated. Respondents argue that because the couple resided
in Arizona and began cohabiting as husband and wife in Arizona that we should apply the law of this state rather than that of Colorado
in determining whether the marriage was validly "contracted." In essence, respondents' approach incorporates into A.R.S. § 25-112 a
choice-of-law analysis that would require this court to discern which state has the most significant contacts with the relationship before
honoring a common-law marriage that has been validly contracted under the laws of a sister state. We cannot agree with this line of
reasoning.
It is unquestionably the general rule, as embodied in A.R.S. § 25-112, that a marriage valid in the state where contracted or celebrated
is valid everywhere:
Marriage is primarily a contract. In its constitution it is purely personal and consensual. Considered merely as a contract, it is valid
everywhere if entered into according to the lex loci.This is the common-law rule. The statute [A.R.S. § 25-112] recognizes the common-
law rule, `all marriages valid by the laws of the place where contracted shall be valid in this state.'
Horton v. Horton, 22 Ariz. 490, 494, 198 P. 1105, 1107 (1921).[2] Justifications for the rule include predictability and the interstate order
arising from society's interest in marriage. Horton; see generally, Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 220 at 445 (3d ed. 1977).
The exceptions to this general rule are extremely limited and include only the strongest of public policy considerations. See
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(2) comment k at 238 (1971). The only marriages validly contracted in another
jurisdiction that are denied recognition in Arizona are those involving the marriage of persons with a certain degree of consanguinity.
A.R.S. § 25-101 provides:
Void and prohibited marriages. Marriage between parents and children, including grandparents and grandchildren of every degree,
between brothers and sisters of the one-half as well as the whole blood, and between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews and
between first cousins, is prohibited and void.
A.R.S. § 25-112(C) provides:
Parties residing in this state may not evade the laws of this state relating to marriage by going to another state or country for
solemnization of the marriage.
These statutes embody the exclusive grounds upon which we will deny recognition of an otherwise valid foreign marriage. [3] As stated
by our supreme court in Horton:
The legislature undoubtedly had the power to enact what marriages shall be void in this state, notwithstanding their validity in the state
where celebrated, whether contracted between parties who were in good faith domiciled in the state where the ceremony was
performed, or between parties who, being domiciled in this state, *377 left the state for the purpose of avoiding its statutes and married.
But the legislature has not seen fit to do so.... If our views shall be found inconvenient or repugnant to sound principles, it may be
expected that the succeeding legislature will explicitly enact that marriage contracted within another state by parties who have left this
state for the purpose of avoiding its laws, and who return and live here, shall be of no force in this state.
22 Ariz. at 495-96, 198 Pac. at 1107.[4]
The fact that petitioner and the decedent may have been domiciled in Arizona simply does not preclude petitioner from establishing that
a valid common-law marriage was contracted in another jurisdiction.[5] In ascertaining the validity of a common-law marriage, we must
look to the law of the state where the marriage is alleged to have been contracted and not to the law of the domiciliary state, absent
extreme public policy considerations such as those set forth in A.R.S. § 12-101. This is not to say that the couple's contacts with
Colorado or lack thereof is an unimportant issue in this case, only that such contacts must assume importance, if at all, under Colorado
law, not our own.[6]
Having disposed of respondent's statutory argument, we turn to the question of whether petitioner established the existence of a valid
Colorado common-law marriage.
"By the statutes of Colorado, marriage is declared to be a civil contract; and there is only one essential requirement to its validity,
between parties capable of contracting, viz. the consent of the parties." Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Colo. App. 303, 50 P. 1049(1907).
Evidence of cohabitation and repute, while not essential to the legality of the relationship, is competent and in itself properly may be the
basis for inferring consent to a contract of marriage. Moffat Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 108 Colo. 388, 118 P.2d 769 (1941); In Re
Peters, 73 Colo. 271, 215 P. 128 (1923); Deter v. Deter, 484 P.2d 805 (Colo. App. 1971). Thus, if a contract or agreement cannot be
shown, its existence may be proven by, and presumed from, evidence of cohabitation and general repute. Taylor; Klipfel's Estate v.
Klipfel, 41 Colo. 40, 92 P. 26, 28 (1907). It is necessary that there be evidence of both before a common-law marriage will be
presumed; proof of one alone is not sufficient to sustain the presumption. Klipfel at 28. A presumption of marriage by cohabitation and
repute can only be established by evidence that is convincing and positive, id.at 29, or that is clear, consistent and
convincing. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 124 Colo. 68, 234 P.2d 901 (1951).
The Taylor court defined cohabitation and general reputation as follows:
`Cohabitation,' as here used, means something more than sexual intercourse ... `It is not a sojourn, nor a habit of *378 visiting, nor even
a remaining with for a time. None of these fall within the true idea of cohabitation as a fact presumptive of marriage ... To cohabit is to
live or dwell together, to have the same habitation; so that, where one lives and dwells, there does the other live and dwell with him ...'
By `general reputation or repute' is meant the understanding among the neighbors and acquaintances with whom the parties associate
in their daily life that they are living together as husband and wife, and not in meretricious intercourse. `In its application to the fact of
marriage, it is more than mere hearsay. It involves, and is made up of, social conduct and recognition, giving character to an admitted
and unconcealed cohabitation.'
50 Pac. at 1049-50. What is meant by "general reputation" was more closely examined in Peery v. Peery, 27 Colo. App. 533, 150 P.
329 (1915):
`It is in the nature of a verdict of the community upon their relations, arrived at from observing their conduct, their manner of life, their
deportment toward each other and the community, and their declarations. It is the general impression or belief created in the minds of
the people from those things which constitute the general reputation which may be shown in evidence as tending to raise the
presumption of marriage, or the contrary. To be of any value as evidence such reputation must be general and uniform.'
(Emphasis theirs.) 150 Pac. at 331.
Although we apply the substantive law of Colorado in determining whether petitioner was in fact married to the decedent, we apply
Arizona law in order to define the appropriate standard of review. Krisko v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,15 Ariz. App. 304, 488 P.2d
509 (1971). An Industrial Commission award will not be set aside by this court on review unless, as a matter of law, there is no
reasonable basis in the evidence upon which the Commission could have reached its conclusion. In Re Estate of Bedwell, 104 Ariz.
443, 454 P.2d 985 (1969); Reynolds Metal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,22 Ariz. App. 349, 527 P.2d 308 (1974). In deciding whether the
Commission's award is reasonably supported by the evidence, we will construe the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the
award. Malinski v. Industrial Comm'n,103 Ariz. 213, 439 P.2d 485 (1968).
We cannot say on the basis of the record before us that the Industrial Commission award denying widow's benefits to petitioner was
wholly unreasonable. The only evidence tending to establish the existence of an actual agreement or contract made in Colorado was
the uncontradicted testimony of petitioner to the effect that the parties mutually decided they were married after listening to a radio
broadcast. There is evidence in the record tending to cast doubt on the credibility of petitioner as a witness. We have frequently stated
that an administrative law judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally binding upon the reviewing court. Adams v.
Industrial Comm'n, 710 P.2d 1073 (Ariz. App. 1985); Koval v. Industrial Comm'n,23 Ariz. App. 277, 532 P.2d 549 (1975). Therefore, we
find no error in the administrative law judge's failure to find that petitioner's uncontradicted testimony standing alone was sufficient to
establish the existence of a contract. Furthermore, we do not believe that the petitioner presented clear and positive evidence of both
cohabitation and general repute in Colorado so as to establish a presumption that such an agreement existed. The only evidence
presented as to the couple's behavior in Colorado was the testimony of petitioner and Stephen Houser regarding their behavior during
the wedding, a single event. This evidence was hardly "general and uniform" within the meaning of Peery, and was not sufficiently clear
and positive so as to raise a presumption of the existence of reputation of marriage in the community under Colorado
law. See Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial *379 Comm'n, 124 Colo. 68 234 P.2d 901 (1951); Peery v. Peery, 27 Colo. App.
533, 150 P. 329 (1915).[7]As noted by H. Clark, Jr., Law of Domestic Relations § 2.4 at 56 (1968):
[P]roof of a common-law marriage under modern cases requires evidence of a course of conduct, of marital cohabitation. At the least,
this would entail a stay of some duration in the nondomiciliary state before evidence of the requisite kind and amount could become
available.
(Emphasis supplied.)[8]
We therefore find that the administrative law judge could reasonably have concluded that petitioner failed to carry her burden, and
affirm the award of the Commission denying widow's benefits under the workers' compensation laws.
BROOKS, J., and DAVIS, J. Pro Tem., concur.

9. WONG WOO YUI V. VIVO

Facts: In proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry in June, 1961, Wong Woo Yiu declared that she came to the Philippines
in 1961 for the first time to join her husband, Perfecto Blas, a Filipino citizen to whom she was married in Chingkang, China on January
15, 1929, that they had several children all of whom are not located in the Philippines, and that their marriage was celebrated by one
Chua Tio, a village leader.

On June 28, 1961, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Las, thus
declaring legal her admission into the country. This decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners on July 12, 1961 of which
petitioner was duly informed in a letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board.

However, on June 28, 1962, the same Board of Commissioners, but composed entirely of a new set of members, rendered a new
decision contrary to that of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country, after
discrepancies were found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband during several investigation conducted by the
immigration authorities concerning the alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929, thus concluding that the petitioner's
claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in evidence as it was "a mass of oral and documentary evidence
bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship,” the Board of Commissioners motu proprio reviewed the record concerning the
admission of petitioner into the country resulting in its finding that she was improperly admitted.

Issue: WON Wong Woo Yiu's marriage to Perfecto Blas is valid and making her admission into the country legal. NO!

Held: SC affirmed the latter Board's decision. Indeed, not only is there no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of
petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their veracity
concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. This claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family relations. Thus,
Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be
valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of
the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). But it may be
contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our
new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is
also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of
marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it
should be presumed that it is the same as our own.

The statutes of other countries or states must be pleaded and proved the same as any other fact. Courts cannot take judicial notice of
what such laws are. In the absence of pleading and proof the laws of a foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same as our
own.

In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a foreign law, it will be presumed to be the same as the domestic law
on the same subject.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.

Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of
them, it is clear that petitioner’s marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.