Oxfam GB

Food and Poverty in the Americas: Institutional and Policy Obstacles to Efficiency in Food
Aid (Alimentation et pauvreté dans les Amériques: obstacles institutionnels et relatifs aux
politiques générales qui entravent l'efficacité de l'aide alimentaire / Alimentação e pobreza nas
Américas: obstáculos institucionais e de política para a eficiência em ajuda alimentar /
Alimento y pobreza en las Américas: obstáculos instituc ...
Author(s): Solon Barraclough
Source: Development in Practice, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May, 1997), pp. 117-129
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of Oxfam GB
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Food and poverty in the Americas:
andpolicyobstaclesto efficiencyinfood aid
institutional

Solon Barraclough

This article reviews trends in poverty, hunger, and food security in the Americas;
examines some of the principal processes, institutions,and policies which generate
unsustainabledevelopment;and speculates on reformsrequiredat all levels in order
to improvefood security. Whilefood aid offers opportunitiesfor alleviating poverty
and hunger,it may contributeto intensifyingrather than resolving livelihood crises.
Since the WorldFood Programmeis a majorplayer in the context offood aid, some
issues crucialfor WFPpolicies in the Americasare considered.

'Food security' implies the sustained and Argentina,andTrinidad& Tobago,hadaverage

assuredaccess by all membersof a society to per capita incomes of between $3,000 and
food thatis adequatein quantityandqualityto almost $8,000. All had sufficient food
meetnutritionalneedsfor an activehealthylife. nationally, with per capita food availabilities
A food systemofferingsuch securitywouldbe approaching orexceedinglevelsin manyOECD
characterisedby thefollowingqualities: countries(except in Venezueladuringa short
crisisperiodin the late 1980s).Theirproduction
a the capacity to produce, import, and store
structures,in termsof the contributionsto GNP
sufficientfood forall its participants;
of agriculture,industry,andservices,resembled
* theprovisionof maximumautonomyandself-
thoseof NorthAmerica.Theseseveneconomies
reliance,withoutimplyingautarky;
account for over two thirds of the region's
* reliability, to minimise vulnerability to
populationandlandarea.Theyalso includeover
variationsin food availabilityfromnaturalor
halftheregion'sdesperatelypoorpeople(World
socio-economiccauses;
Bank1995;FAO,1994;Schejtman,1994).
to protecttheecologicalsystem;
* sustainability,
Thecrucialproblemsencounteredin attempts
* a sufficient degree of equity to provide
to improvefood securityin two thirdsof Latin
dependableaccess to adequatediets for all
America and the Caribbean in some ways
social groups(Barraclough1991; Schejtman
resemblethose of NorthAmerica,ratherthan
1994).
thoseof low-incomecountries.In fact, Mexico
joined the OECD in 1994, and President
Usingthisdefinition,we canstatethatalmostall
Cardosoof Brazil remarkedshortly after his
countriesin LatinAmericaand the Caribbean
electionthatBrazilwas not an under-developed
haveinsecurefood systems.
country,but an unjust one. Here, one should
In 1993, 'upper-middle-income'countries,
recallthatwhile US food-aidprogrammessuch
such as Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Mexico,

0961-45241971020117-13?Oxfam UK and Ireland1997 117

Solon Barraclough
as food stamps,school lunchesand so on may
have contributed to relieving hunger and
improving nutrition, they have been less
successful in reducing poverty. For this, the
structuralcauses- suchas unemployment and
discrimination- haveto be addressed, through
complementary institutionalandpolicyreforms.
Trendsin food security
In 1993, only four countriesin LatinAmerica
andthe Caribbeanwereclassifiedby the World
Bank as 'low-income economies': Haiti,
Guyana,Nicaragua,and Honduras.Eighteen
appearedin the 'lower-middle-income'group.
Severalof thelatterhadamplefood to feed their
populations, but most failed to do so. For
example,food availabilitieswere 10 percentor
more above FAOminimumnorms in the late
1980sin CostaRica,Cuba,Colombia,Ecuador,
and Paraguay.But food distributionhad been
equitable enough to ensure the virtual
eliminationof widespreadunder-nutrition only
in CubaandCostaRica.
When limited per capita food availability is
combined with extremely inequitable
distribution- as in Guatemala,Honduras,the
DominicanRepublic,Haiti,Peru,Bolivia, and
severalothercountries- one wouldexpectthe
highest rates of hunger and under-nutrition.
Availabledataindicatethatthis was partlythe
case. To a surprisingextent, however,serious
hungerwas almost equally prevalentfor low-
income social groupsin severalhigher-income
countries with ample national food supplies,
such as Brazil and Mexico. Even within
countries, rates of serious poverty and
malnutritiondid not necessarilycorrelatewith
average per capita incomes. In Mexico, for
example,under-nutrition was aboutas prevalent
in the high-incomeStateof Tabascoin theearly
1980s as it was in the low-income State of
Chiapas.Thissuggeststhedominantroleplayed
by income distribution and poverty in
determining adequate access to food at the
householdlevel.
The otherfourdimensionsof food insecurity
will be touched on only briefly. Except for
118 Developmentin Practice, Volume7, Number2, May 1997
Brazil,Argentina,Uruguay,andParaguay, every
country in the region was significantly
dependenton foodimports,someheavilyso. For
example,in thelate 1980sJamaica,Haiti,Cuba,
Venezuela,and several small States imported
abouthalf or moreof theirfood consumption.
However,most food-importingcountrieswere
also significant exporters of agricultural
commodities(Haitibeing the exception).This
relianceon food importsleft theirfood systems
vulnerableto thevagariesof internationalprices,
to the tradeand aid polices of food-exporting
and donorcountries,arndto externalpolitical
pressures.Cuba,for example,subjectedto the
continuedUS tradeembargo,has faced severe
problemssincethecollapseof theSovietUnion,
as nearly90 per cent of its tradewas with the
Soviet bloc. Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, and the
CentralAmericanand Caribbeancountriesare
particularlyvulnerableto US pressureswhich
mightaffect theirfood suppliesor commodity
markets. The region's food systems also
increasinglydependon industrialtechnologies
andinputsfromtheUSA, Europe,andJapan.
Foodsystemsin theregionarealsobecoming
unsustainableecologically. Deforestation is
rampantin areasunsuitableforotheruses.So too
aresoil erosion,waterdepletion,pollutionof all
kinds, loss of biodiversity,and otherforms of
environmentaldegradation.Foodproductionis
increasingly dependent on commercially
produced energy, at levels which many
specialists believe cannot be sustained
(Barraclough,Ghimireand Meliczek, 1995).
This is in additionto climaticvagaries,such as
droughtsandfloods, which have alwaysmade
food productionprecariousin manyareas.
The most urgentfood-securityissues in the
region, however,relate to income distribution
and severepoverty.This is almosta tautology.
The EconomicCommissionon LatinAmerica
andtheCaribbean(usuallyknownby its Spanish
acronym,CEPAL)publishes estimates of the
numbersof households and people below the
poverty line, and of those who are indigent.
'Indigence' implies severe poverty,with per
capita household incomes that are below the
value of country-specific minimum food
budgets. The poverty line is defined as being

twice the valueof thisminimumfood budget.If
indigenceis accuratelyestimated,practicallyall
indigent people necessarily lack access to
adequate food. Numerous anthropometric
studiesconfirma close correspondence between
indigenceandunder-nutrition. Of course,some
peoplewithhigherincomesmay also be under-
nourished- becauseof parasites,disease,poor
eatinghabits,ornaturalandsocialcalamities-
while some extremely poor people may find
waysto scroungeadequatediets.Also, country-
specific minimum food budgets may be
misleadingin certainareas.Ingeneral,however,
peoplewho areindigentlackaccess to adequate
food,by definition.
CEPAL estimated that in 1990 some 94
millionpeople in 19 countriesin the Americas
wereindigent,andthatanadditional100million
weremerelypoor.This impliesthat46 percent
of the region's populationwere poor,and that
nearlyhalf of thesewereindigent.Once the ten
small countriesomittedfrom the estimate are
included, this means that at least 100 million
indigent people were vulnerable to serious
hunger.Moreover,althoughonly about29 per
centof the region'stotalpopulationwas rural,a
littleoverhalfof theseriouslypoorlivedin rural
areas. Both the numberand the proportionof
peoplebelievedto be indigentincreasedduring
the 1980s, but most of the increase in their
numbers took place in the cities. Rural
populations across the region remained
practicallystationaryduringthe 1980s, while
the urbanpopulationincreased by about one
third.Duringthe sameperiod,urbanindigence
increasedby some 30 per cent, while in rural
areas it grew by aboutfive per cent (Altimir,
1994).
As we haveseen,thecorrespondence between
averagehouseholdincomeandhungerdoes not
alwaysholdatnationallevels,or withinspecific
regions. Upper-middle-income Argentina,
Uruguay,andTrinidad& Tobagohavefarlower
levelsof extremepovertythando similarlywell-
to-do Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela -
although all have ample food available
nationally.Even more striking is that Brazil,
Mexico, and Venezuela have rates of severe
povertymuchhigherthando China,Sri Lanka,
Developmentin Practice, Volume7, Number2, May 1997
Food and poverty in the Americas
or the IndianStateof Kerala,with averageper
capita GNPs whichare only one tenthas high.
They also havemuchhigherratesof indigence
than lower-middle-income Cuba and Costa
Rica. Guatemala, with a per capita GNP four
times higher than that of India and a slightly
greaterper capita food availability,has ratesof
destitutionthataresimilarto thoseof theIndian
sub-continent,andto manyfarpoorercountries
in sub-Saharan Africa.Understandably, manyof
my Latin American colleagues refer to this
pattern of development, with its increasing
social polarisationandecological degradation,
as degenerative growth.
Improvingthe food security of the
poor
Whena doctortreatsa patienton the basisof an
incorrect diagnosis of the symptoms or the
natureof thedisease,he or sherisksaggravating
theillness.Themedicineprescribedmayhelpor
be harmless,butoftenit harms.The sameholds
for suggesting policies to relieve povertyand
hunger.It helpsto havea good understanding of
thenatureanddynamicsof the deprivationsone
is attemptingto end. Thesewill differfromone
situation to another, but there are some
generalisationsthatapplyin mostcases at local,
national,regional,andgloballevels.Manyof the
commonlyheldgeneralisationsabouthungerin
theAmericas,however,aremisleading.
In antiquity, the classic explanations for
famine were naturalcalamitiesand wars.One
has only to recall the Horsemen of the
Apocalypse,or the plaguesof Egyptrecounted
intheBible.Thesecausesof hungerstilloperate,
andcanbe devastatingwhentheyoccur.Butthey
are very inadequate explanations of mass
povertyandhungerin the Americasin the late
twentiethcentury.
Droughts,floods, hurricanes,crop diseases,
or desertification can cause catastrophic
hardshipslocally,butthe ones who suffermost
are usually those who are already poor.
Pestilences,suchas the recentcholeraoutbreak
in South America, were fed by poverty and
malnutrition,but did not cause them. Violent
119
Solon Barraclough
social conflicts in several Centraland South
Americancountriesduringthe 1970sand 1980s
were devastatingfor the very poor.Indeed,the
socialdynamicsof povertyandoppressionwere
prominentamongthe manyfactorsgenerating
these wars. The growth of urban slums has
occasionally been acceleratedby influxes of
destituterefugeesfleeingdegradedsoils, suchas
the streams of poor migrants from Brazil's
north-eastto Sao Paulo;but most would soon
have left anyhow for other reasons (Barra-
clough, 1993):witnessthe similarflows of poor
migrants from the well-watered prosperous
Brazilian State of Parana,where livelihoods
were lost to make way for mechanised,large-
scale commercialagriculture,especially soya
forexport.
A commonlycitedexplanationof thegrowing
numbersof poor people in the region is rapid
population growth. This may have been a
contributing factor in some places, but is
dangerouslymisleading when presentedas a
primarycause of severe poverty. In fact, the
reversehypothesis- thatpovertyis a principal
causeof theso-calledpopulationexplosion- is
nearerto the truth.Populationin the Americas
collapsedfollowingthe EuropeanConquest.In
muchof LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,it did
not reachpre-Conquestlevels until about400
years later, in spite of natural increase,
continuousimmigrationfromEuropeandAsia,
andsome 10 millionslavesbroughtfromAfrica.
Povertypersistedthroughoutthisperiod.
Theregionhasthenaturalresourcesto makea
very significantimprovementto the livelihoods
of a growingpopulation.Yet severalcountries
with the biggest endowments of potentially
productiveland and othernaturalresourcesin
relationto their populations,such as Bolivia,
have some of the highestproportionsof people
living in abject poverty. As elsewhere,
populationmust be stabilised, the sooner the
better, in order to avoid eventual social and
ecologicalcollapse.But populationgrowthcan
hardlybe saidto be a primarycauseof povertyin
theAmericas.
Inanycase,demographic growthhasrecently
slowed down. Ruralpopulationgrowth-rates
stabilised after the mid-1970s, although
120 Developmentin Practice, Volume7, Number2, May 1997
inequitable access to good agriculturalland
often led to rural over-crowding, with its
attendantpovertyanddestructionof fragileeco-
systems. Urbanpopulationsare growingat an
annualaverageof about2.5 percent,downfrom
fourpercent in the 1970s.Totalfertilityratesin
1992wereless thantwo in Cubaandonly a little
abovetwo in JamaicaandUruguay.
Agricultural production has increased on
averageat aboutthe same rate as the region's
totalpopulation.Theproblemis thatthisgrowth
has been concentrated mainly on large
commercial farms producing primarily for
export, or for higher-income domestic
consumers.The productivityof most peasants
has been stagnant.A few with access to land
began producing non-traditional exports
financed, supervised,and marketedby trans-
nationalinvestors.Some of these peasantsdid
improve their livelihoods. There are serious
doubts,however,aboutthe longer-termsustain-
abilityof theseproductivitygains,bothon large
and small commercial farms. Small peasants
whoseproductivityhas increasedarefrequently
unable to keep much or any of the potential
gains, as they are appropriatedby others.The
sameis trueof ruralworkerson highlyproduct-
ive commercial farms and plantations, who
frequentlyhave uncertainpart-timeemploy-
ment, and are usuallypaid subsistencewages.
Most poor campesinos, however, have inade-
quate and extremely insecure access to paid
employmentor to land, credit, infrastructure,
and markets.Many cannot maintainminimal
livelihoods. Let us recall that nearly half the
region's poor are rural,that nearly half of its
ruralpooraredestitute,andthatoverhalf of the
region'sdestitutearerural.
Theurbanpoorencountersimilardifficulties.
They often live in shanty-towns, lacking
minimal infrastructure,on plots of land from
whichtheycanbe easilyevicted.Employmentis
uncertainandpoorlypaid.Transport is insuffer-
ablydifficultandexpensive,butneededto reach
often distantworkplaces.Physicalinsecurityis
rampant,as is exploitationby mafias,employ-
ers, local political bosses, merchants,money-
lenders, and State-level politicians. In such
circumstances,to imply that people are poor
 Food andpoverty in the Americas

becausethey lackmotivationis an insult.Food, in somesituations,andto alleviateit in others.In

however,is often moreaccessiblefor the urban most of Latin America and Caribbean,three
destitutethan it is for theirruralcounterparts. mutually supporting sets of policies and
The last thing which those with powerwantto institutions have dominated development
risk is food riots. Practicallyall majorcities in
'styles' - in other words, what actually
the regionoperatesome kindsof food subsidy happens, often in contrast to declared goals
forthepoor.Infact,thesehavecontributed (Wolfe,1981).Thesemightbe calledexclusion-
to the
rapidgrowthof conglomeratessuch as Mexico ary, elite self-serving, andcompensatory.Of
Citysinceearlyin thetwentiethcentury. course, similarpolicies (definedas purposeful
linesof conductby theStateandotherinfluential
social actors)havealso beenprominentin other
Povertyand industrialgrowth regions.In severalAsianandAfricancountries,
however,these havetendedto be attenuatedby
Anothermisconception is that technological institutionswhich were less exclusionarythan
modernisationand economic growth will by those in most of the Americas following the
themselvesalleviatepoverty.Theymaydo so for EuropeanConquest. ('Institutions' are here
some,butatthesametimegeneratenewpoverty defined as sub-sets of established rules and
for others. The expansion of labour-saving customswhichstructuresocialrelationsin fairly
mechanised farming often appropriatesland predictableways,andwhichoftencorrespondto
which formerlyprovidedlivelihoodsfor many settledhabitsof thoughtandaction).
self-provisioning campesinos. Modernlarge TheEuropeanconquistadores camein search
farms,however,usuallyemployfew permanent of wealth, power,and adventure.They estab-
workers.Therearesomemultipliereffectsfrom lishedlargeplantationsof sugarandotherexport
modem farmsand industries,but the poor are crops worked by indigenous and imported
likelyto be excluded. slaves.Theirminesandestateswereworkedin a
The rapid growth of modern industries in similarmanner.Indigenouspopulations,slaves
responseto marketforces, State policies, and fromAfrica,andlaterbondedlabourers(mostly
transnational investmentshas been spectacular, from Asia) were excluded from meaningful
especially in Mexico andBrazil.But while the participationin colonialsocieties,as weremost
growth of industrialoutputand capacity has of theirincreasinglymixed-blooddescendants.
been impressive,therehas beenrelativelylittle Political, economic, and civil institutions
growth in industrial employment since the evolved which were similarly exclusionary.
1960s.Modemindustriesimportlabour-saving Land tenure and complementaryinstitutions
technologies developed in rich countries, in were designed to assure the control of the
orderto be internationallycompetitive. How colonial elites over land and labour. These
else can one explainindustrialgrowthin Brazil profoundlyshapedthe laterevolutionof social
during the 1960s and 1970s of 1Oper cent structures,justas theydidin theexport-oriented,
annually, contributing 38 per cent of the plantation-dominated slave-holdingcolonies in
country'sGNP,whileat thesametimeone tenth whatis nowthesouth-eastemareaof theUSA. It
of its urbanpopulationremaineddestitute,and is no accidentthatCostaRica'ssocialevolution
one thirdof it poor? tendedto be moredemocraticandless polarised
than that of its neighbours. The Europeans
simply did not find enough mineralwealth or
Poverty,policies,and institutions potentiallyprofitableexportsthereto makethe
large-scaleuse of slavelabourattractive.Slave-
Therootsof seriouspovertyin themodemworld holding was already out of fashion when
have to be sought in institutionsand policies. profitablecoffee andbananaexportseventually
These interact locally, nationally, and emergedafterindependence(Barracloughand
internationally to generateorperpetuatepoverty Ghimire,1995).

Development in Practice, Volume 7, Number 2, May 1997 121

Solon Barraclough
Politicalsystemsin mostcountrieseventually
becamemoreformallydemocraticinresponseto
increasingsocialdifferentiation,
the emergence
of new middlesectors,pressuresfromworkers
and campesinos, and intra-elite disputes. Less
exclusionarypolicies were adoptedby several
populistgovernments.Establishedinstitutions
aredifficultto reform,however,andin most of
the region such deep-rootedhabitsof thought
andactionpersistedevenaftertheywerelegally
superseded.
Otherelite self-serving policies complem-
ented socially exclusionaryones. The colonial
powersjealously protectedtheir new markets
from competition by rivals, and discouraged
productionof goods and services thatcould be
profitablyexportedby themselves.Afterindep-
endence,theseessentiallymercantilistpolicies
did not changemuch,except thatthe financial
interestsof Britain,the USA, andotherindust-
rialcountriesgraduallyreplacedthoseof Spain
and Portugal, in alliances with local elites.
Duringthe late nineteenthand early twentieth
centuries, several Latin American countries
adopted'neo-liberal'developmentstrategiesto
encourage foreign investments and promote
commodityexports.
Import-substitutionstrategies to promote
industrialisation were adopted by some
countries during the Great Depression and
WorldWarII,whenimportsbecameunfeasible;
andthroughout theregionafterthe 1950s.These
policies promotedimpressiveindustrialgrowth
in manycountries,butof a typethatofferedfew
new opportunitiesfor the poor. Instead, they
primarilybenefitedlocal elites, transnational
investorswho hadoften aggressivelypromoted
them, and some sections of the expanding
middleclasses.
Followingthe debt crisis and the depressed
pricesof manyexportcommoditiesin the 1980s,
import-substitutionstrategieswentoutof vogue.
Structuraladjustmentprogrammes implied
drasticdevaluations,the withdrawalof hefty
subsidies,anopeningof domesticmarkets,anda
scaling-down of State employment and
investments, as well as other policies which
tendedon balanceto be deflationary.Demand
for hitherto highly protected domestic
122 Developmentin Practice, Volume7, Number2, May 1997
manufactured goods collapsed,while the costs
of imported inputs and technologies rose
sharply.Transnational investorsandlocal elites
could gain more from freer trade and
privatisationunderthese circumstancesthan
theycouldfromcontinuedprotection.
It is hardto see, however, how neo-liberal
policieswill benefitthe region'spoor,anymore
than earlierones did. To do so would require
profound reforms in land tenure and other
exclusionaryinstitutions.Policies that fail to
provide the poor with equitable access to
educationaland health services, to social and
productiveinfrastructure, and to opportunities
for remunerativeemploymentwould also have
to be reformed.It is instructiveto rememberthat,
a centuryago, povertyincreaseddramatically in
Mexico andseveralothercountrieswhen large
foreign investments,accompaniedby a rapid
expansionof exportsandimports,excludedthe
majority of the population from customary
sourcesof livelihoods(Hansen,1971).Mexico's
inclusion in the North American Free Trade
Area(NAFTA)in 1994 will probablylead to a
sharp increase in rural poverty there
(Barraclough,1992).
Exclusionaryelite-servingpoliciesandinstit-
utions had to be counteredby some compens-
atory measures to avoid complete social
disintegration.Theprevalenceof militarycoups,
revolutionarymovements, and violent social
conflicts suggests that such measures were
frequentlyinsufficienteven for the short-term
self-interestsof many of those who benefited
fromthestatus quo.
Cheapfoodpolicies
One of the easiest compensatorymeasuresfor
govemmentswas to adoptcheapfood policies.
Unfortunately, in the regional context such
policies by themselvescould generallyrelieve
only some of the short-term symptoms of
poverty. At the same time, they stimulated
increasinglydisarticulatedeconomic growth,
since they were an essential element of
development strategies which continued to
excludethepoorfrommeaningfulparticipation.
Most agriculturewas heavily taxed by trade

barriers and by over-valued exchange rates
whichprimarilybenefitedothersectors(Valdes
andZietz, 1995).These costs were often offset
for large commercial producers, especially
export producers,by cheap credits and other
subsidies.But smallfood-cropproducerswere
penalised by cheap food and complementary
macro-economicpolicies.In addition,mosthad
inadequateand insecureaccess to land, water,
infrastructure,andmarkets.
Cheap food policies were possible largely
because of the ready availability on world
marketsof relativelycheap importsof grains,
edibleoils, anddairyproductsfromtheUSA, the
then European Community (EC), and a few
othercountries.'Commercial'importscouldbe
obtained on easy financial terms. Additional
food was availablethroughfood aid of one type
or another.Most politicians supportedcheap
food, because the groups who benefited were
influentialclients. Moreover,urbanunrestwas
frequentlysparkedby risingfood prices.Those
who facilitated the imports, processing, and
distribution of the food could often profit
directly.As foodis a principalwagegood,cheap
food was defended by most employers,
technocrats,and labourunions. Middle-class
consumerswerevocalin demandingcheapfood.
Somepeasantswho werenet purchasersof food
also benefited. Agro-exportproducersfound
that the availability of cheap imported food
loweredtheirwagecosts.
Cheap food policies, however, depressed
pricesfordomesticproducers.Importsfromrich
food-exportingcountries(whosefoodproducers
were heavilysubsidisedin one way or another)
alsodeprivedfoodexportersin LatinAmericaof
potential marketsin nearby countries. Most
damagingfor the poor, however,was that the
availabilityof cheapfood removedthe political
imperativefor governmentsto makethe policy
and institutionalreformsrequiredto support
small-scale peasant food production, and to
relievethecauses,andnotonlythesymptoms,of
urbanpoverty.
Land-abundant Bolivia provides a good
example. A major proportion of its peasant
farmers gained improved access to land
following the 1953-54 revolution and land
Developmentin Practice, Volume7, Number2, May 1997
Food and poverty in the Americas
reform,in whichtheywerecrucialsocialactors.
Peasantproductionthenaccountedfornearlyall
the country'sfood supplies,andovertwo thirds
of theBolivianpopulationwerepeasants.Cheap
food, importedmostly from the USA afterthe
revolution,contributedto the State'sneglectof
thepeasantry.So too didotherformsof 'aid'and
the relatively good prices for some years for
Bolivia's mineralexports.By the mid-1980s,
Bolivia was importingnearly25 percent of its
food calories.Most publicinvestmentsfollow-
ing the revolution had been directed to non-
agricultural sectors. Of the eight per cent
allocatedto agriculture,nearlyall benefiteda
few large agro-industrial producers (IFAD,
1985).
Alleviatingpoverty:at what cost?
The policy andinstitutionalreformsrequiredto
alleviate dire poverty in the region will be
dauntingly difficult to implement. Effective
agrarian reforms, for example, imply an
organisedpeasantryandunionisedagricultural
labourforce that is autonomous,democratic,
and durable.They also imply thatcampesinos
pressingfor reformscan find powerfulallies in
othersectorsof society. Urbanreformsare no
easier.
Decentraliseddecision-makingcan be a mis-
leadingsolutionfor poverty-alleviation if local
powerstructuresarecontrolledby eliteswhoare
highly influentialat a nationallevel. The sub-
sidiarityprinciplesuggeststhatpolicydecisions
should be taken at the lowest possible level.
Many policies to alleviate poverty, however,
must necessarily be adoptedand enforced at
nationalorgloballevels.Moreover,autonomous
democraticpressuresfromthe poorcan be very
dangerousfor those attemptingto exert them.
This is especiallyso in countrieswherenational
governments derive their legitimacy from
powerfulgroupswho supportthempreciselyfor
the purposeof preventingreformswhichmight
emanatefromdemocraticpopularparticipation.
Popularly based national development
strategiesare essential. If the State views the
pooras potentiallydangerousopponents,rather
123
Solon Barraclough
than as crucial allies, strategies dedicated to
eliminatingpovertyaredoomedto be transitory
and ineffective. But there is a long list of
countriesinwhichpopularlybasedreformswere
frustratedby intemationalpressures,generated
by nationaldefendersof the status quo, allied
with transnationalinterests. Popularlybased
reformsatthe international level areas essential
as atnationalandlocal levels.
The role of internationalfood aid
Foodaidin the 1980sandearly1990samounted
to about 10 per cent of official development
assistance (ODA). Cereals, by far the most
importantcomponent,reachedaboutone tenth
of the total cereal imports of developing
countries. Whetherfood aid helps or hinders
sustainable development, however, depends
principallyon the context in which it arrives.
Food aid can constitute a valuable resource
which contributestowardsreachingdevelop-
mentgoals. But it can also be fritteredawayfor
short-termpolitical ends, or wasted through
poorly conceived programmesand projects
whichareconduciveto increasingsocial polar-
isation, corruption,and capital flight. Donor
policies are important, but the policies and
institutionsof recipient States are even more
crucial.
In the 1960s,almostall food aid in theregion
came fromthe USA. In the 1980sless thanhalf
camefromtheUSA, andone thirdfromthe EU.
Japan,Australia,Canada,andthe Scandinavian
countrieswerealsosignificantdonors.Less than
one fifthof all foodaidis distributed
throughthe
WorldFoodProgramme(WFP).
It is useful to distinguishbetween bilateral Likeotheraid,foodaidis fungible.Thatis, it can
and multilateralaid, as well as between pro-
grammeand project aid, and between aid for
emergencies and that designed to support
developmentinitiatives.Thesecategoriesoften
overlap operationally,but each is associated
withparticular characteristics
andproblems.
Bilateral aid impliesthe transferof food to a importsor capitalflight. Bilateralprogramme
recipientcountryas a grantoronhighlyconcess-
ionalterms,froma singledonoror,as in thecase
of the EU, from an institution created by a
124 Developmentin Practice, Volume7, Number2, May 1997
particulargroupof countries.Multilateralaid,
on the other hand, implies food aid provided
throughthe UnitedNations(UN) system.Most
of the latter is channelled through the WFP,
which is at least partlyinsulatedfrompolitical
pressuresarisingfromdisputesamongmember
countries. It also has the potential to provide
disinterestedhelpto verylow-incomegroupsin
poor countrieswhich lack access to sufficient
food, and which are unlikely to benefit from
otherformsof aidforvariousreasons.
Foodaid is definedas donationsof food for
welfarepurposesor sales with at least a 25 per
cent grantelement - not a very satisfactory
definition. Many cross-border'commercial'
salesof food conceala largesubsidy(dumping)
component. Also, food aid tends to be least
plentifulwhen food is dearestin international
markets,and when it is often most needed in
poorcountries.In strictlyeconomicterms,some
food aid can be usedby oligopoliststo 'gouge'
the market through a multi-price system,
althoughsubsidised'commercial'exportsare
farmoreimportantin thisrespect.
Much of what is classified as 'aid' can be
analysedin similarterms.Manybilateraldonors
havepoliticalagendaswhichaid is supposedto
support. Moreover, aid is often a device for
helping to balanceinternationalaccounts. Of
course,muchof thesupportforfoodaidin donor
countriesis generatedby altruisticmotives.And
mostof WFP'sresourcescomefromdonorswith
tightandshrinkingbudgetsfor multilateralaid.
Currently,WFP purchases nearly half of its
food,two thirdsof thisin developingcountries.
Fungibility
be given for one purposebutused for others.It
couldbe usedto compensateworkersto builda
road,forexample.Butassumingthatthe roadis
importantfor the government,it would have
beenbuiltanyhow,whilethepublicfundssaved
could be used for otherpurposes,such as arms
food aidis particularly subjectto suchabuses,as
it is often a thinlydisguiseddevice to raise the
recipientState'srevenuesfromsales of food to

consumers, in order to finance broad pro-
grammessuch as agriculturaldevelopmentor
structuraladjustment. Whetherprogramme food
aid reallycontributesto food securitydepends
largely upon how the funds raised from food
sales are actually used, and in what context.
Food aid channelled through development
programmesfor low-incomebeneficiarieswho
participatemeaningfully in determiningthe
project'sgoals,andin its implementation,
is less
likelyto be divertedto otheruses.
Additionality
Food aid is supposedto be 'additional'in two
senses. It shouldaddfood thatwouldnot have
been producedor importedotherwise, and it
shouldbe additionalto otheraid. This is often
not the case, especiallyfor large-scalebilateral
programme aid.Exceptin emergencies,foodaid
frequentlydisplacessomedomesticproduction,
orfoodimports,unlesspoliciesareimplemented
to preventthis fromoccurring.Some countries,
mostly in Asia, have managed to do this
successfully.Most WFPfood aid for develop-
mentprojects,however,is too smallinrelationto
totaidemandto haveany significantimpactson
food pricesnationally.Moreover,WFPprojects
often have sufficient built-in safeguards to
preventthemfrom negativelydisruptinglocal
food markets (though there has been some
misuseandinefficientuse of WFPdevelopment
food aid, as documentedby the 1994 tripartite
evaluation).
Foodaidmaybe partlyadditionalto otheraid.
For donors with chronic structurallyinduced
food surpluses,such as the USA and the EU,
food aid is likelyto be additional.TheUSA, for
example,providedaboutone fifthof its ODAin
the 1980s in the form of food aid. If therehad
been no such surpluses, food aid would have
been reduced, but it is doubtful that enough
politicalpressurecould havebeen mobilisedto
increaseotheraid by a correspondingamount.
Recentpolicy changes,plus aggressiveexport-
promotionandotherfactors,have reducedUS
andEU food stocksconsiderably.Decreasesin
food-aidcommitmentshavenot been balanced
by increasesin otherformsof aid.
Developmentin Practice, Volume7, Number2, May 1997
Food and poverty in the Americas
Emergencyfood aid is usuallydistinguished
fromdevelopmentaid, althoughthey shouldbe
seen as oppositepoles of the same continuum.
The formeris morelikely to be additionalthan
the latter,and it is frequentlycrucialfor main-
tainingthe immediatelivelihoods of refugees
and displacedpersons.Emergencyfood aid is
sometimesnot usedfor emergencies,of course;
andsome 'emergencies'becomechronic.
Foreignpolicyandcommercial
goalsof
foodaid
Bilateral food aid may be used primarily to
promotethe politicalgoals of donorcountries,
and to expand their penetration of foreign
markets.Frommy experienceof theUS Depart-
mentof Agriculture'sprogrammes,I can attest
the greatimportancein the pastof bothmarket
expansionandpoliticalgoals in determiningUS
food-aidlevels anduses in particularcountries.
Food aid for developmentor humanitarian
purposes may have several advantages over
otherformsof assistancewhicharemoreeasily
divertedfor purposes other than the relief of
povertyandhunger.Butfood aidof all kindscan
be badlymisused,as hasbeendocumentedin the
case of US food aid for CentralAmericaduring
the 1980s(GarstandBarry,1990).
Structuralfood surplusesin the USA andEU
are likely to continue, in spite of the current
reductionsin theircereal stocks. The Uruguay
Round GATT agreements are supposed to
reduceheavilysubsidisedfood surpluses,under
the scrutinyof the WorldTradeOrganisation
(WTO).This shouldleadto slightlyhigherfood
pricesin worldmarkets.Manyobserversfrom
food-surplusrich countriesremainsceptical,
myself included.Surplusstocks will probably
remainlower thanin the 1980s. However,the
need to dispose of productionabove domestic
demandsand non-concessional international
tradeis likely to continue.Theremay be little
thattheWTOcando aboutthis.
Monetisation
Monetisation is assumed by some to be an
advantageousway to use food aid, while others
125
Solon Barraclough
see it as an aberration to be avoided.
Theoretically,in a dream-worldof reasonably
competitiveandopenmarketscomplemented by
stableandconvertiblecurrencies,it wouldmake
littlesenseto bringfood froma donorcountryto
sell in a recipientcountry,in orderto raisefunds
to supportprojectsorprogrammes benefitingthe
poor. For food to be used most efficiently to
relieve hunger and promote development, it
would usually be more cost-effective for the
donorto providea portionof its foodaidin cash.
Ontheotherhand,in sucha utopianworld,there
wouldbe littleextremepovertyorneedfor food
aid.
In reality,monetisationis a complex issue,
whichmustbe resolvedin particular contextson
a case-by-casebasis.Marketsaremostlyneither
open nor competitive. Currenciesmay not be
convertible, and inflation may be rampant.
Political pressuresand corruptionmay make
monetisation less advisable in some circum-
stancesthanin others.Thekindof foodavailable
may not be the most suitablefor the intended
beneficiaries;or high internaltransportcosts
may makeit desirableto sell food in a portcity
andpurchasefood closer to the beneficiaries.It
maysometimesbe desirableto providecash-for-
work insteadof food-for-work,while in other
circumstancesthis may be out of the question.
These and many other factors have to be
considered each time a decision is made
concerning monetisation.
Obviously,in the real worldtherecan be no
generalprincipledictatingthatmonetisationis
always bad, or always good, for improving
efficiency in food aid. It could be either,
dependingon the time and place. WFP's 1987
guidelines call for prudent and pragmatic
monetisationwhereit is clearlyadvantageous.
These seem reasonable;the problemsarise in
attemptsto interpretthem in each case. Those
advocatingmonetisationshouldbe awareof the
risks, especially in unstable and polarised
societies.In any case, actualor imputedmarket
pricescan be only one elementin assessingthe
desirabilityof monetisationfor improvingthe
efficiencyof food aid in a particularsituation.
126 Developmentin Practice, Volume7, Number2, May 1997
Sustainingdevelopmentin a
hostile environment
Using food for development is far from
straightforward.Therearenumerouspitfallsin
deliveringfood throughsupplementary feeding,
food-for-work(FFW),andsimilarprojects.Are
the objectives clear? Were the intended
beneficiariesconsultedin settingthem?Is food
aid the most efficient means to reach these
objectives?Is the projectfeasible and sustain-
able economically, socially, and politically?
Who benefits, and who bears its direct and
indirectcosts?Arethereadequateprovisionsfor
monitoring,evaluation,andeffectivefeedback
to improve the project's operation? Such
questions should always be posed before
proceeding.
My ownobservationsarethattargetingcanbe
extremelydifficult,especiallyin supplementary
feeding projects. And there are often other
means of meeting project objectives which
mightbe cheaperandmoreeffectivethanfood
aid. If FFW projects are well designed and
implemented,theycanbe largelyself-targeting,
as only the poor and hungry are likely to
volunteerfor hardlabourfor the equivalentof
subsistencewages.Butthedangersaremultiple.
The reforestation, road-construction, or
municipal improvementproject may benefit
others,ratherthanthe people doing the work.
Forexample,an irrigationcanalmay primarily
deliverwaterto landlords.Tree-planting in areas
from which the poor will later be excluded
implies that they cannot reap the longer-term
gains.Urbanimprovementprojectsmaychiefly
benefitmiddle-classandupper-classresidents.
FFW projects are frequently manipulatedto
exploit cheap labour,in violation of ILO and
nationallabourcodes, for the profitof others.
Thebest remedyfor suchabusesis to assurethe
maximumpossible democraticparticipation by
the intendedbeneficiaries- butin manysocial
and political settings, this may be virtually
impossible.
The WFP is an important multilateral
instrumentfordeliveryof food aidto thepoorin
low-income countries, with a comparative
advantageoverotherintemationalorganisations

in the procurement, transport, storage, and
ultimatedeliveryof food to hungryconsumers.
Sadly,the greaterpartof WFP'sresourceswill
probablycontinue to be dedicated to emerg-
enciesandto feedinglonger-termrefugees.This
is a regrettablerealityof the chaoticpost-Cold
Warworld.The risks of misuse of emergency
aid, and the physical risks to those trying to
deliverit in war-tomsettings are well-known.
However,suchaidis likely to be mostneededin
othercontinents,implyingthattheproportionof
WFPfoodfortheAmericasmaydecrease.Thus,
it may be desirableto concentrateWFP aid in
areas where there are good prospects for its
havinga sustainablepositiveimpactforthepoor.
Thecentralissuehereis howto usefoodaidto
promotesocially and ecologically sustainable
developmentin policy andinstitutionalcontexts
which are frequently hostile to the poor.
Whether aid is for emergencies or for
development, donors should do everything
possibleto stimulateits use in waysthatpromote
longer-termimprovementsin the livelihoodsof
verylow-incomegroups.To me, thismeansthat
programmesandprojectsusingfood aid should
always place a high priorityon stimulatingthe
democraticandautonomousorganisationof the
recipients.
It mighthelp if the internationalcommunity
could get its own act together. In any given
country,variousagenciesfrequentlyworkwith
little co-ordination.WFP,UNICEF,and IFAD
(the International Fund for Agricultural
Development)aremandatedto give priorityto
improvingthe livelihoods of the poor.Others,
includingthe WorldBank,the IMF,UNDP,and
FAOhavenumerousotherobjectives,whichare
often internally contradictory. Agencies
frequentlyworkat cross-purposesandcompete
for the same scarce national resources, both
humanandmaterial.Neitherthe UN nor other
intemationalagenciescan prodor coax national
societiesto reformtheirpoliciesandinstitutions.
The pressures have to come primarily from
withineach country'scivil society.But the UN
could be much more helpful than in the past,
provided that it underwent major internal
reforms (South Centre, 1995; Childers and
Urquhart,1994).
Developmentin Practice, Volume7, Number2, May 1997
Food and poverty in the Americas
Giventhedisarrayof theinternational system,
it would be unrealistic foi WFP to turn over
manyof its planning,supervisory,andtechnical
functionsto otherbodies. Yetbilateralfood aid
is increasinglybeing providedthroughNGOs.
Some arehighly competentandprofessionalin
administeringfood aid, but many are not. The
notion that NGOs can automaticallybe more
effectivein reachingthe poorthancan national,
bilateral, or multilateral agencies - on the
groundsthatthe formerarepeople-orientedand
workbetterat the grassroots- is not credible
for anyonewho has spentmuchtime observing
or working with them. NGOs face the same
policy and institutionalconstraintsin tryingto
help the poor as do other agencies. Some are
more dedicated and skilful than others in
confrontingsuchdifficulties,justas somepublic
agenciesare.NGOsmightoccasionallybe more
effectivein assuminganadvocacyroleon behalf
of thepoorthancanmorepoliticallyconstrained
publicagencies- buteven this is by no means
certainon the ground.WFP should cooperate
withlocalandinternational NGOs,andby doing
so couldclearlyimproveits effectiveness.Butit
shouldbe extremelycautiousin selectingNGO
partners.Andit cannotdelegateits fundamental
responsibilitiesto others.
The 1987 WFPCountryFood and Planning
Review Mission to Bolivia recommended a
programmeapproach with country-specific
food strategies,providedthatrecipientcountries
developed parallel food strategies. National
governmentswill have to become politically
committedto popularlybased strategiesaimed
at sustainabledevelopment,whichdealwiththe
roots of poverty,before food security for the
poorcan become a reality.If WFPdevelopsits
own countrystrategies,these may havepositive
impacts.But in mostcases, they may be largely
irrelevant unless recipient countries adopt
realisticcomplementary strategies.
A strategyimpliesspecifyingin generalterms
whichsocialactorsareexpectedto do what,and
how, in approachinggoals. Who are the social
actors who could do something meaningful
aboutmeetingthe needsof the poor,improving
theirself-reliance,andbuildingup theirassets?
Whatincentiveswill theyhaveto worktowards
127
Solon Barraclough
these goals? How can this best be done in
specific national and sub-nationalcontexts?
How can food aid contribute to the durable
democraticandautonomousorganisationof the
poor,so thattheycan betterpressfor theirown
demandsandaspirations?Whatarethe roles of
variousgroupsof poorpeoplein determiningthe
objectives of food-aid projects, and in
implementing them?Thesecrucialquestionsare
often neglected.Even to discuss them briefly,
andto suggestcriteriain seekinganswers,would
requirea muchlongerpaper.
Specificanswersnecessarilydependon each
situation.Effortsof the poorto organisewhich
wouldbe suicidalinoneplacemaybe feasiblein
another.Somegovemmentsandpublicagencies
havea politicalimperativeto reducepovertyand
hungerand may welcome WFP co-operation.
Othersarelikely to regardpolicies for the poor
as being poorpolicies - althoughthey would
usuallyacceptfoodaid,albeitrathercynically.A
poorstrategywouldbe to ignoretherealitiesthat
generate hunger, and not to denounce the
underlyingsocial andpoliticalobstaclesto the
efficientuse of food aid.
References
Altimir,Oscar (1994) 'Incomedistributionand
povertythroughcrisisandadjustment',CEPAL
Review52, April1994,pp 7-31.
Barraclough,Solon (1991)AnEndto Hunger?
The Social Origins of Food Strategies, London:
ZedBooks.
Barraclough, Solon (1992) 'Algunas
cuestionessobrelas implicacionesdel TLCen cl
Mexico Rural' El sector agropecuario mexicano
frente al Tratado De Libre Comercio,
CuauhtemocGonzalezPacheco(Coordinator),
Mexico DF: Instituto de Investigaciones
Economicas,UNAM.
Barraclough,Solon (1993) 'Socialdimensions
of desertification' in D. Stiles (ed) (1993).
Listening to the People: Social Aspects of
Dryland Management, Nairobi: UNEP.
Barraclough, Solon, Krishna Ghimire and
Hans Meliczek (1995) 'The Environmentand
RuralDevelopment:TowardsEcologicallyand
128 Developmentin Practice, Volume7, Number2, May 1997
Socially Sustainable Development in Rural
Areas',draftpaperpreparedby UNRISDat the
request of UNEP for discussion at the 23rd
Meeting of the ACC Subcommitteeon Rural
Development,UNESCOHeadquarters(Paris,
31 May-2June1995).
Barraclough, Solon and Krishna Ghimire
(1995) Forest and Livelihood: The Social
Dynamics of Deforestation in Developing
Countries,London:Macmillan.
Childers,Erskineand Brian Urquhart(1994)
Renewing the United Nations System, Uppsala:
Dag Hammarskj6ld
Foundation.
FAO (1994) Production Yearbook1993, Rome:
FoodandAgricultureOrganisation.
Garst, Rachel and Tom Barry (1990) Feeding
the Crisis: US Food Aid and Farm Policy in
CentralAmerica,LincolnandLondon:Univers-
ity of NebraskaPress.
Hansen, Roger D. (1971) La politica del
desarrollo mexicano, Mexico DF: Siglo XXI.
IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural
Development) (1985) Propuestas para una
Estrategia de Desarrollo Rural de Base
Campesina,Informede la Mision Especial de
Programacion a la Republica de Bolivia,
December1985.
Schejtman, Alexander (1994) Economia
Politica de los Sistemas Alimentarios en
AmericaLatina,FAORegionalOfficefor Latin
AmericaandtheCaribbean,Santiago.
South Centre (1995) Reforming the United
Nations: A Viewfrom the South, A South Centre
Series,Geneva.
Valdes, Alberto and J. Zietz (1995)
'Distortionsin worldfood marketsin the wake
of GATT:evidence and policy implications',
WorldDevelopment, Vol 23, No 6, June 1995.
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1995, New York:OxfordUniversityPress.

Notes
1 This is a shortenedversionof the 'framework
paper' preparedby the authorfor the WFP
AmericasSeminar,'Efficiencyin Food Aid:
Using Food to AddressPovertyandHunger',
which took place in Cartagena de Indias,
Colombia, 28-30 August 1995. This third
regional meeting, organised by WFP to
analysefood aid throughoutthe world,placed
particularemphasis on problems in Latin
Americaandthe Caribbean.
Developmentin Practice, Volume7, Number2, May 1997
Food and poverty in the Americas
Theauthor
Solon Barracloughis a consultantto the United
Nations Research Institute for Social
Development(UNRISD) and to variousother
intemationalorganisations andNGOs.A former
Directorof UNRISD,he workedformanyyears
in Latin America with FAO and various
universities on issues of agrarianpolicy and
sustainabledevelopment.He canbe contactedat
UNRISD,Palaisdes Nations, 1211 Geneva10,
Switzerland.Fax:+41 (0)22 740 0791; E-mail:
<barraclough@unrisd.org>.
129