PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW - COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS

1.) Gonzales v Hechanova

FACTS: Petitioner Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign

rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed a petition questioning said act because
Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207 —
explicitly prohibits the importation of foreign rice by the Rice and Corn Administration or
any other government agency.

Respondent Hechanova countered that the importation is authorized by the President for
military stock pile purposes (the president is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of
threats of war or emergency without waiting for special authority). He also contends that
there is no prohibition on importation made by the “Government itself”. He also further
that the Government has already entered into 2 contracts with Vietnam and Burma; that
these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; and, that
such agreements became binding and effective upon signing thereof by the
representatives of both parties. Hechanova also maintains that the status of petitioner as
a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the petition herein and secure the
relief therein prayed for and that Gonzales has not exhausted all administrative
remedies available to him before coming to court".
ISSUE: Whether the government contracts with Vietnam and Burma are valid? May an
international agreement be invalidated by our courts?
HELD: The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as
executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly considered
as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative
authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited
by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in
the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for
the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing,
in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error
as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts
in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes
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the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also,
when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
2.) Ichong v Hernandez
FACTS: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take
advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail
business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly”
in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or
the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the
right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said
Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that
as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the
income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case,
there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA
1180. The equal protection of the law clause “”does not demand absolute equality
amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced””;
and, that the equal protection clause “”is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not.””

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict
with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the
police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through
the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market
stalls in the Pasay city market.

3.) Kuroda v Jalandoni

FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army
and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during
Second World War. He was charged before a military commission convened by the Chief
of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and
failed to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the
Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war”. The said military
commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the President
of the Philippines.
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Kuroda challenged the validity of Executive Order 68. His arguments, were as follows:
(1) Executive Order 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of
our constitutional law but also our local laws.
(2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of
the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a
signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947 and, therefore, he is charged
with “crime” not based on law, national or international
(3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not
qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the
appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order 68 had violated the provisions of our
constitutional law?
HELD: No. Executive Order 68 has not violated the provision of our constitutional law.
The tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. This executive order is in accordance with
Article 2 Sec 3, of Constitution. It is in accordance with generally accepted principles of
international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and
other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all
persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and
other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war.
The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and
regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international
law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)
Furthermore, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to
parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this
special law.
4.) Co Kim Chan v Tan Keh
FACTS: Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance
of Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case
which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of
any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments
of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an
enabling law granting such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese
occupation were no de facto government.
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ISSUE: Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the
Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces?
HELD: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de
facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto
governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of
war. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on
International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the
territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and
flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or
political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the
territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by
which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such
rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the world, and
confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of
nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private
rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended
or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de
facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new
ones.

5.) Secretary of Justice v Judge Lanton

FACTS: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for
the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The
warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached
along with the request. Charges include:

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the
technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having
matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the
documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to
assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation.
At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures
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and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and
treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in
the documents.
3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with
an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties
such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge
Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested
papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
HELD: No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another
state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under
generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part
of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and
the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to
harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice
has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of
incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments.

6.) Reagan v. CIR

FACTS: The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of Bendix Radio,
Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided technical assistance to the United
States Air Force was assigned at the Clark Air Base Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19.
Nine months, before his tour duty expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960 Cadillac car
which valued at $6443.83. More than two months after the car was imported, petitioner
requested the Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The request was
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granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member of the United States Armed
Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases.

On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private in US
Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill of sale executed at Clark Air Base.
On the same date William Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as
evidence by a deed of sale executed in Manila.

The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal exemption
which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net income arising from such transaction
the amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable for income tax of P2979.00. After paying
the sum, he sought refund from the respondent claiming that he is exempted. He filed a
case within the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal
rate of interest.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent may collect tax from the petitioner?
HELD: The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of Bendix Radio,
Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided technical assistance to the United
States Air Force was assigned at the Clark Air Base Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19.
Nine months, before his tour duty expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960 Cadillac car
which valued at $6443.83. More than two months after the car was imported, petitioner
requested the Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The request was
granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member of the United States Armed
Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases.

On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private in US
Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill of sale executed at Clark Air Base.
On the same date William Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as
evidence by a deed of sale executed in Manila.

The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal exemption
which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net income arising from such transaction
the amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable for income tax of P2979.00. After paying
the sum, he sought refund from the respondent claiming that he is exempted. He filed a
case within the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal
rate of interest.

7.) Abbas v Comelec

FACTS: The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in the 13 provinces and
9 cities in Mindanao and Palawan, in implementation of RA 6734 entitled an “An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for ARMM.”
In 1976, Tripoli Agreement was executed between MNLF and RP for creation of
an autonomous region in Mindanao.
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which for the first time provided for
regional autonomy.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, RA 6734 was enacted and signed into law.
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ISSUE: Whether RA 6734 is in conflict with the provisions of Tripoli Agreement?

HELD: NO. Any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the
provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation
of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a
binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the
land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the
Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter
Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a
subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the
Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought.
8.) Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines v Secretary of
Health
FACTS: Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino
on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under
the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that
the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA)
in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In
1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On
May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,
2006.
ISSUE: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
HELD: YES - under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and
regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to
Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that
such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with
such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
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mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature
9.) North Sea Continental Shelf Case
FACTS: Netherlands and Denmark had drawn partial boundary lines based on the
equidistance principle (A-B and C-D). An agreement on further prolongation of the
boundary proved difficult because Denmark and Netherlands wanted this prolongation to
take place based on the equidistance principle (B-E and D-E) where as Germany was of
the view that, together, these two boundaries would produce an inequitable result for her.
Germany stated that due to its concave coastline, such a line would result in her loosing
out on her share of the continental shelf based on proportionality to the length of its North
Sea coastline. The Court had to decide the principles and rules of international law
applicable to this delimitation. In doing so, the Court had to decide if the principles
espoused by the parties were binding on the parties either through treaty law or customary
international law.
ISSUE: Whether Germany is under a legal obligation to accept the equidistance-special
circumstances principle, contained in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf of 1958, either as a customary international law rule or on the basis of
the Geneva Convention?
HELD: NO - The use of the equidistance method had not crystallised into customary law
and the method was not obligatory for the delimitation of the areas in the North Sea
related to the present proceedings.
The Court concluded that the equidistance principle was not binding on Germany by
way of treaty or customary international law. In the case of the latter, the principle had not
attained a customary international law status at the time of the entry into force of the
Geneva Convention or thereafter. As such, the Court held that the use of the equidistance
method is not obligatory for the delimitation of the areas concerned in the present
proceedings.
10.) Asylum Case
FACTS: Peru issued an arrest warrant against Victor Raul Haya de la Torre “in respect
of the crime of military rebellion” which took place on October 3, 1949, in Peru. 3 months
after the rebellion, Torre fled to the Colombian Embassy in Lima, Peru. The Colombian
Ambassador confirmed that Torre was granted diplomatic asylum in accordance with
Article 2(2) of the Havana Convention on Asylum of 1928 and requested safe passage
for Torre to leave Peru. Subsequently, the Ambassador also stated Colombia had
qualified Torre as a political refugee in accordance with Article 2 Montevideo Convention
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on Political Asylum of 1933 (note the term refugee is not the same as the Refugee
Convention of 1951). Peru refused to accept the unilateral qualification and refused to
grant safe passage.
ISSUE: Did Colombia violate Article 1 and 2 (2) of the Convention on Asylum of 1928
(hereinafter called the Havana Convention) when it granted asylum and is the continued
maintenance of asylum a violation of the treaty?
HELD: The court held that there was no expressed or implied right of unilateral and
definitive qualification of the State that grants asylum under the Havana Convention or
relevant principles of international law (p. 12, 13). The Montevideo Convention of 1933,
which accepts the right of unilateral qualification, and on which Colombia relied to justify
its unilateral qualification, was not ratified by Peru. The Convention, per say, was not
binding on Peru and considering the low numbers of ratifications the provisions of the
latter Convention cannot be said to reflect customary international law
11.) Corfu Channel Case
FACTS: The explosion of mines in the Albanian (P) waters resulted in the death of
a British naval personnel. It was on this basis that the United Kingdom (D) claimed
that Albania (P) was internationally responsible for damages.
Issue: Are international obligations in time of peace created through elementary
consideration?

HELD: Yes. International obligations in peace time are created through elementary
consideration. Every state has an obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other states.

In this case, the Court found that the Hague Convention of 1907 could not be
applied but the Convention was applicable only in time of war. It was on the basis
of the principle of freedom of maritime communication that this case was decided.