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STANDARDS PUBLICATION

QP CORPORATE PHILOSOPHY
FOR FIRE AND SAFETY

DOC NO: QP-PHL-S-001


(Formally EP-S-01)

REVISION 1

SAFETY FIRE DEPARTMENT


QP CORPORATE PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND SAFETY

DOC. No. QP-PHL-S-001 Rev. 1

TABLE OF CONTENT
Page No.
FOREWORD ....................................................................................................... 3

1.0 OBJECTIVE / INTRODUCTION............................................................... 4

2.0 SCOPE .................................................................................................... 4


3.0 APPLICATION......................................................................................... 4

4.0 TERMINOLOGY ...................................................................................... 5

5.0 REFERENCE STANDARDS AND CODES.............................................. 8


6.0 GENERAL PHILOSOPHY ....................................................................... 9

7.0 FIRE & GAS DETECTION SYSTEMS ................................................... 26


8.0 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT .............................. 36

9.0 RELIABILITY, MAINTENANCE AND STANDARDS ............................. 45

10.0 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN AND DEPRESSURISATION SYSTEMS .. 50


11.0 DRAINAGE SYSTEMS .......................................................................... 60
12.0 VENTILATION AND AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEMS .......................... 61
13.0 ANNUNCIATION, ALARMS SYSTEMS ................................................ 66

14.0 EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM ........................................... 69

15.0 VENT AND FLARE SYSTEMS ............................................................. 70

16.0 GENERAL PLANT SAFETY.................................................................. 74

17.0 PIPELINES ............................................................................................ 86


18.0 CONSTRUCTION SAFETY & QUALITY ............................................... 92

19.0 UNITS OF MEASUREMENT.................................................................. 95

INDEX ............................................................................................................... 97
REVISION HISTORY LOG...............................................................................107
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QP CORPORATE PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND SAFETY

DOC. No. QP-PHL-S-001 Rev. 1

1.0 OBJECTIVE / INTRODUCTION

1.1 The primary objective of this philosophy is to ensure that the Fire & Safety design of QP
facilities reduces the risk, to plant personnel, third parties, the environment, production
revenue and capital investment during operation of the facilities, to as low as reasonably
practicable.

1.2 This primary objective shall be assured by utilising a risk based approach to the design of
the facilities, to applying the appropriate Codes and Standards, application of quality
assurance procedures, coupled with Technical Safety reviews; undertaken at key stages in
the design process.

2.0 SCOPE

2.1 This document presents QP’s philosophy relating to the prevention, control and mitigation of
hazards associated with the exploration, production and processing of hydrocarbons in
Qatar.

2.2 The purpose of this philosophy is to identify the major hazards which could lead to injury to
personnel, damage to facilities, loss of production and to prescribe the safety measures
which shall be adopted in the design of the facilities in order to prevent, control or mitigate
the hazards as identified.

2.3 The document is not a comprehensive design manual.

3.0 APPLICATION

3.1 This philosophy provides the basis for reviewing existing facilities and for the subsequent
definition of all modifications required to bring facilities up to the standard established by this
document.

3.2 In general the level of protection advocated by this philosophy should be regarded as the
minimum, with each facility being critically examined on its own merits.

3.3 For each new project a risk based project fire and safety philosophy document shall be
prepared using this document as the basis. That document shall be developed by the
project and shall identify any deviations from this Corporate philosophy and the logic behind
such deviations.

3.4 This philosophy is based on the assumption that only one major incident shall occur at any
one time, and that a fire can occur in any section of a facility in varying degrees of
magnitude and from a variety of sources.

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QP CORPORATE PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND SAFETY

DOC. No. QP-PHL-S-001 Rev. 1

4.0 TERMINOLOGY

4.1 DEFINITIONS

Explosivity Limits The explosivity limits are the minimum (LEL) and maximum (UEL)
concentrations of gas vapour in air which can sustain a self propagating
flame.

Fail-safe The concept that defines the failure direction of a component/system as a


result of specific malfunctions. The failure direction is towards a safer or
less hazardous condition.

Class Rated Fire An ‘A’ class fire division is one which is constructed of steel or equivalent
Divisions material, suitably stiffened and so constructed that it will be capable of
preventing the passage of smoke and flame to the end of the 1 hour
standard fire test. It shall be insulated with approved non-combustible
materials such that the average temperature on the unexposed side will not
rise more than 139oC above the original temperature, nor will the
temperature at any one point rise more than 180oC above the original
temperature, within the time identified by the numeric value following the
Apha (i.e. A-60, A-30, A-15, A-0 which set the time limit to 60, 30,15 or
zero minutes respectively).

‘H’ class divisions shall meet all the requirements of an ‘A’ rated division
but the fire test will be based on the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
Hydrocarbon time temperature curve.

‘B’ class divisions shall be constructed so as to capable of preventing the


passage of smoke and flame to the end of the first half hour standard
cellulosic fire test. They shall be constructed of approved non combustible
materials and be insulated with non-combustible materials such that the
average temperature on the unexposed side will not rise more than 139oC
above the original temperature, nor will the temperature at any one point
rise more than 225oC above the original temperature, within the time
identified by the numeric value following the Apha (i.e. B-15 or B-0 which
set the time limit to 15 or zero minutes respectively).

Fire Zone A fire zone is defined as a given risk area which is geographically
segregated from any adjacent hazards.

Firmware Software (programs or data) that has been written onto read-only memory
(ROM). Firmware is a combination of software and hardware. ROMs,
PROMs and EPROMs that have data or programs recorded on them are
firmware.

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DOC. No. QP-PHL-S-001 Rev. 1

HAZOP A Hazard and operability study is the questioning of every part of the
process to discover what deviations from the design intent can occur and
what their causes and consequences may be. This is undertaken in
systematic manner by the application of guide words This technique of
systematic detailed review is applicable to both batch and continuous
plants and can be applied to new or existing processes to identify hazards.

TLV-TWA Threshold Limit Value - Time Weighted Average is the limit for an 8 hour
workday, or 40 hour workweek to which all workers may be exposed week
after week without adverse affect.

TLV-STEL Threshold Limit Value – Short Term Exposure Limit is the maximum
concentration to which workers can be exposed for a period of 15 minutes
continuously without adverse effect.

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QP CORPORATE PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND SAFETY

DOC. No. QP-PHL-S-001 Rev. 1

4.2 ABBREVIATIONS

B.A. Breathing Apparatus MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit

CCR Central Control Room NGL Natural Gas Liquid

DCSS Distributed Control and PA Public Address


Supervisory System
PSR Preliminary Safety Review
DCS Distributed Control System
PAPA Prepare to Abandon Platform
DHSV Down Hole Safety Valve Alarm

EBD Emergency Blow Down QP Qatar Petroleum

ESD Emergency Shut Down QRA Quantified Risk Assessment

H2S Hydrogen Sulphide S/D Shutdown

HAZOP Hazard & Operability Study SIL Safety Integrity Level

HIPPS High Integrity Pressure SO2 Sulphur Dioxide


Protection System
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea
HSSD High Sensitivity Smoke
Detection STEL Short Term Exposure Limit

HMI Human Machine Interface TLV Threshold Limit Value

HVAC Heating Ventilation and Air TPSD Total Plant Shut Down
Conditioning
UEL Upper Explosive Limit
IR Infra-Red
UPS Un-interruptible Power Supply
LEL Lower Explosive Limit
VDU Visual Display Unit
LER Local Equipment Room

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

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DOC. No. QP-PHL-S-001 Rev. 1

5.0 REFERENCE STANDARDS AND CODES


5.1 The documents listed below shall be used in the development of Fire & Safety Designs. All
documents, regulations, Codes and Standards referred to shall be the latest editions current
at the time of preparation of a project specific philosophy. In addition to the above, specific
Codes and Standards applicable to individual items of equipment/materials shall be
identified in the specifications for that item of equipment/materials.
5.2 Relevant sections from the following documents shall be identified and referenced in the
project specific philosophy:-
QP Engineering Standards
QP Operational procedure guides
QP Health, Safety and Environment regulations.
QP Environmental Standards.
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
American Petroleum Institute (API)
British Standards Institution (BS)
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
Chemical Industries Association Ltd. (CIA)
Energy Industries Council Contractor’s Committee (CCI)
Norway Acts, Regulations and Provisions (DNV)
International Civil Aviation Organisation (IACO)
Institute of Petroleum (IP)
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
International Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA)
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. (SOLAS)
United States Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA)
Statutory Instruments including guidance notes (SI)
Underwriter’s Laboratories, Inc. (UL)

5.3 In case of conflict between this document and the standards / codes referenced herein or other
purchase or contractual requirements, the most stringent requirement shall apply. Apply to the
Custodian Department for guidance or direction.

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DOC. No. QP-PHL-S-001 Rev. 1

6.0 GENERAL PHILOSOPHY

6.0.1 The primary objective of this philosophy is to ensure that the Fire & Safety design of QP
facilities reduces the risk to plant personnel, third parties, the environment, production
revenue and capital investment during operation of the facilities, to as low as reasonably
practicable.

6.0.2 This primary objective shall be assured by utilising a risk based approach to the design of
the facilities, to applying the appropriate Codes and Standards, application of quality
assurance procedures, coupled with Technical Safety reviews; undertaken at key stages
in the design process.

6.0.3 QP facilities handle crude oil, flammable and toxic gas, condensate and natural gas liquids
and formation water. These materials are at pressures ranging from atmospheric to in
excess of 340 bar.

6.0.4 The hydrocarbon fluids contain significant percentages of hydrogen sulphide (H2S) and
the produced water is of high salinity. Therefore minimising corrosion of materials in
contact with the process fluids is to be assured.

6.0.5 The hydrogen sulphide (H2S) concentrations within the produced hydrocarbons are
potentially injurious to the health and safety of personnel. The main hazard being from a
leak in a process system or pipeline. This would result in a toxic or flammable atmosphere
near the leak source, which if inhaled is potentially lethal, or which if ignited would result in
fire or explosion.

6.0.6 Other hazards include the normal occupational dangers associated with industrial plants,
such as trips, falls, hot and cold surfaces, noise, heat radiation, SO2 emissions from flares,
entry into enclosed spaces etc.

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DOC. No. QP-PHL-S-001 Rev. 1

6.0.7 The facility shall be designed to fulfil the Corporation’s safety policy, which is summarised
as follows:
a) Foremost account is taken of the health and safety of its employees, and all other
persons who may be affected directly or indirectly by its activities.
b) The protection of its assets is ensured.
c) Proper regard is given to the conservation of the natural environment and the local
amenities.
d) The design shall recognise the possibility of all hazards involved in the
facility/operation and eliminate/mitigate the resultant risk by identifying and analysing
the risk factors and providing means to eliminate/mitigate these risks.
e) Construction of all facilities shall employ materials which are suitable for the service
and environmental conditions.
f) The potential release of flammable/combustible/toxic hydrocarbon shall be minimised
by appropriate provisions of isolation, process and emergency shutdown and
depressurising equipment for the facilities as per appropriate engineering guides,
Codes and Standards.
g) Elimination or minimising the spread of spills and leaks shall be considered by
provision of the appropriate degree of containment and drainage.
h) The facilities shall be designed with due consideration for the hygienic needs of
personnel. The adequacy and location of buildings must be designed carefully and in
accordance with appropriate Codes and Standards.
i) The facilities design shall cater for protecting operating and maintenance personnel
during normal operations and against contingency situations involved in start-up,
shut-down and emergency control of the facilities.
j) Adequate ventilation shall be provided throughout all areas and spaces to preclude
the accumulation of combustible or toxic vapours.
k) The layout of equipment and process systems shall ensure separation of potential
sources of leak from potential sources of ignition with sufficient means of escape.
The possibility of the event escalating shall also be reduced by appropriately sizing
the plots with adequate separation distance between them.
l) Storage, transfer/lay down areas for materials shall be established as needed in
accordance with appropriate Codes and Standards.

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6.1 PROTECTION AND MITIGATION

6.1.1 The degree of protection required depends on a number of factors which represent the
degree of hazard present, danger to personnel, risk to the installation and environment.
When the risks have been established it is the objective of the safety philosophy to identify
the acceptable level of risks.
6.1.2 Factors which are considered to be important in determining the risk to individuals, assets
and production include:
a) Personnel Safety - Level of manning and distribution
b) Types of communication
c) Means of escape
d) Investment - Magnitude
e) Consequential loss - Loss of production
f) Loss of reserves
g) Probability of fire - Type of equipment
h) Standard of maintenance
i) Location
j) Containment of fire - Location
k) Hydrocarbon inventory

6.1.3 The installation shall be broken down into areas of risk; considering the above factor, they
are –

a) Low risk - Limited probability of hazard occurrence, low loss of investment.

b) High risk - Increased probability of hazard which would be difficult to contain and
would result in danger to personnel and consequently an investment loss.

c) Medium risk - Areas which do not directly fall into the above categories.

6.1.4 Areas of high risk include, fuel and chemical storage areas, fired equipment, gas turbines,
internal combustion engines and compressors.

6.1.5 Areas of medium risk, include all areas of offices, control and telecommunication rooms.

6.1.6 Areas of low risk, normally unmanned areas of low equipment inventory.

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DOC. No. QP-PHL-S-001 Rev. 1

6.2 FLAMMABLE GAS

6.2.1 Gas release can occur in or around an installation as a result of:


a) Operating circumstances.
b) Failures of flanges, fittings, pipelines or equipment.

6.2.2 The ignition of the flammable gas-air mixture can produce fire and/or explosions capable
of causing injury to personnel as well as major structural failure and damage to plant.

6.2.3 The protection philosophy is therefore, to shut in gas sources on the detection of
unacceptable levels and provide facilities to blow down residual pressures. The aim is to
minimise the risk of flammable gas accumulations and potential ignition sources.

6.3 TOXIC GAS

6.3.1 The Threshold Limit Value (TLV) for H2S is 10ppm in air. This figure represents the
maximum allowable concentration for continuous exposure during an 8 hour period. The
maximum allowable Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL) is 15ppm in air. The plant general
alarm shall be initiated on detection of gas concentrations at or above 10ppm.

6.3.2 Hydrogen Sulphide is an extremely toxic gas and concentrations above 500ppm are
potentially fatal. In order to provide an effective protection system to plant personnel in
case of toxic gas release QP’s philosophy is to initiate a general alarm on detection of gas
levels at or above 10ppm. On hearing this alarm, plant personnel are required to use the
breathing apparatus provided and make their way to the designated muster areas.

6.3.3 Wind socks shall be provided at such locations as necessary, to ensure that all plant
personnel who may be at risk from exposure to toxic gas concentrations can readily
identify the wind direction and therefore evacuate the area by the most appropriate route,
cross wind whenever possible.

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6.4 FIRE

6.4.1 The philosophy caters for only one major fire incident at a time on an operational site. Fire
can occur at any location from a variety of fuel sources. The protection philosophy is rapid
detection, elimination of the fuel sources and automatic or manual extinguishing of the fire.

6.4.2 In evaluating potential risk to personnel and property, the characteristics of the materials
being handled, pressures and temperatures, as well as the types of equipment being
used, must be studied with regard to equipment spacing, proximity to other process
facilities, safe mechanical design and types and capacities of fire prevention and fire
protection equipment required.

6.4.3 Passive structural fire proofing, blast walls and thermal barriers to mitigate effects of fire
and explosion shall be utilised where necessary in accordance with approved Codes and
Standards.

6.4.4 Adequate fire fighting equipment and systems shall be provided, in accordance with
appropriate Codes and Standards, to enable quick and effective response to fires; without
exposing personnel to unacceptable levels of hazard.

6.5 SAFETY ANALYSIS / REVIEWS

6.5.1 A number of safety studies and reviews shall be undertaken in order to identify, qualify
and where necessary quantify the risks and establish that design and installed safety
systems provide adequate protection.

6.5.2 The safety studies shall consider single and simultaneous phases of operations such as:-
a) Drilling and Production.
b) Work-over and production.
c) Wireline operations and production.
d) Partial shutdown and maintenance and production.

6.5.3 The safety studies/reviews shall identify possible areas of equipment failure and process
upset and ensure that levels of protection are provided in accordance with appropriate
Codes and Standards. The safety studies/reviews place emphasis on the consequences
of change to operating variables; i.e. of high and low pressure, temperatures, flow rates,
level and leakage both between systems and into the environment. The provision of
protection systems to eliminate or minimise incidents shall be studied to determine their
adequacy.

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6.5.4 Engineering shall undertake Hazops / Safety studies / reviews with representation from
Operations, Maintenance, and Technical Safety.

6.5.5 The aim of the safety studies/reviews is to establish that an adequate level of safety is
achieved against the risk of fire or explosion and other design accident events.

6.5.6 The following safety studies/reviews shall be performed during the following stages of the
project:-

1. Concept Optimisation and Front-end Engineering Design

a) Concept optimisation

i) Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)


The purpose of the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is to identify large scale
potential hazards during the engineering definition of the project.

ii) Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA)


The purpose of the Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) is to identify the extent of
hazards associated with each proposed site location and evaluate the risk levels.
The results of the QRA evaluation shall confirm the site location, plant layout and
safety systems needed for the plant to meet the Corporate Risk Acceptance
Criteria.

b) Feed Phase

i) Preliminary Safety Review (PSR)

The Preliminary Safety Review shall take place during the early stage of feed
when process flow diagrams and layout plot plans are available.

The purpose of the Preliminary Safety Review (PSR) is to carry out a general
review of main aspects of the design and to analyse possible deviations from the
design intention and thereby identify potential hazards which may have significant
impact on cost and/or schedule.

Consequence analyses may be required to support other hazard assessment


work.

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The preliminary Safety Review (PSR) will follow a “what-if” study format, whereby
the review team identify hazards in operating the facility and consider the
necessary safeguards against the identified hazard.

The Preliminary Safety Review (PSR) shall consider the following aspects of the
project design:
• Site location
• Plant layout
• Pipeline layout
• Process design philosophy
• Utilities design philosophy
• Flares, vents and drains design philosophy
• ESD and EBD design philosophy
• Fire and gas detection and protection design philosophy
• Major hazards of plant, pipeline and well operation

c) Completion Of Feed Phase

i) Hazards and Operability Study (HAZOP)


The Hazard And Operability Study (HAZOP) shall be undertaken toward the end
of the Front-end Engineering Design phase once the P&ID’s are ready for
“approved for design” status. The purpose of the Hazard And Operability Study
(HAZOP) is to identify remaining potential hazards or operating concerns that may
occur during operation of the facility.

2. Detail Design Phase


a) Completion Of Detail Design Phase
i) HAZOP
The Hazard And Operability Study (HAZOP) shall be undertaken toward the end
of the Detail Engineering Design phase once the P&ID’s are ready for ‘approved
for construction’ status.
ii) Design Audit

3. Pre-start up
a) Verification Audit

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6.6 HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION


6.6.1 The reasons for classifying the installation into hazardous areas are as follows:
a) To allow for appropriate material / equipment selection.
b) To ensure that sources of ignition are segregated from potential sources of
flammable gas.
c) To assist in the location of clean air inlets for ventilation systems or combustion
equipment.
d) To assist in the location of flammable gas detectors.

6.6.2 The overall design philosophy should be to make the installation as safe as possible by
minimising the sources of release of flammable gas to the atmosphere.

6.6.3 The area classification will be in accordance with the IP Model Code of Safe Practice: Part
15.

6.6.4 The above Code involves classifying the various areas of the installation into zones which
are defined as follows:
Zone 0 : Area in which an explosive gas/air mixture is continuously present or is
present for long periods.
Zone 1 : Area in which an explosive gas/air mixture is likely to occur in normal
operations.
Zone 2 : Area in which an explosive gas/air mixture is not likely to occur in
normal operation and if it occurs it will only exist for a short period.

Non-Hazardous : An area not classified as Zone 0,1, or 2.

6.6.5 The extent of the hazardous zones is defined by the above mentioned code and is
dependent on the source of the hazard, the physical properties of the material released
and the ventilation of the area. These points are discussed below.

6.6.6 The IP Code of Safe Practice grades the sources of release as follows:
a) Continuous : Release is continuous or nearly so.
b) Primary : Release is frequent or occurs at random times and during normal
operations.
c) Secondary : Release is unlikely and if it occurs will be of limited duration. Release
is not more frequent than a few times a year, each with a duration of
less than 2 hours.
6.6.7 The various sources of release are determined from the PFD’s and P&ID’s and their
location on the installation from the equipment layout drawings. Continuous grades of
release giving rise to a Zone 0 area should be eliminated from installations.

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6.6.8 The number of primary sources of hazard should be strictly limited. These are restricted to
continuous or frequent operations and to poorly ventilated areas where gas may
accumulate. The hazards of venting flammable gas must be appreciated and the vent
designed accordingly. The accumulation of pockets of gas should be eliminated by
efficient ventilation whether natural or mechanical.

6.6.9 Secondary sources of release occur infrequently and are typically caused by the failure of
a flanged joint or the infrequent venting of equipment to atmosphere. A fully welded
section of pipeline would not normally be considered to be a source of release. Further
items, which give rise to a secondary source of release, include filter covers and sphere
launcher doors, which are infrequently opened.

6.6.10 The extent of the hazardous area resulting from a source of release is governed by the
physical properties of the material. For most sources (except large vents) the distance is
defined in the IP Code.

6.6.11 A liquid will only give rise to a flammable vapour if it is at a temperature above its flash
point. Fluids with a flash point below 60°C or at a temperature above their flash point are
considered to be hazardous.

6.6.12 Many items of equipment are potential sources of ignition. Electrical systems which could
produce a spark of sufficient energy to ignite the flammable gas must be protected in
accordance with recognised standards such as BS 5345 Part 1. Surface temperatures of
other equipment should be treated in the same way and may be reduced by insulation or
by cooling the contents of the system.

6.6.13 The surface temperature classification of electrical equipment will be no worse than
classification “T3” (BS 5345).

6.6.14 Sparks from the exhausts from combustion equipment may also provide a source of
ignition. These are caused by glowing particles of carbon and to eliminate this problem,
all exhausts are to be taken to the edge of a Non-Hazardous area and extended into this
Non-Hazardous area by minimum of 3 metres.

6.6.15 Other ignition sources may comprise fixed equipment such as fired heaters or mobile
equipment such as plant traffic.

6.6.16 Fired equipment shall be located in non-hazardous areas. Within a hazardous area, the
maximum external surface temperature of equipment and piping systems will be limited to
200°C. Plant roads that are around the perimeter of plots will be in non-hazardous areas
and only authorised traffic will be allowed to enter the plant location.

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6.6.17 Other potential sources of ignition which may be present in hazardous areas during
operations or maintenance, such as welding or gas cutting, will be controlled by the
permit to work system. The plant area will be a “no-smoking” zone, and will be noted as
such by work instructions and by safety signs.

6.6.18 Where non-hazardous areas are located within hazardous areas, airlocks or gas tight,
self-closing doors shall be provided as necessary together with sufficient mechanical
ventilation to achieve a minimum level of pressurisation of 50 Pa above the adjacent
hazardous area.

6.6.19 The HVAC system where provided to maintain pressure differential within the lower
hazard rated area should be capable of ensuring a continuous air flow from the lower
hazard rated area to the higher hazard area when doors are open. This may be achieved
by the provision of a standby system capable of maintaining the required pressure
differential.

6.6.20 Construction of enclosures required to be pressurised should ensure low leakage of


pressurisation air; adequate pipe or cable seals and airtight construction are essential.

6.6.21 Access openings between hazardous and non-hazardous enclosures should be avoided;
where this is not possible the opening should be protected by an airlock or gas tight door.

6.6.22 Access openings into or between Zone I or Zone 2 hazardous areas should be protected
by an appropriate airlock(s) or gas tight door(s). Three alternative situations are possible:
(i) Zone 1 area opening into a Zone 2 area;
(ii) Zone 2 area opening into a non-hazardous area;
(iii) Zone I area opening into a non-hazardous area.

6.6.23 Preference should be given to using an airlock for each of the three alternative situations
referred to above. However, when an airlock is not practicable, gas-tight self-closing doors
may be used for situations (i) and (ii). Situation (iii) should be fitted with a double door
airlock whenever possible, but if this is not practicable the HVAC system provided to
maintain pressure differential should be upgraded from a single fan normally used for
arrangements (i) and (ii), to include two 100% duty fans, one running and one standby.
Controls should automatically start the standby fan on failure of the duty fan or upon
prolonged loss of pressure differential, when both would run simultaneously.

6.6.24 Where practicable doors should be positioned so that they do not face a source of hazard.

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6.6.25 The area of lower hazard rating should be maintained at a minimum pressure differential
of 50 Pa above that of the connected higher hazard rated area.

6.6.26 Loss of pressure differential should initiate an audible/visual alarm at a normally manned
station after a suitable delay period not exceeding 30 seconds.

6.6.27 Loss of pressure differential in a non-hazardous space, coincident with the detection of
gas at any location, should initiate automatic disconnection and de-energising of all
electrical equipment that is not certified for operation in a hazardous atmosphere.

6.6.28 All electric equipment located within an airlock should be certified as suitable for use in a
hazardous area of equal or greater hazard rating than that external to the airlock.

6.6.29 Hinged doors for normal access between hazardous and non-hazardous areas should
open into the non-hazardous area: emergency hinged doors should open in the direction
of escape. The exception to this guidance is sliding doors when fitted.

6.6.30 By design, the following areas shall be defined as “non-hazardous” by location:

a) Control rooms.
b) Living quarters / offices.
c) UPS Switch room/instrumentation/electrical equipment rooms.
d) Telecommunications equipment room.
e) Fire pump rooms.
f) Emergency power generation areas.

6.6.31 Battery rooms; Special considerations shall apply owing to battery venting and possible H2
generation. If mechanical pressurisation is adopted then the room should be negatively
pressurised with respect to adjoining non-hazardous areas but positively pressurised with
respect to the external environment.

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6.6.32 All field equipment that may be required to operate under emergency conditions shall be
suitable for use within a Zone 1 area. This equipment includes all items from the following
list :-

a) Emergency shutdown system.


b) Fire and gas detection system
c) Fire protection system.
d) Emergency lighting.
e) General alarm and emergency communication system(s).

6.6.33 During the course of area classification, particular attention shall be given to the following:-

a) Fuel lines in non-hazardous areas.


b) Chemical storage.
c) Battery storage.
d) Isolated flanges on hydrocarbon lines.
e) Ventilation and pressurisation.
f) Active or partially active MUD systems.
g) Open tanks and containers.
h) Glands of pumps.
i) Sample points.
j) Process vents.

6.6.34 Electrical equipment installed in a hazardous area shall be certified for use in the
appropriate zone classification and comply with the requirement of BS 5345 part 1.

6.6.35 The equipment shall be certified with a minimum temperature classification of T3 (200°C)
maximum surface temperature) due to the presence of predominantly methane gas.

6.6.36 The electrical equipment shall be classified for use in the presence of group IIA gases.

6.6.37 Inherent non-sparking motors cannot be assumed to be safe for use within a hazardous
area, this also applies to equipment which operates at less than 3.3KV. In the event that
Ex ‘e’, ‘n’, or ‘p’ classified equipment is utilised then safety precautions will be required
prior to energising.

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6.6.38 Any electrical field equipment that is required to operate under emergency conditions shall
be Ex’d’ rated as a minimum; irrespective of hazardous area classification.

6.6.39 All mechanical equipment installed in hazardous areas shall be manufactured to ensure
that rotating parts are non sparking and adequately protected against the generation of a
static charge. Surface temperatures shall not exceed 200°C.

6.6.40 Should pressurisation be lost, an alarm shall annunciate in the Control Rooms. If gas is
simultaneously detected on the platform then executive action (electrical isolation) shall be
taken.

6.6.41 In enclosed or semi-enclosed hazardous areas a minimum of 12 air changes per hour
shall be provided either from natural or mechanical ventilation. Special attention shall be
paid to void areas formed by overhead structural beams. In naturally ventilated or
sheltered areas additional mechanical ventilation may be necessary to achieve adequate
ventilation.

6.6.42 The air intakes for combustion engines, air compressors and the ventilation systems shall
be located in non-hazardous areas and as remote from the process areas and other
sources of gas release as practical.

6.6.43 The air exhausts from non-hazardous areas and combustion engines shall be terminated
in non-hazardous areas at a minimum of 4.5m from the air intakes to avoid cross flow
between extract and intake. All combustion exhausts shall be fitted with a spark arrestor.

6.6.44 Hazardous area classification drawings showing the plan view and elevations shall be
prepared and include the following information:-

a) Identification of sources of release.


b) All ventilation inlets and outlets.
c) Air intakes and exhausts of all internal combustion machinery.
d) Location of all equipment units.
e) Points of air transfer from Modules which may affect classification, sealing gaps on
external module walls.
f) Tank or process vents.
g) The classification and extent of all hazardous zones.
h) Ventilation type.

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6.6.45 A hazardous area schedule shall be produced identifying as a minimum; the source of
emission, the process material its operating conditions and flash point, containment
category and fluid category, hazardous area boundary dimensions from source, source of
release grading and zone reference number.

6.7 PLANT LAYOUT

6.7.1 QP plants handle hydrocarbon vapours and liquids such as flammable and toxic gas,
NGL, LNG Crude oil etc. which if ignited following a release, have the potential to cause a
major fire or explosion. It is essential that the plant layout is configured to minimise the
possibility of an undesired event occurring. Careful attention to equipment location
improves the safety, accessibility and efficiency of a plant.

6.7.2 The first approach to layout is to grade each system according to the nature of the hazard
and then categorise the systems of similar grading as follows:
a) Systems which have the potential to emit flammable materials.
b) Systems which may emit toxic gases.
c) Systems which must be located in a Non-Hazardous area.
d) Systems which are considered safe.

6.7.3 The layout of the plant or installation shall be developed to achieve the following safety
features:-

a) Maximum separation between flammable hydrocarbons and ignition sources.


b) Maximum separation between hydrocarbon and hazardous material handling areas
and emergency services, main safety equipment, accommodation areas and means
of escape.
c) Sufficient means of escape to enable efficient and protected evacuation from all
areas to designated muster and abandonment stations, under a hazard condition.
d) Maximum availability of essential services and the main safety equipment under all
foreseeable hazardous conditions.
e) Minimal risk to third parties.
f) Minimal risk of fire spread between plots, so that a fire or other emergency will be
contained in the plot of origin. This will also allow for the safe and effective isolation
of a unit from its operating neighbours when shut down for maintenance. Division
into plots will also optimise on the need for fire protection systems because the
possibility of fire spread is less.
g) Separation between hazardous and non-hazardous areas, for hazardous area
classification purposes and control of potential ignition sources.
h) Appropriate and safe access for construction, operations and maintenance.

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i) Adequate access during emergency for means of escape, for emergency vehicles
and for fire fighting.
j) The location of roads that carry general traffic in non-hazardous areas, so that
vehicles are unlikely to ignite a potential hydrocarbon leak.
k) Fencing requirements and control of visitors.

6.7.4 Consideration shall be given to drainage from all areas taking into account the firewater
discharge rates that would be encountered.

6.7.5 Large vessels may contain high inventories of flammable material which pose a hazard to
the plant. Where possible, the capacity shall be minimised and the vessels segregated
from Non-Hazardous areas.

6.7.6 Consideration shall be given to the location and height of flares and cold vent stacks which
discharge flammable and toxic hydrocarbon materials and combustion products to the
atmosphere.

6.7.7 Arrangement of flares, vents, drains and exhausts shall be in accordance with QP’s
environmental standards.

6.7.8 The separation distances for offshore plant layout shall be determined on a case by case
basis and in accordance with the relevant Codes and Standards.

6.7.9 The installation shall be orientated as far as is practicable to ensure that:


a) Prevailing winds direct any fire, smoke and/or escaping hydrocarbon gas/vapour
clouds away from the installation generally and the accommodation/ temporary
refuge in particular.
b) Support vessels can operate adequately in an emergency.
c) Helicopter approach flight paths conform to the regulations and are free of
interference from cranes, flare tower, drilling derrick, and hazardous vents.
d) Stationing/mooring of supply boats, and the launching of survival crafts has the
lowest possible risk of collision with any part of the installations.

6.7.10 It is normal for an offshore installation to be designed to withstand extreme 100-year


environmental conditions such as wind, current and waves, air and sea temperature
extremes, seabed characteristics and marine growth.

6.7.11 The structure should be designed to withstand all foreseeable combinations of forces
arising from environmentally imposed forces, helicopter landing and take-off, erection,
alteration, dismantling and removal of secondary structure or equipment.

6.7.12 Any structures located in the wave/splash zone should be capable of withstanding the
forces imposed by wave impact.

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6.7.13 The minimum jacket impact absorption criteria should be not less than 4 MJ.

6.7.14 Preference should be given to the use of inherently corrosion resistant material. Any
material not inherently corrosion resistant or adequately protected should be of sufficient
mass to allow for corrosion losses during the service life of the installation. Noting that a
Service life of 30 years is a quite normal requirement for both the structure and topsides
equipment.

6.7.15 The use of aluminium or aluminium alloys should be restricted; particularly in hazardous
areas due to the possibility of generation of incendive sparks.

6.7.16 Where the use of aluminium is unavoidable the material may be allowed following
approval from the Materials and Loss Prevention engineers. Where zinc is used in
proximity to stainless steels there is a risk of metal embrittlement and in such cases
precautions must be taken to protect against the surface of the stainless steel from contact
with flaking or molten zinc.

6.7.17 Onshore Plant Minimum Separation Distances


Factor Minimum Separation
(metres)
Between process equipment and piping systems and edge of plant 7.5
road.

Between process equipment and piping systems and fired heater 15.0

Between process equipment and piping systems and control room 100.0

Between process equipment and piping system and normally 250.0


manned utility buildings such as workshop , office, laboratory and
gate house.

Between process equipment and piping system and unmanned 30.0


electrical utilities such as substations, transformers.

Between process equipment and piping system and boundary fence 30.0

Between two main process units on the same plot 20.0

Between air cooled heat exchangers and fired heaters (to minimise 20.0
the possibility of circulation of hot air).

Notes: Other than all welded pipe work.

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6.7.18 Separation distances for vents and flares need to be calculated, using Internationally
accepted and validated methodology, when the vent and flare flow rates are known.

6.7.19 Separation distance from any bulk storage of hydrocarbon material shall be in accordance
with IP3 and IP19.

6.7.20 Separation distance from any open separator ponds (if there are any) needs to be
calculated.

6.7.21 Dedicated access ways within each plant unit will be provided for operations, escape and
fire fighting. These access ways will run to the plant roads.

6.7.22 Roads and access ways will be arranged so as to avoid 'dead ends'. To allow for the
possibility of one road or access way being blocked e.g. by an accident, there will
generally be at least two separate routes to any location on the site.

6.7.23 The site will itself be accessed by a 'normal' and an 'emergency' road.

6.7.24 Roads will as far as practicable be located in non-hazardous areas so that vehicles are
unlikely to be a source of ignition.

6.7.25 The minimum width of roads will allow for access by plant vehicles such as cranes, and
emergency vehicles such as fire tenders. The width of major roads will allow two vehicles
to pass each other. The minimum width of access ways and roads will be as follows:
- Major roads around each plot 6.0 m
- All other roads 4.0 m
- Pedestrian access within plot limits 1.0 m
- Stairways on tanks 750 mm
- Pedestrian access receiving traffic from two or more routes 1.2 m
- Maintenance access around individual items of equipment 1.0 m

6.7.26 The required headroom over the full width of roads will be 5.5 metres minimum to allow
the passage of emergency vehicles, cranes and other tall vehicles.

6.7.27 All areas of the plant, where emergency vehicles may require access, shall be provided
with roadways of 6 metres width. This is to permit two large vehicles to pass each other in
safety and to deploy to affected areas.

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6.7.28 There will be two means of escape to safety from any normal working area of the site,
except for small platforms or rooms where the distance of a single means of escape is
less than 5 m nominal.

6.7.29 Emergency entrances/exits will be located in perimeter fencing as needed to ensure the
minimum two routes to safety. Consideration will be given to the escape requirements
from any platforms on the process columns.

6.7.30 Escape routes will be directed away from possible hazards and will terminate at a
designated muster area that will be in a safe location by the site entrance.

6.7.31 Where practical, 2 or more means of escape from raised platforms shall be provided.
Interconnections between overhead platforms shall be provided where reasonable.

6.7.32 Escape route philosophy for buildings shall be in accordance with BS 5588 part 3.

6.7.33 Tank bund walls shall be provided with steps cast into the walls at pre-determined
intervals.

7.0 FIRE & GAS DETECTION SYSTEMS

7.1 To ensure that an acceptable level of safety is achieved the protection of personnel, the
plant and the environment from the effects of toxic gas, fire and explosion is a prime
objective.

7.2 The basic requirements of the fire and gas detection systems are as follows:
a) Rapid detection of the undesired event; toxic or flammable gas release and fire.
b) On confirmed detection, simultaneously:
I. Raise Alarm
II. Isolate the source of fuel/gas
III. Isolate sources of ignition
IV. Exclude air where possible
V. Apply extinguishant where appropriate
VI. Protect adjacent equipment to prevent escalation of the incident

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7.3 ESSENTIAL FEATURES:

7.3.1 All field equipment associated with fire and gas detection/control shall be suitable for
operation within a Zone 1 hazardous area and the environmental conditions prevailing.

7.3.2 All components shall be accessible for maintenance and testing without disruption to
routine operation of the plant, interruption of overall protection monitoring or undue
degradation of the system. (including sensors, through logic and annunciation to
activation).

7.3.3 Upon detection of an alarm condition, suitable audible and visual alarms shall be initiated
at the Fire and Gas panel.

7.3.4 Identify the type and location of the detection device activated at the main fire and gas
panel and at any other defined control point or repeater station.

7.3.5 Visual alarms at the alarm panel and any annunciation panels shall meet the approved
colour coding as identified below.

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7.3.6 Video display colours adopted in QP Status Display Systems

GRAPHIC ELEMENT ASSOCIATED COLOURS


Any Inhibit Brown
Any Fault White
Any Fire Alarm Red
Flammable Gas Symbol Magenta
High Alarm(1ooN) Alarm lists will be White Text on Magenta
background
Flammable Gas Border turns Magenta.
High Alarm (2ooN) (Confirmed gas) Alarm lists will be Black Text on Magenta
background.
Flammable Gas symbol Orange.
Low Alarm (1ooN) Alarm lists will be white text on orange
background.
Flammable gas Border turns orange.
Low alarm (2ooN) (Confirmed Gas) Alarm lists will be black text on orange
background.
Toxic gas alarm symbol(1ooN) Yellow.
Alarm lists will be white text on yellow
background.
Toxic gas (2ooN) Border turns yellow.
Alarm lists will be black text on yellow
background.
Detector Tag nos. Normal condition Light Grey
System Status Area/Zone identifiers Green
Symbols Normal condition Black
Graphic display Back cloth Black
General symbols Dark grey
Graphic titles, page numbers, etc.. Green text
System date and time Cyan text.

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7.3.7 All information from sub-systems shall be available to the operator in the master Central
Control Room (CCR). Any sub-system providing information at other plant locations shall
be for indication only. Thus while the master Central Control Room maintains the control
functions, slave information systems on the same plant provide information only with no
executive control features on associated distributed plants (e.g. gas distribution system)
with designated secondary control centres, control facilities may be enabled either by
cascade or password control.

7.3.8 QP ES.F.06 document Human Machine Interface (HMI) for control systems shall be used
as the Corporate Guide for:

a) Construction and hierarchy of graphics


b) Definition and operation of major graphics
c) Adopted colour representations
d) Alarm processing and reporting
e) Matrix and Mimic panels including indications and controls.

7.3.9 The system shall be self-monitoring to detect faults that may affect the operation of the
system. Detection of a fault shall register an appropriate signal at the alarm panel and any
annunciation panels or system displays.

7.3.10 Signals from the fire and gas detection system may be used to initiate operation of fire
fighting equipment or systems, and initiate plant shutdown and blowdown systems.

7.3.11 The alarm system shall be supplied power from the essential power supply and shall
include battery backup with a dedicated battery charger. The back-up battery capacity
shall not be less than 60 minutes maximum load.

7.3.12 The fire and gas system shall be based on the provision of suitable field detector devices,
which alarm to the fire and gas control panel.

7.3.13 The fire and gas detection system shall be physically arranged so that a single failure in it
is unlikely to cause critical impairment of the system’s safety function.

7.3.14 Cables to field detectors shall be fire resistant to IEC 331.

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7.3.15 Detection modes that are arranged to cause plant shutdown shall be generally on a two
out of N voting arrangement to reduce the possibility of spurious shutdowns; where N is a
minimum of three detectors. A revealed fault condition shall be arranged to vote as an
alarm condition. However, any one pneumatic detection system will each operate as a
single loop.
7.3.16 Field detector types shall be selected on the basis of:
a) Which type gives the earliest detection of the event.
b) Freedom from spurious operation
c) Suitability for the ambient environmental conditions
d) An optimum design and limitation of the number of detectors
e) Proven operation in similar situations
f) Inherent reliability
g) Low maintenance requirements

7.4 FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTION

7.4.1 All areas containing potential sources of gas emission shall be monitored for ambient
flammable gas.

7.4.2 Within plant areas the gas detectors will be arranged so that detection is based on a
nominal 5 metre two-dimensional staggered matrix. This dimension is based on
consideration by QP that at least three detectors are within the detectable range of a gas
release within a plant area. Detailed detector locations will be based on relative buoyancy
of the gas or vapour to be detected.

7.4.3 The detector alarm settings will be:


1. Point type :
a) 20% LEL (low level alarm) and 50% LEL (high level alarm) of methane in air.
b) Areas where flammable gas has been excluded under normal operating
conditions; 10% LEL (low level alarm) and 20% LEL (low level alarm) of methane.
c) Ventilation air intakes to gas turbine enclosures; 15% LEL (low level alarm) and
25% LEL (high level alarm).

2. Beam type :
a) 1 LEL metre (low level alarm) and 2.5 LEL metres (high level alarm).

Note: Executive control action shall be taken on confirmed high level alarm.

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7.5 TOXIC GAS DETECTION

7.5.1 On plants producing, treating or using hydrocarbons contain toxic gas, a fixed automatic
toxic gas detection system shall be provided. The system will monitor those parts of the
plant where a toxic gas (H2S) hazard may arise. On detection a general alarm shall be
raised and plant control room personnel automatically alerted to the existence and location
of the condition. Detector locations shall be determined by means of case by case
examination of the plant layout and may be placed either peripherally around the plot, at
suitable intervals or placed to cover areas with a leak potential, or both.

7.5.2 Activation of one detector at 10 PPM will raise an alarm. Further executive actions (if
needed) shall be detailed in the project specific philosophy and identified on the plant
cause and effect chart.

7.6 FIRE DETECTION

7.6.1 Fires within the hydrocarbon plants predominantly involve:


• Leaking hydrocarbon material; from a failure of the process equipment
or
• Electrical and instrument equipment and cabling such as that contained in the
switch room or local equipment room
or
• Other combustible material such as paper, rag, lubricating oil and grease that may
be contained in a workshop or materials store.

7.6.2 Detector types shall be selected to detect the predominant characteristics of the fire
behaviour, and shall be provided in sufficient numbers and suitably located to provide
effective monitoring.

7.6.3 Due consideration shall be given to the specification and design of fire detection systems
to minimise the incidence of false or spurious alarms.
7.6.4 Fire detector selection shall be from the following types: Depending upon the area being
protected: -

Smoke detection - Ionisation, Optical and Air sampling


Heat detection - Pneumatic (Frangible bulb / fusible plug / fusible tube)
- Electrical (Rate of Rise / Rate Compensated / Fixed temp.)
Flame detection - I.R.
Gas Detection - I.R. point / I.R. Open path

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7.7 SMOKE DETECTION

7.7.1 Smoke detectors sense combustion products and should be used within enclosed spaces
that are not subject to extremes of temperature, humidity, dust or wind.

7.7.2 Detection is achieved in the smouldering stage before flames and high temperature
occurs. Areas of selection include accommodation, ceiling void spaces, auxiliary and
switch gear rooms with false floors and ceilings, where high density of electrical cables are
installed.

7.7.3 Where detection is required in false floors and ceilings, remote indicating lamps shall be
provided.

7.7.4 Detection in areas of electrical risk, where historically gaseous fire protection systems have
been employed, and detection in not normally manned buildings on remote not normally
manned plants shall be by high sensitivity smoke detection system (HSSD) which is likely
to give an alarm of a fire at an early stage.

7.7.5 Consideration should also be given to using HSSD systems in not normally manned
buildings on manned plants; where the risk and consequential loss deems it appropriate.

7.7.6 Point type, optical smoke detectors may only be used in accommodation type risk areas
where there is minimal air movement.

7.7.7 Point type, ionisation smoke detectors may be installed, if the Authority having jurisdiction,
permits their use in any appropriate enclosed space that does not require to be provided
with an HSSD system.

7.8 HEAT and FLAME DETECTION

7.8.1 Heat detection shall be used when it is not practical to utilise smoke detection i.e. high
temperature, high humidity, dust etc.

7.8.2 In areas protected by sprinkler or deluge system fusible plugs or frangible quartzoid will
generally be chosen for heat detection/activation with the system being designed in
accordance with NFPA Code 15. In certain areas protected such as floating tank roofs,
plastic tube may be considered as an option.

7.8.3 In open areas, such as process area, fires may show heat radiation and flames. Therefore
appropriate detector types shall be selected using a case by case examination of the plant
equipment and plant layout. This will be detailed in the specific plant project.

Note : Operating efficiency of the detection system shall remain at a maximum at all times.
Prevailing environmental conditions shall be taken into account in establishing the
locations of detectors with attention paid to detrimental vibration effects and moist salt-

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laden air. The detectors shall be protected against accidental damage or tampering where
necessary.
7.9 MANUAL ALARM CALL POINTS
7.9.1 Onshore plants shall be provided with a manual alarm call point system throughout the
plant area. At the entry / exit points to buildings and along escape routes such that the
distance from any part of the process or utilities plant areas to the nearest call point shall
not exceed 30 metres.

7.9.2 Offshore plants shall be provided with a manual emergency alarm call point system
throughout the plant area and at the entry / exit points, at bridge access points and
stairways.

7.9.3 Call points shall be of the lift flap “break-glass” double action type.

7.9.4 Manual alarm call points shall activate audible and visual alarms on the central and local
fire and gas panels, start the firewater pumps and operate the general plant alarm and
plant status lights.

7.10 PRE-DISCHARGE AUDIBLE ALARMS


Enclosed areas protected by fixed gaseous fire protection shall be provided with a pre-
discharge alarm within the protected space, operating in conjunction with the status light.
This is to warn personnel of the imminent discharge of gaseous extinguishant into the
area. Duration of the alarm shall be 30 seconds.

7.11 EXECUTIVE ACTION

7.11.1 Executive action of the fire and gas systems shall be determined on a case by case basis
and shall be detailed in the cause and effect of the specific project. However, in general,
the executive action philosophy is as outlined below.

7.11.2 The fire and gas detection system shall automatically initiate executive actions as follows:
a) FIRE DETECTED
Air sampling type high sensitivity smoke detection
Fire detected (level 1) ALERT 1
• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate local panel alarm

Fire detected (level 2) ALERT 2


• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate local panel alarm
• Additional general alarm

Fire detected (level 3) FIRE 1


• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate local panel alarm
• Additional general alarm
• Fire pump start ( where applicable)
• Alarm to fire station /security office
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Fire detected (level 4) FIRE 2


• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate local panel alarm
• Additional general alarm
• Fire pump start ( where applicable)
• Alarm to fire station /security office
• Shutdown ventillation
• Close dampers

Operation of a single point type smoke detector:


Because of the sensitivity of point type smoke detectors and the potential for false
alarms, activation of a single detector shall:-
• Alarm to Control Room
• Start fire pumps
• Initiate local alarm

Operation of two point type smoke detectors.


• Alarm to Control Room
• Start fire pumps
• Initiate local alarm
• Initiate plant General Alarm
• Isolate power supply to affected area
• Shutdown ventilation system to affected area
• Close fire dampers if provided
• Release fixed extinguishing system (if provided)
• Initiate appropriate shutdown actions

Operation of a single flame detector or electrical heat detector:


• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate plant General Alarm
• Start duty firewater pump

Operation of two flame or two electrical heat detectors:


• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate plant general alarm
• Shutdown ventilation system
• Close fire dampers (if provided)
• Start fire pumps
• Initiate the shutdown and blowdown systems
• Release fixed extinguishing system
• Initiate appropriate shutdown actions

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Operation of a single non-electrical heat detector


• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate Plant General Alarm
• Start fire pumps
• Close fire dampers (if provided)
• Initiate ESD and blowdown systems
• Release fixed extinguishing system

Operation of any two electrical heat detectors in a gas turbine enclosure:


• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate Plant General Alarm
• Shutdown affected unit and isolate its fuel supply
• Shutdown affected units ventilation system
• Release extinguishment agent
• Start firewater pumps

b) FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTED


One flammable gas detector “alert” level.
• Alarm to Control Room

Two or more detectors, in an array of three or


more, reaching “alert” level.
• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate Plant General Alarm

One flammable gas detector reaching “danger” level.


• Alarm to Control Room

Two or more detectors, in an array of three or more,


reaching “danger” level.
• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate Plant General Alarm
• Start duty firewater pump
• Initiate ESD and blowdown
• Shutdown all building ventilation and fire dampers

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c) TOXIC GAS DETECTED


Any one Toxic Gas detector in an array reaching the
occupational exposure level of the gas concerned.

• Alarm in Control Room

Two or more Toxic Gas detectors in array reaching the occupational


exposure level.

• Alarm to Control Room


• Initiate the Plant General Alarm.
• Shutdown all ventilation fans at buildings and switch rooms
• Close air intake dampers for all manned buildings.

d) OPERATION OF MANUAL ALARM CALL POINT


• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate Plant General Alarm
• Start duty firewater pump

e) TOTAL PLANT S/D PUSHBUTTONS


• Alarm to Control Room
• Initiate Plant General Alarm
• Initiate shutdown and blowdown systems
• Stop power generation systems
• Start diesel firewater pump(s)

8.0 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT

8.1 FIRE AND EXPLOSION PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY


8.1.1 The plant shall be arranged in such a way that it will minimise the probability of Fire or
Explosion by containing the hydrocarbon fluids in properly designed and constructed
process systems.

8.1.2 Design and operation of the plant shall seek to control potential ignition sources by
hazardous area classification.

8.1.3 The layout of the plant shall be designed to reduce the impact of the incident, should an
ignited leak occur, by providing suitable separation between equipment. Plant
depressurisation and site drainage shall be arranged to respectively safely reduce gas
pressure and remove leaking fluids. However, fire protection systems shall be needed to
extinguish a fire situation, and to cool plant structure and equipment that may be exposed
to radiant heat.

8.1.4 The fire protection systems shall be a combination of firewater-based systems, gaseous
fire protection systems and passive fire protection; as appropriate to each location.
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8.1.5 The general philosophy for fire fighting on Offshore installations is that any potential fire
shall be contained by the automatic protection systems provided, except in certain defined
areas such as Control Rooms where intervention of the plant personnel will be required.

8.1.6 The general philosophy for fire fighting on Onshore installations is that any major fire shall
initially be contained by protection system provided, followed by intervention of the fire
brigade. For minor fire situations, plant personnel shall be required to initiate a first attack
using portable extinguishers and/or hose reels.

8.2 FIRE ZONES

8.2.1 The design of the fire and safety systems for Onshore Installations shall be based on the
division of the site into fire zones. A fire zone is defined as a given risk area which is
geographically segregated from any adjacent hazards.

8.2.2 Large process areas may be subdivided into a number of fire zones, each of which can be
process isolated from others that have definable physical separation or geographical limits.

8.2.3 These fire zones will be sub-divided into fire areas or sub-zones, to assist in the design
and installation of fire protection systems. This is to prevent excessive demands for
firewater and to more precisely define location of emergencies.

8.2.4 As the project design develops, these requirements shall be continuously reviewed to
ensure correct and safe fire engineering.

8.2.5 The design of the fire protection systems assumes that only one major incident occurs at
any one time. To prevent incidents escalating beyond the capacity of the extinguishing
systems, installations should be segregated into fire zones.

8.2.6 DESIGNATION OF AREA.

a) A major benefit lies in the development of a co-ordinated approach to fire protection


and detection on a modular basis. To assist in this approach, modular construction
of an installation or plant lends itself to be subdivided into modules, compartments
and packages, each of these subdivisions is then defined as a fire area.

b) This method of fire area designation assists in the design and construction phases of
the development as it easily allows the allocation of loss prevention systems,
equipment and documentation.

c) In general, a fire area is provided with a fire and gas detection/protection system.
Where a ceiling or a floor void exists it shall, unless physically separated by a fire
rated division, be considered as part of the fire area.

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8.3 PASSIVE PROTECTION

8.3.1 Sufficient structural protection should be provided in the form of passive fire protection and
blast protection to minimise the effect of a hazard and prevent escalation that may lead to
progressive collapse.

8.3.2 The thickness of passive protection material applied should be sufficient to prevent the
core temperature of steel members from exceeding 400 0C for the specified time or the
temperature at which the yield strength is reduced to 50% of its normal operating value

8.3.3 Where structural collapse due to fire would have major consequences to a plant then the
load-bearing structures shall be passively fire protected. (E.g. vessels containing large
inventories of hydrocarbons, pipe supports for hydrocarbon and firewater ring main
pipework, drilling derrick, flare / vent towers etc.)

8.3.4 All critical structural steel members on an offshore installation shall be passively protected
to maintain structural integrity of the installation when subject to a hydrocarbon fire for a
specified period. The period to be determined by means of a fire risk assessment of the
subject plant.

8.3.5 Fireproofing of structural steel shall be accomplished using acceptable and proven
products.

8.3.6 API RP 2218 “Fire proofing practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical plants” shall be used
as a guide for the design of the passive protection.

8.3.7 FIRE / BLAST DIVISIONS

Provision of Fire / blast divisions shall be considered for separation and fire containment
within an area. The divisions shall inhibit an event in one area from readily escalating to
another. The divisions shall be of a construction certified to provide the fire / blast rating
specified.

8.3.8 ONSHORE BUILDINGS

Onshore buildings shall be constructed of non-combustible materials so that the


propagation of flame through the building structure is minimal. The control room, local
equipment room and electrical switch room shall have fire resistant external walls and
roofs, which will remain fire, smoke and gas tight for one hour when tested to BS 476 “Fire
tests on building materials and structures”.

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8.3.9 OFFSHORE BUILDINGS

a) All external boundaries of the Temporary Refuge shall be H120 rated unless safety
studies can demonstrate that a lesser rating would provide adequate protection.
However, the roof area of the TR shall be H120 rated. The lower deck of the TR shall
be H120 rated, this is to protect the TR against fire on the sea.

b) The emergency/UPS room, the emergency generator room and the battery room
shall be individually segregated from adjacent internal areas by A60 fire rated
divisions.

c) The diesel fire pump rooms shall be A60 rated on all boundaries except the seaward
facing wall and deck. These faces shall be rated H120 to provide protection against
fire on the sea.

d) The switch rooms and workshops shall be A60 rated. If rooms separated from each
other, A60 division shall be provided.

e) HVAC plant room shall be HO rated on all four sides and the underside.

f) The fire proofing needs for critical electrical and instrumentation runs shall be
evaluated on a case by case basis and as the needs are developed. If the runs are
to survive a fire, then the fire proofing shall be for 1 hour. If they are to remain intact
long enough to allow shutdown and blowdown, then the fire proofing shall be for 15
minutes.

8.4 EXPLOSION CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

8.4.1. The primary means of protection against a flammable gas or vapour-air explosion shall be
to locate the plant equipment so that natural ventilation provides dispersion of a potential
hydrocarbon leak before it ignites. In general, no plant shall be in an enclosure unless
adequate or dilution ventilation is provided

8.4.2. The plant layout shall reduce potential explosion over-pressure is by reducing plant
congestion and over-pressure generating turbulence within the expanding flame front. Any
equipment under a canopy will be open-sided for ventilation and explosion venting.

8.4.3. However, a flammable gas/air explosion may still occur and a risk analysis study to
calculate the maximum potential blast over-pressure must be conducted. The calculated
over-pressures shall be used as a primary element in the site selection for buildings.

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8.5 CONTROL ROOM

8.5.1 The functional integrity of a Control Room needs to be assured so that emergency action
can be undertaken after the occurrence of an explosion event. Hence Control Rooms
shall, where practicable, be located outside areas of over-pressure blast effect. If this is
not possible then Control room structures shall be made explosion resistant to withstand
the calculated over-pressure level.

8.5.2 The Chemical Industries Association publication - ‘Process Plant Hazard and Control
Building Design - An approach to categorisation’ may be used as a guide for design and
engineering of control buildings.

8.5.3 LOCAL EQUIPMENT ROOM


Fire and Gas and ESD systems shall be designed as “Fail Safe” and damage to the
equipment within the local equipment room is unlikely to impair its ability to trip plant
shutdown. Although there is no requirement to maintain local equipment room function if
there is an explosion, the LER may be occasionally manned and since it is normally within
the process plot the LER shall have a nominal explosion resistance to preclude its rapid
catastrophic collapse.

8.5.4 OTHER BUILDINGS


No specific blast resistance is required, as other manned buildings shall be located
outside the calculated range of an explosion that may cause severe building damage or if
they are unmanned and do not contain equipment with critical safety function.

8.6 ACTIVE PROTECTION


8.6.1 FIREWATER SYSTEM

a) The plant shall be provided with firewater systems and fixed, mobile and portable fire
fighting equipment in accordance with the relevant design Codes.

b) The firewater requirement for fire protection shall be based on the amount of water
which is necessary to control and to possibly extinguish, the largest single credible
fire event while also providing cooling to adjacent equipment exposed to the effects
of such a fire.

c) For Offshore installations the quantity of water shall be sufficient for the largest single
fire area including fixed water sprays plus simultaneous use of two jets of water
supplied by monitors and/or hose lines.

d) The firewater pressure shall be sufficient to satisfy the pressure requirements of the
most hydraulically remote water spray system, monitor or hose reel.

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8.6.2 FIREWATER PUMPS

a) The firewater pumps shall be considered to be the total system necessary to supply
water to the firewater distribution system.

b) Firewater pumps shall comply with capacity and generated head requirements of
NFPA 20.

c) The firewater pumps shall be directly connected to the firewater distribution system.

d) Each firewater pump shall be located as to minimise the possibility of damage in the
event of fire.

e) Automatic start of Firewater pumps shall be initiated by:


• Low ring main pressure
• Confirmed fire detection
• Confirmed gas detection
• Initiation of call point
• Initiation of ESD-1 switch
• Deluge/sprinkler valve discharge.

With provision to start the pumps manually from:


• Control room
• Local fire pump panel

Firewater pump stop shall be manual from


• Local fire pump panel

f) Confirmed gas detection in a fire pump room shall inhibit start of that pump but shall
not stop the pump if its is already running.

g) Diesel drivers shall have over-speed trip.

h) For Onshore Installations, one electric driven and one diesel engine driven fire pump,
each rated at 100% of firewater demand at the duty pressure shall be provided. The
fire pumps shall be situated in a non-hazardous area and be remote enough from
each other such that both pumps will not be impaired by a single event.

i) For Offshore installations three firewater pumps, each 100% of the firewater demand
at the duty pressure or four 50% units shall be required as a minimum. In addition a
duty electric jockey pump shall be provided to preserve the pressure in the fire main.

j) One electric driven and one diesel engine driven fire pump plus the electric jockey
pump shall be located in a non-hazardous area and a second diesel engine driven
fire pump shall be located on a separate platform.

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8.6.3 FIREWATER RING MAIN

a) Firewater ring mains of the required capacity and suitable material shall be laid to
surround all units bounded by service roads (Onshore) or walkways (Offshore) such
as:

1) Process units
2) Storage facilities for flammable material
3) Loading facilities
4) Bottle filling plants
5) Warehouses, workshops, utilities, laboratories, offices
6) Living quarters

b) Block valves with lock-open facilities shall be suitably located within the firewater
system to permit sections of the main to be isolated during emergencies or for
inspection and repair. Further valves shall allow similar isolation on spray, monitor
and hydrant take-offs. Provision shall be made to enable the firewater ring main to
be supplied with firewater from 2 supply sources.

c) The firewater mains network pipe sizes shall be suitable for the design flow while not
exceeding the piping material’s velocity limitations based on intermittent use. The
fire-water ring main pressure shall be such that under fire conditions a pressure of 10
barg. shall exist at the most remote location under the corresponding design flow
conditions.

d) The ring main network system shall be normally flooded and pressurised to between
2 and 3.5 barg by means of one of the following:
• jockey pump.
• connection to the cooling water supply system or the service water system.
• static head from water storage tank.

8.6.4 WATER SPRAY SYSTEMS

a) Requirements for automatic deluge water spray systems shall be detailed in the
specific plant fire & safety philosophy.

b) However, the design, water spray density and water application rates shall be in
accordance with NFPA 15 water spray fixed systems, and IP 19 “Fire precautions at
petroleum refineries”

8.6.5 HYDRANTS

Firewater mains shall be provided with permanent hydrants, located in strategic positions.
Number of hydrant outlets, spacing between hydrants, size and type of hydrant valves,
operating pressure, etc. shall be detailed in the specific plant fire and safety philosophy.

8.6.6 MONITORS
Requirements for fixed-installed water monitors shall be detailed in the specific plant fire &
safety philosophy.
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8.7 FOAM SYSTEMS


8.7.1 Requirements for foam storage, foam hydrants or foam monitors shall be detailed in the
specific plant fire & safety philosophy.

8.7.2 Permanently installed foam systems shall either be semi-fixed or fixed.

8.7.3 Semi fixed systems are those comprising permanently installed foam distribution
equipment but requiring manual intervention to connect up foam making equipment.

8.7.4 Fixed systems are those comprising permanently installed foam distribution equipment and
foam making equipment. These may be initiated automatically or manually with remote or
local control.

8.7.5 The selection of semi fixed and fixed systems shall be based on the level of risk with
special attention paid to the risk to personnel required to operate a semi fixed system in an
incident.

8.7.6 The main areas where permanently installed foam protection systems may be used are:-

a) Tanks storing Class I, II (2), and III (2) petroleum and petrochemical liquids.

b) Tanks storing Class III (1) petroleum liquids that are heated near or above their flash
point.

c) Class I petroleum and petrochemical product loading/unloading racks.

d) Enclosed process areas.

e) Class 0 petroleum and petrochemical liquids spill protection.

f) Pier and wharf protection.

g) Helicopter landing areas.

h) Fixed foam systems shall not be provided for Class 0 tankage.

8.7.7 Suitability of different types of foam, application rates and minimum supply requirements
shall be detailed in the specific plant project.

8.8 GASEOUS SYSTEMS


Requirements for automatic gaseous fixed fire protection systems shall be detailed in the
specific plant fire and safety philosophy. However, under no circumstance shall halons
and other Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) be used as the gaseous fire firefighting
medium.

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8.9 DRY CHEMICAL SYSTEM


Requirements for an automatic dry chemical fire extinguishing system shall be detailed in
the specific plant fire and safety philosophy.

8.10 MOBILE AND PORTABLE FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT


Requirements for mobile and portable fire fighting equipment shall be detailed in the
specific plant fire and safety philosophy. However, under no circumstance shall halons
and other Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) be used as the gaseous fire firefighting
medium.

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9.0 RELIABILITY, MAINTENANCE AND STANDARDS

9.1 RELIABILITY
9.1.1 The reliability of safety systems must be high to ensure that they operate as intended,
when required and to avoid spurious operation and consequential disruption of production.
To avoid human error, particularly during emergency situations, automatic systems should
be specified wherever possible. System reliability is improved by ensuring complete
autonomy, multiplicity and redundancy as appropriate.

9.1.2 As far as possible, safety systems will fail safe, and have an intrinsic availability greater
than 99.997%

9.2 MAINTENANCE
9.2.1 It is important that the level of maintenance required on all systems is low and if possible
the routine maintenance period should be bi-annual.

9.2.2 Systems should, where possible, be self-diagnostic so that the operator is immediately
informed of any faults. With built-in redundancy these should not affect operation of the
safety systems. Safety equipment should be readily accessible, easy to maintain and
spare parts should be freely available. Standardisation of equipment will minimise the
spare parts holding requirement.

9.3 EQUIPMENT ISOLATION


9.3.1 In general it is preferential to undertake maintenance works on plants which have been
totally shutdown, depressurised to atmosphere, fully isolated and drained, and gas freed.

9.3.2 As the above is not always practicable, facilities shall be incorporated into the design to
enable adequate isolation of units or systems from live plant to permit limited essential
work to be safely executed.

9.3.3 Systems or units in critical service may be provided with back up to the isolation system.

9.3.4 A critical system in this context is one where a non-scheduled failure of the isolation for
routine work would be unacceptable due to economic loss.

9.3.5 Mechanical isolation shall be installed at the inlets and outlets of systems, trains, or items
of equipment dependent on the extent of hardware isolation required for maintenance
purposes.

9.3.6 Mechanical isolation shall take the form of spectacle blind for lines 12” and below and
spacer/spade for 14” and above.

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9.3.7 The minimum isolation facilities to be provided are as identified in the below tabulation;
subject to the following clarifications:-

a) Minor work is defined as a job of a routine nature (e.g. removal of control valve or pig
trap opening).

b) Major work is defined as a job of complex nature (e.g. unit/plant


inspection/maintenance shutdown or vessel entry.)

c) The decision whether to spade/blind should be risk based.

d) For equipment isolation purposes the definition of:-


1) Toxic service shall be: any product stream containing more
than 1000ppm H2S.

2) Hot service shall be: any fluid stream at an operating


temperature of >200o C

3) Cold service shall be: any fluid stream at an operating


temperature of < -46o C

9.3.8 A bleed connection shall be installed between the valve and the spade or blind for line
sizes 6 inches and above at pressure rating ANSI Class 600 and above. This connection
has the dual purpose of checking that the isolation valve holds and of serving as a
draining and depressurising facility when the valve has passed and the spade has to be
removed after the job has been finished.

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System System Description Minimum requirement


Class
Minor work Major work

A A shutdown, No isolation Positive isolation by a


depressurised and spade/blind, or removed
hydrocarbon free system line part for vessel entry
only.

B All systems not Single leak tight closed Single leak tight valve with
mentioned under A or C valve a spade/blind

C - Systems containing Double block or double Double block or block and


gas of ANSI Class 900 block and bleed. bleed with a spade/blind
rating and above.

- Systems containing
liquid of ANSI Class
600 rating and above.

- Critical systems

D All systems containing Double block and bleed Double block and bleed
toxic, cryogenic, hot or with spade/blind.
corrosive fluids.

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9.4 DESIGN OF BLEED SYSTEMS

9.4.1 A double block and bleed system shall consist of two separate valves with a bleed
connection in between.

9.4.2 The reason for installing bleeds in double valve isolation systems is to isolate the system
when one of the valves is slightly passing. By venting the leaking fluids to a safe location
atmospheric pressure can be maintained between the isolation valves.

9.4.3 Bleed connections may increase the risk of unwanted releases when:-
- having a small diameter (less than 1 inch), the connections are prone to mechanical
damage.
- Operated at high pressures, or in fouling service, the bleed valve becomes blocked
by hydrates, or debris making it impossible to close the valve again.
9.4.4 For standardisation the following minimum bleed sizes shall be used:-

Pipe dia. Bleed size


2 inch to 4 inch 1 inch
6 inch to 12 inch 11/2 inch
14 inch and above 2 inch

9.4.5 Bleeds shall be properly reinforced (weldolets) as per piping class.

9.4.6 Bleeds to atmosphere shall have international openings of maximum 1 inch to prevent a
major release in case of inadvertent opening.

9.4.7 During normal operations, bleeds to atmosphere shall be blinded off.

9.4.8 Bleeds shall be located at the top of pipes.

9.4.9 For flashing liquids the bled line shall have two valves n series with at least 0.6 m in
between.

9.4.10 For toxic fluids the bleed shall be hard piped to a safe location with a second upstream
atmospheric vent to check that pressure has been released.

9.4.11 In fouling service, the design of the bleeder shall provide accessibility for cleaning by
rodding.

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9.5 VALVE SELECTION


9.5.1 In principle, any type of single or double seated valve is suitable for isolation, provided
it is properly specified, although in general ball valves are preferred. The use of plug
valves requiring periodic greasing is not acceptable.

9.5.2 Double seated valves with a body bleed shall not be considered to provide adequate
double block and bleed, (even in designs where a leak in the first seal tightens the
second seal), because common failure may still make both isolations ineffective.

9.6 SPOOL PIECES

9.6.1 All vessel nozzles shall be fitted with short sections, which can be conveniently
removed to permit full internal painting of vessels, including their nozzles and flanges.

9.6.2 Such removable sections will often be inherently present between nozzle flanges and
valve or instrument bridle flanges, (provided that there is sufficient flexibility or change
of direction to ensure easy removal). Where such sections are not inherently present,
spool pieces shall be included in the design.

9.6.3 The layout of piping systems, and other hardware in close proximity to vessels, shall be
such that spool pieces, or pipe sections that remove the need for spool pieces, can be
safely removed without the need to first dismantle other equipment. Particular attention
shall be given to the possible need for mechanical lifting aids for large diameter, high-
pressure spools or sections.

9.6.4 In providing removable spools or sections, preference shall be given to removable


flanged elbows.

9.6.5 The presence of an appropriate spool piece, (or equivalent piping section), may
remove the need for a spectacle blind, (provided that all possible
operating/maintenance modes are taking into account).

9.7 STANDARD OF EQUIPMENT

All fire and gas detection and protection systems shall be in accordance with the
appropriate regulations and design codes. Equipment shall be of an approved design,
suitable for the environmental conditions and for the design life of the installation.
9.8 CONTROL

9.8.1 Both local and remote manual control shall be provided in addition to the automatic
feature. This allows operator involvement in the circumstances of an unforeseen
incident, equipment failing to operate as planned, or extinguishant release before the
detection system has time to respond.

9.8.2 All displays, alarms and controls shall be centralised in a well protected, permanently
manned area to ensure immediate operator awareness of the situation. They shall only
convey necessary information in an unambiguous manner, and the display shall be
easy to read and assimilate.

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10.0 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN AND DEPRESSURISATION SYSTEMS

10.1 GENERAL
10.1.1 The Emergency Shutdown and Depressurisation encompasses, the whole
safeguarding system including manual and automatic initiating devices, shutdown
valves, blowdown valves, the controls and related logic devices.

10.1.2 The ESD systems including sensors, actuators and their associated connections and
circuits shall be arranged to operate independently of other monitoring, control and
alarm systems.

10.1.3 The ESD system shall have sufficient separation to ensure that a failure in a particular
part of the system would not render other parts of the system inoperative.

10.2 ESD OBJECTIVES


10.2.1 As a safety related system, The ESD system’s objective is to protect personnel,
production facilities and the environment.

10.2.2 The predominant hazard related to safety is considered to be an uncontrolled


hydrocarbon release, with its associated toxicity risks and the possibility of a
subsequent hydrocarbon fire or explosion.

Therefore, the ESD aims are:

a) To minimise uncontrolled hydrocarbon release.

b) To minimise the effects of uncontrolled hydrocarbon release, when the process


conditions reach critical or dangerous limits, which could threaten the equipment
integrity.

c) To stop hydrocarbon flow and backflow to the plant or area where the
undesirable event has happened.

10.3 ESD FUNCTIONS

10.3.1 To sense an abnormal process or equipment condition and to warn the operator, thus
providing opportunity for possible corrective action, or manual activation of shutdown
from the control room.

10.3.2 To react to the condition (if persisting) automatically by shutting down and isolating the
section of the plant, and/or the whole plant to prevent consequential effects of the
abnormal conditions. The reliability of the shutdown system shall be very high to
prevent spurious shutdown.

10.3.3 To enable sections of a plant to be depressurised when necessary.

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10.3.4 To provide visual and audible means to warn the operator of the initiation of a
shutdown.

10.3.5 The ESD shall monitor inputs from the following initiators: Manual initiators, Process
trip monitors, Fire and Gas outputs.

10.3.6 In a dangerous situation, the ESD system shall initiate the required combination of the
following functions depending on ESD levels:
a) Block-in the process
b) Shutdown all production and test facilities
c) Isolate feed and export lines
d) Close well-head valves
e) Close DHSVs
f) Blowdown the process
g) Shutdown machinery
h) Shutdown all utilities with the exception of safety critical services.
i) Isolate sources of ignition (e.g. fired equipment, etc.)

10.4 LEVELS OF ESD

10.4.1 Following levels of shutdown are required:


a) Level 4
Individual equipment shutdown
b) Level 3
Shutdown and isolation of a process system or sub-system, within the plant. Specific
shutdown valves shall close. Depressurisation shall not occur, unless required for
equipment or process reasons.
c) Level 2
Total process shutdown. All shutdown valves shall close. Depressurisation shall not
occur, unless required for equipment or process reasons. All fired equipment and
internal combustion engines shall shutdown except for items as listed under A and B in
sub-section 10.7.26 of this document. Surface safety valves on wellheads located in
the main complex shall also close.
d) Level 1
Plant shutdown and depressurisation to safe level. All items mentioned under Level 2
shall shutdown, plus those listed under A in sub-section 10.7.26 of this document.

10.4.2 Blowdown valves, together with a suitably sized downstream orifice plate, shall be
provided for each area of the plant that can be isolated by shut down valves.
Blowdown valves shall be of the air actuated fail open type.

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10.4.3 The emergency generator shall be started automatically unless inhibited by the
confirmed detector of flammable gas in its Fire & Gas zone.

10.4.4 Surface and Sub-surface Safety Valves on wellheads located in the main complex shall
also close.

10.5 TOTAL PLANT SHUTDOWN


This level of shutdown requires ESD level-1 to have already occurred, and manual
initiation. It consists of shutting down of UPS, emergency power and life support
systems. Diesel driven firewater pumps shall not be stopped, they will run till
destruction or lack of fuel. TPSD is only initiated manually, as a last action before
abandoning the plant.

10.6 ESD EVENTS

10.6.1 All shutdown levels can be either manually or automatically initiated, except TPSD,
which can only be initiated manually. Manual initiation buttons shall be strategically
located in the control room and the field.

10.6.1 Level 4
Initiated by process trip settings or other protection system for each individual item of
equipment in the plant.

10.6.3 Level 3
Initiated by process trip signal whenever the trip of the related process or process
subsystem doesn’t necessitate the shutdown of the total process.

10.6.4 Level 2
Initiated by signal related to undesirable process events, whenever the trip of the
related process necessitates shutdown of the total process or a total plot.

10.6.5 Level 1
Initiated in the event of confirmed fire in an open hydrocarbon area, or confirmed
flammable gas detection in an open area, power failure, low pressure in instrument air
system and ESD system failure or malfunction.

10.6.6 TPSD
Initiated, manually, before abandoning the plant

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10.7 DESIGN CRITERIA AND REQUIREMENTS:

10.7.1 The following guidelines indicate the minimum design requirements for ESD systems:

10.7.2 ESD systems, including sensors, actuators and their associated connections and
circuits shall be arranged to operate independently of other monitoring, control or
alarm systems. The integrity of the entire ESD system shall be ensured by a self-
contained, automatic, hardware implemented functional test system.

10.7.3 Any single failure in any part of the ESD system shall not render the system
inoperative.

10.7.4 Interfaces with other systems shall not render the ESD system inoperative in the event
of faults or malfunctions in the other systems. Safety related, action initiating,
executive data shall not be conveyed between systems on serial communications
interfaces.

10.7.5 Operation of the ESD system shall be unaffected by Electromagnetic or Radio


Frequency Interference, and tested in accordance with current IEC Standards.

10.7.6 ESD systems shall be designed so that in the event of failure of the ESD controller, its
sensors or actuators, the protected plant reverts to level 1 shutdown.

10.7.7 ESD systems shall be designed to prevent the occurrence of common-cause failure,
e.g. the simultaneous failure of both the process control and ESD systems due to an
external condition affecting both systems. Physical segregation of ESD equipment
and cabling from similar control system items shall be preferred.

10.7.8 The availability of the central signal-conditioning, signal processing, control logic and
output signal driver system shall be greater than 99.997% i.e. its total unavailability
shall be less than 0.27 hour per year. Faults in individual circuits shall be automatically
detected and enunciated by audible and visible alarms. It shall be possible to replace
individual circuit modules without process shutdown.

10.7.9 The status display for the ESD system shall be by either duplicated dedicated display
or single dedicated display together with independent display through a control
system.

10.7.10 Manual initiation of ESD system shall be by input switches/push-buttons, separate


from the DCS keyboard.

10.7.11 In systems with multiple logic processing units, it shall be impossible to override the
inputs to one unit alone, unless the over-ridden unit is taken off-line, and is incapable
of automatic access to outputs.

10.7.12 When installed together with a DCS, The ESD system shall receive time signals for
event logging from the DCS.

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10.7.13 The potential accuracy of event logging in programmable ESD systems shall be
studied case-by-case, to counter the effects of data latency on any “first-up” alarm
logging requirements.

10.7.14 The ESD system shall be protected against unauthorised revisions by Management
Procedures and by software and firmware protection techniques, which shall be
evaluated as part of the Hazop of the total plant.

10.7.15 The documentation of the ESD systems shall be presented in a logical format which
minimises the types of different drawing, while retaining full system data.
Programmable systems shall be self-documenting at least to the level of logic/ladder
diagrams.

10.7.16 The minimum documentation for all systems shall include Cause & Effect (SAFE)
charts in accordance with:
a) API 14C,
b) Input / Output Schedules,
c) Cable block diagrams,
d) logic or ladder diagrams
e) software flow charts. ( for programmable systems.)

10.7.17 Software for programmable systems shall be developed under the control of an
approved QA/QC procedure, and audited by an independent approvals organisation.

10.7.18 Provision shall be made for system expansion of at least 20% in all sections of the
system, i.e. input, logic processing and output.

10.7.19 Reset of ESD valves, or restart of equipment, following an emergency shutdown, shall
be by operation of a local reset device following a “permit to reset/restart” signal from
the Central Control Room. Confirmation of the status of valves or equipment shall be
given on the ESD displays at all times.

10.7.20 Maintenance or start-up over-rides shall be put in place by key-operated switches


located on a dedicated over-ride panel. The status of over-rides shall be presented on
both the dedicated ESD displays and on the main alarm status display in the Central
Control Room.

10.7.21 Power supplies for ESD system shall be taken from an un-interruptible power system.
The status and condition of ESD power supplies shall be monitored by the control
system and any fault or out-of-limit condition displayed on the main alarm status
display in the Central Control Room.

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10.7.22 ESD valves shall be fully testable at a local panel without plant shutdown. The test
shall include partial stroking of the valve, up to a maximum closure of 10% of actuator
travel. ESD valves and blowdown valves shall be accessible at all times for
maintenance and inspection. The location of ESD valves and blowdown valves and
their logic shall be studied at the Hazop of the whole plant .

10.7.23 Bypass facilities may be installed where specifically accepted on a case by case basis,
by the QP Technical Safety Division and endorsed by the Project Hazop Study.

10.7.24 ESD valves shall be fire tested to BS 6755 or API 607 and shall fail to their safe
position.

10.7.25 The human-machine Interface (HMI) with the ESD system displays, any DCS displays
and the main Alarm Status Display in the Central Control Room shall be studied at the
detail design to consider the potential effects of alarm avalanche on the ability of the
process operators to retain control of an emergency situation.
10.7.26 EQUIPMENT LIST
A B
Main Generators UPS

HVAC Fire & Gas Control System

Instrument Air System Process Control System

Cooling water system Emergency Lighting

Drain systems Communication System

Status lights

Emergency Generator

Electric Firewater Pumps

D.C Lube oil pumps for running


machinery

* Navigation Aids

* Navigation aids shall be maintained under all shutdown scenarios.


REFERENCE STANDARDS
ESD concept should refer to:
API 14C Recommended Practice
API 521

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10.8 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN (ESD) FOR GAS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (GDS)

10.8.1 General
a) The emergency Shutdown, encompasses the whole safeguarding system
including manual and automatic initiating devices, shutdown valves, the
controls and related logic devices.
b) The ESD systems including sensors, actuators and their associated
connections and circuits shall be arranged to operate independently of other
monitoring, control and alarm systems.
c) The ESD system shall have sufficient separation to ensure that a failure in a
particular part of the system would not render other parts of the system
inoperative.

10.8.2 ESD Objectives


a) As a safety related system, the ESD system’s objective is to protect personnel,
gas distribution facilities and the environment.
b) The predominant hazard related to safety is considered to be an uncontrolled
gas release, with its associated toxicity risks and the possibility of a subsequent
fire or explosion.
c) Therefore, the ESD aims are:
• To minimise uncontrolled gas release
• To minimise the effects of uncontrolled gas release.
• To stop gas flow and backflow to the area where the
undesirable event has happened.

10.8.3 ESD Functions


a) To provide opportunity for possible corrective action; i.e. manual activation of
shutdown from the Central Control Room or the local push button.
b) To react to the condition (if persisting) by shutting down and isolating the
section of the gas distribution station and/or the whole gas distribution station to
prevent consequential effects of the abnormal conditions. The reliability of the
shutdown system shall be very high to prevent spurious shutdown.
c) The ESD shall monitor inputs from manual initiators and Fire and Gas outputs.

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10.8.4 Design Criteria and Requirement


The following guidelines indicate the minimum design requirements for GDS ESD
systems:
a) ESD systems, including sensors, actuators and their associated connections
and circuits shall be arranged to operate independently of other monitoring,
control or alarm systems. The integrity of the entire ESD system shall be
ensured by a self-contained, automatic, hardware implemented, and functional
test system.

b) Any single failure in any part of the ESD system shall not render the system
inoperative.

c) Interfaces with other systems shall not render the ESD system inoperative in
the event of faults or malfunctions in the other systems. Safety related, action
initiating, executive data shall not be conveyed between systems on serial
communications interfaces.

d) Operation of the ESD system shall be unaffected by electromagnetic or Radio


Frequency Interference, and tested in accordance with current IEC Standards.

e) ESD systems shall be designed to prevent the occurrence of common-cause


failure, e.g. the simultaneous failure of both the gas distribution control and
ESD systems due to an external condition affecting both systems. Physical
segregation of ESD equipment and cabling from similar control system items
shall be preferred.

f) The availability of the central signal-conditioning, signal processing, control


logic and output signal driver system shall be greater than 99.99% i.e. its total
unavailability shall be less than 0.27 hour per year. Faults in individual circuits
shall be automatically detected and enunciated by audible and visible alarms. It
shall be possible to replace individual circuit modules without gas distribution
station or pipeline shutdown.

g) The status display for the ESD system shall be by either duplicated dedicated
display or single dedicated display together with independent display through a
control system.

h) Manual initiation of ESD system shall be by input switches/push-buttons,


separate from the DCS keyboard.

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i) In systems with multiple logic processing units, it shall be impossible to override


the inputs to one unit alone, unless the over-ridden unit is taken off-line, and is
incapable of automatic access to putouts.

j) When installed together with a DCS, the ESD system shall receive time signals
for event logging from the DCS.

k) The potential accuracy of event logging in programmable ESD systems shall be


studied case-by-case, to counter the effects of data latency on any “first-up”
alarm logging requirements.

l) The ESD system shall be protected against unauthorised revisions by


Management Procedures and by software and firmware protection techniques,
which shall be evaluated as part of the HAZOP of the total gas distribution
station.

m) The documentation of the ESD systems shall be presented in logical format


which minimises the types of different drawing, while retaining full system data.
Programmable systems shall be self-documenting at least to the level of
logic/ladder diagrams.

n) The minimum documentation for all systems shall include Cause & Effect
(SAFE) charts in accordance with:
! API 14C
! Input/Output Schedules
! Cable block diagrams
! Logic or ladder diagrams
! Software flow charts (for programmable systems)

o) Software for programmable systems shall be developed under the control of an


approved QA/QC procedure, and audited by an independent approvals
organisation.

p) Provision shall be made for system expansion of at least 20% in all sections of
the system, i.e. input, logic processing and output.

q) Reset of ESD valves, or restart of equipment, following an emergency


shutdown, shall be by operation of a local reset device following a “permit to
reset/restart” signal from the Central Control Room. Confirmation of the status
of valves or equipment shall be given on the ESD displays at all times.
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r) Maintenance or start-up over-rides shall be put in place by key-operated


switches located on a dedicated over-ride panel. The status of over-rides shall
be presented on both the dedicated ESD displays and on the main alarms
status display in the Central Control Room.

s) Power supplies for ESD system shall be taken from un-interruptible power
system. The status and condition of ESD power supplies shall be monitored
by the control system and any fault or out-of-limit condition displayed on the
main alarm status display in the Central Control room.

t) ESD valves shall be fully testable at a local panel without station or pipeline
shutdown. The test shall include partial stroking of the valve, up to a maximum
closure of 10% of actuator travel. ESD valves shall be accessible at all times
for maintenance and inspection. The location of ESD valves and logic shall be
studied at the HAZOP of the whole station.

u) Provision of by-pass to allow ESD full stroke regular testing programme to be


carried out without interrupting gas supplies shall be considered. Regular and
frequent testing of ESD i.e. quarterly shall improve system reliability by
revealing failures.

v) Where ESD valves can’t be mounted in a safe location, passive protection shall
be applied for:
! Valves
! Valve actuators
! Shutdown cabinets
! Air reservoir drums
! Interconnecting piping and tubing
! Pneumatic and hydraulic control lines

w) ESD valves shall be fire tested to BS 6755 or API 607 and shall “fail in
position”.

x) The Man-Machine Interface (MMI) with the ESD system displays, any DCS
displays and the main Alarm Status Display in the Central Control Room shall
be studied at the detail design to consider the potential effects of alarm
avalanche on the ability of the process operators to retain control of an
emergency situation.

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11.0 DRAINAGE SYSTEMS


11.1 GENERAL
The drainage from hazardous areas shall be physically separated from the drains
serving non-hazardous areas. This separation shall ensure that communication
between hazardous and non-hazardous areas via the drain system is prevented.
The following drainage systems shall be provided where appropriate:

11.1.1 Closed Drain System


A suitable closed drain system shall be provided. This is to avoid release of flammable
liquids and vapours to atmosphere during routine draining operations. Hence, all
hydrocarbon process equipment drainage for operational or maintenance shall be
routed via a closed pipe system to a sealed sump. This sump shall have automatic
pumping facilities and the sump vapour space is generally taken to flare. Care must
be taken with high-pressure systems that may need to be segregated from low
pressure sources.

11.1.2 OPEN DRAIN SYSTEM

a) Offshore Installations
A suitable open drains system shall be provided. Drains from the following areas
shall be routed to the open drains system.
1) Non hazardous open area drains
2) Drilling non-hazardous open area drains
3) Hazardous open area drains
4) Deluge drains
5) Rainwater drains

b) Onshore Installations

1) Open drain system shall be provided on site. The system will receive the
run-off from the plant areas, and any over spill firewater or escaped
hydrocarbon leakage from major fire fighting operations.

2) Drainage collection and treatment systems shall be provided to meet QP


requirements of environmental and anti-pollution regulations. Reference
shall also be made to IP Model Code of Safe Practice, Part 3, Refining
Safety Code.

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c) Bulk storage tanks


Bulk storage tanks shall be in bunds that will be sized to contain 100% of the
capacity of the largest tank in the bund area, plus the firewater. Guidance on bulk
storage tank facilities is available in IP19 Detailed drain system requirements
shall be on a case by case basis and subject to a safety study.

d) NGL storage tanks


NGL storage tanks shall not be provided with bunds. Instead, the surrounding
area around NGL pressure storage shall be graded to prevent any accumulation
of leaking NGL below the storage vessel and to dispose of such leaks to a
suitable area.

12.0 VENTILATION AND AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

12.1 GENERAL

12.1.1 The ventilation and air-conditioning systems for all enclosed areas on any installation
shall be designed to meet the following criteria:
a) To provide comfortable and safe atmospheric conditions within any living
quarters, accommodation or office type space .

b) To provide positive pressurisation of rooms or enclosures with respect to


external hazardous areas.

c) To dilute and remove potentially hazardous concentrations of toxic or


flammable materials.

d) To provide combustion and ventilation (cooling) air supplies to essential service


equipment.

e) To shutdown in emergency conditions in accordance with the fire and gas


system logic.

f) To ensure an equitable air distribution pattern throughout each area with the
optimum sweep efficiency.

12.1.2 Override facilities shall be provided to facilitate safety, inspection and maintenance.

12.1.3 Due consideration shall be made to utilise the systems in removing smoke, toxic fumes
and CO2 from areas after a fire incident. All intake/extract dampers shall be provided
with means of opening at a local fire and gas panel.

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12.1.4 Enclosed hazardous areas should be provided with mechanical ventilation systems
capable of continuously providing a minimum of 12 air changes per hour.

12.1.5 Open or partially enclosed hazardous areas should be ventilated by natural means to
achieve a minimum of 12 air changes per hour for 95% of the time this may be
augmented where necessary by mechanical systems to meet the same design criteria
as enclosed hazardous areas.

12.1.6 In areas of high process heat gain the ventilation rate may need to be increased in
order to limit temperature rise in the space to 400C.

12.1.7 Recirculation of air from the space should not be made except where required during
phased. partial or non-production periods.

12.1.8 Air change rates should be based upon the empty volume of the space served and no
allowance made for equipment.

12.1.9 In order to protect against condensation space heating may be provided when waste
heat from operations or processing is not present. In normally unheated unmanned
areas temporary heaters suitable for the area classification may be provided.

12.1.10 Fire/gas control dampers should be provided at all duct and air transfer penetrations of
fire barriers to maintain integrity. On mobile Installations controls local to these
dampers and mechanical indication to the SOLAS and MODU code requirements
should be provided. as well as facilities for remote control/status indication. On fixed
Installations local, safely located fire/gas damper controls should be provided.

12.1.11 HVAC services to wellhead areas should where practicable be separate from those
serving other hazardous areas.

12.2 DRILLING UTILITIES AREAS

HVAC services in Mud storage, mixing and chemical storage rooms, shale shakers
and pumps should be separate from those of other hazardous areas.

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12.3 VENTILATION FOR HAZARDOUS AREAS


12.3.1 Ventilation systems for enclosed hazardous areas shall provide mechanical ventilation
capable of providing a minimum of 12 air changes per hour.

12.3.2 Open or partially open hazardous areas should be ventilated by natural means to
achieve 12 air changes per hour for 95% of the time. If necessary mechanical
ventilation can be provided to meet the same criteria as stated for enclosed hazardous
areas.

12.3.3 Air change rates should be based upon the empty volume of the space under
consideration; no allowance is made for equipment.

12.4 EQUIPMENT PURGE SYSTEMS

12.4.1 Electrical equipment located in hazardous areas, which does not meet the appropriate
zone requirements, should be provided with a purge system.

12.4.2 urge medium and be kept separate from general HVAC systems serving enclosed or
open areas.

12.4.3 Air for purge systems shall be drawn for a non-hazardous source and adequately
controlled to prevent the ingestion of hazardous gases.

12.4.4 Purged equipment should be maintained at a pressure of at least 50 Pa

12.5 AIR INTAKES AND OUTLETS TO INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES AND


GAS TURBINES

Ventilation inlets and aspiration air intakes for internal combustion engines and gas
turbines shall be taken from a Non-Hazardous area (at least 3.0 Metres from a
hazardous area.) In addition, inlet and exhaust openings shall be at least 4.5 Metres
apart such that the probability of cross contamination of the ventilation from other areas
is minimised. The prevailing wind direction will be considered when siting gas vents,
exhausts and flares. Vented gas and exhaust gas shall be carried away downwind of
the plant.

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12.6 VENTILATION OF GAS TURBINE ENCLOSURES

12.6.1 The main design criteria is that the ventilation air should dilute any possible release of
flammable material to less than 20% LEL. (Gas detector settings shall be 15% LEL
alert and 25% LEL danger.)

12.6.2 Turbine enclosures located in “non-hazardous” areas shall have a ventilation system
designed to give a minimum under pressure of 60 Pa in the enclosure relative to the
ambient pressure. For enclosures located in Zone 2 areas the ventilation system shall
give a minimum over pressure of 0.6 Pa. In both cases a suitable differential pressure
device, with local indicator, shall be provided to monitor and alarm.

12.6.3 The inlet and outlet air shall be monitored each with a minimum of three flammable gas
detectors. The inlet gas detectors will sense the ingress of gas into the ventilation
system, whereas the air outlet detectors will sense gas leaks from the turbine.

12.6.4 The ventilation fan shall achieve air change rates in excess of 100 per hour.

12.6.5 A minimum of two ventilation fans shall be provided each capable of supplying 100%
of total air requirements.

12.7 AIR INTAKES AND OUTLETS TO BUILDINGS

12.7.1 Air intakes to buildings shall be a minimum of three metres from areas classified as
hazardous, so as to avoid the ingestion of a potential hydrocarbon gas or vapour leak.
Air intake location shall also avoid the ingestion of vent or exhaust fumes from
machinery.

12.7.2 The air intakes and outlets to mechanical ventilation system shall each have a fire and
gas tight damper to prevent the potential entry of smoke, toxic or flammable gas from
an accident involving the process plant. The dampers shall be arranged to be open
and shut locally by manual action, or shut by the operation of a fusible link, or
automatically closed by the fire & gas detection system.

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12.8 PRESSURISED AREAS

Buildings that are located in a hazardous area and contain equipment that is not
suitable for operation in a hazardous area shall be pressurised to prevent the entry of
gas from outside. Pressurisation will be by mechanical ventilation to a minimum of 50
Pa above ambient atmospheric pressure. There shall be an air lock on the door(s)
used for routine personnel entry. The arrangement of the mechanical ventilation
system and any associated emergency shutdown of equipment on loss of over
pressure shall meet IP15.

12.9 DUCTS
12.9.1 All penetrations of non-hazardous area walls, floors or ceilings shall be sealed
adequately to maintain pressure and prevent the ingress of gas. Where of necessity a
ventilation duct passes through a main vertical zone bulkhead or fire partition (also a
firewall), a fail-safe fire shutter (or damper) held by fusible links shall be fitted adjacent
to the bulkhead. The shutter shall be capable of manual operation from both sides of
the bulkhead. The operating position shall be readily accessible, be marked in a red,
and be fitted on at least one side of the bulkhead with a visible indicator showing the
shutter position.

12.9.2 Fire dampers shall have a fire rating at least equal to the barrier they protect and shall
not impair the integrity of the fire barrier.

12.10 REDUNDANCY

Separate independent ventilation systems shall be provided for all equipment required
to run in an emergency situation when main supply fans would be shutdown.

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13.0 ANNUNCIATION, ALARMS SYSTEMS


13.1 GENERAL
13.1.1 The purpose of the emergency alarm system is to raise the alarm in every part of the
installation. That is achieved by means of an audible alarm and status light. Where
necessary visual alarms located in areas of high ambient noise or on offshore
installations, distinctly identifiable from other signals or alarms in the plant / installations
in order that:
a) All personnel may be summoned to their muster areas.
b) Personnel shall be warned of the occurrence of specific emergencies, and so
enable immediate action to be taken. The resultant action is normally defined in
the plant contingency plan.
13.1.2 The design objectives are:
a) To alert personnel to changes in plant status.
b) To provide a simple alarm code which is easily recognised.
13.1.3 The exact types of audible sounds and visual signals shall be integrated with those
currently used on the existing QP installations.

13.2 ALARM ANNUNCIATION

13.2.1 Alarms shall be annunciated at the following locations:


a) the main fire and gas detection annunciator panel in the plant Control Room
b) repeat annunciator panels at various locations (e.g. fire station)
c) the DCSS visual display screens (VDU’s)
d) every part of an offshore installation
e) local status stations located in each area of an installations (e.g. corridors,
accommodation, mess rooms, switch rooms etc..)

13.3 MAIN ANNUNCIATOR PANEL

13.3.1 This panel shall be located in an installation’s control room and should as a minimum
display the total installation emergency systems.

13.3.2 The status of all detection, automatic fire fighting, heating and ventilating systems,
including positions of fire dampers and fan status, and relevant control functions shall
be presented on the display panel.

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13.4 REPEAT ANNUNCIATOR PANELS

13.4.1 All locations shall be provided with repeat annunciator panels. These panels would
provide selected information on fire & gas detection and executive fire fighting action
and be in the form of a geographically laid out display.
13.4.2 The purpose of the repeat annunciator panel is to advise fire crew and key personnel,
as quickly as possible, that fire or gas leaks had been detected.

13.5 INITIATION

13.5.1 The emergency alarm system shall be capable being activated by:
a) The fire and gas systems.
b) The ESD system.
c) Manual call points.
d) Manual switches or push buttons in the control room.

13.6 ALARMS AND STATUS LIGHTS

Standardisation of alarm systems throughout QP is not feasible as different visual and


audible alarm systems have been installed on existing QP installations. Any new alarm
systems shall therefore be compatible with the system currently installed in the related
operational area.

13.7 EVACUATION ANNUNCIATION AND ALARM SYSTEM FOR MESAIEED NGL


PLANT AREA (NGL-1, NGL-2, NFGP, NGL-4)

13.7.1 The purpose of the evacuation annunciation and alarm system is:
a) To provide audible and visual means of identifying the need for plant personnel to
evacuate the entire Mesaieed NGL plant areas.
b) To ensure that all personnel notified of a major emergency in adequate time to
enable them to evacuate the areas and relocate to safe area muster point/s
beyond of the area of the hazard and outside of the industrial area.

13.7.2 Design Objectives


a) To raise an evacuation alarm to alert all NGL plant area personnel of a major
event which may have the potential to escalate throughout the total NGL facilities.

b) To provide an easily recognisable, simple and unique alarm code to initiate the
emergency action(s) as defined in the plant contingency plans.

c) To provided initiation from and annunciation to all NGL plant control rooms.

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13.7.3 Evacuation Alarm Initiation


a) The evacuation alarm shall be capable of being manually actuated by any control
room supervisor with in the NGL plant area.

b) Means shall be provided which shall permit the evacuation alarm-initiating


supervisor to cancel the alarm.

c) All control room supervisors shall on receiving the evacuation annunciation


ensure that an ESD Level 0 is initiated prior to evacuating the control room.
13.7.4 Evacuation Alarm Annunciation
Alarms shall be annunciated at the following locations: -

a) The main fire and gas panel in the main plant control room

b) Repeat annunciator panels at all plants

c) Repeat annunciator panels at fire station

d) The DCS visual display screens in all plants

e) Every part of the NGL plants area

f) Local stations located in the NGL plants area (e.g. switch rooms, workshops,
office buildings etc.)

13.7.5 Repeat Annunciation Panels

a) All locations shall be provided with repeat annunciator panels. These panels shall
provide information on the source of alarm initiating plant.
b) The purpose of the repeat annunciator panels is to alert control rooms personnel and
fire crew to activate the emergency response and evacuation plan as quickly as
possible.

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14.0 EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

14.1 GENERAL

Emergency power shall be integrated in the normal operating power system in such a
way that loss of main power results in automatic transfer to emergency power.

14.2 EMERGENCY GENERATOR

14.2.1. The emergency power shall be capable of supplying the following services with
electricity for a period of at least 24 hours.
• Emergency lighting
• Helicopter landing area perimeter and obstacle lights.
• Fire & Gas detection systems
• Fire fighting system
• Alarm and PA systems
• ESD system
• Communications system
• Electric BOP pumps
• DCS system

14.2.2 Emergency generators shall be provided with automatic starting and loading facilities.
A simple and reliable method of ensuring that emergency generators can be
immediately switched to their pre-defined load shall be arranged. Manual facilities
shall also be provided for regular testing purposes. Testing facilities should permit the
loading of standby generator sets.

14.2.3 It is preferred that the emergency generator should be capable of running in parallel
with the mains supply for testing purposes and for the purposes of transferring load
without the need for supply break.

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14.3 UNINTERUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS) SYSTEM / DEDICATED


BATTERY POWER.

14.3.1 On loss of both main and emergency generator power, the UPS/emergency battery
power supply systems shall then be capable of providing continuous power to the
following systems for a period of 60 minutes.
• Fire & Gas detection systems
• Fire fighting system
• Communications system
• Alarm and PA systems
• ESD system
• Emergency lighting and navigational aids
• DCS system

14.3.2 The below list are exceptions to the above and shall be provided with battery power
supply for a period of at least 96 hours; on loss of generated power:
• Navigation aids
• Identification lights

15.0 VENT AND FLARE SYSTEMS

15.1 VENTS

15.1.1 Most hydrocarbon installations will require atmospheric vents. Consideration shall be
given to the location and elevation of vent outlets that provide vapour released from
atmospheric vessels, such as storage tanks, sumps etc.

15.1.2 Atmospheric vents may require a flame arrestor where continuous gas venting is
expected.

15.1.3 Exhaust vents


Gas turbines, fire heaters etc. Will normally burn toxic gas. Characteristic of the
exhaust stacks shall be arranged to avoid a toxic concentration of pollutants at ground
level. Local meteorological conditions shall be considered when laying out of such
equipment.

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15.2 FLARES

15.2.1 General
Hydrocarbon disposal to flare shall be via a collecting system (flare header) through a
liquid knockout drum. Consideration shall be given to multiple flares when a wide
range of relief pressures exist, as is the case at QP Offshore Production stations.
15.2.2 Flare Area
a) The flare area shall be devoid of:
1) through roads,
2) equipment requiring regular presence of personnel,
3) equipment which cannot withstand high thermal radiation
4) features which themselves constitute a safety hazard
b) In general, the only equipment allowed in the flare sterile area shall be that
directly related to its operation; such as knock-out drums, pumps and valves etc.

15.2.3 Onshore flare sterile area


Onshore flare sterile area shall be at least 60m radius from the base of the stack. This
is to assure minimum interference with other facilities. The flare area shall be fenced
with two gates.
15.2.4 Offshore flare location
Offshore flare stacks shall be located some distance from any other installation, taking
into consideration thermal radiation, toxic gas concentrations and local meteorological
conditions.
15.2.5 Flare stack height
Thermal radiation level, toxic concentration and local meteorological conditions shall
determine the flare height. The following conditions have been adopted in QP:-
a) Thermal Radiation Criteria
The flare shall be designed and its location shall be determined by the thermal
radiation criteria as given below.
1) Maximum radiation at stack base shall be 6.3 kW/m2
2) Maximum radiation at the flare sterile area edge shall be 6.3 kW/m2
3) Maximum radiation at the flare area edge shall be 4.7 kW/m2
4) Maximum radiation at the not normally manned area shall
be 3.0 kW/m2
5) Maximum radiation at the normally manned area (existing station fence)
shall be1.6 kW/m2

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The above indicated radiation level is inclusive of solar radiation of 0.969 kW/m2.
b) The following should be noted:
1) Flare stack base means the location exactly below the flare stack.
2) Sterile area need not be separately fenced off but the sterile area radius
shall be marked on the plot plan.

3) Any equipment related to the flare can be located in the flare area. The flare
area should be separately fenced off.

4) For this specific situation the not normally manned area (3.0 kW/m2) shall
be fenced off and the fence at the flare area edge (4.7 kW/m2) can be
omitted.

5) Existing station fence means the fence at the plant boundary and the fence
at the edge of the plant manned area.

6) Minimum flare stack height shall be 60m

7) The sterile area perimeter fence shall be at minimum 60m from flare stack
base.
8) The maximum thermal radiation including solar radiation at ground level
(Onshore) or sea level (Offshore) shall be 6.3 kW/m2.

15.2.6 Toxic concentration

a) The concentration of toxic gas such as H2S or SO2 at ground level shall not reach
harmful or irritating levels inside property lines (Onshore) or escape routes
(Offshore) or cause a noticeable stench or irritation outside property lines
(Onshore) or at all parts of the installation to which access is permitted without a
current permit (Offshore) even if the flare is extinguished.

b) For flares serving major common discharge systems the flare stack height shall
be in general at least 60m.

15.3 FLARE TIP

15.3.1 The flare tip shall provide a non-luminous and smokeless flame in accordance with the
QP Environmental Standards.

15.3.2 Noise level shall not exceed that specified in specific plant safety philosophy, when
operating at maximum flaring capacity.

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15.4 PILOT BURNERS

15.4.1 For flare tips up to 16”dia, a maximum of 2 pilot burners shall be provided. 3 pilot
burners shall be provided for flare tips of 16” and greater. Each burner shall be ignited
by means of an individual ignition line.

15.4.2 One flame sensor (signals to local panel) shall be provided for each pilot flare. An
alarm shall be provided in the Control Room, activated by thermocouple failure.

15.5 PURGING

Purge gas connections shall be provided at the upstream end of the flare headers and
the system shall be continuously gas purged to give at least 1cm/s exit speed at the
flare tip.

15.6 BURN PIT

15.6.1 Burn pits normally produces considerable smoke with possibility of contaminated
liquids to reach the water table. Therefore, the use of a burn pit shall only be
considered in exceptional cases. (E.G. occasionally batch disposal of liquids; so that
the burn pit will not be in operation for a long time.)

15.6.2 The burn pit shall have its own sterile area of at least 100m radius and all piping to
burn pits or liquid disposal burners shall be protected against fire.

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16.0 GENERAL PLANT SAFETY

16.1 NOISE AND VIBRATION

16.1.1 Vibration
a) Vibration from rotating and reciprocating equipment shall be kept to the lowest
practical limits as defined in the United Kingdom Department of Energy and QP
Occupational Health Guide (under development).
16.1.2 Noise
a) The noise level defined in the QP Occupational Health Guide shall be used as
the basis of design for all noise control measures, with the following to be taken
into account at the project design stage: -
b) All noise shall be reduced at source so far, as is reasonably practicable.
c) The aim shall be to avoid personal noise doses above 85dB(A) over an 8-hour
working day. This will generally be the case for the majority of operating
personnel in installations designed to a limit of 90dB(A). A basic design sound
level of 90dB(A) at a distance of 1 metre from the equipment shall therefore be
used.
d) The design shall always take into account all operating modes including, for
example, safety valve relief.
e) Under foreseeable working conditions, no person shall be exposed to steady
noise levels above 120 dB(A) irrespective of duration, or to impulse noise levels
above 135dB(A), with or without hearing protection.
f) Machinery vendors shall supply noise parameters with their tender data.

16.2 HOT AND COLD SURFACES

Appropriate design measures shall be taken to protect against injury from hot or cold
equipment that has an external surface temperature that may be hotter than +70 °C or
colder than -10°C and may in normal operations be touched by personnel. The design
measures may include the use of insulation or guard barriers.

16.3 MACHINERY GUARDING

All exposed moving parts on all machinery shall be suitably guarded to protect
personnel from injury.

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16.4 PLATFORMS, STAIRWAYS AND LADDERS

16.4.1 Platforms
a) A platform shall be provided at any item of equipment which requires regular
attention for operation or servicing which is located more than 2 meters above
grade level or another platform.
b) Platforms should therefore be provided for access to:
• Elevated man-ways on process equipment,
• High level fixed fire monitors,
• Instrument locations,
• Manifold locations.
c) Where platforms at different levels are interconnected by walk way, stairs or
ladders, specific attention shall be given to providing alternative escape routes, in
the event of an incident, from all walkway locations.
d) Self-closing gates should be provided at platform exits to all vertical ladders.
e) Toe plates shall be provided along all walkway edges equipped with hand railing,
at openings in flooring around equipment but not across the entrance to platforms
served by a side step or step through ladder.

16.5 STAIRWAYS AND LADDERS

Stairways shall be provided for access to platforms serving equipment, which require
regular and frequent operational attendance, rapid escape or access in the event of an
emergency.
Fixed ladders shall be provided:

a) For access to all platforms not served by a stairway,

b) As an emergency escape from a platform which is already served by a stairway,

c) For access to locations where no platform is necessary but where observation of


a process condition is required involving no manual effort and which will not
create a hazardous situation, e.g. checking a level indicator,

d) For access to platforms provided at high level monitors or corrosion monitoring


points.

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16.6 HANDRAILS & SAFETY CAGES.

16.6.1 Stairways, platforms and walkways shall be provided with hand railing.

16.6.2 Hand railing shall reference ANSI A 1264.1 1989 requirements for floor & wall
openings and (non-residential) stair and railing systems.

16.6.3 Additional safety rails shall be provided where ladders start close to the edge of an
elevated platform. The safety rails shall prevent personnel falling from the platform
when starting to climb up.

16.6.4 Hand railing shall conform to BS 6180.

16.6.5 Walkways over pipe tracks or similar low level access ways not exceeding 2 meters
above grade level may be provided with hand railing on one side only. Any platforms,
access way, etc., above this height shall have hand railing on both sides.

16.6.6 Maintenance access to some specific areas of equipment must be considered, by


providing areas of handrail section adjacent to such equipment with means of removal
and replacement without using hot work or bolting

16.6.7 All ladders rising over 6 meters shall be provided with safety cages.

16.6.8 For additional information refer to Safety Engineering Standard ES.S.05 - Safety
Requirements for Onshore Process Facilities Access Platforms, Stairways and
Ladders.

16.7 INTERLOCKING OF SAFETY RELIEF VALVES


16.7.1 Safety relief valves require replacement for maintenance reasons or statutory
inspection/testing imposed by the applicable regulations.

16.7.2 To enable replacement during normal operation, an arrangement incorporating


installation of a second safety relief valve. Such an arrangement requires the
installation of isolation valves that shall have proper interlocking devices to comply with
the applicable regulation requirements.

16.7.3 The interlocking system is closely related to the isolating method chosen.

16.7.4 A standing instruction shall be prepared and issued to the plant operators on the
procedure for replacing safety relief valves on stream.

16.7.5 When locks and keys are applied, consistent coding system shall be considered.

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16.8 EXIT, EGRESS AND ESCAPE ROUTES

16.8.1 Onshore plants


Refer to pages 25 & 26 of this document

16.8.2 Offshore plants


a) Every building or area of the platform shall be provided with sufficient exits to
permit the prompt escape of personnel. Exits shall be arranged to provide free
and unobstructed egress from all parts of every building, structure, section or
area at all times.

b) A minimum of two (2) separate and remote exits shall be provided from every
building, structure, section or area. Any compartment, which would otherwise
have a travel distance exceeding 20 feet to the nearest exit, shall have a
minimum of two exits.

c) Every exit shall be clearly visible. There shall be no dead-end spaces or


corridors on the platform.

d) Primary escape routes shall be 1.5m wide and have clear headroom of 2.3m.
Doors on escape routes shall open in the direction of escape.

e) External stairways shall, from the accommodation area be 1.5m wide. Other
stairways to be minimum 1.0m. Landings shall be 1.5m by 2.5m minimum. This
is to permit the handling of stretcher cases.

f) Secondary escape routes shall be considered as the means of egress from inside
modules where primary routes do not exist. Secondary escape routes shall be
1.1m wide and have clear headroom of 2.3m.

g) Escape routes shall be so constructed as to allow the easy transfer of a stretcher


bearing a person.

h) All means of access and egress shall be so constructed as to allow a person


wearing self-contained B.A. to pass through without hindrance.

i) Passive and active fire protection shall be used, if necessary, on escape routes
for the protection of personnel against heat radiation.

j) All escape routes, survival crafts and life-raft stations and muster stations shall be
adequately illuminated by emergency lighting and clearly identified by signs.

k) If lifts are installed they shall be designed to permit emergency egress by means
of hatches in the ceilings and ladders within the shaft.

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16.9 TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

16.9.1 General
a) All permanently or partially manned installations shall be provided with
telecommunication system which shall be designed to provide communication
facilities for safety and operational purposes.

b) Requirements shall be on a case by case basis and shall be detailed in the


specific project Fire and Safety Philosophy.

c) Generally, the following telecommunications facilities shall be provided:-


1) Telephone system
For external and internal communications, including hot lines where appropriate.
2) Telex system
3) Paging system
4) Radio system
5) Intercom system

d) Radio system for plant/field operations shall be provided. The system shall be
adequate to communicate, where appropriate, with:
1) Other plants
2) Emergency Centre, fire station
3) Communication centres
4) Marine vessels and life boats
5) Helicopters and heliports
6) Fire vehicles, well head maintenance and wire line vehicles

16.9.2 Emergency
Same as above including portable radios for communications within the plant area.

16.9.3 Public address


a) A public address system shall be provided, the system shall be audible at all
plant points.
b) Answer-back facilities shall also be incorporated at strategic locations.
c) An adequate number of battery powered “Bull Horns” shall be provided.

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16.10 NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

16.10.1 General
a) All fixed structures shall have primary and secondary marine navigational aids
and visual aids.
b) Marine navigational aids and visual aids for helicopter operation shall be
provided as shown on lighting layouts.
c) The marine navigational aids shall conform to the International Association of
Lighthouse Authorities recommendations.
d) The visual aids for helicopter operations are required by the:
• Offshore Installations (Construction & Survey)
• Regulations CSI 289/1974
• C.A.P 437 Civil Aviation Authority. Offshore Helicopter landing area
Guidance on Standards.

16.10.2 Marine Navaids


a) Assemblies containing 12,000 candela (minimum) main white light shall be
installed on opposite corners of the platforms. Secondary white lights of 1200
candela shall also be installed, and in the event of main light failure shall operate
automatically.
b) Subsidiary 15 candelas (minimum) red lights should be installed on the corners
not occupied by the white lights to mark the extremities of the platform. They
should also be installed along all the bridge links.
c) Both main lights and subsidiary lights should flash in unison, emitting the Morse
code letter “U” every 15 seconds.
d) Wellhead jackets not connected with a bridge to the main complex shall be
provided with suitable navigation lamps.

16.10.3 Fog Signals


a) Shall be installed on each platform, they shall have a range of 2 miles. The fog
signals shall sound the Morse code letter “U” every 30 seconds.
b) In the event of main fog signal failure a secondary fog signal shall be provided
with a range of 0.5 mile.

16.10.4 Helicopter visual aids


Helideck and obstruction lights shall be provided to enable helicopter pilots to identify
and use the area by day and night. The marking and lighting of obstacles helps to
ensure a safe separation distance.

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16.10.5 Helideck lighting


a) The landing area shall be delineated by Yellow lights that are visible omni-
directionally above the landing area level.

b) The lights should not be below the level of the deck and should also not exceed a
height of 0.25 metres around the perimeter and the yellow lights should be at
least 15 candelas.

c) The helideck shall be floodlit for night use. The lights should be so arranged, as
not to dazzle the pilot and a facility should be incorporated to allow the floodlights
to be dimmed at the pilot’s request.

16.10.6 Obstruction lights


a) The helicopter pilot should be provided with visual information on the proximity
and height of objects which exceed the height of and are close to the landing
area, or are close to the boundaries of the 150 degree sector as defined by CAP
437.

b) Where the highest point of the installation exceeds the height of the landing area
by more than 15 metres, a Red obstruction light of 200 candelas should show
omni-directionally at that point. Further lights of at least 10 candelas should be
fitted at 10 metre intervals down to the level of the helideck

c) Objects of less than 15 metres height above the landing area shall be provided
with an omni-directional red light of at least 15 candelas.

d) Helideck and obstruction lighting shall be provided with emergency power.

16.10.7 Wind sock


At least one windsock shall be installed on the platform, in a location acceptable to
Gulf Helicopter Company.

16.10.8 Anemometer
A fixed anemometer for wind direction and wind speed shall be provided. This is to
enable plant operators to record wind speed and direction and pass same information
to helicopters, marine vessels and others.

16.10.9 Marker beacons


For sub-sea pipeline and cables, marker beacon or other appropriate means, shall be
provided to minimise damage from anchors.

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16.11 SAFETY SIGNS

16.11.1 Safety signs shall be provided. This is to indicate escape routes and the location of
fire fighting and life saving equipment.

16.11.2 The safety signs shall be of the photoluminscent type so that they will be visible in the
event of lighting failure or dense smoke.

16.11.3 Safety signs language shall be in both Arabic and English.

16.11.4 Safety signs shall be designed to the appropriate BS.

16.12 PLANT IDENTIFICATION PANELS

16.12.1 Plant identification panels shall be required.

16.12.2 The panels shall display QP logo, the registered name of the plant and the plot name
or number.

16.13 OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS

16.13.1 Survival Craft


a) Total enclosed motor propelled survival craft shall be provided on Offshore Plants
and drilling rigs as outlined in the QP Safety Regulations Manual (under
development). The total number of survival craft shall be sufficient to
accommodate 200% of the total number of persons expected to be on the facility
at any given time. The living quarter’s platform alone shall be provided with
survival craft for 150% of the total number of persons on the installation.
Assembly area or muster area shall be provided at the survival craft location to
facilitate safe boarding.
b) Survival craft, launching system, recovery system and emergency equipment
carried on board shall be in accordance with the requirements of SOLAS.
c) Satellite wellhead jackets with helideck facility shall be provided with survival
craft.
d) Survival craft shall be equipped with radio communication system and with a
compressed air breathing system sufficient to sustain the occupants of the craft
for a ten minute period in toxic gas environment.

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16.13.2 Self Inflating Life Rafts


a) Self-inflating life rafts shall be provided on offshore Installations and drilling rigs.
Life rafts shall afford a secondary means of evacuation.
b) Life rafts shall be in accordance with SI 486, Solas Regulations and QP Safety
Regulations.
c) Life rafts shall be sufficient to accommodate 50% of total persons on the
installation at a given time.
d) The life rafts shall be located at strategic locations on the platform.
e) Life rafts installed on drilling rigs shall be Davit launch type, and rafts installed on
fixed structures shall be encapsulated ‘jettison’ type. Embarkation into jettison
type life-raft shall be by means of knotted rope or rope ladder.
f) Satellite wellhead jackets shall be provided with self-inflating life raft.

16.13.3 Life Jackets


a) Life jackets of an approved type shall be provided on offshore installations and
drilling rigs. Life jackets shall be located in the accommodation cabins, survival
craft muster areas, life raft stations and boat landing exit/egress.
b) Life jackets shall be sufficient for 200% of total persons on the installations at a
given time.
c) Life jackets shall conform to SI 486 and SOLAS Regulations.
d) Life vests shall be provided, for persons working over open water.
e) Satellite well-head jackets shall be provided with life jackets.

16.13.4 Life Buoys


a) Sufficient number of life buoys shall be provided and shall be located at survival
craft and life raft stations and at any other point deemed necessary where they
shall be handrail mounted.
b) A length of buoyant line shall be attached to the life buoy and the other end
securely fastened to the installation. The length of the line shall be 3 times the
distance from the mounting position to sea level. The life buoys shall be
equipped with water activated lights. Life buoys equipped with smoke markers
shall also be provided.

16.13.5 Rope Ladders or Knotted Ropes


Rope ladders or knotted ropes shall be provided as a secondary means of escape
from the installation in an emergency situation.

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16.13.6 Safety Standby vessel and Rescue Open Boat


Requirements for rescue open boat and/or safety standby vessel shall be subject to
safety study on a case by case basis.

16.13.7 Safety Equipment


An approved type of safety helmets, safety Boots, overalls, eye protectors, hearing
protectors etc. shall be provided for all personnel engaged in operations where they
may be exposed to risk of injury.

16.13.8 Breathing Apparatus


a) In view of the presence of toxic gas (H2S) in QP produced hydrocarbons,
Emergency Breathing Apparatus (B.A.) shall be provided for all personnel
expected to be on the Offshore Installations at a given time.
b) Emergency B.A sets shall be located in living quarters, survival craft muster
areas, life raft stations and in other areas where an emission of toxic gas may
occur.
c) Quantity required shall be subject to a safety study. But shall not be less than
200% of total persons on the installations at a given time.
d) The emergency B.A sets shall have sufficient capacity to enable the wearer reach
a muster area and shall be provided with a facility for off-take from the cascade
system (if provided).
e) Sufficient quantity of long duration BA sets shall be provided for search, rescue
and fire fighting crew.

16.13.9 Cascade Breathing Air System


a) Cascade breathing air system shall be provided on permanently manned
installations, located at muster areas where survival craft is installed and at drill
floor. 2x100% air compressors shall be provided with on line air quality
monitoring system.
b) Air reservoirs shall be sufficient to provide air for all persons at the muster area
for a period of 60 minutes (40L/min/man can be used for calculations).
c) The off-take points shall be well spaced to prevent congestion in emergency
situation.

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16.13.10 Eyewash /Safety Showers


Eyewash/safety showers shall be provided in areas where personnel may come into
contact with hazardous chemicals. Water tank and pipes shall be protected against
extreme ambient heat. Water temperature at the take-off point shall not exceed
37°C.

16.13.11 First Aid Equipment


First aid equipment as defined by QP medical services shall be provided.

16.13.12 Other Portable Safety Equipment


Other portable safety equipment e.g. personal H2S detector, flammable gas metre
shall be specified and provided by QP to all QP installations.

16.14 ONSHORE INSTALLATIONS

16.14.1 Equipment
An approved type of safety helmets, safety boots, overalls, eye protector, hearing
protector, etc. shall be provided for all personnel engaged in operations where they
may be exposed to risk of injury.

16.14.2 Breathing Apparatus


a) Two long duration breathing apparatus shall be provided at each fire hydrant
station assembly. Sufficient number of long duration breathing apparatus shall
be located in the plant control room for search and rescue team members, not
less than 10 sets shall be provided.
b) Emergency escape sets shall be provided in areas where an emission of toxic
gas may occur.

16.14.3 Eye Baths and Safety Showers


a) Eye baths and safety showers shall be provided in the plant area where corrosive
products are stored, handled or utilised.
b) Water tank and pipes shall be protected against extreme ambient heat.
c) Water temperature at take-off point shall not exceed 37 °C.

16.14.4 First-aid kits


Throughout the installation at strategic locations first aid kits shall be provided. Two
stretchers shall also be provided.

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16.14.5 Other Portable Safety Equipment


Other portable safety equipment e.g. personal H2S detector, flammable gas monitor
shall be specified and provided by QP to all QP installations

16.14.6 Portable And Mobile Equipment For Fire-Fighting


a) Portable and mobile fire-fighting equipment as applicable, shall be readily
available in process and storage areas, on jetties and in buildings, offices,
laboratories, warehouses, workshops etc.

b) Mobile fire-fighting equipment shall be housed in the area fire station or be readily
available in those plant areas with a high potential fire risk.

c) Requirement for potable and mobile equipment for fire fighting shall be subject to
a safety study and shall be detailed in the specific project fire and safety
philosophy.

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17.0 PIPELINES

17.1 SUBMARINE PIPELINES

17.1.1 Safety Management


a) All work associated with the design, construction and operation of submarine
pipeline systems shall be such as to ensure that no single failure shall lead to life
threatening situations for any person, or to unacceptable damage to material or
the marine environment.
b) A systematic analysis shall be carried out at all phases to identify and evaluate
the consequences of single failures and series of failures in the pipeline system
such that necessary measures shall be taken in order to meet the targeted safety
and reliability levels. The extent of such analysis is to reflect the criticality of the
pipeline system, the criticality of operation and previous experience with similar
systems or operations.

17.1.2 Design Conditions


Submarine pipelines :

a) shall be based on location class, fluid category and potential failure


consequences for each failure mode identified in the risk analysis.

b) shall have sufficient safety margin against accidental loads and unplanned
operational conditions.

c) shall fulfil the corporate safety and reliability objectives and have the required
resistance against the loads they are exposed to during operational conditions.

d) shall fulfil the specified transport under given operational conditions capacity
(pressure, temperature, flow, composition etc.).

e) shall fulfil the possibility of changes during pipeline systems lifetime with respect
to composition or type of product to be transported.

f) shall take into account the need to facilitated inspection, testing and
maintenance.

g) shall be monitored for violation of its integrity by provision of appropriate


monitoring systems.

h) shall be provided with suitable pressure control systems.

i) shall be provided with an effective over pressure protection system if it is


anticipated the design pressure can be exceeded under normal operational
conditions.

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j) shall be provided with an automatic pressure safety system to protect the


downstream system during incidental operation. A pressure safety system is not
required if the pressure source to the pipeline cannot deliver a pressure in excess
of the maximum incidental pressure.

k) A pressure 10% above the design pressure shall be considered as the incidental
pressure for the pipe line design case.

l) The pipe line system may be divided into sections with different design
pressures, provided that the pressure control system ensures that, for each
section, the maximum operating pressure cannot be exceeded during normal
operations and that maximum incidental pressure cannot be exceeded during
incidental operation.

17.1.3 Pipeline Route


a) The submarine pipeline route shall be selected with due regard to the
probabilities of damage to the pipe. The following factors shall be taken into
account:
1) Ship traffic
2) Fishing Activity
3) Military Exercise Areas
4) Archaeological sites
5) Offshore installations
6) Existing pipelines
7) Unstable seabed
8) Turbulent flows
9) Future developments in the area
10) Any other obstructions
11) Environmental conditions (e.g. tide, wave, current, water temperature,
marine growth and wind “for risers design” etc.)
12) Environmental conditions caused by coastal features.
13) Location of the landfall to facilitate installation and installation method.
14) Environmental impact.
b) Impact Protection
1) Internal impact - Refer to Design Conditions item 11
2) External Impact - Refer to Pipeline Route

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17.2 ONSHORE PIPELINES

The operator shall, before the design of the pipeline is completed, carry out a risk
assessment study and demonstrate that:

a) All hazards relating to a pipeline with the potential to cause a major accidental
event have been identified;

b) The risks arising from those hazards have been evaluated and assessed;

c) The Safety Management system is adequate

d) Suitable procedures shall be developed for the safe construction installation and
commissioning of the pipeline.

e) Emergency isolation block valves shall be installed at the beginning and end of
the pipeline. Safety evaluation study shall be undertaken to determine weather
or not additional emergency isolation block valves are required to be installed at
section(s) of the pipeline.

f) The emergency isolation block valves shall be fail safe in the closed position.
(Excepting for the gas distribution system where it has been accepted that fail in
position may be utilised on condition that all other GDS ESD safety requirements
have been met.)

g) The emergency isolation block valves shall be fitted for remote operation
condition monitoring with indication and closure activation capability from the
control room.

h) The emergency isolation block valve closing rate shall not be less than 1” per
minute. The total closure period shall not exceed 10 minutes

i) Where safe-operating limits anticipated to be exceeded, pressure protection


systems shall be provided.

j) At valve stations or flange connections, leak detection systems shall be provided.


The type of leak detection systems shall be appropriate for the fluid transported
and operating conditions.

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17.2.1 Risk Acceptance Criteria


Risk acceptance criteria for on-shore pipelines is as follows:

a) Individual risk (one employee) 10-5/year

b) Individual risk (multiple employees) 10-6/year

c) Individual 3rd party risk (1 - 100 member of the public) 10-6/year

d) Individual 3rd party risk (>100 members of the public) 10-7/year

NOTE: The above are minimum requirements and subject to case by case assessment.

17.2.2 Pipeline Corridor And Pipeline Crossings


a) All pipelines shall be placed in designated corridors, which are a minimum of 60m
wide, a pipeline corridor constitutes an exclusive land use area for pipeline-
related activities.
b) The minimum clear space between any pipeline and the corridor boundary shall
be 30m.
c) Spacing of parallel buried pipelines or above-grade individually supported
pipelines shall be as follows:
1) Every pipeline must have a minimum clearance of 15m on one side.
2) Pipelines may be located near one another provided that a minimum
clearance equal to the greater of one meter or twice the diameter of the
larger pipe is maintained between them.
3) Where pipeline and power line corridors cross, the horizontal angle of
intersection shall be within 70 to 110 angular degrees. Poles or structures
for overhead power lines shall not be located in pipeline corridors.
4) Underground cables crossing pipeline corridors shall do so by means of
concrete duct bank. The minimum vertical distance between the bottom of
any pipe and the top of the duct bank is 1.0m. The concrete duct bank
shall be continuous across the width of the pipeline corridor. Cables shall
have no servicing points within pipeline corridors. However, if servicing
points are to be installed, no portion of the service points (manhole/vault)
shall be closer than 25m to any pipeline in the corridor.
5) When pipelines cross under roads through box culverts, the minimum
spacing between any two pipes shall be twice the diameter of the larger
pipe. The minimum spacing between any pipe and the overhead or side
portion of the culvert structures shall be 1.2m.

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17.2.3 Proximity to Occupied Building


The minimum distance between the pipelines and normally occupied buildings shall be
in accordance with BS 8010 section 2.8 sub-section-section 2.4.2.
17.2.4 Pipeline Trenches and Covers
a) The width of a pipeline trench shall be as narrow as practicable where
mechanical compaction is not required, the width of trench shall be typically pipe
O.D + 300mm, but may be reduced where narrow trenching techniques are
employed.

b) The trench bottom shall be prepared to give an even bed for the barrel of the pipe
and to ensure proper alignment.
c) In rocky ground, the trench shall be excavated at least 100mm deeper than
normally required and then made up to the required level by the addition of well
compacted, selected bedding material.
d) 600mm depth of cover will be sufficient in non-agriculture lands.
17.2.5 Impact Protection
a) All gas pipelines shall be buried.
b) Before the design of the pipeline is completed, pipeline external and internal
protection from corrosion, maintenance and inspection impact shall be
considered.
c) Provision of increased cover as a protection against external mechanical damage
or erosion shall be considered.
d) For anticipated subsidence, additional flexible joints, anchored joints, rafts or
piling shall be considered.
e) At crossings and areas where there is a likelihood of third party activities leading
to interference with the pipelines, the use of impact protection shall be required.
Impact protection may take the form of increased cover, concrete surround,
concrete slab over or similar construction.

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17.3 HIGH INTEGRITY PRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM (HIPPS)

17.3.1 Definition
High Integrity Pressure Protection System is a concept of replacing a mechanical
safety device, e.g. a pressure safety valve, with instruments, valves and logic.
17.3.2 Application
HIPPS may be applied in QP for the onshore gas distribution system if project
management demonstrate that: -
i) No other practicable alternative is available (i.e. the cost of alternatives is
unacceptably high (e.g. fully rated piping).
ii) Only clean hydrocarbons shall be transported within the HIPPS protected piping
system.
iii) Flaring shall be eliminated or significantly reduced
iv) Application for subsea pipeline systems has not yet been fully evaluated in the
petroleum industry and therefore application shall be limited to the onshore gas
distribution system.
Where a High Integrity Pressure Protection System is proposed a comprehensive reliability
study shall be undertaken by an independent consultant in which consideration shall be
given to: -
I. Hazard and failure rates.

II. Redundancy.

III. Voting system.

IV. The design of equipment for provision of on-line testing and maintenance.

Note: The reliability analysis shall be subject to a review and assessment by QP Technical
Safety prior to approval for application.
17.3.4 Valves And Pressure Transmitters
The HIPPS may consist of, as a minimum, two rapidly closing series mounted high
integrity valves and three independent pressure transmitters, which feed data to a
voting, based electronic trigger system.
17.3.5 Performance Standard
The Safety Integrity Level (SIL) for HIPPS systems shall not be less than level 4
excepting where risk analysis identifies that lower SIL levels may be accepted due to
the significance of the event consequences.

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18.0 CONSTRUCTION SAFETY & QUALITY

18.1 SAFETY

18.1.1 All personnel working on QP sites shall be subject to all laws, bylaws, regulations and
ordinances issued by the state of Qatar and/or any government authority with
jurisdiction related to the performance of the work, regarding the safeguarding of the
environment, accident prevention, job cleanliness, health and safety.

18.1.2 Those personnel shall strictly comply and shall cause its personnel and its
subcontractor personnel to strictly comply with all rules, guidelines, regulations,
procedures, programmes and policies of QP as set forth in the Qatar General
Petroleum Corporation Health Safety and Environmental Conservation Policy” of 31st
March 1994, the QP Environmental Protection Standards and the QP Safety
Regulations for Contractors.

18.1.3 A Health, Safety and Environment protection plan shall be prepared for construction
activities prior to commencement. The plan shall include the following topics:
a) Scope
b) Objectives
c) Safety Policy
d) Environmental Control
e) Site rules and procedures
f) Emergency procedures
g) Traffic routes
h) Heavy lifting operations
i) Construction hazard assessment
j) Method statement

18.1.4 Contractors personnel shall strictly adhere to Contractor’s Safety Management system
elements specified in the QP Safety Regulations for Contractors e.g. Assignment of
Safety Supervisor, Safety Training and awareness, Safety meetings, inspections,
personal protective equipment, safety and fire-fighting equipment etc.

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18.2 QUALITY

18.2.1 Quality of construction shall be managed by an approved quality assurance system.


18.2.2. Engineering construction quality shall be controlled by:
a) Civil inspection.
b) Dimensional control.
c) NDT.
d) E & I inspection.
e) Mechanical/structural/pipe inspection.
f) Welder qualification and approved welding procedure.
g) Implementing agreed project procedures.
h) Auditing.
1) Emergency Shutdown & Blow down system
• Emergency S/D
• Depressurisation
• Flares and vents
• Total plant shutdown
2) Drainage system
• Closed drains
• Open drains
3) Ventilation and air conditioning systems
• Natural and mechanical ventilation
• Air intakes and outlets
• Pressurised areas
• Ventilation of turbine enclosures
• HVAC system
4) Emergency power
• Emergency power supplies
• UPS system
• Emergency lighting

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5) Annunciation, alarms and communication systems


• Plant alarm system
• Plant status lights
• Hazard warning lights and beacons
• Telecommunications system
• Public address system
6) General plant safety
• Exit, egress and escape routes
• Noise and vibration
• Hot and cold surfaces
• Life saving appliances
• Personnel protective equipment
• Safety signs and plant identification
• Surveillance system
• Navigational aids
• Helicopter operations
• Fuel and chemical storage.

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19.0 UNITS OF MEASUREMENT

GENERAL

The use of various units of measurement shall be in accordance with SI requirements


refer BS 5555 and BS 350. For a full list of SI units and explanation of the SI system
reference to the standards above is necessary. A list of commonly used SI units and
allowable exceptions to the standards that may be used are listed below. These fall into
three categories as below.

ENGINEERING DESIGN

The following units shall be used for all design calculations and records purposes.

QUANTITY UNIT NAME STANDARD

NOTATION

BASE UNITS

Length metre m
Mass kilogram (gram) kg (g)
Time second s
Electric current ampere A
Temperature Kelvin K
Amount of substance mole mol
Luminous intensity candela cd

SUPPLEMENTARY UNITS
Plane angle radian rad
solid angle staradian sr

DERIVED UNITS
Frequency hertz Hz
Force Newton N
Pressure bar absolute bara
bar gauge barg
2 2
Stress newton/rnillirneter N/rnrn
2 2
kilo newton/metre kN/rn

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Energy, work and heat quantity joule J


Power, heat flow watt w
Electric charge coulomb C
Electric potential EMF volt V
Electric resistance ohm Ω
Electric conductance siemens S
Electric capacitance farad F
Magnetic flux weber Wb
Magnetic flux intensity tesla T
Inductance henry H
Luminous flux lumen lm
Illuminance lux lx
Dynamic viscosity centipoise cP
Kinematic viscosity metre2/second m
o
Temperature degree C
PERMANENT NON-SI UNITS

Time second / minute / hour / day s/m/h/d

Plane angle {degree / minute / second o/‘/“


2 2 2 2
Area millimetre (metre ) mm (m )
Volume litre l
3
cubic metre m
Mass tonne t
kilogram kg
Pressure bar bar
Velocity metre/second m/s

MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS

QUANTITY UNIT NAME NOTATION


STANDARD
Pipe sizes inch Inch or "
Length Metre m
Mass Kilogram or gram kg or g
Pipe schedule Refer ANSI 31.3 -

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INDEX

A
ACCESS WAYS .......................................................................................................................... 25

ADEQUATE VENTILATION ........................................................................................................ 10

AIR INTAKES ........................................................................................................................ 21, 62

AIRLOCK ............................................................................................................................... 18, 19

ALARM ANNUNCIATION............................................................................................................ 65

ALARM SYSTEM ........................................................................................................................ 29

ALARMS ........................................................................................................ 27, 33, 34, 48, 52, 65

ALUMINIUM ALLOYS ................................................................................................................. 24

ANEMOMETER........................................................................................................................... 79

AREA CLASSIFICATION ................................................................................................ 16, 20, 36

ATMOSPHERIC VENTS ............................................................................................................. 69

AUTHORISED TRAFFIC............................................................................................................. 17

B
BATTERY BACK-UP ................................................................................................................... 29

BATTERY ROOMS ..................................................................................................................... 19

BLAST WALLS ............................................................................................................................ 13

BREAK-GLASS ........................................................................................................................... 33

BREATHING APPARATUS................................................................................................... 82, 83

BUILDINGS ............................................................................................. 10, 24, 36, 64, 38, 40, 84

BULK STORAGE......................................................................................................................... 25

BURIED PIPELINES ................................................................................................................... 88

BURN PITS ................................................................................................................................. 72

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C
CALL POINT................................................................................................................................ 36

CASCADE BREATHING AIR SYSTEM ...................................................................................... 82

CENTRAL CONTROL ROOM (CCR).......................................................................................... 29

CODES AND STANDARDS .......................................................................................................... 8

COMBUSTION EXHAUSTS........................................................................................................ 21

CONTROL ROOM................................................................................... 24, 38, 49, 51, 65, 66, 83

CORPORATION’S SAFETY POLICY ......................................................................................... 10

CORROSION ................................................................................................................................ 9

D
DESIGN ACCIDENT EVENTS.................................................................................................... 14

DETECTOR ALARM SETTINGS ................................................................................................ 30

DETECTORS .............................................................................................................................. 31

DOUBLE BLOCK AND BLEED ....................................................................................... 46, 47, 48

DRAINS ........................................................................................................................... 23, 59, 92

DRILLING .................................................................................................................................... 59

DUTY PRESSURE ...................................................................................................................... 41

E
EGRESS...................................................................................................................................... 76

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT .................................................................................................. 17, 20

ELECTRICAL ISOLATION .......................................................................................................... 21

EMERGENCY BREATHING APPARATUS ................................................................................ 82

EMERGENCY ENTRANCES/EXITS........................................................................................... 26

EMERGENCY GENERATORS ................................................................................................... 68

EMERGENCY LIGHTING ........................................................................................................... 76

EMERGENCY POWER............................................................................................................... 68

EMERGENCY POWER............................................................................................................... 68

EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN ................................................................................ 10, 49, 53, 64,92

EMERGENCY VEHICLES..................................................................................................... 22, 25

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ESCAPE ROUTES .......................................................................................................... 33, 76, 80

ESCAPE SETS............................................................................................................................ 83

EX’D’ ........................................................................................................................................ 20

EXECUTIVE ACTION.................................................................................................................. 33

EXHAUST STACKS .................................................................................................................... 69

EXHAUSTS ..................................................................................................................... 17, 21, 23

EXPLOSION.................................................................................................. 12, 14, 36, 39, 40, 49

EXTERNAL STAIRWAYS ........................................................................................................... 76

EYEWASH................................................................................................................................... 83

F
FACILITIES DESIGN................................................................................................................... 10

FAULT CONDITION .................................................................................................................... 30

FAULTS ........................................................................................................................... 29, 44, 52

FIELD DETECTOR TYPES......................................................................................................... 30

FIRE AND GAS DETECTION ....................................................................... 26, 27, 33, 37, 48, 65

FIRE AND GAS DETECTION SYSTEM ..................................................................................... 29

FIRE DETECTION....................................................................................................................... 31

FIRE DIVISIONS ......................................................................................................................... 38

FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT.............................................................................................. 13, 44

FIRE PREVENTION .................................................................................................................... 13

FIRE RATED DIVISIONS ............................................................................................................ 39

FIRE SPREAD............................................................................................................................. 22

FIRE WATER PRESSURE.......................................................................................................... 40

FIRE WATER REQUIREMENT................................................................................................... 40

FIRE ZONE.............................................................................................................................. 5, 37

FIRE ZONES ............................................................................................................................... 37

FIRED HEATERS.................................................................................................................. 17, 24

FIRST AID EQUIPMENT............................................................................................................. 83

FIRST AID KITS .......................................................................................................................... 83

FIXED LADDERS ........................................................................................................................ 74

FLAME/ HEAT DETECTOR ........................................................................................................ 34


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FLAMMABLE GAS .................................................................................................... 12, 39, 51, 83

FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTOR ................................................................................................. 35

FLARES................................................................................................................. 9, 23, 24, 69, 71

FLASH POINT ................................................................................................................. 17, 21, 43

FOG SIGNAL............................................................................................................................... 78

G
GAS DETECTOR .................................................................................................................. 30, 63

GAS PIPELINES ......................................................................................................................... 89

GAS TIGHT DOOR ..................................................................................................................... 18

GAS TURBINE ENCLOSURE..................................................................................................... 35

H
HAND RAILING ........................................................................................................................... 75

HAZARDOUS AREA ....................................................................................................... 17, 18, 59

HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION .................................................................................... 21

HAZARDOUS AREA SCHEDULE .............................................................................................. 21

HAZARDOUS AREAS................................................................................................................. 16

HAZOP ........................................................................................................................................ 15

HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION PLAN............................................... 91

HEAT DETECTION ............................................................................................................... 31, 32

HEAT DETECTORS.................................................................................................................... 35

HELICOPTER APPROACH ........................................................................................................ 23

HELICOPTER OPERATIONS ..................................................................................................... 78

HELIDECK............................................................................................................................. 79, 80

HIGH INTEGRITY PRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM.......................................................... 90

HIGH RISK .................................................................................................................................. 11

HINGED DOORS ........................................................................................................................ 19

HSSD ........................................................................................................................................ 32

HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACE (HMI) ...................................................................................... 29

HVAC ........................................................................................................................................ 54

HVAC SYSTEM........................................................................................................................... 18

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HYDROGEN SULPHIDE (H2S) .............................................................................................. 9, 12

I
IDENTIFICATION PANELS......................................................................................................... 80

IGNITION....................................................................................................... 10, 12, 26, 36, 50, 72

IGNITION SOURCES.................................................................................................................. 17

INTERLOCKING DEVICES......................................................................................................... 75

ISOLATION ......................................................................................................... 10, 22, 42, 50, 75

K
KNOTTED ROPES...................................................................................................................... 81

L
LANDING AREA.................................................................................................................... 43, 79

LAY DOWN ................................................................................................................................. 10

LAYOUT ................................................................................................................................ 10, 31

LIFE BUOYS ............................................................................................................................... 81

LIFE JACKETS............................................................................................................................ 81

LIFE RAFTS ................................................................................................................................ 81

LOCAL EQUIPMENT ROOM ...................................................................................................... 40

LOW RISK ................................................................................................................................... 11

M
MACHINERY GUARDING........................................................................................................... 73

MAIN LIGHTS.............................................................................................................................. 78

MAINTENANCE ................................................................................ 18, 27, 44, 54, 59, 60, 75, 77

MAINTENANCE ACCESS........................................................................................................... 75

MANUAL ALARM CALL POINT .................................................................................................. 33

MANUAL ALARM CALL POINTS................................................................................................ 33

MATERIALS .......................................................................................................................... 10, 60

MEANS OF ESCAPE ................................................................................................ 10, 22, 26, 81

MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ...................................................................................................... 21

MECHANICAL ISOLATION......................................................................................................... 44

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MECHANICAL VENTILATION .................................................................................................... 18

MEDIUM RISK............................................................................................................................. 11

MESAIEED NGL PLANT AREAS................................................................................................ 66

METAL EMBRITTLEMENT ......................................................................................................... 24

MINIMUM JACKET IMPACT ABSORPTION CRITERIA ............................................................ 23

MINIMUM SEPERATION DISTANCES ...................................................................................... 24

MOBILE FIRE-FIGHTING EQUIPMENT..................................................................................... 84

N
NATURALLY VENTILATED ........................................................................................................ 21

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS................................................................................................................. 78

NON-HAZARDOUS AREA .................................................................................................... 19, 21

NON-SPARKING MOTORS ........................................................................................................ 20

O
OBSTRUCTION LIGHT......................................................................................................... 78, 79

OFFSHORE..................................................................................................................... 59, 81, 82

ONSHORE................................................................................................................................... 59

ONSHORE BUILDINGS .............................................................................................................. 38

ORIENTATION ............................................................................................................................ 23

P
PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION ................................................................................................... 38

PASSIVE STRUCTURAL FIRE PROOFING .............................................................................. 13

PERMIT TO WORK..................................................................................................................... 18

PERSONAL NOISE DOSES ....................................................................................................... 73

PHA ........................................................................................................................................ 14

PIPE LINE SYSTEM.................................................................................................................... 86

PIPELINE CORRIDOR................................................................................................................ 88

PIPELINE TRENCH .................................................................................................................... 89

PLANT AREA ...................................................................................................... 18, 30, 33, 59, 83

PLANT LAYOUT.............................................................................................................. 22, 36, 39

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PLANT ROADS ........................................................................................................................... 25

PLANT SAFETY .......................................................................................................................... 71

PLANT SHUTDOWN................................................................................................................... 30

PLATFORMS............................................................................................................................... 74

PORTABLE RADIOS................................................................................................................... 77

PORTABLE SAFETY EQUIPMENT...................................................................................... 83, 84

POSITIVE PRESSURISATION ................................................................................................... 60

POTENTIAL RISK ....................................................................................................................... 13

POWERLINE CORRIDORS ........................................................................................................ 88

PRE-DISCHARGE ALARM ......................................................................................................... 33

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS.......................................................................................... 14

PRELIMINARY SAFETY REVIEW ........................................................................................ 14, 15

PRESSURE ..................................................................................................................... 51, 59, 60

PRESSURISED AREAS.............................................................................................................. 64

PREVAILING WINDS .................................................................................................................. 23

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE ............................................................................................................. 4, 9

PRIMARY SOURCES OF HAZARD ........................................................................................... 17

PRIMARY STRUCTURES........................................................................................................... 23

PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY............................................................................................... 12, 13

PSR .................................................................................................................................. 14, 15

PUBLIC ADDRESS ..................................................................................................................... 77

PURGE GAS ............................................................................................................................... 72

Q
QP STATUS DISPLAY ................................................................................................................ 28

QUANTIFIED RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) ................................................................................ 14

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R
REPEAT ANNUNCIATOR PANELS ........................................................................................... 66

RISK FACTORS .......................................................................................................................... 10

ROADS ............................................................................................................................ 17, 22, 70

ROPE LADDERS ........................................................................................................................ 81

S
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM............................................................................................ 91

SAFETY RAILS ........................................................................................................................... 75

SAFETY SHOWERS ................................................................................................................... 83

SAFETY SIGNS .......................................................................................................................... 80

SAFETY STUDIES ................................................................................................................ 13, 14

SELF-CLOSING GATES ............................................................................................................. 74

SEPARATION DISTANCE .............................................................................................. 10, 23, 78

SEPARATOR PONDS................................................................................................................. 25

SHELTERED AREAS.................................................................................................................. 21

SHORT TERM EXPOSURE LIMIT ............................................................................................. 12

SMOKE DETECTORS ................................................................................................................ 32

SPARKS ...................................................................................................................................... 17

SPLASH ZONE ........................................................................................................................... 23

SPOOL PIECE ............................................................................................................................ 48

STAIRWAYS ............................................................................................................................... 74

STANDBY VESSEL..................................................................................................................... 82

STEADY NOISE LEVELS ........................................................................................................... 73

STORAGE ................................................................................................................................... 10

SUBMARINE PIPELINES............................................................................................................ 85

SUB-SEA PIPELINE AND CABLES............................................................................................ 79

SUBSIDIARY LIGHTS................................................................................................................. 78

SUPPLY BOATS ......................................................................................................................... 23

SUPPORT VESSELS.................................................................................................................. 23

SURFACE TEMPERATURE ..................................................................................... 17, 20, 21, 73

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SURVIVAL CRAFT...................................................................................................................... 80

T
TANK BUND WALLS................................................................................................................... 26

TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM ............................................................................................ 77

THERMAL BARRIERS ................................................................................................................ 13

THERMAL RADIATION............................................................................................................... 71

THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE ....................................................................................................... 12

TOE PLATES .............................................................................................................................. 74

TOTAL PLANT S/D ..................................................................................................................... 36

TOXIC GAS ............................................................................................. 22, 31, 69, 71, 80, 82, 83

TOXIC GAS DETECTOR ............................................................................................................ 36

TURBINE ENCLOSURES ........................................................................................................... 63

U
UNDERGROUND CABLES......................................................................................................... 88

UNITS OF MEASUREMENT....................................................................................................... 93

UPS/EMERGENCY BATTERY POWER..................................................................................... 69

V
VENTILATION ......................................................................................... 21, 34, 36, 39, 60, 63, 64

VERIFICATION AUDIT................................................................................................................ 15

VIBRATION ................................................................................................................................. 73

VOTING ....................................................................................................................................... 30

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W
WELLHEAD JACKETS.................................................................................................... 78, 80, 81

WIND SOCK.......................................................................................................................... 12, 79

Z
ZONE ........................................................................................................................................ 16

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REVISION HISTORY LOG

Revision Number:………1……. Date 24/10/2000

Item Revised: Rev. 1 – Issued for Approval as Corporate Standard


Whole document re-structured to meet the Corporate Standard
Document requirements and document re-numbered
From EP-S-01 to QP-PHL-S-001 rev. 1

Item Revised Rev. B – Issued for Comment (Planed Periodic update)


Document updated for clarification and extended to provide
information on Gas Distribution ESD, Pipelines, HIPPS systems
Ammendments identified by margin bar

Note:

The revision history log shall be updated with each revision of the document. It shall contain a
written audit trail of the reason why the changes/amendments have occurred, what the
changes/amendments were, and the date at which the changes/amendments were made.

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