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NOOΣ and Noein in the Homeric Poems

Author(s): K. von Fritz


Source: Classical Philology, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr., 1943), pp. 79-93
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/264293
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CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY
Volume XXXVIII APRIL 1943 Number 2

NOOMAND NOEIN IN THE HOMERIC POEMS


K. VON FRITZ

T of the Greek terms desig-


HE history respond to typical and rather primitive
nating knowledge or the acquisition experiences, situations, and reactions
of knowledge has a double interest. which are often described in early Greek
With the exception of the East Indians poetry, especially in Homer, and since
the Greeks are the only nation in the his- their origin from these experiences has
tory of the world which developed a com- greatly influenced the early development
plete scientific and philosophical termi- of a theory of knowledge in Greek philos-
nology entirely in its own language and ophy.
almost free from any foreign influence.' The second reason why the history of
Most of the terms used in Greek philoso- the Greek terms for knowledge is of some
phy and science are, therefore, either di- interest derives from the fact that this his-
rectly taken over from prephilosophical tory continues right down to the present
and prescientific language or are deriva- time, since a great number of modern phil-
tions from and adaptations of words be- osophical terms in this field are either di-
longing to this prephilosophical language. rectly borrowed from the Greeks or trans-
These words could not have been put to lated from their language. The changes of
such use if their meanings in prephilosoph- meaning which these have undergone in
ical language had not had some affinity the course of this long history were natu-
to the philosophical concepts which they rally not always deliberate but often in-
were later used to express. A study of the advertent. Such inadvertent changes
history of such terms offers, therefore, a often cause confusion. In order to distin-
unique opportunity for an inquiry into the guish the real philosophical problems from
connections between philosophical and the pseudo-problems arising from such
prephilosophical thought. This is especial- confusion, it seems useful to follow the
ly true of the words designating knowl- history of the terms so as to discover the
edge or the acquisition of knowledge, since, exact point at which the confusion started.
as B. Snell2 has shown, many of them cor- Most of the Greek words for knowledge
1 This does not, of course, mean that Greek philos- -To4?'a, Yv "u-0, w7CLS, avieVcUL, arropLv,
ophy and science were not influenced by foreign been thoroughly
thought. But the Greeks did not take over any for-
'rta-Hgg-have
'&,G,ua,
eign words directly into their philosophical and sci- analyzed in Snell's excellent book. But he
entiflc terminology, and there are only a very few omitted the words voi3s and vOcLv, per-
cases of little signiflcance in which a Greek term may
have been adopted as a direct translation of a foreign haps because the word voUS, from which
term. VOELV,voqjua, voqcts,etc., are derived, does
2 Bruno Snell, "Die Ausdrticke fiur den Begriff des
not mean "knowledge" or "acquisition of
Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie," Philo-
logische Untersuchungen, XXIX (1924). knowledge" but rather "mind" or "intel-
PHLOLOGY,XXXVIII, APRL,1943
ICLASSICAL 3 79
80 K. VON FRITZ

lect." Yet there can be hardly any doubt problems with which we are confronted in
that the verb voeZv and its derivations Homer are naturally somewhat different
designate certain ways of acquiring knowl- from those with which we shall have to
edge and that in this respect, therefore, deal in an analysis of philosophical texts,
Snell's book has left a gap. An attempt and since later literature is not quite free
to fill this gap in part was made by from philosophical influence, it seems ad-
J. Boehme.3 But his analysis, which, as visable to keep the two parts of our in-
its title indicates, starts from a more spe- quiry separate. The present article, there-
cial problem, is, as we shall see, neither fore, will confine itself to Homer. A sec-
complete nor free from error. Some of his ond article, which is to be published soon,
omissions and errors were supplemented will follow the history of the terms and of
or corrected in a review of his book by their derivations vo6u.ta, vo71qfs, bcavoEZtv,
B. Snell,4 who contributed some excellent etc., from Hesiod to Plato.
5aLavoLa,
observations. But even Snell in this case If there existed a universally accepted
does not ask what simple and everyday etymology of the word voiVS, it would be
experiences led to a distinction between advisable to start with a discussion of this
I6ELP,
E' v YL IKEY, and vOe?v in a language etymology. Since this is not the case, it
which shows no signs of the influence of seems preferable to begin with an analysis
abstract speculation, though he has used of the texts and to come back to the ques-
this approach with brilliant success in re- tion of possible etymologies later.6 But,
gard to other Greek words for knowledge. though our approach will be somewhat
There is also an interesting article by different, it seems appropriate to state
J. Stenzel.' He tried to determine the briefly the conclusions at which Boehme
meaning of voiVS and vOELvin early Greek arrived in his book.7 He states that voivs
philosophy by means of a reconstruction in Homer always means something purely
of the archaic way of thinking (das ar- intellectual or rather purely mental (rein
chaische Denken). Unfortunately, he con- intellektuell);8 he adds by way of explana-
fines himself entirely to the philosophical tion that vOeZvcan in no case be identified
texts; and even a man of his philosophical with any kind of sensual perception9 and
acumen cannot, in an attempt like this, that the voVSis always put in contrast
neglect with impunity the interconnection with emotion.10 He does not say expressly
between prephilosophical language and that the concept of voi3sand vOcLvnever
early philosophical terminology. If he had implies an element of volition, though his
analyzed the Homeric usage, he would, I statement that the voiVS is always "rein
believe, have discovered that the archaic intellektuell"might be taken to imply such
way of thinking, though in some respects a denial."
lacking modern differentiations, is neither Boehme further distinguishes three
so obscure nor so difficult to understand main meanings of the word vovis: (1)
as he thinks it is. It may therefore be "Seele als Trager seelischer Erlebnisse,"
worth while to make an attempt to fill the
6 See below, pp. 91 f-
gaps left by previous inquiries. Since the
7Op. cit.
3 Joachim Boehme, Die Seele und das Ich im Ho- 8Ibid., p. 27 (rein qeistiqe Bedeutung) and p. 53
merischen Epos (Berlin: Teubner, 1929). (rein intellektuell).
4 Gnomon, VII (1931), 77 f. 9 Ibid., pp. 24 fr.
10 pp. 52 ff.
Ibid.,
s Julius Stenzel, "Zur Entwicklung des Geistesbe-
griffes in der griechischen Philosophie," Die Antike, 11Cf. also Boehme's distinction between v6os and
I (1925), 244 ff. qpeves (ibid., pp. 44 and 54).
NOO AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERICPOEMS 81

which may perhaps be translated as "the There are a great many passages in the
soul as an organ of experiences"; (2) "Ver- Homeric poems in which the opinion is
stand," which can be either "mind" or expressed or implied that different indi-
"intellect" or "intelligence" or "under- viduals or nations have different voo. The
standing"; (3) "Plan," which is "plan" or locus classicus for this notion is the third
"iplanning."'12 In order to clarify these dis- line of the Odyssey: wroXXGv 7&cv
6a'vOpcwnrwv
tinctions, Snell"3pointed out that in the aarcEa KaL vOov eyvw. The word voOSin this
first case vo-vsmeans an organ, in the sec- line has been translated into English in a
ond and third case the function of this great many different ways: "their mind
organ but with the further difference that and ways,"'15"their ways and purposes,"''6
in the second case it means the function "their various temper,"'7 to take three
as such while in the third case it means the well-known translations at random. All
function at a given moment. The second the translators, however, seem to have
meaning, then, would correspond to the felt that the word implies both an intel-
present tense of a verb, the third to an lectual element and an element of voli-
aorist. We shall see later that there is tion. Indeed, it seems obvious that Odys-
much truth in this latter distinction; but seus is said to have discovered not a dif-
the Homeric poems do not contain any ferent grade of intelligence or a different
such abstract notions as "organ" or "func- type of intellect in different nations but
tion," and the difficulty encountered in rather a different outlook on and attitude
the attempt to translate Boehme's defini- toward life which expresses itself in ac-
tions into English shows that words like tions.
vois or Verstand have no exact equiva- A slightly different but closely related
lents in different languages. It seems meaning of voOScan be found in the Iliad
therefore preferable to follow a somewhat iv. 307. Nestor lines up the troops for
more empirical method and to begin with battle: the horsemen and chariots in
an analysis of outstanding passages in front, the infantry in the rear, the KaKOL in
which the words occur and with a tenta- the middle so that the latter will be com-
tive description or outline of the meanings pelled to stay in line and fight even against
which we encounter rather than with a their will. Then he exhorts the horsemen
definition or a direct translation.14 not to leave the ranks, whether it be in
12 Ibid., pp. 53 f. 13 Gnomon, p. 77. order to join battle with the enemy ahead
14 Recently there seems to have arisen a school of of the others or by holding back, since by
thought which contends that the traditional method of
determining the meaning of a term-namely, by an keeping the ranks closed they will make
analysis of outstanding and signiflcant passages in the impact of their attack much greater.
which it occurs and by making use of the results of
this analysis in the interpretation of other passages- Then he goes on to say: c16EKaLol lrporEpoL
is "subjective" or "arbitrary" and implies a vicious r6XEaS KaL TEUXE' hr'p,fov ToWE voov Ka'
circle. The suggestion is then made that it should be
replaced by the more objective method of statistics. CAu/v EvLaT,0,EOL The fact that
ExovrTs.
It should, however, be obvious that no intelligent sta- voosis here linked with Ou/o'smakes the in-
tistics can be made unless one has flrst a principle of
division, and this principle cannot be found except terpretation more difficult, since it is not
by intelligent observation. It is, on the other hand, certain from the outset to which aspect of
not true that the traditional method implies a vicious
circle. If a geometrical simile is to be used, it may 15 Homer's Odyssey, trans. L. Bigge-Wither (Ox-
rather be likened to a spiral, since a more and more ford, 1869).
complete understanding is reached as the investiga-
tion continually returns from the interpretation of
16 The Odyssey of Homer, trans. Earl of Carnarvon
larger contexts in which the word occurs to the word (London, 1886).
itself, and from the word as such to the interpretation 17 The Odyssey of Homer, trans. J. G. Cordery (Lon-
of larger contexts. don, 1897).
82 K. VON FRITZ

the desired attitude each one of the words ope's conceived. This thought of hers is
refers. But, since it is an attitude in nowise seemly. Therefore so long thy
battle which Nestor asks for, since in cheers and stores devour they as she this
connection with the tactical arrangements will retains."22 The same mixture of these
this attitude requires a certain intellectual two elements is also found in all those
understanding, and since OvAo'salways cases in which vo'oscan be translated by
designates a more passionate or emotional "attention,"23 "intention,"24 or "plan."25
part or function of the soul, it is clear that But it is natural that there are passages
in this case also vo'osimplies both an in- in which the intellectual element is em-
tellectual element and an element of voli- phasized and others in which the element
tion. There is further, just as in the first of volition is more in the foreground.
passage quoted, an implication that dif- When Circe says: ooL 66 nTs EV o-GeooLv
ferent individualsmay have differentVO'Ol. a'X47xros V'oS b,-r,26 she means that
But, in addition, the passage implies that Odysseus' clearness of mind has not been
the same individual may have different affected by her magical art,27while in the
6ootat different times. sentence o-v 6 ot vo'ov OVK EfrEXeo-o-aS28and
Both these peculiarities of the vo'oscan similar passages29 vo'os seems to mean
be followed a little further. The difference "will" or "wish." Yet the other element
in the vo'otof different individuals can be is never completely missing, since in the
used to characterize these persons, as, for first of the two passages quoted Odysseus'
instance, the Phaeacians by their voos clearness of mind finds its expression in
Geova?s,18 the Cyclopes by their lack of a his aims and actions, while in the second
god-fearing Po'os,19or Aias and Achilles by one, as in all those similar to it, vo'osdoes
their voos a 1V-.20
77 But an individualcan not mean a vague desire but a clearly
also have a certain kind of vo'osspecifically conceived aim and a vision of a way to its
in relation to another individual, as, for attainment.
instance, Odysseus' servants in regard to That these two elements can be found
Odysseus.2' in the concept of vo'oswas not unknown.
The inextricable connection of an in- In fact, most dictionaries indicate as
tellectual element with an element of vo- much. But, since some of Boehme's re-
lition in the concept of vo'osis perhaps marks30 tend to obscure the fact, it was
best illustrated by the passage in Odyssey necessary to restate it and to illustrate it
ii. 121 ff.: -rUawv o0v-Ls ouoa 'o',4ara lIl?7eXo- by examples, especially since these same
lrEL p717
VrL aap ,uv TfOVf
70)7'
y'va'a,
'ElC
U examples will prove useful in the further
f'Opa -yapo.LE' Y/0' 0V
ev_7o.
- y&p ouv LOTO' TE TEO' KaL course of our inquiry. To begin with,
KT7?,Icr' `bo TatL, O/pa KE KELP?7 TOVfOV ex 22 Bigge-Wither, op. cit. (Italics are mine.)
Poop o'riva oL vvv 'v a6e71oEaL TLOELo OEoL,
23 I. vii. 447. This meaning is very rare in Homer;
cf. also below, p. 91.
which one writer translates as follows: 24 E.g., Od. iv. 256 and 493.

"Of these not one such notions as Penel- 25 E.g., II. ix. 104-5: oi yap rts v6ov &XXovl.j.eeiova TOUOf
vo0uet olov &yi voiw si,d srAXatno' 9Lral KiP; cf. also II. xv
18 Odyssey vi. 121: in the passage quoted, Odysseus 509, and Od. v. 23; xxiv, 497.
is wondering whether he will flnd the inhabitants of 26 Od. x. 329.
the island to have a v6oS Oeovlis, but from what follows 27 See also Boehme, op. cit., p. 53, n. 2, and below,
it is clear that the vMoS OeovOisis as characteristic of the p. 87.
Phaeacians as the V6OS&7n7vis of Achilles and Aias, etc.
28 . xxiii. 149.
19 Od. ix. 176.
29 Cf. It. viii. 143; xvi. 103; xx. 25; Od. xxii. 215;
20 Iliad xvi. 35; xxiii. 484; cf. also Od. xviii. 381. etc.
21 E.g., Od. xxi. 205. 30 See above, p. 80.
NOO: AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERIC POEMS 83

Boehme's distinction between voos as ing function and the function at a given
"soul" and voos as "mind" or as an organ moment, therefore, seems most ade-
and its function seems not very ade- quate,36 especially since this covers also
quate.31 There is no evidence anywhere the meanings "attention" and "inten-
in the Homeric poems that the vo'oswas tion." It is, however, perhaps pertinent
conceived of as a separate entity in anal- to add that even in this latter use, which
ogy to the 4lvX7',which after the death of corresponds to the aorist of the verb, the
a person goes to another place and lives word vo'osnever means a purely momen-
there by itself. Boehme himself quotes32 tary decision but always implies some
as evidence for the meaning "soul," kind of long-range vision.
among a great many similar examples, the Since everywhere, then, the word voos
passages Odyssey i. 3 and x. 329, which we seems to designate a function rather than
have analyzed above.33 But it is difficult anything else, it is perhaps permissible to
to believe that the omeric Odysseus turn to the verb vaeOvin the hope of find-
should have discovered different types of ing in its analysis the key to our main
souls or different organs of knowledge in problem, though from the linguistic point
different nations. It is much more likely of view the verb is clearly secondary.37
that he found their minds to function dif- Boehme, as we have seen,38 contends
ferently. In the Circe passage, on the that there is no emotional element what-
other hand, it is absolutely impossible to ever in the vo'osand that in fact it always
distinguish between organ and function; appears as the very opposite of emotion.
and the same is true of Boehme's other He explains an expression like xaLpe 0 3
examples. All that we can say, therefore, as referring to "purely intellectual joy,"
is that the Homeric Greeks did not make which, he declares, is not an emotion.40 I
the rather abstract distinction between an do not know whether there is such a thing
intellectual organ and its function34 but as purely intellectual joy-perhaps in
that if they had made the distinction they analogy to Spinoza's amor intellectualis
would probably have considered the vo'os Dei-but I am quite sure that no such
a function rather than an organ.
36Gnomon, p. 77; cf. also above, p. 81.
Snell's distinction between the function 37It is certainly a strange fact requiring some ex-
as such and the function at a given mo- planation that the verb voeiv is derived from the
ment is much more to the point. One noun v6os, though the latter, as we have seen, clearly
designates a function, so that we should expect the
might object that in those cases in which opposite relation between noun and verb on analogy
voos means "plan" it designates the re- to the similar cases of PyvyP6cKeLV and yP61A7vor ricTra(rOaL
and ZirLaTT5,I71. But this difflculty must not prevent us
sult of a function rather than the function from beginning our analysis with the verb, since it
itself. Yet the passages in which the is quite possible that the verb, though secondary, has
preserved an earlier stage of the development of the
word vo'os occurs in this sense35 seem to meaning of v6os, just as, for instance, Canadian
indicate that even then it designates not French has preserved certain peculiarities of the
French language of the seventeenth century which
so much a ready-made plan but a plan in have disappeared in the language of the motherland.
the process of being conceived or elabo- In the present case this is all the more likely, since
the verb would naturally better preserve the func-
rated. Snell's distinction between the last- tional character of the original meaning of the root
than would the noun, and since actually the noun, as
31 op. cit., p. 56. we shall see, shows a much greater variety of meaning
32 Ibid., p. 54. 33 See above, p. 81. than the verb. As to possible explanations of the de-
34 One may perhaps add that a great many philos- rivative character of the verb see below, pp. 92
ophers from Aristoxenos to the present time also have and 93.
rejected this distinction on philosophical grounds. 38 See above, p. 80.
35 See esp. II. ix. 104-5. 39 Od. viii. 78. 40 Op. cit., p. 53.
84 K. VON FRITZ

mystic notions can be found in Homer. seem even more surprising: (1) Without
There may be a joy the cause of which is exception, in all those cases in which the
purely intellectual, though even this is by verb voe-lvhas a direct and concrete ob-
no means the case in the passages which ject47 violent emotion is caused by the
Boehme quotes from Homer,41 but the joy voeLv. (2) In all those cases in which the
itself would still remain an emotion. In verb has a direct and concrete object the
his desire to stress the antagonism be- verb is used in the aorist. These interre-
tween vo'osand emotion-perhaps under lations, however, are not reversible. The
the influence of Plato's distinction of vo'os, verb is not infrequently used in the aorist
OvAIos,and 17rLOvALat-Boehme has over- where no emotion is involved. Likewise,
looked and obscured a factor which is ab- violent emotion may follow where there
solutely fundamental for an understand- is no direct and concrete object.
ing of the essence and origin of the early Since, considering the very great num-
concept of v'os. ber of passages involved, what we have
If we take at random three passages observed can hardly be a mere coinci-
from the third book of the Iliad in which dence, we must look for an explanation of
the verb voe-lvoccurs, we find the follow- these facts. Actually, what at first sight
ing evidence: (1) To'v 5's oiv 6vorE' may seem somewhat mysterious is not
ap74cAXos MEvfXaos cpXolue6ov lrpolrapoLoEv very difficult to explain. All the cases in
61iXov AIaKpLaIt3av'ra "s TE Xwiv e'Xa'p?7*42 which the verb PoE6voccurs and in which
(2) Tov 5' s ou'v ivoraev 'AMXcavbpos0EOeLtb5s it has no direct and concrete object can
Ev irpoIaXoLol4 q4avrEva, KaTE7rXacLyIckLXov be brought under one of two heads: the
irOp 43 (3) KacLp Ws o'v EvonoE OEas IrEpt- object of the verb voELv,whether it be ex-
LELprIv afT7OEAa0' LIEpoevTa KaL ojtta-ra
KaXXcfa
pressly mentioned or merely to be under-
,iapMiaLpol'ra, 0a3r aE." In all three cases stood, either is a situation rather than a
the verb is followed by a verb express- concrete thing48 or else it is an intention
ing violent emotion. In fact, this is the
xvii. 116, 483, 486, 682; xxiv. 294, 312; Od. vii. 290;
case in about one-fourth of all the pas- viii. 271, 533; x. 375; xi. 572, 601; xiii. 318; xv. 59;
sages in which the verb voE6v occurs in xvi. 5; xviii. 228, 309; xx. 367. It is clear that when
Priam on his way to Achilles sees a good omen (II.
Homer. If one adds to these the cases xxiv. 294), when Odysseus for the first time after a
in which the fact that voE6vcauses a vio- long absence sees the smoke of his house (Od. i. 58),
when Hector sees the chariot and horses of Achilles
lent emotion does not need to be expressly (II. xvii. 483), or when Helios discovers Ares and
stated because it follows immediately Aphrodite in flagranti delicto, they feel strong emo-
tions, whatever their character in a given case may
from the situation,446 one finds that more be, though the poet does not and need not expressly
than half of all the passages with voPv mention the fact. These cases, therefore, as well as
all the others enumerated in this note, belong in the
imply violent emotion. The following ob- same category as those mentioned in the preceding
servations, however, may at first sight note, though this cannot be proved by statistics con-
cerning the occurrence of certain speciflc words.
41 When Agamemnon (Od.viii.78) rejoices over the 47 By "direct and concrete object" I mean, for in-
violent quarrel between Odysseus and Achilles, one stance, a human being, an animal, a house, a river,
can hardly say that the cause of his joy is "purely smoke, or the like, but not, for instance, &XXain the
intellectual." frequent expression &XX' 6,ocr,E,where &XXameans "an-
42 11. iii. 21 ff. 43 Ibid. 30 ff. 44 Ibid. 396ff. other plan." I do not, of course, include the cases in
45 Ibid. v. 669, 711; vi. 470, 485; xi. 248; xii. 143, which the verb is negatived, since emotion naturally
will be caused by VoeiV and not by oi VoeV.
393; xv. 395; xx. 419; xxi. 49, 418, 527, 550; xxii. 136,
463; xxiv. 700; Od. i. 322; iv. 148, 653; vi. 163; xii. 49 This is the case in the following instances: II.
248; xvii. 301, 576; xix. 233, 552; xx. 204; xxiv. 232. iii. 374; v. 312, 680; viii. 91, 132; ix. 223; xi. 343; xv.
46Il. ii. 391; iv. 200; v. 95, 590; vii. 17; viii. 10; x 453, 649; xvii. 483; xx. 246, 291; xxiii. 305; Od. vi. 67;
224, 550; xi. 284, 521, 575, 581, 599; xii. 335; xv. 422; viii. 94; xvi. 136; xvii. 193, 281; xxi. 257.
NOO AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERICPOEMS 85

or a plan.49 It is the first of these two son why the verb voe-tv,when it has a di-
groups that gives the answer to our prob- rect and concrete object, is always sur-
lem. When Paris sees Menelaus,50it is not rounded by expressions of emotion. For a
the sight of Menelaus as such that strikes single and concrete object does not ordi-
him but the realization that Menelaus has narily suggest a whole situation unless its
no more ardent desire than to take re- sight strikes us suddenly with some im-
venge by killing him on the battlefield. pact. The suddenness then naturally calls
When Menelaus discovers Paris,5" he is for the aorist, while the impact with which
struck by the realization that now at last it strikes naturally results in emotion.
he may have an opportunity to avenge It is also quite clear why the interrela-
himself. When Helen is stunned at the tion is not reversible.54 Where the abbre-
sight of her visitor,52 it is because of her viated expression is not used, there need
sudden realization that this is not an old be neither suddenness nor emotion, as, for
woman but a goddess. In other words, in instance, in the many cases in which a
each of these cases the concrete object is person describes and explains a situation
only the incident through which a charac- and then adds: VOEElS U Kal ai-6's ("but you
ter suddenly realizes the full meaning of a understand [or "you realize"] this [the
situation. This situation is the real object situation] yourself").55 But nothing, on the
of the mental act designated by the verb other hand, compels the poet to use the
vOEYv. It is nothing but an abbreviated and abbreviated expression (in which refer-
more concentrated expression when the ence to the situation as such is replaced
description of the situation is replaced by by mention of the object in which the situ-
the object in which the situation is fo- ation is focused) always when he makes a
cused.53 This is also the very simple rea- situation strike a person with a sudden
impact.56
49 See II. i. 343 ("to have foresight and hindsight,"
but with stress on the ability to plan), 545, 577; vii. So far, then, our investigation shows
358; ix. 105; xii. 232; xv. 81; xx. 310; xxii. 235; xxiii. that there are two basic meanings of the
140, 193; xxiv. 560; Od. ii. 382, 393; iii. 27; iv. 795;
v. 170, 188; vi. 112; vii. 299; xvi. 409; xviii. 184, 230, word voEYv: to realize a situation and to
242, 344. plan or to have an intention. What is the
50 Il. iii. 30 ff.; see above, p. 84.
interconnection between these two mean-
51 Ibid. iii. 21 ff. 52 Ibid. iii. 396 ff.

53 In the passage II. iii. 21 ff., for instance, Paris'


ings? Is one of them derived from the
"sensual perception" of Menelaus and his realization other? Or are both of them derived from
of the dangerous situation in which he flnds himself the same root? Or are they derived from
happen in his mind at the same instant and are psy-
chologically hardly separable. This is the reason why different roots which merely by the coin-
what is actually the object of sensual perception or of cidence of phonetic developments pro-
recognition can grammatically become the object of
the verb voeTv. Much more instructive, however, are
some other passages. In Od. iv. 78 ff. Menelaus tells this action is not the real object of Penelope's vOELp
Telemachus of his own wanderings, then mentions but rather the contrast of the behavior of the geese
Odysseus, who has not yet come home after so many with what she saw and heard in her dream.
years. When Telemachus hears the name of his father, 54 See above, p. 89.
he begins to weep. Having told so much, the poet
goes on to say: v67o- be yv MevEXaos (iv. 116). Here
65 E.g., Od. xxi. 257; cf. also II. i. 577; xxiii. 305;
it is quite clear that the poet does not mean that now Od. xvi. 136; xvii. 193, 281.
for the flrst time Menelaus notices Telemachus: he 56 The poet can, for instance, say: "when he no-
has been talking to him all the time. N67oe Si lAuv means ticed that Menelaus was going to attack he trembled"
that he saw him weeping, that is: he saw how he was instead of saying "when he noticed M. he trembled";
affected: he realized the situation. Another very in- but he never says in quiet discussion and where there
structive example is to be found in Od. xix. 552. Here is no emotion involved: "you notice M.," but al-
the object xjvas is connected with a participle so that ways: "you notice that. . ..,""you notice how
the action of the geese which Penelope iv677er is di- .... or "you notice this" where "this" means a
rectly expressed. But the context shows that even situation and not a concrete object.
86 K. VON FRITZ

duced words of different meaning but and POElV in Homer are used in the sense
identical appearance? The last of these of plan or planning it is almost always in
possibilities can be eliminated from the consequence of the realization of a dan-
outset, since, as we have seen, an element gerous situation. This may be significant;
of volition and an intellectual element are for a situation of this kind naturally at
so closely connected in the concept of voos once suggests a plan to escape it, to over-
that the double aspect of the word can come it, or to make use of it. This plan
hardly be due to chance.57 But all the then appears in the form of a vision which,
other possibilities have to be seriously so to speak, extends the present situation
considered. into the future. Since, furthermore, in
The survey given in notes 45, 46, 48, situations of this kind the plan and the in-
and 49, covering all the cases in which the tention to carry it out are psychologically
word occurs in Homer, shows that in identical, this would also explain vociv in
about four-fifths of all cases vocZJvmeans the sense of having an intention and so
to realize a situation and only in about would, at the same time, show how the
one-fifth to plan or to have an intention. volitional element gradually creeps in.
The evidence concerning the noun voos is A similar, though not identical, transi-
much less clear, since, as a comparison of tion may also be observed in the use of
different modern translations shows, in the word voos. In the expression ai8pELpoLt
the majority of the cases involved trans- voowo6'the voos of Epicaste is blunted by
lators disagree as to whether the intellec- ignorance of a relevant fact so that she
tual element or the element of volition is does not understand the situation, name-
preponderant, so that there is no such ly, that she is about to marry her own
clear-cut distinction possible between two son. When Agamemnon says that Mene-
different meanings as in the case of the laus held back ovSr'OKVq E'LKCK)OvTr a4pa68pc7L
verb. Yet, at closer scrutiny, the evidence voOLO,62 he explains later that Menelaus
seems sufficient for the solution of our acted in this way because he did under-
problem: (1) We have seen above58 that stand the situation, namely, that Aga-
one of the meanings of voos in which the memnon and not he was the leader. But in
volitional element is strongest, namely, connection with OKVPCE'LKCV the expression
"wilful attention," is still very rare in a'pa8Lpc7t voowo means also that Menelaus
Homer and becomes more frequent only did not suffer from a lack of resolution. In
in later writers.59 We shall see later that this case the transition from "lack of un-
in all the other cases also in which the derstanding" to "lack of resolution" is es-
volitional element seems absolutely preva- pecially clear. Finally, in the expression
lent the intellectual element is stronger -TOXVKEP8EL1?7L vooLo63 the greed for gain
than most translations express.60 (2) It is has blunted the voos, but because the voos
important to restate the fact that voos itself is concentrated on gain. Here, then,
never means a momentary decision but, the volitional element has come to the
even when it can be translated by "wish" foreground.
or "will," always implies some long-range No such easy transition, it seems, can
plan or vision. (3) What is perhaps most be found from the volitional to the intel-
important, since this meaning is much lectual element in the concept of voos.
more frequent in Homer, wherever voos Theoretically one might think that the re-
57 See also below, p. 92. 59See n. 23 above. alization of a situation might be the result
58 See above, p. 82. 60 See below, p. 92. 61Od. xi. 272. 62
II. X. 122. 63 Od. xxiii. 77.
NOO AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERICPOEMS 87

of watchful attention and that this might ful attention the two mental acts are al-
form the link of transition between the vo- ways carefully distinguished.67
litional and the intellectual element in the In conclusion, then, we may say that,
concept. But voe-tv never means "to as far as Homer is concerned, there is no
watch," though Boehme, in strange con- trace whatever of a transition from the
trast to his assertion that the voosis al- meaning of planning to that of realization
ways "purely intellectual," says that it of a situation but that there is definite
does.64 He argues on the basis of his in- evidence for the possibility of a transition
terpretation of a scene in the Iliad,65 in the opposite direction. Since there is no
where, at the critical moment of a duel earlier Greek literature than Homer, any
between Paris and Menelaus, Aphrodite investigation into the earlier history of the
suddenly intervenes and snatches her fa- term leads into the field of linguistic specu-
vorite from the hands of his enemy. The lation. It seems wise to remain for a while
poet adds that Paris would have met with on the more solid ground of the Homeric
certain death: EL,u) ap' 4b P6?o1vE AloS usage.
OvuyaT7rrp 'AOpo6LrT7. According to Boehme, It is now possible to define more ac-
this means: "if she had not watched the curately the relation between the intellec-
whole duel closely." But it would have tual and the emotional element in the
been very ridiculous to make the goddess, concepts of voos and vocPv. We have seen
who later takes great pains to restore that vocLvin a majority of the passages in
Paris to his full beauty, watch the duel which it occurs, but by no means always,
with close attention but without interfer- is followed by violent emotion. Yet
ing until her favorite is in a most deplor- Boehme is not wrong when he contends
able state and his good looks greatly im- that it is not only in Plato and in Stoic
paired. It is therefore quite clear that the philosophy that the voosis contrasted with
words EL u? 'ap' 6ob P677Ye do not mean "if emotion but that traces of this contrast
she had not watched" but "if she had not can also be found in Homer.68 There are
suddenly clearly seen or realized the im- undoubtedly passages in Homer in which
minent danger." A survey shows that this the poet says or implies that the voos is
is the meaning in all the passages in which dulled or blunted by emotion.69 But this
the expression 4v6 PO?77E occurs.66 But not seeming contradiction is not difficult to
only does voELv itself never mean "to explain. The realization of a situation,
watch" but in the overwhelming majority even when it strikes us with a sudden im-
of the cases found in Homer the realiza- pact which causes strong emotion, often
tion of a situation designated by VOElV iS raises us above our ordinary abilities,
not even the result of watching or of wilful makes us see all the implications and con-
attention but is either the result of a vivid sequences of the situation with unwonted
impression that comes to the mind from A passage excellently suited to illustrate this
67

the outside and with a sudden impact or point is II. xxii. 90 ff. Hector had watched Achilles as
he was drawing nearer and nearer and had taken the
of a slow process in which the different firm resolution to fight him in single combat. But
elements which come to the knowledge of when Achilles was right upon him, brandishing his ter-
rible spear, fear seized Hector is iv6ae. In this
the subject gradually form a concrete pic- sage there can be no doubt whatever that Hector pas- had
ture of the situation. Finally, in those few both seen and closely watched Achilles long before;
and yet only when Achilles was right before him
cases in which VOEaVis preceded by watch- that is, only then he realized what it meant to b6qae,flght
this man.
64 op. cit., p. 26. 65 E. 370 ff. 68 Op. cit., pp. 53 f.
66 V. 312, 680; viii. 91, 132; xi. 343; xv. 649; xx. 291. 69 See the passages discussed ibid., esp. p. 53, n. 2.
88 K. VON FRITZ

clarity, and makes us act with unusual de- yL-yV'O-KELV.73 The term lbe-v covers all the
termination and foresight. But it is also cases in which something comes to our
possible that the emotional impact with knowledge by the sense of vision, includ-
which the realization of an imminent dan- ing the case in which this object remains
ger, for instance, strikes us dulls and ob- indefinite: for instance, a green patch or a
scures our minds so that our actions seem brown patch the shape of which we can-
to lack co-ordination. In the first case the not quite distinguish.The term7y7VC'TKELV,
emotion helps the transition from a vision on the other hand, designates specifically
of the present to a vision of the possibili- the recognition of this object as some-
ties of the future-or, in other words, from thing definite: for instance, a shrub, or a
voEIv in the sense of realization of a pres- mound, or a human being.74 This recogni-
ent situation to voe?vin the sense of plan- tion implies, of course, the classification
ning or vision of the future. In the second of the object under a general concept.
case the emotion proves inimical to the Snell has pointed out75 that if there is an
voos or understanding by which it was etymological connection between 7t7vC'-
caused and stops it short in the first phase O-KELVand yt-veo-Gatit may be explained by
of its functioning. This shows that one the fact that only when the indefinite some-
must interpret these passages from the thing is classified does it come into being, so
psychological point of view and that it is to speak, as a definite object.76 The term
faulty logic to conclude that voe?vcan voEcv,then, signifies a further step in the
never occur alongside emotion, because recognition of the object: the realization,
emotion sometimes obscures the voos. for instance, that this brown patch is not
Most interesting, however, is the rela- only a human being but an enemy lying
tion between the concept of voetvand the in ambush. This latter realization, if we
concept of perception. Snell,70 Krause,7 use our modern terminology, is, of course,
and many others have rightly stressed the a purely mental act and does not belong
fact that in the Greek language the notion to sensual perception proper. The Ho-
of voe?vhas an especially close relation to meric Greeks did not think in such ab-
the sense of vision. Boehme, on the other stract terms. But we need no longer be
hand, contends72 that from the very be- surprised that they clearly distinguished
ginning voEcLvwas carefully distinguished between the vision of a brown patch, its
from any kind of sensual perception-in recognition as a human being, and the re-
other words, that it always designates a alization that this human being is an ene-
purely mental act. He fails to explain my lying in ambush, since this distinction
how in a period and in a literature which 73 "Die Ausdrucke," pp. 24 ff.
otherwise show no sign of a high degree of 74 The Homeric language has, of course, no special

abstract thinking, so abstract a distinc- word which designates exclusively the perception of
indeflnite shapes or color patches which have not yet
tion could not only be made but unfail- been identifled or classifled as deflnite objects. As in
all languages, the word which designates "sensual vi-
ingly applied in all cases by the Homeric sion" is also used for the perception of a deflnite ob-
poets. We are now able to give this ex- ject. But whenever the act of recognition as a deflnite
object is distinguished from or added to the mere per-
planation. Snell has given a brilliant anal- ception of a yet unidentified shape the word yvpCvat
ysis of the difference between le'tv and is used.
75 "Die Ausdruicke," pp. 21 f.
70 Gnomon, p. 77. 76 The attempt to connect the word yvGxva&with
6voja, nomen, "name," is now rejected by most schol-
71 Deutsche Literaturzeitung, XLVIII (1) (1927),
1049. ars for linguistic reasons. Otherwise the assumption
that there is some connection would be very tempting,
72 Op. cit., pp. 24 ff. since it is by being named that an object is classified.
NOO2 AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERIC POEMS 89

results directly from very simple everyday complicated than the case discussed
experience. II above, in which this mental act adds
There is, however, another case which simply a further element to the recogni-
deserves special attention, since it is of tion, for instance, of a brown patch as a
very great importance for the history of human being. But all the cases discussed
the terms vovsand vo&Ev in Greek philos- are psychologically sufficiently closely re-
ophy. In the case just now discussed, lated to make us understand without dif-
what was first recognized indifferently as ficulty how the meaning of the term voEtv
a human being reveals itself on closer scru- could be extended to cover all of them.
tiny as an especially important category The fact that the cases which involve a
of human being, namely, an enemy with correction of the first impression are much
the intention of doing harm to us; but it less frequent in Homer than those of the
remains a human being nevertheless. In simpler type may perhaps be considered
the case of Helen and Aphrodite, men- sufficient evidence to indicate that the
tioned above,78 what appeared first as an more complicated type marks a later stage
old woman, that is, a human being, reveals in the history of the meaning of the term,
itself as a goddess, that is, as something especially since the extended meaning was
very different from a human being. 7 to become prevalent in early Greek philos-
Similar, though not identical, is the case ophy, where it acquired great importance
in which someone considers a human be- in the development of a theory of knowl-
ing as friendly because it approaches him edge.
with friendly words and gestures, and re- Some further observations may be
alizes only later, and when it may be too added. When we realize that a human
late, that evil intentions were hidden be- being who at first seemed indifferent or
hind the friendly appearance. 80 Both friendly has evil intentions, we arrive at
cases have in common the fact that the this discovery in the course of a mental
first recognition or classification turns out process which involves a certain amount
to be deceptive and has to be replaced by of reasoning and, one may say, logical de-
another and truer recognition which, so duction. There is something in the ges-
to speak, penetrates below the visible sur- tures and behavior of a man, some inflec-
face to the real essence of the contem- tion in his voice, some expression in his
plated object and at the same time, by face, etc., which first arouses our suspi-
means of this new and corrected recogni- cion and finally, taken together with other
tion, reveals a situation of great emotion- observations, leads us to the conclusion
al importance.81 These cases in which the that behind his friendly appearance there
mental act designated by vOELCimplies a are evil intentions. The process through
correction or reversal of the first impres- which we arrive at this conclusion may re-
sion are, of course, different and more quire considerable time, but the realiza-
77 As to a possible still more remote origin of the tion itself that this is an enemy usually
application of the term v6oS to this kind of experience comes like a flash. We suddenly "see" or
see below, p. 93.
78 See above, p. 87. "feel," or sometimes mistakenly believe
79 For similar cases see, e.g., Od. i. 322; iv. 653; etc. we see, what he is aiming at. We are then
80 E.g., II. xix. 112. much more conscious of this sudden reali-
81 Boehme (op. cit., p. 61), Snell (Gnomon, p. 77),
and many others considered this the original and
zation, which has the appearance of a
most characteristic meaning of Ofeiv; but the evi- "perception," than of the mental process
dence shows that it belongs to a later stage of the de- which has led to it. This may seem to
velopment and became prevalent only in certain sec-
tions of pre-Socratic philosophy. apply especially to those cases in which
90 K. VON FRITZ
the verb voEZvis used in the aorist. But -OsEIvmean the recognition of the true na-
a similar observation can be made in all ture or essence of a thing as against its
those cases in which the verb is used in surface appearance, there is no room for
the present tense. Stress is then always a difference in the vo'o of different peo-
laid on the visualization of the situation ple, since the truth is but one. But when
as a whole, not on the process of reasoning and where voos and vo&Evmean the way
by which we may gradually arrive at in which a situation is perceived or con-
this visualization.82 Finally, where JoEv sidered (one may also say, "what a situa-
means planning, it is the visualization of tion means to a person") and the immedi-
the plan which we see unfold, not a proc- ate reaction to this situation,85 it is quite
ess of reasoning by which its usefulness or natural that we should find different voot
the necessary interdependence of its dif- in different individuals and nations. For
ferent parts might be demonstrated.3 the realization that those human beings
While, therefore, as pointed out above,84 over there on the wrecked ship are stran-
vo,Ev is always distinguished from purely gers has an entirely different meaning to
sensual perception, it is not conceived of the Laestrygonians and to the Phaeacians.
as the result of a process of reasoning, Since in cases like this what a thing means
much less as this process itself, but rather to a person, what the person "sees" in the
as a kind of mental perception, if this ex- thing, and the person's reaction to it are
pression is allowable. In other words, it psychologically inextricably connected, it
may, in some way, appear as a kind of is easy to understand how this latter
sixth sense which penetrates deeper into meaning of "active reaction" sometimes
the nature of the objects perceived than comes in. 86 When, for instance, the poet
the other senses. This connotation of the says that a man has a voos 0EoV6Is,87 he
term was to become of great importance means primarily that this man reacts with
in early Greek philosophy. It is also very at'c's to the presence or appearance of a
important to be aware of the fact that god; but this implies also that a god
originally, and in Homer, voPs never means more to him and that he sees more
means "reason" and voELv never "to rea- in a god than a man who has not a voos
son," whether deductively or inductively. GIEOVU7S.
Let us then turn back for a moment to It is perhaps partly in connection with
those passages in Homer in which differ- cases like this that still another extension
ent vo'o are attributed to different indi- of the meaning of voos was gradually de-
viduals and nations or to the same indi- veloped. The difference in the voos of a
vidual at different times. Where voos and 0Eov6?7S a4vi7p and of a man who is not god-
82 E.g., 11. . 577; xxiii. 305; Od. iv. 148; xvi. 136; fearing is permanent in the sense that
xvii. 193, 281; xviii. 223; xx. 309, 367. they will react differently whenever cer-
83 So, e.g., very clearly II. ix. 105. The same is true tain objects come to their notice or cer-
of the passages (e.g., II. ix. 600; xx. 234; Od. v. 188)
in which v'oetv means "to have an intention." In tain situations arise. But as the notion
these cases also it is very easy to see that the vision develops that the gods are ever present
of the intended action is stressed and not the process
of reasoning by which a person may arrive at his reso-
or keep always a watchful eye on mortals
lution. Where, on the other hand, a person deliberates 85 This use of the word v6os, by the way, becomes
concerning his future course of action, this process of very rare in later authors (some instances of it can
deliberation is never described by the word voetv but be found in Theognis) and does not occur in philo-
by a number of different words, most of them derived sophical texts, while it is rather frequent in Homer.
from the root Opev (cf. also B. Snell, "Das Bewusstsein This confirms the observation made in n. 81.
von eigenen Entscheidungen im frtihen Griechentum,"
Philologus, LXXXV [1930], 141 ff.). 86 See above, p. 81 f.
84 See above, p. 88. 87 Od. vi. 121; viii. 576; ix. 176; xiii. 202; etc.
NOO2 AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERIC POEMS 91
the voos OEovb's of a man will express itself ed to the case just analyzed. Any full re-
not only in the a&bas with which he reacts alization of a situation implies a mental
whenever he is in the presence of a god vision, which not only penetrates deeper
but also and preponderantly in the fact but also "sees farther" both in space and
that he is more often or always aware of in time than our eyes.9' This voos which
the ever present watchfulness with which "makes far off things present"92was also
the gods follow his actions. It is therefore to become of great importance in Greek
perhaps not a mere coincidence that one philosophy. In Homer it is perhaps most
of the very rare cases88 in which voos beautifully illustrated by the simile in the
seems to have the meaning of "wilful at- Iliad93 where a traveler "who has trav-
tention" is the passage in which Poseidon ersed many lands" envisages in his voos
complains that the mortals no longer turn the different countries which he has seen
their voos to the gods.89 It is characteris- and which in the future course of his jour-
tic of the outlook of a god-fearing man ney he may traverse again.
that with him the gods are always "part What we have discussed up to this
of the picture," and this may also be ex- point accounts, as far as I can see, for all
pressed by saying that his voos is always
the different meanings which the words
turned to the .gods.
voos and voELv have anywhere, in Homer.
There is still one further extension of
All of them, as we have seen, can be de-
the meaning of voos which has to be con-
rived from one original and fundamental
sidered. The gods may in some way be
ever present and ever watchful. Yet this concept, which may be defined as the real-
ever-presence is different and, in some ization of a situation. But from this one
paradoxical way, more "far off" than the original concept a great many other con-
actual and personal bodily presence of cepts have been developed, all of which
either a human being or a god. Here, are described by the same word and some
then, we have a voos which sees or is of which, nevertheless, are as different
aware of things which are not present in from or even contradictory to one another
such a way that we can see them with our as the concept of understanding from the
bodily eyes.90 But this voos is not restrict- concept of will, wish, or plan or the con-
88 II. vii. 446 ff.; see also n. 23 above. cept of many different vooL in different in-
89 We have here another instance in which it is dividuals and nations from the concept of
easy to follow the gradual development of the meaning one indivisible voos, which is the same in
of the word. In the sentence 6OTs 7O TOav&Towtn v6ov
KaL MLTLP EPLftEL the word EvbPEL'has obviously still the everybody, and which, whenever it looks
original meaning of '-aircr-insequo, "I make follow," at an object, must always come to the
"I send after." If this is the correct translation of the
passage, we have here a v6os which is made to follow same conclusion as to its essence and na-
(or is intentionally turned toward) the gods. The pre- ture.
ceding stages would be: (a) a v6oSwhich is struck
by the presence of a god and realizes its importance; So far, I have tried to keep our investi-
(b) a v6os which is always in some way aware of the gation free from all etymological and lin-
watchfulness of the gods.
90 In this connection
guistic speculation. We have now reached
one may perhaps point out
that in the Homeric poems there seems to be a dif- a point at which we may perhaps safely
ference between Zeus (who is never personally present ask whether there is an etymology that
in a battle and does not personally give advice to mor-
tals except indirectly through messengers, dreams, or
91Starting from this observation, one might also
omens but who from his outlook on Mount Olympus
keeps watch over human affairs in general) and explain vociv in the sense of "planning" and v6os in
Athena, Hera, Ares, and other gods, who attend to the sense of "plan" as nothing but a special case of
human affairs in person. The ever-presence of a god the v6os which sees farther in space and time than
which nevertheless is somewhat more far off seems bodily vision.
to have been developed flrst in Zeus and later extended 92 Cf. Parmenides, Frag. B2. 1 (Diels).
to other divinities. 93 xv. 80 ff.
92 K. VON FRITZ

agrees with our previous findings and car- his will by a nod" with those passages in
ries us a step further into the preliterary which vo'os designates the will of Zeus
history of our term. I do not propose to which cannot be resisted.'00
discuss all the etymologies of the word But as soon as one tries to derive the
voos which have been proposed, since other meanings of voos and vOELv from
many of them are either based on rather this assumed original meaning of the root
fantastic assumptions concerning the de- he encounters insurmountable difficulties.
velopment of the meaning of the word94 For not only is there no easy psychologi-
or are phonetically impossible.95 There cal transition from voos in the sense of
are, as far as I can see, only two etymolo- "twill"to YOOSin the sense of "understand-
gies of the word which deserve serious ing" :101 much more decisive is the fact
consideration-one from VEbEV, "to nod" that neither voos nor JoetJ ever designates
(Lat. nuere; Ger. nicken) ;96 the other from a momentary decision of the kind which
a root snu, "to sniff" (MHG snouwen; may be, and often is, expressed by a nod'02
Ger. schnuppern, schniiffeln),97 which pre- but that these terms always imply some
supposes, of course, that the original form long-range plan or vision.'03 Yet if "to
of voos was Vn'bfos.The first of these two nod" in the sense of giving one's assent or
etymologies has the great advantage of making a decision was the origin of the
presenting us with a Greek verb directly word YOoswe should expect at least this
derived from the same root as the noun. derivative meaning to have survived in
This would solve the riddle with which the usage of voos or voe-t somewhere in
we were confronted at the beginning of Homer.104That this is not the case seems
this inquiry,98namely, that a noun which to exclude also the possibility that two
clearly designates a function and not a 99E.g., II i. 514, 527; viii. 175, 245. Cf. also
quality or a concrete object seems to have Athena: II. vi. 311; Hector: IL. x. 393; Achilles: Od.
iv. 6.
no equivalent in a verb belonging to the
100 E.g., II. viii. 143; xvi. 103, 688; xvii. 176; Od.
same stage of the linguistic development. xxiv. 164.
We might then assume that there is such 101 See above, p. 87.

a verb, namely, veULJv, but that the noun 102 It is important to notice that in all those cases
in which vebeLP, K,Tarapetv, EirLVebeL, etc., mean "to make
vOos developed new meanings in which a decision" the decision is always made in response to
vEvetvhad no part and that this led to the request of another person. In all other cases (e.g.,
II. ix. 223, 620) in which a form of vebew is used with
the creation of a new verb voe-tv which cor- a personal subject, it means "to signal," "to give a sign
responded to the new meanings of the to someone," etc. In these latter cases there is, of
course, still less reason to believe in a connection of
noun. The connection between the noun the word with P6os,
and the original verb, on the other hand, 103 See above, p. 83.
might be found in a comparison of those 104 There are three passages in the II. (xvi. 103,
688; xvii. 176) in which vbos seems to approach the
many passages in which Zeus expresses meaning which must be postulated if the word is to
be derived from Vf ftv. In all three cases heroes
94 So Kieckers' derivation from P4etv, "to swim"; struggle in vain against the v6osof Zeus. The reason
the derivation from Sanskrit naya, "to lead," etc. for their lack of success is the fact that Zeus, by fa-
de la langue
See Boisacq, Dictionnaire tymeologique voring the Trojans, wishes to give satisfaction to
grecque, S.D. Achilles. For Zeus, on the demand of Thetis, has
95 This is the case, e.g., with the attempt to derive agreed by a nod (iV'Efbe) to give her son this satis-
v6os from the same root as 'yvCvat. faction. Yet the seeming connection is fallacious. For
der vebecv in i. 528 expresses the momentary decision to
96 See Prellwitz, Etymologisches Worterbuch
grant Thetis' wish, while Aias' defeat, for instance, is
griechischen Sprache (G6ttingen, 1905), pp. xii and 315.
part of the long-range plan by which this decision is
97 See E. Schwyzer in Festschrift fur Paul Kret- carried through in detail. It was not a part of the
schmer (Leipzig and New York, 1926), pp. 247 ff. decision itself to have Aias specifically defeated by the
98 See above, p. 83. Trojans. His defeat is only incidental.
NOO AND NOEIN IN THE HOMERIC POEMS 93

roots of different form and meaning have danger and to distinguish between friend
been merged in the word voos by the mere and enemy. It is not unlikely that in a
coincidence of phonetic developments.105 very early stage of human development
Let us then consider the derivation the sense of smell played a preponderant
from a root meaning "to sniff . " E. Schwy- part in this function. One has only to
zer, who proposed this etymology,106 has point to the fact that even in our present-
tried to cope with the difficulty presented day language we still speak of "smelling
by the absence of a verb of equal linguistic a danger." With the development of a
age by pointing out that the history of the higher civilization the sense of smell would
formation and survival of words and word naturally have been more and more re-
forms shows many irregularities. One placed by the sense of vision. But the un-
might perhaps add that an original verb derstanding of a situation remained never-
cTveFEVfrom the root snu must in Greek theless distinguished from the vision or
inevitably have become identical in ap- even recognition'09 of an indifferent ob-
pearance with vEvELv,"to nod."1107 This ject. It is not impossible that the emer-
may have been the reason for its replace- gence of this new concept of a purely men-
ment by a new derivative from voos, espe- tal function was greatly favored by the
cially after voos had developed new mean- fact that the original connection of this
ings. function with the sense of smell receded
A second objection which has been more and more into the background, as
raised against Schwyzer's etymology'08 the sense of vision became more prepon-
can now easily be refuted. It is quite true derant in importance, and finally was
that in Homer vOaev appears more often completely forgotten. This transition, in
connected with the sense of vision than the course of which the vooswas more and
with any other sense. But this need not more considered as a way of acquiring
always have been the case. The most fun- knowledge or as a "capacity," as the phi-
damental and most original meaning of losophers of the eighteenth century would
vOaevin Homer seemed to have been "to have said, different from but analogous to
realize or to understand a situation." The the senses"0 may also help to explain why
most primitive case in which a situation it was the noun rather than the verb
becomes important is that in which there which survived so that a new verb had to
is danger or where there is an enemy near be derived from it.
by. The most primitive function of the The results of our inquiry, then, seem
voos therefore would have been to sense to show that Schwyzer's etymology is very
106 For another possibility see n. 107 below.
likely to be correct. But our inquiry itself
106 See n. 97 above. was completely independent from all ety-
107 Many linguists are convinced that the original mological considerations. The usefulness
form of PEIELP, "to nod," was also avOFrc. If this is cor- of its results for an analysis of the meaning
rect and if one takes into consideration that VEbELP
is just as much &vavebetv as KaTPaveUeP and that an and history of voos, voELv, and their deri-
animal raises its head with a jerk when it senses or vations in early Greek philosophy will not
"smells" danger, there is just a faint possibility that
the roots of the words for "to nod" and for "to sniff" be influenced by the acceptance or rejec-
were originally identical. But this is too vague a tion of any etymological explanation of
speculation to be acceptable, unless some conflrma-
tive evidence from other Indo-Germanic languages these terms.
should turn up. In any case it is certain that v6oswas
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
not derived from VEbELVin the sense of making a de-
cision. 109 See above, p. 88.
108 Cf. Krause, loc cit. 110 See above, p. 90.

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