1. CALUB vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000]
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement
Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles loaded with
thousands of board feet of illegally sourced lumber. The two vehicles were
owned by Jose Vargas and Manuela Babalcon.
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles,
failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the
apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of
lumber at the DENR-PENR Office in Catbalogan. Felipe Calub, Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the
Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against
Abuganda, for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705 as
amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code.
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the
vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for
the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an
application for replevin against herein petitioners. The RTC averred that
they cannot recover possession of the vehicles because the latter are in
custodia legis. However, the CA reversed the decision of RTC and ruled that
mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by
Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not
automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. The Court of Appeals
noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a
report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the
owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and
recommendations to the Secretary. Therefore, in failing to follow such
procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not
be considered in custodia legis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that mere
seizure of a conveyance pursuant to section 68-a [78-a] of p.d. no. 705 as
amended by executive order 277 does not place said conveyance in custodia
legis.

HELD:
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that consfication by DENR
officers does not put the confiscated property in custodia legis.
Sec 28 of the Revised Forestry Code makes mere possession of timber
or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents
unlawful and punishable. As such, there shall be confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements

1
and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are
found. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest
products at the time of the seizure and admittedly, no permit evidencing
authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly
presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced which is
a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code.
Under Section 4 of DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of
1990, Sec. 4. The Secretary or his duly authorized representative such as
the forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of
the DENR are authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and
guidelines pertinent thereto. Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber
while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence
title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the
involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the
Revised Forestry Code. The petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure
outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was
justifiably explained. Since the seizure was in accordance with law, the
subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis.

2
2. LALICAN v. VERGARA
[G.R. No. 108619. July 31, 1997]
ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:
On or about the February 9, 1991, the petitioners conspired to have
under their possession and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and
dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps without permit. As
such, information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended
by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Princesa City against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court.
At their arraignment, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an
offense. He contended that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and
other forest products" and not to "lumber.” He also asserted that "timber"
becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards. On
June 10, 1992, the lower court setting aside the motion to quash ordered by
the previous judge. It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber
is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is
equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of
forest products.
Petitioner argued that the lower court gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in
denying his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not “lumber” is excluded from the forest products

enumerated in Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No.
277.

HELD:
No. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber
without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither should we.
As pointed out in recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, the Revised Forestry Code
contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
'Processing plant,' which reads as any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest
raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper
board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest
raw material. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. To exclude
possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly
emasculate the law itself. WHEREFORE, the petition denied.

3
3. PALLADA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000]
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that
illegally cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia
Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is
engaged in rice milling and trading. DENR officers, assisted by elements of
the Philippine National Police, raided the company's warehouse in
Poblacion, Valencia in different dates on the strength of a warrant issued by
the Regional Trial Court. After the raid, an information was produced
stating that the company wilfully and unlawfully possess 2,115 pieces of
lumber of different dimensions in the total volume of 29,299 .25 board feet
or equivalent to 69.10 cubic meters with an estimated value P488,334.45
without any authority, license or legal documents from the government.
The acts are contrary to and in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended
by E.O. 277.
Judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Perfecto Pallada and
Francisco Tankiko guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having in their
possession timber products worth of P488,334.45 without the legal.
Accused Isaias Valdehueza and Noel Sy are ACQUITTED for lack of
evidence against them.
Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which, affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko for lack of
proof of his participation in the purchase or acquisition of the seized
lumber. According to Pallada, he must be acquitted because he possessed a
Certificate of Timber Origin and therefore also covers his possession of
lumber because lumber and timber are of the same things.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals was correct in

upholding the decision of the trial court that the certificate of timber origin
was not the proper document to justify petitioner's possession of the
squared timber or flitches.

HELD:
Yes. The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the
Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held
by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin.
Lumber transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber
Origin (CLO) shall be considered as proceeding from illegal sources and as
such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in accordance with
LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines. As already noted, the opening
paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a
separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint
accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have
uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."

4
 Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a
substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous
irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter.
Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin bears no
date, the dorsal side bears the certification that the logs were "scaled on
August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to that Certificate is dated
February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list the sizes and
volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company purchased cut
lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of petitioner that when
the company bought the forest products, they were still in the form of
flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the company.
These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which
they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial
court in giving no credence to the same. What render these documents
without legal effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That
petitioner may not have any responsibility for such irregularity is
immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge of the purchase of
the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and
he should have taken steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign
ignorance and assert that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are
regular and complete.
The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption
that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned.
The presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when the public
documents are, on their faces, regular and properly accomplished.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October
31, 1997, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is
sentenced to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

5
4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DATOR
[G.R. No. 136142. October 24, 2000]
DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On October 29, 1993 at around 8:00 in the evening, two Police
Station discovered that an Isuzu cargo is loaded with 1,560.16 board feet of
assorted lumber flitches valued at P23,500.00 without any legal document
as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper
government authorities. The driver, Genol, informed the police authorities
that the pieces of lumber were owned by herein appellant, Pastor Telen.
In his defense, Telen said that a written permit was not anymore
necessary before he could cut the Dita trees, which are considered soft
lumber, from the private land of his mother, provided the same would be
used exclusively for the renovation of his house and that he shall plant trees
as replacement thereof, which he did by planting Gemelina seedlings.
He also contended that he secured verbal permission from Boy
Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of the DENR-CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte
before cutting the lumber, and that the latter purportedly assured him that
written permit was not anymore necessary before cutting soft lumber, such
as the Antipolo and Dita trees in this case, from a private track of land, to
be used in renovating appellants house, provided that he would plant trees
as replacements thereof, which he already did.
The lower court convicted the accused Pasto Telen beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the accused is correct in contending that he no longer
needs to get a permit to cut because the land where the trees are
attached is owned by his mother.
2. Whether or not the verbal permission given to the accused by the
DENR-CENRO Secretary is sufficient to stand as legal document
required by law.

HELD:

1.No.The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51)

pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber, as well as his subsequent
failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code. It must be underscored that the appellant stands charged with the
crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, a special
statutory law, and which crime is considered mala prohibita. In the
prosecution for crimes that are considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry
is whether or not the law has been violated. The motive or intention
underlying the act of the appellant is immaterial for the reason that his
mere possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber without the legal

6
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations gave rise
to his criminal liability.
In line with the National Reforestation Program and in order to
promote the planting of trees by owners of private lands and give incentives
to the tree farmers, Ministry Administrative Order No. 4 dated January 19,
1987 which lifted the restriction in the harvesting, transporting and sale of
firewood, pulpwood or timber produced from Ipil-Ipil (leucaenia spp) and
Falcate (Albizzia falcataria) is hereby amended to include all other tree
species planted in private lands except BENGUET PINE and premium
hardwood species. Henceforth, no permit is required in the cutting of
planted trees within the titled lands or tax declared A and D lands with
corresponding application for patent or acquired through court
proceedings, except BENGUET PINE and premium species listed under
DENR Administrative Order No 78, Series of 1987, provided, that a
certification of the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products
came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land is
issued accompanying the shipment.

2. No. The mere allegation of the appellant regarding the verbal permission
given by Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of DENR-CENRO, Maasin,
Southern Leyte, is not sufficient to overturn the established fact that he had
no legal documents to support valid possession of the confiscated pieces of
lumber. It does not appear from the record of this case that appellant
exerted any effort during the trial to avail of the testimony of Boy Leonor to
corroborate his allegation. Absent such corroborative evidence, the trial
court did not commit an error in disregarding the bare testimony of the
appellant on this point which is, at best, self-serving.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that appellant Pastor Telen is sentenced to six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

7
5. PICOP v. CALO
[G.R. No. 161798. October 20, 2004]
Tinga, J.:

FACTS:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
through its officers, rendered three Memoranda, which designated
Resources, Inc. (PICOP) as a DENR depository and custodian for
apprehended forest products and conveyances within its concession.
Pursuant to these Memoranda, PICOP’s security personnel were deputized
as DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment, and
conveyance used in the commission of illegal logging and the forest
products removed and possessed by the offenders.
In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda,
petitioner PICOP, through its security personnel, had apprehended
numerous violators who loaded illegally cut trees in trucks and other forms
of conveyance such as carabaos. One June 18, 2001, by way of class suit, the
United Farmers Association of Bislig (UFAP), one of those apprehend by
PICOP, filed a complaint against PICOP stating that the Memoranda was
issued in grave abuse of discretion and therefore be declared null and void.
They also asked to institute writ of preliminary injunction against PICOP.
On September 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision. The trial
court disregarded the claim of UFAP and sustained the validity of the
Memoranda. However, the trial court granted private respondents prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction.
On April 29, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer
for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of injunction
before the Court of Appeals. In filing this petition, petitioner is merely
defending its subsisting proprietary interest pursuant to these license
agreements.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit on July 23, 2003.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner PICOP has the right to question the order
of preliminary injunction instituted against it.

HELD:
No. It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the
confiscated forest products and conveyances. It has no subsisting
proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing agreements, which need to
be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial court.
Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the
apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated a
depository of the DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such
depository, petitioner merely holds the confiscated products and
conveyances in custody for the DENR while the administrative or criminal
proceedings regarding said products are pending.

8
6. YSMAEL, JR. v. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
[G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990]
COURTS, J.:

FACTS:
October 12, 1965, the Petitioner entered into a timber license
agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut,
collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified
portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the
municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965
until June 30, 1990.
On August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations
in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging
concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to
presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of
Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner
sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and
another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the
Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking the reinstatement of its
timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the
Marcos administration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may compel the authorities

regarding the reinstatement of its timber license.

HELD:
No. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can
hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by
the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to
the renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest
lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced
ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed,
most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the
profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only
resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but
has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects.
The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods
and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy
resources required by the people seriously depleted.

9
 Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear
constitutional command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology.
Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides, “the State shall
protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”
In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion
more than suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR
evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime,
or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the
department.

10
7. BON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. 152160; January 13, 2004]
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza owns a titled agricultural land under
Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, administered by
Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being
stolen, cut and sawed into lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she
sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to investigate the report. During their
investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees: four (4) Narra
trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one amugis tree. On the land, Virgilio Bon
admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber.
Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of Teresita
for Illegal Cutting of Trees repaired to the land on July 17, 1990, and found
four stumps of trees. Petitioner Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.
together with Rosalio Bon were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705,
as amended, under an Information.
On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision
convicting Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. for the crime charged.
Co-accused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. The CA sustained the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Julian Lascano and
Manuel Dangalan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of the witnesses are credible and
sufficient

HELD:
No. Punishable under the Sec. 68 P.D. 705 are the following acts:
(a) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b)
possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with the first offense. It was thus necessary for the
prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of
lumber from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. However,
conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged
cutting, gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by
the prosecution through the following pieces of documentary evidence:
photographs of tree stumps, the investigation report of an officer of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit
was secured for the cutting of the trees, and the CENRO’s computation of
the value of the timber generated from the felled trees. The no permit to cut
alone, together with the circumstantial evidence, indubitably points to no
other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged.

11
8. CHU VS. TAMIN
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1786. August 28, 2003]
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
By virtue of a search warrant issued by Judge Tamin, Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer Michael F. dela Cruz (CENRO
dela Cruz) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Region IX, CENRO dela Cruz discovered that Chu was in possession of
forest products of dubious origin in violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705 (PD 705), as amended.
On the same day, respondent judge issued Search Warrant No. 364
ordering the seizure of 576 pieces of pagatpat lumber (mangrove specie)
with an estimated value of P183,790 from complainant’s fishpond in
Bulawan, Payao, Zamboanga del Sur.
Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that respondent
judge issued, under questionable procedure, search warrants against him
for violation of PD 705. Complainant recalled that on 10 November 1998,
respondent judge issued four search warrants against him (Search Warrant
Nos. 281 to 284), authorizing the seizure from his compound
of pagatpat lumber worth more than P1.5 million. Complainant alleged
that the records of the four warrants did not also contain any transcript of
the required examination of witnesses. Complainant therefore moved to
quash the four warrants. Respondent judge, however, denied the motion on
the ground that he had in fact conducted such examination but the record
of the deposition was misfiled in another case folder through inadvertence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tamin is liable for gross ignorance of the law

HELD:
Yes. The Court upholds the OCAs findings that respondent judge, who
had earlier professed ignorance of the rule in question, failed either to
examine any witness before issuing Search Warrant No. 364 or to reduce
the examination in writing.
Judge Tamin failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rulesof Criminal Procedure which provides that he judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. This
provision implements the proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures found in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
His omission renders him liable for gross ignorance of the law. When
the law is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court on search warrant issuance, not to know it or to act as if one
does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

12
9. OPOSA v. FACTORAN
[G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993]
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
In this case, the principal plaintiffs, now the principal petitioners, are
all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The
minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn.” in ordering the defendant (Sec. of DENR) to
(1)cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; (2)Cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.
According to the petitioners, the country's land area should be
utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover
and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial,
commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance
as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as water shortages, salinization of the water table, massive
erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, global warming, and the like.
On the other hand, the respondents averred that the petitioners failed
to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right”. Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. The respondents
also stated that the minors as well as generations yet unborn have no legal
standing and the timber licenses are contracts and therefore cannot be
rescinded, otherwise, the non-impairment clause under the Constitution
shall be violated.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the concept of intergenerational responsibility can
constitute personality to sue.
2. Whether or not “environmental right is a legal right.
2. Whether or not the timber licenses are contracts.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
1. YES. Petitioners minors asserted that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. The Supreme Court ruled that filing a class
suit for others of their generation and for the succeeding generation
constitutes legal standing. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the "rhythm and
harmony of nature." Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility
to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology.

13
2. YES. Environmental right focuses on one specific fundamental legal right
— the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Sections 16 and 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides. As
a matter of fact, environmental right does not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind; thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve and protect the
environment for the present generation and for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. Without
such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative
duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. The granting of the timber licenses, violated the right of the
petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection of
such right requires that no further timber licenses should be renewed or
granted.

3. NO. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the

utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the
due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.

14
10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CFI OF QUEZON
[G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992]
MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS:
Godofredo Arrozal, being the administrator of the Infanta Logging
Corporation, with intent to gain, conspired with the other accused to
feloniously enter the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled
in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente. Once inside, the
accused illegally cut, gathered, and stole without the consent of the said
owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license
or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species.
In the view of the foregoing, the private respondents were charged
with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines.
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the
information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form.
On April 13, 1977, the trial court dismissed the information on the
grounds invoked.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts or omissions of the accused fall under the
purview of Sec. 80 of P.D. 705

HELD:
No. The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the
situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was
committed not in the presence of a forest officer.
It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken
not from a public forest but from private woodland registered in the name
of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The grant of license
agreement and license or lease is immaterial because the State is not the
owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines
including those produced in private woodlands.
Sec. 80 of P.D. 705 covers two (2) specific instances when a forest
officer may commence a prosecution for the violation of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest officer or
employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person
who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses
described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an offense
described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest officer
or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a
complaint. In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall
investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate official
authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the
necessary information in court.

15
11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. QUE
[G.R. NO. 120365 DECEMBER 17, 1996]
PUNO, J.:

FACTS:
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion
and SPO1 Elmer Patoc, saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-
548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos
Bridge. There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo
Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver
identified accused- appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut
slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there
were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs. Accused appellant
failed to present the following for the cargo's supporting documents,
specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport
agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5)
certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut
slabs. All he could show was a certification from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira,
Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was
issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to
San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant can be convicted for violation

of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705

HELD:
Yes. The accused was given permit by the DENR to transport one (1)
truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused
was apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate number
PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn
lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the outside.
The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut
slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were
removed. Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the
accused was very much aware that he needed documents to possess and
transport the lumber but could not secure one and, therefore, concealed the
lumber by placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by
police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In addition, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting
and removal of the forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of
forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime.
Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because
E.O 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.

16
12. ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al.
[G.R. No. 152989.September 4, 2002]

FACTS:
On August 9, 2001, Petitioner Roldan Jr. applied for a Private Land
Timber Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and poultry farm
in his property. He also paid all the fees required by the various
government agencies.
While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was allegedly
informed by some employees from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) that he could proceed with the cutting of trees
even though his application was still awaiting approval. The petitioner, on
the other hand, abided the advice given.
About three weeks later, representatives of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and personnel from the Intelligence
Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided
petitioner's place, allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the
cut trees was conducted. The logs were not confiscated but were entrusted
to a barangay kagawad since there was allegedly no search warrant at that
time. Several days thereafter, the CENRO group and ISAFP returned, this
time armed with a search warrant and proceeded to confiscate 872 pieces of
sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled timber logs with a
total market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.

ISSUE: Whether the Roland Jr., the owner of a private land, is criminally
liable under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property.

HELD:
Yes. Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, the
ownership of the land is of no moment. The said law does not even
distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts
under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property. What is
material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the
person or entity involved or charged with its violation possesses the
required permit, license or authorization from DENR at the time he or it
cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest products.

17
13. SECRETARY OF DENR v. YAP
[GR No. 172775; October 8, 2008]
REYES, R.T., J.:

FACTS:
Respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, et.al., filed an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes of Boracay Island. However, on November 10, 1978, then
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Islands as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority; such law precluded
Yap from getting a judicial confirmation for the titling of Boracay.
In their defense, Yap declared that they themselves or through
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession over the land in Boracay since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
During the pendency of the case, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Islands into 400 hectares
of reserved forest land which are inalienable and 628.96 hectares of
agricultural lands which are alienable.

ISSUE: Whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.

HELD:
No. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have
not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public
domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the
agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as
under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court
has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those
lands which have been officially delimited and classified.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the

18
Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
disposition before 2006.Matters of land classification or reclassification
cannot be assumed.

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