People v Echegaray G.R. No. 117472.
February 7, 1997 Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section
Per Curiam
Facts:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-
year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in
April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect,
accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of
death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother
that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape
against the accused. This was dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense
counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the
Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group
of the Philippines.
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the
FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three
(3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the
trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of
accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question
of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely
abolished the death penalty.
Ratio:
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure
society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the
legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and
punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the
executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and
sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a
constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a
cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States
Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution.
It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life.
Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly
believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise
or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the
statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its
imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"
Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily
show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares
the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that
the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides
for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain
enough
19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the
legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the
constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this
constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process
consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-
impose the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on
the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes
and no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to
re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as
provided in the Revised Penal Code.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this
amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished by the
1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty
and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious
time.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of
heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified
crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other
crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death,
they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily
penalized by death. The proper time to determine their
heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review,
we are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659,
with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of
judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be
additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime
for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes
under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate
and in the House of Representatives reveals that, while both
Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the
Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death
penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes
without regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and
more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous and that
the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the
imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their
occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of
Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of
the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by
Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was
clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower
House, no doubt as to their cause.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests
in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not
subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is
subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose
the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe
what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and
penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion
 perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be2. Whether or not the trial court’s haste in deciding the case resulted to
imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in
court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance
with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill;
and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be1.
singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes."
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power to
heinousness must be squarely applied.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness
and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with
each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and
debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards2.
of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and
consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or
aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic
agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated,
curtailed and altogether eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states
that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision
imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a
positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime
should first be perceived and statistically proven following the
suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision
require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when
all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
society.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there
has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same was
never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the
existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in
the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes,
finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said
crimes."
Against cruelty
People vs. Mercado G.R. No. 116239 November 29, 2000
Bill of Rights
People vs. Mercado
G.R. No. 116239November 29, 2000
FACTS:
The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of
kidnapping with murder and sentencing them the punishment of
death.
The defendants raised the constitutionality of death penalty and the
alleged haste of the trial court in deciding the case resulting in
grave and serious errors committed in convicting the accused.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust,
excessive or unusual punishment."
grave and serious errors to the prejudice of the defendants.
RULING:
No the death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled in People
vs. Echagaray, death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or
"secure society against the threatened and actual evil". Procedural
and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are
established.
No, the contention of the defendants that the speed the trial court
decided their case resulted in grave and serious errors to their
prejudice. A review of the trial court's decision shows that its
findings were based on the records of this case and the transcripts
of stenographic notes taken during the trial. The speed with which
the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the
injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not
supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have
been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a
judge studies a case long before the deadline set for the
promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period
between the filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and the
promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider their
arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as the
trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice
in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be
taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch. The trial
court in this case committed no reversible errors and,
consequently, except for some modification, its decision should be
affirmed.
Double jeopardy
CUISON vs. CA and Valiant
G.R. No. 88539
October 26, 1993
FACTS: Kue Cuison is a sole proprietorship engaged in the
purchase and sale of newsprint, bond paper and scrap.
Valiant Investment Associates delivered various kinds of paper
products to a certain Tan. The deliveries were made by Valiant
pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiac who was then
employed in the Binondo office of petitioner. Upon delivery, Tan
paid for the merchandise by issuing several checks payable to cash
at the specific request of Tiac. In turn, Tiac issued nine (9)
postdated checks to Valiant as payment for the paper products.
Unfortunately, sad checks were later dishonored by the drawee
bank.
Thereafter, Valiant made several demands upon petitioner to pay
for the merchandise in question, claiming that Tiac was duly
authorized by petitioner as the manager of his Binondo office, to
enter into the questioned transactions with Valiant and Tan.
Petitioner denied any involvement in the transaction entered into
by Tiac and refused to pay Valiant.
Left with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against
petitioner for the collection of sum of money representing the price
of the merchandise. After due hearing, the trial court dismissed the
complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. On appeal, however,
the decision of the trial court was modified, but was in effect
reversed by the CA. CA ordered petitioner to pay Valiant with the
sum plus interest, AF and costs.
ISSUE: WON Tiac possessed the required authority from
petitioner sufficient to hold the latter liable for the disputed
transaction
the transaction entered into by Tiac on his behalf. Thus, even when
the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily
liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to fact as
though he had full powers (Article 1911 Civil Code), as in the case
at bar.
Finally, although it may appear that Tiac defrauded his principal
(petitioner) in not turning over the proceeds of the transaction to
the latter, such fact cannot in any way relieve nor exonerate
petitioner of his liability to private respondent. For it is an
equitable maxim that as between two innocent parties, the one who
made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear
the resulting loss

HELD:

YES
As to the merits of the case, it is a well-established rule that one
who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent and holds
him out to the public as such cannot be permitted to deny the
authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of
innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith and in
the honest belief that he is what he appears to be

It matters not whether the representations are intentional or merely

negligent so long as innocent, third persons relied upon such
representations in good faith and for value. Article 1911 of the
Civil Code provides:

“Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is
solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to
act as though he had full powers.”

The above-quoted article is new. It is intended to protect the rights

of innocent persons. In such a situation, both the principal and the
agent may be considered as joint tortfeasors whose liability is joint
and solidary.

It is evident from the records that by his own acts and admission,
petitioner held out Tiac to the public as the manager of his store in
Binondo. More particularly, petitioner explicitly introduced to
Villanueva, Valiant’s manager, as his (petitioner’s) branch
manager as testified to by Villanueva. Secondly, Tan, who has
been doing business with petitioner for quite a while, also testified
that she knew Tiac to be the manager of the Binondo branch. Even
petitioner admitted his close relationship with Tiu Huy Tiac when
he said that they are “like brothers” There was thus no reason for
anybody especially those transacting business with petitioner to
even doubt the authority of Tiac as his manager in the Binondo
branch.

Tiac, therefore, by petitioner’s own representations and

manifestations, became an agent of petitioner by estoppel, an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon (Article 1431, Civil Code of the Philippines). A
party cannot be allowed to go back on his own acts and
representations to the prejudice of the other party who, in good
faith, relied upon them. Taken in this light,. petitioner is liable for
Self –incrimination
G.R. 125687, December 9, 1999
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
ART III SECTION 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
FACTS: The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice
pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 year old
victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her
vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of homicide only. For his
conviction, several circumstantial pieces of evidence were
submitted including strands of his hair for comparison with the
strands of hair found in the victim’s right hand at the scene of the
crime as well as blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken
from his house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his
hair strands without his express written consent and without the
presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his
Constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sections 12
and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-
appellant’s hair strands can be admitted as evidence against him?
HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is
actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not
the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the
accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of
lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the
accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently,
although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly
taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination,
the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him,
for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or
any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants
taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were
taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers.
Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after
arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the
clothesline without proper authority. This was never rebutted by
the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as
the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the
state should not be used to gain other evidence because the
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having been
seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal
searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.
263 Phil. 1060
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner was indicted for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act in an information reading as follows:
That on or about March 6, 1982, in the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused Primitivo Marcelo, a public officer being then a Deputy
Sheriff in the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan and Atty.
Alberto Domingo, a private law practitioner, conspiring,
confederating and confabulating with one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause undue injury to
Reynaldo Sanchez and give Osaka Merchandising Co., Inc.
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by
accused Primitivo Marcelo of his official and administrative
functions in connection with the enforcement of the Writ of
Execution issued by the CFI of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 6336-M,
entitled "Osaka Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Sanz Steel Corp."
through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, by unlawfully
taking, carrying and seizing one (1) Ford Fiera with Plate No.
DCK 863, owned by and registered in the name of Reynaldo
Sanchez, and as such not belonging to Sanz Steel Corp., which
vehicle was not included in the notice of levy or execution of
leased properties and without issuing any receipt therefor nor
mentioning the same in the partial sheriff's returns on execution
thereby making it appear that said vehicle was not seized, levied or
taken away by accused Primitivo Marcelo and Alberto Domingo
and, consequently deprived Reynaldo Sanchez of the use and
possession of said vehicle.
After trial, he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment from
three to six years, perpetual disqualification from public office,
and to pay the costs. His co-accused was acquitted on reasonable
doubt that he had conspired with the petitioner.[1]
The petitioner now comes to us seeking reversal of the judgment
on the ground that it is tainted with error and grave abuse of
discretion.
The respondent court found that the petitioner abused his
functions as a deputy sheriff in the implementation of a writ of
execution. Specifically, he was held liable under Section 3(e) of
the above-mentioned law, to wit:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
It was established at the trial that on March 5, 1982, the petitioner
went to the premises of the Sanz Steel Corporation to enforce a
writ of execution against it in favor of the Osaka Merchandising
Company.
Instead of limiting himself to the properties he had earlier listed in
the notice of levy,[2] he also took a Ford Fiera with license plate
No. DCK 863 over the objection of Reynaldo Sanchez, who said
the vehicle belonged to him.
The petitioner did not issue a receipt for the vehicle.[3] He also did
not list it in the partial sheriff's return on execution as among the
properties seized by him in satisfaction of the judgment. [4]
Testifying on his behalf, the petitioner declared that the
Ford Fiera had originally been included in the notice of levy but he
had to erase the entry on orders of Sanchez, who had threatened
him.[5] Curiously, though, the vehicle was seized nonetheless. The
petitioner gave no explanation for the non-inclusion of the
Ford Fiera in the sheriff's return except to say that Atty. Domingo
told him he would deny any involvement in the seizure.[6]
The averment that the petitioner had been threatened is not
acceptable in the light of the evidence that he was accompanied at
the time by two armed constables.[7] The petitioner said that
Sanchez closed the gates of the compound and turned off all the
lights. Nevertheless, the petitioner does not deny that he was able
to take out the Ford Fiera, along with all the articles listed in the
partial return.
We agree with the respondent court that the petitioner did not act
toward the judgment creditor with manifest partiality, which it
described as "a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection
to favor one side rather than the other." [8] The record does not
disclose such motivation. As the respondent court observed, "the
evidence falls short of that quantum necessary to establish the fact
that he had been manifestly or patently partial to the plaintiff's
corporation."
But while absolving the petitioner of such fault, the respondent
court ascribes to him evident bad faith in acting as he did, resulting
in injury to the complaining witness and incidental benefit to the
judgment creditor. Citing authorities, the decision stresses that -
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some
motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895,
1007). It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior
purposes. (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-
167). Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on
the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.
Applying these very same definitions, we feel that the petitioner
cannot in fairness be held liable under the indictment. We are
persuaded from a study of the evidence that he was not actuated by
a dishonest purpose or ill will partaking of a fraud or some furtive
design or ulterior purpose to do wrong and cause damage.
In fact, what we see here is a rather confused person, prodded on
the one hand by the judgment creditor's counsel and resisted on the
other by the president of the judgment debtor. Both apparently
exerted some kind of influence upon him that befuddled his mind
and warped his judgment. In the end, he was left holding the bag,
so to speak, and hardly able to explain himself.
But despite his general confusion, this much he could say
convincingly about the Ford Fiera. It was not unreasonable for
him to mistake it as property of the judgment debtor because the
name of Sanz Steel Corporation was clearly painted on its
sides. Anyone would have assumed that it belonged to the
corporation. Sanchez claimed having exhibited his registration
certificate, but the petitioner denies this; and the respondent court
noted that this document was produced only much
later.[9] Significantly, after the vehicle had been towed away,
Sanchez merely reported to the police that it had been "carnapped"
and then simply left it at that.[10] As the respondent court observed:
x x x Sanchez could have filed a third-party claim with the court
issuing the writ of execution or he could have officially notified
the Sheriff that he was adversely claiming the same. The fact
remains that he submitted the certificate of registration long after
the seizure.
Our reading of this sorry mess is that because of the conflicting
pressures exerted on him by Domingo and Sanchez, the petitioner
excluded the Ford Fiera in the notice of levy he had earlier
prepared and then, to be consistent, omitted it also in the list of the
seized articles in his partial sheriff's return on execution.
The petitioner says it was only after his arrest that he realized he
had not included the vehicle in the return. This may or may not be
true. But what we may ourselves say is that this omission
was as much the fault of the petitioner as of the complaining
witness, who should have demanded its inclusion for his own
protection.
We go further and add this. We believe that the petitioner is not
liable even for "gross inexcusable negligence," as there is no
showing that he had acted in a wantonly careless manner to the
prejudice of the complaining witness. The breach of duty was not
flagrant and palpable.[11] The petitioner had not acted recklessly or
in utter disregard of consequences so as to suggest some degree of
intent to cause injury.[12]
Notably, the petitioner did not appropriate the vehicle
for himself but left it in the compound of the judgment
creditor.[13] As previously observed, there was plausible reason to
suppose that the Ford Fiera belonged to the Sanz Steel Corporation
which, significantly, was a family corporation with Sanchez as its
president.[14] If the petitioner mistook the vehicle for property of
the corporation, such mistake certainly cannot be
considered so gross or inexcusable as to come under the sanctions
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In any event, we are not prepared to affirm that the petitioner's acts
and omissions border on the criminal and justify the penalty
imposed on him.
It seems to us that a more appropriate relief against the petitioner
would be a civil action for damages or an administrative complaint
for the faulty implementation of the writ of execution. This
observation should, of course, not be taken as a prejudgment of
such cases if they are filed. We do feel, though, that the criminal
action lodged against the petitioner was ill-advised and that his
conviction, on the basis of the meager evidence submitted, was
less than warranted.

While this Court has always been implacable in the face of guilt
that must be punished, it has also never hesitated to protect the
innocent against an accusation that is palpably unjust, as in the
case at bar. In earlier decisions, we have cautioned the prosecution
against hasty indictments, lest the accused be needlessly molested
and irreparably stigmatized. We now address a similar
admonition, and in the same spirit, to the lower courts. That the
innocent may not suffer from an undeserved sentence, we urge the
judges to be more careful in theirevaluation of the evidence,
always remembering that what is presumed in the free society is
not the guilt of the accused but his innocence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged

decision is REVERSED. The petitioner is ACQUITTED, with no
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.