1. City v.
v. NAWASA, 107 Phil 1112
Petitioners: THE CITY OF CEBU
Respondents: THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY
Doctrine: the term "public works for public service" must be interpreted, following the principle
of ejusdem generis, in the concept of the preceding words "provincial roads, city streets,
municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters and promenades" — under Article 424 of
the New Civil Code — which are used freely by all, without distinction. Hence, if the public works
is not for such free public service, it is not within the purview of the first paragraph, but of the
second paragraph of Article 424, and, consequently, patrimonial in character.
A municipal water system designed to supply water to the inhabitants for profit is a corporate
function of the municipality.
Hence, the Osmenñ a Waterworks System, which is open to the public only upon payment of rental,
is a patrimonial property of the City of Cebu, and not one for public use
Facts:
 The Philippine Legislature authorized the Municipality of Cebu to incur indebtedness and
issue bonds for:
o providing funds for the construction of sewer and drainage facilities
o to secure a sufficient supply of water and necessary buildings for primary
schools
o and for other purposes
 the Municipality of Cebu floated bond issue and invested part of the proceeds of the sale
thereof in the construction of a waterworks system to supply water to its inhabitants
o The system came to be known as the Osmenñ a Waterworks System (in honor of
a Cebuano, former President Sergio Osmenñ a, Sr.)
 The city of Cebu then came into existence absorbing the municipality of Cebu
o The Municipal Board was granted the power to maintain the waterworks for
the purposes of supplying water to the inhabitants
 The Municipal Board of the City of Cebuú has been running and operating the Osmenñ a
Waterworks System.
o But later, the Public Service Commission granted the City a certificate of public
convenience to operate and maintain the Osmena Waterworks System
 On 1955, NAWASA was created as a public corporation which shall have jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all territory now embraced by the Metropolitan Water
District
o as well as all areas now served by existing government-owned waterworks and
sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities, municipalities,
and municipal districts in the Philippines including those served by the
Waterworks and Wells and Drills Sections of the Bureau of Public Works
 Defendant was also given the power 'to acquire, purchase, hold, transfer, sell, lease, rent,
mortgage, encumber, and otherwise dispose of real and personal property including
rights and franchises within the Philippines, as authorized by the purposes for which the
Authority was created and reasonably and necessarily required for the transaction of the
lawful business of the same unless otherwise provided in this Act', and to exercise the
right of eminent domain for the purpose for which the Authority was created, in the
manner provided for by law for condemnation proceedings by the national, provincial,
and municipal governments
 It was also provided that 'all existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage
systems in cities, municipalities and municipal districts, including springs and other
water sources, as well as the water-works and sewerage bonds, sinking funds, and all
indebtedness in general of the said Metropolitan Water District, and government-owned
waterworks and sewerage systems are transferred to the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority, and the Board is hereby authorized and directed to receive and
assume all such assets and liabilities or on behalf of the said Authority, and in turn to
pledge such assets as security for the payment of waterworks and sewerage bonded debt'
and that the net book value of the properties and assets of the Metropolitan Water District
and of government owned waterworks and sewerage systems in cities, municipalities, or
municipal districts, and other government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems
shall be received by the Authority in payment for an equal value of the assets of the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
 Petitioner alleges that the NAWASA Charter deprived Cebu city of its right to property
without due process and filed for an action for declaratory relief
o To prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), , from
taking over the ownership, control, supervision, and jurisdiction over the
Osmenñ a Waterworks System
 NAWASA contends that Congress had the power to create the same and that the Water
System was public property and therefore within the control of Congress
o Granting that it was patrimonial property, there was proper compensation
provided in the NAWASA Charter
 LC declared the NAWASA Charter unconstitutional "in so far as it vests in defendant
authority (NAWASA) ownership over the Osmenñ a Waterworks System without just
compensation as required by the Constitution
 Respondents contend that the waterworks involved herein is not a patrimonial property
of the City of Cebu but one for public use and, therefore, falls within the control of the
legislature
Issue: WON the Osmena Waterworks System is a patrimonial property which the NAWASA Charter
deprived the City of the Right to due process? - YES
Ratio:
 Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1383 (NAWASA CHARTER) provides that "the net book value
of the properties and assets of the Metropolitan Water District and of government-owned
waterworks and sewerage systems in cities, municipalities of municipal districts, and
other government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems shall be received by the
Authority in payment for an equal value of the assets of the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority"
o All that is provided in Section 8 is that NAWASA acquires all the assets and
liabilities of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the
country.
o It is an equal value of these unliquidated assets and liabilities that is supposed
to be given to plaintiff-appellee as payment of its System.
o Such, certainly, is not a compensation that satisfies the Constitutional
provisions.
 The flaw in appellant's contention that the System is a public works for public service is
due to an apparent misapprehension that because the System serves the public in a
manner of speaking, it is, but that token alone, necessarily for public service.
 The contention overlooks the fact that only those of the general public who pay the
required rental or charge authorized and collected by the System, do make use of the
water. In other words, the System serves all who pay the charges. It is open to the public
(in this sense, it is public service), but upon the payment only of a certain rental (which
makes it proprietary.) Article 424 of the New Civil Code
o Art. 424. Property for public use, in the province, cities, and municipalities,
consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid
for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
o All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws
  Thus, the term "public works for public service'' must be interpreted, following the
principle of ejusdem generis, in the concept of the preceding words "provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters and promenades'' which
are used freely by all, without distinction.
o Hence, if the public works is not for such free public service, it is not within the
purview of the first paragraph, but of the second paragraph of Article 424, and,
consequently, patrimonial in character.
o as already held by this Court, a municipal water system designed to supply
water to the inhabitants for profit is a corporate function of the municipality
 the transfer of ownership of the Osmenñ a Waterworks System to another governmental
agency is an invalid exercise of the police power of the State, because while the power
to enact laws intended to promote public order, safety, health, morals and general
welfare of society is inherent in every sovereign state such power is not without
limitations, notable among which is the constitutional prohibition against the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation.
 No exercise of the police power can disregard the constitutional guarantees in respect
to the taking of private property, due process and equal protection of the laws and it
should to override the demands of natural justice
 Appellant also urges recognition of the right of the National Government (through the
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority) to acquire the Osmenñ a Waterworks System
by eminent domain
o This, we find to be equally untenable, for one of the essential requisites to the
lawful exercise of this right is the payment to the owner of the condemned
property of just compensation to be ascertained according to law
 Needless to state in this respect, that it is precisely for this reason, that is, lack of
provision regarding effective payment of just compensation, that Republic Act No. 1383
was declared violative of the Constitution, in the case of City of Baguio vs. National
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority
Dispositive:
Wherefore, and finding no reason to depart from the established jurisprudence on the matter, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs. So ordered.|.
2. Prov. Of Zambo. V. City, supra (repeated case)
Petitioners: Province of Zamboanga del Norte
Respondents: City of Zamboanga, Secretary of Finance, Commission of Internal Revenue
Doctrine: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its
public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over
it. On the other hand, if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it
without due process and payment of just compensation.
Facts: (copied old case)
 Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the municipality of Zamboanga Province
used to be the provincial capital of the Zamboanga province.
 Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the municipality into Zamboanga City.
 CA 39 provides that buildings and properties which province shall abandon upon the
transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.
 The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings
constructed thereon located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individual by Torrens
certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province.
 In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog and in 1948, RA
286 was approved creating the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of
Zamboanga Province.
 In 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General fixed the value of the
properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at
P1,294,244.00.
 RA 711 approved dividing the province of Zamboanga (del Norte and del Sur). The assets
and obligations of the old province were divided equitably between the two.
 The Auditor General apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct province of
Zamboanga (Norte – 54,89% Sur – 45.61%) of the P1,294,244.
 Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244, the total value
of the lots and buildings in question, or P704, 220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.
 In 1959, the Executive Secretary issued a ruling that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested
right as owner of the properties mentioned in CA 39 and is entitled to the price thereof
payable by Zamboanga City.
 Cabinet resolution revoked this ruling conveying all 50 lots and buildings to Zamboanga
City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of then Zamboanga
Province was transferred to Dipolog.
 The Secretary of Finance authorized the CIR to deduct 25% of the regular internal
revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for 3 quarters of fiscal year.
 The deductions aggregating 57,373.46 was credited to the province of Zamboanga del
Norte, in partial payment of the 705,220,05 due it.
 However, RA 3039 amended the CA 39 providing that all buildings, properties, and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga
are transferred, FREE OF CHARGE, in favor of the City of Zamboanga.
 Secretary of finance ordered CIR to return to Zamboanga City the 57,373.46 taken from it
out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte.
 P43,030.11 of P57,373.46 has already been returned.
 Zamboanga del Norte assailed the constitutionality of 3039.
Issue/s:
 W/N RA 3039 is constitutional - YES
Ratio:
 The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings
thereon in question.
 If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its
public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute
control over it. On the other hand, if the property is owned in its private or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control.
The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation.
 The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is
intended and devoted.
 Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public
service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
 considered public, it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental Based on a contract made on October 18, 1926, Jose Syquia constructed on a piece of land of the City
purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. of Manila, a school building, containing twenty compartments, pursuant to the specifications
 Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school imposed by the city. The contract contains the following two clauses:
sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school
playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these were held by the former Mr. Syquia shall lease the building to the City, after the construction thereof, for a period
Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the of not more than three years, at a monthly rental of P600, payable within the first five days of every
absolute control of Congress. month following.
 However, Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of
The City shall buy the building from Mr. Syquia within three years from the occupancy
its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial thereof for P46,600.lawphil.net
properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes.
 The fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly On April 13, 1927 this contract was amended in part by the following clauses:
private in nature.
 The 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance since (c) That the contractor shall lease the building to the City of Manila for a period of not more than
registration cannot convert public property to private. three (3) years and for a monthly rent of not more than P30 per room: Provided, however, That the
City of Manila, in turn, shall lease to the contractor for the same period of not more than three years,
Additional Notes: the land of the City on which the building is to be constructed, for the nominal price of one peso a
month; and
 The lower courts used the Civil code classification of properties which is a general law.
The SC used the Law of Municipal Corporation which is a special law. Under the Civil
(d) That the City of Manila shall buy the school building within the said period of three (3) years
Code:
according to the price stipulated in the contract:
"ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities,
Provided, however, That, if at the end of three years, the City of Manila, for any reason, shall be
consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
unable to pay the stipulated sales price, the contract of lease of the land and of the building Annex
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for
shall be deemed extended for the same period, and so on successively.
by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
With the conformity of the city all the rights of Syquia flowing from his contract with the city, were
"All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by
fully transferred, first, to Sandoval, and, thereafter, to Noble.
this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."
After the construction of the building, the City of Manila occupied it in accordance with the contract,
paying its monthly rental of P600.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby entered as follows:
Then mayor of the city, Tomas Earnshaw, proposed to Vicente Noble that, in order to comply with
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte
the rules of accounting then existing, the contract be amended in the sense that, the lease be made
in lump sum the amount of P43,030,11 which the former took back from the latter out of the
renewable every year, instead of every three years.
sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter, and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever
The City of Manila failed to pay the stipulated rent so Vicente Noble, filed the complaint wherein he
balance remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting
asks that the city be ordered to purchase the building for the price of P46,600, and to pay the rentals
therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of
at the rate of P600 a month until the purchase of the building is effected and the price thereof paid.
the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from
In this answer, the defendant City of Manila prayed that the lease of the building by the city be
the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
rescinded and set aside and that the same be expropriated.
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.
the court, ordered, that, upon the deposit of the amount of P46,000 by the defendant, the latter take
immediate possession of the building for the purpose of the expropriation

3. Noble v. City, 67 Phil 1 In a motion for reconsideration, the court rendered its decision declaring that the City of Manila has
no right to expropriate the building and that it should comply with the terms of the contract of
Petitioners: VICENTE NOBLE,
October 18, 1926, and to pay to the plaintiff, for the price of the building, the sum of P46,000, plus
the rentals thereof, until the final and absolute conveyance of the building is made, with legal
Respondents:CITY OF MANILA,
interest on the rentals due an unpaid.
Doctrine: Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner to
Issue: W/N the City of Manila has has the right to expropriate the building-NO
the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the price.
Ratio:
Expropriation, as a manifestation of the right of eminent domain of the state and as a limitation
We conclude that, despite the amendment of the original contract, the obligation of the city to
upon private ownership, is based upon the consideration that it should not be an obstacle to
purchase the building was kept alive, although not necessarily within the first three years of its
human progress and to the development of the general welfare of the community.
occupancy. The defendant itself has acknowledged this obligation, wherein it was stated that the
Facts: lease was renewable from year to year until the leased building is purchased pursuant to the original
contract.

The contract, therefore, in so far as it refers to the purchase of the building, as we have interpreted it,
is in force, not having been revoked by the parties or by judicial decision. This being the case, the city
being bound to buy the building at an agreed price, under a valid and subsisting contract, and the
plaintiff being agreeable to its sale, the expropriation thereof, as sought by the defendant, is
baseless.
Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or by
the lack of any agreement as to the price. There being in the present case a valid and subsisting
contract, between the owner of the building and the city, for the purchase thereof at an agreed price,
there is no reason for the expropriation.
Expropriation, as a manifestation of the right of eminent domain of the state and as a limitation
upon private ownership, is based upon the consideration that it should not be an obstacle to human
progress and to the development of the general welfare of the community. In the circumstances of
the present case, however, the expropriation would depart from its own purposes and turn out to be
an instrument to repudiate compliance with obligations legally and validly contracted.
It is said that the contract should be rescinded as unfair and against morals, not because it was so
when it was entered into, but because after what has already been paid by way of rentals for the
lease, if the sale is now made, the same would be excessively favorable to the plaintiff and prejudicial
to the defendant.
But if this state of things is the result of too much delay in effecting the purchase, this is attributable
to the defendant itself, for it was up to it entirely to make the purchase at any time since the contract
was entered into.
As the defendant has abandoned the lease, we concur in the conclusion of the court that it is bound,
under its contract with the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff, to purchase the building for
P46,600 and that it is not entitled to the expropriation proceedings. This conclusion resolves the
other errors assigned on his appeal.
Dispositive:Wherefore, we affirm the appealed judgment, with the costs to the appellant. So
ordered
4. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734
Petitioners: Rafael Salas
Respondents: Hon. Hilarion Jarencio and Mayor Villegas
Doctrine: The subdivision of the land does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent
domain without just compensation but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to
deal with state property.
Facts:
1. CFI Manila, as a land registration court, declared City of Manila as the owner of a parcel of
land known as Lot 1., Block 557 containing an area of 9,689 sqm.
2. The register of deeds issued an OCT in the name of the City.
3. City of Manila sold portions of the land in favor Pura Villanueva, and as a consequence, the
OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued in favor of Villanueva.
4. TCT 22547 which covers the residue of Lot 1 measuring 7490 sqm was issued in the
name of Manila.
5. The Municipal board of manila presided by Villegas adopted a resolution requesting the
President of the Philippinesto considere the feasibility of declaring the property under
TCT 22547 as patrimonial property for the purpose of reselling those lots to the actual
occupants.
6. The resolution was submitted to the President and to Congress.
7. House Bill 191 was filed in House of Rep. seeking to declare the property in question as
patrimonial property, with an explanatory note saying:
1. The land is not used as a public communal property.
2. The Municipal board adopted a resolution requesting for the converting the
property into a patrimonial property.
b. The bill was sent to the senate and was passed into law (RA 4118).
1. Land is converted into disposable or alienable land.
2. Under the disposal of the Land Tenure Administration.
3. Subdivided into small lots not exceeding 120 sqm each.
b. To implement said law, Deputy Governor Yap of Land Authority (succeeded Land Tenure
Administration) addressed a letter to Villegas, furnishing him with a copy of the proposed
subdivision plan for the resale of the lots.
c. Villegas acknowledged the receipt of the subdiision plan and interposed no objection to
the implementation of RA 4118.
d. Land AUhtority requested the City Treasurer of Manila to surrender and deliver to the
former the owner’s duplicate of the TCT to obtain title thereto in the name of the Land
Authority. The request was granted, and a new TCT was issued in the name of Land
Authority.
e. However, due to reasons which do not appear in the record, Manila made a complete turn-
about when Mayor Villegas brought an action for injunction against Land Authority from
further implementing RA 4118 because it is unconstitutional.
f. RTC rendered a decision declaring RA 4118 unconstitutional because it deprived the City
of Manila of its property without due process and payment of just compensation.
Issue:
1. Whether RA 4118 is valid - YES
Ratio:
1. To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law must be clear and
unequivocal.
2. RA 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the constitution and the
government program of land for the landless.
3. The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its proprietary
capacity. Its title should be deemed to held in trust for the state as the land constituting
part of Manila was granted by the sovereign upon its creation.
4. The City of Manila recognized the title of the state over the land when by its resolution,
the municipal board, presided by Villegas requested the president to convert the land as
patrimonial property.
5. The request is a blatant recognition of the fact that the land belongs to the state and was
simply granted in usufruct to the City for municipal purposes.
6. RA 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm
its character as communal land of the state and to make it available for disposition by the
national government.
7. The subdivision of the land does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent
domain without just compensation but simply as a manifestation of its right and
power to deal with state property.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners shall proceed
with the free and untrammeled implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from
the respondents. Without costs.
5. Luzurriaga v Dir., 24 P 203
Petitioners: Municipality of Luzurriaga
Respondents: THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF JARO
Doctrine: Where a municipality has used land from time immemorial for recognized public
 purposes based upon a public necessity were formerly recognized by the Government as a basis
for a grant of land of land to a municipality, a grant from the State in favor of the municipality will
be presumed.
Facts: This case is a consolidation of proceedings numberd in land Court 5830 and 5829, to register
said lands located in Barrio Bungao, municipality of Luzuriaga, Negros Oriental.
While the Municipaility of Luzariaga was only organized under the laws in 1901, it had existed as a
municipality under the Spanish regime from time immemorial under the name of Nueva Valencia.
The parcel of land in Case no. 5829 was obtained by the municipality by exchange with Mariano
Ymbo in 1907. Ymbo obtained the land by purchase for Marcino Los Banñ os and her sister, who had
acquired it through inheritance from their parents. Since then, the municipality and its predecessors
have occupied and administered the land as owners from almost 30 years. The land is enclosed by a
barb wire fence, and is used as a municipal cemetery at present.
The land involved in case No. 5830 adjoins the land in 5829. At present, the municipality public
market and a cockpit are located. However, the Government opposed this and stated that said land is
a land of the State and in order to show good title, it is necessary to prove that the State expressly
granted it to the municipality since it does not appear that the land had ever been occupied as a
public school. Also, since the land is a public square, it cannot be registered. Despite the opposition,
the Land Court registered the title to the lands to the municipality of Luzuriaga. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not land in case 5830 should be granted to the municipality of Luzuriaga?
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that since the municipality has used the land for so many years for
recognized public purposes, which have for their basis a public necessity, undisturbed and
unchallenged, a grant in its favor will be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
We do not believe that either of these contentions is sound. The municipality having used this land
for so many years for recognized public purposes, which have for their basis a public necessity,
undisturbed and unchallenged, a grant in its favor will be presumed in the absence of evidence to
the contrary.
iWhen the municipality has used the land for the purposes spec ied from time immemorial, a grant
from the state in favor of the municipality will be presumed. The land, however, to be susceptible of
that presumption must have been used for recognized public purposes, based upon a public
necessity in relation to which the Government was wont to grant lands to municipalities in former
times
in order that the municipality may rely upon a presumed grant from the State in its favor, the land
concerning which the grant is to be presumed must have been used by the municipality for the
ipurposes specied in said quotations, namely, to meet a public necessity, and therefore must be land
which would have been originally granted by the State for such purposes. In other words, the lands
susceptible of this presumption cannot be agricultural or communal lands; they must be lands which
the municipality itself can be exclusively own, i.e., they must be lands used to meet a public
necessity.
. There is at least one other purpose which may be considered to be based upon a public necessity
for which the State could have granted, and died grant, lands to the municipalities, namely, for public
market. In many parts of the Islands, formerly as now, municipal markets were, and are, in a very
real sense public necessities. While, from the strict standpoint of necessity, there is undoubtedly a
difference between a courthouse, for example, and a municipal market, still it is one of degree rather
than of kind; and where it appears, as in this case, that a public market was a necessity of the
municipality, that the land has been the site of such market for time our of mind, and is still
dedicated to such use, the presumption of a grant from State arises.
Dispositive: We think that the decision of the court below was well founded and therefore affirm it,
without special finding as the costs.
6. City v. Chinese Comm., 40 Phil 349
Petitioners: City of Manila
Respondents: Chinese Community of Manila (Comunidad de Chinos de Manila)
Doctrine: Since the cemetery in the city is a public cemetery already devoted to a public use, the
city cannot condemn a portion of the same for a public street. The rule is a property that has
already been devoted to a public use may not be taken for another public use. (doctrine in
Martin)
Facts:
 The City of Manila filed a petition in the CFI of Manila, praying that certain lands be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, particularly the
extension of Rizal Avenue.
 In the second paragraph of the petition, it was alleged:
o That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire
ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in Binondo xxx”
 The Chinese Community, the defendants in the petition, answered the petition: (only
pertinent parts of the Answer)
o That it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said
parcels be expropriated for street purposes
o That existing streets and roads furnished ample means of communication for
the public
o That the lands in question had been used by it for cemetery purposes for the
Chinese people
o That if the expropriation would be carried out, it would disturb the resting
places of the dead, require the expenditure of a large sum of money to transfer
them to new sites and create irreparable loss and injury
 Tambunting, another defendant, added that the land had become quasi-public property of
a benevolent association, dedicated and used for the burial of the dead
 CFI: there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land
Issue: WoN the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation by a
city - YES
Ratio:
 It is not questioned that the City of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for
public purposes (Charter of the City).
 No procedure for expropriation can be found in the City’s charter, so the procedure under
Act No. 190 should be the guide.
o The complaint for expropriation should state with certainty the right of
condemnation.
o The Act also provides that there should be trial once the court finds that the
right exists, the appointment of commissioners, and appeal to the Supreme
Court.
 City: contends that if the court shall find that the right to expropriate exists i.e. some law
authorizes it to expropriate, then courts have no other function than to authorize the
expropriation.
 It cannot be denied that if the legislature under proper authority should grant the
expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified public
purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that
legislation.
 If, upon the other hand, the Legislature should grant general authority to a municipal
corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, We think that the courts
have ample authority in this jurisdiction to make inquiry and to her proof, upon an issue
properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the
purpose was, in fact, public.
 The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation and before
it can exercise the right, some law must exist conferring the power upon it.
 Courts should not be limited to merely examining statutes to find out whether the
municipality has the right to expropriate.
 Courts must not only find that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain, but also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with
law
 In the present case, there are two conditions imposed: that the land must be private and
the purpose must be public.
o If the court finds that neither exists, it cannot be contended that the right is
being exercised in accordance with law.
 Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a
question of fact. Whether the land is public, is a question of fact.
 When the legislature conferred upon the courts the right to ascertain upon trial whether
the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should
inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions.
 The legislative may, it is true, in effect declare certain uses to be public, and, under the
operation of the well-known rule that a statute will not be declared to be unconstitutional
except in a case free, or comparatively free, from doubt, the courts will certainly sustain
the action of the legislature unless it appears that the particular use is clearly not of a
public nature.
 The decisions must be understood with this limitation; for, certainly, no court of last
resort will be willing to declare that any and every purpose which the legislative might
happen to designate as a public use shall be conclusively held to be so, irrespective of the
purpose in question and of its manifestly private character.
 The right to take private property for public use originates in the necessity, and the taking
must be limited by such necessity.
 If the courts can inquire into the question whether a public use exists or not, then it seems
that it must follow that they can examine into the question of the necessity.
 The record does not show conclusively that the City has definitely decided that there
exists a necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described in the complaint.
o The Exhibits clearly indicate that the municipal board believed at one time that
other land might be used for the proposed improvement, thereby avoiding the
necessity of distributing the quiet resting place of the dead.
o Furthermore, the cemetery in question seems to have been established under
governmental authority in an order of a Spanish Governor-General.
o It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by
the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation
of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in
question public property.
 If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the City must be denied,
for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under
the law to expropriate public property.
 While we do not contend that the dead must not give place to the living, and while it is a
matter of public knowledge that in the process of time sepulchres may become the seat of
cities and cemeteries traversed by streets and daily trod by the feet of millions of men,
yet, nevertheless such sacrifices and such uses of the places of the dead should not
be made unless and until it is fully established that there exists an eminent
necessity therefor. While cemeteries and sepulchres and the places of the burial of the
dead are still within the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they
are still devoted to pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the
legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that such places, under such
circumstances, should be violated.
 In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street
in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same
through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been
offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
Dispositive: For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the lower court
should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
7. City v. Arellano Law Colleges, 85 Phil 663
Petitioners: THE CITY OF MANILA
Respondents: THE ARELLANO LAW COLLEGES, INC.
Doctrine:
To authorize a grantee’s condemnation of any particular land by the power of eminent domain, a
necessity for the proposed uses and purposes for such taking must exist. For such foundation of
eminent domain is a genuine necessity which must be of a public character. The ascertainment of
such necessity must precede or accompany the taking of the land. It cannot come after. Such
necessity only speaks of reasonable/practical necessity that would combine the greatest benefit
to the public with the least inconvenience to the condemning party and property owner.
Facts:
 This present action seeks to condemn the City of Manila’s purchase and expropriation of
several parcels of land (Arellano College’s lands with an area of 7,270 square meters),
under the power of Section 1 of RA 267, situated on Legarda Street, Manila City. This was
to provide homes to a few families (i think this is what the case was about).
 Section 1 of RA 267, provides that cities/municipalities can contract loans from the
Reconstruction Finance Corp, the PNB, and/or any other entity at a maximum interest
rate of 8% per year for purchasing/expropriating homesites within their jurisdiction and
for reselling them to their residents.
o The court below ruled that such provision merely empowers cities to purchase,
but not to expropriate lands for subdivision and resale.
Issue:
 Whether or not necessity exists for the expropriation of the subject land to be valid? NO,
such necessity does not exist.
Ratio:
 The Court held that the court below erred. RA 267 does indeed empower cities to
expropriate and purchase lands for homesites, as “expropriating” can only mean one
thing. However, such expropriation is subject to jurisprudential limitations.
 Jurisprudence (Guido v Rural Progress Administration and Commonwealth of the
Philippines v De Borja) has provided that expropriation of large states and lands that
embrace a whole town or a large section of it, bears a direct relation to the public welfare.
This is because of the land’s size, the number of people benefited, and the extent of
social/economic reform secured by the condemnation.
 o The land in the expropriation in question is merely ⅓ of the land sought to be
taken in the Guido case and ⅔ of the land involved in the De Borja case.
o Arellano College is in a highly commercial part of the city.
o Its occupants are not bona fide tenants.
o The land was bought in order to become a university site.
 The National Government cannot confer upon its instrumentalities authority which the
National Government itself may not exercise. A stream cannot run higher than its source.
o To authorize a grantee’s condemnation of any particular land by the power of
eminent domain, a necessity for the proposed uses and purposes for such
taking must exist. For such foundation of eminent domain is a genuine
necessity which must be of a public character. The ascertainment of such
necessity must precede or accompany the taking of the land. It cannot come
after.
 Such necessity only speaks of reasonable/practical necessity that
would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience to the condemning party and property owner.
 In this case, the necessity for such condemnation has not been shown.
o The land in question cost the owner P140,000.
o The people for whose benefit the condemnation is being done are so poor that
they cannot afford to meet this high price.
 “Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school and
more suited to the occupants' needs and means, if really they only
want to own their own homes, are aplenty elsewhere.”
o While some people might benefit from the expropriation, the university’s
development, which had 9,000 students enrolled at the time, would be
sacrificed.
 “Any good that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a
few families fades into insignificance in comparison with the
preparation of young men and young women for useful citizenship
and for service to the government and the community, a task which
the government alone is not in a position to undertake.”
Dispositive:
The order of the Court of First Instance of Manila is affirmed without costs.
8. Bishop v. Aparri, 43 Phil 835
Petitioners: Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao
Respondents: Municipality of Aparri
Doctrine:
The general rule is that while a municipality cannot obtain title to public land by mere
prescription as against the Sovereign, nevertheless, in those cases where the property has been
applied to a use which might have been the legitimate basis of a Government grant under the
Spanish regime, an ancient grant will not be presumed in favor of the municipality, where, where
occupation and use has continued for a sufficient length of time to give rise to the presumption of
a grant.
This doctrine not applicable to a case like this where it affirmatively appears that the parcel in
question ceased to be a part of the public domain and acquired the character of privately owned
property more than a hundred years ago.
Facts:
 This is an appeal brought forth by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao to reverse a
judgment of the CFI of Cagayan in land registration proceeding No. 59 G.L.R.O. denying the
right of the petitioner to have a parcel of land, situated in the municipality of Aparri,
under their name
 Municipality of Aparri opposed the motion on the ground that the property belongs to the
municipality since it was in its possession as owner for 20 years
 The trial judge sustained the opposition on the ground that according to the proof the
municipality had been in adverse possession at the time this proceeding was begun for
more than 10 years and therefore acquired title to the land thru prescription under
section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Issue: W/N the land in question is owned by the municipality - No
Ratio:
 The general rule is that while a municipality cannot obtain title to public land by mere
prescription as against the Sovereign, nevertheless, in those cases where the property has
been applied to a use which might have been the legitimate basis of a Government grant
under the Spanish regime, an ancient grant will not be presumed in favor of the
municipality, where, where occupation and use has continued for a sufficient length of
time to give rise to the presumption of a grant.
This doctrine not applicable to a case like this where it affirmatively appears that the
parcel in question ceased to be a part of the public domain and acquired the character of
privately owned property more than a hundred years ago.
Acquisitive prescription is undoubtedly a lawful source of title and a municipality can
acquire property by that means to the same extent as any other way, as for example by
purchase, donation, or the exercise of the right of eminent domain; and for all legitimate
municipal purposes, municipalities can acquire and hold real and personal property to
the same extent as any other person or entity known to law (Adm. Code, sec. 2165). In the
case before us, the parcel in question has been continuously used as a wharf of landing
place for a municipal ferry for more than the period required to confer title is vested in
the municipality; and the property is held by it in the character of patrimonial estate. In
this connection it is unnecessary to inquire whether the use to which this property has
been put was such a use as would have justified the presumption of an ancient grant,
because our decision does not proceed upon the presumption of such a grant, the
question not being one between the municipality and the higher political entity, the
Insular Government, but between the municipality and the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Tuguegarao.
Dispositive: From what has been said it follows that the motion to rehear is not well founded,
and the same is accordingly denied.
9. Masikip v. City, 479 SCRA 391
Petitioners: LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP
Respondents: THE CITY OF PASIG, HON. MARIETTA A. LEGASPI, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 165 and THE COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine: Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which
the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the
purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the
taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.
Facts:
  Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at
Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. The City of Pasig notified petitioner of its
intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the
“sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan.
This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang
Bayan of Pasig.
 Petitioner replied stating that the intended expropriation of her property is
unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive.
 Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to
provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents” and subsequently filed
with the trial court a complaint for expropriation.
Issue: Was the City of Pasig able to establish “genuine necessity”?
Ratio:
 The Court holds that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a
genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property.
 A scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay
Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan.
 Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly
and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that
there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in
the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including
those of Caniogan.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 are REVERSED. The complaint for
expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig, docketed as SCA No. 873, is
ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
10. Antonio v. Geronimo, 476 SCRA 240, 348-349
Petitioners: Danilo Antonio Ambrocio et al (too many)
Respondents: Hon. Isagani Geronimo (MTC judge)
Doctrine: In expropriation, it must follow the requisites for it to be effective. (See ratio)
Facts:
 The Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo, Rizal passed a resolution authorizing Municipal
Mayor Daniel Garcia to acquire through expropriation or purchase, a land situated at
Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal, for public purposes/socialized housing.
 The land was allegedly owned by private respondent, Alexander Catolos, in which the
petitioners were refusing to vacate even after demand of private respondent.Prior to the
resolution, private respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of demolition which
the lower court granted and after partial demolition took place, private respondent filed
an urgent ex parte motion seeking the full implementation of the writ of demolition which
the respondent judge granted.
Issue: WON A RESOLUTION FOR EXPROPRIATION BY AN LGU CAN SUSPEND THE WRIT OF
EXECUTION AND DEMOLITION IN AN EJECTMENT CASE. NOOOOOoooooo
Ratio:
 A resolution for expropriation by an LGU cannot suspend the writ of execution and
demolition in an ejectment case.
 The Sangguniang Bayan, being a local legislative body, may exercise the power to
expropriate private properties, subject to the following requisites, all of which must
concur:
 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
 In the instant case, no ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo,
instead it were resolutions.
 An LGU cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution.
 A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.
 An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion
of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.
 An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary
in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members
Dispositive: Petition is dismissed
11. Lagcao v. Labra, 440 SCRA 279, 284
Petitioners: Diosdado Lagcao, Doroteo Lagcao and Urusula Lagcao,
Respondents: Judge Generosa Labra
Doctrine: LGUs do not have unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain. The
exercise of such power is limited by due process and equal protection and just compensation
For an ordinance to be valid it (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be
unreasonable
Facts:
 In 1964 the province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu
 Of these was Lot 1029. In 1965 petitioners purchased lot 1029 on installment basis
 The province tried to annul the sale, which promoted the petitioners to sue the province
for specific performance and damages
 On July 9, 1986, the Province of Cebu was ordered to execute final deed of sale in favor of
petitioners. On June 11, 1992 the CA affirmed the decision.
 The province of Cebu executed a deed of absolute sale over the lot . A tct was issued in the
name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao
 Petitioners tried to take possession but discovered that it was occupied by squatters
  Petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings. MTCC rendered a decision ordering the
squatters to vacate the lot. The RTC affirmed the decision and issued a writ of execution
and order of demolition
 However, prior to the demolition order being implemented, the Cebu City Mayor Alvin
Garcia wrote to letters to the MTCC requesting deferment of the demolition on the ground
that the city was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the request
the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days
 During the suspension period the Sangguniang Panglungsod passed a resolution
identifying Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site
 Ordinance 1843 was enacted authorizing the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings
for the acquisition of Lot 1029
 Lagcao filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of ordinance 1843 for being
unconstitutional
 The trial court dismissed the complaint
 Upon appeal Lacao argues that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the
expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor
contrary to the concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it
will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was
obviously passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes.
Issue:
WON the expropriation contravenes the constitution and applicable laws? Yes
Ratio:
 Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can only exercise
it when it is expressly authorized by the legislature
 By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to
expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160
o SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. − A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws
 However, LGUs do not have unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent
domain
 The exercise of such power is limited by due process and equal protection and just
compensation
 The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily
choose which private property should be expropriated.
 In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or
selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioner’s property as
the site of a socialized housing project.
 RA 7279 provides an order of priority in acquiring land for socialized house and the
resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire it. Private lands rank last in the
order of priority. It may only be resorted to when other modes are exhausted as well.
o SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. − Lands for socialized housing shall
be acquired in the following order:
o (a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
o (b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
o (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
o (d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal
Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
o (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have
not yet been acquired; and
o (f) Privately-owned lands.
o Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local
government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of
government lands. (Emphasis supplied).
o SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. − The modes of acquiring lands for
purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land
swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the
Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation:
Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners
shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied).
 The city did not strictly comply with sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279
 Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners property without any attempt to
first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279.
 Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of
RA 7279 were first exhausted.
 Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid
and definite offer to buy petitioners property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160.
 When Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext
that the city was looking for a relocation site, the city instead suddenly enacted ordinance
1843. It was trickery and bad faith.
 For an ordinance to be valid it (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable
 The court summarizes the constitutional infirmity:
 first, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;
 second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression
masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;
 third, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for expropriation for the
purpose of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality
against petitioners, and
 fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end
sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide
adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell
short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 1, 2002 decision of Branch 23 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
12. Jesus is Lord v. Pasig, 466 SCRA 235

Petitioners:
Respondents:
Doctrine:
Facts:
 Municipality of Pasig decided to acquire 51 sqm out of the 1791 sqm property of Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho (Ching Cuancos)
abutting ER Santos Street
o Municipality needed an access road from E Santos St (a municipal road near
the Pasig Public Market) to Bgy. Sto Tomas (where 60 t0 70 houses, mostly
made out of light materials) were located. Road had to be at least 3m in width
so that fire trucks could pass through. Also, the residents in the area needed the
road for water and electrical outlets.
 Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approve an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to
initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund
therefor. The Ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the
municipality’s intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they
rejected the offer.
 Municipality filed a complaint against Ching Cuancos for expropriation of the property
under RA 7160 (LGC).
o Municipality alleged that it notified the Ching Cuancos, by letter, of its intention
to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell
the same portion. A photocopy of the letter addressed to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco
was appended to the complant.
o Municipality deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property
based on the latest tax declaration covering the property.
o Upon motion, RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be
expropriated.
o Nov 26 1993: Municipality caused the annotation of notice of lis pendens of the
TCT of the subject lot under the name of Jesus is Lord Christian School
Foundation (JILCSFI)
o Municipality thereafter constructed a cemented road (named Damayan Street)
with a width of 3m.
 Ching Cuanco et al answered that they had sold the property to JILSCFI in Feb 1993.
JILSCFI then moved to become a defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC
granted. In its answerinintervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative
defenses, that:
o The plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and
not for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
o The property sought to be expropriated is not the best portion for the road and
the least burdensome to it.
o It also filed a crossclaim against Ching Cuancos for reimbursement in case the
subject property is expropriated. I
o In its amended answer, JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and
enjoyment of its property because the road was constructed in the middle
portion and that the plaintiff (municipality) was not the real partyin-interest
 RTC: issued an Order in favor of plaintiff, holding that: (1) there was substantial
compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of RA7160, Sec. 19; and (2) that
the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas
Bukid.
 CA affirmed the RTC Order. JILCSFI filed an MR, which was denied for lack of merit.
 In the instant petition, JILSCFI now argues that:
o the law explicitly requires that a valid and definite offer be made to the owner
of the property and that such offer was not accepted. In this case, there was no
evidence to show that such offer has been made either to the previous owner
or JILSCFI, the present owner.
 the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Reyes, notifying Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco of the respondent’s intention to construct a road on its
property, cannot be considered because the trial court did not admit
it in evidence.
 assuming that such letter is admissible in evidence, it would not
prove that the offer has been made to the previous owner because
mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to an offer to
purchase
 the offer should be made to the proper party, that is, to the owner of
the property. It noted that the records in this case show that as of
February 1993, it was already the owner of the property. Assuming,
therefore, that there was an offer to purchase the property, the same
should have been addressed to the petitioner, as present owner
 the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed since its
exercise is necessarily in derogation of the right to property
ownership. All the requirements of the enabling law must therefore,
be strictly complied with. Compliance with such requirements
cannot be presumed but must be proved by the local government
exercising the power.
o the local government should, likewise, comply with the requirements for an
easement of rightofway; hence, the road must be established at a point least
prejudicial to the owner of the property.
o If the property is already devoted to or intended to be devoted to another
public use, its expropriation should not be allowed
 For its part, municipality avers that:
o the CA already squarely resolved the issues raised in this petition, and the
petitioner failed to show valid and compelling reason to reverse the CA’s
findings. Moreover, it is not the function of the Supreme Court to weigh the
evidence on factual issues all over again
o the Ching Cuancos were deemed to have admitted that an offer to purchase has
been made and that they refused to accept such offer considering their failure
to specifically deny such allegation in the complaint. In light of such admission,
the exclusion of the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Reyes ,therefore, is no
longer significant.
Issue:
1. W/N Municipality complied with the requirement of a valid and definite offer to
acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint (under Sec. 19 of the LGC)-
NO
2. WON JILSCFI’s property which is already intended to be used for public purposes
may still be expropriated by the Municipality- YES
Ratio:
1. Eminent domain is the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property
within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The authority to condemn is to be
strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor because it is a
derogation of private rights. It is the condemnor who has the burden of proving all the
requisites have been complied with. 4 requisites: (1) An ordinance is enacted by the local
legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government
unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over
a particular private property. (2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. (3) There is
 payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution,
and other pertinent laws. (4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
The letter was not a valid and definite offer because the letter was not addressed to all registered
owners and it only manifested intent, instead of a definite offer to buy, on the part of the
Municipality. Notice of lis pendens and declarations in whereas clauses of an Ordinance do not
constitute substantial compliance.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to
encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of the property to avoid the expense and delay of a
court action. The law is designed to give the owner the opportunity to sell his land w/o the expense
and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. A reasonable offer in good faith, not
merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, must be made. A single bona fide offer will suffice. The offer
must be made to the registered owners.
As applied:
a. Letter to Lorenzo— Since the pty was co-owned, the Municipality sh have made the offer to ALL
the Ching Cuancos, not merely to Lorenzo. Also, the letter contained no definite offer, it merely
expressed the Municipality’s intent to acquire the pty.
b. Notice of lis pendens— While it deemed a notice to the whole world of the pendency of an
action, there is no legal basis to claim that this constitutes substantial compliance with the requisite
offer. Moreover, it was annotated long after the complaint has been filed in the RTC.
c. Whereas clauses in the Ordinance—also not substantial compliance, there still has be competent
evidence that indeed, there was a definite an valid offer to all co-owners.
2. We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be expropriated
by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious
worship and a school for its members. As aptly explained by this Court in Manosca v.
Court of Appeals, thus: It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co.,
that: . . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term “public use” to be one of
constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increases and each
demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . for
“whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use.”
The Court likened this to the expropriation of Felix Manalo’s birthplace. The practical reality that
greater benefit may be derived by members of INC than by most others could well be true but such a
peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a
few would actually benefit from the expropriation of party, does not necessarily diminish the
essence and character of public use.
Dispositive:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the
respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof.
13. Saguitan v. Mandaluyong City, 328 SCRA 137
Petitioners: Heirs of Alberto Saguitan
Respondents: City of Mandaluyong
Doctrine: (Modes of Acquisition)
The courts have to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with by the
LGUs in their exercise of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit
of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted
Facts:
 The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a Resolution authorizing Mayor
Benjamin Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto
Suguitan in Mandaluyong. The purpose of expropriation was the expansion of the
Mandaluyong Medical Center.
 Mayor Abalos wrote Suguitan a letter offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to
sell.
 So, the city filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasig.
 Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the power of eminent domain is
not being exercised in accordance with law.
 RTC denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss.
 RTC: issued an order allowing the City to take immediate possession of Suguitan's
property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market value of the
subject property.
 The City assumed possession of the subject property by virtue of a writ of possession
issued by the RTC.
 Petitioner asserts that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of
eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of the LGC, and not
by means of a mere resolution.
 Respondent contends, however, that it validly and legally exercised its power of eminent
domain; that pursuant to Art 36, Rule VI of the IRR of the LGC, a resolution is a sufficient
antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the RTC.
Issue: WON the City of Mandaluyong validly expropriated the property of Saguitan through a
resolution? NO.
Ratio:
 The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, that
such power may be validly delegated to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities,
although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of
the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms
of the delegating law.
 Please see Sec. 19 of the LGC in the notes.
 Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the
duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in
accordance with the delegating law.
 In fact, the courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving questions
involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by local bodies, as compared to
instances when it is directly exercised by the national legislature.
 READ DOCTRINE.
 In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent
domain over petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first
requisite.
 The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code
requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
  We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and
"ordinance" are synonymous.
 A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.
Ordinance Resolution
It is a law. Merely a declaration of sentiment or opinion.
General and permanent in character. Temporary in nature.
Requires a third reading to be enacted. Not required.
 In Municipality of Paranaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation:
o Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which
requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain.
This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself,
surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is
axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended
by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 28, 1998 decision of Branch
155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No. 875 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO
ORDERED.
Notes:
Sec. 19. LGC: A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the
benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner, and such offer was not accepted; xxx xxx xxx
14. Province of Camarines Sur v. CA 222 SCRA 173
Petitioners: PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and
HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur
Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN
SAN JOAQUIN
Doctrine: LGUs need not secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the
conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the
necessary expropriation proceedings.
Facts:
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a resolution
authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to
the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-
traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
 Pursuant to the Resolution, the province, through its Governor filed two separate
cases for expropriation against San Joaquin. The judge resolved the case in favor of the
province and ordered it to take possession of the property.
 Aggrieved, San Joaquin appealed the matter and asked that: (a) the resolution of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void and (b) the dismissal of the
complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation.
 The CA held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
Issue: Whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the
prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform. NO.
Ratio:
MODE OF ACQUISITION USED IN THIS CASE: EXPROPRIATION
 Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public
purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The
old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public
(e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the
constitutional requirement of "public use".
o Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience
or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity
of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project.
o Moreover, as held in Sumulong v. Guerrero: Housing is a basic human need.
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the
general welfare.
 The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public
purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct
benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational,
the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology
on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry.
 It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain
and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true
that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or
impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments. While such
delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the
limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the
law conferring the power or in other legislations.
NO REQUIREMENT TO OBTAIN PRIOR APPROVAL FROM DAR
 Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units
must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion
of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the
necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian
Reform.
 The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention
of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. — After the lapse of five (5) years from
its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and
sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become
urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon
application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to
the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the
 reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition:
Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
 The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found above cannot be the source of the
authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of
agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority.
 To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the
Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a
change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. This is a wrong
interpretation of the law.
 Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine
whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being
an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and
will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to
the public use.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents'
property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court,
denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
15. Moday v. CA 268 SCRA 586
Petitioners: PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN
Doctrine: Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be
validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of
private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must
be just compensation. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan is without authority to disapprove the
resolution issued by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the municipal mayor to exercise the
power of eminent domain.
Facts:
 The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed a
resolution authorizing the municipal mayor to Initiate the petition for expropriation of a
One hectare portion of a lot along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the
site of Bunawan Farmers Center and other government sports facilities.
 In due time, the resolution was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo
and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that
"expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan
for the establishment of the government center."
 The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for
Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the Regional Trial Court at
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
 The complaint was later amended to include the registered owners, Percival Moday's
parents, Zotico and Leonora Moday, as party defendants.
 Public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of
Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal
treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court and that it would be in the government's best interest for public
respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property.
 Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the Regional Trial Court
granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land. The lower court
held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it
effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the
ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (l) of B.P.
Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one
of the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
 Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied hence, petitioners elevated the case in
a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, but
the same was dismissed by respondent appellate court. The Court of Appeals held that the
public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid,
expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed.
 Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject
property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both
wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.
 The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining public
respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her July 2, 1991 Order and
respondent municipality from using and occupying all the buildings constructed and from
further constructing any building on the land subject of this petition.
Issue:
Whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which
was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan? YES.
Ratio:
 The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
 Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant
case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's
right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for
public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and
public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the
taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation.
 The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not
disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government
Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law
states:
o "Section 9. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent
domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose."
 What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right
since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an
infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed
 in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare
a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the
Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue.
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise
the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said
resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows
that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to
petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.
 As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival Moday
incurred the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to support the latter's
candidacy for mayor in previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C.
Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were
other properties belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically,
they allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to
petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan.
 The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public,
compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The Supreme
Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the
taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the
necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character.
Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
 After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support
for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not
conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners'
property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned decision,
respondent appellate court similarly held that the pleadings and documents on record
have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's "other available properties
available for the same purpose”. The accusations of political reprisal are likewise
unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds that petitioners'
demand that the former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages is without
basis.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the case of "Percival Moday, et al. v. Municipality of Bunawan, et
al." (CA G.R. SP No. 26712) are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on
December 8, 1993 is LIFTED.
16. Mun. Paranaque v. VM Realty, 292 SCRA 678
Petitioners:
Respondents:
Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ratio:
Dispositive:
17. Filstream v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 716
Petitioners: Filstream International Incorporated
Respondents:CA etc.
Facts:
 Filstream is an owner of adjacent parcels of Land in Manila.
 It filed an ejectment suit against private respondents on the grounds of termination
of lease contract and non-payment of rentals. MTC ruled in favor of Filstream. RTC
affirmed. CA affirmed. It became final and executory
 It appeared however during the pendency of ejectment proceedings, private
respondents filed an annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream
 It was during this time that City of Manila (Mayor Lim) initiate through an
ordinance the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase or other legal
means. Another ordinance stated the approval of expropriation of lands owned by
Filstream
 Said lands were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant
to Land Use Development program of Manila
 Manila filed for expropriation and Filstream filed a Motion to dismiss
 Meanwhile, when the ejectment suit decision became final, writ of execution was
issued as a notice to vacate to private respondents. Manila moved to squash for the
private respondents as it is now the present possessor of the property pursuant to
the program
Issue: WON City of Manila can exercise the power of eminent domain? YES
Ratio:
 Despite the finality in favor of Filstream, the City of Manila ha an undeniable right
to exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction for public use as
expressed in LGC
 SECTION 19. Eminent Domain A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, that the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That
the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the
proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property. (DOCTRINE)
 The City of Manila has the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of
its urban land reform and housing program as explicitly laid out in the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila
 The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposed of
urban land reform and housing in Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 and 10 of which specifically provide as follows:
 Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land Lands for socialized housing shall be
acquired in the following order:
 (a) Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
 (b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
 (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
 (d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites,
and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been
acquired;
  (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet
been acquired; and
 (f) Privately-owned lands.
 Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local
government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government
lands.
 Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this
Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement,
negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be
resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted (not proven
that other modes were exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is
resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for
purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall
be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid
down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court
 But the Court held that there was a violation of right to due process of Filstream because
City of Manila did not comply with the requirements under section 10 based on the
records
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. In G.R. 125218, the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36904 dated March 18, 1996 and May 20, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. In G.R. No. 128077, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43101 dated
January 28, 1997 and February 18, 1997 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Quezon City v. Ericta 122 SCRA 90
Petitioners: City Govt of QC and City Council of QC
Respondents: Judge Vicente Ericta, of CFI Rizal and Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
Doctrine:
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit, nor does it include the power to
confiscate.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of a
private cemetery for charity and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safe, or general
welfare of the people.
Facts:
 Ordinance No. 6118 “Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance, and
Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of
QC and Providing Penalties for the Violation Thereof”
o Sec. 9. At least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of QC for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities…
 Not enforced for several years
 7 years after the enactment - QC Council passed a resolution
o “RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby
request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof
have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.”
 QC Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino that Sec. 9 would be enforced.
o Himlayang reacted by filing with the CFI for declaratory relief, prohibition, and
mandamus with WPI to annul Sec. 9, being contrary to the Const., QC Charter,
Local Autonomy Act, and Revised Admin Code.
 Both parties agreed to the rendition of judgment on the pleadings since the question was
purely legal.
o CFI: Sec. 9 - void
 QC: taking of Himlayang’s property is a valid exercise of police power and that the land is
taken for a public use (burial ground of paupers)
o QC Charter has a general welfare clause.
 Himlayang: taking or confiscation of property is obvious as the ordinance permanently
restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
and deprives the owner of all beneficial use.
o General welfare clause is not available here since it refers to promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.
 If an owner is deprived of his property outright under police power,
the property is generally not taken for public use but is summarily
destroyed in order to promote general welfare.
Issue: W/N Sec. 9 is a valid exercise of police power - NO
Ratio:
 QC Charter - no provision justifying the ordinance except the provision granting the
power “to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation
as may be established or practised…”
o The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit, nor does it
include the power to confiscate.
 The ordinance not only confiscates, but also prohibits the operation
of a memorial park cemetery as Sec. 13 provides for conviction and
revocation/cancellation of permit for violation.
 Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of
liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare.
o Not involve the taking or confiscation of property, except where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare
 Sec. 9 is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation -
deprives a person of his private property without due process, and
more than that, without compensation.
 There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area
of a private cemetery for charity and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safe, or
general welfare of the people.
o Ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area of a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the city.
 Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries.
 QC relied solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers, and not on any
express provision of law as statutory basis.
o The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot
stretch it to cover this particular taking.
 Ordinance was passed after Himlayang had incorporated.
o The sequestration of 6% cannot be considered as having been impliedly
acknowledged by Himlayang when it accepted the permit.
Dispositive: Petition is dismissed.
18. City of Angeles v. CA, 261 SCRA 90
Petitioners: THE CITY OF ANGELES, Hon. ANTONIO ABAD SANTOS, in his capacity as MAYOR of
Angeles City, and the SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF ANGELES
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Doctrine:
Facts:
 Timog Silangan Devt. Corporation donated 5% of the gross area of its medium-density
subdivision in favor of City of Angeles.
 This donation is pursuant to PD 1216 which requires the subdivision developer to donate
a portion of its subdivision to the city or municipality where it is located.
 This donated property is to be devoted for non-buildable open spaces (parks,
playgrounds) for the benefit of the public, and outside the commerce of men.
 Under PD 1216, Timog Silangan is obliged to donate 7% of its property to City of Angeles
since its subdivision is considered as medium-density.
 In the Deed of Donation, Timog Silangan imposed the condition that the city government
should construct a sports complex thereon.
 Failure to observe this condition will cause the donor to revoke said donation and recover
the donated property with its improvements thereon.
 City of Angeles constructed a drug rehabilitation facility instead.
 Timog Silangan sued for revocation of the donation.
 According to the City of Angeles, since the donor is mandated by law to donate a portion
of its subdivision to the city or municipality concerned, it has no right to impose the
condition to construct a sports complex thereon.
 It cannot prescribe any condition as to the use of the area donated because the use of the
open spaces is already governed by PD 1216.
 Therefore, said condition is deemed not written.
Issue:
1. W/N the donor can impose conditions on the said donation. - YES.
2. W/N the condition is valid. - NO.
3. W/N TImog Silangan revoke the donation for the breach committed by City of Angeles. -
NO.
Ratio:
1. YES. The general law on donations does not prohibit the imposition of conditions on a
donation so long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible.
o Conditions may be imposed so long as they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.
o The special law involved does not provide that donations made by the
subdivision in favor of the city or municipality should be unconditional.
2. NO. Timog Silangan is mandated by PD 1216 to donate 7% of its subdivision to the city
government to be designated as non-buildable open spaces (for parks and playgrounds),
but it donated only 5% of its area.
o As there is actually a deficiency in the area donated, the whole property should
be reserved for said parks and playgrounds; the sports complex cannot be
constructed thereon.
o Said sports complex could only be built if Timog Silangan donated more than
7% of its gross area to the city government.
 The donation is valid and subsisting, except for the condition to
construct a sports complex on the donated land. The condition was
considered void.
 The SC ordered the demolition of the drug rehabilitation facility and
to devote such property for parks, playgrounds or other recreational
use.
3. Timog Silangan and the City of Angeles are considered in pari delicto because:
o Timog Silangan donated less than that required by law, and for agreeing to
construct a sports complex on such non-buildable area.
o City of Angeles constructed a drug rehabilitation center on such non-buildable
area.
4. Since the condition to construct a sports complex on the donated land is contrary to law,
revocation of the donation and the recovery of the property cannot be done because:
o There was no valid stipulation that was breached; and
o The donated property was considered by PD 1216 as property beyond the
commerce of men and property of public dominion.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Petitioners are hereby ENJOINED perpetually from operating the drug rehabilitation center or
any other such facility on the donated open space.
(2) Petitioner City of Angeles is ORDERED to undertake the demolition and removal of said drug
rehabilitation center within a period of three (3) months from finality of this Decision, and
thereafter, to devote the said open space for public use as a park, playground or other recreational
use.
(3) The Amended Deed of Donation dated November 26, 1984 is hereby declared valid and
subsisting, except that the stipulations or conditions therein concerning the construction of the
Sports Center or Complex are hereby declared void and as if not imposed, and therefore of no force
and effect.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
19. City v. Hon. Besana, G.R. 178967, Feb. 12, 2010
Petitioners: City of Iloilo
Respondents: HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
32, and ELPIDIO JAVELLANA,
Doctrine: Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Facts:
 After successful expropriation proceedings of a land to be used for a school site, City of
Iloilo filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it had deposited the
amount of ₱40,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank-Iloilo Branch.
  City of Iloilo claimed that it was entitled to the immediate possession of the Subject
Property, citing Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1533, after it had deposited an
amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation.
 Javellana, the owner of the land, filed an Opposition to the Motion for the Issuance of Writ
of Possession arguing that:
o the city already had a vast tract of land where its existing school site was
located
o the deposit of a mere 10% of the Subject Property’s tax valuation was grossly
inadequate.
 A Writ of Possession was issued in the City’s favor, and the City was able to take physical
possession of the properties sometime in the middle of 1985.
 Sixteen years later, on April 17, 2000, Javellana filed an Ex Parte Motion/Manifestation,
where he alleged that when he finally sought to withdraw the ₱40,000.00 allegedly
deposited by the petitioner, he discovered that no such deposit was ever made.
o He thus demanded his just compensation as well as interest.
 It bears emphasis that City of Iloilo could not present any evidence to prove that any
payment was actually made to private respondent.
 On April 2, 2003, Javellana filed a Complaint against City of Iloilo for Recovery of
Possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages
o that since he had not been compensated for the property, the City’s possession
was illegal, and he was entitled to recovery of possession of his lots.
o that the fair market value of the Subject Property should be reckoned from the
date when the court orders the condemnation of the property, and not the date
of actual taking, since petitioner’s possession of the property was questionable
 City of Iloilo claims that
o the computation should be made as of September 18, 1981, the date when the
expropriation complaint was filed
o Javellana could no longer bring an action for recovery since the Subject
Property was already taken for public use
o He could only demand for the payment of just compensation
Issue:
WHETHER City of Iloilo is liable for damages - YAS
WHETHER just compensation is to be ascertained at the time of the filing of the complaint -
ALSO YAS
Ratio:
1st Issue
 City of Iloilo should be held liable for damages for taking Javellana’s property without
payment of just compensation
o non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to
recover possession of their expropriated lot
o Javellana slept on his rights for over 18 years and did not bother to check with
the PNB if a deposit was actually made by the City.
 a government agency’s prolonged occupation of private property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings undoubtedly entitled the landowner to damages
 Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form of actual or
compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value
of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment.
o This is based on the principle that interest "runs as a matter of law and follows
from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can
accomplish, as of the date of the taking
2nd Issue
 just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
 Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint
 When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing
of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint.
 Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure, under which the complaint for
expropriation was filed, just compensation is to be determined "as of the date of the filing
of the complaint."
 Here, there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the point of reference for
assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time of the filing of the complaint for
expropriation.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 14052 and Civil Case No. 03-27571 dated December 12, 2003,
June 15, 2004, and March 9, 2005 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 32 is DIRECTED to immediately determine the just
compensation due to private respondent Elpidio T. Javellana based on the fair market value of the
Subject Property at the time Civil Case No. 14052 was filed, or on September 18, 1981 with interest
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of filing until full payment is made.
The City of Iloilo is ORDERED to pay private respondent the amount of ₱200,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
20. Ortega v. City of Cebu, 602 SCRA 601, 607-608
Petitioners: Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega
Respondents: City of Cebu
Doctrine: Government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy judgments, based on obvious consideration of public policy.
Facts:
1. Spouses Ortega are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Hipodromo, Cebu.
2. ½ of the land was occupied by squatters.
1. The Spouses then filed an ejectment case against the squatters in the MTCC of
Cebu.
2. The MTCC ruled in favor of the Spouses. This became final and executory.
b. The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu enacted an Ordinance.
1. Giving authority to the Mayor to expropriate ½ portion of the land which was
occupied by squatters.
b. Pursuant to the Ordinance, the City of Cebu filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain in the
RTC.
1. The RTC issued an Order.
1. Declaring that [Cebu City] has the lawful right to take the property,
for public use or purpose described in the complaint upon payment
of just compensation
ii. The RTC issued another Order.
1. Ordering the City of Cebu to pay the Spouses 31,416,000 Pesos as
just compensation.
ii. The RTC Orders became final and executory.
b. [Cebu City] filed an Omnibus Motion to Withdrawal of the Case,
 i. Contending that the price set by the [RTC] as just compensation to be paid to
[the Spouses Ortega] is way beyond the reach of its intended beneficiaries for
its socialized housing program.
ii. The motion was denied by the [RTC].
b. The RTC then ordered the service of Notice of Garnishment to the Philippine Postal Bank.
i. Garnishing Cebu City’s bank deposit in the Bank.
b. Cebu City argued that the garnishment of [Cebu City’s] bank account with Philippine
Postal Bank was illegal, because government funds and properties may not be seized
under writ of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment, on obvious reason of
public policy.
Issue:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs denial of Cebu City’s Omnibus Motion to Modify
Judgment and to be Allowed to Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings.--NO.
2. Whether the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank, appropriated for a different
purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be subject to garnishment as payment for the
expropriated lot covered by City Ordinance No. 1519.--NO.
Ratio:
1. In re: RTCs denial of Cebu City’s Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be Allowed
to Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings.
1. Expropriation proceedings speak of 2 stages:
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit. This ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, of condemnation [or order of expropriation]
declaring that the plaintiff has the lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in
the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint; and
2. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.
ii. An order by the trial court fixing just compensation does not affect a prior
order of expropriation.
1. As applied to the case at bar, Cebu City can no longer ask for
modification of the judgment, much less, withdraw its complaint,
after it failed to appeal even the first stage of the expropriation
proceedings.
ii. Cebu City is adamant, however, that it should be allowed to withdraw its
complaint as the just compensation fixed by the RTC is too high, and the
intended expropriation of the Spouses Ortegas property is dependent on
whether Cebu City would have sufficient funds to pay for the same.
1. The City is wrong. The determination of just compensation is a
judicial prerogative.
b. In re: whether the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank, appropriated for
a different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be subject to garnishment as
payment for the expropriated lot
i. Government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution
or garnishment to satisfy judgments, based on obvious consideration of public
policy.
1. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law.
2. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
ii. The proper remedy of [the Spouses Ortega] is to file a mandamus case against
[CebuCity] in order to compel its Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact an
appropriation ordinance for the satisfaction of [the Spouses Ortegas] claim.
iii. In Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, x x x where the Municipality of
Makati enacted an ordinance appropriating certain sum of money as payment
for the land the municipality expropriated, chargeable to Account No. S/A 265-
537154-3 deposited in PNB Buendia Branch, the Supreme Court held that the
trial court has no authority to garnish the Municipalitys other bank account
(Account No. S/A 263-530850-7) in order to cover the deficiency in Account
No. S/A 265-537154-3, even if both accounts are in the same branch of the
PNB.
iv. While the Sangguniang Panglungsod of petitioner enacted Ordinance No. 1519
appropriating the sum of P3,284,400.00 for payment of just compensation for
the expropriated land, such ordinance cannot be considered as a source of
authority for the [RTC] to garnish [Cebu Citys] bank account with Philippine
Postal Bank, which was already appropriated for another purpose. [Cebu Citys]
account with Philippine Postal Bank was not specifically opened for the
payment of just compensation nor was it specifically appropriated by
Ordinance No. 1519 for such purpose.
1. Said account, therefore, is exempt from garnishment.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 181562-63 and 181583-84 are hereby
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 80187 and 00147 is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
21. Eusebio v. Luis, 603 SCRA 576, 584
Petitioners: HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, LORNA A. BERNARDO, VICTOR ENDRIGA, and the
CITY OF PASIG
Respondents: JOVITO M. LUIS, LIDINILA LUIS SANTOS, ANGELITA CAGALINGAN, ROMEO M.
LUIS, and VIRGINIA LUIS-BELLESTEROS
Doctrine: Non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover
possession of their expropriated lot. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation, to
be determined based on the value of the property at the time of its taking.
Facts:
Respondents Luis, et al are the registered owners of a parcel of landin Pasig. Said parcel of land was
taken by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as a municipal road now known as A.
Sandoval Avenue, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City.
 note: the taking of the property was without the benefit of expropriation proceedings
2. In 1993, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed a Resolution authorizing payments to respondents
for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee of the City of Pasig assessed the value of
the land only at P150.00 per square meter. Luis et al requested the Appraisal Committee to consider
P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land.
Thus, Luis et al filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damagesbefore the RTC against
petitioners.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decisionin favor of Luis et al.
1. It declared illegal and unjust the actions of petitioners in taking respondents’ property
without the benefit of an expropriation proceedings.
2. ordered the return of the property with payment of reasonable rentals.
3. In case it can no longer be returned, pay the reasonable value at P5,000.00 per square
meter with payment of reasonable rental for its use.
 note: the just compensation was based on the price paid for properties in the same
location, taken by the city government only sometime in the year 1994, even though the
property was taken sometime in 1980
Issue:
1. WON the action for payment of just compensation had prescribed; --- NO
2. WON respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city government
in the 1980’s and, in the event that said property can no longer be returned, how should just
compensation to respondents be determined --- NOT entitled to regain possession (barred by
estoppel) BUT still entitled to payment of just compensation and damages for the taking of the
property without expropriation proceedings. Payment of just compensation should be based on the
value of the property at the time of the taking in 1980s.
Ratio:
1. Prescription Issue
Petitioners must be disabused of their belief that respondents’ action for recovery of their property,
which had been taken for public use, or to claim just compensation therefor is already barred by
prescription.
 Where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring
title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the
land or the value thereof does not prescribe.
2. Possession
Non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of
their expropriated lot. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
 In a previous case (Forform v PNR), the Court held that because the landowner did not act
to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a very long period of time and even
negotiated with the PNR as to how much it should be paid as just compensation, said
landowner is deemed to have waived its right and is estopped from questioning the power of
the PNR to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised
Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to question the taking of their property
for a long period of time (from 1980 until the early 1990’s) and, when asked during trial what action
they took after their property was taken, witness Jovito Luis, one of the respondents, testified that
"when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always asked for compensation." 9 It is
likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on respondents’ property
was a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein
respondents are also estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just
compensation.
3. Amount of Compensation and how it is determined
Amount determined by RTC must be strike down for being contrary to established rules and
jurisprudence.
The trial court should have fixed just compensation for the property at its value as of the time of
taking in 1980, but there is nothing on record showing the value of the property at that time. The
trial court, therefore, clearly erred when it based its valuation for the subject land on the price paid
for properties in the same location, taken by the city government only sometime in the year 1994.
First: trial by commissioner
Even if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the trial
court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment of not more than three competent and
disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
subject property.
 "trial with the aid of commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all."
 although ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners’
findings may only be disregarded or substituted with the trial court’s own estimation of the
property’s value only if:
1. the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them;
2. where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence; or
3. where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.
Second: time as to when just compensation should be fixed
It is settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of possession thereof before the
commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking
that is controlling.
 Ratio: the value thereof may be enchanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the
entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there
may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint
is filed, due to general economic conditions.
 The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is
not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury.
4. Damages
In taking respondents’ property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without
payment of just compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter disregard of respondents’
proprietary rights. Such conduct cannot be countenanced by the Court. For said illegal taking, the
City of Pasig should definitely be held liable for damages to respondents.
The illegal occupation of the owner’s property for a very long period of time surely resulted in
pecuniary loss to the owner. Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form
of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value
of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment
Note however, that the award of interest renders unwarranted the grant of back rentals as extended
by the courts below.
 The indemnity for rentals is inconsistent with a property owner’s right to be paid legal
interest on the value of the property, for if the condemnor is to pay the compensation due to
the owners from the time of the actual taking of their property, the payment of such
compensation is deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the property; and, hence, there is
no basis for claiming rentals from the time of actual taking.
5. Mayor and officials NOT personally and severally liable
There is a dearth of evidence which would show that said petitioners were already city government
officials in 1980 or that they had any involvement whatsoever in the illegal taking of respondents’
property. Thus, any liability to respondents is the sole responsibility of the City of Pasig.
Dispositive:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 28, 2003 is MODIFIED to read as follows:
1. The valuation of just compensation and award of back rentals made by the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 155 in Civil Case No. 65937 are hereby SET ASIDE. The
 City of Pasig, represented by its duly-authorized officials, is DIRECTED to institute the
appropriate expropriation action over the subject parcel of land within fifteen (15) days
from finality of this Decision, for the proper determination of just compensation due to
respondents, with interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent per annum from the time
of taking until full payment is made.
2. The City of Pasig is ORDERED to pay respondents the amounts of ₱200,000.00 as
exemplary damages and ₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
No costs.
22. Villanueva v. Castaneda 154 SCRA 142
Petitioners: FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA,
RICARDO PUNO, FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO
Respondents: HON. MARIANO CASTANÑ EDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch III, VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor, San
Fernando, Pampanga
Doctrine: A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and hence cannot be the object of lease
or any other contractual undertaking.
Facts:
 A talipapa is found in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along
Mercado Street, a strip of land on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls.
 Petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by
virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government.
o That the disputed area is under lease to them by virtue of contracts they had
entered into with the municipal government, first in 1961 insofar as the
original occupants were concerned
o And that contracts were entered into later with them and the other petitioners
by virtue of the space allocations made in their favor in 1971 for which they
saw they are paying daily fees.
 Respondents deny such claim and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal
constructions on public property.
o That since the fees were collected daily, the leases, assuming their validity,
could be terminated at will, or any day
o The claimed rentals indicated that the period of the leases was from day to day
 A temporary restraining order was issued at petitioners’ behest.
Issue: W/N the municipality is bound by the lease contracts - NO.
Ratio:
 The original classification of the land is for a public plaza, therefore, it is public land. A
public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any
other contractual undertaking.
 Petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot
insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts.
 Respondent Macalino, as officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor, had the duty to clear
the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the
municipality of San Fernando.
 The Court feels that it would have been far more amiable if the petitioners themselves,
recognizing their own civic duty, had at the outset desisted from their original stance and
withdrawn in good grace from the disputed area to permit its peaceful restoration as a
public plaza and parking place for the benefit of the whole municipality. In the words of
the SC:
o They owed this little sacrifice to the community in general which has suffered all
these many years because of their intransigence. Regrettably, they have refused
to recognize that in the truly democratic society, the interests of the few should
yield to those of the greater number in deference to the principles that the
welfare of the people is the supreme law and overriding purpose. We do not see
any altruism here.
o The traditional ties of sharing are absent here. What we find, sad to say, is a
cynical disdaining of the spirit of "bayanihan," a selfish rejection of the cordial
virtues of "pakikisama " and "pagbibigayan" which are the hallmarks of our
people.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision dated July 19, 1982, and the order-dated
August 5, 1982, are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order dated August 9, 1982, is LIFTED.
This decision is immediately executory. Costs against the petitioners.
23. Espiritu v. Mun. Council, 102 Phil 886
Petitioners: VICTORIANA ESPIRITU, JORGE ROBLES, JOSEFINA DE VERA, FAUSTINO QINTIVES,
LEONOR BRIONES, EVANGELINA PATACSIL, TEOFILO ANCHETA and BRIGIDA MANGONON
Respondents: THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, MUNICIPAL MAYOR and THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF
POZORRUBIO, PANGASINAN
Doctrine: The town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of
residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law.
Town Plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made
available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed
of or even leased by the municipality to private parties
FACTS
1. During the last world war, the market building of the town of Pozzurobio was destroyed and so the
market vendors began constructing temporary stalls and even small residences on a portion of the
plaza. The Municipal treasurer collected from the stall owners fees at the rate of .25 cents/sqm per
month. When the market building was rehabilitated, the stall owners refused to transfer to the
market place.
2. Several civic organizations like Women's club etc asked for the removal of the stalls because the
portion of the plaza occupied was supposed to be developed into a children's park. The Municipal
Council of Pozzurobio issued an ordinance ordering the stall owners to remove their buildings but
they refused. Stall owners filed an action for prohibition and the case eventually reached the SC.
ISSUE: Are the stalls considered nuisance?-- YES
RATIO:
1. The trial court found that the fee of P.25 per square meter collected by the Municipal Treasurer,
was not for the rent of the portion of the public plaza occupied by the market stalls, as claimed by
appellants, but rather the market stall fees charges on all market vendors in a public market; and
that there was absolutely no contract or agreement between the appellants on one side and the
municipality on the other, about renting of the Plaza to the former. There is reason to believe that the
occupation of the plaza and the construction of temporary buildings thereon by appellants mostly
for market, even residence purposes, was merely tolerated by the municipality, because of the
destruction of the public market during the war, but the trouble is that appellants, even after the
rehabilitation of the old market, refused to transfer to said market place, perhaps to save the trouble
and expense of transferring their buildings, or possibly to continue enjoying the benefits from the
strategic position of their stalls at the plaza. There is absolutely no question that the town plaza
cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures
constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town Plazas are properties of public
dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are
outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to
private parties. While in case of war or during an emergency, town plazas may be occupied
temporarily by private individuals, as was done and as was tolerated by the Municipality of
Pozorrubio, when the emergency has ceased, said temporary occupation or use must also cease, and
the town officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open to the public and
free from encumbrances or illegal private constructions.
DISPOSITIVE:In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. With costs
against appellants.
24. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 386 OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO
Petitioners: BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION INC., and JUNIOR CHAMBER OF BAGUIO CITY, INC.,
Respondents:THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO,
Doctrine:The Ordinance in question is a patent nullity. It considered all squatters of public land
in the City of Baguio as bona-fide occupants of their respective lots. Being unquestionably a
public land, no disposition thereof could be made by the City of Baguio without prior legislative
authority.
Facts:
Citizens filed with the CFI, praying that the Baguio ordinance be declared as invalid and illegal ab
initio
Ordinance states:
All squatters be given all the necessary and needed protection... in that the lots occupied by said
squatters be awarded to them by direct sale through Presidential Proclamation
Issue: W/N ordinance is Valid - no
Ratio:
The Ordinance in question is a patent nullity. It considered all squatters of public land in the City of
Baguio as bona-fide occupants of their respective lots
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate it
into a lawful act.
Such permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not promote public
welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain.
Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where
there is an orderly form of government.
Squatter’s areas pose problems of health, sanitation. They are breeding places for crime.
In the instant case, the land occupied by the squatters are portions of watersheds, reservations,
scattered portions of the public domain within the Baguio townsite. Being unquestionably a public
land, no disposition thereof could be made by the City of Baguio without prior legislative authority.
Nor could the enactment of the Ordinance be justified by stating that "this Ordinance is primarily
designed to extend a helping hand to the numerous landless city residents
In carrying out its social re-adjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral
standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful and unlawful
origin and character of their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining
their just solution
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Ordinance 386 is hereby rendered nullified and without force
and effect.
25. Rodriguez v. City, 107 Phil 293
Petitioners: AURORA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.
Respondents: CITY OF CABANATUAN
Doctrine:
Where a municipal council by resolution grants to the municipal mayor authority to enter into a
contract of lease of certain portion of the municipal land with private individuals, on condition
that the municipal council may, by ordinance, increase or decrease the rental should conditions
warrant the same, the burden of proof is on the municipality to prove that the conditions
warrants an, increase in rental in order that the ordinance passed by it raising the rental may
have binding effect on the contract of lease.
Facts:
 Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before the CFI of Nueva Ecija
o Seeking to declare Ordinance No. 12, series of 1956, null and void on the
ground that it impairs the contract of lease entered into between them
covering portions of land facing the public market belonging to the City of
Cabanatuan
 Defendant’s defense:
o Said ordinance does not have the effect of impairing any contractual obligation
because the contract of lease mentioned in the complaint is null and void for
having been executed by the mayor in excess of his authority
 TC Ruling:
o Held that Ordinance No. 12, insofar as it raises the rental of the portions of land
covered by the contract of lease entered into between the parties, has no
binding effect upon said contract for it will be a violation of a contractual
obligation
o Dismissed defendant's counterclaim without pronouncement as to costs
 Defendant took the case to the Court of Appeals
o But the CA certified the case to the SC on the ground that only questions of law
are involved
Antecedents:
 Prior to January 4, 1950 — Lot 1511 of the Cadastral Survey of Cabanatuan belonging to
the City of Cabanatuan was leased to several persons
 January 4, 1950 — Aurora Rodriguez, et al., plaintiffs herein, wrote a letter to the
Municipal Council of Cabanatuan requesting that the mayor be authorized to enter into a
contract of lease with them
o Regarding portions of said lot which were already occupied by them for a
period of not exceeding 10 years
 o With an option to renew for a like period at the same rate per square meter
they were then paying — which was P0.30 per square meter considering that
the present month to month lease they have leaves them no security of tenure
 Acting on this request the municipal council approved Resolution No. 2
o Granting the municipal mayor the requisite authority to enter into the contract
in accordance with the conditions stated in the petition
o Provided that the municipal council may, by ordinance, increase or decrease
the rental should conditions warrant said increase or decrease
 Pursuant to said resolution, the City of Cabanatuan entered into separate contracts of
lease with the plaintiffs
o Covering different portions of the lot wherein the lessees agreed to pay a rental
at the rate of P0.30 per square meter per month
o This was the rate which plaintiffs paid until April, 1956, when the Municipal
Board of Cabanatuan City approved Ordinance No. 12 raising the rental from
P0.01 per square meter a day to P0.03 per square meter a day
 Considering this ordinance violative of their contracts of lease, plaintiffs instituted the
present action
 In the contract of lease entered into between plaintiffs and defendant, one of the
stipulations agreed upon is as follows
o “That the rate of rental stipulated under paragraph 2 may be increased or
decreased should the Municipal Council find it advisable to effect such increase
or decrease and the party of the second part is willing to pay such new rental
as fixed by the Municipal Council on condition that any decrease or increase in
the rate of rental shall be within fifty (50%) per cent of the present rate agreed
upon.”
 Appellee's contention:
o In view of this limitation in the rate of rental that may be decreased or
increased, appellant cannot now impose a rate beyond the limit fixed,
otherwise it will be violative of the contract.
 Appellant’s contention:
o Limitation is ineffective because it is in excess of the authority conferred upon
the mayor by Resolution No. 2 which provides that only the municipal council
may by ordinance increase or decrease such rental if conditions should
warrant, which conditions cannot be limited by the mayor
 TC:
o Important question to determine was whether the increase in the rental in
accordance with Ordinance No. 12 was warranted by the conditions then
prevailing at the time it was adopted by the Municipal Board of Cabanatuan
City
o Under Resolution No. 2 of Cabanatuan City, the Municipal Board may by
ordinance increase or decrease the rental should "conditions warrant such
increase or decrease."
o Under the terms of the resolution which had been accepted by the lessees, the
Municipal Council may increase or decrease the rental only when the
conditions warrant such increase or decrease.
o The resolution does not reserve to the Municipal Board the absolute power to
raise or decrease the rental at its whim and caprice.
 The conditions must warrant the increase.
o Municipal Council should not have the absolute power and authority to
increase the rental
 If it had, such reservation will be void for it leaves the fulfillment of
the contract to one party
 To give that authority to the Municipal Board, assuming it to be valid
would subject the lessees to the mercies of the Municipal Board
Issue:
W/N the increase in the rental in accordance with Ordinance No. 12 was warranted by the
conditions then prevailing at the time it was adopted by the Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City
Ratio:
 The Municipal Council under Resolution 2 could increase or decrease the rental during
the period of the lease only when the conditions warrant.
o The authority is dependent upon the fulfillment of this condition. What these
conditions which would warrant the increase or decrease of the rental are, do
not appear from Resolution No. 2.
o But it may be presumed that the conditions which should warrant the increase
of the rental would be the rise in the value of real property, increased volume of
business, and such other circumstances which would show that the lease has
been profitable to the lessee.
 In raising the rental to three times the rental agreed upon in the contract of lease in
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 12, Municipal Board had acted arbitrarily.
o Nothing in Ordinance No. 12 appears to show that the conditions warrant the
raising of the rental as authorized in Resolution No. 2, and no evidence had
been presented by the defendant that the condition warranted such increase of
the rental from P0.01 per square meter a day to P0.03 per square meter a day,
or three times the rental agreed upon.
 On the contrary, it is admitted that the lot of Samahang Magsasaka which is adjacent to
Lot 1511 of the defendant City of Cabanatuan charges the same rate of P0.01 per square
meter a day as is now charged to the present lessees by the defendant City of Cabanatuan.
o It is true that the City of Cabanatuan charges a rental of P0.05 per square meter
a day on the market lots which is on the opposite side of the street.
o But this alone does not prove that the conditions warrant the raising of the
rental on Lot 1511. Conditions in the market site are different from conditions
existing on the lot in question even if they are on the same street.
 A market is a place where people converge especially during market
hours. People who go to the market would not take the trouble of
crossing the street and making their purchases on the other side.
 What they can purchase in the market site they would purchase
there.
o And moreover, the right or authority of the defendant to charge a rental on the
market site is different from its authority to raise the rental under the contract
of lease entered into by the plaintiffs.
 The authority of the defendant to raise the rental is subject to the
limitation that the condition should warrant the raise.
 The burden is upon the defendant to prove that the conditions warrant such a raise.
o This it had not done.
o On the contrary, if one is to judge from the rental charged by the Samahang
Magsasaka, the conditions did not warrant the raising of the rental.
 Even if we give emphasis to Resolution No. 2 which served as the basis of the authority
exercised by the Mayor of Cabanatuan in entering into said contract as appellant wants to
have it, we would find that the increase in the rental embodied in Ordinance No. 12 would
still appear arbitrary.
o As the trial court said, defendant has not adduced any proof justifying the
increase of the rental by 300%.
 o Note that said resolution expressly provides that the municipal council may
authorize the increase only when existing conditions would warrant.
o The exercise of such authority is therefore predicated upon a condition which
in this case was not complied with.
o This being a matter which is evidentiary in character, we are not now justified
in disturbing the appreciation of the situation made by the trial court for failure
of appellant to adduce the necessary evidence.
o We are therefore persuaded to affirm, as we hereby do, the decision of the trial
court.
Dispositive:
Wherefore, the decision is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
26. Cebu v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481
Petitioners: CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC.,
Respondents: HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES and JOSE L. ESPELETA
Doctrine: Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of
title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial
property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Facts:
 On December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2755, authorized
the Acting City Mayor to sell the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The lot was awarded to Cebu Oxygen being the highest bidder. By virtue of the deed of
absolute sale, Cebu Oxygen processed the registration of the land. In 1974, however, the
assistant provincial fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground
that the property sought to be registered, being a public road intended for public use, is
considered part of the public dominion and therefore outside the commerce of man.
Issue: WON a declared abandoned road may be the object of a common contract? Yes.
Ratio:
 From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a
city road or street.
 In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, where the power of the city Council of Baguio City to
close city streets and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use was similarly
assailed, this court said:
o So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city council's act of withdrawing a
strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public use and converting the
remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well within the ambit of the
power to close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, is the
authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still
necessary for public use.
 Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not
ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or
fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some
private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.
 The Revised Charter of Cebu empowers it to close any city road, street or alley. Property
thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.
 Since the portion of the city street subject of petitioner’s application of registration of title
was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent court in
Land Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent court is
hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the petitioner's application for registration of title.
27. Esteban v. City, 108 Phil 374
Petitioners: CEFERINO ESTEBAN, GERONIMO CASTRO, ANDREA G. GALINDEZ, MARIA B.
RONQUILLO, ISABEL ALEJO, ANACLETO MARANAN, FELIPE GARCIA, ELEONOR P. VELAYO,
HERMOGENES G. DOMINGO, ALICIA GUZMAN, RITA EVANGELISTA, MARTA BAYAN, PABLO
NICOLAS, AMBROSIO TIONGSON, FEDERICO AGUSTIN, CELESTINA DE GUZMAN, VICENTE
MENDOZA, ROSALINDA SANTIAGO, MARIA MARANAN, and OTHERS
Respondents: CITY OF CABANATUAN
Doctrine: When a municipal corporation fixes the fees for the use of its properties, such as public
markets, it does not assert governmental authority, or wield the police power or the power of
taxation. It exercises merely a proprietary function, and, like any private owner, it is, in the
absence of any constitutional or statutory limitation, free to charge such sums as it may deem
best, regardless of the reasonableness of the amount fixed, for the prospective lessees are free to
enter into the corresponding contract of lease, if they are agreeable to its terms, or, otherwise, not
to enter into such contract.
Facts:
 Nineteen (19) plaintiffs who are holders of stalls in the market site of the City of
Cabanatuan, claiming to act on their behalf and that of other stallholders belonging to
their class, prayed the CFI of Nueva Ecija to "enjoin the City of Cabanatuan and all its high
officials from enforcing, or acting on, Ordinance No. 12, series of 1956, pending this
lawsuit; to allow the plaintiffs to continue paying the defendant their rentals at the old or
usual rates; to declare said ordinance null and void for being ultra vires and
unconstitutional.
 The City of Cabanatuan is the owner of a block located in the heart of the City used as a
market site. It is bounded by Paco Roman, Melencio, and Sanciangco Streets and Burgos
Avenue. This is leased to stallholders by the City.
 For several years prior to the approval of Ordinance No. 12 by the Municipal Board of the
City of Cabanatuan, plaintiffs had been occupying as lessees, stalls on Melencio and
Sanciangco streets.
 On March 21, 1956, the Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City passed and approved
Ordinance No. 12, series of 1956, raising the rentals.
 The validity of this ordinance is challenged by the plaintiffs as unreasonable and
confiscatory and, therefore, null and void.
Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 12 is valid? - YES
Ratio:
 Plaintiffs contest the legality of the ordinance in question upon the ground that the rates
therein fixed are unreasonable. This claim is, in turn, predicated upon the theory that a
municipal ordinance, to be valid, "must relate to a subject within the scope of the
corporation; it must be in harmony with the constitution, the laws and treaties of the
state, the municipal charter and the general principles of common law and equity, it must
be reasonable in its terms; and it must be enacted in good faith, in the public interest
alone.”
 The foregoing statement must be qualified. It is, more or less, an expression of the rule
governing the validity of municipal ordinance enacted in the exercise of the police power,
under which most, but not all, ordinances as well as laws, fall.
  Certain exactions, imposable under an authority other than police power, are not subject,
however, to qualification as to the amount chargeable, unless the Constitution or the
pertinent laws provide otherwise. For instance, the rates of taxes, whether national or
municipal, need not be reasonable, in the absence of such constitutional or statutory
limitation.
 Similarly, when a municipal corporation fixes the fees for the use of its properties, such as
public markets, it does not wield the police power, or even the power of taxation. Neither
does it assert governmental authority. It exercises merely a proprietary function. And, like
any private owner, it is - in the absence of the aforementioned limitation, which does not
exist in the Charter of Cabanatuan City — free to charge such sums as it may deem best,
regardless of the reasonableness of the amount fixed, for the prospective lessees are free
to enter into the corresponding contract of lease, if they are agreeable to the terms
thereof, or, otherwise, not enter into such contract.
Dispositive:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the plaintiffs-
appellants. It is so ordered.
28. Ros v. DAR 468 SCRA 471, 483-484
Petitioners:JOSE LUIS ROS, ANDONI F. ABOITIZ, XAVIER ABOITIZ, ROBERTO E. ABOITIZ,
ENRIQUE ABOITIZ, MATTHIAS G. MENDEZONA, CEBU INDUSTRIAL PARK DEVELOPERS, INC.
and FBM ABOITIZ MARINE, INC.
Respondents:
Doctrine:The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Rep.
Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local
Government Code. The Code explicitly provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657.
Facts:
 Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Cebu. By
virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal Council of Balamban,
Cebu, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. On 1995, the Provincial Board of
Cebu approved Balambans land use plan and adopted en toto Balambans Municipal
Ordinance No. 101 with the passage of Resolution No. 836-95 and Provincial Ordinance
No. 95-8, respectively. As part of their preparation for the development of the subject
lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the necessary permits and appropriate
government certifications.
 Despite these permits and certifications, petitioner Matthias Mendezona received a letter
from Mr.Llames, Director of DAR Regional Office, informing him that the DAR was
disallowing the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed him to
cease and desist from further developments on the land to avoid the incurrence of civil
and criminal liabilities.
 Petitioners were thus constrained to file with the RTC for Injunction with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, RTC, ruled that it is
the DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
 CA affirmed the dismissal of RTC.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by the Municipality of
Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991 (the LGC) has the effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of the
CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR;
XXX
(c & d)(third and fourth issues which may be summed up into) whether or not an injunction is the
appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining petitioners in developing the subject
land
Ratio:
FIRST ISSUE :
 After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of
conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands
already reclassified before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 are exempted from
conversion.
 Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988. Municipal Ordinance No. 101 of Balamban,
Cebu, which reclassified the subject lands, was passed on 25 March 1992, and Provincial
Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of Cebu, which adopted Municipal Ordinance
No. 101, was passed on 03 April 1995, long after Rep. Act No. 6657 has taken effect.
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
 SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands
as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands
of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
XXXX
 (d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon.
 The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Rep. Act
No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local
Government Code. The Code explicitly provides that nothing in this section shall be
construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657.
 It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the
complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
THIRD AND FORTH ISSUE: NO
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No injunction, restraining
order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the
program.
Dispositive:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42666 dated 02 December 1997 affirming the
order dated 12 August 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T-
590 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
 29. Pasong Bayabas v. CA 429 SCRA 109
Petitioners: PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Respondents: Court of Appeals
Doctrine: The municipality is empowered to issue zoning classification of land pursuant to its
exercise of police power, as granted by the LGC.
Facts:
 Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of land in Carmona, Cavite
 Title was issued to and in the name of LDC’s successor, Credito Asiatic Incorporated (CAI)
 LDC/CAI developed 75 hectares of the property into residential and industrial estate,
where industrial and low cost housing project called the Tamanli Housing Project would
be established.
 LDC applied with the Municipal Council of Carmona for an ordinance approving the
zoning and subdivision of the property. The subdivision plan was referred to the National
Planning Commission, as mandated by Administrative Order No. 152. This was approved.
 CAI embarked on the development of the housing project in three phases.
 The project was registered with the National Housing Authority (NHA)
 The Property was subdivided into 728 residential lots. Separate title was issued for each.
 Although the Municipal Council of Carmona already approved the conversion of the
property into a residential area, CAI still filed an application with the Office of the
Minister of Agrarian Reform or the conversion of the property from Agricultural to
residential.
 The application was granted
 In 1987, CAI decided to continue with the development of its project but this was stymied
by a Complaint for Damages with Prayer or TRO and Injunction.
 In that case, the plaintiffs, claiming to be actual tillers of the land, alleged that they had
previously reached an agreements with the respondent that they would remain in
peaceful possession of their farmholdings in exchange of rental fee of P400 a year per
hectare. However, notwithstanding such, the defendant ordered the bulldozing of the
property
 In an answer to the complaint, CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffs to possess and
cultivate the landholding with fixed rentals
 Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a compromise agreement which
eventually led to all of the other plaintiffs entering into an agreement with CAI. They
executed quitclaims and waivers over the portions of the property.
 With this settlement, CAI continued its development of the rest of the Hakone Housing
Project.
 However, CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for Compulsory Coverage under Rep. Act
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed
before the DAR by seventeen (17) individuals who alleged that they are farmers who have
occupied a parcel of public agricultural land adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River. They
request DAR to order an official survey the aforesaid agricultural land
 Pending the request, petitioners and 20 others banded and formed a group called Pasong
Bayabas Farmers Association (PBFAI)
 The president of PBFAI filed a petition for compulsory coverage of the portion of the CAI
Project under CARL
 Pending the resolution of the PBFAI petition, CAI decided to continue again with its
project.
 The survey (Petition by PBFAI) was completed on Oct. 9, 1995 but CAI caused the
bulldozing and other development activities on Oct 14 and 15 that resulted in the
destruction of plants and trees.
 PBFAI then filed a complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with
Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
 The Provincial Adjudicator issued a TRO.
 In its answer, CAI denied the claims of the plaintiffs and averred that it never consented to
the cultivation of the property nor to the erection of plaintiffs’ houses
 For their part, plaintiffs said the conversion earlier secured was made prior to the
enactment of CARL. But upon the passage of the said law, the reclassification of
agricultural land included the subject property and that the Agrarian Reform Minister did
not have the authority to exempt the property from the coverage of the law
 After due hearing, PARAD resolved the case in favor of CAI on the ground that the present
case was barred by res judicata. However, PARAD said it had no jurisdiction to decide
whether the property was covered by CARL or not.
 While the case was on appeal, several members of PBFAI executed quitclaims in favor of
CAI. Notwithstanding this development, DARAB reversed the PARAD decision declaring
the subject property covered by CARL.
 On appeal, the CA reversed the DARAB decision saying the land was exempted because it
had 18% slope and that the Municipality of Carmona already reclassified the lad as
residential.
Issue: is the subject property covered by CARL? – NO.
Ratio:
 Long before the CARL took effect, the property has already been reclassified and
converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land.
 In issuing a location clearance, a development permit, a certificate of inspection over the
housing project, and a license to sell the subdivision lots in favor of LDC/CAI pursuant to
its charter, the HSRC, now HLURB, approved and confirmed the reclassification and
conversion of the land made by the Municipal Council of Carmona and Agrarian Reform
Minister Estrella.
 As ruled in Natalia Realty vs DAR, the municipality is empowered to issue zoning
classification of land in an exercise of its police power
 The failure of CAI to complete the housing project before the set date, even if true, did not
have the effect of reverting the property as agricultural land
Dispositive:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The complaint of the petitioner PBFAI in DARAB Case
No. CA-0285-95 is DISMISSED. The counterclaim of the private respondent for damages in DARAB
Case No. CA-0285-95 is, likewise, DISMISSED. The thirty-seven (37) members of the petitioner
PBFAI and all those occupying the property subject of the complaint in DARAB Case No. CA-0285-95
in their behalf are ORDERED to vacate the landholding.
30. Fortich v. Corona, 298 SCRA 678
Petitioners: HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY
B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Respondents: HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D.
GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Doctrine:
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large parcel of
land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-
beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound
in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of
Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7,
1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.
Facts:
 This pertains to the two (2) separate motions for reconsideration filed by respondents
and the applicants for intervention, seeking a reversal of the April 24, 1998 Decision
nullifying the so-called "win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by the
Office of the President and denying the applicants' Motion For Leave To Intervene.
 The March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the same office as final and executory in
its Order dated June 23, 1997 after the respondents DAR's motion for reconsideration of
the said decision was denied in the same order for having been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period.
 In their instant motion, the respondents contend that
o the "win-win" Resolution of November 7, 1997 "is not a void resolution as it
seeks to correct an erroneous ruling," hence, "(t)he March 29, 1996
decision of the Office of the President could not as yet become final and
executory as to be beyond modification."
o DAR's failure to file on time the motion for reconsideration of the March 29,
1996 OP Decision was "excusable:"
o "The manner of service of the copy of the March 29, 1996 decision also made it
impossible for DAR to file its motion for reconsideration on time. The copy was
received by the Records Section of the DAR, then referred to the Office of the
Secretary and then to the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance. By the time it
was forwarded to the litigation office of the DAR, the period to file the motion
for reconsideration had already lapsed.
 The respondents further stressed that OP should have resolved "the (DAR's) motion for
reconsideration on the merits in the interest of substantial justice," instead of simply
denying the same for having been filed late, adding that "technicalities and procedural
lapses" should be "subordinated to the established merits of the case."
 The movants complain that the case was decided by us on the basis of a "technicality,"
and, this has been the rallying cry of some newspaper columnists who insists that we
resolve this case not on mere "technical" grounds.
Issue:
1. WON the “win-win” resolution has become final--YES
2. WON the OP should have resolved DAR’s motion for reconsideration on the merits in the
interest of substantial justice--YES but respondents have not shown a justifiable
relaxation of the rules
3. WON the case should be decided on the basis of technical grounds or substantial
grounds--SUBSTANTIAL
Ratio:
1. The said denial of the DAR's motion for reconsideration was in accordance with Section 7
of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, which mandates that
"decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof x x x, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed
within such period."
 The late filing by the DAR of its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision is not excusable.
 The respondents' explanation that the DAR's office procedure after receiving the copy of
the March 29, 1996 OP Decision "made it impossible for DAR to file its motion for
reconsideration on time" since the said decision had to be referred to the different
departments of the DAR, cannot be considered a valid justification. There is nothing
wrong with referring the decision to the departments concerned for the preparation of
the motion for reconsideration, but in doing so, the DAR must not disregard the
reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation.
o In other words, the DAR must develop a system of procedure that would enable
it to comply with the reglementary period for filing said motion.
o The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made
subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body.
2. Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they
are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice.
 While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.
 In the instant case, we cannot grant respondents the relief prayed for since they have not
shown a justifiable for a relaxation of the rules. As we have discussed earlier, the DAR/s
late filing of its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was not
justified.
3. A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on
the ground that the same was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is elementary that
jurisdiction of a body, court or tribunal is an essential and mandatory requirement before it can
act on a case or controversy. And even if said body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but
has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act is still invalid. The
decision nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication on the merits.
 In the instant case, several fatal violations of the law were committed, namely:
(1) the DAR filed its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision way
beyond reglementary period;
(2) after the said motion for reconsideration was denied for having been filed late, the
March 29, 1996 Decision was declared final and executory, but the DAR still filed a
second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited by the rules;
(3) despite this, the second motion for reconsideration was entertained by herein
respondent, then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, and on the basis thereof,
issued the "win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, substantially modifying the
March 29, 1996 Decision which had long become final and executory; and
(4) the reopening of the same case through the issuance of the November 7, 1997 "win-
win" resolution was in flagrant infringement of the doctrine of res judicata.
 These grave breaches of the law, rules and settled jurisprudence are clearly
substantial, not of technical nature.
 Issue: WON DAR AO 01-02, as amended violates the local autonomy of local government units? - NO
Whether the DAR Secretary gravely abused his discretion in issuing the various administrative orders.
NO.
Dispositive:
Ratio:
WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998 Decision of this Court,
filed by the respondents and the applicants for intervention, are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
31. Chamber v. Secretary 621 SCRA 295, 309
Petitioners: CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA)
Respondents: THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Doctrine: The act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply
specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for nonagricultural uses and does not
automatically convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes.
Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential, commercial, industrial
or other nonagricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations
enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the process of conversion, despite having
undergone reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for other purposes.
Facts:
 The Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 07-97 entitled
Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non
Agricultural Uses.
 The said AO embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands
reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.
 On March 1999, DAR Secretary issued a Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses, it covers the following:
(1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other
non-agricultural purposes;
(2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry,
and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage;
(3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized;
and
(4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses
on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section
20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be
converted to such uses.
 The DAR Secretary issued more administrative orders namely: DAR AO No. 01-02 entitled
"2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO
No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. It
covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to
another agricultural use. Further amendments particularly addressing land conversion in
time of exigencies and calamities were also made.
 Memorandum No. 88 was also issued in which it temporarily suspended the processing
and approval of all land use conversion applications.
 The petitioner contends that the said AOs requiring a conversion process caused an actual
slow down of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage,
unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the
petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.
 The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in
violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-awarded
lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations on or
after 15 June 1988 is specious.
 The DAR’s express power over land use conversion provided for under Section 65 of RA.
6657 is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years,
ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes.
 To suggest, however, that these are the only instances that the DAR can require
conversion clearances would open a loophole in RA 6657 which every landowner may use
to evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. It should logically follow,
therefore, from the said department’s express duty and function to execute and enforce
the said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial or
industrial property, on or after the effectivity of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988 should first be
cleared by the DAR.
 A mere reclassification of lands does not suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ
from each other. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural
land into some other use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of
specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the
requirements and procedures for land use conversion.
 In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically
allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion before
he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.
 DAR’s conversion authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
6657 on 15 June 1988. The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic
reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR
conversion clearance or authority. Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is
already subject to DAR’s conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use
the agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use
of reclassified agricultural lands.
 It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by the LGUs or by
way of Presidential Proclamations because either way they must still undergo
conversion process. The act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural
uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural
uses and does not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses
or for other purposes.
 For reclassified agricultural lands, therefore, to be used for the purpose to which
they are intended there is still a need to change the current use thereof through the
process of conversion. The authority to do so is vested in the DAR, which is
mandated to preserve and maintain agricultural lands with increased productivity.
Thus, notwithstanding the reclassification of agricultural lands to non-agricultural
uses, they must still undergo conversion before they can be used for other
purposes.
 Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential, commercial,
industrial or other nonagricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of
 Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the
process of conversion, despite having undergone reclassification, before
agricultural lands may be used for other purposes.
 It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public agricultural
lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public school,
etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. Based on
jurisprudence,only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or reserve a piece
of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation of public
agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect converted the same to such use
without undergoing any conversion process and that they must be actually, directly and
exclusively used for such public purpose for which they have been reserved, otherwise,
they will be segregated from the reservations and transferred to the DAR for distribution
to qualified beneficiaries under the CARP. More so, public agricultural lands already
reserved for public use or purpose no longer form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. Hence, they are outside the coverage
of the CARP and it logically follows that they are also beyond the conversion authority of
the DAR.
 The Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in
Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian
reform implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for
purposes of land use conversion.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
32. Heirs v. Land Bank G.R. No. 169913 June 8, 2011
Petitioners: HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE, namely: JOSEFA DELESTE, JOSE RAY DELESTE, RAUL
HECTOR DELESTE, and RUBEN ALEX DELESTE
Respondents: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), as represented by its Manager, LAND
VALUATION OFFICE OF LBP COTABATO CITY; THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR REGION 12 OF
COTABATO CITY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF REGION X CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, represented by MCMILLAN
LUCMAN, in his capacity as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of DAR Lanao del Norte;
LIZA BALBERONA, in her capacity as DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO);
REYNALDO BAGUIO, in his capacity as the Register of Deeds of Iligan City as nominal party; the
emancipation patent holders: FELIPE D. MANREAL, CUSTUDIO M. RICO, HEIRS OF DOMINGO V.
RICO, HEIRS OF ABDON T. MANREAL, MACARIO M. VELORIA, ALICIA B. MANREAL, PABLO RICO,
SALVACION MANREAL, HEIRS OF TRANQUILIANA MANREAL, HEIRS OF ANGELA VELORIA,
HEIRS OF NECIFURO CABALUNA, HEIRS OF CLEMENTE RICO, HEIRS OF MANTILLANO OBISO,
HEIRS OF HERCULANO BALORIO, and TITO BALER
Doctrine: Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local Government Code provides
that municipal and/or city councils are empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
or regulations; local governments have the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural
lands, and is not subject to DAR approval
Facts: Sps. Nanaman owned a parcel of agricultural land.
Sps. Nanaman were childless, but Gregorio (husband) had a son named Virgilio. Virgilio was raised
by the couple. Gregorio also had two other daughters, Esperanza and Caridad.
Gregorio died. Virgilio and Hilaria administered the agricultural land. They sold it to Dr. Deleste for
P16k. It was notarized and registered. A new tax declaration was issued in the name of Dr. Deleste.
Dr. Deleste also paid for the tax arrears.
When Hilaria (wife) died, Gregorio’s brother, Juan, was appointed as special administrator of the
estate. Noel subsequently replaced Juan
Noel filed an action against Deleste for the reversion of the title over the property. The SC eventually
ruled that the property was part of the conjugal property of the Spouses and Hilaria could only sell
her share in the property to Deleste. Thus, Deleste and the estate of Gregorio were held as co-
owners.
When such case was pending, PD 27 was issued for Land Reform. The property became subject of
such, however, only the Heirs of Gregorio were identified as landowners. Only they received the
notices and processes relative to the coverage.
The City of Iligan passed a Zoning Ordinance reclassifying the subject property as commercial or
residential.
DAR issued the Certificates of Land Transfer in favor of private respondents who were tenants and
actual cultivators of the land. The Certificates were later on registered
The City of Iligan filed a complaint with the RTC for the expropriation of a portion of the subject
property. It was granted. Since the real owner of the expropriated portion is undetermined because
it has not yet been partitioned, the just compensation therefor was deposited with DPB.
The Heirs of Deleste filed with DARAB a petition seeking to nullify the emancipation patents of the
private respondent. PARAD ruled in favor of the Hers of Deleste, because they were denied of due
process. However, this was reversed by the DARAB. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of
DARAB.
Issue: WoN the Zoning Ordinance took out the property from the coverage of PD27 - YES.
Ratio: Local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural lands, as
provided by RA 2264.
City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted by the City of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject
property into a commercial/residential area.
There was no need for HLURB approval because HLURB did not exist at the time the Ordinance was
passed. HLURB’s predecessor was not empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances and
regulations.
Local governments were required to submit their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances,
enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements for review and
ratification. In this case, by the Minister of Human Settlements.
Since at the time of effectivity of RA 6657, the subject property is not agricultural, it is beyond the
ambit of CARP.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CAs
October 28, 2004 and September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The Emancipation
Patents and Original Certificates of Title covering the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407,
issued in favor of private respondents are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents and Original
Certificates of Title erroneously issued in favor of private respondents.
33. Villegas v. Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270
Petitioners: MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS
Respondents: HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA
Doctrine: An ordinance of a municipality that fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to
guide or limit the mayor's action and expresses no purpose to be attained with the effect of
conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power is invalid, being an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity that is per se lawful
Facts:
 The Municipal board of Manila passed Ordinance no. 6537 which was signed by Mayor
Villegas.
 The ordinance prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent,
temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor
of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 EXCEPT persons employed in the
diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance
programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those
working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or
congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
 Any violation of the ordinance will be punished by imprisonment or fine.
 Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, an employee in Manila, filed a petition with the CFI of Manila for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order and to declare the
ordinance as null and void. He claims that:
1. As a revenue measure- the ordinance is discriminatory and in
violation of uniformity of taxation.
2. As a police power measure- it makes no distinction as to useful and
non-useful occupation and that the 50.00 fee for the permit is out of
proportion to the cost of registration. Moreover, the ordinance does
not provide any standard to guide/limit the action of the mayor
3. It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable as it only applies to
aliens resulting to a deprivation their life, liberty and property in
violation of due process and equal protection of the law.
 The RTC held that the ordinance was null and void. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is void? Yes
Held:
 The ordinance is actually a revenue measure. While it is true that the first part which
requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the
exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of
applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second
part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a
revenue measure. There is no justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been
cleared for employment. Thus, It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise
money under the guise of regulation.
 The requirement of a fee of 50.00 is unreasonable as it is charged to all. It does not
consider valid substantial differences in the situation of the aliens required to pay it. It
does not take into account whether the employee is casual or permanent, part time or full
time or a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Although the equal protection clause
allows classification, such classification must be based on real and substantial differences
with a reasonable relation to the subject matter of the legislation.
 The ordinance conferred an arbitrary or unrestricted power to the Mayor as it did not give
any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in his discretion.
 To require a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the Mayor of Manila
who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of
the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. Even if the
Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and
equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
Dispositive:
aWHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby armed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
34. The Learning Child Inc, et al. v. Ayala Alabang G.R. 134269
Petitioners: THE LEARNING CHILD, INC. and SPS. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO
Respondents: AYALA ALABANG VILLAGEASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA
ARZAGA, MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC
Doctrine:
Contracts Clause; Limitations on the use of land imposed by contract yield to reasonable exercise
of police power and, hence, zoning ordinances are superior to contractual restrictions on the use
of property.
SUMMARY:
The case is 3 consolidated petitions for review on certiorari concerning the operation of The
Learning Child, a preparatory AND grade school located in Ayala Alabang Village. AAVA filed an
injunction case against TLC and the spouses Alfonso for violating the Deed of Restrictions which
limits the use of the lot to a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school. The Supreme Court held
that AAVA’s and ALI’s insistence on (1) the enforcement of the Deed of Restriction or (2) the
obtainment of the approval of the affected residents for any modification of the Deed of Restrictions
is reasonable absent any interest or zoning purpose asserted by the Municipality contrary to that of
the subdivision developer in declaring the subject property as institutional
Deed of Restrictions Metropolitan Manila Muntinlupa Muntinlupa
Commission Zoning Resolution No. 94-
Ordinance No. 81-01 Ordinance No. 179
91-39
 property into an institutional area and would require the conduct of public
“USE AND OCCUPANCY – Classified Ayala Reclassified Corrected a hearings.
The property shall be Alabang Village for the subject typographical error in
o Office of the President – The Office of the President set aside this conclusion
used exclusively for the zoning purposes as a property as the description of a
of the HLURB and declared Resolution No. 94-179 as a valid corrective
establishment and low-density residential “institutional” parcel of land under
issuance. It further held that the Deed of Restrictions had lost its force and
maintenance thereon of a area, thereby limiting the heading
effect in view of the passage of Ordinance No. 91-39.
preparatory (nursery and the use of the subject “Institutional Zone” in
kindergarten) school, property to the Appendix B of  CA – The CA upheld the validity of Resolution No. 94-179 but held that the Office of the
which may include such establishment or Ordinance No. 91-39 , President erred; that Ordinance No. 91-39 did not have the effect of nullifying the Deed of
installations as an office operation of a nursery adjusting the Restrictions inasmuch as there is no conflict between the two
for school administration, and kindergarten description “Lot 25, Issue:
playground and garage school, which should Block 1, Phase V, Ayala 1. WON the CA is correct in upholding the validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-
for school vehicles.” not exceed two Alabang” to “Lot 25, 179 -- YES, being a mere corrective issuance, it is not invalidated by the lack of notice and
classrooms. Block 3, Phase V, Ayala hearing as AAVA contends.
Alabang” 2. WON the CA is correct in upholding the validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-
179 -- YES, being a mere corrective issuance, it is not invalidated by the lack of notice and
hearing as AAVA
Facts: 3. WON Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected by Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 91-179, has the effect of nullifying the provisions of the Deed of
 Sale of Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang – Ayala Land Inc. (ALI) sold this parcel
Restrictions on the subject property -- NO, there is a way to harmonize the seemingly
of land to spouses Yuson. They then sold it to spouses Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was
opposing provisions
annotated on the TCT which expressly provides that, “the property shall be used
4. WON AAVA is estopped from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions -- NO
exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and
Ratio:
kindergarten) school.” ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on
1. YES, being a mere corrective issuance, it is not invalidated by the lack of notice and
the properties in the Ayala Alabang Village to the association of homeowners, the AAVA.
hearing as AAVA contends
 Establishment of TLC and Expansion – In 1989, the spouses opened on the same lot 1. Both the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa and that of the Ayala Alabang
The Learning Child Pre-school which initially consisted of nursery and kindergarten Village show that the subject lot is classified as “institutional.” The official
classes. In 1991, it was expanded to include a grade school program, the School of the zoning map is an indispensable and integral part of a zoning ordinance,
Holy Cross. without which said ordinance would be considered void.
 AAVA Protest – The AAVA filed with the RTC of Makati an action for injunction against 2. It is clear that there was a typo and the Court is merely affirming the correction
TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract by the defendant spouses of the made by the same entity which committed the error.
Deed of Restrictions. 3. The authority of the HLURB is subordinate to that of the Office of the President
 RTC of Makati – Rendered a Decision in favour of AAVA, emphasizing that the restrictions and the acts of the former may be set aside by the latter.
b. MOOT, since their motion was filed in 1998, Aquino, et al., would no longer be in grade
were in reality an easement which an owner of a real estate may validly impose under
school at this time.
Article 688 of the Civil Code.
1. For the sake of argument, the Court finds no reversible error in CA’s denial of
 Motion for Reconsideration – TLC alleged that with the passage of Muntinlupa Zoning their Motion. The motion was filed three months after the CA had already
Ordinance No. 91-39 which reclassified the subject property as “institutional,” there rendered its Decision.
ceased to be legal basis for the RTC to uphold the Deed of Restrictions. RTC agreed and set 2. Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure clearly imports that
aside its earlier Decision. Citing Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank & Trust Co., intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its
it decreed that while the non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the Decision, and much less, as in the instant case, when even the CA had rendered
rule is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police its own Decision on appeal.
power by the municipality. b. NO, there is a way to harmonize the seemingly opposing provisions
 CA – Upon appeal by the AAVA, it set aside the Resolution of the RTC and reinstated the 1. TLC and spouses Alfonso: Reclassification of properties is a valid exercise of
previous decision in favour of AAVA. TLC and spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for the state’s police power, with which contractual obligations should be
Reconsideration from this Decision but was denied. reconciled.
 Motion to Intervene – Aquino, et al., students of TLC, alleging that they are minor 2. AAVA: Even where the exercise of police power is valid, the same does not
children who suffer from various learning disabilities and behavioural disorders operate to automatically negate all other legal relationships in existence since
benefiting from TLC’s full-inclusion program, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and the better policy is to reconcile the conflicting rights.
their own Motion for Reconsideration with the CA. The CA denied their Motions for being 3. Review of jurisprudence:
proscribed by Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. 1. Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank & Trust Co: The Court,
in upholding the exercise of police power attendant in the
 Zoning Ordinance Case – In the meantime, the Municipality of Muntinlupa passed reclassification of the subject property therein over the Deed of
Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an alleged typo on abovementioned Ordinance No. 91- Restrictions over the same property, took into consideration the
39, effectively placing Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V (herein subject lot) under the “Institutional prevailing conditions in the area. “Resolution was passed in the
Zone.” exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety,
o HLURB – According to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.”
the Resolution was not a mere correction of a typo but an actual rezoning of the
 2. Co v. Intermediate Appellate Court: The Court denied the applicability
of reclassification. “This is not to suggest that a zoning ordinance
cannot affect existing legal relationships for it is settled that it can
legally do so, being an exercise of police power. As such, it is superior
to the impairment clauses. xxx The zoning ordinance in question,
while valid as a police measure, was not intended to affect existing
rights protected by the impairment clause. It is always a wise policy
to reconcile apparently conflicting rights under the Constitution and
to preserve both instead of nullifying one against the other.”
3. Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association: The Court allowed the operation
of the Hot Pan de Sal Store despite the Deed of Restrictions, but not
without examining the surrounding area like in Ortigas.
ii. SC: The subject property, though declared as an institutional lot, nevertheless
lies within a residential subdivision and is surrounded by residential lots. TLC’s
student population had swelled to 350 students. The greater traffic will affect
adjacent property owners’ enjoyment and use of their own properties. AAVA’s
insistence on the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions is thus reasonable.
Also, the Municipality of Muntinlupa did not appear to have any special
justification for declaring the subject lot as an institutional property.
b. NO
i. TLC and Spouses Alfonso: AAVA had allegedly abrogated said restrictions by its
own acts
ii. However, TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the gravity of AAVA’s acts so as to bar the latter from insisting
compliance.
iii. Circumstances around the enumerated acts of AAVA also show that there was
no intention on the part of AAVA to abrogate the Deed of Restrictions nor to
waive its right to have said restrictions enforced
iv. Finally, a thorough examination of the records of the case shows that AAVA
consistently insisted upon compliance with the Deed of Restrictions
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court rules on the consolidated Petitions as follows:
1. The Petition in G.R. No. 134269 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated November 11, 1997 and July 2, 1998,
respectively, insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision ordering the
defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the
Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two
classrooms, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the two-classroom
restriction is deleted, and (2) the current students of the School of the Holy Cross, the
Learning Child Schools grade school department, be allowed to finish their elementary
studies in said school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The enrollment of new
students to the grade school shall no longer be permitted.
2. The Petition in G.R. No. 134440 is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. The Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated July 2, 1998, insofar as it dismissed
the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Jose Marie V. Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Veloso,
Christopher E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce is hereby
AFFIRMED
3. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 54438, dated August 15, 2000, which upheld the validity of a Mandaluyong
Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance is
hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
35. Negros Occidental II Electric v. Dumaguete, 155 SCRA 421
Petitioners:
Respondents:
Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ratio:
Dispositive:
36. Mascunana v. Mun. Board, 79 SCRA 399
Petitioners: ANGEL MASCUÑANA
Respondents: THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF
TALISAY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, LEON T. TREYES, ULPIANA INSON, GONZALO ORDANIEL and
FLORENTINO GARGALLANO
Doctrine: A municipal ordinance is not the same as a resolution of the municipal council.
Legislative acts passed by the municipal council in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are
denominated ordinances (Sec. 2227, Revised Administrative Code).
Where the municipality closed that part of a municipal street, which ran between the public
market and the plaintiff’s property, and the said adjoining property owner was admittedly
damaged by such action, he was entitled to recover the amount of the damage by virtue of section
2246. The municipality’s contention that it was not liable for damages because it acted in the
exercise of its police power and for the public welfare was not sustained.
 The municipal council of Talisay, Negros Occidental issued Resolution No. 59 declaring a
piece of land as municipal property closed to vehicular traffic. The land was situated near
the intersection of Burgos and Rizal Streets and adjacent to the bank of the Minuluan.
 Among those adjacent lots are Lot No. 80 owned by Angel Mascunñ ana and Lots 81-A, 81-B
and 81-C registered in the names of his children, Angeles M. Verdeflor, Angel, Jr. and
Manuel.
 Angel Mascunñ ana alleged that the piece of land in question is the terminus or extension of
Burgos Street.
 Mascunñ ana and his daughter, Angeles, in a letter, informed the mayor of Talisay that
portion of Burgos Street was occupied by squatters. He asked the mayor to take the
necessary steps to clear the area of squatters so that the public could use that part of
Burgos Street.
 The mayor took up Mascunñ ana’s request with the municipal council. The council indorsed
Mascunñ ana’s letter to the municipal treasurer.
 The treasurer found that the alleged portion or extension of Burgos Street mentioned in
Mascunñ ana’s letter is the property of the municipality of Talisay.
 The treasurer was not certain as to whether the said land had been used as a street, or
had been withdrawn from that use or had been abandoned or had never been designated
for public use. To determine the "character" of the said land, he suggested that the matter
be referred to the municipal attorney for further study.
 The acting provincial fiscal, rendered the opinion that "Burgos Street is a municipal
street and under the law is a property devoted for public use" and is outside the
commerce of man; that there was no record to show that portion of Burgos Street in
question had been withdrawn from public use by the municipal council, and that nonuser
alone would not destroy its public_nature.
 The members of the municipal council of Talisay concluded that there was no valid reason
for opening it to vehicular traffic. The council passed the aforementioned Resolution No.
59.
  In a letter, the acting provincial fiscal informed the municipal council of Talisay that the
closure of a municipal street is governed by section 2246 of the Revised Administrative
Code which authorizes a municipal council to close a municipal road, street, alley, park or
square, after indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby, and to use or convey for any
lawful purpose such property withdrawn from public servitude.
 The fiscal advised that any resolution approving the closure of the street should be
accompanied with the following data required in a circular of the Executive Bureau: (I)
the recommendation of the district engineer; (2) certified copies of documents executed
by owners of lots adjacent to the street to be closed waiving all claims for damages to
their respective properties, and (3) a statement of the provincial fiscal as to the
sufficiency of the documents submitted.
 The provincial fiscal rendered an opinion upholding the validity of the municipal council’s
Resolution No. 59 and stating that the council may dispose of the land in question, as its
patrimonial property, in any manner which it may deem proper. And that portion of land
cannot be even considered as part of Burgos Street nor (may) it be properly called a
thoroughfare. So, the requirement of Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code
need not be complied with.
 The provincial board approved the municipal council’s Resolution No. 59.
 Mascunñ ana and his daughter Angeles filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental against the provincial board, the municipal council and the four occupants of
the area in question, a petition wherein they prayed that Resolution No. 59 of the
municipal council and Resolution No. 1035 of the provincial board be declared void. They
also prayed for other equitable relief.
 They further alleged that Resolution No. 59 is void because there was no compliance with
the three requisites, prescribed in section 161 of the Compilation of Provincial Circulars
of the Executive Bureau, for the closure of municipal streets as authorized in section 2246
of the Revised Administrative Code.
 The provincial board in its answer alleged that section 2246 cannot be invoked because
the disputed portion is not a part of Burgos Street.
 The petitioners in their opposition contended that their action might be treated as an
action for prohibition wherein they seek to enjoin the enforcement of Resolution No.
59.
 The lower court summarily dismissed the petition it in a minute order.
 Mascunñ ana and Angeles M. Verdeflor appealed.
ISSUE:
1. W/N an action to declare void Resolution No. 59 of the municipal council is not an action for
declaratory relief because section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court refers to an ordinance and not to a
resolution, but rather an ordinary action for the enforcement of section 2246 of the Revised
Administrative Code and for the opening to vehicular traffic of the disputed area.–YES
2. W/N If the disputed area is proven to have been a part of Burgos Street, and if its closure to vehicular
traffic, as effectuated under Resolution No. 59, is held to be illegal, petitioner Verdeflor might claim
damages –YES
3. W/N the trial should have tried the case on the merits and should not have summarily dismissed the
petition it in a minute order—YES
RULING:
ISSUE #1:
1. A municipal ordinance is not the same as a resolution of the municipal council.
Legislative acts passed by the municipal council in the exercise of its lawmaking authority
are denominated ordinances (Sec. 2227, Revised Administrative Code).
2. A resolution is less solemn and formal than an ordinance. It "is an act of a special or
temporary character, not prescribing a permanent rule of government, but is merely
declaratory of the will or opinion of a municipal corporation in a given matter, and in the
nature of a ministerial or administrative act, and is not a law" (62 C.J.S. 786-7).
3. In reality, petitioners’ action is not for declaratory relief but is an ordinary action for
the enforcement of section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code and for the
opening to vehicular traffic of the disputed area.That section reads as follows:
"SEC. 2246. Authority to close thoroughfare. — With the prior authorization of the
Department Head, a municipal council may close any municipal road, street, alley, park, or
square; but no such way or place aforesaid, or any part thereof, shall be closed without
indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby.
"Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the municipality might be lawfully
used or conveyed."cralaw virtua1aw library
ISSUE #2:
1. As stated on pages 9 to 11 of their brief, petitioners’ contention is that Resolution No. 59
is void because the municipal council did not observe the requisites delineated in section
161 of the Compilation of Provincial Circulars which requisites were prescribed by the
Executive Bureau for the implementation of section 2246.
2. If the disputed area is proven to have been a part of Burgos Street, as the cadastral map
seems to indicate, and if its closure to vehicular traffic, as effectuated under Resolution
No. 59, is held to be illegal, petitioner Verdeflor might claim damages.
3. Thus, in Abella v. Municipality of Naga, 90 Phil. 385, it was held that where the
municipality closed that part of a municipal street, which ran between the public market
and the plaintiff’s property, and the said adjoining property owner was admittedly
damaged by such action, he was entitled to recover the amount of the damage by virtue of
section 2246. The municipality’s contention that it was not liable for damages because it
acted in the exercise of its police power and for the public welfare was not sustained.
(Compare with Unson v. Lacson and Genato Commercial Corp., 100 Phil. 695 and 112 Phil.
752, regarding the lease of a part of a Manila street to a private firm which was declared
void).
4. Mascunñ ana’s letter to the mayor shows petitioners’ cause of action. In that better, he
requested the mayor to clear the disputed area of squatters because their constructions
are prejudicial to the public in general and, in particular, to petitioner Verdeflor as owner
of Lot 81-A.
5. From petitioners’ viewpoint, they have reason to complain of a delict or wrong caused by
the closure of the disputed area to vehicular traffic due to the acts of the private
respondents in occupying that area and to the act of the public respondents in giving to
that closure a semblance of legality by means of their resolutions which have been
questioned by the petitioners in this case.
6. The finding of the fiscal and other provincial officials during their ocular inspection that
the disputed area is not a part of Burgos Street because it is not passable at all
strengthens petitioners’ cause of action that the resolution declaring it closed to vehicular
traffic should be voiced and that the area should be cleared of squatters so that it could be
used by the public.
If, as revealed in the cadastral map, the disputed area was originally a part of Burgos Street,
then the constructions of the four private respondents on said area, which obstruct and
interfere with the free passage of the street, may possibly be characterized as a nuisance which
can be abated summarily (Arts. 694 and 695, Civil Code; Letter of Instruction No. 19, dated
October 2, 1972, 68 O. G. 7962; Sitchon v. Aquino, 98 Phil. 458).
ISSUE #3:
1. The trial court in disposing of the case in a minute order gave the impression that it had
ignored or cavalierly treated petitioners’ contentions.
2. It is true that there is no rule requiring a trial court to make findings of fact and law in an
order of dismissal. The constitutional requirement of making findings of fact and law
applies only to decisions. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that a trial court’s
 order dismissing a complaint or petition is appealable like a final judgment. Therefore, for
the satisfaction of the losing party and to assist the appellate court in resolving the
appeal, the trial court should take some pains to reason out its order of dismissal and
should not merely incorporate therein, by reference, the motion to dismiss.
3. We should not be understood as having prejudged this case in favor of the petitioners-
appellants. What is being underscored is that the ends of justice would be better served
by holding in this case a trial on the merits if no amicable settlement is arrived at during
the pre-trial or if there is no agreed statement of facts. The legal points raised by the
petitioners should be resolved in a decision on the merits of the case.
Dispositive:WHEREFORE, the trial court’s minute order of dismissal is reversed and set aside with
costs against the private Respondents-Appellees.
37. Favis v. City, supra
Petitioners: Antonio Favis
Respondents: City of Baguio
Doctrine: Even where the statute or municipal charter requires the municipality to act by
ordinance, if a resolution is passed in the manner and with the statutory formality required in the
enactment of an ordinance, it will be binding and effective as an ordinance
Facts:
 On April 1957, Antonio Favis bought a parcel of land with about 1,000 sq. m. from the
Assumption Convent Inc.
 The lot is bounded on the southwest by Lot 2-E-3-B-3-B-1 (proposed road), owned by
Assumption Convent, Inc. The proposed road lot (Lot 2-E-3-B-B1) was donated by
Assumption to the City of Baguio for road purposes.
 Antonio Favis uses this road as his means of egress and ingress from his residence to a
public street called Lapu-Lapu Street.
 Lapu-Lapu street is a portion of a big tract of land registered in the name of the City,
known as Baguio Market Subdivision. It is 8 meters wide and it abruptly ends as it meets
portions of two lots. The road opening at the connecting point of the Lapu-Lapu street
and the donated lot is 2.5 meters.
 Lot 25 is the Northern most part of the Market Subdivision and is approximately 400
meters. Resolution No. 115, Series of 1947, of the City Council of Baguio leased this Lot 25
to Shell for a ten-year period renewable for another ten years. Shell constructed thereon a
service station of about 335 square meters.
 Resolution No. 132 authorized the Mayor to lease to Shell 2 parcels of land Lot 25 and the
donated lot. Shell filed an application with the Office of the City Engineer of Baguio for a
building permit for the construction of a new and bigger gasoline station on the leased
premises. Said office, in a letter to the City Council thru the City Mayor dated June 30,
1961, noted that the leased "[1] to 'B' which consists of 100 square meters is exactly
within the road right-of-way of Lapu-Lapu Street," is for public use, and may not be
leased.
 Antonio Favis sent a letter-protest against the additional lease made in favor of Shell. He
claimed that it would diminish the width of Lapu-Lapu Street to five meters only, that it
would destroy the symmetry of the said street thus making it look very ugly, and that the
City was bereft of authority to lease any portion of its public streets in favor of anyone.
 Resolution No. 215, amending Resolution No. 132, Series of 1961, by converting that
"portion of Lapu-Lapu Street lying southeast from Lot B of the sketch plan prepared
March 10, 1961 by Private Land Surveyor Perfecto B. Espiritu, beginning at this portion's
intersection with Dagohoy Street, into an alley 5.00 meters wide (4 m. now in actual use);
declaring for this purpose, that said Lot B shall not be a part of this alley.
 Antonio Favis then instituted a petition annulling the lease contract between the City and
shell.
Lower courts (CFI Baguio) held that the resolutions were valid.
Issues:
1. Is closing of the street without an ordinance is valid - YESSIR
2. May the City of Baguio may close down a street - YESSIR
Ratio:
1. It has been held that "even where the statute or municipal charter requires the
municipality to act by ordinance, if a resolution is passed in the manner and with
the statutory formality required in the enactment of an ordinance, it will be binding
and effective as an ordinance." Such resolution may operate regardless of the name by
which it is called. Resolutions No. 132 and 215, Series of 1961, were unanimously
approved with all the councilors present and voting, carried the seal of the city council,
were signed by the City Vice-Mayor, the Presiding Officer, approved by the City Mayor, and
attested by the City Secretary. With the presumption of validity of the resolution and the
other presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, the embattled
resolutions are just as good as ordinances and have the same force.
2. In subsection (L) of Section 2558 of the Review Administrative Code (Baguio Charter) it
states that:
-“(L) To provide for laying out, opening, extending, widening, straightening, closing up,
constructing, or regulating, in whole or in part, any public plaza, square, street, sidewalk,
trail, park, waterworks, or water remains, or any cemetery, sewer, sewer connection or
connections, either on, in, or upon public or private property;”
Hence, the City is explicitly allowed by its own charter to close up streets. The Court held
that the City in closing up a portion of the Lapu-Lapu street is well within the powers
granted to it. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary and the discretion will
not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse
or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that
some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation
ordinance.
Dispositive:
For the reasons given, the appealed judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio declaring valid
Resolution No. 132, Series of 1961, and Resolution No. 215, Series of 1961, both of the City Council
of Baguio, and ordering the dismissal of the complaint as well as the counterclaim, is hereby
affirmed.
Costs against plaintiff-appellant.
38. Malonzo v. Zamora 323 SCRA 875
Petitioners: REYNALDO O. MALONZO, in his capacity as City Mayor of Caloocan, OSCAR
MALAPITAN, in his capacity as Vice Mayor of Caloocan, CHITO ABEL, BENJAMIN MANLAPIG,
EDGAR ERICE, DENNIS PADILLA, ZALDY DOLARTE, LUIS TITO VALERA, SUSAN PUNZALAN, and
HENRY CAMAYO, in thier capacities as Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan

Respondents: RONALDO B. ZAMORA, in his capcaity as Executive Secretary, RONALDO V. PUNO,
in his capacity as Undersecretary of the DILG, and EDUARDO TIBOR.
Doctrine: Capital outlay cannot be approriated for the payment of just compensation in
expropriation proceedings (even if cancelled) for another purpose until such original purpose has
been fully complied with.
Facts:
 In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan passed ORDINANCE NO. 0168, S.
1994, authorizing the City Mayor to initiate proceedings for the exprorpriation of Lot 26
of the Maysilo Estate, registered in the name of CLT Realty (CLT).
 The expropriation of the lot was appropriated the amount of Php35,997,975.00 (later
increased to Php39,352,047.75).
 It turned out, however, that the Maysilo Estate straddled the City of Caloocan and
Malabon, prompting CLT to file a special civil action against the Caloocan and Malabon
restraining them from assessing and collecting real property taxes.
 After failing to conclude a voluntary sale of the questioned Lot, the City Legal Officer
recommended to the City Mayor that, in view of the pending resolution of the above-
mentioned case, the exprorpriation of the Lot be cancelled and/or abandoned.
 In the meantime, Vice Mayor Malapitan wrote to Mayor Malonzo requesting for the repair
and renovation of the office of councilors, and the hiring of personnel in support of the
councilors. Malonzo acted on the letter and endorsed the same to the City Treasurer,
which in turn manifested through a memorandum that since the expropriation has been
discontinued, the appropriation for the expropriation can be reverted for use in the
supplemental budget, stating further that he certifies it for its reversion since it is not yet
obligated, and available for re-approriation in the supplemental budget.
 Pursuant to the certification by the City Treasurer, the Sanggunian passed Ordinance No.
0254, S. 1998, appropriating the amount of Php39,343,028.00 as its supplemental
budget.
 Alleging that the petitioners conspired to violate provisions of the Local Government Code
in enacting the latter Ordinance, a certain Eduardo Tibor filed an administrative
complaint against the petitioners before the Office of the President (OP).
 Later, a certain Teotimo de Guzman Gajudo filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of
the Ordinance in question.
 The OP rendered judgment finding the petitioners guilty of misconduct in allowing for the
passage of the Ordinance without following the required Procedure (as to be discussed
later) and meted out the penalty of suspension for three months. The petitioners assail
the OP’s Order before the Supreme Court.
 To support their petition, petitioners contend that on account of the filing of an action for
interpleader by CLT, the expropriation proceedings had to be suspended pending final
resolution of the boundary dispute between Malabon and Caloocan City. Due to his
dispute, the P50 million appropriation for the expropriation of properties under current
operating expenses had not been obligated and no security deposit was forthcoming. It
was not at the time a continuing appropriation. This unavoidable discontinuance of the
purpose for which the appropriation was made effectively converted the earlier
expropriation of P39,352,047.75 into savings as defined by law.
 They argue further that there is no truth in the allegation that Ordinance No. 0254, S.
1998 was passed without complying with Sections 50 and 52 of the Local Government
Code requiring that on the first regular session following the election of its members and
within 90 days thereafter, the Sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing
rules of procedure. According to them, the minutes of the session held on July 2, 1998
would reveal that the matter of adoption or updating of the house rules was taken up and
that the council arrived at a decision to create an ad hoc committee to study the rules.
 The OSG, representing the respondents, asserted further that the filing on August 6, 1997
of an interpleader case by CLT which owns Lot 26 should not be considered as an
unavoidable discontinuance that automatically converted the appropriated amount into
savings which could be used for supplemental budget. Since the said amount was not
transformed into savings and, hence, no funds were actually available, then the passage of
Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 which realigned the said amount on a supplemental budget
violated Section 321 of the Code requiring an ordinance providing for a supplemental
budget to be supported by funds actually available as certified by the local treasurer or by
new revenue sources.
 Petitioners were likewise faulted for violating Sections 50 and 52 of the Code requiring
the Sangguniang Panlungsod to adopt or update its existing rules of procedure within the
first 90 days following the election of its members. The Sanggunian allegedly conducted
three readings of Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 in one day and on the first day of its session
(July 2, 1998) without the Sanggunian having first organized itself and adopted its rules
of procedure. It was only on July 23, 1998 that the Sanggunian adopted its internal rules
of procedure.
Issue: W/N petitioners validly re-approriated the amount as stated in the subject Ordinances and
followed the correct procedure in adopting Ordinance No. 0254, s. 1998. - YES.
Ratio:
 The OP erred when it stated that the original appropriation for the Lot 26 is
considered as capital outlay is considered as continuing appropriation and thus
cannot be reverted to the treasury for reappropriation
o First, The Court held that the OP misappropriated the facts when it considered
the case of the petitioners. The OP found that the petitioners breached Section
332 of the Local Government Code when it realigned the appropriated amount
of Php39,352,047.75 when it passed the Ordinance authorizing the
supplemental budget.
 Based on the Sec. 322, the OP reached the determination that
Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 could not have lawfully realigned the
amount of Php39,352,047.75 which was previously appropriated
for the expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate since such
appropriation was in the nature of a capital outlay until fully spent,
reverted; or the project for which it is earmarked is completed.
 However, the Court saw that the amount of the supplemental
budget (Php39,343,028.00) was DIFFERENT from the
appropriation allocated for the expropriation of the lot.
o The question, however, is not whether the appropriation of P39,352,047.75
could fall under the definitions of continuing appropriation and capital outlays,
considering that such amount was NOT the subject of the realignment
made by Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998. Rather, the issue is whether
petitioners are liable for their actions in regard to said ordinance which
actually realigned a position of the P50 million which was simply
denominated in a general manner as Expropriation of Properties and
classified under Current Operating Expenditures in the 1998 Annual
Budget of Caloocan City.
o Clearly, these are two distinct amounts separate from each other. That this is
the case has likewise been clarified in the pleadings and during the oral
argument where petitioners adequately explained that the P50 million was NOT
appropriated for the purpose of purchasing Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate but
rather for expenses incidental to expropriation such as relocation of squatters,
 appraissal fee, expenses for publication, mobilization fees, and expenses for
preliminary studies
o The appropriation of P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0246, S. 1997
(the Ordinance that increased the amount ot be used for expropriation) is, we
believe, still a subsisting appropriation that has never been lumped
together with other funds to arrive at the sum of P50 million allocated in
the 1998 budget.
o No less than respondents themselves argued, citing Sections 321 and 322 in
relation to Section 306 (d) and (e) of the Code, that realignment shall not be
allowed when what is involved are continuing appropriations or capital
outlays. But this argument becomes clearly inapplicable in view of our
disquisition above that the realignment being complained of had nothing to do
with the P39,352,047.75 appropriation for the purchase of Lot 26 of the
Maysilo Estate which is clearly the one that is classifiable as a capital outlay or
a continuing appropriation. The realignment, as we have earlier discussed,
pertained to the P50 million which was classified as Current Operating
Expenditures. Having been determined as such by the local council upon which
legislative discretion is granted, then the statutory proscription does not,
therefore, apply and respondents cannot insist that it should.
 The Sanggunian of Caloocan correctly followed procedure in enacting the
Ordinances.
o As to the alleged violation of Sections 50 and 52 of the Code requiring the
adoption of house rules and the organization of the council, we believe that the
same hardly merits even cursory consideration. We cannot infer the mandate
of the Code that no other business may be transacted on the first regular
session except to take up the matter of adopting or updating rules.All that the
law requires is that on the first regular session the sanggunian concerned shall
adopt or update its existing rules or procedure. There is nothing in the
language thereof that restricts the matters to be taken up during the first
regular session merely to the adoption or updating of the house rules. If it were
the intent of Congress to limit the business of the local council to such matters,
then it would have done so in clear and unequivocal terms. But as it is, there is
no such intent.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 98-H-8520 dated March 15, 1999 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of
jurisdiction. Consequently, respondents, their subordinates, agents, representatives, and successors-
in-interest are permanently enjoined from enforcing or causing the execution in any manner of the
aforesaid decision against herein petitioners.
39. Zamora v. Caballero, 419 SCRA 384, 392
Petitioners: MANUEL E. ZAMORA
Respondents: GOVERNOR JOSE R. CABALLERO, ANESIO M. RANARIO, in his capacity as Provincial
Ratio:
Administrator, MARIANO KINTANAR, in his capacity as Provincial Auditor, CARMEN R. RASUL, in his
capacity as Provincial Treasurer, ROLANDO L. OSORIO, BELINDA G. APAWAN, ARMANDO L. SERAS,
RUWEL PETER S. GONZAGA, ARMANDO C. CODILLA, RAUL B. BASAÑES, GRACIANO C. ARAFOL, JR.,
Doctrine:
Facts:
 Petitioner Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela
Valley (the Sanggunian), seeks to invalidate all acts executed and resolutions issued by
the Sanggunian during its sessions held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum.
 On February 6, 2001, Vice-Governor Reynaldo Navarro sent a written notice of a special
session on February 7, 2001. Upon the request of Governor Jose R. Caballero, however,
the scheduled special session was reset to February 8, 2001 without the benefit of a
written notice.
 On February 8, 2001, the Sanggunian thus held a special session to, among other
things, allow the Governor to deliver his State of the Province Address. As only seven
members of the fourteen-member Sanggunian were present, no resolution was
considered.
 On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its 4th regular session during which it
issued Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley under a
state of calamity and Resolution No. 07 authorizing the Governor to, on behalf of the
province, enter into a construction contract (Contract) with Allado Construction
Company, Inc. (the Allado Company) for the completion of Phase II of the construction
of the capitol building. During the same session, the Sanggunian accepted the letter of
irrevocable resignation submitted by Board Member Gemma Theresa M. Sotto.
 While only eight members of the Sanggunian were present at the commencement of the
session on February 26, 2001, the Journal of the Proceedings (Journal) and Resolution
Nos. 05 and 07 showed that a total of thirteen members attended it
 Petitioner: challenged the validity of the acts of the Sanggunian on February 26, 2001,
alleging that while the Journal and Resolutions indicated the presence of 13 members, the
Sanggunian nonetheless "conducted official business without a quorum" as only seven of
its fourteen members were actually present when the irrevocable letter of resignation of
Board Member Sotto was noted, and the motions to declare the entire province of
Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and to authorize the Governor to enter into
the Contract with the Allado Company were approved.
 Petitioner additionally alleged that when the vote respecting Resolution No. 05 was
taken, only the remaining six members voted for the adoption thereof, the then
presiding officer Board Member Rolando Osorio not having cast his vote; that when
Resolution No. 07 was taken up, however, then presiding officer Osorio, relinquished
his seat to Board Member Graciano Arafol after the six members present unanimously
voted on the said resolution in the affirmative, following which Osorio cast his vote as a
member also in the affirmative, thereby authorizing the Governor to enter into the
Contract with Allado Company; and that Board Member Arafol thereafter relinquished
his seat as presiding officer to Board Member Osorio who once again assumed the
duties of a presiding officer.
 Petitioner furthermore challenged the validity of the special session of February 8, 2001
for lack of quorum, there being only seven members of the Sanggunian in attendance, and
for lack of written notice sent to all members at least 24 hours before the holding of the
special session in accordance with Section 52 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC).
 Respondents: contended that since Board Member Sotto was in the United States at the
time the questioned acts were executed and resolutions adopted, the actual number of
Board Members then in the country was thirteen which should be the basis of the
determination of a quorum.Issue:
 there is nothing on record, save for respondents' allegation, to show that Board Member
Sotto was out of the country and to thereby conclude that she was outside the coercive
power of the Sanggunian when the February 8 and 26, 2001 sessions were held. In fact it
is undisputed that the leave form filed by said Board Member before the Department of
the Interior and Local Government (DILG) did not mention that she was going out of the
country. Petitioner's contention that the trial court cannot take judicial notice of Board
Member Sotto's whereabouts is thus well taken. On this score, the instant case is outside
the application of the doctrine in Avelino.
 A court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or those which are
capable of unquestionable determination or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions. With respect to disputed facts, however, the court must receive
evidence thereof, with notice to the parties
 "Quorum" is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally
assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business
or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or
ordinance or do any valid act. "Majority," when required to constitute a quorum, means
the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In fine, the entire
membership must be taken into account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, for while the constitution merely states that "majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum," Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting as it requires that the
"majority of all members of the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified" shall constitute a
quorum.
 The difference in the wordings of the constitution and the LGC is not merely "a matter
of style and writing" as respondents would argue, but is actually a matter of "meaning
and intention." The qualification in the LGC that the majority be based on those
"elected and qualified" was meant to allow sanggunians to function even when not all
members thereof have been proclaimed. And, while the intent of the legislature in
qualifying the quorum requirement was to allow sanggunians to function even when
not all members thereof have been proclaimed and have assumed office, the provision
necessarily applies when, after all the members of the sanggunian have assumed office,
one or some of its members file for leave. What should be important then is the
concurrence of election to and qualification for the office. And election to, and
qualification as member of, a local legislative body are not altered by the simple
expedient of filing a leave of absence.
 The trial court should thus have based its determination of the existence of a quorum
on the total number of members of the Sanggunian without regard to the filing of a leave
of absence by Board Member Sotto. The fear that a majority may, for reasons of political
affiliation, file leaves of absence in order to cripple the functioning of the sanggunian is
already addressed by the grant of coercive power to a mere majority of sanggunian
members present when there is no quorum.
 A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal function and duty of
the sanggunian, requires the participation of all its members so that they may not only
represent the interests of their respective constituents but also help in the making of
decisions by voting upon every question put upon the body. The acts of only a part of
the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions aforementioned
are legally infirm, highly questionable and are, more importantly, null and void. And all
such acts cannot be given binding force and effect for they are considered unofficial
acts done during an unauthorized session.
 Board Member Sotto is then deemed not resigned because there was no quorum when
her letter of irrevocable resignation was noted by the Sanggunian. For the same reason,
Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 are of no legal effect.
 Even assuming arguendo that there were indeed thirteen members present during the
questioned February 26, 2001 session, Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province
of Compostela Valley under state of calamity is still null and void because the motion
for its approval was approved by only six members. When there are thirteen members
present at a session, the vote of only six members can not, at any instance, be deemed
to be in compliance with Section 107(g) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC which requires the concurrence of the approval by the majority of the members
present and the existence of a quorum in order to validly enact a resolution.
 The motion to grant the Governor authority to enter into the construction contract is also
deemed not approved in accordance with the law even if it received seven affirmative
votes, which is already the majority of thirteen, due to the defect in the seventh vote. For
as priorly stated, as the Journal confirms, after all six members voted in the affirmative,
Board Member Osorio, as acting presiding officer, relinquished his seat to Board Member
Arafol and thereafter cast his vote as a member in favor of granting authority to the
Governor.
 While acting as presiding officer, Board Member Osorio may not, at the same time, be
allowed to exercise the rights of a regular board member including that of voting even
when there is no tie to break. A temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the
shoes of the presiding officer could not have greater power than that possessed by the
latter who can vote only in case of a tie.
 Lastly, for a resolution authorizing the governor to enter into a construction contract to
be valid, the vote of the majority of all members of the Sanggunian, and not only of
those present during the session, is required in accordance with Section 468 of the
LGC in relation to Article 107 of its Implementing Rules.
 Even including the vote of Board Member Osorio, who was then the Acting Presiding
Officer, Resolution No. 07 is still invalid. Applying Section 468 of the LGC and Article
107 of its Implementing Rules, there being fourteen members in the Sanggunian, the
approval of eight members is required to authorize the governor to enter into the
Contract with the Allado Company since it involves the creation of liability for payment
on the part of the local government unit.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley dated April 24, 2001 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley
approved on February 26, 2001, declaring the entire Province of Compostela Valley under a
state of calamity and granting authority to the Provincial Governor to enter into a general
construction agreement, respectively, are hereby declared null and void. AIDTHC
SO ORDERED.
40. Reyes v. CA, 320 SCRA 486, 494
Petitioners: ANTONIO Z. REYES, ELISEO P. OCAMPO and EDITHA ARCIAGA-SANTOS||
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FRANKLIN DRILON and
MAYOR JINGGOY ESTRADA (JOSE EJERCITO) OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO
MANILA
Doctrine:We find Figuerres instructive. Petitioners have not proved in the case before us that the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan failed to conduct the required public hearings before the
enactment of Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101. Although the Sanggunian had the control of
records or the better means of proof regarding the facts alleged, petitioners are not relieved from
the burden of proving their averments. Proof that public hearings were not held falls on
petitioners' shoulders. For failing to discharge that burden, their petition was properly dismissed.
In any event, for the purpose of securing certainty where doubt would be intolerable, it is a
general rule that the regularity of the enactment of an officially promulgated statute or ordinance
may not be impeached by parol evidence or oral testimony either of individual officers and
members, or of strangers who may be interested in nullifying legislative action. This rule
supplements the presumption in favor of the regularity of official conduct which we have upheld
repeatedly, absent a clear showing to the contrary.
Facts:
 San Juan implemented several tax ordinances:
o 87 An ordinance imposing a municipal tax of fifty percent (50%) of one percent
(1%) of the gross receipt on business of printing and publication
o 91 An ordinance imposing a transfer tax equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of
one percent (1%) of the total consideration on the sale, donation, barter or any
 other mode of transferring ownership or title of real property situated in San
Juan, Metro Manila, or its fair market value, whichever is higher
o 95 An ordinance imposing fifty percent (50%) of one percent of (1%) for social
housing tax on the assessed value of all real estate property in San Juan, Metro
Manila in excess of P50,000.00 value as provided in the New Urban Land
Reform Law, also known as R.A. 7279.
o 100 An ordinance imposing new rates of business taxes of the Municipality of
San Juan Metro Manila
o 101 An ordinance levying an annual "Ad Valorem" tax on real property and an
additional tax accruing to the special education fund (SEF)
 Petitioners Reyes, Ocampo and Arciaga-Santos filed an appeal with DOJ assailing the
constitutionality of the ordinances for having been promulgated without previous public
hearings
o EFFECT: Deprivation of property without due process of law
 OJ Secretary dismissed for being filed out of time
o CA affirmed the DOJ Ruling
 Petitioner now contends that in the absence of public hearing, the ordinances are invalid
and therefore no prescriptive period could lapse
 Respondent on the other hand cites Sec. 187 of RA 7160
o That any question on the constitutionality of any tax ordinance or revenue may
be raised on appeal within 30 days to the SOJ
o This appeal shall not suspend the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment of the tax,
fee, or charge levied therein
Issue:
 WON the validity of ordinances be assailed through parol evidence? – NO.
Ratio:
 As stated in the case of Figuerres v. CA:
o There is indeed a requirement of prior public hearing prior to the enactment of
ordinances
o But if the petitioner cannot prove that there was no public hearing, and the
municipality alleges otherwise, the former cannot prevail
o There is a presumption of constitutionality and legality of an ordinance
 GR: the regularity of the enactment of an officially promulgated statute or ordinance may
not be impeached by parol evidence or oral testimony either of individual officers and
members, or of strangers who may be interested in nullifying legislative action
 The constitutionality of an act of Congress will not be passed upon by the Court unless at
the first opportunity that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate
case, and is necessary to a determination of the case, particularly where the issue of
constitutionality is the very lis mota presented.
 The constitutional validity of a statutory provision should not be entertained by the Court
where it was not specifically raised below, insisted upon, and adequately argued.
 Moreover, given the circumstances in this case, we find no genuine necessity to dwell on
the issue of constitutional invalidity of Section 187 in relation to issue of valid enactment
of the subject ordinances, as shown in the foregoing discussion.
 Suffice it now to say that, having resolved the first and second issues, we find no grave
abuse of discretion nor reversible error in the decision of the respondent appellate court.
 There are three periods to comply when asking for redress before a competent court
o 30 days from effectivity- appeal must be filed with the SOJ
o 30 days- allowed time to go to court upon decision of the SOJ
o 60 days inaction by SOJ- proceed to seek relief from court
 These periods are set to prevent delays and enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial functions
o Especially true in tax cases which is for the delivery of basic services to the
public
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. LLpr
SO ORDERED.
41. Drilon v. Lim, supra (repeated case)
Petitioners: HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Respondents: MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER
ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA
Doctrine: There is a distinction between control and supervision. The first is the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the second is the
power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance
with law.
Sec. 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the
tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or
modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for
the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.
Facts: (copied from previous case)
 Sec. 187 of the Local Government Code:
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and
revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That
public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof;
Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances
or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from
the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the
effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the
tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice
acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court
of competent jurisdiction.
 Pursuant thereto, Secretary of Justice Drilon had (on appeal to him of four oil companies
and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue
Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment
of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
 Judge Palattao of the RTC of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the
ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More
importantly, he declared Sec. 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional
because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local
governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution
 and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President only the power of
supervision over local governments.
 The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the
procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local
Government Code had indeed not been observed.
Issue/s:
 W/N Sec. 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional – YES
Ratio:
 The lower court was hasty in invalidating the provision. In the exercise of this jurisdiction,
lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the
consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less
than on the doctrine of separation of powers.
 There is a distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,"
while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform
their functions in accordance with law."
 Sec. 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of
these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not
also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure.
 Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his
own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or
unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad
law. What he found only was that it was illegal.
 All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under
the Local Government Code. That was an act not of control, but of mere supervision.
 An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.
 If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform
to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He
has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
 In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than
this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.
Additional Notes:
 The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code is another matter.
 The procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings
were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits the proposed ordinances were
published in the Balita and the Manila Standard and the approved ordinance was
published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993
issue of Balita.
 The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved, but this omission does
not affect its validity considering that its publication in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that
the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement
applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the
local government unit and not to tax ordinances.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of
the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code
unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of
the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to costs.
42. Delos Reyes v. Sandiganbayan, 281 SCRA 631
Petitioners: MAYOR OSCAR DE LOS REYES,
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Doctrine: the grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of
signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the
local chief executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to
veto it and return it with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the
same.
Facts:
Petitioner, along with two others, was charged with the crime of falsification of a public document,
specifically Resolution No. 57-S-92 of the Municipal Council of Mariveles, Bataan.
The complaint alleged that the resolution, appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for the payment of
the terminal leave of two municipal employees, was anomalous for not having been approved by the
said Council, as the minutes of the proceedings therein made no reference to the supposed approval
thereof.
It contended that its seeming passage was carried out by petitioner in connivance with Sangguniang
Bayan (SB) Member Jesse Concepcion and SB Secretary Antonio Zurita.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. Respondent Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for
Reinvestigation.
Thus petitioner filed this instant petition for certiorari.
Issue: W/N the final step in the approval of an ordinance or resolution, where the local chief
executive affixes his signature, is purely a ministerial act-NO
Ratio:
On September 18, 1995, the Court resolved to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for by
petitioner.
The order of respondent Sandiganbayan must be sustained.

In an effort to exonerate himself from the charge, petitioner argues that the deliberations
undertaken and the consequent passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative in nature.
He adds that as local chief executive, he has neither the official custody of nor the duty to prepare
said resolution; hence, he could not have taken advantage of his official position in committing the
crime of falsification as defined and punished under Article 171[6] of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the final step in the approval of an ordinance
or resolution, where the local chief executive affixes his signature, is purely a ministerial act.
This view is erroneous. Article 109(b) of the Local Government Code outlines the veto power of the
Local Chief Executive which provides:
Article 109 (b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay shall have the power to veto
any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a
local development plan and public investment program or an ordinance directing the payment of
money or creating liability. x x x.
Contrary to petitioners belief, the grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple
mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power
accords the local chief executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first
instance or to veto it and return it with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to
reconsider the same.
The Sanggunian concerned, however, may override the veto by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its
members thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.
It is clear, therefore, that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance
or resolution requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of judgment after
meticulous analysis and intelligence as well.
It must be stressed that the Ombudsman correctly relied on the minutes taken during the session of
the Sangguniang Bayan held last July 27, 1992, which petitioner regards as inconclusive evidence of
what actually transpired therein.
In the case at bar, the minutes of the session reveal that petitioner attended the session of the
Sangguniang Bayan on July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner approved the subject
resolution knowing fully well that the subject matter treated therein was neither taken up and
discussed nor passed upon by the Sangguniang Bayan during the legislative session.
Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what actually
transpires in every proceeding. It has happened that the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true
account of a proceeding, thus giving the Court more reason to accord them great weight for such
subsequent corrections, if any, are made precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records.
In light of the conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar, the Court, without resorting to the
minutes, will encounter difficulty in resolving the dispute at hand.
With regard to the joint affidavit of some members of the Sangguniang Bayan attesting to the actual
passage and approval of Resolution No. 57-S-92, the Court finds the same to have been belatedly
submitted as a last minute attempt to bolster petitioners position, and, therefore, could not in any
way aid the latters cause.
Indeed, the arguments raised by petitioners counsel are best taken up in the trial on the merits.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated December 29, 1994, and May 24, 1995, are hereby
AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September 18, 1995, is hereby
LIFTED.
The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 21073 for arraignment and trial.
SO ORDERED.
43. Homeowners v. Municipal Board, 24 SCRA 856
Petitioners: Homeowners’ Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Vicente Rufino
Respondents: Municipal Board of Manila and Mayor Antonio Villegas
Doctrine:
Facts:
1. Petitioner brought this action to nullify Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 of the City of
Manila.
2. The Ordinance reads as follows: ( i shortened it already)
1. Sec. 1. Lessors/Sublessors of lands primarily devoted to residential purposes
are prohibited from increasing the rental to an amount in excess of the
proportion in the increase of the assessed value of the land.
2. Sec. 2. Lessors/Sublessors of buildings primarily devoted to residential
purposes are prohibited from increasing the rentals in excess of 10% per
annum of the assessed value of the building leased and of the land on which the
building stands.
3. Sec. 3. Ordinance shall apply to contracts of lease or sublease existing upon its
approval.
4. Any person violating the ordinance shall be punished by a fine not less than
100 but not more than 200 and imprisonment for not less than 1 month but
not more than 6 months.
b. CFI declared the ordinance as ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio.
1. Lower court struck down the ordinance on the ground that the power to
declare a state of emergency exclusively pertains to Congress.
2. There’s no longer any state of emergency which may justify the regulation of
house rentals
3. Ordinance is an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private
properties and encroaches on the property rights of its owners.
4. Power to regulate business of leasing lands and buildings doesnt include the
authority to prohibit what is forbidden in said ordinance.
5. Ordinance is not sanctioned by the General Welfare clause.
Issue: Whether the ordinance is invalid - YES
Ratio:
1. The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power. Such
exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation, or restriction
demanded by the regard, respect and obedience due to the prescriptions of the Bill of
Rights.
2. Exercise of such power must be reasonable. Individual rights may be affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest.
3. If the demands brought about by a state of emergency, the interference upon individual
rights must be co-terminous with the exercise thereof. Since emergency is temporary in
character, so must the regulations promulgated therefor be, for the effect cannot remain
in existence upon the removal of its cause.
4. As a consequence a law or ordinance affecting the rights of individuals, as a means to tide
over a critical condition, to be valid and legal, must be for a "definite" period of time, the
 length of which must be "reasonable", in relation to the nature and duration of the crisis it
seeks to overcome or surmount.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. It is so ordered. The Court feels that it would have been far more amiable if the
petitioners themselves, recognizing their own civic duty, had at the outset desisted from their
original stance and withdrawn in good grace from the disputed area to permit its peaceful
restoration as a public plaza and parking place for the benefit of the whole municipality. They owned
this little sacrifice to the community in general which has suffered all these many years because of
their intransigence. Regrettably, they have refused to recognize that in the truly democratic society,
the interests of the few should yield to those of the greater number in deference to the principles
that the welfare of the people is the supreme law and overriding purpose. We do not see any
altruism here. The traditional ties of sharing are absent here. What we find, sad to say, is a cynical
disdaining of the spirit of "bayanihan," a selfish rejection of the cordial virtues of "pakikisama " and
"pagbibigayan" which are the hallmarks of our people.
44. Viray v. Caloocan, 20 SCRA 291
Petitioners: Policarpio Viray, et al
Respondents: City of Caloocan, et al
Doctrine: An ordinance imposing a cadaver transfer fee which is distinct from the burial
permit fee, is void. It is not sanctioned by the power of the municipal board to regulate the
use of cemeteries.
Also, the provision of the Local Autonomy Act, empowering cities and municipalities to
impose license fees and taxes on persons engaged in any occupation or business or
exercising privileges does not sanction the levy of a cadaver transfer fee. The transfer and
burial of a cadaver is not an occupation or business or the exercise of a privilege
Facts: On September 18, 1962, the Municipal Board of Caloocan City enacted Ordinance No. 94
which imposed an entrance fee on cadavers coming from places outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Caloocan, sought to be buried in private cemeteries within the City of Caloocan. The
ordinance impose entrance fees, such as: P 5.00 if the deceased is below 14 years old and P 10.00 if
14 years old or above.
Macario Asistio, the Mayor of the City of Caloocan, approved Ordinance No. 94 on September 22,
1962, and on March 8, 1963, Policarpio Viray and Antonio Cajote paid Php 5.00 each, and Leopoldo
Prieto paid Php 10.00 for the burial of their respective relatives at the La Loma Cemetery (private
cemetery within the City of Caloocan).
Amado Oliveros, the Treasurer of the City of Caloocan, through his deputy, collected the entrance
fees from the mentioned Viray and others. Subsquently, VIray and others demanded from the City
Treasurer the refund of the corresponding entrance fees by means of a formal letter of demand.
However, despite the demand, the City Treasurer refused to refund the entrance fees. Hence, Viray
and others filed a case against the city government, its Mayo and treasurer in the CFI of Caloocan,
contesting the legality of the ordinance on the ground that it was a revenue measure beyond the
taxing authority of the city to enact. Thus, they prayed that the ordinance be declared ultra vires and
void, and that the fees they paid be returned to them.
The CFI of Caloocan dismissed the case on the ground that the oridnance was authorized under the
charter of the City of Caloocan (RA 3278) and other pertinent laws.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 94, series of 1962, and the collection of the entrance fees are valid?
Ratio: NO. Although the ordinance which regulates the "exhumation and/or transfer of corpses"
from other burial grounds to those located in the City of Caloocan is within the legislative power of
the said city, the imposition of the transfer fees under Ordinance No. 94, on the "interment of dead
relatives," was not justified.
The disputed ordinance speaks of 2 kinds of fees: one, in connection with the exhumation of the
remains of a dead person, and the other which is imposed whenever a cadaver is sought to be buried
in that city coming from other places. Taken in its entirety, it is clear that what is being regulated
through this ordinance is not the burying of the mortal remains of a person, but the exhumation and
transfer of a cadaver. In other words, the term "transfer" used in the ordinance does not refer to the
conducting or conveying of an unburied dead body from the funeral parlor or vigil site—to the
burial grounds. Rather, the transfer permit mentioned in the ordinance is required whenever a
cadaver, previously interred in a burial place, is removed therefrom for transfer to a private
cemetery in Caloocan.
The permit called for under the ordinance is not for the “burying of the dead” because a separate
"burial permit" is also being issued by defendant the City of Caloocan. It is also noteworthy that
while Ordinance No. 94 refers to a "transfer permit", the amounts being collected were receipted for
as "entrance fees," giving rise to the presumption that the City of Caloocan must have been aware
that the imposition of such transfer fees was indeed unauthorized.
The defense of the City of Caloocan regarding taxation and police power for the said imposition of
fees also cannot be justified.While Sec. 2 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) confers on chartered
cities and municipalities the "authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons
engaged in any occupation or business by requiring them to secure licenses at rates fixed by the
municipal board or city council," the mere burying of a cadaver in a private cemetery does not
constitute either an occupation or business or the exercise of privileges that would justify the
imposition of taxes (within the terms and intent of RA 2264).
The defense of imposition of fees due to the involvement of the assignment of police officers to
ensure that the funeral procession is orderly as well as re-rerouting of city traffic cannot be justified
because the Ordinance collects the said fees solely in the case of cadavers coming from places
outside the territory of Caloocan City for burial in private cemeteries within the City, when other
corpses coming from within the city (to be buried on public or private cemeteries) also require such
police resources and traffic regulation. This is then a clear case of the ordinance discriminating
against private cemeteries, in violation of the equal protection clause.
DISPOSITIVE: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and the questioned portion of
Ordinance No. 94, series of 1962 of the City of Caloocan, is declared ultra vires and void. Costs
against the respondents. So ordered.
45. Pp. v. Esguerra, 81 Phil 33
Petitioners: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Timoteo Esguerra et. al.
Doctrine: An ordinance cannot prohibit a subject matter which the law provides can only be
regulated; otherwise, it is void.
Facts:
1. Esguerra et. al, defendants in these twelve cases were each charged with violation of
municipal ordinance No. 4, series 1944, enacted by the municipal council of Tacloban,
Leyte, which provides the following:
SEC. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, association, or firm, to manufacture, distill,
produce, cure, sell, barter, offer or give or dispose of in favor of another, possess or to have
under control any intoxicating liquor, drink or beverage, locally manufactured, distilled,
produced or cured wine, whiskey, gin, brandy and other drink containing liquor including
tuba.
SEC. 2. All permits and licenses issued for the manufacture, production or establishment
or distilleries and sale of tuba, wine, whiskey, and other alcoholic beverages, are hereby
revoked and cancelled.
 SEC. 3. Any person, association or firm, who violates the provisions of this ordinance, shall
be punished upon conviction by competent court, by a fine of not less than one hundred
pesos nor more than two hundred pesos and imprisonment of not less than three months
nor more than six months. xxx
2. The informations filed against Timoteo Esguerra and against Teofilo Decatoria charged
that each of them did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, barter,
convey, offer, give, or dispose of whisky or intoxicating liquor to or in favor of soldiers of
the United States Army, which wine or intoxicating liquor the accused had then in their
possession and under their custody and control without any legal authority to do so.
2. The informations against Jose Chan, Felix Labordo, and Pilar E. Pascual, and against the
defendants in other seven (7) separate cases, charged the defendants with having,
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, had in their possession and under their control and
custody "tuba" or intoxicating liquor without any legal authority to do so.
2. Esguerra et. al. moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground that the ordinance
No. 4, series 1944 was null and void, because the municipal council of Tacloban,
Leyte, had no power to enact it.
a. The lower court declared the ordinance in question null and void.
2. The People of the Philippines, appealed from the decision of the lower court in the twelve
cases, and all of them are now before us on appeal.
2. People: the ordinance at bar was enacted by virtue of the police power of the
municipality of Tacloban conferred by the general welfare clause and is therefore
valid.
Issue: WoN the ordinance is void - YES
Ratio:
1. The ordinance is null and void.
2. Under the general welfare clause, section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, a
municipal council may enact such ordinances, not repugnant to law, as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, etc., of the inhabitants of the
municipality.
3. The ordinestebanance in question prohibiting the selling, giving away and dispensing of
liquor is repugnant to section 2242 (g) of the same Revised Administrative Code. Hence,
the Municipal council of Tacloban had no power under said to enact the ordinance under
consideration.
1. Section 2242(g) "to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing of
intoxicating malt, vinous, mixed or fermented liquors at retail"
b. The word "regulate" means and includes the power to control, to govern and to restrain;
and can not be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit.”
c. Since the municipality of Tacloban is empowered only to regulate, it cannot prohibit the
selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors, for that which is prohibited or
does not legally exist can not be regulated.
d. The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section
2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other
provisions of the same Code,
1. Therefore, it cannot be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate
the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically by section
2242 (g) to municipal councils.
2. To hold that, under the general power granted by section 2238, a municipal
council may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the provision of
section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory,
because the power to prohibit, includes power to regulate, the selling, giving
away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors.
Dispositive: In view of the foregoing, the appealed orders or resolutions of the lower court
dismissing the informations in the above entitled cases, are affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.
46. Balacuit v. CFI, 163 SCRA 182
Petitioners: CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL
Respondents: COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch
II, and the CITY OF BUTUAN
Doctrine:
Police power requires that the public interest requires the interference with private rights and
the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for such purpose and not duly oppressive upon
people. There must be a public necessity which demands the need for proper measures to secure
the ends sought to be attained by such ordinance. Such discretion to determine what the public
interest requires is vested with the legislature. The legislature cannot, under the guise of
protecting public interest, arbitrarily interfere with such private businesses or impose
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.
Facts:
 The Municipal board of Butuan City enacted Ordinance #460 which penalizes anyone,
who sells tickets to “any movie… other public exhibitions, games, contests, or
performances,” to require kids aged 7-12 to pay full payment of the tickets. Instead, they
should be charged at half-price. This is because some parents complained that paying the
full price for children is too financially burdensome.
 The petitioners, who are managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater,
and the Diamond Theater, assail this ordinance as unconstitutional, void, and
unenforceable.
o They argue that the ordinance is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police
power, because it was not within the Municipal Board’s power to enact such.
They base their contention on Section 15 (n) of Butuan City’s charter which
provides that the Municipal Board has the legislative power to regulate and fix
the amount of the license fees of theaters/theatrical
performances/cinematographs/public exhibitions/all other
performances/places of amusements.
o Such ordinance, according to them, is unfair, unjust, and confiscatory as a
restraint of trade, violating their right as persons to enter into contracts,
considering that theater owners are bound under a contract with the film
owners for just admission prices.
 The respondent Butuan City justifies the ordinance’s enactment with Section 15 (nn) of
Butuan City’s charter, which provides their general welfare clause, which grants the city
the power to enact all ordinances necessary for the safety/promotion of morality and
good order/comfort/convenience of the city.
Issue:
 Whether or not Ordinance #460 was a constitutional exercise of police power? NO, it was
not a valid exercise of police power nor was it constitutional, as it infringes on the
owners’ property rights.
Ratio:
 It is settled in our jurisdiction that the operation of theaters, cinemas, and other places of
public exhibition are subject to the municipal council’s regulatory authority in the
exercise of delegated police power by the local government.
o However, in In re Gilchrist, 181 N.Y.S. 245,110 Misc. Rep. 362, a New York case, it
provided that an ordinance which regulates the selling of admission tickets to
 public exhibitions/performances by the cities’ power under the General City
Law (general welfare clause) was considered not within the scope of the
powers implied in their charters.
 The power of regulation of public exhibitions/amusement places
within the city granted by the charter does not carry with it any
authority to interfere with the admission prices of such places.
 Butuan City, now realizing that it has no authority to enact Ordinance #640 in its
regulatory power under Section 15 (nn), now invokes its delegated police power under
the general welfare clause to justify the ordinance’s enactment.
o Police power requires that the public interest requires the interference with
private rights and the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for such
purpose and not duly oppressive upon people. There must be a public necessity
which demands the need for proper measures to secure the ends sought to be
attained by such ordinance. Such discretion to determine what the public
interest requires is vested with the legislature.
 The legislature cannot, under the guise of protecting public interest,
arbitrarily interfere with such private businesses or impose
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.
 The ordinance in question is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. Police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
o In this case, no such relation exists. It can be seen that the ordinance’s aims are
obviously helpful to ease the burdens of parents, but such price reduction
would be damaging to the petitioners, who are the ones made to bear the cost
of these savings. They’re even penalized for failure to comply with it!
o The children aren’t even economically exploited as they are treated with the
same quality of entertainment as the adults.
 With such ordinance in effect, cinemas might even be discouraged
from showing wholesome movies for general patronage in order to
avoid compliance with the ordinance.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.
47. Manila v. Laguio, supra
Petitioners: City of Manila
Respondents: Judge Perfecto Laguio
Doctrine:
Facts:
 Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
 Saind ordinance prohibits establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels
from operating in the Malate District which had been notoriously viewed as a red light
district harboring thrill seekers
 Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) avers that the ordinance is invalid as it
includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or
entertainment.
 They reiterate that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for
entertainment.
o Further aver that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot
prohibit heir operation
 The City of Manila on the other hand claims that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power as provided by the LGC
o Emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City
Issue: W/N the Ordinance is valid - NO
Ratio:
 The assailed ordinance is null and void
 For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU,
but must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law
 Apart from this, it must conform to the following substantive requirements:
o Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
o Must not be unfair or oppressive;
o Must not be partial or discriminatory;
o Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
o Must be general and consistent with public policy;
o Must not be unreasonable
 The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching is subordinate to
constitutional limitations thereon
 It is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
48. Primicias v. Urdaneta, 93 SCRA 462
Petitioners: THE MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN, ET AL.
Respondents: JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS
Doctrine: Ordinance must be in accordance with the law
Facts:
 Juan Augusto B. Primicias, plaintiff-appellee, was in his car within the
jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police asked
him to stop.
 He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3,
Series of 1964, "and more particularly, for overtaking a truck."
 Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance
Issue: W/N the ordinance is valid. NOoooooooooo
Ratio:
 Municipality of Urdaneta Pangasinan contends that the Ordinance is valid, being
"patterned after and based on Section 53, par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended Revised
Motor Vehicle Law. In so arguing, Urdaneta fails to note that Act No. 3992 has been
superseded by Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which
became effective on June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned ordinance
was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council.
  By this express repeal, and the general rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law,
Urdaneta is in error in contending that "a later enactment of the law relating to the same
subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of
the original law."
 An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must not contravene .
. . the statute,"
 The ordinance "must give way."
 Ordinance must be in accordance with Land Transportation and Traffic Code
 The classifications which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36
which states that "no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any
ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided
in this Act."
 In this case, however, there is no showing that the marking of the streets and areas falling
under Section 1, par. (a), Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, was done with the approval of
the Land Transportation Commissioner. Thus, on this very ground alone, the Ordinance
becomes invalid.
 Since it lacks the requirement imposed by Section 38, the provincial, city, or municipal
board or council is enjoined under Section 62 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
from "enacting or enforcing any ordinance or resolution in conflict with the provisions of
this Act."
Dispositive: In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
49. Batangas CATV v. CA, 439 SCRA 326
Petitioners: BATANGAS CATV, INC.
Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD
and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR
Doctrine:
Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt
ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a
municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by
a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid.
Facts:
 In July 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting
petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City.
Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers
the maximum rates specified therein, provided, however, that any increase of rates shall
be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
 In November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per
month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its
permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sanggunian, pursuant to Resolution
No. 210.
 Petitioner then filed a petition for injunction with RTC-Batangas City.
o It alleged that respondent Sanggunian has no authority to regulate the
subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under EO No. 205, the
NTC has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.
 RTC ruled in favor of petitioners.
o the enactment of Resolution No. 210 violates the States deregulation policy as
set forth by the NTC Memorandum dated August 25, 1989.
o The sole agency of the government which can regulate CATV operation is the
NTC, and that the LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over it without
appropriate legislation.
 CA reversed the RTC decision.
o Although the Certificate of Authority to operate a CATV System is granted by
the NTC pursuant to Executive Order No. 205, this does not preclude the
Sanggunian from regulating the operation of the CATV in their locality under
the powers vested upon it by the Local Government Code of 1983.
o Section 177 (now Section 457 paragraph 3 (ii) of Republic Act 7160) provides
The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall regulate, fix the license fee for, and tax any
business or profession being carried on and exercised within the territorial
jurisdiction of the city, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports,
hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards
which shall remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of
Tourism which shall exercise such authority without infringement on the
taxing and regulatory powers of the city government.
o The regulation of businesses in the locality is expressly provided in the Local
Government Code. The fixing of service rates is lawful under the General
Welfare Clause.
o Resolution No. 210 which granted the permit to construct, install and operate a
CATV system in Batangas City provided that in case of violation by the grantee
of the terms and conditions/ requirements specifically provided therein, the
City shall have the right to withdraw the franchise.
o Appellee increased the service rates from P88 to P180.00 without the approval
of appellant. Such act breached Resolution No. 210 which gives appellant the
right to withdraw the permit granted to appellee.
Issue:
W/N a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators
within its territorial jurisdiction – NO!
Ratio:
 It has been more than two decades now since our national government, through the NTC,
assumed regulatory power over the CATV industry. Changes in the political arena did not
alter the trend. Instead, subsequent presidential issuances further reinforced the NTCs
power. Significantly, President Marcos and President Aquino, in the exercise of their
legislative power, issued P.D. No. 1512, E.O. No. 546 and E.O. No. 205. Hence, they have the
force and effect of statutes or laws passed by Congress. That the regulatory power stays
with the NTC is also clear from President Ramos E.O. No. 436 mandating that the
regulation and supervision of the CATV industry shall remain vested solely in the NTC. In
light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV
operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
 But nothing herein should be interpreted as to strip LGUs of their general power to
prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. It
must be emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the regulatory power shall be
vested solely in the NTC, it pertains to the regulatory power over those matters which are
peculiarly within the NTCs competence, such as, the: (1) determination of rates, (2)
issuance of certificates of authority, (3) establishment of areas of operation, (4)
examination and assessment of the legal, technical and financial qualifications of
applicant operators, (5) granting of permits for the use of frequencies, (6) regulation of
ownership and operation, (7) adjudication of issues arising from its functions, and (8)
other similar matters. Within these areas, the NTC reigns supreme as it possesses the
exclusive power to regulate -- a power comprising varied acts, such as to fix, establish, or
control; to adjust by rule, method or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; or
to subject to governing principles or laws.
 There is no dispute that respondent Sanggunian, like other local legislative bodies, has
been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare
clause of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983. That it continues to possess
such power is clear under the new law, R.A. No. 7160.
 The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the
State to LGUs. Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health,
and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective
territorial jurisdictions.
 Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general
welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of
crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The
physical realities of constructing CATV system the use of public streets, rights of ways, the
founding of structures and the parcelling of large regions allow an LGU a certain degree of
regulation over CATV operators. This is the same regulation that it exercises over all
private enterprises within its territory.
 But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot
sustain Resolution No. 210. Respondents strayed from the well-recognized limits of its
power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws
and (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
 Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national
legislature. Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. To test
its validity, we must apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by
the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
o An ordinance enacted by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the
Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. (United
States vs. Abendan)
o ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare
clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. (De la
Cruz vs. Paraz)
 The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No.
436 insofar as it permits respondent Sanggunian to usurp a power exclusively vested in
the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators. The fixing
of subscriber rates is definitely one of the matters within the NTCs exclusive domain.
 In this regard, it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has made
provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the subject
matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its general
powers, cannot regulate the same conduct.
o Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it
to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered
by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate
the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature,
may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide concern, and
the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration
is binding throughout the State. A reason advanced for this view is that such
ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation.
(Keller vs. State)
 It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general
character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. Since E.O. No. 205, a
general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by the
NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said
law.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 12, 1999 as well as its Resolution dated May 26, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52461, are hereby
REVERSED. The RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4254 is AFFIRMED.
50. Villarena v. COA, 408 SCRA 455
Petitioners: Atty. Rudy Villarea
Respondents: Commission on Audit
Doctrine: (Under Test of Validity)
A general law does not operate to modify or repeal a special law unless it has been so
expressly provided. Any apparent inconsistency should be reconciled by regarding the
prohibition stated in RA 6758 as an exception or limitation to the authority of local
legislative bodies under the LGC.
Facts:
 Atty. Villarea is became a City Auditor when Marikina became a city on December 6, 1996.
 Pursuant to the LGC of 1991, the legislative body of Marikina passed ordinances which
approved the budget allocations for Marikina for calendar years 1995-1997. Allotted in
each of these were allowances and benefits granted to COA personnel assigned to
Marikina, including petitioner.
 A Special Audit Team (SAT) was constituted by the COA to conduct an examination of the
cash and accounts of the City.
 In the course of the audit, the SAT learned of the allowances given to COA personnel by
Marikina and it declared these to have been received in violation of Section 18 of Republic
Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System
in the Government and for Other Purposes (see notes), COA Memorandum 89-584.
 The SAT’s Confidential Report recommended that the COA personnel should be ordered to
stop receiving additional fringe benefits, honoraria, allowances and other forms of
compensation from Marikina and to refund all those previously received.
 Because of the Report, petitioner was charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and/or violation of
office rules and regulations.
 In his Answer, petitioner averred that he received the benefits fully believing that
Section 18 of RA 6758 and COA Memorandum 89-584 have been repealed and/or
superseded by the Local Government Code which authorizes local government
units to give additional compensation to national government officials.
 COA Decision found petitioner guilty of neglect of duty, simple misconduct and violation
of reasonable office rules and regulations. He was fined and was ordered to refund the
sums he received in the amount of P227,092.50.
Issue:
1. WON Atty. Villarea validly received his allowances by virtue of the ordinances enacted by
the legislative council of the City of Marikina, under the authority provided for by the LGC,
particularly in Sec. 447 and 458? NO. (see notes; he considered himself under the
classification of national government official)
2. WON the LGC repealed the COA Memorandum through its repealing clause Sec. 534 (f)?
NO. (notes)
Ratio:
1&2
  The OSG, points out that RA 6758 is a special law while the LGC is a general law, the SC
agrees.
 SEE DOCTRINE.
 It is significant to note that petitioner cited only paragraph (f) of the LGC section on
repeal and left out the other provisions that meticulously enumerate specific laws or
parts thereof that were repealed or modified.
 Implied repeals are not lightly presumed. The rule is that instead of placing one law
against another, in a destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile
the statutes.
 Accordingly, in case of a conflict between RA 6758 and the LGC, the proper action is not to
uphold one and annul the other, but, if possible, to give effect to both by harmonizing the
two.
 In the case at bar, the two statutes can easily be harmonized. Under the LGC, local
legislative bodies may provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national
government officials stationed or assigned to their municipality or city.
 This authority, however, is limited, as it does not include the grant of benefits that runs in
conflict with other statutes, such as RA 6758. The exception stated in these laws must be
read together with the LGC, so as to make both the Code and these laws equally effective
and mutually complementary.
 By allocating a portion of the local budget for financial assistance to the auditing office of
Marikina City, the legislative council of Marikina acted in excess of its powers under the
LGC.
 Consequently the ordinances which grant these allowances, insofar as these contravene
the prohibition contained in Republic Act No. 6758, are declared invalid.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, this Court affirms COA Decision No. 2000-266 finding petitioner guilty of
neglect of duty, simple misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and
ordering him to pay a fine equivalent to one month and one days salary, and to refund the amount he
received without authority from the City of Marikina. The amount to be refunded, however, will have
to be recomputed by the COA in conformity with this decision. Cost de oficio. SO ORDERED.
Notes: (read the emphasized parts)
Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 provides the following:
SECTION 18. Additional Compensation of Commission on Audit Personnel and of Other
Agencies. In order to preserve the independence and integrity of the Commission on Audit (COA), its
officials and employees are prohibited from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances
or other emoluments from any government entity, local government unit, and government-
owned and controlled corporations, and government financial institution, except those
compensation paid directly by the COA out of its appropriations and contributions.
xxxxxx
LGC
SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as
the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in
the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code,
and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:
xxxxxx
(xi) When the finances of the city government allow, provide for additional allowances and other
benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national
government officials stationed in or assigned to the city;
xxxxxx
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause.
(a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, Executive Order No.
112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b)(c)(d)(e) enumeration of other specific laws that were repealed by the LGC.
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations
and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of
the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
51. Zoomzat v. People of the Philippines, 451 SCRA 226
Petitioners: Zoomzat Inc
Respondents:People of the Philippines, Rodriguez etc.
Doctrine: It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization,
municipalities have no power to grant franchises.
Facts:
 Zoomzat alleged that the Sanggunian Panglungsod of Gingoog City passed resolution
which express the willingness of the city to allow Zoomzat to install and operate a cable
TV system so it applied for mayor’s permit but it was not acted upon
 Respondents enacted an ordinance which granted a franchise to Gingoog Spacelink Cable
TV, Inc.
 Zoomzat filed a complaint in Ombudsman for violation of RA 3019 by the respondents
gave unwarranted benefits
 Graft Investigation Officer recommended indictment but it was reversed by Special
Prosecution Officer. Sandiganbayan approved the reversal
 Petitioner assails the findings of Special Prosecutor that under Executive Order No. 205, it
is the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and not the local government
unit, that has the power and authority to allow or disallow the operation of cable
television. Petitioner argues that while the NTC has the authority to grant the franchise to
operate a cable television, this power is not exclusive because under the Local
Government Code, the city council also has the power to grant permits, licenses and
franchises in aid of the local government units regulatory or revenue raising powers.
Issue: WON NTC only has the authority to grant certificates of authority to cable television
operators and issue the necessary IRR? YES
Ratio:
 Executive Order No. 205 clearly provides that only the NTC could grant certificates of
authority to cable television operators and issue the necessary implementing rules and
regulations. Likewise, Executive Order No. 436, vests with the NTC the regulation and
supervision of cable television industry in the Philippines.
 There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV
system. Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when
President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1512 terminating all franchises, permits or certificates
for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments. Today,
pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons, associations, partnerships,
 corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority
by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable
television service within a service area.
 It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities
have no power to grant franchises. Consequently, the protection of the constitutional
provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges,
franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.
 But the LGU despite the EOs can exercise their general power to prescribe regulations
under the general welfare clause of LGC. It can regulate operation of cable television but
only when it encroaches on public properties (public streets, rights of ways)
 No right conferred to Spacelink. The grant of Sangguniang Panlungsod was ultra vires.
There is no more ground for violation of RA 3019 as petitioner is not prejudiced.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan dated June 17, 1998, approving the withdrawal of the Information against the
respondents and the dismissal of Crim. Case No. 22026, for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019,
and the Resolution dated September 9, 1998, denying reconsideration thereof, are AFFIRMED
52. White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, 576 SCRA 416, 431-432
Petitioners: White Light Corp., Titanium Corp., and Sta. Mesa Tourist & Devt Corp.
Respondents: City of Manila, represented by Mayor Alfredo Lim
Doctrine:
The desirability of the ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
Ordinance penalizing establishments with wash-up rates is an invalid exercise of police power
since it violates the fundamental rights to liberty and to privacy.
Facts:
 City of Manila enacted Manila City Ordinance No. 7774.
o “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates,
and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension
Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila”
 Sec. 4. Short-time admission - admission and charging of room rate
for less than 12 hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms
more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by
owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the
same.
 Sec. 5. Penalty Clause - P5k or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or
both
 Malate Tourist Devt Corp (MDTC), as owner of Victoria Court in Malate, filed a complaint
for declaratory relief with prayer for WPI/TRO.
o Petitioners WLC, TC, and SMTC intervened as operators of drive-in-hotels and
motels in Manila.
o MDTC withdrew.
 RTC issued a TRO and a WPI to desist from enforcing the ordinance.
o During pre-trial, petitioners agreed to submit the case for decision without trial
as it involved a purely legal question.
 RTC - ordinance is void; made WPI permanent
o Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and
jealously guarded by the Const.
o Cited Const. provisions encouraging private enterprises, and the incentive to
needed investment, and the right to operate economic enterprises
o The illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be
consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay.
 City - LGC provides the power “to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.”
o Revised Manila Charter - "to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and
to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and
imprisonment for a single offense.”
 CA - reversed
o Ordinance did not violate right to privacy or freedom of movement as it only
penalizes owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for
short time stays.
o Lawful subject - to curb immoral activities, to minimize if not eliminate the use
of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike
o Lawful means - the establishments are still allowed to operate
Issue: W/N the ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power - YES
Ratio:
 Goal of the ordinance certainly falls within the ambit of police power.
o But, the desirability of the ends does not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement.
 Strict scrutiny was applied - fundamental rights to liberty and to privacy were involved
(see notes)
 Right to liberty defined by Justice Malcolm - "the right to exist and the right to be free
from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom
from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."
o Included: rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to
live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to
pursue any avocation
 Legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting
single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed.
 Right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe v. Mutuc, the invasion
of which should be justified by a compelling state interest.
o Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection.
o Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal
life of the citizen.
o There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more
than twice a day.
 Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel
whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes.
 In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips
have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels.
 Any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private
spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex
 or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or
hotel as a convenient alternative.
 Lacking the lawful means, the ordinance must be struck down.
o The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited
and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws.
o Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and
drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation.
o So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use.
 These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of
the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.
o Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate
without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
o Drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele
by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
 Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to
governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due
process of liberty.
o And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for
the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more
judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
Dispositive: Petition is granted…
Notes:
 Standards of judicial review for validity of an ordinance on substantive due process:
o strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the
political process
 compelling state interest (not merely substantial govt interest) and
on the absence of less restrictive means
 Regulation of fundamental freedoms - speech, gender, race, suffrage,
judicial access, interstate travel
o rational basis standard of review for economic legislation, equal protection
challenges
o heightened or immediate scrutiny - classifications on gender and legitimacy
53. Tano v. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154, 172
Petitioners: ALFREDO TANO, et. al.
Respondents: GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, et. al.
Doctrine:
Marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State.
One of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves.
Facts:
 The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of:
o Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF
ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS,
PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"
o Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in
any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his
possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain
first a Mayor’s and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary
inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from
Puerto Princesa and,
o Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING
THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT
OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS”
 The petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law,
their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of
Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that
the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit.
 They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and
insofar as the Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented
from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary,
and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion
 Public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the
Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise
maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution.
Issue:
1. W/N the challenged ordinances are unconstitutional. – NO.
Ratio:
 The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws.
 There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or
marginal fisherman.
 Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen,
but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth.
 The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of
marine resources is not at all absolute.
 In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
“exploration, development and utilization shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State.
 In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves.
 This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery
laws within the municipal waters.
 In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the
powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police
power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining
order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.
54. Samson v. City, 60 SCRA 267
Petitioners: Elisa Samson and Angel Gavilan
Respondents: Mayor of Bacolod and City Council of Bacolod
Doctrine:
The burden of demonstrating the alleged nullity of an ordinance rests on the party assailing its
infirmity, there being a presumption of its validity .
Facts:
1. The City of Bacolod enacted an Ordinance
o Making it unlawful for any proprietor, lessee, or operator of an amusement
place to admit two or more persons with only one admission ticket.
2. A complaint was filed by Samson and Gavilan, who were movie operators.
o Alleging that the Ordinance was contrary to the due process clause of the
Constitution.
3. The RTC declared the Ordinance null and void.
o The RTC however relied merely on the memoranda presented by Samson and
Gavilan
o No evidence was required to be presented in the RTC.
Issue:
WoN the RTC erred in ruling for the invalidity of an Ordinance without the reception of evidence.
--YES.
Ratio:
1. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
2. The burden of demonstrating the alleged nullity of an ordinance rests on the party
assailing its infirmity, there being a presumption of its validity.
3. There being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here.
4. The Municipality, as is seen from the quotation of the general municipal law, has the right
to enact ordinances relating to sanitation and the public health. The ordinance as set out
above seems to us to be an enactment clearly within the purview of the statute
authorizing it, and, while very general in its terms, it contains no provision which of itself
is against the fundamental law or act of the Legislature or is oppressive or unreasonable.
Unreasonable persons may try to apply it in an unreasonable manner or to an
unreasonable degree or under unreasonable conditions, but in and of itself the ordinance
discloses none of the defects which have been alleged against it.
5. insofar as movie houses and other places of amusement are concerned, 23 the least doubt
cannot be entertained as to the validity of a measure prohibiting a proprietor, lessee or
operator of an amusement place to admit two or more persons with only one admission
ticket, not only in the interest of preventing fraud insofar as municipal taxes are
concerned, but also in accordance with public health, public safety and the general
welfare
6. The statute is only a regulation of places of public entertainment and amusement upon
terms of equal and exact justice to everyone holding a ticket of admission, and who is not,
at the time, under the influence of liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd and
immoral character. . . . Such a regulation, in itself just, is likewise promotive of peace and
good order among those who attend places of public entertainment and amusement. It is
neither an arbitrary exertion of the state's inherent or governmental power, nor a
violation of any right secured by the Constitution.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 22, 1967, declaring null and void Bacolod City
Ordinance No. 1074, series of 1967, is hereby reversed and set aside. The writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the lower court on June 30, 1967, is likewise set aside and declared to be bereft
of any force or effect. Costs against plaintiffs.
55. Pp. v. Cheng, 65 Phil 625
Petitioners: People
Respondents: Wong Cheng (@ Wong Chun)
Doctrine: The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the
port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is
simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive
that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to
smoke opium on board.
Facts:
 Cheng is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa
of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles
from the shores of the city.
 A demurrer was filed which alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. This was
granted and the case was dismissed.
Issue: WHETHER the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like smoking
opium, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters - YAS
Ratio:
 Two fundamental rules
o the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign
merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within
whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission
affects the peace and security of the territory
o the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United
States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in
general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed.
 Of these two rules, it is the English rule that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States
 When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction,
 and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe
temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country
 No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came
within three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to
Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became
applicable
 The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign
subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper
political agency
 We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was
held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our
Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects
entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in
our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding.
o Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public
order.
 But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such
drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the
purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
 The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the
port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on
him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination
to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit
Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.
Dispositive: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So
ordered
56. U.S v. Chantiengco, 25 Phil 89
Petitioners: THE UNITED STATES
Respondents: CHAN TIENCO
Doctrine: A municipality, under proper charter authority, may adopt ordinances upon subjects
already covered by the general law of the state, so long as the ordinance is not repugnant nor in
conflict with such general law.
Facts:
A complaint was filed against Chan Tienco charging him with violation of Municipal Ordinance No.
12 issued by the municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union
 Violation: slaughtering a bovine animal, without the permission or approval of the
president of the municipal board of health
CFI found him guilty, and sentenced to a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
His appeal is predicated on the alleged invalidity and unconstitutionality of the Ordinance. He argues
that inasmuch as section 33 of Act No. 1147 provides a punishment for slaughtering large cattle
without a permit, the municipal ordinance covering the same subject is illegal and unconstitutional.
 Section 33 of Act No. 1147 prohibits the slaughtering of large cattle at the municipal
slaughtering house for human consumption or for food without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer.
 Article 41 of Ordinance No. 12 of the municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union,
prohibits the slaughtering of the large cattle within said municipality, even though the object
should be for sale, without the permit of the president of the municipal board of health.
Issue: WON the Municipal Ordinance is valid --- YES
Ratio:
A municipality, under proper charter authority, may adopt ordinances upon subject already covered
by the general law, so long as the ordinance is not repugnant nor in conflict with such general law.
The ordinance and general law are not repugnant simply because they are adopted for the same
general purpose.
The mere fact that a municipality, for the purpose of protecting the health of its people, requires a
permit from the president of the municipal board of health for the slaughtering of large cattle, does
not contravene nor is it repugnant to the provisions of the general law of the State requiring, for the
purposes mentioned in the general law, a permit from the municipal treasurer for the slaughtering
of large cattle.
The purposes of the two laws are distinct. Many instance might be given showing that an inhabitant
of a municipality, before he can do a particularly thing or engage in particular class of business,
should secure two permits, one from the municipality and another from the State.
 In granting a permit to slaughter, the president of the municipal board of health examines
into the question of the effect upon the health of the people of the community.
 The municipal treasurer, in granting a permit, examines into entirely different questions.
He examines into the question of the identity of the animal, its ownership, etc.
 The president of the municipal board of health, in granting his permit, examines into the
question only of the physical condition of the animal — whether it is in a physical
condition to be used as food.
 Both laws are highly important for the welfare of the people of the municipality. One goes
to protect the people in their property rights, and the other goes to protect the people in
their health and comfort.
A violation of either law is therefore, a distinct offense from a violation of the other.
Dispositive:
Having reached the conclusion that the ordinance is valid, the defendant admitting his guilt under
the proof, it is hereby ordered, for the foregoing reasons, that the appeal be dismissed, and that the
cause be returned to the court from whence it came with direction that the sentence of the lower
court be executed. It is so ordered, with costs.
57. U.S v. Espiritusanto, 23 Phil 610
Petitioners: THE UNITED STATES
Respondents: ISIDORO ESPIRITUSANTO
Doctrine: Municipal council does not exceed its authority by enacting a municipal ordinance
prohibiting gambling and particular acts related to it provided that it kept strictly within the
powers conferred upon it by its organic law and the general laws that deal with gambling.
Facts:
  Espiritusanto was sentenced to the payment of a fine of P50, to subsidiary imprisonment
and the costs for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1910, enacted by the
municipal council of Malabon, Rizal
 Accused was found to be engaged, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, in collecting wagers
for the gambling game known as jueteng, the tickets necessary for conducting the same
having been seized in his possession.
 Defendant's counsel appealed from this judgment on the ground that said ordinance was
unconstitutional.
 The Ordinance in question strictly prohibits the game of jueteng within the limits of the
said pueblo and prescribes the penalties to be imposed for its violation; it further
provides:
o That any person who shall collect money for wagers on the said game, or who
shall keep, make, or prepare any list of numbers, or representative signs
thereof, for use in such game, shall be deemed to be a collector of jueteng, and
bankers
o Those who directly conduct the game, receive from the collectors the tickets or
other contrivances, and are found in possession of the tambiolos or other
articles used for the purpose of conducting the said game;
o Those who keep or maintain jueteng games shall be deemed to be keepers or
maintainers of gambling houses, in accordance with the provisions of section 6
of Act No. 1757.
Issue: W/N municipal ordinance no.1 is unconstitutional - NO.
Ratio:
 Municipal council acted within their powers conferred upon it by the Municipal Code and
in accordance with Act No. 1757, since the game of jueteng, as one of chance absolutely
prohibited by the latter, is not susceptible of regulation, but must be prosecuted and
completely suppressed in order to avoid repetitions of the great and far-reaching social
and moral evils it has been producing in the towns of the islands of the PH.
 it is undeniable that the said municipal council did not exceed its authority and kept
strictly within the powers conferred upon it by its organic law and the general laws that
deal with gambling
 The ordinance is not a general law, but is merely a regulation of a local nature, and one
perfectly valid and effective, provided it is in harmony with the general laws in force in the
Islands
Dispositive:
For the foregoing reasons we deem it proper to affirm and do hereby affirm the judgment from, with
the costs against the appellant.
58. Pp. v. Relova, 148 SCRA 292,
Petitioners: People of the Philippines
Respondents: THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA
Doctrine: The constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the
same act or set of acts.
FACTS
1. Manuel Opulencia is the owner of Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage. The ice plant was
searched by the Batangas City Police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light. The police
discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary
authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building"
owned by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of
the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current
consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant.
2. An Information was filed for violation of CITY ORDINANCE. The case was dismissed because of
prescription.
3. Fourteen days later, the fiscal filed before the CFI another information for violation of art. 309 of
the Revised Penal Code (theft of electric power).
4. Opulencia moved to quash the second information on the ground of double jeopardy. Motion to
quash granted. MR denied. Fiscal on behalf of People filed the instant petition for certiorari and
mandamus. People argues that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is protection
against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the
first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized
installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the City
Government of Batangas while the second case is for theft of electric power which are two different
offenses.
ISSUE: Is there double jeopardy?-- YES
RATIO:
1. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
2. People is correct in its argument that the unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of
Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second
offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is
not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. However, the the basic
difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first
sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the
same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense
that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and
second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV
(22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double
jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the
offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that
both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
3. The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different
sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the
situation where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a
national statute. If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into
the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal
ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never
constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities — though
one be subordinate to the other — and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions
during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted
precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence.

4. In the present case, since the same acts constitute the offense punished under the ordinance and
the RPC, there is double jeopardy.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil
action for related civil liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for
further proceedings as indicated above. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
59. Yap v. Lutero, 105 Phil 1307 [unreported]
Petitioners: (Can’t find the original online )
Respondents:
Doctrine: If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under
either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other.
Facts:
Manuel Yap was criminally charged in MTC with violation of an Iloilo ordinance for reckless driving.
(CASE 1)
Three months later, Yap was again criminally charged in the same Court, this time with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. (CASE 2)
The information charged him with violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law committed by driving
and operating an automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a result thereof inflicting
injuries upon an unfortunate pedestrian. Yap averred that Case 2 placed him twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same act.
This was denied by the judge.
Meanwhile, the first court had acquitted Yap (in Case 1)
Yap then instituted a petition for certiorari in CFI to set aside the order of the judge in Case 2. CFI
granted it.
Issue:
W/N there was double jeopardy - yes
Ratio:
The issue in the case is whether or not, under the information in Case 2, Yap could be convicted of
the same act charged in Case 1, in which he has already been acquitted.
The information in Case 1 alleges, substantially, that on the date and in the place therein stated, Yap
had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and operated "recklessly and without reasonable
caution" an automobile described in said information.
Upon the other hand, the information in Case 2, similarly states that, on the same date and in the
same place, Yap drove and operated the aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and negligent
manner at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No.
3992) and existing city ordinances."
Thus, if the theories mentioned in the second information were not established by the evidence, Yap
could be convicted in Case 2 of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in Case 1,
unless he pleaded double jeopardy.
Since he pleaded double Jeopardy, therefore, that CFI has not erred.
The Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section
1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense."
The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act."
Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the
second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided
that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in or
does not include, the crime charged in the other case.
The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that
one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges
are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall
bar a prosecution under the other.
Such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations
charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense,
even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
The offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo City Ordinance and serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law are derived from the same act or sets of
acts — that is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless manner.
The additional technical element of serious physical injuries is a consequence that occurred in the
same occasion that the accused operated the automobile (recklessly).
Still, the moral element of negligence permeated the act
Dispositive:
60. Rivera v. Villegas, 5 SCRA 359
Petitioners: GONZALO SANTOS RIVERA, FRANCIS P. YUSECO,ERIBERTO A. REMIGIO,VICENTE G.
CRUZ,PABLO V. OCAMPO, APOLONIO GENER, ERNESTO M. MACEDA, FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO,
ALFREDO R. GOMEZ, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, and FRANCISCO VARONA, JR.
Respondents: ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board
of Manila
Doctrine:
The Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila possesses in the Municipal Board no more than the
prerogatives and authority of a “Presiding Officer” as such and those specified by law (to vote in
case of tie, and to sign all ordinances or resolutions and measures directing the payment of
money or creating liability enacted or adopted by the board).
Facts (MAIN)
 Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila involving purely questions
of law.
 11 petitioners herein are members of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila.
o Respondent Antonio J. Villegas was, on the dates material to this case, the Vice-
Mayor of said City and presiding officer of the aforementioned Board.
 Alleged in their petition
o PARAGRAPH 6: March 1960 — The respondent, then present (acts of which are
purely ministerial on his part), proceeded to address the same members of the
Board
 He did this during the regular session of the Municipal Board of
Manila
 In connection with a deliberation of the members of said Board in
voting upon a measure then under discussion
 Instead of determining the result of the voting and announcing the
same to the members of the Municipal Board
 Giving his opinion on the matter under discussion, and otherwise
performing acts properly belonging to the members of the Municipal
Board respondent, among other things, stating:
 "The Chair should not be interrupted because LIKE ANY
OTHER MEMBER OF THE BOARD, HE HAS THE RIGHT TO
SPEAK"
 “the Chair holds the view that he has a right to speak as
that is one of the freedoms granted us by our Constitution
xxx He is not a simple servant of this Body. He is in fact the
administrative and legislative head of this Body.”
o PARAGRAPH 7: March 25, 1960 — The herein respondent caused to be
inserted in the body of the approved Resolution, statements and matters, not
authorized nor deliberated upon by the members of the Municipal Board who
supposedly passed the same
 Upon a Resolution submitted by 16 members of the Municipal Board
to request the President of the Philippines to order the Honorable
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to suspend, recall or
repeal the set of rules and regulations
 Promulgated by virtue of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
548
 Approved on February 9, 1956
 Adopted by said Body on same date
o Said acts and utterances of respondent are "without and/or in excess of his
powers" as presiding officer of said Board
 Despite petitioners' admonitions to the contrary, respondent persist
in performing said acts, thereby unnecessarily delaying and
hampering the deliberation of said Board, to the prejudice and
damage of the interest and welfare of the people of Manila
 There is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
 Petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
respondent to desist in actively participating in the
discussions of matters before said Board and giving his
opinion and remarks thereon, other than to preside over
the sessions of the Board, calling it to order, recognizing
members desirous of speaking and performing acts
incident to these duties.
 Respondent admitted some allegations of the petition,
denied other allegations thereof, stated what acts were
performed by him and maintained his right to do so.
 Lower court rendered judgment for respondent.
 MR denied
o Hence, this appeal
Issue:
W/N the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila possesses in the Municipal Board no more than the
prerogatives and authority of a “Presiding Officer”
Ratio:
 Petitioners maintain that the Vice-Mayor of the City and shall consist of the Vice-Mayor as
the presiding of but merely its presiding officer, like the Vice-President of the United
States, who is ex-officio president of the Senate of the United States, but not a member
thereof, and, hence, devoid of the powers and attributes of the latter, except to vote in case
of tie.
 Section 13 of the Revised Charter of Manila, as amended by Republic Act No. 1571, reads,
in part:
o “The Municipal Board shall be the legislative body of the City and shall consist
of the Vice-Mayor as the presiding officer, and five elective members from each
representative district who shall hold office for four years. The Vice-Mayor
shall have no right to vote except in case of a tie. . . . The presiding officer shall
sign all ordinances, or resolutions and measures directing the payment of
money or creating liability enacted or adopted by the board. . . .”
 The language of this provision is clear and explicit.
o The Municipal Board of Manila "shall consist of the Vice-Mayor as the presiding
officer and five (5) elective members from each" of its representative districts.
o The Vice-mayor of Manila forms part, therefore, of said Board
 Unlike the Vice-President of the United States
 Not a constituent element of its Senate — the same being
exclusively "composed of two (2) senators from each State
. . ." — although he is "President of the Senate"
 And "shall have no vote, unless" its members "be equally
divided" (Article I, Section 2, Constitution of the United
States)
 And unlike the President of the Senate of the Philippines in relation
to our Commission on Appointments
 Consists only of "twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12)
members of the House of Representatives", and,
accordingly, does not include the President of the Senate
 Except insofar as he is its "Chairman ex-officio", and, as
such, may vote "in case of tie", and may call the
Commission to meet, while the Congress is in session, to
discharge such powers and functions as are conferred by
the Constitution upon said Commission (Article VI,
Sections 12 and 13, Constitution of the Philippines).
 The lower court opined that the present case is at parity
with that of Bagasao vs. Tumangan
o The Vice-Mayor of Cabanatuan City -- the charter of which provides that "the
Municipal Board shall be the legislative body of the city and shall be composed
of the Vice-Mayor, who shall be the presiding officer, and two (2) councilors
who shall be elected from each district" — is, not only the presiding officer of
said Board, but, also, a member thereof, with the right to vote on any proposed
ordinance, resolution or motion even though there is no tie.
o Finding in effect, that said provision of the charter of Cabanatuan City is
identical to that of the City of Manila, the lower court concluded in this case
that "respondent is a member of the Municipal Board, with all the rights and
privileges" of the latter "(except as to salary) subject to the limitation that he
cannot vote except in case of a tie".
  The Vice-Mayor of Manila is not identically situated as the
Vice-Mayor of Cabanatuan City, except insofar as each
forms part of the respective municipal board and presides
the same.
o The former is an integral part of the Municipal Board of Manila, but only "as the
presiding officer" thereof.
o Hence, unlike the Vice-Mayor of Cabanatuan City, that of Manila does not have
either the status of a regular member of its municipal board, or the powers and
attributes of a municipal councilor.
o In short, the Vice-Mayor of Manila possesses in the Municipal Board of Manila
no more than the prerogatives and authority of a "presiding officer" as such,
and those specified by law (to vote in case of tie, and to sign all ordinances or
resolutions and measures directing the payment of money or creating liability
enacted or adopted by the Board).
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified accordingly, without special pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.
This case is weird it has a diff. ruling for the PARAGRAPH 6 allegation and PARAGRAPH 7 allegation?
But I’m not sure if need pa to, but just in case, I placed everything here below. Sorry for how weird the
formatting of this digest is.
PARAGRAPH 6
Facts:
 Session prior to March 8, 1960 — the Municipal Board adopted a Liberal Party-sponsored
resolution requesting the City Engineer to prepare estimates for the asphalting and/or
cementing with curbs and gutters all the unasphalted streets of the city.
 Session of March 8 — Nacionalista councilor Maceda presented a MR of the approval of
the said resolution
 Respondent as presiding officer ruled, on a point of order raised by Liberal Party
councilor Isidro, that the motion for reconsideration was out of order
o According to respondent, the resolution had already been implemented and the
matter was already in the hands of the City Engineer
 Nacionalista councilor Maceda appealed the ruling of respondent to the Board
 While respondent was obtaining the decision of the Board on the appeal of Nacionalista
councilor Maceda by counting raised hands and after counting 11 votes in favor, Liberal
Party councilor Quintos asked for nominal voting.
 Respondent granted the request for nominal voting relying on section 17 of the Charter
and section 6(e) and 6(g) of Rule VII of the Rules of the Board.
o Nacionalista councilor Remigio in turn raised a point of order, objecting to
nominal voting because voting by raised hands had already begun.
o Respondent overruled the point of order, because the purpose of nominal
voting was to record the names of those in favor, those against and those
abstaining.
 An appeal from this last ruling was then made by Nacionalista councilor Maceda
o During the nominal voting, the Nacionalista councilors gave their votes and
explained their votes by arising many charges against respondent as presiding
officer for allegedly violating the Rules of the Board and favoring the Liberal
Party minority
 As respondent was about to answer these accusations and innuendos, he was interrupted
by Nacionalista councilor Ocampo who even walked out of the session, followed by the
other Nacionalista councilors prompting a recess
 When session was resumed, respondent again attempted to answer the charges against
him
o But he was again rudely interrupted by Nacionalista councilor Maceda who
questioned respondent's right to speak, leading to adjournment
 Thus was respondent's right to speak come to be questioned
Issue:
W/N respondent had authority to act as he did
Lower Court Ruling:
 Respondent has the power to "preside over the sessions" of the Municipal Board and the
position of presiding officer implies direction, control or regulation over the deliberations
of the Board
 Section 1-A-1(e) of Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Municipal Board:
o The presiding officer "shall assist in expediting business"
 Robert's Rules of Order:
o "If at any time, the chairman rises to state a point of order, or give information,
or otherwise speak, within his privilege, a member speaking must take his seat
till the chairman has been heard first. When called to order by the chair, the
member must sit down until the question of order is decided."
o ". . . Whenever the presiding officer decides a question of order, he has the
right, without leaving his chair, to state the reasons for his decision . . ."
 In view of the foregoing, the right of respondent Presiding Officer to state his reasons for
his ruling as happened here is undeniable.
SC Ruling:
 Owing to the recent demise of the Mayor of Manila and the ascent to said office of the
Vice-Mayor, respondent herein, the issues herein have thereby become moot.
o This notwithstanding, the Court deems it best to pass upon said issues in the
interest of public policy and welfare.
 The SC is fully in accord with the LC ruling.
o The right of a presiding officer to state the reasons for his rulings as such is too
obvious to require demonstration.
PARAGRAPH 7
Facts:
 March 18, 1960 — Nacionalista councilor Gatmaitan submitted a motion co-authored by
the 19 other councilors, for the adoption of a resolution requesting the Mayor of Manila to
suspend the enforcement of Commonwealth Act No. 548
o Respondent as presiding officer stated that the Mayor of Manila could not
suspend the enforcement of a duly enacted law and that the motion, should
therefore be modified
o Liberal Party councilor Isidro likewise submitted a written motion proposing
the adoption of a resolution requesting the mayor to order the Manila Police
Department to hold in abeyance or suspend the enforcement of the traffic rules
and regulations allegedly promulgated under Commonwealth Act No. 548
o The Nacionalista majority floorleader then moved to consolidate the proposal
of Nacionalista councilor Gatmaitan as proposed to be modified by respondent
and the proposal of Liberal Party councilor Isidro. This motion was adopted.
 March 22, 1960 — 13 councilors headed by Liberal Party councilor Isidro submitted a
motion that the Board adopt "a resolution requesting the Honorable Secretary of Public
Works & Communications to suspend, recall or repeal certain regulations promulgated by
 virtue of Sec. 1 of CA 548 which prohibits animal-drawn vehicles to pass through streets,
plaza and bridges in the City of Manila".
o There being no objection, this motion was declared by respondent as approved
 There being no adopted worded resolution, respondent framed the following resolution
based on the records
 Respondent drafted and authenticated resolution Exhibit 6-B
Lower Court Ruling:
 It is clear that resolution Exhibit 6-B duly interpreted the will of the Municipal Board as
can be gleaned from the reasons given by the members as per minutes of March 18, 22
and 25, 1960.
 The reasons which were incorporated in the corresponding resolution were based mainly
on the statements of Councilor Manuel Isidro during the session of the Board on March
22, 1960 as well as on the motions Exhibits 6 & 3-F.
 The right and duty of respondent to frame the questioned resolutions may be gleaned
from his duty as presiding officer to authenticate, whenever necessary, all orders, acts,
and proceedings of the Board, declaring its wills and obeying its commands
 ". . . It is his (presiding officer's) duty to declare the will of the body over which he
presides, ascertained by rules previously adopted, or, in the absence of such rules, by
other methods not repugnant to the due and orderly procedure of a deliberative body"
(37 Am. Jur. 672).
61. Velasco v. Blas, 115 SCRA 540
Petitioners: VIRGILIO S. VELAZCO and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CAVITE
Respondents: EMILIA S. BLAS, CONRADO SAYAS and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CAVITE, BRANCH IV, TAGAYTAY CITY
Doctrine: The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers
conferred upon the council or president making the same
Facts:
 Resolution No. 3, of the Municipal Council of Silang, Cavite, authorized Emilia S. Blas to
operate a cinema. Because the cinema would be near the medical clinic of Dr. Velazco, the
resolution expressly prohibited the installation and use of any loudspeaker or any similar
device.
 After receiving official advice of the resolution, Blas started construction of the cinema.
However, the Provincial Board of Cavite, upon representations made by Dr. Velazco,
approved Resolution No. 68 which declared Resolution No. 3 null and void on the ground
that it was contrary to the provisions of R.A. No. 1224.
 And because Blas continued with the construction of the cinema notwithstanding the
action of the Provincial Board, it passed Resolution No. 80 advising the Mayor of Silang to
stop the construction.
 He did not succeed so Dr. Velazco filed an action in the trial court to declare the operation
of the cinema illegal and to stop its construction because (1) the noise produced by the
construction was harmful to the patients of the clinic and (2) the operation of the cinema
contravenes the provisions of R.A. No. 1224.
 After holding that the operation of the cinema does not contravene R.A. No. 1224, and that
the noise from the construction was not a nuisance, the trial court dismissed the
complaint.
Issue: W/N Resolution No. 68 of the Provincial Board of Cavite is ultra vires because it is beyond the
powers granted to the board by Sec. 2233 of the Revised Administrative Code? YES
Ratio:
Sec. 2233 of the Revised Administrative Code
Sec. 2233. Provincial board to pass on legality of municipal proceedings. — “…If
the board should in any case find that any resolution, ordinance, or order, as
aforesaid, is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or mayor making
the same, it shall declare such resolution, ordinance, or order invalid, entering
its action upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities
thereof. The effect of such action shall be to annul the resolution, ordinance, or
order in question, subject to action by the Secretary of the Interior as
hereinafter provided."
 We agree with the trial court that the resolution of the Provincial Board in question
suffers from a fatal legal infirmity. For it is manifest that the municipal council has the
power to authorize and regulate the operation of cinemas, not by virtue of R.A. No. 1224
but pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by Chapter 57, Article IX of the Revised
Administrative Code.
 Upon the other hand, the only power granted to the provincial board by Sec. 2233 of the
same Code is to declare a municipal council issuance void on the sole ground that it is
beyond the power of the municipal council to issue.
 The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the
powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.
 The provincial disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised
specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of
the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the
legislative functions of the municipal council or president.
 The law does not require the approval of the Provincial Board for the validity of municipal
ordinances or resolutions. It only authorizes the Board to declare them invalid if in excess
of its powers. Having declared the action of the Board null and void, therefore, the Court
does not have to declare the municipal council resolution valid. It is valid by operation of
law.
 On a purely legal point of view, the courts are vested with the power to determine the
validity of municipal proceedings despite a previous determination by the provincial
board.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No special pronouncement as to costs.
62. Manantan v. Luna, supra||
G.R. No. L-2337 || February 26, 1949
Petitioners: JULIAN SEGUNDO MANANTAN, MARIA A. VDA. DE TALAVERA, BEATRIZ
TALAVERA MORALES, accompanied by her husband JESUS MORALES, and DELFIN B.
FLORES
Respondents:THE MUNICIPALITY OF LUNA, LA UNION, JOSE N. ANCHETA, Mayor, JOSE A.
NUVAL, AMBROSIO ARIBON, HILARIO NAZAL, ROMUALDO MULATO, EULOGIO CASEN
CATALINA RESURRECCION, councilors, and TIMOTEO SANTAROMANA
Doctrine:the only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution
invalid is when such resolution is beyond the powers conferred upon the council making the
same
Facts:
 On 1945, the municipal council of Luna, Province of La Union, passed its Resolution No.
32, for the purpose of offering at public auction on 1946, a lease of the privilege to catch
"banñ gus" fry within certain section of the municipal waters. The pertinent part off the
resolution reads:
 RESOLVED FURTHER, That said lease should be paid in cash by the successful bidder and
that the minimum bid is hereby fixed to the minimum price of One thousand pesos (P1,000)
for one year, beginning January 1, 1946 up to and including December 31, 1949 that said
lease can be extended for a period of from one to four years, to be paid in cash or by yearly
installments as this council may deem it profitable for the best interest of the government of
this municipality.
 Acting on the authority granted in said resolution the municipal treasurer issued the
necessary notices for the auction wherein it was stated, among other things that the
fishing privilege in question would be leased to the highest bidder ranging from P1,000
and up together with a deposit of 10 per cent of the amount so offered for the period of
one year from January 1, 1946, to December 31, 1946." with the further statement that
"Bids for more than one year but not more than four years can be offered. Prospective
bidders may see the Municipal Secretary about the conditions of the lease for more than one
year.
 Bid was conducted. In official confirmation of this declaration the municipal council
passed Resolution No. 37, series of 1946, granting to Julian Segundo Manantan and his
associates the fishing privilege in question and authorizing the municipal mayor to
execute the corresponding contract of lease.
 After paying the P1,000 corresponding to the first year of the lease, the lessees began
catching "bangus" fry within the fishery zone in question. But on July 20, 1946, the
municipal council, now composed of a new set councilors headed by a new mayor, passed,
Resolution No. 2, series requesting the Provincial Board of La Union to annul Resolution
No. 32, series of 1945, and the fishing privilege granted thereunder to Julian Segundo
Manantan and his partners, and the request having been granted, the said council, on
December 22, 1946, approved Resolution No. 23 fishing privilege for the year 1947 at the
minimum auction, Julian Segundo Manantan, later joined by his partners, commenced the
present suit in the Court of First Instance of La Union to have the last-mentioned
resolution declared void and the municipal council enjoined from carrying out the
auction.
 The municipal council, however, went ahead with the auction and awarded the lease for
the fishing privileges in question to Timoteo Santaromana,. But the petitioners succeeded
in having a writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 11, 1947, against the
municipality, the municipal mayor, the municipal councilors, and Timoteo Santaromana,
enjoining them and their agents from preventing the petitioners form enjoining their
privilege under the lease.
 Court of First Instance decided in favor of the respondents, holding Resolution No. 37,
series of 1946, and the fishery lease contract granted thereunder to the petitioners to null
and void, and in consequence upholding the validity of the lease contract granted to
Timoteo Santaromana and requiring the petitioners to account for the value of the
"banñ gus" fry caught by them from the date of the issuance of the preliminary injunction,
less reasonable expenses.
Issue:Whether or not the lower court erred in holding Resolution No. 37 to be null and void, and in
not declaring Resolution No. 23 null and void as violative of the constitutional provision prohibiting
the passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts.--NO
Ratio:
 The learned trial judge rightly held that Resolution No. 32 (the one authorizing the first
auction) was not invalidated by the fact that it was disapproved by the provincial board,
since "the only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal
resolution invalid is when such resolution is beyond the powers conferred upon
the council making the same", and there is no question that Resolution No. 32 is within
the powers granted to municipal councils by the Fishery Law (section 67, Act No. 4003 as
amended by Com. Act. No. 471).
 His Honor, however, was in error in taking the view that Resolution No. 37 and the lease
contract granted under it were null and void on the ground that when the municipal
council by said resolution "accepted the four-year if proposal of petitioners and declared
them to be the best and highest bidders for the 1946- 1949 fishing privilege, the
municipal council in effect awarded to the petitioners the four fishing privilege without
the intended benefits of public auction, in violation of section 69 of Act No. 4003, the
Fishery Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 471."
 We don't think this assumption is justified by the terms of the resolution. It is true that the
resolution fixes the minimum price for the lease at P1,000 for one year "beginning
January 1, 1946, up to and including December 31, 1949." But nowhere does it say that
the lease was to be for one year only.
 On the contrary, it expressly provides that the lease "can be extended for a period of
from one to four years," thus indicating an intention not to limit the duration of the
lease to one year.
 In accord with that intention, the municipal treasurer, in announcing the public auction,
inserted in the notice a provision that "bids for more than one year but not more
than four years can be offered," and the same municipal council which passed the
resolution (No. 32) confirmed that intention by entertaining and accepting in its
Resolution No. 37 the petitioners' bid for four years.
 As that part of the notice issued by the municipal treasurer which calls for bids for a
longer period than one year but not more than four years is in accord with the real intent
of Resolution No. 32, as that intention was subsequently confirmed in Resolution No. 37
of the same municipal council, the said notice can not be deemed to be unauthorized and
void, so that it is erro to hold that he grant of the fishing privilege to the petitioners was
null and void for lack of a valid notice of the public auction.
 It results that the contract of lease entered into under the authority of Resolution No. 37
between the petitioners and the municipal government of Luna is a valid and binding
contract and as such it is protected by the Constitution and can not, therefore, be
impaired by a subsequent resolution which sets in it aside and grants the fishing
privilege to another party.
DISPOSITIVE :
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is revolved and another one shall be entered declaring the
contract entered into between the municipal government of Luna, Province of La Union and Julian
Segundo Manantan and his associates under the authority of Resolutions No. 32, series f 1945 and
No. 37, series of 1946, to be valid; and Resolution No. 27, series of 1946, and the contract entered
into thereunder between the same municipal government and Timoteo Santaromana to be void as
violative of the constitutional provision against the impairment of the obligation of contracts. With
costs against the appellees.
63. Guzman v. Taytay, 65 Phil 340
Petitioners:
Respondents:
Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ratio:
Dispositive: