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CASE
DIGESTS
CIVIL
LAW
REVIEW
SUBMITTED
BY:
SHEENA
MARIE
T.
MORALES
11185694
Class
No.
12
GO3
DLSU
–
COL
SUBMITTED
TO:
ATTY.
CRISOSTOMO
A.
URIBE
1
Page
Case
Titles
Subject
Topic
Numbers
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Robert
P.
Narceda
G.R.
No.
182760
8-‐9
April
10,
2013
Persons
and
Family
Declaration
of
Ponente:
C.J.
Sereno
Relations
Presumptive
Death
Syed
Azhar
Abbas
v.
Gloria
Goo
Abbas
G.R.
No.
183896
Marrigae
License
10-‐11
January
30,
2013
Persons
and
Family
as
Formal
Ponente:
J.
Velasco
Jr.
Relations
Requisite
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Cesar
Encelan
G.R.
No.
170022
12-‐13
January
09,
2013
Persons
and
Family
Psychological
Ponente:
J.Brion
Relations
Incapacity
Antonio
Perla
vs.
Mirasol
Baring
and
Randy
Perla
G.R.
No.
172471
14-‐15
November
12,
2012
Persons
and
Family
Ponente:
J.Del
Castillo
Relations
Filiation
Arabelle
J.
Mendoza
vs.
Republic
of
the
Philippines
and
Dominic
C.
Mendoza
G.R.
No.
157649
16-‐17
November
12,
2012
Persons
and
Family
Psychological
Ponente:
J.Bersamin
Relations
Incapacity
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
and
Eduardo
De
Quintos,
Jr.
G.R.
No.
159594
18-‐19
November
12,
2012
Persons
and
Family
Psychological
Ponente:
J.Bersamin
Relations
Incapacity
Charles
Gotardo
vs.
Divina
Buling
G.R.
No.
165166
20-‐21
August
15,
2012
Persons
and
Family
Ponente:
J.Brion
Relations
Filiation
Charlie
Fortaleza
and
Ofelia
Fortaleza
vs.
Raul
Lapitan
and
Rona
Lapitan
G.R.
No.
178288
22
August
15,
2012
Persons
and
Family
Ponente:
J.
Del
Castillo
Relations
Family
Home
Brigido
B.
Quiao
vs.
Rita
C.
Quiao,
et.
al.
G.R.
No
176556
Conjugal
23-‐24
July
4,
2012
Persons
and
Family
Partnership
of
Ponente:
J.Reyes
Relations
Gains
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Yolanda
Cadacio
Granada
G.
R.
No.
187512
25-‐26
June
13,
2012
Persons
and
Family
Declaration
of
Ponente:
J.
Sereno
Relations
Presumptive
Death
2
Merope
Enriquez
Vda.
De
Catalan
vs.
Louella
A.
Catalan-‐
Lee
G.
R.
No.
183622
27-‐28
February
8,
2012
Persons
and
Family
Nationality
Ponente:
J.
Sereno
Relations
Principle
Antonia
R.
Dela
Peña
et.
al.
vs.
Gemma
Remilyn
Avila
and
FEBTC-‐BPI
G.R.
No.
187490
Conjugal
29-‐30
February
8,
2012
Persons
and
Family
Partnership
of
Ponente:
J.
Perez
Relations
Gains
Bobby
Tan
vs.
Grace
Andrade,
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
171904
and
172017
Conjugal
31-‐32
August
7,
2013
Persons
and
Family
Partnership
of
Ponente:
J.
Perlas-‐Bernabe
Relations
Gains
Minoru
Fujiki
vs.
Maria
Paz
Galela
Marinay,
Shinichi
Maekara
G.R.
No.
196049
33-‐34
June
26,
2013
Persons
and
Family
Declaration
for
Ponente:
J.
Sereno
Relations
Nullity
of
Marriage
California
Clothing,
Inc.
and
Michelle
Ybañez
vs.
Shirley
Quiñones
G.R.
No.175822
35-‐36
October
23,
2013
Persons
and
Family
Ponente:
J.
Peralta
Relations
Exercise
of
Rights
Edilberto
U.
Ventura
Jr.
vs.
Spouses
Paulino
and
Evangeline
Abuda
G.R.
No.
202932
Conjugal
October
23,
2013
Persons
and
Family
Partnership
of
37-‐38
Ponente:
J.
Carpio
Relations
Gains
The
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Liberty
D.
Albios
G.R.
No.
198780
39-‐40
October
16,
2013
Persons
and
Family
Declaration
for
Ponente:
J.
Mendoza
Relations
Nullity
of
Marriage
Estrella
Aduan
Orpiano
vs.
Spouses
Antonio
C.
Tomas
and
Myrna
U.
Tomas
G.R.
No.
178611
41-‐42
January
14,
2013
Persons
and
Family
Sale
of
Conjugal
Ponente:
J.
Del
Castillo
Relations
Property
Spouses
Benjamin
Mamaril
and
Sonia
Mamaril
vs.
The
Boy
Scout
of
the
Philippines
G.R.
No.
179382
43
January
14,
2013
Persons
and
Family
Ponente:
J.
Perlas-‐Bernabe
Relations
Human
Relations
3
Ma.
Carminia
C.
Calderon
vs.
Jose
Antonio
F.
Roxas
and
the
Court
of
Appeals
G.R.
No.
185595
44
January
9,
2013
Persons
and
Family
Support
Pendente
Ponente:
J.
Villarama
Jr.
Relations
Lite
Evangeline
Rivera-‐Calingasan
vs.
Wilfredo
Rivera
G.R.
No.171555
46
April
17,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Brion
Property
Forcible
Enrty
Spouses
Cabahug
vs.
National
Power
Corporation
G.R.
No.
186069
47
January
30,
2013
Power
of
Eminent
Ponente:
J.
Perez
Property
Domain
Mercy
Vda.
De
Roxas
vs.
Our
Lady’s
Foundation,
Inc.
G.R.
No.
182378
48-‐49
March
6,
2013
Rights
of
Builder
in
Ponente:
CJ.
Sereno
Property
Bad
Faith
Juanita
Ermitaño
vs.
Lailanie
M.
Paglas
G.R.
No.
174436
50-‐51
January
23,
2013
Right
of
Ponente:
J.
Peralta
Property
Redemption
Purificacion
and
Ruperto
Estanislao
vs.
Spouses
Norma
and
Damiano
Gudito
G.R.
NO.
173166
55-‐53
March
13,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Peralta
Property
Unlawful
Detainer
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
AFP
Retirement
and
Separation
Benefits
System
G.R.
No.
180463
54-‐55
January
16,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Del
Castillo
Property
Donation
VSD
Realty
&
Development
Corporation
vs.
Uniwide
Sales
Inc.
G.R.
No.
170677
56-‐57
July
31,
2013
Recovery
of
Ponente:
J.
Peralta
Property
Possession
Heirs
of
Margarita
Prodon
vs.
Heirs
of
Maximo
S.
Alvarez
and
Valentina
Clave
G.R.
No.
170604
58-‐59
September
2,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Bersamin
Property
Quieting
of
Title
Jose
Z.
Casilang,
Sr.
(substituted
by
his
heirs)
vs.
Rosario
Z.
Casilang-‐Dizon,
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
180269
60-‐61
February
20,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Reyes
Property
Partition
4
Republic
of
the
Philippines
(DPWH)
vs.
Bank
of
the
Philippine
Islands
(BPI)
G.R.
No.
203039
62-‐63
September
11,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Carpio
Property
Eminent
Domain
Pilar
Development
Corporation
vs.
Ramon
Dumadag
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
194336
64-‐65
March
11,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Peralta
Property
Easement
Teodoro
S.
Teodoro
(Substituted
by
Heirs)
vs.
Danilo
Espino
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
189248
66-‐67
February
5,
2014
Ponente:
J.
Perez
Property
Forcible
Enrty
Antonio
James
et.
al.
vs.
Eurem
Realty
Development
Corporation
G.R.
No.
190650
68-‐69
October
14,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Reyes
Property
Quieting
of
Title
Heirs
of
Albina
G.
Ampil
vs.
Teresa
and
Mario
Manahan
G.R.
No.
175990
70-‐71
October
11,
2012
Ponente:
J.
Mendoza
Property
Ownership
Gaudencio
Pacete
vs.
Inocencio
Asotigue
G.R.
No.
188575
72-‐73
December
10,
2012
Ponente:
J.
Mendoza
Property
Ownership
Jose
Casilang
Sr.
vs.
Rosario
Casilang-‐Dizon,
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
180269
75-‐76
February
20,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Reyes
Succession
Partition
Maria
Mendoza,
et.
al.
vs.
Julia
Policarpio
Delos
Santos
G.R.
No.
176422
77-‐78
March
20,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Reyes
Succession
Reserva
Troncal
Carolina
Vda.
De
Figuracion,
et.
al.
vs.
Emilia
Figuracion-‐
Gerilla
G.R.
No.
151334
79-‐80
February
13,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Reyes
Succession
Partition
Richard
B.
Lopez
vs.
Diana
Jeanne
Lopez,
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
189984
81-‐82
November
12,
2012
Probate:
Ponente:
J.Perlas-‐Bernabe
Succession
Attestation
Clause
5
Antipolo
Ining
et.
al.
vs.
Leonardo
R.
Vega
et.
al
G.R.
No.
174727
83-‐84
August
12,
2013
Repudiation
of
a
Ponente:
J.
Del
Castillo
Succession
Co-‐owner
Heirs
of
Magdaleno
Ypon
vs.
Gaudioso
Ponteras
Ricaforte
a.k.a.
“Gaudioso
E.
Ypon”
G.R.
No.
198680
Determination
of
85-‐86
July
8,
2013
Heirship
in
Special
Ponente:
J.
Perlas-‐Bernabe
Succession
Proceeding
Heirs
of
Dr.
Mariano
Favis
Sr.
vs.
Juana
Gonzales
G.R.
No.
185922
87-‐88
January
15,
2014
Donation
Inter
Ponente:
J.
Perez
Succession
Vivos
Cerila
J.
Calanasan
vs.
Spouses
Virgilio
Dolorito
and
Evelyn
c.
Dolorito
G.R.
No.
171937
89-‐90
November
25,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Brion
Succession
Donation
6
PERSONS
AND
FAMILY
RELATIONS
CASES
7
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Robert
P.
Narceda
G.R.
No.
182760
April
10,
2013
Ponente:
C.J.
Sereno
Topic:
Declaration
of
Presumptive
Death
Facts:
Robert
Narceda
married
Marina
on
July
22,
1987.
According
to
Robert
Narceda,
Marina
went
to
Singapore
sometime
in
1994
and
never
returned
since.
There
was
never
any
communication
between
them.
Though
he
tried
to
look
for
her,
but
he
could
not
find
her.
One
of
their
town
mates
who
came
from
Singapore,
had
told
him
that
the
last
time
she
saw
Marina,
she
was
already
living
with
a
Singaporean
husband.
In
view
of
her
absence
and
his
desire
to
remarry,
Narceda
filed
a
Petition
for
a
Judicial
Declaration
of
the
Presumptive
Death
and/or
Absence
of
Marina
with
the
RTC
on
May
16,
2002.
The
Petition
was
granted,
declaring
the
presumptive
death
of
Marina
B.
Narceda
for
all
legal
intents
and
purposes
of
law.
The
Republic,
appealed
the
Decision
to
the
Court
of
Appeals.
According
to
the
Republic,
Narceda
failed
to
conduct
a
search
for
his
missing
wife
with
the
diligence
required
by
law
and
enough
to
give
rise
to
a
“well-‐founded”
belief
that
she
was
dead.
The
CA
dismissed
the
appeal
ruling
that
the
hearing
of
a
petition
for
the
declaration
of
presumptive
death
is
a
summary
proceeding
which
under
Article
247
of
the
Family
Code
provides
that
the
judgment
of
the
trial
court
in
summary
court
proceedings
shall
be
immediately
final
and
executory.
Issue:
Did
the
Court
of
Appeals
commit
an
error
in
dismissing
the
petition
for
a
lack
of
jurisdiction
by
ruling
that
the
presumptive
death
of
Marina
was
immediately
final
and
executory,
because
by
express
provision
of
law,
the
judgment
of
the
RTC
is
not
appealable?
Held:
No.
“The
appellate
court
argues
that
there
is
no
reglementary
period
within
which
to
perfect
an
appeal
in
summary
judicial
proceedings
under
the
Family
Code,
because
the
judgments
rendered
thereunder,
by
express
provision
of
Article
247,
are
immediately
final
and
executory
upon
notice
to
the
parties.
In
Republic
v.
Tango,
the
remedy
of
a
losing
party
in
a
summary
proceeding
is
not
an
ordinary
appeal,
but
a
petition
for
certiorari,
to
wit:
“By
express
provision
of
law,
the
judgment
of
the
court
in
a
summary
proceeding
shall
be
immediately
final
and
executory.
As
a
matter
of
course,
it
follows
that
no
appeal
can
be
had
of
the
trial
court’s
judgment
in
a
summary
proceeding
for
the
declaration
of
presumptive
death
of
an
absent
spouse
under
Article
41
of
the
Family
Code.
It
goes
without
saying,
however,
that
an
aggrieved
party
may
file
a
petition
for
certiorari
to
question
abuse
of
discretion
amounting
to
lack
of
jurisdiction.
Such
petition
should
be
filed
in
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
accordance
with
the
Doctrine
of
Hierarchy
of
Courts.
To
be
sure,
even
if
the
Court’s
original
jurisdiction
to
issue
a
writ
of
certiorari
is
concurrent
with
the
RTCs
and
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
certain
cases,
such
8
concurrence
does
not
sanction
an
unrestricted
freedom
of
choice
of
court
forum.
From
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals,
the
losing
party
may
then
file
a
petition
for
review
oncertiorari
under
Rule
45
of
the
Rules
of
Court
with
the
Supreme
Court.
This
is
because
the
errors
which
the
court
may
commit
in
the
exercise
of
jurisdiction
are
merely
errors
of
judgment
which
are
the
proper
subject
of
an
appeal.”
When
the
OSG
filed
its
notice
of
appeal
under
Rule
42,
it
availed
itself
of
the
wrong
remedy.
As
a
result,
the
running
of
the
period
for
filing
of
a
Petition
for
Certiorari
continued
to
run
and
was
not
tolled.
Upon
lapse
of
that
period,
the
Decision
of
the
RTC
could
no
longer
be
questioned.”
9
Syed
Azhar
Abbas
v.
Gloria
Goo
Abbas
G.R.
No.
183896
January
30,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Velasco
Jr.
Topic: Marrigae License as Formal Requisite
Facts:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen and Gloria, a Filipino citizen, were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei
Mosque in Taiwan. On January 9, 1993, he was told by his mother-‐in-‐law that he was going to undergo
some ceremony but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony, he and Gloria
signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony on was a marriage until Gloria
told him later. He claimed that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that
he had never resided in that area. He went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar issued a certification on July 11,
2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain couple.
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria
Goo by the mother of the bride and that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for
the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. He
further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained.
The Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued in favor of Gloria and Syed, as
Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to someone else and that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, which was in violation of
Article 9 of the Family Code. The Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Syed. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision stating that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value.
Issue:
Was there a valid marriage license issued for the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas?
Held:
No.
“It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed
to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly,
neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify
to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the
existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
10
mother,
Felicitas
Goo,
could
not
even
testify
as
to
the
contents
of
the
license,
having
admitted
to
not
reading
all
of
its
contents.
Atty.
Sanchez,
one
of
the
sponsors,
whom
Gloria
and
Felicitas
Goo
approached
for
assistance
in
securing
the
license,
admitted
not
knowing
where
the
license
came
from.
The
task
of
applying
for
the
license
was
delegated
to
a
certain
Qualin,
who
could
have
testified
as
to
how
the
license
was
secured
and
thus
impeached
the
certification
of
the
Municipal
Civil
Registrar
as
well
as
the
testimony
of
her
representative.
As
Gloria
failed
to
present
this
Qualin,
the
certification
of
the
Municipal
Civil
Registrar
still
enjoys
probative
value.
In
the
case
of
Cariño
v.
Cariño,
following
the
case
of
Republic,
it
was
held
that
the
certification
of
the
Local
Civil
Registrar
that
their
office
had
no
record
of
a
marriage
license
was
adequate
to
prove
the
non-‐
issuance
of
said
license.
The
case
of
Cariño
further
held
that
the
presumed
validity
of
the
marriage
of
the
parties
had
been
overcome,
and
that
it
became
the
burden
of
the
party
alleging
a
valid
marriage
to
prove
that
the
marriage
was
valid,
and
that
the
required
marriage
license
had
been
secured.
All
the
evidence
cited
by
the
CA
to
show
that
a
wedding
ceremony
was
conducted
and
a
marriage
contract
was
signed
does
not
operate
to
cure
the
absence
of
a
valid
marriage
license.
Article
4
of
the
Family
Code
is
clear
when
it
says,
“The
absence
of
any
of
the
essential
or
formal
requisites
shall
render
the
marriage
void
ab
initio,
except
as
stated
in
Article
35(2).”
Article
35(3)
of
the
Family
Code
also
provides
that
a
marriage
solemnized
without
a
license
is
void
from
the
beginning,
except
those
exempt
from
the
license
requirement
under
Articles
27
to
34,
Chapter
2,
Title
I
of
the
same
Code.
Again,
this
marriage
cannot
be
characterized
as
among
the
exemptions,
and
thus,
having
been
solemnized
without
a
marriage
license,
is
void
ab
initio.”
11
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Cesar
Encelan
G.R.
No.
170022
January
09,
2013
Ponente:
J.Brion
Topic:
Psychological
Incapacity
Facts:
On
August
25,
1979,
Cesar
married
Lolita.
To
support
his
family,
Cesar
went
to
work
in
Saudi
Arabia.
Cesar,
while
still
in
Saudi
Arabia,
learned
that
Lolita
had
been
having
an
illicit
affair
with
Alvin.
Lolita
allegedly
left
the
conjugal
home
with
her
children
and
lived
with
Alvin.
Since
then,
Cesar
and
Lolita
had
been
separated.
Cesar
filed
with
the
RTC
a
petition
for
the
declaration
of
the
nullity
of
his
marriage
with
Lolita
based
on
her
psychological
incapacity.
Lolita
denied
that
she
had
an
affair
and
insisted
that
she
is
not
psychologically
incapacitated
and
that
she
left
their
home
because
of
irreconcilable
differences
with
her
mother-‐in-‐law.
Cesar
presented
the
psychological
evaluation
report
on
Lolita
prepared
by
Dr.
Flores
of
the
National
Center
for
Mental
Health.
Dr.
Flores
found
that
Lolita
was
"not
suffering
from
any
form
of
major
psychiatric
illness
but
had
been
"unable
to
provide
the
expectations
expected
of
her
for
a
good
and
lasting
marital
relationship"
and
that
her
"transferring
from
one
job
to
the
other
depicts
some
interpersonal
problems
with
co-‐workers
as
well
as
her
impatience
in
attaining
her
ambitions
and
her
refusal
to
go
with
her
husband
abroad
signifies
her
reluctance
to
work
out
a
good
marital
and
family
relationship."
Issue:
Are
Lolita's
interpersonal
problems
with
co-‐workers
enough
basis
to
nullify
Cesar's
marriage
to
her
on
the
ground
of
psychological
incapacity?
Held:
No.
There
is
no
sufficient
basis
existing
to
annul
Cesar's
marriage
to
Lolita
on
the
ground
of
psychological
incapacity.
“Cesar
mistakenly
relied
on
Dr.
Flores'
psychological
evaluation
report
on
Lolita
to
prove
her
alleged
psychological
incapacity.
The
psychological
evaluation,
in
fact,
established
that
Lolita
did
not
suffer
from
any
major
psychiatric
illness.
Dr.
Flores'
observation
on
Lolita's
interpersonal
problems
with
co-‐workers,
to
our
mind,
does
not
suffice
as
a
consideration
for
the
conclusion
that
she
was
–
at
the
time
of
her
marriage
–
psychologically
incapacitated
to
enter
into
a
marital
union
with
Cesar.
Aside
from
the
time
element
involved,
a
wife's
psychological
fitness
as
a
spouse
cannot
simply
be
equated
with
her
professional/work
relationship;
workplace
obligations
and
responsibilities
are
poles
apart
from
their
marital
counterparts.
While
both
spring
from
human
relationship,
their
relatedness
and
relevance
to
one
another
should
be
fully
established
for
them
to
be
compared
or
to
serve
as
measures
of
comparison
with
one
another.
To
be
sure,
the
evaluation
report
Dr.
Flores
prepared
and
submitted
cannot
serve
this
purpose.
12
Dr.
Flores'
further
belief
that
Lolita's
refusal
to
go
with
Cesar
abroad
signified
a
reluctance
to
work
out
a
good
marital
relationship
is
a
mere
generalization
unsupported
by
facts
and
is,
in
fact,
a
rash
conclusion
that
this
Court
cannot
support.
Once
again,
we
stress
that
marriage
is
an
inviolable
social
institution
protected
by
the
State.
Any
doubt
should
be
resolved
in
favor
of
its
existence
its
existence
and
continuation
and
against
its
dissolution
and
nullity.
It
cannot
be
dissolved
at
the
whim
of
the
parties
nor
by
transgressions
made
by
one
party
to
the
other
during
the
marriage.”
13
Antonio
Perla
vs.
Mirasol
Baring
and
Randy
Perla
G.R.
No.
172471
November
12,
2012
Ponente:
J.Del
Castillo
Topic:
Filiation
Facts:
Mirasol
filed
a
complaint
for
support
for
her
son
Randy
against
Antonio.
Mirasol
testified
that
Antonio
courted
her
and
eventually
became
her
first
boyfriend.
When
Mirasol
became
pregnant,
Antonio
assured
her
that
he
would
support
her.
Eventually,
however,
Antonio
started
to
evade
her.
Mirasol
gave
birth
to
Randy.
She
presented
Randy’s
Certificate
of
Live
Birth
and
Baptismal
Certificate
indicating
her
and
Antonio
as
parents
of
the
child.
According
to
her,
when
Antonio
landed
a
job
as
seaman,
he
abandoned
them
and
failed
to
give
any
support
to
his
son.
Randy
recounted
having
met
Antonio
for
the
first
time
in
1994
in
the
house
of
his
Aunt
Lelita,
Antonio’s
sister,
where
he
was
vacationing.
During
their
encounter,
Randy
called
Antonio
"Papa"
and
kissed
his
hand
while
the
latter
hugged
him.
Antonio
denied
having
fathered
Randy.
Although
he
admitted
to
having
known
Mirasol,
denied
courting
her
and
that
she
never
became
his
common-‐law
wife
nor
was
she
treated
as
such.
Regarding
Randy’s
Certificate
of
Live
Birth,
Antonio
testified
as
to
several
inaccuracies
in
the
entries
thereon.
Issues:
1.
Are
the
birth
and
baptismal
certificates
competent
proofs
of
paternity
when
putative
father
had
no
hand
in
preparation?
2.
Was
Mirasol
and
Randy
able
to
prove
filiation
through
the
open
and
continuous
possession
of
status
of
Randy?
Held:
No
to
both
issues.
Mirasol
and
Randy
failed
to
establish
Randy’s
illegitimate
filiation
to
Antonio.
Issue
1.
“Respondents
presented
the
Certificate
of
Live
Birth
of
Randy
identifying
Antonio
as
the
father.
However,
said
certificate
has
no
probative
value
to
establish
Randy’s
filiation
to
Antonio
since
the
latter
had
not
signed
the
same.
It
is
settled
that
"a
certificate
of
live
birth
purportedly
identifying
the
putative
father
is
not
competent
evidence
of
paternity
when
there
is
no
showing
that
the
putative
father
had
a
hand
in
the
preparation
of
said
certificate.”
x
x
x
“Anent
Randy’s
baptismal
certificate,
we
cannot
agree
with
the
CA
that
the
same
is
a
good
proof
of
Antonio’s
paternity
of
Randy.
Just
like
in
a
birth
certificate,
the
lack
of
participation
of
the
supposed
father
in
the
preparation
of
a
baptismal
certificate
renders
this
document
incompetent
to
prove
paternity.
And
"while
a
baptismal
certificate
may
be
considered
a
public
document,
it
can
only
serve
as
evidence
of
the
administration
of
the
sacrament
on
the
date
specified
but
not
the
veracity
of
the
entries
with
respect
to
the
child’s
paternity.
Thus,
x
x
x
baptismal
certificates
are
per
se
inadmissible
in
evidence
14
as
proof
of
filiation
and
they
cannot
be
admitted
indirectly
as
circumstantial
evidence
to
prove
the
same.”
Issue
2.
“Neither
does
the
testimony
of
Randy
establish
his
illegitimate
filiation.
That
during
their
first
encounter
in
1994
Randy
called
Antonio
"Papa"
and
kissed
his
hand
while
Antonio
hugged
him
and
promised
to
support
him;
or
that
his
Aunt
Lelita
treated
him
as
a
relative
and
was
good
to
him
during
his
one-‐week
stay
in
her
place,
cannot
be
considered
as
indications
of
Randy’s
open
and
continuous
possession
of
the
status
of
an
illegitimate
child
under
the
second
paragraph
of
Article
172(1).
"[T]o
prove
open
and
continuous
possession
of
the
status
of
an
illegitimate
child,
there
must
be
evidence
of
the
manifestation
of
the
permanent
intention
of
the
supposed
father
to
consider
the
child
as
his,
by
continuous
and
clear
manifestations
of
parental
affection
and
care,
which
cannot
be
attributed
to
pure
charity.
Such
acts
must
be
of
such
a
nature
that
they
reveal
not
only
the
conviction
of
paternity,
but
also
the
apparent
desire
to
have
and
treat
the
child
as
such
in
all
relations
in
society
and
in
life,
not
accidentally,
but
continuously."
Here,
the
single
instance
that
Antonio
allegedly
hugged
Randy
and
promised
to
support
him
cannot
be
considered
as
proof
of
continuous
possession
of
the
status
of
a
child.
To
emphasize,
"[t]he
father’s
conduct
towards
his
son
must
be
spontaneous
and
uninterrupted
for
this
ground
to
exist."
Here,
except
for
that
singular
occasion
in
which
they
met,
there
are
no
other
acts
of
Antonio
treating
Randy
as
his
son.
Neither
can
Antonio’s
paternity
be
deduced
from
how
his
sister
Lelita
treated
Randy.
To
this
Court,
Lelita’s
actuations
could
have
been
done
due
to
charity
or
some
other
reasons.”
15
Arabelle
J.
Mendoza
vs.
Republic
of
the
Philippines
and
Dominic
C.
Mendoza
G.R.
No.
157649
November
12,
2012
Ponente:
J.Bersamin
Topic:
Psychological
Incapacity
Facts:
Arabelle
and
Dominic
got
married
while
they
were
still
in
college.
Arabelle
became
pregnant
with
Allysa
Bianca.
When
Arabelle
delivered
Alyssa
Bianca,
Dominic
had
to
borrow
funds
from
petitioner’s
best
friend
to
settle
the
hospital
bills.
He
remained
jobless
and
dependent
upon
his
father
for
support
until
he
finished
his
college
course.
Arabelle
took
on
various
jobs
to
meet
the
family’s
needs
and
she
shouldered
all
of
the
family’s
expenses.
When
Dominic
got
a
commission
basis
job,
he
spent
his
first
sales
commission
on
a
celebratory
bash
with
his
friends.
Arabelle
discovered
Dominic’s
illicit
relationship
with
Zaida,
his
co-‐employee
at
Toyota
Motors.
Dominic
gave
her
a
Daihatsu
car
as
a
birthday
present.
Later
on,
he
asked
her
to
issue
two
blank
checks
that
he
claimed
would
be
for
the
car’s
insurance
coverage.
She
soon
found
out,
however,
that
the
checks
were
not
paid
for
the
car’s
insurance
coverage
but
for
his
personal
needs.
Worse,
she
also
found
out
that
he
did
not
pay
for
the
car
itself,
forcing
her
to
rely
on
her
father-‐in-‐law
to
pay
part
of
the
cost
of
the
car,
leaving
her
to
bear
the
balance.
Dominic
was
fired
from
his
employment
after
he
ran
away
with
money
belonging
to
his
employer.
He
was
criminally
charged
with
violation
of
Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
22
and
estafa,
for
which
he
was
arrested
and
incarcerated.
Arabelle
bailed
him
out
and
discovered
his
swindling
activities.
Dominic
abandoned
the
conjugal
abode
because
Arabelle
asked
him
for
"time
and
space
to
think
things
over."
A
month
later,
she
refused
his
attempt
at
reconciliation,
causing
him
to
threaten
to
commit
suicide.
At
that,
she
and
her
family
immediately
left
the
house
to
live
in
another
place
concealed
from
him.
Arabelle
filed
in
the
RTC
her
petition
for
the
declaration
of
the
nullity
of
her
marriage
with
Dominic
based
on
his
psychological
incapacity
under
Article
36
of
the
Family
Code.
The
Office
of
the
Solicitor
General
(OSG)
opposed
the
petition.
In
the
Psychiatric
Report
of
Dr.
Samson,
it
stated
that
Dominic
had
evidently
failed
to
comply
with
what
is
required
of
him
as
a
husband
and
father.
Besides
from
his
adulterous
relationship
and
irresponsibility,
his
malevolent
conduct
and
lack
of
true
remorse
indicate
that
he
is
psychologically
incapacitated
to
fulfill
the
role
of
a
married
man.
The
RTC
declared
the
marriage
an
absolute
nullity
and
the
Republic
appealed.
The
CA
reversed
the
decision.
Issues:
1.
Did
the
report
on
the
psychiatric
evaluation
conducted
by
Dr.
Samson
comply
with
the
requirements
to
prove
psychological
incapacity
since
a
personal
medical
or
psychological
examination
is
no
longer
needed
for
a
declaration
of
nullity?
2.
Are
appeals
by
the
Office
of
the
Solicitor
General
no
longer
required
under
A.M.
No.
02-‐11-‐10?
Held:
Issue
1.
No.
The
totality
of
the
evidence
adduced
by
petitioner
was
insufficient
to
prove
that
Dominic
was
psychologically
unfit
to
discharge
the
duties
expected
of
him
as
a
husband,
and
that
he
suffered
from
such
psychological
incapacity
as
of
the
date
of
the
marriage.
16
“In
fine,
the
failure
to
examine
and
interview
Dominic
himself
naturally
cast
serious
doubt
on
Dr.
Samson’s
findings.
The
CA
rightly
refused
to
accord
probative
value
to
the
testimony
of
such
expert
for
being
avowedly
given
to
show
compliance
with
the
requirements
set
in
Santos
and
Molina
for
the
establishment
of
Dominic’s
psychological
incapacity.”
x
x
x
“Apparent
from
the
aforecited
pronouncements
is
that
it
was
not
the
absence
of
the
medical
expert’s
testimony
alone
that
was
crucial
but
rather
petitioners’
failure
to
satisfactorily
discharge
the
burden
of
showing
the
existence
of
psychological
incapacity
at
the
inception
of
the
marriage.
In
other
words,
the
totality
of
the
evidence
proving
such
incapacity
at
and
prior
to
the
time
of
the
marriage
was
the
crucial
consideration,
as
the
Court
has
reminded
in
Ting
v.
Velez-‐Ting:
“By
the
very
nature
of
cases
involving
the
application
of
Article
36,
it
is
logical
and
understandable
to
give
weight
to
the
expert
opinions
furnished
by
psychologists
regarding
the
psychological
temperament
of
parties
in
order
to
determine
the
root
cause,
juridical
antecedence,
gravity
and
incurability
of
the
psychological
incapacity.
However,
such
opinions,
while
highly
advisable,
are
not
conditions
sine
qua
non
in
granting
petitions
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage.
At
best,
courts
must
treat
such
opinions
as
decisive
but
not
indispensable
evidence
in
determining
the
merits
of
a
given
case.
In
fact,
if
the
totality
of
evidence
presented
is
enough
to
sustain
a
finding
of
psychological
incapacity,
then
actual
medical
or
psychological
examination
of
the
person
concerned
need
not
be
resorted
to.
The
trial
court,
as
in
any
other
given
case
presented
before
it,
must
always
base
its
decision
not
solely
on
the
expert
opinions
furnished
by
the
parties
but
also
on
the
totality
of
evidence
adduced
in
the
course
of
the
proceedings.”
x
x
x
“In
light
of
the
foregoing,
even
if
the
expert
opinions
of
psychologists
are
not
conditions
sine
qua
non
in
the
granting
of
petitions
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage,
the
actual
medical
examination
of
Dominic
was
to
be
dispensed
with
only
if
the
totality
of
evidence
presented
was
enough
to
support
a
finding
of
his
psychological
incapacity.
This
did
not
mean
that
the
presentation
of
any
form
of
medical
or
psychological
evidence
to
show
the
psychological
incapacity
would
have
automatically
ensured
the
granting
of
the
petition
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage.
What
was
essential,
we
should
emphasize
herein,
was
the
"presence
of
evidence
that
can
adequately
establish
the
party’s
psychological
condition,"
as
the
Court
said
in
Marcos.
But
where,
like
here,
the
parties
had
the
full
opportunity
to
present
the
professional
and
expert
opinions
of
psychiatrists
tracing
the
root
cause,
gravity
and
incurability
of
the
alleged
psychological
incapacity,
then
the
opinions
should
be
presented
and
be
weighed
by
the
trial
courts
in
order
to
determine
and
decide
whether
or
not
to
declare
the
nullity
of
the
marriages.”
Issue
2.
No.
“The
Resolution
nowhere
stated
that
appeals
by
the
OSG
were
no
longer
required.
On
the
contrary,
the
Resolution
explicitly
required
the
OSG
to
actively
participate
in
all
stages
of
the
proceedings”.
17
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
and
Eduardo
De
Quintos,
Jr.
G.R.
No.
159594
November
12,
2012
Ponente:
J.Bersamin
Topic:
Psychological
Incapacity
Facts:
Eduardo
and
Catalina
were
married.
Eduardo
filed
a
petition
for
the
declaration
of
nullity
of
their
marriage,
citing
Catalina’s
psychological
incapacity
to
comply
with
her
essential
marital
obligations.
Eduardo
testified
that
Catalina
always
left
their
house
without
his
consent;
that
she
engaged
in
petty
arguments
with
him;
that
she
constantly
refused
to
give
in
to
his
sexual
needs;
that
she
spent
most
of
her
time
gossiping
with
neighbors
instead
of
doing
the
household
chores
and
caring
for
their
adopted
daughter;
that
she
squandered
by
gambling
all
his
remittances
as
an
overseas
worker
in
Qatar
and
that
she
abandoned
the
conjugal
home
in
1997
to
live
with
Bobbie
Castro,
her
paramour.
Eduardo
presented
the
results
of
the
neuro-‐psychiatric
evaluation
conducted
by
Dr.
Annabelle
L.
Reyes,
a
psychiatrist.
Based
on
the
tests
she
administered
on
Catalina,
Dr.
Reyes
opined
that
Catalina
exhibited
traits
of
Borderline
Personality
Disorder
that
was
no
longer
treatable.
Dr.
Reyes
found
that
Catalina’s
disorder
was
mainly
characterized
by
her
immaturity
that
rendered
her
psychologically
incapacitated
to
meet
her
marital
obligations.
Issue:
Was
the
Neuropsychiatric
Evaluation
and
Testimony
of
Dr.
Reyes
able
to
establish
Catalina’s
Psychological
Incapacity
despite
not
having
a
thorough
and
in-‐depth
assessment?
Held:
No.
“Psychological
incapacity
under
Article
36
of
the
Family
Code
contemplates
an
incapacity
or
inability
to
take
cognizance
of
and
to
assume
basic
marital
obligations,
and
is
not
merely
the
difficulty,
refusal,
or
neglect
in
the
performance
of
marital
obligations
or
ill
will.
It
consists
of:
(a)
a
true
inability
to
commit
oneself
to
the
essentials
of
marriage;
(b)
the
inability
must
refer
to
the
essential
obligations
of
marriage,
that
is,
the
conjugal
act,
the
community
of
life
and
love,
the
rendering
of
mutual
help,
and
the
procreation
and
education
of
offspring;
and
(c)
the
inability
must
be
tantamount
to
a
psychological
abnormality.
Proving
that
a
spouse
failed
to
meet
his
or
her
responsibility
and
duty
as
a
married
person
is
not
enough;
it
is
essential
that
he
or
she
must
be
shown
to
be
incapable
of
doing
so
due
to
some
psychological
illness.”
x
x
x
“Thirdly,
we
have
said
that
the
expert
evidence
presented
in
cases
of
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage
based
on
psychological
incapacity
presupposes
a
thorough
and
in-‐depth
assessment
of
the
parties
by
the
psychologist
or
expert
to
make
a
conclusive
diagnosis
of
a
grave,
severe
and
incurable
presence
of
psychological
incapacity.”
x
x
x
18
“But
Dr.
Reyes
had
only
one
interview
with
Catalina,
and
did
not
personally
seek
out
and
meet
with
other
persons,
aside
from
Eduardo,
who
could
have
shed
light
on
and
established
the
conduct
of
the
spouses
before
and
during
the
marriage.
For
that
reason,
Dr.
Reyes’
report
lacked
depth
and
objectivity,
a
weakness
that
removed
the
necessary
support
for
the
conclusion
that
the
RTC
and
the
CA
reached
about
Catalina’s
psychological
incapacity
to
perform
her
marital
duties.”
x
x
x
“Fourthly,
we
held
in
Suazo
v.
Suazo
that
there
must
be
proof
of
a
natal
or
supervening
disabling
factor
that
effectively
incapacitated
the
respondent
spouse
from
complying
with
the
basic
marital
obligations,
viz:
It
is
not
enough
that
the
respondent,
alleged
to
be
psychologically
incapacitated,
had
difficulty
in
complying
with
his
marital
obligations,
or
was
unwilling
to
perform
these
obligations.
Proof
of
a
natal
or
supervening
disabling
factor
–
an
adverse
integral
element
in
the
respondent’s
personality
structure
that
effectively
incapacitated
him
from
complying
with
his
essential
marital
obligations
–
must
be
shown.
Mere
difficulty,
refusal
or
neglect
in
the
performance
of
marital
obligations
or
ill
will
on
the
part
of
the
spouse
is
different
from
incapacity
rooted
in
some
debilitating
psychological
condition
or
illness;
irreconcilable
differences,
sexual
infidelity
or
perversion,
emotional
immaturity
and
irresponsibility
and
the
like,
do
not
by
themselves
warrant
a
finding
of
psychological
incapacity
under
Article
36,
as
the
same
may
only
be
due
to
a
person’s
refusal
or
unwillingness
to
assume
the
essential
obligations
of
marriage.”
19
Charles
Gotardo
vs.
Divina
Buling
G.R.
No.
165166
August
15,
2012
Ponente:
J.Brion
Topic:
Filiation
Facts:
Divina
and
Charles
met
at
the
Philippine
Commercial
and
Industrial
Bank,
Maasin,
Southern
Leyte
branch
where
they
were
co-‐employees.
Charles
eventually
started
intimate
sexual
relations
with
Divina
leading
to
her
pregnancy.
When
told
of
the
pregnancy,
Charles
was
happy
and
made
plans
to
marry
Divina.
However,
Charles
backed
out
of
the
wedding
plans.
Divina
gave
birth
to
their
son
Gliffze.
When
Charles
did
not
show
up
and
failed
to
provide
support
to
Gliffze,
Divina
sent
him
a
letter
demanding
recognition
of
and
support
for
their
child.
When
Charles
did
not
answer
the
demand,
Divina
filed
her
complaint
for
compulsory
recognition
and
support
pendente
lite.
Charles
denied
the
imputed
paternity.
Issue:
Can
the
issue
on
support
be
adjudicated
in
a
filiation
proceeding?
Held:
Yes.
“We
have
recognized
that
"[f]iliation
proceedings
are
usually
filed
not
just
to
adjudicate
paternity
but
also
to
secure
a
legal
right
associated
with
paternity,
such
as
citizenship,
support
(as
in
this
case)
or
inheritance.
[In
paternity
cases,
the
burden
of
proof]
is
on
the
person
who
alleges
that
the
putative
father
is
the
biological
father
of
the
child.”
x
x
x
“In
Herrera
v.
Alba,
we
stressed
that
there
are
four
significant
procedural
aspects
of
a
traditional
paternity
action
that
parties
have
to
face:
a
prima
facie
case,
affirmative
defenses,
presumption
of
legitimacy,
and
physical
resemblance
between
the
putative
father
and
the
child.
We
explained
that
a
prima
facie
case
exists
if
a
woman
declares
—
supported
by
corroborative
proof
—
that
she
had
sexual
relations
with
the
putative
father;
at
this
point,
the
burden
of
evidence
shifts
to
the
putative
father.
We
explained
further
that
the
two
affirmative
defenses
available
to
the
putative
father
are:
(1)
incapability
of
sexual
relations
with
the
mother
due
to
either
physical
absence
or
impotency,
or
(2)
that
the
mother
had
sexual
relations
with
other
men
at
the
time
of
conception.
In
this
case,
the
respondent
established
a
prima
facie
case
that
the
petitioner
is
the
putative
father
of
Gliffze
through
testimony
that
she
had
been
sexually
involved
only
with
one
man,
the
petitioner,
at
the
time
of
her
conception.
Rodulfo
corroborated
her
testimony
that
the
petitioner
and
the
respondent
had
intimate
relationship.”
x
x
x
20
“Since
filiation
is
beyond
question,
support
follows
as
a
matter
of
obligation;
a
parent
is
obliged
to
support
his
child,
whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate.
Support
consists
of
everything
indispensable
for
sustenance,
dwelling,
clothing,
medical
attendance,
education
and
transportation,
in
keeping
with
the
financial
capacity
of
the
family.
Thus,
the
amount
of
support
is
variable
and,
for
this
reason,
no
final
judgment
on
the
amount
of
support
is
made
as
the
amount
shall
be
in
proportion
to
the
resources
or
means
of
the
giver
and
the
necessities
of
the
recipient.
It
may
be
reduced
or
increased
proportionately
according
to
the
reduction
or
increase
of
the
necessities
of
the
recipient
and
the
resources
or
means
of
the
person
obliged
to
support.”
21
Charlie
Fortaleza
and
Ofelia
Fortaleza
vs.
Raul
Lapitan
and
Rona
Lapitan
G.R.
No.
178288
August
15,
2012
Ponente:
J.
Del
Castillo
Topic:
Family
Home
Facts:
Spouses
Fortaleza
obtained
a
loan
from
spouses
Lapitan.
As
security,
spouses
Fortaleza
executed
a
Deed
of
Real
Estate
Mortgage
over
their
residential
house
and
lot.
When
spouses
Fortaleza
failed
to
pay
the
indebtedness
including
the
interests
and
penalties,
the
creditors
applied
for
extrajudicial
foreclosure
of
the
Real
Estate
Mortgage.
At
the
sale,
the
creditors’
son
Dr.
Raul
Lapitan
and
his
wife
Rona
emerged
as
the
highest
bidders.
The
one-‐year
redemption
period
expired
without
the
spouses
Fortaleza
redeeming
the
mortgage.
Thus,
spouses
Lapitan
executed
an
affidavit
of
consolidation
of
ownership.
Despite
the
foregoing,
the
spouses
Fortaleza
refused
spouses
Lapitan’s
formal
demand
to
vacate
and
surrender
possession
of
the
subject
property.
Spouses
Fortaleza
argue
that
the
subject
property
is
exempt
from
forced
sale
because
it
is
a
family
home.
Issue:
Is
the
residential
house
of
the
Spouses
Fortaleza
which
was
made
subject
to
a
Real
Estate
Mortgage
exempt
from
execution
because
it
is
a
family
home?
Held:
No.
“As
a
rule,
the
family
home
is
exempt
from
execution,
forced
sale
or
attachment.
However,
Article
155(3)
of
the
Family
Code
explicitly
allows
the
forced
sale
of
a
family
home
"for
debts
secured
by
mortgages
on
the
premises
before
or
after
such
constitution."
In
this
case,
there
is
no
doubt
that
spouses
Fortaleza
voluntarily
executed
on
January
28,
1998
a
deed
of
Real
Estate
Mortgage
over
the
subject
property
which
was
even
notarized
by
their
original
counsel
of
record.
And
assuming
that
the
property
is
exempt
from
forced
sale,
spouses
Fortaleza
did
not
set
up
and
prove
to
the
Sheriff
such
exemption
from
forced
sale
before
it
was
sold
at
the
public
auction.
As
elucidated
in
Honrado
v.
Court
of
Appeals:
“While
it
is
true
that
the
family
home
is
constituted
on
a
house
and
lot
from
the
time
it
is
occupied
as
a
family
residence
and
is
exempt
from
execution
or
forced
sale
under
Article
153
of
the
Family
Code,
such
claim
for
exemption
should
be
set
up
and
proved
to
the
Sheriff
before
the
sale
of
the
property
at
public
auction.
Failure
to
do
so
would
estop
the
party
from
later
claiming
the
exemption.
“
As
this
Court
ruled
in
Gomez
v.
Gealone:
“Although
the
Rules
of
Court
does
not
prescribe
the
period
within
which
to
claim
the
exemption,
the
rule
is,
nevertheless,
well-‐settled
that
the
right
of
exemption
is
a
personal
privilege
granted
to
the
judgment
debtor
and
as
such,
it
must
be
claimed
not
by
the
sheriff,
but
by
the
debtor
himself
at
the
time
of
the
levy
or
within
a
reasonable
period
thereafter.
Certainly,
reasonable
time
for
purposes
of
the
law
on
exemption
does
not
mean
a
time
after
the
expiration
of
the
one-‐year
period
for
a
judgment
debtor
to
redeem
the
property.”
22
Brigido
B.
Quiao
vs.
Rita
C.
Quiao,
et.
al.
G.R.
No
176556
July
4,
2012
Ponente:
J.Reyes
Topic:
Conjugal
Partnership
of
Gains
Facts:
Rita
C.
Quiao
filed
a
complaint
for
legal
separation
against
Brigido
B.
Quiao.
The
RTC
rendered
a
Decision
declaring
the
legal
separation.
In
the
decision,
Brigido’s
share
of
the
net
profits
earned
by
the
conjugal
partnership
is
forfeited
in
favor
of
the
common
children
being
the
guilty
party.
Brigido
claimed
that
the
court
a
quo
is
wrong
when
it
applied
Article
129
of
the
Family
Code,
instead
of
Article
102.
He
argued
that
Article
102
applies
because
there
is
no
other
provision
under
the
Family
Code
which
defines
net
profits
earned
subject
of
forfeiture
as
a
result
of
legal
separation.
Issue:
Was
Brigido’s
vested
right
over
half
of
the
common
properties
of
the
conjugal
partnership
violated
when
the
trial
court
forfeited
them
in
favor
of
his
children
pursuant
to
Articles
63(2)
and
129
of
the
Family
Code?
Held:
No.
“Thus,
from
the
foregoing
facts
and
law,
it
is
clear
that
what
governs
the
property
relations
of
the
petitioner
and
of
the
respondent
is
conjugal
partnership
of
gains.
And
under
this
property
relation,
“the
husband
and
the
wife
place
in
a
common
fund
the
fruits
of
their
separate
property
and
the
income
from
their
work
or
industry.”
The
husband
and
wife
also
own
in
common
all
the
property
of
the
conjugal
partnership
of
gains.
Second,
since
at
the
time
of
the
dissolution
of
the
petitioner
and
the
respondent's
marriage
the
operative
law
is
already
the
Family
Code,
the
same
applies
in
the
instant
case
and
the
applicable
law
in
so
far
as
the
liquidation
of
the
conjugal
partnership
assets
and
liabilities
is
concerned
is
Article
129
of
the
Family
Code
in
relation
to
Article
63(2)
of
the
Family
Code.
The
latter
provision
is
applicable
because
according
to
Article
256
of
the
Family
Code
“[t]his
Code
shall
have
retroactive
effect
insofar
as
it
does
not
prejudice
or
impair
vested
or
acquired
rights
in
accordance
with
the
Civil
Code
or
other
law.”
x
x
x
“Indeed,
the
petitioner
claims
that
his
vested
rights
have
been
impaired,
arguing:
“As
earlier
adverted
to,
the
petitioner
acquired
vested
rights
over
half
of
the
conjugal
properties,
the
same
being
owned
in
common
by
the
spouses.
If
the
provisions
of
the
Family
Code
are
to
be
given
retroactive
application
to
the
point
of
authorizing
the
forfeiture
of
the
petitioner's
share
in
the
net
remainder
of
the
conjugal
partnership
properties,
the
same
impairs
his
rights
acquired
prior
to
the
effectivity
of
the
Family
Code.”
In
other
words,
the
petitioner
is
saying
that
since
the
property
relations
between
the
spouses
is
governed
by
the
regime
of
Conjugal
Partnership
of
Gains
under
the
Civil
Code,
the
petitioner
acquired
23
vested
rights
over
half
of
the
properties
of
the
Conjugal
Partnership
of
Gains,
pursuant
to
Article
143
of
the
Civil
Code,
which
provides:
“All
property
of
the
conjugal
partnership
of
gains
is
owned
in
common
by
the
husband
and
wife.”
Thus,
since
he
is
one
of
the
owners
of
the
properties
covered
by
the
conjugal
partnership
of
gains,
he
has
a
vested
right
over
half
of
the
said
properties,
even
after
the
promulgation
of
the
Family
Code;
and
he
insisted
that
no
provision
under
the
Family
Code
may
deprive
him
of
this
vested
right
by
virtue
of
Article
256
of
the
Family
Code
which
prohibits
retroactive
application
of
the
Family
Code
when
it
will
prejudice
a
person's
vested
right.”
x
x
x
“From
the
foregoing,
it
is
clear
that
while
one
may
not
be
deprived
of
his
“vested
right,”
he
may
lose
the
same
if
there
is
due
process
and
such
deprivation
is
founded
in
law
and
jurisprudence.”
x
x
x
“From
the
foregoing,
the
petitioner's
claim
of
a
vested
right
has
no
basis
considering
that
even
under
Article
176
of
the
Civil
Code,
his
share
of
the
conjugal
partnership
profits
may
be
forfeited
if
he
is
the
guilty
party
in
a
legal
separation
case.
Thus,
after
trial
and
after
the
petitioner
was
given
the
chance
to
present
his
evidence,
the
petitioner's
vested
right
claim
may
in
fact
be
set
aside
under
the
Civil
Code
since
the
trial
court
found
him
the
guilty
party.”
24
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Yolanda
Cadacio
Granada
G.
R.
No.
187512
June
13,
2012
Ponente:
J.
Sereno
Topic:
Declaration
of
Presumptive
Death
Facts:
Yolanda
Cadacio
Granada
married
Cyrus
Granada
and
their
marriage
resulted
in
the
birth
of
their
son,
Cyborg
Dean
Cadacio
Granada.
Sometime
in
May
1994,
when
Sumida
Electric
Philippines
closed
down,
Cyrus
went
to
Taiwan
to
seek
employment.
Yolanda
claimed
that
from
that
time,
she
had
not
received
any
communication
from
her
husband,
notwithstanding
efforts
to
locate
him.
After
nine
(9)
years
of
waiting,
Yolanda
filed
a
Petition
to
have
Cyrus
declared
presumptively
dead
which
was
granted.
The
Office
of
the
Solicitor
General
(OSG),
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration
of
this
Decision
arguing
that
Yolanda
had
failed
to
exert
earnest
efforts
to
locate
Cyrus
and
thus
failed
to
prove
her
well-‐founded
belief
that
he
was
already
dead.
However,
the
RTC
denied
the
motion.
The
OSG
filed
a
Notice
of
Appeal
to
elevate
the
case
to
the
CA.
Yolanda
filed
a
Motion
to
Dismiss
on
the
ground
that
the
CA
had
no
jurisdiction
over
the
appeal.
She
argued
that
her
Petition
for
Declaration
of
Presumptive
Death,
based
on
Article
41
of
the
Family
Code,
was
a
summary
judicial
proceeding,
in
which
the
judgment
is
immediately
final
and
executory
and,
thus,
not
appealable.
Issue:
1.
Is
a
petition
for
declaration
of
presumptive
death
of
an
absent
spouse
for
the
purpose
of
contracting
a
subsequent
marriage
a
summary
proceeding
and
therefore
not
subject
to
appeal?
2.
Did
Yolanda
fail
to
exert
earnest
efforts
to
locate
Cyrus
and
prove
her
well-‐founded
belief
that
Cyrus
was
already
dead?
Held:
Issue
1.
Yes.
“Clearly,
a
petition
for
declaration
of
presumptive
death
of
an
absent
spouse
for
the
purpose
of
contracting
a
subsequent
marriage
under
Article
41
of
the
Family
Code
is
a
summary
proceeding
“as
provided
for”
under
the
Family
Code.”
x
x
x
“Under
Article
41
of
the
Family
Code,
the
losing
party
in
a
summary
proceeding
for
the
declaration
of
presumptive
death
may
file
a
petition
for
certiorari
with
the
CA
on
the
ground
that,
in
rendering
judgment
thereon,
the
trial
court
committed
grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting
to
lack
of
jurisdiction.
From
the
decision
of
the
CA,
the
aggrieved
party
may
elevate
the
matter
to
this
Court
via
a
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
under
Rule
45
of
the
Rules
of
Court.”
Issue
2.
Yes.
However,
the
RTC
ruling
on
the
issue
of
whether
respondent
was
able
to
prove
her
“well-‐
founded
belief”
that
her
absent
spouse
was
already
dead
prior
to
her
filing
of
the
Petition
to
declare
him
presumptively
dead
is
already
final
and
can
no
longer
be
modified
or
reversed.
25
“Similarly,
in
Republic
v.
Court
of
Appeals
and
Alegro,
petitioner
Republic
sought
the
reversal
of
the
CA
ruling
affirming
the
RTC’s
grant
of
the
Petition
for
Declaration
of
Presumptive
Death
of
the
absent
spouse
on
the
ground
that
the
respondent
therein
had
not
been
able
to
prove
a
“well-‐founded
belief”
that
his
spouse
was
already
dead.
The
Court
reversed
the
CA,
granted
the
Petition,
and
provided
the
following
criteria
for
determining
the
existence
of
a
“well-‐founded
belief”
under
Article
41
of
the
Family
Code:
For
the
purpose
of
contracting
the
subsequent
marriage
under
the
preceding
paragraph,
the
spouse
present
must
institute
a
summary
proceeding
as
provided
in
this
Code
for
the
declaration
of
presumptive
death
of
the
absentee,
without
prejudice
to
the
effect
of
reappearance
of
the
absent
spouse.
The
spouse
present
is,
thus,
burdened
to
prove
that
his
spouse
has
been
absent
and
that
he
has
a
well-‐founded
belief
that
the
absent
spouse
is
already
dead
before
the
present
spouse
may
contract
a
subsequent
marriage.
The
law
does
not
define
what
is
meant
by
a
well-‐grounded
belief.
Cuello
Callon
writes
that
“es
menester
que
su
creencia
sea
firme
se
funde
en
motivos
racionales.”
Belief
is
a
state
of
the
mind
or
condition
prompting
the
doing
of
an
overt
act.
It
may
be
proved
by
direct
evidence
or
circumstantial
evidence
which
may
tend,
even
in
a
slight
degree,
to
elucidate
the
inquiry
or
assist
to
a
determination
probably
founded
in
truth.
Any
fact
or
circumstance
relating
to
the
character,
habits,
conditions,
attachments,
prosperity
and
objects
of
life
which
usually
control
the
conduct
of
men,
and
are
the
motives
of
their
actions,
was,
so
far
as
it
tends
to
explain
or
characterize
their
disappearance
or
throw
light
on
their
intentions,
competence
[sic]
evidence
on
the
ultimate
question
of
his
death.
The
belief
of
the
present
spouse
must
be
the
result
of
proper
and
honest
to
goodness
inquiries
and
efforts
to
ascertain
the
whereabouts
of
the
absent
spouse
and
whether
the
absent
spouse
is
still
alive
or
is
already
dead.
Whether
or
not
the
spouse
present
acted
on
a
well-‐founded
belief
of
death
of
the
absent
spouse
depends
upon
the
inquiries
to
be
drawn
from
a
great
many
circumstances
occurring
before
and
after
the
disappearance
of
the
absent
spouse
and
the
nature
and
extent
of
the
inquiries
made
by
present
spouse.
Applying
the
foregoing
standards
to
the
present
case,
petitioner
points
out
that
respondent
Yolanda
did
not
initiate
a
diligent
search
to
locate
her
absent
husband.
While
her
brother
Diosdado
Cadacio
testified
to
having
inquired
about
the
whereabouts
of
Cyrus
from
the
latter’s
relatives,
these
relatives
were
not
presented
to
corroborate
Diosdado’s
testimony.
In
short,
respondent
was
allegedly
not
diligent
in
her
search
for
her
husband.
Petitioner
argues
that
if
she
were,
she
would
have
sought
information
from
the
Taiwanese
Consular
Office
or
assistance
from
other
government
agencies
in
Taiwan
or
the
Philippines.
She
could
have
also
utilized
mass
media
for
this
end,
but
she
did
not.
Worse,
she
failed
to
explain
these
omissions.
26
Merope
Enriquez
Vda.
De
Catalan
vs.
Louella
A.
Catalan-‐Lee
G.
R.
No.
183622
February
8,
2012
Ponente:
J.
Sereno
Topic:
Nationality
Principle
Facts:
Orlando
B.
Catalan
was
a
naturalized
American
citizen.
After
allegedly
obtaining
a
divorce
in
the
United
States
from
his
first
wife,
Felicitas
Amor,
he
contracted
a
second
marriage
with
Merope.
Orlando
died
intestate
in
the
Philippines.
Merope
filed
with
the
RTC
Petition
for
the
issuance
of
letters
of
administration
for
her
appointment
as
administratrix
of
the
intestate
estate
of
Orlando.
Louella
A.
Catalan-‐Lee,
one
of
the
children
of
Orlando
from
his
first
marriage,
filed
a
similar
petition
with
the
RTC.
Merope
prayed
for
the
dismissal
of
Louella’s
petition
on
the
ground
of
litis
pendentia,
considering
that
her
petition
covering
the
same
estate
was
already
pending.
Louella
alleged
that
Merope
was
not
considered
an
interested
person
qualified
to
file
a
petition
for
the
issuance
of
letters
of
administration
of
the
estate
of
Orlando.
In
support
of
her
contention,
Louella
alleged
that
a
criminal
case
for
bigamy
was
filed
against
Merope
by
Felicitas
Amor
alleging
that
Merope
contracted
a
second
marriage
to
Orlando
despite
having
been
married
to
one
Eusebio
Bristol.
The
court
had
acquitted
petitioner
of
bigamy
in
that
case.
The
trial
court
also
ruled
then
that
since
the
deceased
was
a
divorced
American
citizen,
and
since
that
divorce
was
not
recognized
under
Philippine
jurisdiction,
the
marriage
between
him
and
petitioner
was
not
valid.
Finally,
the
trial
court
found
that,
in
the
first
place,
petitioner
had
never
been
married
to
Eusebio
Bristol.
The
RTC
dismissed
the
Petition
for
the
issuance
of
letters
of
administration
filed
by
Merope
and
granted
that
of
Louella.
Contrary
to
the
findings
in
the
case
for
bigamy,
the
RTC
held
that
the
marriage
between
Merope
and
Eusebio
Bristol
was
valid
and
subsisting
when
she
married
Orlando.
Without
expounding,
it
reasoned
further
that
her
acquittal
in
the
previous
bigamy
case
was
fatal
to
her
cause.
Thus,
the
trial
court
held
that
Merope
was
not
an
interested
party
who
may
file
a
petition
for
the
issuance
of
letters
of
administration.
Issue:
1.
Did
the
acquittal
of
Merope
from
the
bigamy
case
render
her
marriage
with
Orlando
as
valid?
2.
Can
the
divorce
of
Orlando
to
Felicitas
be
considered
valid?
Held:
Issue
1.
Yes.
“At
the
outset,
it
seems
that
the
RTC
in
the
special
proceedings
failed
to
appreciate
the
finding
of
the
RTC
in
Crim.
Case
No.
2699-‐A
that
petitioner
was
never
married
to
Eusebio
Bristol.
Thus,
the
trial
court
concluded
that,
because
petitioner
was
acquitted
of
bigamy,
it
follows
that
the
first
marriage
with
Bristol
still
existed
and
was
valid.
By
failing
to
take
note
of
the
findings
of
fact
on
the
nonexistence
of
the
marriage
between
petitioner
and
Bristol,
both
the
RTC
and
CA
held
that
petitioner
was
not
an
interested
party
in
the
estate
of
Orlando.”
Issue
2.
Yes.
“Second,
it
is
imperative
to
note
that
at
the
time
the
bigamy
case
in
Crim.
Case
No.
2699-‐A
was
dismissed,
we
had
already
ruled
that
under
the
principles
of
comity,
our
jurisdiction
recognizes
a
valid
divorce
obtained
by
a
spouse
of
foreign
nationality.
This
doctrine
was
established
as
early
as
1985
in
Van
Dorn
v.
Romillo,
Jr.
wherein
we
said:
27
It
is
true
that
owing
to
the
nationality
principle
embodied
in
Article
15
of
the
Civil
Code,
only
Philippine
nationals
are
covered
by
the
policy
against
absolute
divorces[,]
the
same
being
considered
contrary
to
our
concept
of
public
policy
and
morality.
However,
aliens
may
obtain
divorces
abroad,
which
may
be
recognized
in
the
Philippines,
provided
they
are
valid
according
to
their
national
law.
In
this
case,
the
divorce
in
Nevada
released
private
respondent
from
the
marriage
from
the
standards
of
American
law,
under
which
divorce
dissolves
the
marriage.
Xxx”
x
x
x
“Nonetheless,
the
fact
of
divorce
must
still
first
be
proven
as
we
have
enunciated
in
Garcia
v.
Recio,[9]
to
wit:
Respondent
is
getting
ahead
of
himself.
Before
a
foreign
judgment
is
given
presumptive
evidentiary
value,
the
document
must
first
be
presented
and
admitted
in
evidence.
A
divorce
obtained
abroad
is
proven
by
the
divorce
decree
itself.
Indeed
the
best
evidence
of
a
judgment
is
the
judgment
itself.
The
decree
purports
to
be
a
written
act
or
record
of
an
act
of
an
official
body
or
tribunal
of
a
foreign
country.”
x
x
x
“It
appears
that
the
trial
court
no
longer
required
petitioner
to
prove
the
validity
of
Orlando’s
divorce
under
the
laws
of
the
United
States
and
the
marriage
between
petitioner
and
the
deceased.
Thus,
there
is
a
need
to
remand
the
proceedings
to
the
trial
court
for
further
reception
of
evidence
to
establish
the
fact
of
divorce.
Should
petitioner
prove
the
validity
of
the
divorce
and
the
subsequent
marriage,
she
has
the
preferential
right
to
be
issued
the
letters
of
administration
over
the
estate.
Otherwise,
letters
of
administration
may
be
issued
to
respondent,
who
is
undisputedly
the
daughter
or
next
of
kin
of
the
deceased,
in
accordance
with
Sec.
6
of
Rule
78
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court.”
28
Antonia
R.
Dela
Peña
et.
al.
vs.
Gemma
Remilyn
Avila
and
FEBTC-‐BPI
G.R.
No.
187490
February
8,
2012
Ponente:
J.
Perez
Topic:
Conjugal
Partnership
of
Gains
Facts:
Antonia
R.
Dela
Peña
obtained
from
A.C.
Aguila
&
Sons,
Co.
a
loan.
Antonia
also
executed
in
favor
of
Aguila
a
notarized
Deed
of
Real
Estate
Mortgage
over
a
property
registered
in
the
name
of
Antonia,
“married
to
Antegono
A.
Dela
Peña”,
for
the
purpose
of
securing
the
payment
of
said
loan
obligation.
Antonia
then
executed
a
notarized
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
over
the
property
in
favor
of
Gemma
Remilyn
C.
Avila.
Gemma
also
constituted
a
real
estate
mortgage
over
said
parcel
in
favor
of
Far
East
Bank
and
Trust
Company
(FEBTC-‐BPI),
to
secure
a
loan
facility.
Antonia
filed
with
the
Register
of
Deeds
of
Marikina
an
Affidavit
of
Adverse
Claim
to
the
effect,
among
others,
that
she
was
the
true
and
lawful
owner
of
the
property
which
had
been
titled
in
the
name
of
Gemma
and,
that
the
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
Gemma
utilized
in
procuring
her
title
was
simulated.
In
view
of
Gemma’s
failure
to
pay
the
principal
as
well
as
the
accumulated
interest
and
penalties
on
the
loans
she
obtained,
on
the
other
hand,
FEBTC-‐BPI
caused
the
extrajudicial
foreclosure
of
the
real
estate
mortgage
constituted
over
the
property.
Antonia
and
her
son,
Alvin,
filed
against
Gemma
the
complaint
for
annulment
of
deed
of
sale.
Claiming
that
the
subject
realty
was
conjugal
property,
the
Dela
Peñas
alleged,
among
other
matters,
that
the
Deed
of
Real
Estate
Mortgage
Antonia
executed
in
favor
of
Aguila
was
not
consented
to
by
Antegono
who
had,
by
then,
already
died
and
that
no
liquidation
was
done
as
required
under
Article
130
of
the
Family
Code.
Issue:
Was
the
property
conjugal
in
nature
and
therefore
leading
to
the
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
executed
by
Antonia
in
favor
of
Gemma
being
void
as
a
disposition
without
the
liquidation
required
under
Article
130
of
the
Family
Code?
Held:
No.
“Pursuant
to
Article
160
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines,
all
property
of
the
marriage
is
presumed
to
belong
to
the
conjugal
partnership,
unless
it
be
proved
that
it
pertains
exclusively
to
the
husband
or
to
the
wife.
Although
it
is
not
necessary
to
prove
that
the
property
was
acquired
with
funds
of
the
partnership,
proof
of
acquisition
during
the
marriage
is
an
essential
condition
for
the
operation
of
the
presumption
in
favor
of
the
conjugal
partnership.”
x
x
x
“As
the
parties
invoking
the
presumption
of
conjugality
under
Article
160
of
the
Civil
Code,
the
Dela
Peñas
did
not
even
come
close
to
proving
that
the
subject
property
was
acquired
during
the
marriage
between
Antonia
and
Antegono.
Beyond
Antonia’s
bare
and
uncorroborated
assertion
that
the
property
was
purchased
when
she
was
already
married,
the
record
is
bereft
of
any
evidence
from
which
29
the
actual
date
of
acquisition
of
the
realty
can
be
ascertained.
When
queried
about
the
matter
during
his
cross-‐examination,
even
Alvin
admitted
that
his
sole
basis
for
saying
that
the
property
was
owned
by
his
parents
was
Antonia’s
unilateral
pronouncement
to
the
effect.
Considering
that
the
presumption
of
conjugality
does
not
operate
if
there
is
no
showing
of
when
the
property
alleged
to
be
conjugal
was
acquired,
we
find
that
the
CA
cannot
be
faulted
for
ruling
that
the
realty
in
litigation
was
Antonia’s
exclusive
property.
Not
having
established
the
time
of
acquisition
of
the
property,
the
Dela
Peñas
insist
that
the
registration
thereof
in
the
name
of
“Antonia
R.
Dela
Peña,
of
legal
age,
Filipino,
married
to
Antegono
A.
Dela
Peña”
should
have
already
sufficiently
established
its
conjugal
nature.
Confronted
with
the
same
issue
in
the
case
Ruiz
vs.
Court
of
Appeals,
this
Court
ruled,
however,
that
the
phrase
“married
to”
is
merely
descriptive
of
the
civil
status
of
the
wife
and
cannot
be
interpreted
to
mean
that
the
husband
is
also
a
registered
owner.
Because
it
is
likewise
possible
that
the
property
was
acquired
by
the
wife
while
she
was
still
single
and
registered
only
after
her
marriage,
neither
would
registration
thereof
in
said
manner
constitute
proof
that
the
same
was
acquired
during
the
marriage
and,
for
said
reason,
to
be
presumed
conjugal
in
nature.
“Since
there
is
no
showing
as
to
when
the
property
in
question
was
acquired,
the
fact
that
the
title
is
in
the
name
of
the
wife
alone
is
determinative
of
its
nature
as
paraphernal,
i.e.,
belonging
exclusively
to
said
spouse.”
30
Bobby
Tan
vs.
Grace
Andrade,
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
171904
and
172017
August
7,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Perlas-‐Bernabe
Topic:
Conjugal
Partnership
of
Gains
Facts:
Rosario
Vda.
De
Andrade
was
the
registered
owner
of
four
parcels
of
land,
which
she
mortgaged
to
and
subsequently
foreclosed
by
one
Simon
Diu.
When
the
redemption
period
was
about
to
expire,
Rosario
sought
the
assistance
of
Bobby
Tan
who
agreed
to
redeem
the
subject
properties.
Rosario
sold
the
lands
to
Bobby
and
her
son,
Proceso
Andrade,
Jr.
which
was
evidenced
by
a
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale.
Proceso,
Jr.
executed
a
Deed
of
Assignment,
ceding
unto
Bobby
his
rights
and
interests
over
the
subject
properties
in
consideration
of
P50,000.00.
The
Deed
of
Assignment
was
signed
by
one
of
Rosario’s
sons,
Henry,
as
instrumental
witness.
In
the
Deed
of
Sale,
Bobby
extended
an
Option
to
Buy
the
subject
properties
in
favor
of
Proceso,
Jr.,
giving
the
latter
until
7:00
pm
to
purchase
the
same.
Which
he
failed
to
do
so,
hence,
Bobby
consolidated
his
ownership
over
the
subject
properties.
Rosario’s
children,
namely,
Grace,
Proceso,
Jr.,
Henry,
Andrew,
Glory,
Miriam
Rose,
Joseph,
Jasmin
Blaza,
and
Charity
A.
Santiago,
filed
a
complaint
for
reconveyance
and
annulment
of
deeds
of
conveyance
and
damages
against
Bobby
and
alleged
that
the
transaction
between
Rosario
and
Bobby
was
not
one
of
sale
but
was
actually
an
equitable
mortgage
which
was
entered
into
to
secure
Rosario’s
indebtedness
with
Bobby.
They
also
claimed
that
Rosario
had
no
right
to
dispose
of
their
respective
shares
because
the
subject
properties
were
inherited
by
them
from
their
father,
Proceso
Andrade,
Sr.,
the
subject
properties
were
conjugal
in
nature.
In
t his
light,
they
argued
that
they
remained
as
co-‐owners
of
the
subject
properties
together
with
Bobby,
despite
the
issuance
of
the
TCTs
in
his
name.
Issue:
Are
the
subject
properties
are
conjugal
in
nature?
Held:
Yes.
“Pertinent
to
the
resolution
of
this
second
issue
is
Article
160
of
the
Civil
Code which
states
that
“All
property
of
the
marriage
is
presumed
to
belong
to
the
conjugal
partnership,
unless
it
be
proved
that
it
pertains
exclusively
to
the
husband
or
to
the
wife.”
For
this
presumption
to
apply,
the
party
invoking
the
same
must,
however,
preliminarily
prove
that
the
property
was
indeed
acquired
during
the
marriage.
“
x
x
x
“In
this
case,
records
reveal
that
the
conjugal
partnership
of
Rosario
and
her
husband
was
terminated
upon
the
latter’s
death
on
August
7,
1978 while
the
transfer
certificates
of
title
over
the
subject
properties
were
issued
on
September
28,
1979
and
solely
in
the
name
of
“Rosario
Vda.
de
Andrade,
of
legal
age,
widow,
Filipino.” Other
than
their
bare
allegation,
no
evidence
was
adduced
by
the
Andrades
to
establish
that
the
subject
properties
were
procured
during
the
31
coverture
of
their
parents
or
that
the
same
were
bought
with
conjugal
funds.
Moreover,
Rosario’s
declaration
that
she
is
the
absolute
owner
of
the
disputed
parcels
of
land
in
the
subject
deed
of
sale
was
not
disputed
by
her
son
Proceso,
Jr.,
who
was
a
party
to
the
same.
Hence,
by
virtue
of
these
incidents,
the
Court
upholds
the
RTC’s
finding
that
the
subject
properties
were
exclusive
or
sole
properties
of
Rosario.”
32
Minoru
Fujiki
vs.
Maria
Paz
Galela
Marinay,
Shinichi
Maekara
G.R.
No.
196049
June
26,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Sereno
Topic:
Declaration
for
Nullity
of
Marriage
Facts:
Minoru
Fujiki
is
a
Japanese
national
who
married
Maria
Paz
Galela
Marinay
in
the
Philippines.
Fujiki’s
parents
are
against
the
said
marriage.
Thus,
he
could
not
bring
his
wife
to
Japan
where
he
resides.
Marinay
met
another
Japanese,
Shinichi
Maekara.
Without
the
first
marriage
being
dissolved,
Marinay
and
Maekara
were
married
in
the
Philippines.
Maekara
brought
Marinay
to
Japan.
However,
Marinay
allegedly
suffered
physical
abuse
from
Maekara.
She
left
Maekara
and
started
to
contact
Fujiki.
Fujiki
and
Marinay
met
in
Japan
and
they
were
able
to
reestablish
their
relationship.
Fujiki
helped
Marinay
obtain
a
judgment
from
a
family
court
in
Japan
which
declared
the
marriage
between
Marinay
and
Maekara
void
on
the
ground
of
bigamy.
Fujiki
filed
a
petition
for
Judicial
Recognition
of
Foreign
Judgment
with
RTC.
Fujiki
prayed
that
the
judgment
of
the
Japanese
Family
Court
be
recognized
and
that
the
bigamous
marriage
between
Marinay
and
Maekara
be
declared
void
ab
initio
under
Articles
35(4)
and
41
of
the
Family
Code
of
the
Philippines.
RTC
dismissed
the
Petition
and
took
the
view
that
only
“the
husband
or
the
wife,”
in
this
case
either
Maekara
or
Marinay,
can
file
the
petition
to
declare
their
marriage
void,
and
not
Fujiki.
Issue:
Does
Fujiki
has
the
personality
to
declare
his
wife’s
subsequent
marriage
void?
Held:
Fujiki
has
the
personality
to
file
a
petition
to
recognize
the
Japanese
Family
Court
judgment
nullifying
the
marriage
between
Marinay
and
Maekara
on
the
ground
of
bigamy
because
the
judgment
concerns
his
civil
status
as
married
to
Marinay.
For
the
same
reason
he
has
the
personality
to
file
a
petition
under
Rule
108
to
cancel
the
entry
of
marriage
between
Marinay
and
Maekara
in
the
civil
registry
on
the
basis
of
the
decree
of
the
Japanese
Family
Court.
There
is
no
doubt
that
the
prior
spouse
has
a
personal
and
material
interest
in
maintaining
the
integrity
of
the
marriage
he
contracted
and
the
property
relations
arising
from
it.
There
is
also
no
doubt
that
he
is
interested
in
the
cancellation
of
an
entry
of
a
bigamous
marriage
in
the
civil
registry,
which
compromises
the
public
record
of
his
marriage.
The
interest
derives
from
the
substantive
right
of
the
spouse
not
only
to
preserve
(or
dissolve,
in
limited
instances)
his
most
intimate
human
relation,
but
also
to
protect
his
property
interests
that
arise
by
operation
of
law
the
moment
he
contracts
marriage.
These
property
interests
in
marriage
include
the
right
to
be
supported
“in
keeping
with
the
financial
capacity
of
the
family” and
preserving
the
property
regime
of
the
marriage
Property
rights
are
already
substantive
rights
protected
by
the
Constitution, but
a
spouse’s
right
in
a
marriage
extends
further
to
relational
rights
recognized
under
Title
III
(“Rights
and
Obligations
between
33
Husband
and
Wife”)
of
the
Family
Code. A.M.
No.
02-‐11-‐10-‐SC
cannot
“diminish,
increase,
or
modify”
the
substantive
right
of
the
spouse
to
maintain
the
integrity
of
his
marriage. In
any
case,
Section
2(a)
of
A.M.
No.
02-‐11-‐10-‐SC
preserves
this
substantive
right
by
limiting
the
personality
to
sue
to
the
husband
or
the
wife
of
the
union
recognized
by
law.
Section
2(a)
of
A.M.
No.
02-‐11-‐10-‐SC
does
not
preclude
a
spouse
of
a
subsisting
marriage
to
question
the
validity
of
a
subsequent
marriage
on
the
ground
of
bigamy.
On
the
contrary,
when
Section
2(a)
states
that
“[a]
petition
for
declaration
of
absolute
nullity
of
void
marriage
may
be
filed
solely
by
the
husband
or
the
wife”―it
refers
to
the
husband
or
the
wife
of
the
subsisting
marriage.
Under
Article
35(4)
of
the
Family
Code,
bigamous
marriages
are
void
from
the
beginning.
Thus,
the
parties
in
a
bigamous
marriage
are
neither
the
husband
nor
the
wife
under
the
law.
The
husband
or
the
wife
of
the
prior
subsisting
marriage
is
the
one
who
has
the
personality
to
file
a
petition
for
declaration
of
absolute
nullity
of
void
marriage
under
Section
2(a)
of
A.M.
No.
02-‐11-‐10-‐SC.”
x
x
x
When
the
right
of
the
spouse
to
protect
his
marriage
is
violated,
the
spouse
is
clearly
an
injured
party
and
is
therefore
interested
in
the
judgment
of
the
suit.
Juliano-‐Llave
ruled
that
the
prior
spouse
“is
clearly
the
aggrieved
party
as
the
bigamous
marriage
not
only
threatens
the
financial
and
the
property
ownership
aspect
of
the
prior
marriage
but
most
of
all,
it
causes
an
emotional
burden
to
the
prior
spouse.” Being
a
real
party
in
interest,
the
prior
spouse
is
entitled
to
sue
in
order
to
declare
a
bigamous
marriage
void.
For
this
purpose,
he
can
petition
a
court
to
recognize
a
foreign
judgment
nullifying
the
bigamous
marriage
and
judicially
declare
as
a
fact
that
such
judgment
is
effective
in
the
Philippines.
Once
established,
there
should
be
no
more
impediment
to
cancel
the
entry
of
the
bigamous
marriage
in
the
civil
registry.
34
California
Clothing,
Inc.
and
Michelle
Ybañez
vs.
Shirley
Quiñones
G.R.
No.175822
October
23,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Peralta
Topic:
Exercise
of
Rights
Facts:
Shirley
G.
Quiñones
is
a
Reservation
Ticketing
Agent
of
Cebu
Pacific
Air
in
Lapu
Lapu
City,
went
inside
the
Guess
Boutique
at
the
second
floor
of
Robinson’s
Department
Store
in
Cebu
City.
She
decided
to
purchase
the
black
jeans.
Respondent
allegedly
paid
to
the
cashier
evidenced
by
a
receipt
issued
by
the
store.
While
she
was
walking
to
her
next
destination,
an
employee
from
the
Guess
store
approached
and
informed
her
that
she
failed
to
pay
the
item
she
got.
She,
however,
insisted
that
she
paid
and
showed
the
receipt
issued.
She
then
suggested
that
they
talk
about
it
at
the
Cebu
Pacific
Office
located
at
the
basement
of
the
mall.
When
she
arrived
at
the
Cebu
Pacific
Office,
the
Guess
employees
allegedly
subjected
her
to
humiliation
in
front
of
the
clients
of
Cebu
Pacific
and
repeatedly
demanded
payment
for
the
black
jeans.
They
supposedly
even
searched
her
wallet
to
check
how
much
money
she
had,
followed
by
another
argument.
On
the
same
day,
the
Guess
employees
allegedly
gave
a
letter
to
the
Director
of
Cebu
Pacific
Air
narrating
the
incident,
but
the
latter
refused
to
receive
it
as
it
did
not
concern
the
office.
Another
letter
was
allegedly
prepared
and
was
supposed
to
be
sent
to
the
Cebu
Pacific
Office
in
Robinson’s,
but
the
latter
again
refused
to
receive
it.
Respondent
also
claimed
that
the
Human
Resource
Department
of
Robinson’s
was
furnished
said
letter
and
the
latter
in
fact
conducted
an
investigation
for
purposes
of
canceling
respondent’s
Robinson’s
credit
card.
She
thus
filed
the
Complaint
for
Damages
before
the
RTC
against
petitioners
California
Clothing,
Inc.,
Villagonzalo,
Hawayon
and
Ybañez.
Petitioners
and
the
other
defendants
admitted
the
issuance
of
the
receipt
of
payment.
They
claimed,
however,
that
instead
of
the
cashier
(Hawayon)
issuing
the
official
receipt,
it
was
the
invoicer
(Villagonzalo)
who
did
it
manually.
They
explained
that
there
was
miscommunication
between
the
employees
at
that
time
because
prior
to
the
issuance
of
the
receipt.
Realizing
the
mistake,
Villagonzalo
rushed
outside
to
look
for
respondent
and
when
he
saw
the
latter,
he
invited
her
to
go
back
to
the
shop
to
make
clarifications
as
to
whether
or
not
payment
was
indeed
made.
Instead,
however,
of
going
back
to
the
shop,
respondent
suggested
that
they
meet
at
the
Cebu
Pacific
Office.
Villagonzalo,
Hawayon
and
Ybañez
thus
went
to
the
agreed
venue
where
they
talked
to
respondent.
They
pointed
out
that
it
appeared
in
their
conversation
that
respondent
could
not
recall
whom
she
gave
the
payment.
They
emphasized
that
they
were
gentle
and
polite
in
talking
to
respondent
and
it
was
the
latter
who
was
arrogant
in
answering
their
questions.
Issue:
Did
California
Clothing,
Inc.
and
Michelle
Ybañez
abuse
their
rights
by
subjecting
Shirley
Quiñones
to
ridicule
and
humiliation
by
their
act
of
questioning
and
the
sending
of
the
letter
to
the
Cebu
Pacific
Office?
Held:
Yes.
35
“In
this
case,
petitioners
claimed
that
there
was
a
miscommunication
between
the
cashier
and
the
invoicer
leading
to
the
erroneous
issuance
of
the
receipt
to
respondent.
When
they
realized
the
mistake,
they
made
a
cash
count
and
discovered
that
the
amount
which
is
equivalent
to
the
price
of
the
black
jeans
was
missing.
They,
thus,
concluded
that
it
was
respondent
who
failed
to
make
such
payment.
It
was,
therefore,
within
their
right
to
verify
from
respondent
whether
she
indeed
paid
or
not
and
collect
from
her
if
she
did
not.
However,
the
question
now
is
whether
such
right
was
exercised
in
good
faith
or
they
went
overboard
giving
respondent
a
cause
of
action
against
them.
Under
the
abuse
of
rights
principle
found
in
Article
19
of
the
Civil
Code,
a
person
must,
in
the
exercise
of
legal
right
or
duty,
act
in
good
faith.
He
would
be
liable
if
he
instead
acted
in
bad
faith,
with
intent
to
prejudice
another.
Good
faith
refers
to
the
state
of
mind
which
is
manifested
by
the
acts
of
the
individual
concerned.
It
consists
of
the
intention
to
abstain
from
taking
an
unconscionable
and
unscrupulous
advantage
of
another.
Malice
or
bad
faith,
on
the
other
hand,
implies
a
conscious
and
intentional
design
to
do
a
wrongful
act
for
a
dishonest
purpose
or
moral
obliquity.
Initially,
there
was
nothing
wrong
with
petitioners
asking
respondent
whether
she
paid
or
not.
The
Guess
employees
were
able
to
talk
to
respondent
at
the
Cebu
Pacific
Office.
The
confrontation
started
well,
but
it
eventually
turned
sour
when
voices
were
raised
by
both
parties.
As
aptly
held
by
both
the
RTC
and
the
CA,
such
was
the
natural
consequence
of
two
parties
with
conflicting
views
insisting
on
their
respective
beliefs.
Considering,
however,
that
respondent
was
in
possession
of
the
item
purchased
from
the
shop,
together
with
the
official
receipt
of
payment
issued
by
petitioners,
the
latter
cannot
insist
that
no
such
payment
was
made
on
the
basis
of
a
mere
speculation.
Their
claim
should
have
been
proven
by
substantial
evidence
in
the
proper
forum.
x
x
x
It
can
be
inferred
from
the
foregoing
that
in
sending
the
demand
letter
to
respondent’s
employer,
petitioners
intended
not
only
to
ask
for
assistance
in
collecting
the
disputed
amount
but
to
tarnish
respondent’s
reputation
in
the
eyes
of
her
employer.
To
malign
respondent
without
substantial
evidence
and
despite
the
latter’s
possession
of
enough
evidence
in
her
favor,
is
clearly
impermissible.
A
person
should
not
use
his
right
unjustly
or
contrary
to
honesty
and
good
faith,
otherwise,
he
opens
himself
to
liability.
The
exercise
of
a
right
must
be
in
accordance
with
the
purpose
for
which
it
was
established
and
must
not
be
excessive
or
unduly
harsh.
In
this
case,
petitioners
obviously
abused
their
rights.
36
Edilberto
U.
Ventura
Jr.
vs.
Spouses
Paulino
and
Evangeline
Abuda
G.R.
No.
202932
October
23,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Carpio
Topic:
Conjugal
Partnership
of
Gains
Facts:
Socorro
Torres
and
Esteban
Abletes
were
married.
They
never
had
common
children
but
both
of
them
had
children
from
prior
marriages.
Esteban
had
a
daughter
named
Evangeline
Abuda
and
Socorro
had
a
son,
who
was
the
father
of
Edilberto
U.
Ventura,
Jr.,
the
petitioner.
Socorro
had
a
prior
subsisting
marriage
to
Crispin
Roxas
when
she
married
Esteban.
This
marriage
was
not
annulled,
and
Crispin
was
alive
at
the
time
of
Socorro’s
marriage
to
Esteban.
According
to
Edilberto,
sometime
in
1968,
Esteban
purchased
a
portion
of
a
lot
situated
at
2492
State
Alley,
Bonifacio
Street,
Vitas,
Tondo,
Manila
(Vitas
Property).
The
remaining
portion
was
thereafter
purchased
by
Evangeline
on
her
father’s
behalf
.
The
Vitas
property
was
covered
by
Transfer
Certificate
of
Title
No.
141782,
issued
to
“Esteban
Abletes,
of
legal
age,
Filipino,
married
to
Socorro
Torres.”
According
to
Edilberto,
when
Esteban
was
diagnosed
with
colon
cancer,
he
decided
to
sell
the
Delpan
and
Vitas
properties
to
Evangeline.
Evangeline
continued
paying
the
amortizations
on
the
two
(2)
properties
situated
in
Delpan
Street.
Issue:
Are
the
Vitas
and
Delpan
property
presumed
to
be
co-‐owned
by
Socorro
and
Esteban?
Held:
No.
Edilberto
admitted
that
in
unions
between
a
man
and
a
woman
who
are
incapacitated
to
marry
each
other,
the
ownership
over
the
properties
acquired
during
the
subsistence
of
that
relationship
shall
be
based
on
the
actual
contribution
of
the
parties.
Applying
the
foregoing
provision,
the
Vitas
and
Delpan
properties
can
be
considered
common
property
if:
(1)
these
were
acquired
during
the
cohabitation
of
Esteban
and
Socorro;
and
(2)
there
is
evidence
that
the
properties
were
acquired
through
the
parties’
actual
joint
contribution
of
money,
property,
or
industry.
The
title
itself
shows
that
the
Vitas
property
is
owned
by
Esteban
alone.
The
phrase
“married
to
Socorro
Torres”
is
merely
descriptive
of
his
civil
status,
and
does
not
show
that
Socorro
co-‐owned
the
property.
The
evidence
on
record
also
shows
that
Esteban
acquired
ownership
over
the
Vitas
property
prior
to
his
marriage
to
Socorro,
even
if
the
certificate
of
title
was
issued
after
the
celebration
of
the
marriage.
Registration
under
the
Torrens
title
system
merely
confirms,
and
does
not
vest
title.
Edilberto
claims
that
Esteban's
actual
contribution
to
the
purchase
of
the
Delpan
property
was
not
sufficiently
proven
since
Evangeline
shouldered
some
of
the
amortizations.
Thus,
the
law
presumes
that
Esteban
and
Socorro
jointly
contributed
to
the
acquisition
of
the
Del
pan
property.
37
Thus,
it
is
clear
that
Evangeline
paid
on
behalf
of
her
father,
and
the
parties
intended
that
the
Delpan
property
would
be
owned
by
and
registered
under
the
name
of
Esteban.
38
The
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Liberty
D.
Albios
G.R.
No.
198780
October
16,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Mendoza
Topic:
Declaration
for
Nullity
of
Marriage
Facts:
Fringer
is
an
American
citizen
was
married
to
Albios.
Albios
filed
with
the
RTC
a
Petition
for
Declaration
of
Nullity
of
Marriage.
She
alleged
that
immediately
after
their
marriage,
they
separated
and
never
lived
as
husband
and
wife
because
they
never
really
had
any
intention
of
entering
into
a
married
state
or
complying
with
any
of
their
essential
marital
obligations.
She
described
their
marriage
as
one
made
in
jest
and,
therefore,
null
and
void
ab
initio.
The
RTC
declared
the
marriage
void
ab
initio,
declaring
the
marriage
of
Liberty
Albios
and
Daniel
Lee
Fringer
as
void
from
the
very
beginning.
The
RTC
was
of
the
view
that
the
parties
married
each
other
for
convenience
only.
Giving
credence
to
the
testimony
of
Albios,
it
stated
that
she
contracted
Fringer
to
enter
into
a
marriage
to
enable
her
to
acquire
American
citizenship;
that
in
consideration
thereof,
she
agreed
to
pay
him
the
sum
of
$2,000.00;
that
after
the
ceremony,
the
parties
went
their
separate
ways;
that
Fringer
returned
to
the
United
States
and
never
again
communicated
with
her;
and
that,
in
turn,
she
did
not
pay
him
the
$2,000.00
because
he
never
processed
her
petition
for
citizenship.
The
RTC,
thus,
ruled
that
when
marriage
was
entered
into
for
a
purpose
other
than
the
establishment
of
a
conjugal
and
family
life,
such
was
a
farce
and
should
not
be
recognized
from
its
inception.
The
CA
affirmed
the
RTC
ruling
which
found
that
the
essential
requisite
of
consent
was
lacking.
Issue:
Is
a
marriage
contracted
for
the
sole
purpose
of
acquiring
American
citizenship
in
consideration
of
$2,000.00
void
ab
initio
on
the
ground
of
lack
of
consent?
Held:
No.
Under
said
Article
2,
for
consent
to
be
valid,
it
must
be
(1)
freely
given
and
(2)
made
in
the
presence
of
a
solemnizing
officer.
A
“freely
given”
consent
requires
that
the
contracting
parties
willingly
and
deliberately
enter
into
the
marriage.
Consent
must
be
real
in
the
sense
that
it
is
not
vitiated
nor
rendered
defective
by
any
of
the
vices
of
consent
under
Articles
45
and
46
of
the
Family
Code,
such
as
fraud,
force,
intimidation,
and
undue
influence.
Consent
must
also
be
conscious
or
intelligent,
in
that
the
parties
must
be
capable
of
intelligently
understanding
the
nature
of,
and
both
the
beneficial
or
unfavorable
consequences
of
their
act.
Their
understanding
should
not
be
affected
by
insanity,
intoxication,drugs,
or
hypnotism.
Based
on
the
above,
consent
was
not
lacking
between
Albios
and
Fringer.
In
fact,
there
was
real
consent
because
it
was
not
vitiated
nor
rendered
defective
by
any
vice
of
consent.
Their
consent
was
also
conscious
and
intelligent
as
they
understood
the
nature
and
the
beneficial
and
inconvenient
consequences
of
their
marriage,
as
nothing
impaired
their
ability
to
do
so.
That
their
consent
was
freely
given
is
best
evidenced
by
their
conscious
purpose
of
acquiring
American
citizenship
through
marriage.
39
Such
plainly
demonstrates
that
they
willingly
and
deliberately
contracted
the
marriage.
There
was
a
clear
intention
to
enter
into
a
real
and
valid
marriage
so
as
to
fully
comply
with
the
requirements
of
an
application
for
citizenship.
There
was
a
full
and
complete
understanding
of
the
legal
tie
that
would
be
created
between
them,
since
it
was
that
precise
legal
tie
which
was
necessary
to
accomplish
their
goal.
In
ruling
that
Albios’
marriage
was
void
for
lack
of
consent,
the
CA
characterized
such
as
akin
to
a
marriage
by
way
of
jest.
A
marriage
in
jest
is
a
pretended
marriage,
legal
in
form
but
entered
into
as
a
joke,
with
no
real
intention
of
entering
into
the
actual
marriage
status,
and
with
a
clear
understanding
that
the
parties
would
not
be
bound.
The
ceremony
is
not
followed
by
any
conduct
indicating
a
purpose
to
enter
into
such
a
relation.
It
is
a
pretended
marriage
not
intended
to
be
real
and
with
no
intention
to
create
any
legal
ties
whatsoever,
hence,
the
absence
of
any
genuine
consent.
Marriages
in
jest
are
void
ab
initio,
not
for
vitiated,
defective,
or
unintelligent
consent,
but
for
a
complete
absence
of
consent.
There
is
no
genuine
consent
because
the
parties
have
absolutely
no
intention
of
being
bound
in
any
way
or
for
any
purpose.
The
respondent’s
marriage
is
not
at
all
analogous
to
a
marriage
in
jest.
Albios
and
Fringer
had
an
undeniable
intention
to
be
bound
in
order
to
create
the
very
bond
necessary
to
allow
the
respondent
to
acquire
American
citizenship.
Only
a
genuine
consent
to
be
married
would
allow
them
to
further
their
objective,
considering
that
only
a
valid
marriage
can
properly
support
an
application
for
citizenship.
There
was,
thus,
an
apparent
intention
to
enter
into
the
actual
marriage
status
and
to
create
a
legal
tie,
albeit
for
a
limited
purpose.
Genuine
consent
was,
therefore,
clearly
present.
The
avowed
purpose
of
marriage
under
Article
1
of
the
Family
Code
is
for
the
couple
to
establish
a
conjugal
and
family
life.
The
possibility
that
the
parties
in
a
marriage
might
have
no
real
intention
to
establish
a
life
together
is,
however,
insufficient
to
nullify
a
marriage
freely
entered
into
in
accordance
with
law.
The
same
Article
1
provides
that
the
nature,
consequences,
and
incidents
of
marriage
are
governed
by
law
and
not
subject
to
stipulation.
A
marriage
may,
thus,
only
be
declared
void
or
voidable
under
the
grounds
provided
by
law.
There
is
no
law
that
declares
a
marriage
void
if
it
is
entered
into
for
purposes
other
than
what
the
Constitution
or
law
declares,
such
as
the
acquisition
of
foreign
citizenship.
Therefore,
so
long
as
all
the
essential
and
formal
requisites
precribed
by
law
are
present,
and
it
is
not
void
or
voidable
under
the
grounds
provided
by
law,
it
shall
be
declared
valid.
Motives
for
entering
into
a
marriage
are
varied
and
complex.
The
State
does
not
and
cannot
dictate
on
the
kind
of
life
that
a
couple
chooses
to
lead.
Any
attempt
to
regulate
their
lifestyle
would
go
into
the
realm
of
their
right
to
privacy
and
would
raise
serious
constitutional
questions.
The
right
to
marital
privacy
allows
married
couples
to
structure
their
marriages
in
almost
any
way
they
see
fit,
to
live
together
or
live
apart,
to
have
children
or
no
children,
to
love
one
another
or
not,
and
so
on.
Thus,
marriages
entered
into
for
other
purposes,
limited
or
otherwise,
such
as
convenience,
companionship,
money,
status,
and
title,
provided
that
they
comply
with
all
the
legal
requisites,
are
equally
valid.
Love,
though
the
ideal
consideration
in
a
marriage
contract,
is
not
the
only
valid
cause
for
marriage.
Other
considerations,
not
precluded
by
law,
may
validly
support
a
marriage.
40
Estrella
Aduan
Orpiano
vs.
Spouses
Antonio
C.
Tomas
and
Myrna
U.
Tomas
G.R.
No.
178611
January
14,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Del
Castillo
Topic:
Sale
of
Conjugal
Property
Facts:
Petitioner
Estrella
Aduan
Orpiano
is
the
widow
of
Alejandro
Orpiano.
Part
of
their
conjugal
estate
is
a
lot
covered
by
TCT
No.
RT-‐23468.
A
Decision
was
rendered
by
the
defunct
Juvenile
and
Domestic
Relations
Court
declaring
Estrella
an
absent/absentee
spouse
and
granting
Alejandro
the
authority
to
sell
the
lot.
Alejandro
sold
the
lot
on
installment
basis
to
respondent
spouses
Antonio
and
Myrna
Tomas.
That
very
same
day,
a
new
title
was
issued
in
the
name
of
the
Spouses
Tomas
despite
the
fact
that
the
purchase
price
has
not
been
paid
in
full,
the
spouses
having
been
given
until
December
of
that
same
year
to
complete
their
payment.
Alejandro
filed
a
collection
case
in
the
RTC
seeking
collection
of
the
balance
of
the
price
in
the
amount
supposedly
left
unpaid
by
the
Tomas
spouses.
During
the
pendency
of
the
collection
case,
Alejandro
passed
away.
His
heirs
including
Estrella
were
substituted
in
his
stead
in
the
collection
case.
Estrella
moved
to
amend
the
Complaint
to
one
for
Rescission/
Annulment
of
Sale
and
Cancellation
of
Title,
but
was
denied
by
the
Court.
She
next
moved
to
be
dropped
as
party
plaintiff
but
was
again
rebuffed.
Estrella
filed
for
annulment
of
the
March
1996
sale
and
cancellation
of
TCT
No.
N-‐
152326.
Estrella
claimed
that
the
1979
declaration
of
her
absence
and
accompanying
authority
to
sell
the
lot
were
obtained
by
Alejandro
through
misrepresentation,
fraud
and
deceit,
adding
that
the
May
1979
JDRC
Decision
was
not
published
as
required
by
law
and
by
the
domestic
relations
court.
Thus,
the
declaration
of
absence
and
Alejandro’s
authority
to
sell
the
lot
are
null
and
void.
The
Tomas
spouses
prayed
for
the
dismissal
thereof
on
the
ground
of
forum
shopping,
arguing
that
the
filing
of
the
annulment
case
was
prompted
by
the
denial
of
Estrella’s
motion
initiated
in
the
collection
case
to
amend
the
Complaint
to
one
for
annulment
of
sale.
The
trial
court
dismissed
the
annulment
case.
Issue:
Can
Estrella
maintain
her
collection
case
for
her
conjugal
share
and
at
the
same
time
file
an
annulment
case
for
the
sale
based
on
the
absence
of
her
consent?
Held:
No.
“As
plaintiff
in
the
collection
case,
Estrella
–
though
merely
succeeding
to
Alejandro’s
rights
–
was
an
indispensable
party,
or
one
without
whom
no
final
determination
can
be
had
in
the
collection
case.
Strictly,
she
may
not
be
dropped
from
the
case.
However,
because
of
her
dual
identity,
first
as
heir
and
second
as
owner
of
her
conjugal
share,
she
has
been
placed
in
the
unique
position
where
she
has
to
succeed
to
her
husband’s
rights,
even
as
she
must
protect
her
separate
conjugal
share
from
Alejandro’s
perceived
undue
disposition.
She
may
not
seek
to
amend
the
cause
of
action
in
the
collection
case
to
one
for
annulment
of
sale,
because
this
adversely
affects
the
interests
of
her
co-‐heirs,
which
is
precisely
to
obtain
payment
of
the
supposed
balance
of
the
sale
price.
Nor
may
Estrella
simultaneously
maintain
the
two
actions
in
both
capacities,
as
heir
in
the
collection
case
and
as
separate
owner
of
her
conjugal
share
in
the
annulment
case.
This
may
not
be
done,
because,
as
was
earlier
on
declared,
this
amounts
to
41
simultaneously
accepting
and
rejecting
the
same
deed
of
sale.
Nor
is
it
possible
to
prosecute
the
annulment
case
simultaneously
with
the
collection
case,
on
the
premise
that
what
is
merely
being
annulled
is
the
sale
by
Alejandro
of
Estrella’s
conjugal
share.
To
repeat,
the
absence
of
the
consent
of
one
spouse
to
a
sale
renders
the
entire
sale
null
and
void,
including
the
portion
of
the
conjugal
property
pertaining
to
the
spouse
who
contracted
the
sale.
Undoubtedly,
Estrella
had
the
right
to
maintain
the
annulment
case
as
a
measure
of
protecting
her
conjugal
share.
There
thus
exists
a
just
cause
for
her
to
be
dropped
as
party
plaintiff
in
the
collection
case
so
that
she
may
institute
and
maintain
the
annulment
case
without
violating
the
rule
against
forum
shopping.
Unless
this
is
done,
she
stands
to
lose
her
share
in
the
conjugal
property.”
42
Spouses
Benjamin
Mamaril
and
Sonia
Mamaril
vs.
The
Boy
Scout
of
the
Philippines
G.R.
No.
179382
January
14,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Perlas-‐Bernabe
Topic:
Human
Relations
Facts:
Spouses
Benjamin
C.
Mamaril
and
Sonia
P.
Mamaril
would
park
their
6
passenger
jeepneys
every
night
at
the
Boy
Scout
of
the
Philippines'
compound.
One
evening,
all
these
vehicles
were
parked
inside
the
BSP
compound;
however,
one
of
the
vehicles
was
missing
and
was
never
recovered.
The
guards
claimed
that
a
male
person
took
the
subject
vehicle
out
of
the
compound.
Sps.
Mamaril
filed
a
complaint
for
damages
before
the
RTC
and
averred
that
the
loss
of
the
subject
vehicle
was
due
to
the
gross
negligence
of
the
above-‐named
security
guards
on-‐duty
who
allowed
the
subject
vehicle
to
be
driven
out
by
a
stranger
despite
their
agreement
that
only
authorized
drivers
duly
endorsed
by
the
owners
could
do
so.
BSP
denied
any
liability
contending
that
not
only
did
Sps.
Mamaril
directly
deal
with
AIB
with
respect
to
the
manner
by
which
the
parked
vehicles
would
be
handled,
but
the
parking
ticket
itself
expressly
stated
that
the
"Management
shall
not
be
responsible
for
loss
of
vehicle
or
any
of
its
accessories
or
article
left
therein."
Issue:
Is
BSP
liable
for
the
lost
of
the
vehicle
due
to
their
negligence?
Held:
No.
“Article
20
of
the
Civil
Code
provides
that
every
person,
who,
contrary
to
law,
willfully
or
negligently
causes
damage
to
another,
shall
indemnify
the
latter
for
the
same.”
“In
this
case,
it
is
undisputed
that
the
proximate
cause
of
the
loss
of
Sps.
Mamaril's
vehicle
was
the
negligent
act
of
security
guards
Peña
and
Gaddi
in
allowing
an
unidentified
person
to
drive
out
the
subject
vehicle.
Proximate
cause
has
been
defined
as
that
cause,
which,
in
natural
and
continuous
sequence,
unbroken
by
any
efficient
intervening
cause,
produces
the
injury
or
loss,
and
without
which
the
result
would
not
have
occurred.”
43
Ma.
Carminia
C.
Calderon
vs.
Jose
Antonio
F.
Roxas
and
the
Court
of
Appeals
G.R.
No.
185595
January
9,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Villarama
Jr.
Topic:
Support
Pendente
Lite
Facts:
Ma.
Carminia
C.
Calderon
and
Jose
Antonio
F.
Roxas,
were
married.
Calderon
filed
an
Amended
Complaint
for
the
Declaration
of
Nullity
of
their
Marriage
on
the
ground
of
psychological
incapacity
under
Art.
36
of
the
Family
Code
of
the
Philippines.
The
trial
court
issued
an
Order
granting
petitioner’s
application
for
support
pendente
lite.
Roxas
filed
a
Motion
to
Reduce
Support
citing,
among
other
grounds,
that
the
monthly
support
for
the
children
as
fixed
by
the
court
was
even
higher
than
his
then
monthly
salary
as
city
councilor.
The
trial
court
issued
an
Order
dated
March
7,
2005
granting
the
motion
to
reduce
support
and
denying
petitioner’s
motion
for
spousal
support,
increase
of
the
children’s
monthly
support
pendente
lite
and
support-‐in-‐arrears.
Calderon
filed
a
motion
for
partial
reconsideration
of
the
March
7,
2005
Order
which
was
denied
on
May
4,
2005.
On
June
14,
2005,
Calderon
through
counsel
filed
a
Notice
of
Appeal
from
the
Orders
dated
March
7,
2005
and
May
4,
2005.
Issue:
Are
the
March
7,
2005
and
May
4,
2005
Orders
on
the
matter
of
support
pendente
lite
interlocutory
or
final?
Held:
Yes.
“The
assailed
orders
relative
to
the
incident
of
support
pendente
lite
and
support
in
arrears,
as
the
term
suggests,
were
issued
pending
the
rendition
of
the
decision
on
the
main
action
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage,
and
are
therefore
interlocutory.
They
did
not
finally
dispose
of
the
case
nor
did
they
consist
of
a
final
adjudication
of
the
merits
of
petitioner’s
claims
as
to
the
ground
of
psychological
incapacity
and
other
incidents
as
child
custody,
support
and
conjugal
assets.
The
Rules
of
Court
provide
for
the
provisional
remedy
of
support
pendente
lite
which
may
be
availed
of
at
the
commencement
of
the
proper
action
or
proceeding,
or
at
any
time
prior
to
the
judgment
or
final
order.
On
March
4,
2003,
this
Court
promulgated
the
Rule
on
Provisional
Orders
which
shall
govern
the
issuance
of
provisional
orders
during
the
pendency
of
cases
for
the
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage,
annulment
of
voidable
marriage
and
legal
separation.
These
include
orders
for
spousal
support,
child
support,
child
custody,
visitation
rights,
hold
departure,
protection
and
administration
of
common
property.”
“The
subject
orders
on
the
matter
of
support
pendente
lite
are
but
an
incident
to
the
main
action
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage.”
44
PROPERTY
CASES
45
Evangeline
Rivera-‐Calingasan
vs.
Wilfredo
Rivera
G.R.
No.171555
April
17,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Brion
Topic:
Forcible
Entry
Facts:
Wilfredo
Rivera
and
his
wife,
Loreto
Inciong,
acquired
several
parcels
of
land.
When
Loreto
died,
he
was
survived
by
Wilfredo
and
their
two
daughters,
Evangeline
and
Brigida
Liza.
Loreto’s
heirs
executed
an
extrajudicial
settlement
of
her
one-‐half
share
of
the
conjugal
estate,
adjudicating
all
the
properties
in
favor
of
Evangeline
and
Brigida
Liza
while
Wilfredo
waived
his
rights
to
the
properties,
with
a
reservation
of
his
usufructuary
rights
during
his
lifetime.
Wilfredo
filed
with
MTC
a
Complaint
for
Forcible
Entry
against
the
petitioners
and
Star
Honda,
Inc.
claiming
that
he
lawfully
possessed
and
occupied
the
2
parcels
of
land
with
a
building
used
for
his
furniture
business.
Taking
advantage
of
his
absence
due
to
his
hospital
confinement,
the
petitioners
and
Star
Honda,
Inc.
took
possession
and
caused
the
renovation
of
the
building
on
the
property.
The
petitioners
and
Star
Honda,
Inc.,
with
the
aid
of
armed
men,
barred
him
from
entering
the
property.
Both
the
Petitioners
countered
that
Wilfredo
voluntarily
renounced
his
usufructuary
rights
in
a
Petition
for
Cancellation
of
Usufructuary
Rights.
The
Court
held
that
Wilfredo
lacked
a
cause
of
action
to
evict
the
petitioners
and
Star
Honda,
Inc.
since
Evangeline
is
the
registered
owner
of
the
property
and
Wilfredo
had
voluntarily
renounced
his
usufructuary
rights.
Issue:
Should
the
ejectment
case
prosper
on
the
ground
that
Wilfredo
have
prior
physical
possession
of
the
property?
Held:
Yes.
“The
only
question
that
the
courts
resolve
in
ejectment
proceedings
is:
who
is
entitled
to
the
physical
possession
of
the
premises,
that
is,
to
the
possession
de
facto
and
not
to
the
possession
de
jure.
It
does
not
even
matter
if
a
party's
title
to
the
property
is
questionable."
Thus,
"an
ejectment
case
will
not
necessarily
be
decided
in
favor
of
one
who
has
presented
proof
of
ownership
of
the
subject
property."
Indeed,
possession
in
ejectment
cases
"means
nothing
more
than
actual
physical
possession,
not
legal
possession
in
the
sense
contemplated
in
civil
law."
In
a
forcible
entry
case,
"prior
physical
possession
is
the
primary
consideration."
"A
party
who
can
prove
prior
possession
can
recover
such
possession
even
against
the
owner
himself.
Whatever
may
be
the
character
of
his
possession,
if
he
has
in
his
favor
prior
possession
in
time,
he
has
the
security
that
entitles
him
to
remain
on
the
property
until
a
person
with
a
better
right
lawfully
ejects
him."
"The
party
in
peaceable,
quiet
possession
shall
not
be
thrown
out
by
a
strong
hand,
violence,
or
terror."
The
respondents
have
proven
prior
physical
possession
of
the
property.
In
this
case,
we
are
convinced
that
Wilfredo
had
been
in
prior
possession
of
the
property
and
that
the
petitioners
deprived
him
of
such
possession
by
means
of
force,
strategy
and
stealth.”
46
Spouses
Cabahug
vs.
National
Power
Corporation
G.R.
No.
186069
January
30,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Perez
Topic:
Power
of
Eminent
Domain
Facts:
The
Spouses
Cabahug
are
the
owners
of
2
parcels
of
land
registered
in
their
names.
A
suit
for
expropriation
was
filed
covering
the
properties
by
NPC
before
the
RTC,
in
connection
with
its
Leyte-‐Cebu
Interconnection
Project,
which
was
dismissed
when
NPC
opted
to
settle
with
the
landowners
by
paying
an
easement
fee
equivalent
to
10%
of
value
of
their
property.
Jesus
Cabahug
executed
two
documents
denominated
as
Right
of
Way
Grant
in
favor
of
NPC.
Jesus
Cabahug
granted
NPC
a
continuous
easement
of
right
of
way
for
the
latter’s
transmissions
lines
and
their
appurtenances
over
the
said
parcels
of
land.
Jesus
Cabahug
agreed
not
to
construct
any
building
or
structure
whatsoever,
nor
plant
in
any
area
within
the
Right
of
Way
that
will
adversely
affect
or
obstruct
the
transmission
line
of
NPC,
except
agricultural
crops,
the
growth
of
which
will
not
exceed
three
meters
high
but
reserved
the
option
to
seek
additional
compensation
for
easement
fee,
based
on
the
Supreme
Court’s
in
National
Power
Corporation
v.
Spouses
Misericordia
Gutierrez
and
Ricardo
Malit,
et
al.
with
G.R.
No.
60077.
Spouses
Cabahug
filed
the
complaint
for
the
payment
of
just
compensation,
damages
and
attorney’s
fees
against
NPC.
Claiming
to
have
been
totally
deprived
of
the
use
of
the
portions
of
land
and
alleged
among
other
matters,
that
in
accordance
with
the
reservation,
they
have
demanded
from
NPC
payment
of
the
balance
of
the
just
compensation
for
the
subject
properties
which,
based
on
the
valuation
fixed
by
the
Leyte
Provincial
Appraisal
Committee.
Issue:
Can
the
Spouses
Cabahug
ask
for
additional
compensation
on
the
ground
that
they
have
been
totally
deprived
of
the
use
of
the
portions
of
the
subject
land?
Held:
Yes.
“Where
the
right
of
way
easement,
as
in
this
case,
similarly
involves
transmission
lines
which
not
only
endangers
life
and
limb
but
restricts
as
well
the
owner's
use
of
the
land
traversed
thereby,
the
ruling
in
Gutierrez
remains
doctrinal
and
should
be
applied.
It
has
been
ruled
that
the
owner
should
be
compensated
for
the
monetary
equivalent
of
the
land
if,
as
here,
the
easement
is
intended
to
perpetually
or
indefinitely
deprive
the
owner
of
his
proprietary
rights
through
the
imposition
of
conditions
that
affect
the
ordinary
use,
free
enjoyment
and
disposal
of
the
property
or
through
restrictions
and
limitations
that
are
inconsistent
with
the
exercise
of
the
attributes
of
ownership,
or
when
the
introduction
of
structures
or
objects
which,
by
their
nature,
create
or
increase
the
probability
of
injury,
death
upon
or
destruction
of
life
and
property
found
on
the
land
is
necessary.
Measured
not
by
the
taker’s
gain
but
the
owner’s
loss,
just
compensation
is
defined
as
the
full
and
fair
equivalent
of
the
property
taken
from
its
owner
by
the
expropriator.”
47
Mercy
Vda.
De
Roxas
vs.
Our
Lady’s
Foundation,
Inc.
G.R.
No.
182378
March
6,
2013
Ponente:
CJ.
Sereno
Topic:
Rights
of
Builder
in
Bad
Faith
Facts:
Salve
Dealca
Latosa
filed
a
Complaint
for
the
Recovery
of
Ownership
of
a
portion
of
her
residential
land
located
at
Our
Lady’s
Village.
She
alleged
that
Petitioner
Atty.
Henry
Amado
Roxas
encroached
on
a
quarter
of
her
property
by
arbitrarily
extending
his
concrete
fence
beyond
the
correct
limits.
In
his
Answer,
Roxas
imputed
the
blame
to
respondent
Our
Lady’s
Village
Foundation,
Inc.,
now
Our
Lady’s
Foundation,
Inc
and
filed
a
Third-‐Party
Complaint
against
respondent
and
claimed
that
he
only
occupied
the
adjoining
portion
in
order
to
get
the
equivalent
area
of
what
he
had
lost
when
OLFI
trimmed
his
property
for
the
subdivision
road.
The
Trial
Court
held
that
Latosa
had
established
her
claim
of
encroachment
by
a
preponderance
of
evidence.
It
found
that
Roxas
occupied
a
total
of
112
square
meters
of
Latosa’s
lots,
and
that,
in
turn,
OLFI
trimmed
his
property
by
92
square
meters.
Having
it
become
final,
the
RTC
issued
a
Writ
of
Execution
to
implement
the
ruling
ordering
OLFI
to
reimburse
Roxas
for
the
value
of
the
92-‐square-‐meter
property
plus
legal
interest
to
be
reckoned
from
the
time
the
amount
was
paid
to
the
third-‐party
defendant.
The
trial
court
then
approved
the
Sheriff’s
Bill,
which
valued
the
subject
property
at
P2,500
per
square
meter
or
a
total
of
P230,000.
Adding
the
legal
interest
of
12%
per
annum
for
10
years,
respondent’s
judgment
obligations
totaled
P506,000.
Opposing
the
valuation
of
the
subject
property,
OLFI
filed
a
Motion
to
Quash
the
Sheriff’s
Bill
and
a
Motion
for
Inhibition
of
the
RTC
judge.
It
insisted
that
it
should
reimburse
Roxas
only
at
the
rate
of
P40
per
square
meter,
the
same
rate
that
Roxas
paid
when
the
latter
first
purchased
the
property.
Nevertheless,
before
resolving
the
Motions
filed
by
OLFI,
the
trial
court
approved
an
Amended
Sheriff’s
Bill,
which
reduced
the
valuation
to
P1,800
per
square
meter.
Eventually,
the
RTC
denied
both
the
Motion
for
Inhibition
and
the
Motion
to
Quash
the
Sheriff’s
Bill.
It
cited
fairness
to
justify
the
computation
of
respondent’s
judgment
obligation
found
in
the
Amended
Sheriff’s
Bill
stating
that
although
it
might
be
true
that
the
property
was
originally
purchased
at
P40.00
per
square
meter,
the
value
of
the
Philippine
Peso
has
greatly
devaluated.
Refusing
to
pay
P1,800
per
square
meter
to
Roxas,
OLFI
filed
a
Rule
65
Petition
before
the
CA.
The
CA
construed
reimbursement
as
an
obligation
to
pay
back
what
was
previously
paid
and
thus
required
OLFI
to
merely
reimburse
him
at
the
rate
of
P40
per
square
meter,
which
was
the
consideration
respondent
had
received
when
Roxas
purchased
the
subdivision
lots.
Issue:
In
reimbursing
Roxas
for
the
land
encroached
upon
by
OLFI,
should
the
rate
at
the
time
of
purchase
be
the
one
used
as
basis?
Held:
No.
“To
settle
the
contention,
this
Court
resorts
to
the
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code
governing
encroachment
on
property.
Under
Article
448
pertaining
to
encroachments
in
good
faith,
as
well
as
Article
450
48
referring
to
encroachments
in
bad
faith,
the
owner
of
the
land
encroached
upon
–
petitioner
herein
–
has
the
option
to
require
respondent
builder
to
pay
the
price
of
the
land.
Although
these
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code
do
not
explicitly
state
the
reckoning
period
for
valuing
the
property,
Ballatan
v.
Court
of
Appeals
already
specifies
that
in
the
event
that
the
seller
elects
to
sell
the
lot,
"the
price
must
be
fixed
at
the
prevailing
market
value
at
the
time
of
payment."
More
recently,
Tuatis
v.
Spouses
Escol
illustrates
that
the
present
or
current
fair
value
of
the
land
is
to
be
reckoned
at
the
time
that
the
landowner
elected
the
choice,
and
not
at
the
time
that
the
property
was
purchased.
“
x
x
x
“From
these
cases,
it
follows
that
the
CA
incorrectly
pegged
the
reimbursable
amount
at
the
old
market
value
of
the
subject
property
–
P40
per
square
meter
–
as
reflected
in
the
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
between
the
parties.
On
the
other
hand,
the
RTC
properly
considered
in
its
2
December
2004
Order
the
value
of
the
lot
at
P1,800
per
square
meter,
the
current
fair
price
as
determined
in
the
Amended
Sheriff’s
Bill.
Thus,
we
reverse
the
ruling
of
the
CA
and
reinstate
the
2
December
2004
Order
of
the
RTC
directing
OLFI
to
reimburse
petitioner
at
P1,800
per
square
meter.”
49
Juanita
Ermitaño
vs.
Lailanie
M.
Paglas
G.R.
No.
174436
January
23,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Peralta
Topic:
Right
of
Redemption
Facts:
Petitioner
Juanita
Ermitaño
through
her
representative,
lsabelo
R.
Ermitaño,
executed
a
Contract
of
Lease
for
a
period
of
1
year,
wherein
petitioner
leased
in
favor
of
respondent
Lailanie
M.
Paglas
a
residential
lot
and
a
house.
The
contract
period
is
one
(1)
year,
which
commenced
on
November
4,
1999.
Subsequent
to
the
execution
of
the
lease
contract,
respondent
received
information
that
sometime
in
March
1999,
petitioner
mortgaged
the
subject
property
in
favor
of
a
certain
Charlie
Yap
(Yap)
and
that
the
same
was
already
foreclosed
with
Yap
as
the
purchaser
of
the
disputed
lot
in
an
extra-‐judicial
foreclosure
sale
which
was
registered
on
February
22,
2000.
Yap's
brother
later
offered
to
sell
the
subject
property
to
respondent.
Respondent
entertained
the
said
offer
and
negotiations
ensued.
On
June
1,
2000,
respondent
bought
the
subject
property
from
Yap.
A
Deed
of
Sale
of
Real
Property
was
executed
by
the
parties
as
evidence
of
the
contract.
However,
it
was
made
clear
in
the
said
Deed
that
the
property
was
still
subject
to
petitioner's
right
of
redemption.
Prior
to
respondent's
purchase
of
the
subject
property,
petitioner
filed
a
suit
for
the
declaration
of
nullity
of
the
mortgage
in
favor
of
Yap
as
well
as
the
sheriff's
provisional
certificate
of
sale
which
was
issued
after
the
disputed
house
and
lot
were
sold
on
foreclosure.
Meanwhile,
on
May
25,
2000,
petitioner
sent
a
letter
demanding
respondent
to
pay
the
rentals
which
are
due
and
to
vacate
the
leased
premises.
A
year
later,
a
second
demand
letter
was
sent
but
both
letters
were
ignored.
Petitioner
filed
with
the
MTCC
a
case
of
unlawful
detainer
against
respondent
that
was
dismissed,
which
prompted
Petitioner
to
file
an
appeal
with
the
RTC.
The
RTC
ordered
to
pay
plaintiff
herein
petitioner
the
equivalent
of
10
months
unpaid
rentals
on
the
property
but
dismissed
the
unlawful
detainer
case.
Petitioner
filed
a
petition
for
review
with
the
CA
which
affirmed
the
decision.
Issue:
Is
Ermitaño
entitled
to
the
physical
possession
of
the
premises
because
the
right
of
redemption
has
not
yet
expired?
Held:
Yes.
“There
is
no
dispute
that
at
the
time
that
respondent
purchased
Yap's
rights
over
the
subject
property,
petitioner's
right
of
redemption
as
a
mortgagor
has
not
yet
expired.
It
is
settled
that
during
the
period
of
redemption,
it
cannot
be
said
that
the
mortgagor
is
no
longer
the
owner
of
the
foreclosed
property,
since
the
rule
up
to
now
is
that
the
right
of
a
purchaser
at
a
foreclosure
sale
is
merely
inchoate
until
after
the
period
of
redemption
has
expired
without
the
right
being
exercised.
The
title
to
land
sold
under
mortgage
foreclosure
remains
in
the
mortgagor
or
his
grantee
until
the
expiration
of
the
redemption
period
and
conveyance
by
the
master's
deed.
Indeed,
the
rule
has
always
been
that
it
is
only
upon
the
expiration
of
the
redemption
period,
without
the
judgment
debtor
having
made
use
of
his
right
of
redemption,
that
the
ownership
of
the
land
sold
becomes
consolidated
in
the
purchaser.”
50
“It,
thus,
clearly
follows
from
the
foregoing
that,
during
the
period
of
redemption,
the
mortgagor,
being
still
the
owner
of
the
foreclosed
property,
remains
entitled
to
the
physical
possession
thereof
subject
to
the
purchaser's
right
to
petition
the
court
to
give
him
possession
and
to
file
a
bond
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
Section
7
of
Act
No.
3135,
as
amended.
The
mere
purchase
and
certificate
of
sale
alone
do
not
confer
any
right
to
the
possession
or
beneficial
use
of
the
premises.
In
the
instant
case,
there
is
neither
evidence
nor
allegation
that
respondent,
as
purchaser
of
the
disputed
property,
filed
a
petition
and
bond
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
Section
7
of
Act
No.
3135.
In
addition,
respondent
defaulted
in
the
payment
of
her
rents.
Thus,
absent
respondent's
filing
of
such
petition
and
bond
prior
to
the
expiration
of
the
period
of
redemption,
coupled
with
her
failure
to
pay
her
rent,
she
did
not
have
the
right
to
possess
the
subject
property.”
51
Purificacion
and
Ruperto
Estanislao
vs.
Spouses
Norma
and
Damiano
Gudito
G.R.
NO.
173166
March
13,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Peralta
Topic:
Unlawful
Detainer
Facts:
Respondents
Spouses
Norma
and
Damiano
Gudito
are
the
owners
of
a
residential
lot
being
leased
by
petitioners
on
a
month-‐to-‐month
basis.
Petitioners
has
been
renting
and
occupying
the
subject
lot
since
1934
and
were
the
ones
who
built
the
house
on
the
subject
lot
in
accordance
with
their
lease
agreement
with
one
Gaspar
Vasquez.
When
Gaspar
Vasquez
died,
the
portion
of
the
lot
on
which
petitioners'
house
was
erected
was
inherited
by
his
son
Victorino
Vasquez
who
was
then
married
to
Ester
Vasquez.
The
Vasquez
couple
wanted
the
Estanislao
family
and
the
other
tenants
to
vacate
the
said
property,
but
the
tenants
refused.
The
Vasquez
couple
refused
to
accept
their
rental
payments.
Thus,
petitioner
Purificacion
Estanislao,
with
due
notice
to
Ester
Vasquez,
deposited
the
amount
of
her
monthly
rentals
at
Allied
Banking
Corporation
under
a
savings
account
in
the
name
of
Ester
Vasquez
as
lessor.
A
Deed
of
Donation
was
executed
by
the
Vasquez
couple
in
favor
of
respondent
Norma
Vasquez
Gudito.
Hence,
in
October
1994,
respondents
notified
petitioners
to
remove
their
house
and
vacate
the
premises
within
three
months
because
of
their
urgent
need
of
the
residential
lot.
However,
petitioners
failed
to
comply.
On
November
10,
1995,
respondents
filed
a
Complaint
for
Unlawful
Detainer/
Ejectment
against
petitioners
before
the
MeTC
which
rendered
a
decision
in
favor
of
respondents.
MeTC's
decision
was
reversed
by
RTC.
The
CA
annulled
and
set
aside
the
RTC's
decision
and
reinstated
the
MeTC's
decision.
Issue:
Do
the
Spouses
Norma
and
Damiano
Gudito
have
the
better
right
of
possession
over
the
subject
property?
Held:
No.
“Petitioners
strongly
argue
that
respondents
cannot
evict
them
from
the
subject
property
pursuant
to
Presidential
Decree
(P.D.)
1517,
in
relation
to
P.D.
2016,
as
the
subject
property
is
allegedly
within
one
of
the
245
Proclaimed
Area
for
Priority
Development
and/or
Urban
Land
Reform
No.
1967,
as
amended
by
Presidential
Proclamation
No.
2284.
Petitioners
further
contend
that
they
were
not
aware
that
the
subject
property
had
been
acquired
by
respondents
via
a
Deed
of
Donation
executed
by
the
Vasquez
couple.
Thus,
they
assail
that
said
donation
was
merely
simulated
in
order
to
deprive
them
of
their
right
of
first
refusal
to
buy
the
subject
property.
x
x
x
Here,
it
is
undisputed
that
respondents
do
not
own
any
other
lot
or
real
property
except
the
herein
subject
lot.
They
have
urgent
need
of
the
same
to
build
their
own
house
to
be
used
as
their
residence.
Also,
petitioners
had
already
been
asked
to
leave
the
premises
as
early
as
1982,
but
sternly
refused,
52
hence,
its
former
owners
refused
to
accept
their
rental
payments.
When
the
same
property
was
donated
to
respondents,
petitioners
were
allowed
to
continue
occupying
the
subject
lot
since
respondents
did
not
as
yet
have
the
money
to
build
a
house
of
their
own.
But
now
that
respondents
have
sufficient
money
to
build
their
own
house,
petitioners
still
rebuff
respondents'
demand
to
vacate
the
premises
and
to
remove
or
demolish
their
house.
Clearly,
since
respondents
have
complied
with
the
requirements
of
the
law,
their
right
to
possess
the
subject
property
for
their
own
use
as
family
residence
cannot
be
denied.
It
is
also
worthy
to
note
that
petitioners
have
failed
to
prove
that
the
transfer
of
the
subject
property
was
merely
a
ploy
designed
to
defeat
and
circumvent
their
right
of
first
refusal
under
the
law.
As
emphasized
by
the
CA,
the
Deed
of
Donation
executed
in
favor
of
respondents
was
signed
by
the
parties
and
their
witnesses,
and
was
even
notarized
by
a
notary
public.
x
x
x
As
can
be
gleaned
from
the
foregoing,
petitioners
cannot
use
P.D.
1517
as
a
shield
to
deny
respondents
of
their
inherent
right
to
possess
the
subject
property.
The
CA
correctly
opined
that
"under
P.D.
1517,
in
relation
to
P.D.
2016,
the
lessee
is
given
the
right
of
first
refusal
over
the
land
they
have
leased
and
occupied
for
more
than
ten
yean
and
on
which
they
constructed
their
houses.
But
the
right
of
first
refusal
applies
only
to
a
case
where
the
owner
of
the
property
intends
to
sell
it
to
a
third
party.
If
the
owner
of
the
leased
premises
do
not
intend
to
sell
the
property
in
question
but
seeks
to
eject
the
tenant
on
the
ground
that
the
former
needs
the
premises
for
residential
purposes,
the
tenant
cannot
invoke
the
land
reform
law."
Clearly,
the
circumstances
required
for
the
application
of
P.D.
1517
are
lacking
in
this
case,
since
respondents
had
no
intention
of
selling
the
subject
property
to
third
parties,
but
seek
the
eviction
of
petitioners
on
the
valid
ground
that
they
need
the
property
for
residential
purposes.
53
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
AFP
Retirement
and
Separation
Benefits
System
G.R.
No.
180463
January
16,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Del
Castillo
Topic:
Donation
Facts:
By
virtue
of
Proclamation
No.
168,
3
parcels
of
land
particularly,
lots
X,
Y-‐1
and
Y-‐2
were
reserved
for
recreation
and
health
purposes.
In
1983,
Proclamation
No.
2273
was
issued
amending
Proc.
No.
168,
and
removing
and
segregating
Lots
Y-‐1
and
Y-‐2
from
the
reservation
and
declaring
them
open
for
disposition
to
qualified
applicants.
As
a
result,
only
Lot
X
(15,020
sqm)
remained
part
of
the
reservation
now
known
as
Magsaysay
Park.
The
respondents-‐intervenors
waged
a
campaign
–
through
petitions
and
pleas
made
to
the
President
–
to
have
Lots
Y-‐1
and
Y-‐2
taken
out
of
the
reservation
for
the
reason
that
through
their
predecessor
Cabalo
Kusop,
they
have
acquired
vested
private
rights
over
these
lots.
This
campaign
resulted
in
Proc.
2273,
which
re-‐classified
and
returned
Lots
Y-‐1
and
Y-‐2
to
their
original
alienable
and
disposable
state.
Respondents-‐intervenors
filed
applications
for
the
issuance
of
individual
miscellaneous
sales
patents
over
the
whole
of
Lot
X.
Consequently,
16
OCTs
covering
Lot
X
were
issued
in
the
names
of
respondents-‐intervenors
and
several
others.
These
16
titles
were
simultaneously
conveyed
to
herein
respondent
AFP-‐Retirement
and
Separation
Benefits
System,
resulting
in
the
issuance
of
16
new
titles.
The
Republic
of
the
Philippines
instituted
a
Complaint
for
reversion,
cancellation
and
annulment
of
the
AFP-‐RSBS
titles
because
they
were
issued
over
a
public
park
which
is
classified
as
inalienable
and
non-‐disposable
public
land.
Respondents-‐intervenors
argued
that
their
predecessor-‐in-‐interest
Kusop
had
acquired
vested
interests
over
Lot
X
even
before
Proc.
168
was
issued,
having
occupied
the
same
for
more
than
30
years.
They
claimed
that
these
vested
rights,
taken
together
with
the
favorable
recommendations
and
actions
of
the
DENR
and
other
government
agencies
to
the
effect
that
Lot
X
was
alienable
and
disposable
land
of
the
public
domain,
as
well
as
the
subsequent
issuance
of
sales
patents
and
OCTs
in
their
names,
cannot
be
defeated
by
Proc.
168.
Issue:
Did
the
heirs
of
Cabalo
Kusop
have
any
transmissible
proprietary
rights
over
the
donated
property
at
the
time
of
the
donation?
Held:
No.
Respondents-‐intervenors
no
longer
had
any
right
to
Lot
X
–
not
by
acquisitive
prescription,
and
certainly
not
by
sales
patent.
In
fact,
their
act
of
applying
for
the
issuance
of
miscellaneous
sales
patents
operates
as
an
express
acknowledgment
that
the
State,
and
not
respondents-‐intervenors,
is
the
owner
of
Lot
X.
It
is
erroneous
to
suppose
that
respondents-‐intervenors
possessed
title
to
Lot
X
when
they
applied
for
miscellaneous
sales
patents,
for
the
premise
of
such
grant
or
privilege
is
precisely
that
the
State
is
the
owner
of
the
land,
and
that
the
applicant
acknowledges
this
and
surrenders
to
State
ownership.
The
government,
as
the
agent
of
the
State,
is
possessed
of
the
plenary
power
as
the
persona
in
law
to
determine
who
shall
be
the
favored
recipients
of
public
lands,
as
well
as
under
what
terms
they
may
be
54
granted
such
privilege,
not
excluding
the
placing
of
obstacles
in
the
way
of
their
exercise
of
what
otherwise
would
be
ordinary
acts
of
ownership.
Respondents-‐intervenors’
actions
betray
their
claim
of
ownership
to
Lot
X.
When
Proc.
168
was
issued,
they
did
not
institute
action
to
question
its
validity,
using
as
cause
of
action
their
claimed
ownership
and
title
over
the
land.
The
same
is
true
when
Proc.
2273
came
out.
They
did
not
file
suit
to
invalidate
it
because
it
contravenes
their
claimed
ownership
over
Lot
X.
They
simply
sat
and
waited
for
the
good
graces
of
the
government
to
fall
on
their
laps.
They
simply
waited
for
the
State
to
declare
them
beneficiaries
of
the
land.
And
when
the
President
failed
to
include
Lot
X
in
Proc.
2273
and
declare
it
open
for
disposition
to
them
as
beneficiaries,
they
filed
their
applications
for
issuance
of
miscellaneous
sales
patents
over
said
lot.
All
these
actions
are
anathema
to
a
claim
of
ownership,
and
instead
indicate
a
willingness
to
abide
by
the
actions
of
the
State,
a
show
of
respect
for
its
dominion
over
the
land.
Under
the
law,
respondents-‐intervenors
are
charged
with
knowledge
of
the
law;
they
cannot
feign
ignorance.
In
fact,
they
could
not
claim
to
be
unaware
of
Proc.
168,
for
precisely
they
hid
under
its
protective
mantle
to
seek
the
invalidation
of
a
donation
claimed
to
have
been
made
by
them
to
one
Jose
Tayoto.
Thus,
in
Tayoto
v.
Heirs
of
Kusop,
an
alleged
donee
(Tayoto)
of
property
located
within
Lots
X,
Y-‐
1,
and
Y-‐2
filed
a
case
for
quieting
of
title
against
the
donors
–
herein
respondents-‐intervenors
–
to
protect
the
property
which
they
allegedly
donated
to
him,
which
was
then
in
danger
of
being
lost
for
the
reason
that
respondents-‐intervenors
supposedly
reneged
on
the
donation.
Respondents-‐intervenors
filed
an
urgent
motion
to
dismiss
the
Complaint
claiming,
among
others,
the
"invalidity
of
the
donation
as
the
subject
thereof
had
not
yet
been
excluded
from
the
Magsaysay
Park."
In
disposing
of
the
case,
the
Court
made
the
following
pronouncement:
Be
that
as
it
may,
the
donation
is
void.
There
are
three
essential
elements
of
donations:
[1]
the
reduction
of
the
patrimony
of
the
donor,
[2]
the
increase
in
the
patrimony
of
the
donee,
and
[3]
the
intent
to
do
an
act
of
liberality
(animus
donandi).
Granting
that
there
is
an
animus
donandi,
we
find
that
the
alleged
donation
lacks
the
first
two
elements
which
presuppose
the
donor's
ownership
rights
over
the
subject
of
the
donation
which
he
transmits
to
the
donee
thereby
enlarging
the
donee's
estate.
This
is
in
consonance
with
the
rule
that
a
donor
cannot
lawfully
convey
what
is
not
his
property.
In
other
words,
a
donation
of
a
parcel
of
land
the
dominical
rights
of
which
do
not
belong
to
the
donor
at
the
time
of
the
donation,
is
void.
This
holds
true
even
if
the
subject
of
the
donation
is
not
the
land
itself
but
the
possessory
and
proprietary
rights
over
said
land.
In
this
case,
although
they
allegedly
declared
Magsaysay
Park
as
their
own
for
taxation
purposes,
the
heirs
of
Cabalo
Kusop
did
not
have
any
transmissible
proprietary
rights
over
the
donated
property
at
the
time
of
the
donation.
In
fact,
with
respect
to
Lot
Y-‐2,
they
still
had
to
file
a
free
patents
application
to
obtain
an
original
certificate
of
title
thereon.
This
is
because
Proclamation
No.
2273
declaring
as
‘open
to
disposition
under
the
provisions
of
the
Public
Land
Act’
some
portions
of
the
Magsaysay
Park,
is
not
an
operative
law
which
automatically
vests
rights
of
ownership
on
the
heirs
of
Cabalo
Kusop
over
their
claimed
parcels
of
land.
55
VSD
Realty
&
Development
Corporation
vs.
Uniwide
Sales
Inc.
G.R.
No.
170677
July
31,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Peralta
Topic:
Recovery
of
Possession
Facts:
Petitioner
VSD
Realty
and
Development
Corporation
filed
a
Complaint
for
Annulment
of
Title
and
Recovery
of
Possession
of
property
against
respondents
Uniwide
Sales,
Inc.
and
Dolores
Baello
with
the
RTC.
Petitioner
sought
the
nullification
of
TCT
in
the
name
of
Dolores
Baello
and
the
recovery
of
possession
of
property
that
is
being
occupied
by
Uniwide
by
virtue
of
a
Contract
of
Lease
with
Dolores
Baello.
Petitioner
VSD
claimed
ownership
over
the
parcel
of
land
in
Caloocan
City
which
was
allegedly
bought
from
Felisa
D.
Bonifacio,
whose
title
thereto
was
registered
by
virtue
of
an
Order
authorizing
the
segregation
of
the
same
in
the
Land
Registration
Commission
Case.
Petitioner
also
alleged
that
its
right
to
the
subject
property
and
the
validity
and
correctness
of
the
technical
description
and
location
of
the
property
are
duly
established
in
LRC
Case
No.
C-‐3288.
Petitioner
alleged
that
its
title
is
the
correct,
valid
and
legal
document
that
covers
the
subject
property,
since
it
is
the
result
of
land
registration
proceedings
in
accordance
with
law.
Petitioner
alleged
that
respondent
Baello’s
title,
covering
the
same
property,
is
spurious
and
can
only
be
the
result
of
falsification
and
illegal
machinations.
Issue:
Was
there
a
valid
ground
to
annul
respondent’s
title
to
warrant
the
reconveyance
of
the
subject
property
to
petitioner?
Held:
The
case
was
remanded
to
the
CA.
“The
established
legal
principle
in
actions
for
annulment
or
reconveyance
of
title
is
that
a
party
seeking
it
should
establish
not
merely
by
a
preponderance
of
evidence
but
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence
that
the
land
sought
to
be
reconveyed
is
his.
Article
434
of
the
Civil
Code
provides
that
to
successfully
maintain
an
action
to
recover
the
ownership
of
a
real
property,
the
person
who
claims
a
better
right
to
it
must
prove
two
(2)
things:
first,
the
identity
of
the
land
claimed,
and;
second,
his
title
thereto.
In
an
action
to
recover,
the
property
must
be
identified,
and
the
plaintiff
must
rely
on
the
strength
of
his
title
and
not
on
the
weakness
of
the
defendant's
claim.
The
Court
upheld
the
decision
of
the
trial
court
that
petitioner
was
able
to
establish
through
documentary
and
testimonial
evidence
that
the
technical
description
of
its
Torrens
title,
embodying
the
identity
of
the
land
claimed,
covers
the
property
that
is
being
occupied
by
respondent
Uniwide
by
virtue
of
a
lease
contract
with
respondent
Baello,
and
that
a
comparison
of
the
technical
description
of
the
land
covered
by
the
title
of
petitioner
and
the
technical
description
of
the
land
covered
by
the
title
of
Baello
shows
that
they
are
not
the
same.
Hence,
the
Court
granted
the
petition,
and
reversed
and
set
aside
the
Decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
and
its
Resolution
denying
petitioners'
motion
for
reconsideration;
and
the
Decision
of
the
RTC
was
reinstated
with
modification.
The
dispositive
portion
of
the
Court's
decision
has
been
cited
earlier.
56
x
x
x
The
Court
recognizes
the
importance
of
protecting
the
country's
Torrens
system
from
fake
land
titles
and
deeds.
Considering
that
there
is
an
issue
on
the
validity
of
the
title
of
petitioner
VSD,
which
title
is
alleged
to
be
traceable
to
OCT
No.
994
registered
on
April
19,
1917,
which
mother
title
was
held
to
be
inexistent
in
Manotok
Realty,
Inc.
v.
CLT
Realty
Development
Corporation,
in
the
interest
of
justice,
and
to
safeguard
the
correct
titling
of
properties,
a
remand
is
proper
to
determine
which
of
the
parties
derived
valid
title
from
the
legitimate
OCT
No.
994
registered
on
May
3,
1917.
Since
this
Court
is
not
a
trier
of
facts
and
not
capacitated
to
appreciate
evidence
of
the
first
instance,
the
Court
may
remand
this
case
to
the
Court
of
Appeals
for
further
proceedings.
57
Heirs
of
Margarita
Prodon
vs.
Heirs
of
Maximo
S.
Alvarez
and
Valentina
Clave
G.R.
No.
170604
September
2,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Bersamin
Topic:
Quieting
of
Title
Facts:
Respondents,
in
their
Complaint
for
Quieting
of
Title
and
Damages
against
Margarita
Prodon
averred
the
following:
1-‐
that
their
parents,
the
late
spouses
Maximo
S.
Alvarez,
Sr.
and
Valentina
Clave,
were
the
registered
owners
of
that
parcel
of
land;
2-‐
that
their
parents
had
been
in
possession
of
the
property
during
their
lifetime;
3-‐
that
upon
their
parents’
deaths,
they
had
continued
the
possession
of
the
property
as
heirs,
paying
the
real
property
taxes
due
thereon;
4-‐
that
they
could
not
locate
the
owner’s
duplicate
copy
but
original
copy
on
file
with
the
Register
of
Deeds
of
Manila
was
intact;
5-‐
that
the
original
copy
contained
an
entry
stating
that
the
property
had
been
sold
to
defendant
Prodon
subject
to
the
right
of
repurchase;
and
6-‐
that
the
entry
had
been
maliciously
done
by
Prodon
because
the
deed
of
sale
with
right
to
repurchase
covering
the
property
did
not
exist.
Consequently,
they
prayed
that
the
entry
be
cancelled,
and
that
Prodon
be
adjudged
liable
for
damages.
Prodon’s
Answer
claimed
that
the
late
Maximo
Alvarez,
Sr.
had
executed
on
September
9,
1975
the
deed
of
sale
with
right
to
repurchase;
that
the
deed
had
been
registeredwith
the
Register
of
Deeds
and
duly
annotated
on
the
title;
that
the
late
Maximo
Alvarez,
Sr.
had
been
granted
six
months
from
September
9,
1975
within
which
to
repurchase
the
property;
and
that
she
had
then
become
the
absolute
owner
of
the
property
due
to
its
non-‐repurchase
within
the
given
6-‐month
period.
Issue:
Is
Prodon’s
claim
of
ownership
was
already
barred
by
laches?
Held:
Yes
For
an
action
to
quiet
title
to
prosper,
two
indispensable
requisites
must
concur,
namely:
(a)
the
plaintiff
or
complainant
has
a
legal
or
an
equitable
title
to
or
interest
in
the
real
property
subject
of
the
action;
and
(b)
the
deed,
claim,
encumbrance,
or
proceeding
claimed
to
be
casting
cloud
on
his
title
must
be
shown
to
be
in
fact
invalid
or
inoperative
despite
its
prima
facie
appearance
of
validity
or
legal
efficacy.
This
case
involves
an
action
for
quieting
of
title,
a
common-‐law
remedy
for
the
removal
of
any
cloud
or
doubt
or
uncertainty
on
the
title
to
real
property
by
reason
of
any
instrument,
record,
claim,
encumbrance,
or
proceeding
that
is
apparently
valid
or
effective,
but
is,
in
truth
and
in
fact,
invalid,
ineffective,
voidable,
or
unenforceable,
and
may
be
prejudicial
to
said
title.
In
such
an
action,
the
competent
court
is
tasked
to
determine
the
respective
rights
of
the
complainant
and
other
claimants
to
place
things
in
their
proper
place
and
to
make
the
one
who
has
no
rights
to
said
immovable
respect
and
not
disturb
the
other.
The
action
is
for
the
benefit
of
both,
so
that
he
who
has
the
right
would
see
every
cloud
of
doubt
over
the
property
dissipated,
and
he
can
thereafter
fearlessly
introduce
any
desired
improvements,
as
well
as
use,
and
even
abuse
the
property.
x
x
x
58
The
action
for
quieting
of
title
may
be
based
on
the
fact
that
a
deed
is
invalid,
ineffective,
voidable,
or
unenforceable.
The
terms
of
the
writing
may
or
may
not
be
material
to
an
action
for
quieting
of
title,
depending
on
the
ground
alleged
by
the
plaintiff.
For
instance,
when
an
action
for
quieting
of
title
is
based
on
the
unenforceability
of
a
contract
for
not
complying
with
the
Statute
of
Frauds,
Article
1403
of
the
Civil
Code
specifically
provides
that
evidence
of
the
agreement
cannot
be
received
without
the
writing,
or
a
secondary
evidence
of
its
contents.
There
is
then
no
doubt
that
the
Best
Evidence
Rule
will
come
into
play.
x
x
x
Her
inaction
was
an
index
of
the
falsity
of
her
claim
against
the
respondents.
59
Jose
Z.
Casilang,
Sr.
(substituted
by
his
heirs)
vs.
Rosario
Z.
Casilang-‐Dizon,
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
180269
February
20,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Reyes
Topic:
Partition
Facts:
The
late
spouses
Liborio
and
Francisca
had
8
children,
namely:
Felicidad,
Ireneo,
Marcelina,
Jacinta,
Bonifacio,
Leonora,
Jose,
and
Flora.
Liborio
died
intestate
at
the
age
of
83,
followed
not
long
after
by
his
wife
Francisca.
Their
son
Bonifacio
also
died
and
was
survived
by
his
child
Bernabe,
while
when
son
Ireneo
died
he
was
survived
by
his
4
children,
namely:
Mario,
Angelo,
Rosario
and
Rodolfo,
herein
respondents.
The
estate
of
Liborio,
which
left
no
debts,
consisted
of
3
parcels
of
land.
Respondent
Rosario
filed
with
the
MTC
a
complaint
for
unlawful
detainer
to
evict
her
uncle,
petitioner
Jose
from
the
lot
that
was
owned
by
her
father
Ireneo,
as
evidenced
by
Tax
Declaration.
Thereafter,
the
respondents
executed
a
Deed
of
Extrajudicial
Partition
with
Quitclaim
whereby
they
adjudicated
the
said
lot
to
themselves.
In
the
same
instrument,
respondents
Mario,
Angelo
and
Rodolfo
renounced
their
respective
shares
in
favor
of
Rosario.
As
a
defense,
Jose
said
that
he
was
the
“lawful,
absolute,
exclusive
owner
and
in
actual
possession”
of
the
said
lot,
and
that
he
acquired
the
same
“through
intestate
succession
from
his
late
father.”
Subsequently,
7
of
the
8
children
of
Liborio
and
Francisca
filed
with
the
RTC
a
Complaint
for
“Annulment
of
Documents,
Ownership
and
Peaceful
Possession
with
Damages”
against
the
respondents.
Among
the
documents
sought
to
be
annulled
was
the
1997
Deed
of
Extrajudicial
Partition
executed
by
Ireneo’s
children.
The
petitioners
alleged
in
their
complaint
that
all
8
children
of
Liborio
entered
into
a
verbal
partition
of
his
estate,
pursuant
to
which
Jose
was
allotted
the
said
lot
as
his
share
and
that
Ireneo
never
claimed
ownership
of
nor
took
possession
of
it.
The
complete
disposition
of
the
intestate
estate
of
Liborio
was
done
through
verbal
partition.
Issue:
Is
the
verbal
partition
made
valid
and
binding?
Held:
Yes
The
validity
of
an
oral
partition
is
well-‐settled
in
our
jurisdiction.
In
Vda.
de
Espina
v.
Abaya
(1991),
this
Court
declared
that
an
oral
partition
is
valid:
Anent
the
issue
of
oral
partition,
We
sustain
the
validity
of
said
partition.
“An
agreement
of
partition
may
be
made
orally
or
in
writing.
An
oral
agreement
for
the
partition
of
the
property
owned
in
common
is
valid
and
enforceable
upon
the
parties.
The
Statute
of
Frauds
has
no
operation
in
this
kind
of
agreements,
for
partition
is
not
a
conveyance
of
property
but
simply
a
segregation
and
designation
of
the
part
of
the
property
which
belong
to
the
co-‐owners.”
x
x
x
60
A
possessor
of
real
estate
property
is
presumed
to
have
title
thereto
unless
the
adverse
claimant
establishes
a
better
right.
Moreover,
under
Article
541
of
the
Civil
Code,
one
who
possesses
in
the
concept
of
owner
has
in
his
favor
the
legal
presumption
that
he
possesses
with
a
just
title,
and
he
cannot
be
obliged
to
show
or
prove
it.
Similarly,
Article
433
of
the
Civil
Code
provides
that
actual
possession
under
a
claim
of
ownership
raises
a
disputable
presumption
of
ownership.
Thus,
actual
possession
and
exercise
of
dominion
over
definite
portions
of
the
property
in
accordance
with
an
alleged
partition
are
considered
strong
proof
of
an
oral
partition
which
the
Court
will
not
hesitate
to
uphold.
61
Republic
of
the
Philippines
(DPWH)
vs.
Bank
of
the
Philippine
Islands
(BPI)
G.R.
No.
203039
September
11,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Carpio
Topic:
Eminent
Domain
Facts:
On
February
12,
1998,
Department
the
of
Public
Works
and
Highways
(DPWII)
filed
with
the
RTC
a
case
for
expropriation
against
portions
of
the
properties
of
Bank
of
the
Philippine
Islands
(BPI)
and
of
Bayani
Villanueva
(Villanueva)
in
Las
Piñas
City
for
the
construction
of
the
Zapote-‐Alabang
Fly-‐Over.
Neither
BPI
nor
Villanueva
objected
to
the
propriety
of
the
expropriation
hence,
the
trial
court
in
its
Decision
set
the
fair
market
value
at
P40,000.00
per
square
meter
which
then
became
final
and
executor.
Meanwhile,
BPI
filed
a
Motion
for
Partial
New
Trial
to
determine
the
just
compensation
of
its
building,
which
was
not
included
in
the
said
Decision.
The
motion
was
properly
heeded
by
the
trial
court,
increasing
the
amount
of
just
compensation
due
to
BPI.
DPWH
moved
for
the
reconsideration
of
the
amended
Decision
on
the
ground
that
the
proceeding
fixing
the
just
compensation
of
the
building
is
null
and
void
for
not
complying
with
the
mandatory
procedure
set
forth
in
Sections
5
to
8
of
Rule
67
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
Issue:
Is
the
award
of
additional
just
compensation
for
BPI’s
building
in
the
amount
fixed
therefor
is
unfounded
and
without
legal
basis?
Held:
No.
The
findings
of
the
lower
courts
are
borne
by
the
records.
Hence,
there
was
proper
basis
for
the
determination
of
just
compensation
for
the
building
for
consequential
damages.
Eminent
domain
is
the
authority
and
right
of
the
State,
as
sovereign,
to
take
private
property
for
public
use
upon
observance
of
due
process
of
law
and
payment
of
just
compensation.
The
State’s
power
of
eminent
domain
is
limited
by
the
constitutional
mandate
that
private
property
shall
not
be
taken
for
public
use
without
just
compensation.
Just
compensation
is
the
full
and
fair
equivalent
of
the
property
sought
to
be
expropriated.
The
general
rule
is
that
the
just
compensation
to
which
the
owner
of
the
condemned
property
is
entitled
to
is
the
market
value.
Market
value
is
that
sum
of
money
which
a
person
desirous
but
not
compelled
to
buy,
and
an
owner
willing
but
not
compelled
to
sell,
would
agree
on
as
a
price
to
be
paid
by
the
buyer
and
received
by
the
seller.
The
general
rule,
however,
is
modified
where
only
a
part
of
a
certain
property
is
expropriated.
In
such
a
case,
the
owner
is
not
restricted
to
compensation
for
the
portion
actually
taken;
he
is
also
entitled
to
recover
the
consequential
damage,
if
any,
to
the
remaining
part
of
the
property.
62
x
x
x
No
actual
taking
of
the
building
is
necessary
to
grant
consequential
damages.
Consequential
damages
are
awarded
if
as
a
result
of
the
expropriation,
the
remaining
property
of
the
owner
suffers
from
impairment
or
decrease
in
value.
The
rules
on
expropriation
clearly
provide
a
legal
basis
for
the
award
of
consequential
damages.
Section
6
of
Rule
67
of
the
Rules
of
Court
provides:
x
x
x
The
commissioners
shall
assess
the
consequential
damages
to
the
property
not
taken
and
deduct
from
such
consequential
damages
the
consequential
benefits
to
be
derived
by
the
owner
from
the
public
use
or
public
purpose
of
the
property
taken,
the
operation
of
its
franchise
by
the
corporation
or
the
carrying
on
of
the
business
of
the
corporation
or
person
taking
the
property.
But
in
no
case
shall
the
consequential
benefits
assessed
exceed
the
consequential
damages
assessed,
or
the
owner
be
deprived
of
the
actual
value
of
his
property
so
taken.
63
Pilar
Development
Corporation
vs.
Ramon
Dumadag
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
194336
March
11,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Peralta
Topic:
Easements
Facts:
Petitioner
filed
a
Complaint
for
accion
publiciana
with
damages
against
respondents
for
allegedly
building
their
shanties,
without
its
knowledge
and
consent.
It
claims
that
said
parcel
of
land,
which
is
duly
registered
in
its
was
designated
as
an
open
space
of
Pilar
Village
Subdivision
intended
for
village
recreational
facilities
and
amenities
for
subdivision
residents.
Respondents
denied
the
material
allegations
of
the
Complaint
and
briefly
asserted
that
it
is
the
local
government,
not
petitioner,
which
has
jurisdiction
and
authority
over
them.
RTC
dismissed
petitioner’s
complaint,
finding
that
the
land
being
occupied
by
respondents
are
situated
on
the
sloping
area
going
down
and
leading
towards
the
Mahabang
Ilog
Creek,
and
within
the
three-‐meter
legal
easement;
thus,
considered
as
public
property
and
part
of
public
dominion
under
Article
502
of
the
New
Civil
Code
which
could
not
be
owned
by
petitioner.
The
court
further
opined
that
respondents
have
a
better
right
to
possess
the
occupied
lot,
since
they
are
in
an
area
reserved
for
public
easement
purposes
and
that
only
the
local
government
of
Las
Piñas
City
could
institute
an
action
for
recovery
of
possession
or
ownership.
Issue:
Is
the
Petitioner
the
owner
of
the
subject
parcel
of
land
(3-‐meter
strip),
which
entitled
to
him
the
lawful
possession,
hence,
the
proper
party
to
file
an
action
for
recovery
of
possession?
Held:
No.
Petitioner’s
right
of
ownership
and
possession
has
been
limited
by
law
with
respect
to
the
3-‐meter
strip/zone
along
the
banks
of
Mahabang
Ilog
Creek.
Similar
to
petitioner,
respondents
have
no
right
or
title
over
it
precisely
because
it
is
public
land.
x
x
x
An
easement
or
servitude
is
a
real
right
on
another’s
property,
corporeal
and
immovable,
whereby
the
owner
of
the
latter
must
refrain
from
doing
or
allowing
somebody
else
to
do
or
something
to
be
done
on
his
or
her
property,
for
the
benefit
of
another
person
or
tenement;
it
is
jus
in
re
aliena,
inseparable
from
the
estate
to
which
it
actively
or
passively
belongs,
indivisible,
perpetual,
and
a
continuing
property
right,
unless
extinguished
by
causes
provided
by
law.
The
Code
defines
easement
as
an
encumbrance
imposed
upon
an
immovable
for
the
benefit
of
another
immovable
belonging
to
a
different
owner
or
for
the
benefit
of
a
community,
or
of
one
or
more
persons
to
whom
the
encumbered
estate
does
not
belong.
There
are
two
kinds
of
easement
according
to
source:
by
law
or
by
will
of
the
owners—the
former
are
called
legal
and
the
latter
voluntary
easement.
A
legal
easement
or
compulsory
easement,
or
an
easement
by
necessity
constituted
by
law
has
for
its
object
either
public
use
or
the
interest
of
private
persons.
64
x
x
x
While
Article
630
of
the
Code
provides
for
the
general
rule
that
“[t]he
owner
of
the
servient
estate
retains
the
ownership
of
the
portion
on
which
the
easement
is
established,
and
may
use
the
same
in
such
a
manner
as
not
to
affect
the
exercise
of
the
easement,”
Article
635
thereof
is
specific
in
saying
that
“[all]
matters
concerning
easements
established
for
public
or
communal
use
shall
be
governed
by
the
special
laws
and
regulations
relating
thereto,
and,
in
the
absence
thereof,
by
the
provisions
of
this
Title
[Title
VII
on
Easements
or
Servitudes].”
x
x
x
Yet
all
is
not
lost
for
petitioner.
It
may
properly
file
an
action
for
mandamus
to
compel
the
local
government
of
Las
Piñas
City
to
enforce
with
reasonable
dispatch
the
eviction,
demolition,
and
relocation
of
respondents
and
any
other
persons
similarly
situated
in
order
to
give
flesh
to
one
of
the
avowed
policies
of
R.A.
7279,
which
is
to
reduce
urban
dysfunctions,
particularly
those
that
adversely
affect
public
health,
safety,
and
ecology.
Indeed,
as
one
of
the
basic
human
needs,
housing
is
a
matter
of
state
concern
as
it
directly
and
significantly
affects
the
general
welfare.
65
Teodoro
S.
Teodoro
(Substituted
by
Heirs)
vs.
Danilo
Espino
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
189248
February
5,
2014
Ponente:
J.
Perez
Topic:
Forcible
Entry
Facts:
The
case
is
for
Forcible
Entry
filed
by
the
predecessor-‐in-‐interest
of
petitioners
Nelson
and
Rolando
Teodoro,
heirs
of
Teodoro
S.
Teodoro
against
respondents
Danilo
Espino,
Rosario
Santiago,
Juliana
Castillo,
Paulina
Litao,
Raquel
Rodriguez,
Rufina
dela
Cruz
and
Leonila
Cruz,
a
squabble
for
physical
possession
of
a
portion
of
a
real
property,
the
ownership
of
which
is
traceable
to
Genaro
Teodor.
The
subject
property
pertains
to
the
vacant
lot
where
the
old
ancestral
house
of
Genaro
stood
until
its
demolition
in
June
2004,
at
the
instance
of
Teodoro
Teodoro.
Genaro
had
5
children:
Santiago;
Maria,
from
whom
respondents
descended
and
trace
their
claim
of
ownership
and
right
of
possession;
Petra,
Mariano,
Teodoro
Teodoro’s
father;
and
Ana.
Genaro
and
his
children
are
all
deceased.
Petra’s
holographic
will,
which
was
validly
asserted
ownership,
devised
the
subject
property
to
Teodoro
Teodoro.
Teodoro
Teodoro
effected
the
demolition
of
the
ancestral
house,
intending
to
use
the
subject
property
for
other
purposes.
Respondents,
who
resided
at
portions
that
surround
the
subject
property
on
which
the
ancestral
house
previously
stood,
erected
a
fence
on
the
surrounding
portion,
barricaded
its
frontage,
and
put
up
a
sign
thereat,
effectively
dispossessing
Teodoro
Teodoro
of
the
property
bequeathed
to
him
by
Petra.
After
Teodoro
Teodoro’s
demand
for
respondents
to
vacate
the
subject
property
went
unheeded,
he
filed
the
complaint
for
forcible
entry
against
respondents.
Issue:
Is
the
act
of
respondents
in
barricading
the
frontage
of
the
portion
of
Lot
No.
2476
on
which
stood
the
ancestral
house
occupied
by
Petra
amounted
to
Teodoro
Teodoro’s
unlawful
dispossession
thereof
through
the
forcible
entry
of
respondents?
Held:
Yes
Certainly,
and
as
found
by
the
trial
courts,
the
whole
of
Lot
No.
2476
including
the
portion
now
litigated
is,
owing
to
the
fact
that
it
has
remained
registered
in
the
name
of
Genaro
who
is
the
common
ancestor
of
both
parties
herein,
co-‐owned
property.
All,
or
both
Teodoro
Teodoro
and
respondents
are
entitled
to
exercise
the
right
of
possession
as
co-‐owners.
Neither
party
can
exclude
the
other
from
possession.
Although
the
property
remains
unpartitioned,
the
respondents
in
fact
possess
specific
areas.
Teodoro
Teodoro
can
likewise
point
to
a
specific
area,
which
is
that
which
was
possessed
by
Petra.
Teodoro
Teodoro
cannot
be
dispossessed
of
such
area,
not
only
by
virtue
of
Petra’s
bequeathal
in
his
favor
but
also
because
of
his
own
right
of
possession
that
comes
from
his
co-‐ownership
of
the
property.
As
the
RTC
concluded,
petitioners,
as
heirs
substituting
Teodoro
Teodoro
in
this
suit,
should
be
restored
in
the
lawful
possession
of
the
disputed
area.
66
x
x
x
The
ground
rules
in
forcible
entry
cases:
(1)
One
employs
force,
intimidation,
threat,
strategy
or
stealth
to
deprive
another
of
physical
possession
of
real
property.
(2)
Plaintiff
(Teodoro
Teodoro)
must
allege
and
prove
prior
physical
possession
of
the
property
in
litigation
until
deprived
thereof
by
the
defendant
(herein
respondents).
This
requirement
implies
that
the
possession
of
the
disputed
land
by
the
latter
was
unlawful
from
the
beginning.
(3)
The
sole
question
for
resolution
hinges
on
the
physical
or
material
possession
(possession
de
facto)
of
the
property.
Neither
a
claim
of
juridical
possession
(possession
de
jure)
nor
an
averment
of
ownership
by
the
defendant
can,
at
the
outset,
preclude
the
court
from
taking
cognizance
of
the
case.
(4)
Ejectment
cases
proceed
independently
of
any
claim
of
ownership,
and
the
plaintiff
needs
merely
to
prove
prior
possession
de
facto
and
undue
deprivation
thereof.
67
Antonio
James
et.
al.
vs.
Eurem
Realty
Development
Corporation
G.R.
No.
190650
October
14,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Reyes
Topic:
Quieting
of
Title
Facts:
On
September
17,
2003,
the
heirs
of
Gorgonio
(petitioners)
filed
Civil
Case
for
Declaration
of
Nullity
of
Title
and
Ownership
of
Real
Property
with
Damages
against
Eurem
Realty
Development
Corporation
(respondent).
They
alleged
that
they
are
the
registered
owners
and
possessors
of
a
448
sqm
property
in
Dipolog
City
while
respondent
is
the
registered
owner
of
a
344-‐sq
m
portion
of
the
same
property
owned
by
the
petitioners
which
the
respondent
derived
its
title
from
Lopez
who
executed
in
its
favor
a
Deed
of
Assignment
and
Exchange
on
September
6,
1990.
In
turn,
Lopez
derived
his
title
from
Primitivo
(Gorgonio’s
brother)
in
which
there
is
an
annotation
made
that
TCT
in
the
name
of
Primitivo
as
null
and
void,
and
ordering
the
partition
among
the
heirs
of
Butler
James
in
accordance
with
the
terms
of
“Partition
Extrajudicially”
executed
on
October
21,
1949.
The
said
annotation
was
not
carried
on
in
the
respondent’s
name
that
made
his
title
void
ab
initio
as
its
predecessor-‐in-‐interest
Lopez
derived
his
title
from
Primitivo’s
void
title.
They
emphasized
that
Lopez
acted
in
bad
faith
in
assigning
the
property
to
the
respondent
as
he
knew
fully
well
that
he
had
no
right
or
interest
over
said
property
and
the
respondent
has
knowledge
of
Lopez’s
bad
faith
since
it
is
a
corporation
organized
by
Lopez.
They
are
basically
praying
for
nullification
of
respondent’s
title
and
to
be
declared
as
the
lawful
owner
of
the
entire
subject
property.
However
respondent
argued
that
the
complaint
is
barred
by
prior
judgment
(res
judicata)
and
that
prescription
has
already
set
in.
The
heirs
of
Gorgonio
was
the
defendant
in
Civil
Case
for
recovery
of
possession
and
damages
filed
by
Lopez
in
which
the
court
declared
Lopez
as
the
lawful
and
absolute
owner
and
possessor
of
the
said
lot.
Further,
petitioners
filed
the
complaint
in
Declaration
of
Nullity
of
Title
and
Ownership
of
Real
Property
with
Damages
on
September
17,
2003,
or
more
than
30
years
after
its
predecessor-‐in-‐interest
Lopez
bought
the
property
from
Primitivo
way
back
in
April
25,
1972.
Hence,
such
action
was
barred
by
prescription.
Issue:
Is
the
petitioners’
action
is
barred
by
prescription?
Held:
No.
Parenthetically,
there
are
two
kinds
of
prescription
provided
in
the
Civil
Code.
One
is
acquisitive,
i.e.,
the
acquisition
of
a
right
by
the
lapse
of
time;
the
other
is
extinctive,
whereby
rights
and
actions
are
lost
by
the
lapse
of
time.
The
kind
of
prescription
raised
by
the
respondent
pertains
to
extinctive
prescription.
The
action
filed
by
the
petitioners
is
essentially
one
for
quieting
of
title.
An
action
to
quiet
title
is
a
common
law
remedy
designed
for
the
removal
of
any
cloud
upon,
or
doubt,
or
uncertainty
affecting
title
to
real
property.
The
pleadings
filed
in
this
case
show
that
both
the
petitioners
and
respondent
have
title
over
the
same
property,
albeit
the
petitioners’
title
covers
448
sq
m,
while
that
of
the
respondent’s
68
covers
a
344-‐sq
m
portion
thereof.
It
likewise
appears
from
the
records
that
both
parties
are
in
possession
of
their
respective
portions
of
the
property.
In
an
action
for
quieting
of
title,
the
competent
court
is
tasked
to
determine
the
respective
rights
of
the
complainant
and
the
other
claimants,
not
only
to
place
things
in
their
proper
places,
and
make
the
claimant,
who
has
no
rights
to
the
immovable,
respect
and
not
disturb
the
one
so
entitled,
but
also
for
the
benefit
of
both,
so
that
whoever
has
the
right
will
see
every
cloud
of
doubt
over
the
property
dissipated,
and
he
can
thereafter
fearlessly
introduce
any
desired
improvements,
as
well
as
use,
and
even
abuse
the
property.
An
action
to
quiet
title
is
a
real
action
over
immovables,
which
prescribes
after
thirty
years.
Thus,
even
assuming
that
the
petitioners’
action
is
subject
to
extinctive
prescription,
it
was
error
for
the
RTC
to
reckon
the
date
when
prescription
began
to
run
solely
on
the
date
of
the
issuance
of
Lopez’s
title
on
October
11,
1972.
The
petitioners
cannot
be
expected
to
file
the
action
after
the
issuance
of
Lopez’s
title
since
at
that
time,
the
appeal,
the
case
between
their
predecessor
Gorgonio
and
his
siblings
as
against
their
other
sibling
Primitivo,
was
still
pending
and
was
only
resolved
with
finality
by
the
CA
only
on
November
7,
1978.
The
appeal
in
the
case
between
Lopez
and
Gorgonio,
meanwhile,
was
dismissed
by
the
CA
with
finality
only
on
August
17,
1978.
It
should
also
be
noted
that
what
is
being
attacked
is
the
respondent’s
TCT
which
was
issued
on
March
2,
1992.
Thus,
reckoning
the
prescriptive
period
from
said
date,
the
30-‐year
period
clearly
has
not
yet
lapsed
since
the
complaint
was
filed
only
on
September
17,
2003.
69
Heirs
of
Albina
G.
Ampil
vs.
Teresa
and
Mario
Manahan
G.R.
No.
175990
October
11,
2012
Ponente:
J.
Mendoza
Topic:
Ownership
Facts:
Exequiel
G.
Ampil,
as
representative
of
the
heirs
of
the
late
Albina
G.
Ampil
filed
a
complaint
for
ejectment
against
spouses
Perfecto
Manahan
and
Virginia
Manahan,
Teresita
Manahan,
Almario
Manahan,
Irene
Manahan
and
all
persons
claiming
rights
under
them.
It
was
alleged
that
Albina
was
the
owner
of
two
(2)
adjoining
residential
lots.
They
asserted
that
during
her
lifetime,
Albina
allowed
Perfecto
and
his
family
to
occupy
a
portion
of
the
said
properties
on
the
condition
that
they
would
vacate
the
same
should
the
need
to
use
it
arise.
After
the
death
of
Albina
in
1986,
her
heirs,
represented
by
Exequiel,
requested
Perfecto
and
family
to
vacate
the
property
in
question
but
the
latter
refused.
Petitioners,
through
counsel,
sent
a
demand
letter
to
the
respondents
to
surrender
possession
of
the
lands
in
question
but
to
no
avail.
Consequently,
petitioners
filed
a
complaint
for
ejectment
before
the
Municipal
Trial
Court.
The
respondents
filed
their
answer
with
counterclaim
averring
that
the
lots
they
had
been
occupying
belonged
to
them,
their
predecessor-‐in-‐interest
having
been
in
peaceful
and
continuous
possession
thereof
in
the
concept
of
an
owner
since
time
immemorial
and
that
Albina
was
never
the
owner
of
the
property.
Issue:
1.
Did
Exequiel
have
the
authority
to
file
the
complaint
on
behalf
of
his
co-‐heirs?
2.
Can
Exequiel
prove
his
ownership
through
tax
declarations,
despite
them
not
being
conclusive?
Held:
Issue
1:
Yes.
“Article
487
of
the
Civil
Code
provides
that
anyone
of
the
co-‐owners
may
bring
an
action
for
ejectment
without
joining
the
others.
The
action
is
not
limited
to
ejectment
cases
but
includes
all
kinds
of
suits
for
recovery
of
possession
because
the
suit
is
presumed
to
have
been
instituted
for
the
benefit
of
all.”
x
x
x
“In
the
case
at
bench,
the
complaint
clearly
stated
that
the
disputed
property
was
held
in
common
by
the
petitioners;
and
that
the
action
was
brought
to
recover
possession
of
the
lots
from
respondents
for
the
benefit
of
all
the
heirs
of
Albina.
Hence,
Exequiel,
a
co-‐owner,
may
bring
the
action
for
unlawful
detainer
even
without
the
special
power
of
attorney
of
his
co-‐heirs,
for
a
complete
relief
can
be
accorded
in
the
suit
even
without
their
participation
because
the
suit
is
deemed
to
be
instituted
for
the
benefit
of
all
the
co-‐owners.”
Issue
2:
Yes.
“In
an
unlawful
detainer
case,
the
physical
or
material
possession
of
the
property
involved,
independent
of
any
claim
of
ownership
by
any
of
the
parties,
is
the
sole
issue
for
resolution.
But
where
the
issue
of
ownership
is
raised,
the
courts
may
pass
upon
said
issue
in
order
to
determine
who
has
the
right
to
possess
the
property.
This
adjudication,
however,
is
only
an
initial
determination
of
ownership
for
the
purpose
of
settling
the
issue
of
possession,
the
issue
of
ownership
being
inseparably
linked
70
thereto.
As
such,
the
lower
court’s
adjudication
of
ownership
in
the
ejectment
case
is
merely
provisional
and
would
not
bar
or
prejudice
an
action
between
the
same
parties
involving
title
to
the
property.
In
the
case
at
bench,
the
Court
sustains
the
findings
of
both
the
MTC
and
the
RTC.
The
bare
allegation
of
respondents,
that
they
had
been
in
peaceful
and
continuous
possession
of
the
lot
in
question
because
their
predecessor-‐in-‐interest
had
been
in
possession
thereof
in
the
concept
of
an
owner
from
time
immemorial,
cannot
prevail
over
the
tax
declarations
and
other
documentary
evidence
presented
by
petitioners.
In
the
absence
of
any
supporting
evidence,
that
of
the
petitioners
deserves
more
probative
value.
A
perusal
of
the
records
shows
that
respondents’
occupation
of
the
lot
in
question
was
by
mere
tolerance.
To
prove
ownership
over
the
property,
the
petitioners
presented
the
tax
declarations
covering
the
properties
and
a
certification
issued
by
the
Municipality
of
Paombong,
Bulacan,
showing
that
their
mother,
Albina,
had
been
paying
the
corresponding
real
property
taxes
thereon.
Petitioners
also
submitted
a
survey
plan,
dated
August
5,
1968,
prepared
by
Geodetic
Engineer
Roberto
H.
Dimailig,
in
support
of
Albina’s
application
for
land
registration
over
the
disputed
lots.
In
fact,
on
December
14,
2006,
the
Registry
of
Deeds
of
Bulacan
issued
Katibayan
ng
Orihinal
na
Titulo
Blg.
P-‐13627,
conferring
title
over
Lot
742
in
the
names
of
the
heirs
of
Albina.”
x
x
x
“Well
established
is
the
rule
that
ownership
over
the
land
cannot
be
acquired
by
mere
occupation.
While
it
is
true
that
tax
declarations
are
not
conclusive
evidence
of
ownership,
they,
nevertheless,
constitute
at
least
proof
that
the
holder
has
a
claim
of
title
over
the
property.
It
strengthens
one's
bona
fide
claim
of
acquisition
of
ownership.”
71
Gaudencio
Pacete
vs.
Inocencio
Asotigue
G.R.
No.
188575
December
10,
2012
Ponente:
J.
Mendoza
Topic:
Ownership
Facts:
Asotigue
filed
a
complaint
for
reconveyance
and
damages
against
Pacete
before
the
RTC
which
he
averred
that
he
acquired
the
disputed
land,
denominated
as
Lot
No.
5-‐A,
from
Rizalino
Umpad
and
that
he
had
been
in
possession
and
occupation
of
the
said
lot
openly,
publicly,
notoriously,
and
in
the
concept
of
an
owner
for
more
than
21
years.
He
had
declared
the
lot
in
his
name
for
taxation
purposes,
paying
faithfully
the
real
taxes
due
thereon,
as
shown
by
his
Tax
Declaration
and
that
he
introduced
permanent
improvements
on
the
said
lot
by
planting
considerable
number
of
rubber
trees
and
other
fruit-‐bearing
trees.
He
said
that
the
present
dispute
arose
when
he
found
out
for
the
first
time,
upon
filing
his
application
for
title
over
the
said
lot,
that
it
was
included
in
Pacete’s
OCT
and
that
he
then
demanded
from
Pacete
the
reconveyance
of
the
said
lot,
but
his
demand
was
unheeded.
Pacete
denied
the
material
allegations
of
Asotigue
and
asserted
that
he
was
the
owner
of
the
disputed
lot,
presenting
OCT
No.
issued
on
July
13,
1961
as
evidence
of
his
ownership.
He
claimed
that
sometime
in
1979,
Asotigue,
by
stealth,
strategy
and
prior
knowledge,
entered
the
disputed
lot
and
started
planting
trees
despite
his
demand
to
vacate
the
said
lot.
Asotigue
testified
that
the
disputed
lot
was
previously
owned
by
Sambutuan
Sumagad,
a
native.
The
lot
was
mortgaged
by
Sumagad
to
Pasague
who
later
on
bought
it.
Pasague
then
sold
the
lot
to
Umpad
by
way
of
Relinquishment
of
Rights
and
Improvements.
Asotigue
bought
the
lot
from
Umpad
by
way
of
Transfer
of
Rights
and
Improvements.
Asotigue
then
entered
the
lot
and
planted,
among
others,
rubber
trees,
fruit
trees
and
coconut
trees.
According
to
him,
he
failed
to
apply
for
a
title
over
the
said
lot
due
to
financial
constraint.
Nonetheless,
he
declared
the
same
for
taxation
purposes
under
his
name
and
consistently
paid
the
real
taxes
due
thereon.
To
strengthen
his
claim
of
ownership,
Asotigue
also
submitted
documentary
evidence,
among
which
were
copies
of
the
Transfer
of
Rights
and
Improvements
and
Tax
Declarations
under
his
name.
Issue:
Is
the
OCT
issued
in
Pacete’s
name
in
1961
an
unassailable
evidence
of
his
ownership
over
the
disputed
lot
having
been
issued
pursuant
to
the
Torrens
System
of
Registration?
Held:
No.
“On
the
issue
of
whether
Pacete’s
title,
OCT
No.
V-‐16654,
which
had
included
the
lot
in
dispute,
can
be
considered
unassailable
evidence
of
his
ownership
over
the
disputed
lot,
the
Court
rules
in
the
negative.
It
must
be
stressed
that
both
the
RTC
and
the
CA
have
passed
upon
this
factual
issue.
In
affirming
the
RTC,
the
CA
made
the
following
findings:
Plaintiff’s
evidence
proves
that
all
transactions
involving
the
conveyance
or
transfer
of
rights
and
improvements
of
the
land
in
litigation
were
with
the
knowledge
and
even
consent
of
defendant.
Defendant
even
accompanied
Pasague,
Sumagad,
Datu
Balimba,
Datu
Masagra
and
Brgy.
Chairman
Abay
when
this
land
was
conveyed
to
Umpad
by
Pasague.
Umpad
later
on
conveyed
this
land
to
plaintiff.
This
72
land
was
conveyed
from
Sumagad
to
Pasague,
then
Pasague
to
Umpad
and
finally
to
plaintiff.
From
all
these
conveyances
defendant
did
not
make
any
claim
on
the
land.
He
did
not
oppose
any
transfer
from
one
person
to
another.
It
was
the
third
transfer
to
plaintiff
that
defendant
had
laid
claim.
x
x
x.
The
transfer
from
Pasague
to
Umpad
was
done
on
March
19,
1971.
The
sale
by
Sumagad
to
Pasague
was
obviously
on
a
much
earlier
date.
The
land
was
granted
to
defendant
in
1961.
Original
Certificate
of
Title
No.
V-‐16654
(Exh.
"1")
was
issued
in
his
favor.
Defendant
therefore
was
aware
that
the
portion
of
this
land
was
conveyed
by
Sumagad,
then
Pasague,
then
Umpad
and
ultimately
to
plaintiff.
He
did
not
protest
their
occupation
until
the
year
2000.
The
possession
of
Sumagad
in
1958
tacked
to
the
possession
of
Pasague,
Umpad
and
plaintiff
was
more
than
thirty
(30)
years.
When
Sumagad
took
possession
on
the
land,
it
was
still
alienable
and
disposable.
The
title
to
defendant
was
only
issued
in
1961.
x
x
x.
Plaintiff
had,
therefore,
acquired
by
operation
of
law
a
right
to
a
grant,
a
government
grant
without
the
necessity
of
a
certificate
of
title
being
issued
on
the
land
he
is
now
in
possession
and
cultivation.
Records
also
show
that
when
the
disputed
lot
was
conveyed
by
Pasague
to
Umpad,
Pacete
never
objected
to
it.
Neither
did
he
file
a
suit
against
Pasague
over
the
said
transfer
to
protect
his
supposed
interest
over
the
said
lot.
In
fact,
the
testimony
of
Pasague
taken
on
12
November
2001
will
bolster
the
fact
that
Pacete
had
full
knowledge
of
the
conveyance
or
transfer
of
the
said
lot
made
by
Pasague
to
Umpad”
x
x
x
“Thus,
Pacete
cannot
therefore
rely
on
his
OCT
No.
V-‐16654
as
an
unassailable
evidence
of
his
ownership
over
the
disputed
property.
The
Land
Registration
Act
and
the
Cadastral
Act
only
protect
holders
of
a
title
in
good
faith
and
do
not
permit
their
provisions
to
be
used
as
a
shield
to
enrich
oneself
at
the
expense
of
another.
As
correctly
found
by
the
CA,
Pacete
cannot
rely
on
his
OCT
No.
V-‐
16654
as
an
incontrovertible
proof
of
his
ownership
over
the
property
in
dispute
because
he
was
not
in
good
faith
when
he
obtained
the
said
title
as
he
was
fully
aware
of
the
conveyance
of
the
said
lot
between
Pasague
and
Umpad.
Reconveyance
is
proper
under
the
circumstances.
Reconveyance
is
available
not
only
to
the
legal
owner
of
a
property
but
also
to
the
person
with
a
better
right
than
the
person
under
whose
name
said
property
was
erroneously
registered.
Although
Asotigue
is
not
the
titled
owner
of
the
disputed
lot,
he
apparently
has
a
better
right
than
Pacete,
the
latter
not
being
in
good
faith
when
he
obtained
his
title
to
the
said
property.”
73
SUCCESSION
CASES
74
Jose
Casilang
Sr.
vs.
Rosario
Casilang-‐Dizon,
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
180269
February
20,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Reyes
Topic:
Partition
Facts:
The
late
spouses
Liborio
and
Francisca
had
8
children,
namely:
Felicidad,
Ireneo,
Marcelina,
Jacinta,
Bonifacio,
Leonora,
Jose
and
Flora.
Liborio
died
intestate
followed
not
long
after
by
his
wife
Francisca.
Their
son
Bonifacio
also
died
in
1986,
survived
by
his
child
Bernabe,
while
son
Ireneo
died
on
June
11,
1992,
survived
by
his
four
children,
namely:
Mario,
Angelo,
Rosario
and
Rodolfo,
herein
respondents.
Rosario,
et.
al.
executed
a
Deed
of
Extrajudicial
Partition
with
Quitclaim
whereby
they
adjudicated
Lot
No.
4618
to
themselves.
In
the
same
instrument,
respondents
Mario,
Angelo
and
Rodolfo
renounced
their
respective
shares
in
Lot
No.
4618
in
favor
of
Rosario.
Rosario
filed
with
the
Municipal
Trial
Court
(MTC)
of
Calasiao,
Pangasinan
a
complaint
for
unlawful
detainer,
to
evict
her
uncle,
petitioner
Jose
from
Lot
No.
4618.
Rosario
claimed
that
Lot
No.
4618
was
owned
by
her
father
Ireneo,
as
evidenced
by
Tax
Declaration
No.
555
under
her
father’s
name.
In
his
Answer,
Jose
raised
the
defense
that
he
was
the
"lawful,
absolute,
exclusive
owner
and
in
actual
possession"
of
the
said
lot,
and
that
he
acquired
the
same
"through
intestate
succession
from
his
late
father."
The
MTC
rendered
judgment
finding
Rosario
to
be
the
owner
of
Lot
No.
4618,
and
ordering
Jose
to
remove
his
house,
vacate
Lot
No.
4618.
The
petitioners,
counting
7
of
the
8
children
of
Liborio
and
Francisca,
filed
with
the
RTC
of
Dagupan
City
a
Complaint
for
"Annulment
of
Documents,
Ownership
and
Peaceful
Possession
with
Damages"
against
Rosario,
et.
al.
The
petitioners
alleged
in
their
complaint
that
all
eight
children
of
Liborio
entered
into
a
verbal
partition
of
his
estate,
pursuant
to
which
Jose
was
allotted
Lot
No.
4618
as
his
share.
Rosario
alleged
that
she
is
the
actual
and
lawful
owner
of
Lot
No.
4618,
having
acquired
the
same
by
way
of
a
Deed
of
Extra
judicial
Partition
with
Quitclaim
which
was
duly
executed
among
her
and
her
brothers
and
that
her
ownership
over
subject
property
could
be
traced
back
to
her
late
father
Ireneo
which
the
latter
inherited
by
way
of
intestate
succession
from
his
deceased
father
Liborio.
Issue:
Can
the
subject
lot
be
adjudicated
to
Jose
Casilang
Sr.
through
oral
partition
invalidating
the
deed
of
extrajudicial
partition
and
quitclaim
by
Rosario?
Held:
Yes.
“A
review
of
the
parties’
evidence
shows
that
they
entered
into
an
oral
partition,
giving
Lot
No.
4618
to
Jose
as
his
share,
whereas
Rosario
presented
no
proof
whatsoever
that
her
father
inherited
Lot
No.
4618
from
his
father
Liborio.
Rosario’s
only
proof
of
Ireneo’s
ownership
is
TD
No.
555,
issued
in
his
name,
but
she
did
not
bother
to
explain
why
it
was
dated
1994,
although
Ireneo
died
on
June
11,
1992.
Liborio’s
ownership
of
Lot
No.
4618
is
admitted
by
all
the
parties,
but
it
must
be
asked
whether
in
his
lifetime
Liborio
did
in
fact
transmit
it
to
Ireneo,
and
if
not,
whether
it
was
conveyed
to
him
by
Liborio’s
heirs.
It
is
imperative
for
75
Rosario
to
have
presented
proof
of
this
transfer
to
Ireneo,
in
such
a
form
as
would
have
vested
ownership
in
him.
We
find,
instead,
a
preponderance
of
contrary
evidence.
“The
validity
of
an
oral
partition
is
well-‐settled
in
our
jurisdiction.
In
Vda.
de
Espina
v.
Abaya,
this
Court
declared
that
an
oral
partition
is
valid:
Anent
the
issue
of
oral
partition,
We
sustain
the
validity
of
said
partition.
"An
agreement
of
partition
may
be
made
orally
or
in
writing.
An
oral
agreement
for
the
partition
of
the
property
owned
in
common
is
valid
and
enforceable
upon
the
parties.
The
Statute
of
Frauds
has
no
operation
in
this
kind
of
agreements,
for
partition
is
not
a
conveyance
of
property
but
simply
a
segregation
and
designation
of
the
part
of
the
property
which
belong
to
the
co-‐owners."
“In
numerous
cases
it
has
been
held
or
stated
that
parol
partition
may
be
sustained
on
the
ground
of
estoppel
of
the
parties
to
assert
the
rights
of
a
tenant
in
common
as
to
parts
of
land
divided
by
parol
partition
as
to
which
possession
in
severalty
was
taken
and
acts
of
individual
ownership
were
exercised.
And
a
court
of
equity
will
recognize
the
agreement
and
decree
it
to
be
valid
and
effectual
for
the
purpose
of
concluding
the
right
of
the
parties
as
between
each
other
to
hold
their
respective
parts
in
severalty.
A
parol
partition
may
also
be
sustained
on
the
ground
that
the
parties
thereto
have
acquiesced
in
and
ratified
the
partition
by
taking
possession
in
severalty,
exercising
acts
of
ownership
with
respect
thereto,
or
otherwise
recognizing
the
existence
of
the
partition.”
76
Maria
Mendoza,
et.
al.
v.
Julia
Policarpio
Delos
Santos
G.R.
No.
176422
March
20,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Reyes
Topic:
Reserva
Troncal
Facts:
Petitioners
are
grandchildren
of
Placido
Mendoza
and
Dominga
Mendoza.
Placido
and
Dominga
had
4
children:
Antonio,
Exequiel,
married
to
Leonor,
Apolonio
and
Valentin.
Petitioners
Maria,
Deogracias,
Dionisia,
Adoracion,
Marcela
and
Ricardo
are
the
children
of
Antonio.
Respondents
on
the
other
hand
are
Valentin’s
children:
Juliana,
Fely,
Mercedes,
Elvira
and
Fortunato.
Petitioners
alleged
that
the
properties
were
part
of
Placido
and
Dominga’s
properties
that
were
subject
of
an
oral
partition
and
subsequently
adjudicated
to
Exequiel.
After
Exequiel’s
death,
it
passed
on
to
his
spouse
Leonor
and
only
daughter,
Gregoria.
After
Leonor’s
death,
her
share
went
to
Gregoria.
Gregoria
died
intestate
and
without
issue.
They
claimed
that
after
Gregoria’s
death,
respondent,
who
is
Leonor’s
sister,
adjudicated
unto
herself
all
these
properties
as
the
sole
surviving
heir
of
Leonor
and
Gregoria.
Hence,
Mendoza,
et.
al.
claim
that
the
properties
should
have
been
reserved
by
Delos
Santos
in
their
behalf
and
must
now
revert
back
to
them,
applying
Article
891
of
the
Civil
Code
on
reserva
troncal.
Delos
Santos,
however,
denies
any
obligation
to
reserve
the
properties
as
these
did
not
originate
from
Mendoza’s
familial
line
and
were
not
originally
owned
by
Placido
and
Dominga.
According
to
her,
the
properties
were
bought
by
Exequiel
and
Antonio
from
a
certain
Alfonso
Ramos.
The
Regional
Trial
Court
(RTC)
of
Malolos,
Bulacan,
Branch
6,
found
merit
in
Mendoza’s
claim
and
granted
their
action
for
Recovery
of
Possession
by
Reserva
Troncal.
The
CA
ruled
that
Mendoza
failed
to
establish
that
Placido
and
Dominga
owned
the
properties
in
dispute.
The
CA
also
ruled
that
even
assuming
that
Placido
and
Dominga
previously
owned
the
properties,
it
still
cannot
be
subject
to
reserva
troncal
as
neither
Exequiel
predeceased
Placido
and
Dominga
nor
did
Gregoria
predecease
Exequiel.
Issue:
Are
the
properties
reservable
and
is
it
sufficient
that
the
properties
came
from
the
paternal
line
of
Gregoria
for
it
to
be
subject
to
reserva
troncal?
Held:
No.
“There
are
three
(3)
lines
of
transmission
in
reserva
troncal.
The
first
transmission
is
by
gratuitous
title,
whether
by
inheritance
or
donation,
from
an
ascendant/brother/sister
to
a
descendant
called
the
prepositus.
The
second
transmission
is
by
operation
of
law
from
the
prepositus
to
the
other
ascendant
or
reservor,
also
called
the
reservista.
The
third
and
last
transmission
is
from
the
reservista
to
the
reservees
or
reservatarios
who
must
be
relatives
within
the
third
degree
from
which
the
property
came.”
“It
should
be
pointed
out
that
the
ownership
of
the
properties
should
be
reckoned
only
from
Exequiel’s
as
he
is
the
ascendant
from
where
the
first
transmission
occurred,
or
from
whom
Gregoria
inherited
the
properties
in
dispute.
The
law
does
not
go
farther
than
such
ascendant/brother/sister
in
determining
77
the
lineal
character
of
the
property.
It
was
also
immaterial
for
the
CA
to
determine
whether
Exequiel
predeceased
Placido
and
Dominga
or
whether
Gregoria
predeceased
Exequiel.
What
is
pertinent
is
that
Exequiel
owned
the
properties
and
he
is
the
ascendant
from
whom
the
properties
in
dispute
originally
came.
Gregoria,
on
the
other
hand,
is
the
descendant
who
received
the
properties
from
Exequiel
by
gratuitous
title.
Moreover,
Article
891
simply
requires
that
the
property
should
have
been
acquired
by
the
descendant
or
prepositus
from
an
ascendant
by
gratuitous
or
lucrative
title.
A
transmission
is
gratuitous
or
by
gratuitous
title
when
the
recipient
does
not
give
anything
in
return.
At
risk
of
being
repetitious,
what
was
clearly
established
in
this
case
is
that
the
properties
in
dispute
were
owned
by
Exequiel
(ascendant).
After
his
death,
Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus)
acquired
the
properties
as
inheritance.”
x
x
x
“Gregoria’s
ascendants
are
her
parents,
Exequiel
and
Leonor,
her
grandparents,
great-‐grandparents
and
so
on.
On
the
other
hand,
Gregoria’s
descendants,
if
she
had
one,
would
be
her
children,
grandchildren
and
great-‐grandchildren.
Not
being
Gregoria’s
ascendants,
both
petitioners
and
Julia,
therefore,
are
her
collateral
relatives.
In
determining
the
collateral
line
of
relationship,
ascent
is
made
to
the
common
ancestor
and
then
descent
to
the
relative
from
whom
the
computation
is
made.
In
the
case
of
Julia’s
collateral
relationship
with
Gregoria,
ascent
is
to
be
made
from
Gregoria
to
her
mother
Leonor
(one
line/degree),
then
to
the
common
ancestor,
that
is,
Julia
and
Leonor’s
parents
(second
line/degree),
and
then
descent
to
Julia,
her
aunt
(third
line/degree).
Thus,
Julia
is
Gregoria’s
collateral
relative
within
the
third
degree
and
not
her
ascendant.”
x
x
x
“Moreover,
petitioners
cannot
be
considered
reservees/reservatarios
as
they
are
not
relatives
within
the
third
degree
of
Gregoria
from
whom
the
properties
came.
The
person
from
whom
the
degree
should
be
reckoned
is
the
descendant/prepositus―the
one
at
the
end
of
the
line
from
which
the
property
came
and
upon
whom
the
property
last
revolved
by
descent.
It
is
Gregoria
in
this
case.
Petitioners
are
Gregoria’s
fourth
degree
relatives,
being
her
first
cousins.
First
cousins
of
the
prepositus
are
fourth
degree
relatives
and
are
not
reservees
or
reservatarios.”
x
x
x
“Following
the
order
prescribed
by
law
in
legitimate
succession,
when
there
are
relatives
of
the
descendant
within
the
third
degree,
the
right
of
the
nearest
relative,
called
reservatario,
over
the
property
which
the
reservista
(person
holding
it
subject
to
reservation)
should
return
to
him,
excludes
that
of
the
one
more
remote.
The
right
of
representation
cannot
be
alleged
when
the
one
claiming
same
as
a
reservatario
of
the
reservable
property
is
not
among
the
relatives
within
the
third
degree
belong
to
the
line
from
which
such
property
came,
inasmuch
as
the
right
granted
by
the
Civil
Code
in
Article
811
now
Article
891
is
in
the
highest
degree
personal
and
for
the
exclusive
benefit
of
the
designated
persons
who
are
the
relatives,
within
the
third
degree,
of
the
person
from
whom
the
reservable
property
came.
Therefore,
relatives
of
the
fourth
and
the
succeeding
degrees
can
never
be
considered
as
reservatarios,
since
the
law
does
not
recognize
them
as
such.”
78
Carolina
Vda.
De
Figuracion,
et.
al.
vs.
Emilia
Figuracion-‐Gerilla
G.R.
No.
151334
February
13,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Reyes
Topic:
Partition
Facts:
Leandro
Figuracion
died
intestate
and
the
parties
herein
are
his
heirs.
Petitioner
Carolina
is
the
surviving
spouse.
The
other
petitioners
–
Elena
Figuracion-‐Ancheta,
Hilaria
A.
Figuracion,
Felipa
Figuracion-‐
Manuel,
Quintin
Figuracion,
and
Mary
Figuracion-‐Ginez
–
and
respondent
Emilia
were
Carolina
and
Leandro’s
children.
Subject
of
the
dispute
are
2
parcels
of
land
which
were
acquired
by
Leandro
during
his
lifetime.
Both
lands
were
registered
in
the
name
of
Leandro
Figuracion
married
to
Carolina
Adviento.
Leandro
executed
a
Deed
of
Quitclaim
over
the
above
real
properties
in
favor
of
his
6
children.
Their
shares,
however,
were
not
delineated
with
particularity
because
spouses
Leandro
and
Carolina
reserved
the
lots
and
its
fruits
for
their
expenses.
Also
involved
in
the
controversy
is
Lot
No.
707
originally
owned
by
Eulalio
Adviento,
covered
by
OCT
No.
15867
issued
in
his
name.
Eulalio
begot
Agripina
Adviento
with
his
first
wife
Marcela
Estioko,
whom
Eulalio
survived.
When
he
remarried,
Eulalio
had
another
daughter,
herein
petitioner
Carolina,
with
his
second
wife,
Faustina
Escabesa.
Agripina
executed
a
Deed
of
Quitclaim
over
the
eastern
half
of
Lot
No.
707
in
favor
of
her
niece,
herein
respondent
Emilia.
Petitioner
Carolina
executed
an
Affidavit
of
Self-‐Adjudication,
adjudicating
unto
herself
the
entire
Lot
No.
707
as
the
sole
and
exclusive
heir
of
her
deceased
parents,
Eulalio
and
Faustina.
Carolina
also
executed
a
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
No.
707
in
favor
of
petitioners
Hilaria
and
Felipa,
who
in
turn
immediately
caused
the
cancellation
of
OCT
No.
15867
and
the
issuance
of
TCT
No.
42244
in
their
names.
Emilia
and
her
family
went
to
the
United
States
and
returned
to
the
Philippines
only
in
1981.
Upon
her
return
and
relying
on
the
Deed
of
Quitclaim,
she
built
a
house
on
the
eastern
half
of
Lot
No.
707.
The
legal
debacle
of
the
Figuracions
started
in
1994
when
Hilaria
and
her
agents
threatened
to
demolish
the
house
of
Emilia
who,
in
retaliation,
was
prompted
to
seek
the
partition
of
Lot
No.
707.
Issue:
Can
Emilia
compel
the
partition
of
Lot
No.
707?
Held:
Yes.
“The
first
stage
in
an
action
for
partition
is
the
settlement
of
the
issue
of
ownership.
Such
an
action
will
not
lie
if
the
claimant
has
no
rightful
interest
in
the
subject
property.
In
fact,
the
parties
filing
the
action
are
required
by
the
Rules
of
Court
to
set
forth
in
their
complaint
the
nature
and
the
extent
of
their
title
to
the
property.
It
would
be
premature
to
effect
a
partition
until
and
unless
the
question
of
ownership
is
first
definitely
resolved.
Here,
the
respondent
traces
her
ownership
over
the
eastern
half
of
Lot
No.
707
from
the
Deed
of
Quitclaimexecuted
by
Agripina,
who
in
turn,
was
the
co-‐owner
thereof
being
one
of
the
legitimate
heirs
of
Eulalio.
It
is
well
to
recall
that
the
petitioners
failed
to
categorically
dispute
the
existence
of
the
Deed
79
of
Quitclaim.
Instead,
they
averred
that
it
has
been
rendered
ineffective
by
TCT
No.
42244
in
the
name
of
Felipa
and
Hilaria―this
contention
is,
of
course,
flawed.
Mere
issuance
of
a
certificate
of
title
in
the
name
of
any
person
does
not
foreclose
the
possibility
that
the
real
property
may
be
under
coownership
with
persons
not
named
in
the
certificate,
or
that
the
registrant
may
only
be
a
trustee,
or
that
other
parties
may
have
acquired
interest
over
the
property
subsequent
to
the
issuance
of
the
certificate
of
title.
Stated
differently,
placing
a
parcel
of
land
under
the
mantle
of
the
Torrens
system
does
not
mean
that
ownership
thereof
can
no
longer
be
disputed.
The
certificate
cannot
always
be
considered
as
conclusive
evidence
of
ownership.
In
this
case,
co-‐ownership
of
Lot
No.
707
was
precisely
what
respondent
Emilia
was
able
to
successfully
establish,
as
correctly
found
by
the
RTC
and
affirmed
by
the
CA.
The
status
of
Agripina
and
Carolina
as
the
legitimate
heirs
of
Eulalio
is
an
undisputed
fact.
As
such
heirs,
they
became
co-‐owners
of
Lot
No.
707
upon
the
death
of
Eulalio
on
July
20,
1930.
Since
Faustina
was
predeceased
by
Eulalio,
she
likewise
became
a
co-‐owner
of
the
lot
upon
Eulalio’s
death.
Faustina’s
share,
however,
passed
on
to
her
daughter
Carolina
when
the
former
died
on
October
18,
1949.
The
Affidavit
of
Self-‐Adjudicationexecuted
by
Carolina
did
not
prejudice
the
share
of
Agripina
because
it
is
not
legally
possible
for
one
to
adjudicate
unto
himself
an
entire
property
he
was
not
the
sole
owner
of.
A
co-‐owner
cannot
alienate
the
shares
of
her
other
co-‐owners
–
nemo
dat
qui
non
habet.
Hence,
Lot
No.
707
was
a
co-‐owned
property
of
Agripina
and
Carolina.
As
co-‐owners,
each
of
them
had
full
ownership
of
her
part
and
of
the
fruits
and
benefits
pertaining
thereto.
Each
of
them
also
had
the
right
to
alienate
the
lot
but
only
in
so
far
as
the
extent
of
her
portion
was
affected.
Thus,
when
Carolina
sold
the
entire
Lot
No.
707
on
December
11,
1962
to
Hilaria
and
Felipa
without
the
consent
of
her
co-‐owner
Agripina,
the
disposition
affected
only
Carolina’s
pro
indiviso
share,
and
the
vendees,
Hilaria
and
Felipa,
acquired
only
what
corresponds
to
Carolina’s
share.
A
co-‐owner
is
entitled
to
sell
his
undivided
share;
hence,
a
sale
of
the
entire
property
by
one
co-‐owner
without
the
consent
of
the
other
co-‐owners
is
not
null
and
void
and
only
the
rights
of
the
co-‐owner/seller
are
transferred,
thereby
making
the
buyer
a
co-‐owner
of
the
property.
Accordingly,
the
deed
of
sale
executed
by
Carolina
in
favor
of
Hilaria
and
Felipa
was
a
valid
conveyance
but
only
insofar
as
the
share
of
Carolina
in
the
co-‐ownership
is
concerned.
As
Carolina’s
successors-‐in-‐
interest
to
the
property,
Hilaria
and
Felipa
could
not
acquire
any
superior
right
in
the
property
than
what
Carolina
is
entitled
to
or
could
transfer
or
alienate
after
partition.
In
a
contract
of
sale
of
co-‐owned
property,
what
the
vendee
obtains
by
virtue
of
such
a
sale
are
the
same
rights
as
the
vendor
had
as
co-‐owner,
and
the
vendee
merely
steps
into
the
shoes
of
the
vendor
as
co-‐owner.
Hilaria
and
Felipa
did
not
acquire
the
undivided
portion
pertaining
to
Agripina,
which
has
already
been
effectively
bequeathed
to
respondent
Emilia
as
early
as
November
28,
1961
thru
the
Deed
of
Quitclaim.
In
turn,
being
the
successor-‐in-‐interest
of
Agripina’s
share
in
Lot
No.
707,
respondent
Emilia
took
the
former’s
place
in
the
co-‐ownership
and
as
such
co-‐owner,
has
the
right
to
compel
partition
at
any
time.
80
Richard
B.
Lopez
v.
Diana
Jeanne
Lopez,
et.
al.
G.R.
No.
189984
November
12,
2012
Ponente:
J.Perlas-‐Bernabe
Topic:
Probate:
Attestation
Clause
Facts:
Enrique
S.
Lopez
died
leaving
his
wife,
Wendy
B.
Lopez,
and
their
four
legitimate
children,
namely,
petitioner
Richard
B.
Lopez
and
the
respondents
Diana
Jeanne
Lopez,
Marybeth
de
Leon
and
Victoria
L.
Tuazon
as
compulsory
heirs.
Before
Enrique’s
death,
he
executed
a
Last
Will
and
Testament
and
constituted
Richard
as
his
executor
and
administrator.
Richard
filed
a
petition
for
the
probate
of
his
father's
Last
Will
and
Testament
before
the
RTC
with
prayer
for
the
issuance
of
letters
testamentary
in
his
favor.
Marybeth
and
Victoria
opposed
the
petition
contending
that
the
purported
last
will
and
testament
was
not
executed
and
attested
as
required
by
law,
and
that
it
was
procured
by
undue
and
improper
pressure
and
influence
on
the
part
of
Richard.
The
RTC
denied
probate.
It
held
that
while
Article
809
of
the
same
Code
requires
mere
substantial
compliance
of
the
form
laid
down
in
Article
805
thereof,
the
rule
only
applies
if
the
number
of
pages
is
reflected
somewhere
else
in
the
will
with
no
evidence
aliunde
or
extrinsic
evidence
required.
While
the
acknowledgment
portion
stated
that
the
will
consists
of
7
pages
including
the
page
on
which
the
ratification
and
acknowledgment
are
written,
the
RTC
observed
that
it
has
8
pages
including
the
acknowledgment
portion.
Issue:
Can
the
fact
that
the
acknowledgment
portion
stated
that
the
will
consisted
of
7
pages
including
the
page
on
which
the
ratification
and
acknowledgment
are
written
when
it
actually
consisted
of
8
pages
be
considered
as
substantial
compliance
in
the
form
of
a
will?
Held:
No.
“The
law
is
clear
that
the
attestation
must
state
the
number
of
pages
used
upon
which
the
will
is
written.
The
purpose
of
the
law
is
to
safeguard
against
possible
interpolation
or
omission
of
one
or
some
of
its
pages
and
prevent
any
increase
or
decrease
in
the
pages.
While
Article
809
allows
substantial
compliance
for
defects
in
the
form
of
the
attestation
clause,
Richard
likewise
failed
in
this
respect.
The
statement
in
the
Acknowledgment
portion
of
the
subject
last
will
and
testament
that
it
"consists
of
7
pages
including
the
page
on
which
the
ratification
and
acknowledgment
are
written"
cannot
be
deemed
substantial
compliance.
The
will
actually
consists
of
8
pages
including
its
acknowledgment
which
discrepancy
cannot
be
explained
by
mere
examination
of
the
will
itself
but
through
the
presentation
of
evidence
aliund.
On
this
score
is
the
comment
of
Justice
J.B.L.
Reyes
regarding
the
application
of
Article
809,
to
wit:
“The
rule
must
be
limited
to
disregarding
those
defects
that
can
be
supplied
by
an
examination
of
the
will
itself:
whether
all
the
pages
are
consecutively
numbered;
whether
the
signatures
appear
in
each
and
every
page;
whether
the
subscribing
witnesses
are
three
or
the
will
was
notarized.
All
these
are
facts
that
the
will
itself
can
reveal,
and
defects
or
even
omissions
concerning
them
in
the
attestation
81
clause
can
be
safely
disregarded.
But
the
total
number
of
pages,
and
whether
all
persons
required
to
sign
did
so
in
the
presence
of
each
other
must
substantially
appear
in
the
attestation
clause,
being
the
only
check
against
perjury
in
the
probate
proceedings.”
82
Antipolo
Ining
et.
al.
vs.
Leonardo
R.
Vega
et.
al
G.R.
No.
174727
August
12,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Del
Castillo
Topic:
Repudiation
of
a
Co-‐owner
Facts:
Leon
Roldan
is
the
owner
of
the
subject
property
in
Aklan.
He
is
married
to
Rafaela
Menez.
Leon
and
Rafaela
died
without
issue.
Leon
was
survived
by
his
siblings
Romana
and
Gregoria
who
are
also
now
both
deceased.
Petitioners
in
this
case,
except
for
Tresvalles
and
Tajonera,
are
Gregoria’s
heirs.
Leonardo
filed
with
the
Regional
Trial
Court
for
partition,
recovery
of
ownership
and
possession,
with
damages,
against
Gregoria’s
heirs
and
alleged
that
on
several
occasions,
he
demanded
the
partition
of
the
property
but
Gregoria’s
heirs
refused
to
heed
his
demands
and
Gregoria’s
heirs
claimed
sole
ownership
of
the
property.
Among
others,
he
further
alleged
that
portions
of
the
property
were
sold
to
Tresvalles
and
Tajonera,
which
portions
must
be
collated
and
included
as
part
of
the
portion
to
be
awarded
to
Gregoria’s
heirs
and
that
the
husband
of
the
petitioner
Teodora,
illegally
claimed
absolute
ownership
of
the
property
which
have
deprived
him
of
the
fruits
of
the
property.
Other
heirs
claimed
in
their
answer
that
Leonardo
had
no
cause
of
action
against
them
and
that
they
have
become
the
sole
owners
of
the
subject
property
through
continuous,
actual,
adverse,
notorious
and
exclusive
possession
of
the
property
with
a
just
title.
Leonardo
passed
away
and
was
duly
substituted
by
his
heirs,
the
respondents
herein.
Leonardo
action
for
partition
was
dismissed
and
referred
to
MTC.
The
property
was
allegedly
sold
by
Leon
to
Enriquez
through
an
unnotarized
document
who
in
turn
allegedly
sold
the
property
to
Lucimo
Sr.
Petitioners
were
in
sole
possession
of
the
property
for
more
than
30
years,
while
Leonardo
acquired
custody
of
OCT.
Lucimo
Sr.
executed
an
Affidavit
of
Ownership
of
Land
claiming
sole
ownership
of
the
property
which
he
utilized
to
secure
in
his
name
Tax
Declaration
over
the
property.
Lucimo
Sr.
died
in
199
and
the
property
was
partitioned
among
the
petitioners,
to
the
exclusion
of
Leonardo.
Issue:
Is
Lucimo
Sr.’s
execution
of
the
Affidavit
of
Ownership
of
Land
in
1979
amounted
to
a
repudiation
of
his
co-‐ownership
of
the
property
with
Leonardo
hence
his
action
for
partition
is
barred
by
prescription
and
laches?
Held:
No.
The
finding
that
Leon
did
not
sell
the
property
to
Lucimo
Sr.
had
long
been
settled
and
had
become
final
for
failure
of
petitioners
to
appeal.
Thus,
the
property
remained
part
of
Leon’s
estate.
Thus,
petitioners’
insistence
on
Lucimo
Sr.’s
1943
purchase
of
the
property
to
reinforce
their
claim
over
the
property
must
be
ignored.
Since
no
transfer
from
Leon
to
Lucimo
Sr.
took
place,
the
subject
property
clearly
remained
part
of
Leon’s
estate
upon
his
passing
in
1962.
83
x
x
x
Leon
died
without
issue;
his
heirs
are
his
siblings
Romana
and
Gregoria.
Gregoria’s
and
Romana’s
heirs
are
co-‐owners
of
the
subject
property.
Thus,
having
succeeded
to
the
property
as
heirs
of
Gregoria
and
Romana,
petitioners
and
respondents
became
co-‐owners
thereof.
As
co-‐owners,
they
may
use
the
property
owned
in
common,
provided
they
do
so
in
accordance
with
the
purpose
for
which
it
is
intended
and
in
such
a
way
as
not
to
injure
the
interest
of
the
co-‐ownership
or
prevent
the
other
co-‐owners
from
using
it
according
to
their
rights.
They
have
the
full
ownership
of
their
parts
and
of
the
fruits
and
benefits
pertaining
thereto,
and
may
alienate,
assign
or
mortgage
them,
and
even
substitute
another
person
in
their
enjoyment,
except
when
personal
rights
are
involved.
Each
co-‐owner
may
demand
at
any
time
the
partition
of
the
thing
owned
in
common,
insofar
as
his
share
is
concerned.
Finally,
no
prescription
shall
run
in
favor
of
one
of
the
co-‐
heirs
against
the
others
so
long
as
he
expressly
or
impliedly
recognizes
the
co-‐ownership.
x
x
x
For
prescription
to
set
in,
the
repudiation
must
be
done
by
a
co-‐owner.
“A
co-‐owner
cannot
acquire
by
prescription
the
share
of
the
other
co-‐owners,
absent
any
clear
repudiation
of
the
co-‐ownership.
In
order
that
the
title
may
prescribe
in
favor
of
a
co-‐owner,
the
following
requisites
must
concur:
(1)
the
co-‐owner
has
performed
unequivocal
acts
of
repudiation
amounting
to
an
ouster
of
the
other
co-‐
owners;
(2)
such
positive
acts
of
repudiation
have
been
made
known
to
the
other
co-‐owners;
and
(3)
the
evidence
thereof
is
clear
and
convincing.”
In
fine,
since
none
of
the
co-‐owners
made
a
valid
repudiation
of
the
existing
co-‐ownership,
Leonardo
could
seek
partition
of
the
property
at
any
time.
84
Heirs
of
Magdaleno
Ypon
vs.
Gaudioso
Ponteras
Ricaforte
a.k.a.
“Gaudioso
E.
Ypon”
G.R.
No.
198680
July
8,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Perlas-‐Bernabe
Topic:
Determination
of
Heirship
in
Special
Proceeding
Facts:
Petitioners,
together
with
some
of
their
cousins
filed
a
complaint
for
Cancellation
of
Title
and
Reconveyance
with
Damages
against
respondent
Gaudioso
Ponteras
Ricaforte.
They
alleged
that
Magdaleno
died
intestate
and
childless
but
left
various
real
estate
properties.
They
are
claiming
to
be
the
sole
heir
of
Magdaleno
but
Gaudioso
executed
an
Affidavit
of
Self-‐Adjudication
and
caused
the
cancellation
certificates
of
title
that
lead
to
subsequent
transfer
in
his
name
which
to
the
prejudice
of
petitioners
who
are
Magdaleno’s
collateral
relatives
and
successors-‐in-‐interest.
In
his
answer,
Gaudioso
claimed
to
be
the
lawful
son.
Issue:
Can
the
determination
of
heirship
be
made
in
an
ordinary
action
for
recovery
of
ownership
and/or
possession?
Held:
No.
Matters
relating
to
the
rights
of
filiation
and
heirship
must
be
ventilated
in
the
proper
probate
court
in
a
special
proceeding
instituted
precisely
for
the
purpose
of
determining
such
rights.―In
the
case
of
Heirs
of
Teofilo
Gabatan
v.
CA
(2009),
the
Court
held
that
the
determination
of
who
are
the
decedent’s
lawful
heirs
must
be
made
in
the
proper
special
proceeding
for
such
purpose,
and
not
in
an
ordinary
suit
for
recovery
of
ownership
and/or
possession,
as
in
this
case:
Jurisprudence
dictates
that
the
determination
of
who
are
the
legal
heirs
of
the
deceased
must
be
made
in
the
proper
special
proceedings
in
court,
and
not
in
an
ordinary
suit
for
recovery
of
ownership
and
possession
of
property.
This
must
take
precedence
over
the
action
for
recovery
of
possession
and
ownership.
The
Court
has
consistently
ruled
that
the
trial
court
cannot
make
a
declaration
of
heirship
in
the
civil
action
for
the
reason
that
such
a
declaration
can
only
be
made
in
a
special
proceeding.
x
x
x
In
the
early
case
of
Litam,
et
al.
v.
Rivera,
this
Court
ruled
that
the
declaration
of
heirship
must
be
made
in
a
special
proceeding,
and
not
in
an
independent
civil
action.
This
doctrine
was
reiterated
in
Solivio
v.
Court
of
Appeals
x
x
x:
In
the
more
recent
case
of
Milagros
Joaquino
v.
Lourdes
Reyes,
the
Court
reiterated
its
ruling
that
matters
relating
to
the
rights
of
filiation
and
heirship
must
be
ventilated
in
the
proper
probate
court
in
a
special
proceeding
instituted
precisely
for
the
purpose
of
determining
such
rights.
Citing
the
case
of
Agapay
v.
Palang,
this
Court
held
that
the
status
of
an
illegitimate
child
who
claimed
to
be
an
heir
to
a
decedent’s
estate
could
not
be
adjudicated
in
an
ordinary
civil
action
which,
as
in
this
case,
was
for
the
recovery
of
property.
85
x
x
x
By
way
of
exception,
the
need
to
institute
a
separate
special
proceeding
for
the
determination
of
heirship
may
be
dispensed
with
for
the
sake
of
practicality,
as
when
the
parties
in
the
civil
case
had
voluntarily
submitted
the
issue
to
the
trial
court
and
already
presented
their
evidence
regarding
the
issue
of
heirship,
and
the
Regional
Trial
Court
had
consequently
rendered
judgment
thereon,
or
when
a
special
proceeding
had
been
instituted
but
had
been
finally
closed
and
terminated,
and
hence,
cannot
be
re-‐opened.
However,
in
this
case,
none
of
the
foregoing
exceptions,
or
those
of
similar
nature,
appear
to
exist.
86
Heirs
of
Dr.
Mariano
Favis
Sr.
vs.
Juana
Gonzales
G.R.
No.
185922
January
15,
2014
Ponente:
J.
Perez
Topic:
Donation
Inter
Vivos
Facts:
Dr.
Favis
was
married
to
Capitolina
Aguilar
with
whom
he
had
7
children
named
Purita,
Reynaldo,
Consolacion,
Mariano,
Esther,
Mercedes
and
Nelly.
When
Capitolina
died,
Dr.
Favis
took
Juana
as
his
common-‐law
wife
with
whom
he
sired
one
child,
Mariano.
When
Dr.
Favis
got
married
to
Juana,
he
executed
an
affidavit
acknowledging
Mariano
as
one
of
his
legitimate
children.
Mariano
was
married
to
Larcelita
with
whom
he
has
four
children,
named:
Ma.
Theresa
Joana,
Ma.
Cristina,
James
Mark,
and
Ma.
Thea.
On
July
29,
1995,
Dr.
Favis
died
of
cardiopulmonary
arrest
secondary
to
multi-‐organ/system
failure
secondary
to
sepsis
secondary
to
pneumonia.
He
died
intestate
and
left
the
following
properties:
a
parcel
of
residential
land,
a
commercial
building
erected
on
the
said
land,
another
parcel
of
residential
land,
a
house,
a
parcel
of
orchard
land.
Before
he
died,
he
allegedly
executed
a
Deed
of
Donation
transferring
and
conveying
properties
in
favor
of
his
grandchildren
with
Juana.
Which
was
claimed
to
prejudiced
petitioners’
legitime,
hence
the
filing
of
an
action
for
annulment
of
the
Deed
of
Donation,
inventory,
liquidation
and
partition
of
property
before
the
RTC
of
Vigan,
Ilocos
Sur.
Issue:
Is
the
Deed
of
Donation
void
for
it
was
executed
not
under
the
fullness
of
faculties
of
the
donor?
Held:
Yes.
The
issue
of
the
validity
of
donation
was
fully
litigated
and
discussed
by
the
trial
court.
Indeed,
the
trial
court's
findings
were
placed
at
issue
before
the
Court
of
Appeals
but
the
appellate
court
chose
to
confine
its
review
to
the
procedural
aspect.
In
addressing
first
the
procedural
issue,
the
facts
of
the
case
show
that
compromise
was
never
an
option
insofar
as
the
respondents
were
concerned.
The
impossibility
of
compromise
instead
of
litigation
was
shown
not
alone
by
the
absence
of
a
motion
to
dismiss
but
on
the
respondents’
insistence
on
the
validity
of
the
donation
in
their
favor
of
the
subject
properties.
Nor
could
it
have
been
otherwise
because
the
Pre-‐trial
Order
specifically
limited
the
issues
to
the
validity
of
the
deed
and
whether
or
not
respondent
Juana
and
Mariano
are
compulsory
heirs
of
Dr.
Favis.
The
Court
of
Appeals
ignored
the
facts
of
the
case
that
clearly
demonstrated
the
refusal
by
the
respondents
to
compromise.
Instead
it
ordered
the
dismissal
of
petitioner’s
complaint
on
the
ground
that
it
did
not
allege
what
in
fact
was
shown
during
the
trial.
The
error
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
is
patent.
87
x
x
x
Dr.
Mariano
Favis,
Sr.
during
the
execution
of
the
Deed
of
Donation
was
already
92
years
old;
living
with
the
defendants
and
those
years
from
1993
to
1995
were
the
critical
years
when
he
was
sick
most
of
the
time.
In
short,
he’s
dependent
on
the
care
of
his
housemates
particularly
the
members
of
his
family.
It
is
the
contention
of
the
defendants
though
that
Dr.
Mariano
Favis,
Sr.
had
full
control
of
his
mind
during
the
execution
of
the
Deed
of
Donation
because
at
that
time,
he
could
go
on
with
the
regular
way
of
life
or
could
perform
his
daily
routine
without
the
aid
of
anybody
like
taking
a
bath,
eating
his
meals,
reading
the
newspaper,
watching
television,
go
to
the
church
on
Sundays,
walking
down
the
plaza
to
exercise
and
most
importantly
go
to
the
cockpit
arena
and
bet.
Dr.
Ofelia
Adapon,
a
neurology
expert
however,
testified
that
a
person
suffering
from
Parkinson’s
disease
when
he
goes
to
the
cockpit
does
not
necessarily
mean
that
such
person
has
in
full
control
of
his
mental
faculties
because
anyone,
even
a
retarded
person,
a
person
who
has
not
studied
and
have
no
intellect
can
go
to
the
cockpit
and
bet.
One
can
do
everything
but
do
not
have
control
of
his
mind.
x
x
x
That
Hiatal
Hernia
creeps
in
very
insidiously,
one
is
not
sure
especially
if
the
person
has
not
complained
and
no
examination
was
done.
It
could
be
there
for
the
last
time
and
no
one
will
know.
x
x
x.
The
correctness
of
the
finding
was
not
touched
by
the
Court
of
Appeals.
The
respondents
opted
to
rely
only
on
what
the
appellate
court
considered,
erroneously
though,
was
a
procedural
infirmity.
The
trial
court's
factual
finding,
therefore,
stands
unreversed;
and
respondents
did
not
provide
us
with
any
argument
to
have
it
reversed.
88
Cerila
J.
Calanasan
vs.
Spouses
Virgilio
Dolorito
and
Evelyn
c.
Dolorito
G.R.
No.
171937
November
25,
2013
Ponente:
J.
Brion
Topic:
Donation
Facts:
Cerila
took
care
of
her
orphan
niece,
Evelyn,
since
the
latter
was
a
child
and
when
Evelyn
was
already
married
to
Virgilio,
Cerila
donated
to
Evelyn
a
parcel
of
land
which
had
earlier
been
mortgaged
for
P15,000.00.
The
donation
was
conditional
that
Evelyn
must
redeem
the
land
and
the
petitioner
was
entitled
to
possess
and
enjoy
the
property
as
long
as
she
lived.
Evelyn
redeemed
the
property,
had
the
title
of
the
land
transferred
to
her
name,
and
granted
the
Cerila
usufructuary
rights
over
the
donated
land.
Soon
after,
Cerila
filed
a
complaint
that
Evelyn
had
committed
acts
of
ingratitude
against
her
and
prayed
that
her
donation
be
revoked.
Cerila
died
while
the
case
was
pending
with
the
RTC.
Respondents
filed
a
demurrer
to
evidence
because
the
petitioner
failed
to
prove
that
it
was
Evelyn
who
committed
acts
of
ingratitude
against
the
petitioner,
thus,
Article
765
of
the
New
Civil
Code
found
no
application
in
the
case.
Issue:
Is
Article
765
of
the
New
Civil
Code
applicable
in
determining
if
there
was
a
valid
revocation
of
donation
or
not
in
the
case?
Held:
No.
Rules
of
contract
govern
the
onerous
portion
of
donation;
rules
of
donation
only
apply
to
the
excess,
if
any.
x
x
x
In
Republic
of
the
Phils.
v.
Silim,
we
classified
donations
according
to
purpose.
A
pure/simple
donation
is
the
truest
form
of
donation
as
it
is
based
on
pure
gratuity.
The
remuneratory/compensatory
type
has
for
its
purpose
the
rewarding
of
the
donee
for
past
services,
which
services
do
not
amount
to
a
demandable
debt.
A
conditional/modal
donation,
on
the
other
hand,
is
a
consideration
for
future
services;
it
also
occurs
where
the
donor
imposes
certain
conditions,
limitations
or
charges
upon
the
donee,
whose
value
is
inferior
to
the
donation
given.
Lastly,
an
onerous
donation
imposes
upon
the
donee
a
reciprocal
obligation;
this
is
made
for
a
valuable
consideration
whose
cost
is
equal
to
or
more
than
the
thing
donated.
x
x
x
Since
the
donation
imposed
on
the
donee
the
burden
of
redeeming
the
property
for
P15,000.00,
the
donation
was
onerous.
As
an
endowment
for
a
valuable
consideration,
it
partakes
of
the
nature
of
an
ordinary
contract;
hence,
the
rules
of
contract
will
govern
and
Article
765
of
the
New
Civil
Code
finds
no
application
with
respect
to
the
onerous
portion
of
the
donation.
89
Insofar
as
the
value
of
the
land
exceeds
the
redemption
price
paid
for
by
the
donee,
a
donation
exists,
and
the
legal
provisions
on
donation
apply.
Nevertheless,
despite
the
applicability
of
the
provisions
on
donation
to
the
gratuitous
portion,
the
petitioner
may
not
dissolve
the
donation.
She
has
no
factual
and
legal
basis
for
its
revocation,
as
aptly
established
by
the
RTC.
First,
the
ungrateful
acts
were
committed
not
by
the
donee;
it
was
her
husband
who
committed
them.
Second,
the
ungrateful
acts
were
perpetrated
not
against
the
donor;
it
was
the
petitioner’s
sister
who
received
the
alleged
ill
treatments.
These
twin
considerations
place
the
case
out
of
the
purview
of
Article
765
of
the
New
Civil
Code.
90
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